Constantino vs Mendez GR 57227 May 14, 1992J. Bidin

Facts:Amelita Constantino was a waitress at Tony’s restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and there she met Ivan Mendez sometime in August 1974. The next day, she was invited by Ivan to dine with him at Hotel Enrico and courted her. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. He later on confessed that he is a married man. Despite this, they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974 and as a result, Amelita got pregnant. She asked for support but Ivan refused to attend to her. Amelita claimed that she had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs. Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's restaurant but denied having carnal knowledge her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. After giving birth to Michael, Amelita filed an amended complaint.The trial court ruled in favor of Amelita and ordered Mendez to pay her the damages and to recognize her son Michael as his own illegitimate child.

Issue/s:Whether or not Michael should be recognized as Ivan’s illegitimate child and should Amelita be entitled to damages.

Held:The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed. Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974 is inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. She also admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and the repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not promise of marriage was the reason that she allowed to submit herself to Ivan. Therefore she is not entitled to damages. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Concepcion vs CAGR 123450 August 31, 2005J. Corona

Facts:Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989. Aftewhich, they lived with Theresa’s parents in Fairview, Quezon City.  Almost a year late, Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Their relationship was shortlived. In 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.He alleged that Theresa has a subsisting marriage with one Mario Gopiao who was still alive. Theresa admitted it but she said that the marriage was obtained through fraud and she has never lived with Mario. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.She felt betrayed and humiliated and asked to cancel the visitation rights and change her son’s from Concepcion to Almonte. Gerardo opposed the motion.  He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname.

Issue/s:Whether or not Jose Gerardo is the legitimate son of Mario or the illegitimate son of Gerardo.

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Held:The presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them and for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity.  It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children as legitimate status is more favorable to the child. Meanwhile the birth certificate of Jose Gerardo was not given weight as evidence; a record of birth is merely  prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. The court declared that as a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa. The petition is denied.

Eceta vs EcetaGR 157037 May 20, 2004J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts:Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926 and had a son, Vicente.The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property located in Cubao,Quezon City. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. Vicente died in 1977, but he had an illegitimate child, Ma. Theresa. Thus, his compulsory heirs were his mother and Ma. Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for Partition and Accounting with Damages against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.

Issue/s:Whether or not Theresa is entitled to be Rosalina’s co-owner and co-heir in the disputed property.

Held:Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate.  Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter.By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. Rosalina Eceta also admitted that Ma. Theresa is her granddaughter. Therefore, she is in no doubt an illegitimate daughter of Vicente and is entitled to be a co-owner and co-heir of Rosalina in the property.

Jison vs CAG.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998J. Davide Jr.

Facts:Monina Jison filed a complaint in the RTC alleging that Francisco had been married to one Lilia Lopez but impregnated Esperanza Amolar, the nanny of his daughter, and mother of Monina. And since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous and implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts. She also alleged that Francisco has been giving her support and provided for her education. In view of Francisco’s refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. Meanwhile, Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint because she was not anymore his employee at the time.  Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. Francisco contended that Monina had no cause of action against him and that her action was barred by prescription. He petitioned for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages.

Issue/s:Whether or not Monina had established evidence to prove that she is an illegitimate child of Francisco.

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Held:The positive testimonies of Monina and her witnesses all bearing on Francisco’s acts and/or conduct showing that he had continuously acknowledged Monina as his illegitimate daughter have not been successfully refuted.  Francisco’s vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of Monina’s testimonial evidence. The Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle well as the Baptismal Certificates which the trial court admitted in evidence as part of Monina’s testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to further reinforce her claim as an illegitimate daughter of Francisco by Esperanza Amolar. Also, if Monina was not truly the illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.  Francisco merely consists of denials and failed to present sufficient evidence, thus, his petition is denied.

Bernabe vs AlejoG.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002J. Panganiban

Facts: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. When Ernesto Bernabe and his legal wife Rosalina, died, the only heir left is Erestina. Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his father’s estate. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The trial court declared that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.

Issue: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son.

Held: According to the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The petition is hereby denied.

Conde vs AbayaGR 4275 March 23, 1909CJ Arellano

Facts:Casiano Abaya died unmarried in April 1899. Roman Abaya, his brother and administrator of his estate appealed on the decision of the Court of First Instance, giving Paula Conde sole hereditary rights to the inheritance of his brother. Paula Conde is the mother of Casiano’s natural children, Jose and Teopista. In reply to the foregoing motion of Roman Abaya, Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof. She would like to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child under the old Civil Code.

Issues:Whether Conde, as the mother of the presumed natural child, after his/her death may bring an action to acknowledge the deceased child as a natural child.

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Held:The petition for acknowledgment will not prosper on the ground that the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy may be transmitted to his heirs only in the event that the child dies during minority or in a state of insanity. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in cases where the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority. And if, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged. The case at bar did not qualify, not even as exception. Therefore, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.

Teotico vs Del ValGR 18753 March 26, 1965J. Angelo Bautista

Facts:Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died in Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish where she affixed her signature on every page. The said will was acknowledged before a notary public by the testatrix and her witnesses. Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, husband of her niece Josefina. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will in the CFI of Manila. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of the deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear. Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene.

Issue/s:Whether or not the oppositor Del Val has a legal personality to intervene in a probate proceeding.

Held:It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, she would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. The case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim, et al.GR168992-93 May 21, 2009J. Carpio

Facts:

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Petitioner, an optometrist, married Primo Lim but they were childless. Lucia Ayuban entrusted them minor children whom they registered to make it appear that they are the parents. The children were named Michelle and Michael Jude. They took care of the children and sent them to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records and documents. When Primo Lim died, the petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent and so with Michael. Olario likewise executed the same.  In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. The trial court dismissed the petitions.

Issue/s:Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

Held:Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt In Section 7, Article III of RA 8552, the use of the word “shall” means that  joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen, mere giving of consent is not sufficient. Also, petitioner does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. The petition is dismissed.

Javier vs Lucero Gr L-6706 March 29, 1954J. Bengzon

Facts:Plaintiff Salud Arca was married to Alfredo Javier in Manila; they have a son, Alfredo Javier Jr. Alfredo went to the United States to join the US Navy. Salud was left to live with Alfredo’s parents but she moved to Cavite due to incompatibility. When the spouses’ relationship became strained, Alfredo filed for a divorce decree in the Circuit Court of Alabama. In her answer, Salud contended that her husband is not a resident of the said state and that the same does not support her and their son. Nevertheless, the court decreed dissolution. Later on, Alfredo married American citizen Thelma Francis and bought a house in New York City but they also divorced. He returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina. Salud Arca filed a case of bigamy against Alfredo. The respondent judge (Lucero) asked him to give his wife and son a monthly allowance of 60 pesos. Alfredo contended that Arca is not anymore his wife and their son is already over 21 years old to be supported. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied

Issue/s:Whether or not respondent judge ordered issue with grave abuse of discretion.

Held:The court declared that while it is true that Alfredo Javier Jr. has reached the age of majority, support may still be given support in order to enable him to complete his education for same trade or profession. Regarding with the support for the wife, she would only lose her privilege if her accusation is found to be false. In this case, it was proven that the husband committed bigamy for contracting a third marriage without having the first dissolved. He was only acquitted for lack of criminal intent. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate the grievous mistake of the respondent judge.

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