Persons- 3rd Batch 147-148
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Transcript of Persons- 3rd Batch 147-148
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CASES UNDER ARTICLE 147
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG,J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error
committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner
avers that the court a quohas failed to apply the correct law that should govern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared
void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both
parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten
during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez
sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the
trial court,1in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential
marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela
Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who
are in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common propertiesas defined byArticle 147of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles 50, 51, and 52of the same
code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages.2(Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the
Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the
hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint af fidavit expressing their desire to
remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
n an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides
that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant willown their "family home"and all their properties for that matte
equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaint
and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.3(Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petiti
and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property
regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by therules on owners
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application
since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidatio
the absolute community of property.4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied
30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of
Family Code should be held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendothat Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab
initioon the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same ma
read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children w
to stay.5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;6it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each othelive exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned b
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through the
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, wor
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Ar
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition there
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
the household.
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Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivosof his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The
term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacityof a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
n Articles 37 and 38"7
of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union isprima faciepresumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
ointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."8Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has
clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides
that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivoshis or her share in co-
ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her
share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or
waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent
party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation9
ordeclaration of nullity of the marriage.
10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when
they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however,
areprima faciepresumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner already heretofore expressed.11
n deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of theparties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must
be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential
matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the
Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,12of the
Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43,13relates o
by its explicit terms, to voidablemarriages and, exceptionally, to void marriag
under Article 4014
of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes t
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the ve
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now
requiring forpurposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgme
of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not the
illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 4115and 42, 16o
the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriagecontracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicablepro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law
also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the othe
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordai
on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisio
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 199
the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA,Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondent
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA,Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,Respondent
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA,J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which
was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herei
respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of cour
amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychological
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In respon
respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispos
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979
null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2
million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from
the date of this decision plus attorneys fees ofP100,000.00;
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3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation
of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent
(50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12%
nterest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount ofP15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as
the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden
family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries
of properties.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case
was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase
the P15,000 monthly supportpendente liteof their son Javy Singh Buenaventura.
Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such
ncident be set for oral argument.3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the
supportpendente liteto P20,000.4Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
questioning the said Resolution.5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing
petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts
decision.6Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From
the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution,
which increased the monthly support for the son.7Petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorarito question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8and the Petition
for Certiorari9were ordered consolidated by this Court.
10
n the Petition for Review on Certioraripetitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6%
NTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL
BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES ANDP50,000.00 EXPENSES
OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF ORP1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM
THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE
DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH S
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTI
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES
MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO
WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM,
BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS
PERSON.11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSE
SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SO
FOR HEARING.12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS
MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT
PRESENT PRICES.13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPO
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS
THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,0
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulate
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained fro
the testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee bu
likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of
Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-
appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to he
that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of prid
married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as
fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable t
relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, a
father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in tim
trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee an
their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation;
the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the
parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike t
arising from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequencmarriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no dec
case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or
performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no
award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral an
exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, i
the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half o
what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the
court.16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 2
the Civil Code, which read as follows:
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ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
s contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917of the Civil Code
enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions
Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the
ndividual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the
act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed
that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and
freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and
void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of
the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest onlyafter its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
ncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriagewhich, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
ove, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
ncapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. . . .18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner
after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a
product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of
acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
nto the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this
case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly
ncognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as
a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the
petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent
was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of
exemplary damages cannot stand s ince the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages are imposed in additionto moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.19
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the tria
court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as i
this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigat
and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where
Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of li tigat
should be recovered. (par. 11)20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is f
justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court
likewise fully justified.21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his
psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment
his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private responde
to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psycholog ical incapacity,
which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of mor
and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees an
expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co.
the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the asse
the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the
marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of null
of marriage carries ipso factoa judgment for the liquidation of property
(Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCR
pp. 572573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it
ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the f inal judgm
therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of theproperties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children a
the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all prop
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presum
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art.
Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal
partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one
the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or bo
of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage
the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of
each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an
inventory of what are the parties conjugal properties and what are the exclu
properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this cas
that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-Presid
of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from th
said bank in the amount ofP3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions
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amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount ofP3,675,335.79 and actually
paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts
or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation
pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case,
however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had
there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share
n the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the
plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered byT.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor
of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12,
1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was
actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past support.
n reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the
plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of
iquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here,
what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant
so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half
was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of hershare in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be
given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the
plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been
obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said
defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For
the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of
stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident
Group of Companies.22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for
him to give one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank &
Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in
the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the
Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise
Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is
dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the
separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East
Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for
the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants service for the
bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-
appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the
outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the
time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half
thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court.23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage,
the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family
Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule
applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of
equal co-ownership.
InValdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24
this Court expou
on the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spou
and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each othe
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned b
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through the
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, wor
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Ar
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition there
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivosof his or her share
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without th
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their comm
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination o
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, sufferinno legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husb
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the
capacityof a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age o
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their workand industryshall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have bee
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed the
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the fa
household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the coupleseparate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clar
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her
share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the
period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or he
share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default there
waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong t
the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innoce
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party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
n deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must
be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern
the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
atter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the
co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidablemarriages and, exceptionally,
to voidmarriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
atter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish theirnullity. In now requiring forpurposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by
final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims
to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage.
t is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicablepro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has
also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in
the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of
Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless,
even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code
on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family
Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found,
both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the
union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits
of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
nvolved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a
quoshould, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age
on May 27, 200526
and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these
would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its
Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for
Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted.
The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner
from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in
Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but
on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownersh
and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decis
and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari(G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court
Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which
increased the supportpendente litein favor of the parties son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006
JOHN ABING,petitioner,
vs.
JULIET WAEYAN,respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Co
petitioner John Abing (John, hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision1datedOctober 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675, rever
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which affirmed a
earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in a
ejectment suit thereat commenced by the petitioner against the respondent
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the
good old days, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Later, they par
ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common
properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met
fell in love with each other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. Together, the couple bought a 2-storey
residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot own
by a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Conseque
the purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the
name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She wou
send money to John who deposited the same in their joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it w
annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure a
the sari-saristore thereat are the properties involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She man
the sari-saristore while John worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto
Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence,
decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed on Octo
7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left
unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under thei
unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying
the amount of P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. O
the same dateOctober 7, 1995Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 b
way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be pa
by Juliet in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.
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Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John
demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-saristore. Juliet
refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her before the MTC of
Mankayan, Benguet.
n his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the
annex structure with his own funds and thru money he borrowed from his
relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the structure was under
his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject
structure, which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the
atter's failure to pay the agreed balance due him under the
aforementionedMemorandum of Agreement
.
n her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their
common funds and that the subject structure annexed thereto was merely an
attachment or an extension of their original residential house, hence the same
pertained to the two of them in common.
n a decision2dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used
n the construction of the structure in question solely came from John, ruled that
the same exclusively pertained to the latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet's
eviction therefrom, including the sari-saristore thereat, and required her to
surrender possession thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and against the
defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in litigation
covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of the Plaintiff and
turn over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P2,500.00 a
month from the time she withheld possession of the store in litigation in June
1996 until she vacates the same and turn over possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by way
of Attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995, affirmed
that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24,
2000,3reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby reversed and set as ide. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to
possess the property and maintain therein her business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
t is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties
which must be divided between them upon the termination of their common law
relationship.
xxx xxx xxx
. . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code
on conjugal partnership... but by the rule on co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
. . the parties' share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during
their cohabitation shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary.
To the CA, John's evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the
construction of the annex structure. Hence, the same pertained to both, and
being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted therefrom, adding that if e
John's cause of action should have been for a sum of money "because he clai
that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension." According to the CA
ejectment cannot lie against Juliet because Juliet's possession of the premise
dispute was not by virtue of a contract, express or implied, nor did she obtain
such possession thru force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John's present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreementwhich should
been binding between them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-sari
store) is owned by the two of them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a separa
action for partition even as the community character of the subject premises
not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not th
property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner
John. Departing from the factual findings of the two courts before it, the CA
found that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, th
latter having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the mo
spent for the construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of
same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court norma
eschews from, yet, given the conflicting factual findings of the three courts
below, the Court shall go by the exception4to the general rule and proceed t
make its own assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as
husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage. Neithe
it disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked
thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint accoIn fact, Juliet was still in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and mone
borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structur
evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John even failed to
reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the
alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount o
money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money in putti
up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Maca
to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Maca
stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said
amount from him. With the petitioner's own admission that the subject struc
was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he borrowed P30,000.00 froMacaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he allegedly borrowed fro
the latter went into the construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is no
that while petitioner was able to present in evidence the Macaraeg affidavit,
failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from whom h
claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative came
forward to confirm petitioner's tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support petitioner's self-serving allegation th
the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was put up thru his own
funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the ta
declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and
again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of
claims of ownership.5Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more t
indicating possession in the concept of an owner.6Neither tax receipts nor
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declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.7
n this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
ive exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
n the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
ndustry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property
acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed
to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And
under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares."
Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by
the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True it is that under Article 4878of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action
for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of a common property. It bears stressing, however, that in
this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive
ownership of the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession
thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject
structure and the sari-saristore thereat by virtue of her being a co-owner
thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as
John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of
Agreement, being unsigned by Juliet and John, has no binding effect betweenthem.
t is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the
amount of P232,397.66, as initial payment for John's share in their common
properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable in twelve monthly
nstallments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of record that the
Agreement was signed by the witnesses thereto. Hence, the irrelevant
circumstances that the Agreement was left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot
adversely affect its binding force or effect between them, as evidently, Juliet's
nitial payment of P232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had
agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliet's failure
to pay John the balance of the latter's share in their common properties could at
best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of
the said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIEDand the assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED,
except that portion thereof denying effect to the parties' Memorandum of
Agreement for being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.,petitioner,
vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL,respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR.,J.:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on Janua
19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen
Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon
located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-
101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, T
No. 1562831of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was issued in the name o
Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After tr
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31
1995, a Decision,2declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the sam
decision, the RTC, inter alia,ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex
spouses conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple go
their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Olive
obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust C
(Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including
involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florenci
submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy o
marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" t
Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor o
Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, b
did not incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiatedforeclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office o
the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the
publication of the notice of sale on three issues of Remate.3At the auction sa
January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000
before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortg
of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually ra
to Branch 65 of the court. In i t, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is
conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in itsAnswer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,4alleged that th
disputed lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metroba
also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, w
subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001, judgmen
finding for Nicholson. Thefalloreads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real estate
mortgage on the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the Registry of Dee
for the City of Makati as well as all proceedings thereon null and void.
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The Court further orders defendants [Metrobank and Florencia] jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff [Nicholson]:
1. PhP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. PhP75,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
3. The costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said
ot to be conjugal, the same having been acquired during the existence of themarriage of Nicholson and Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the
Family Code, providing that "all property acquired during the marriage, whether
the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved." To the trial court, Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive
conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the RTC concluded that the
disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without
Nicholsons consent.
The RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be
fatally defective. For let alone the fact that Nicholson denied executing the same
and that the signature of the notarizing officer was a forgery, the waiver
document was allegedly executed on April 9, 1995 or a little over three months
before the issuance of the RTC decision declaring the nullity of marriage between
Nicholson and Florencia.
The trial court also declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith on account of
negligence, stating the observation that certain data appeared in the supporting
contract documents, which, if properly scrutinized, would have put the bank on
guard against approving the mortgage. Among the data referred to was the date
of execution of the deed of waiver.
The RTC dismissed Metrobanks counterclaim and cross-claim against the ex-
spouses.
Metrobanks motion for reconsideration was denied. Undeterred, Metrobank
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74874.
The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTCs Decision
On January 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision affirmatory of that of the RTC,
except for the award therein of moral damages and attorneys fees which the CA
ordered deleted. The dispositive portion of the CAs Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the award of moral damages and attorneys
fees which is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.6
Like the RTC earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to overthrow the
presumption established in Art. 116 of the Family Code. And also decreed as
going against Metrobank was Florencias failure to comply with the prescriptions
of the succeeding Art. 124 of the Code on the disposition of conjugal partnership
property. Art. 124 states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy x x x.
n the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
n the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, a
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spo
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
As to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees, the CA
gist, held that Metrobank did not enter into the mortgage contract out of ill-w
or for some fraudulent purpose, moral obliquity, or like dishonest considerat
as to justify damages.
Metrobank moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA.
Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, ra
the following issues for consideration:
a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity
marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga i
factodissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value.7
Our Ruling
A modification of the CAs Decision is in order.
The Disputed Property is Conjugal
It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing t
"[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partner
unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife
applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of governing
application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage before
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. CitingManongsong v.
Estimo,8Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal ownership unde
Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the
presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to
prove that not only was the property acquired during the marriage but that
conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden Nicholson allegedly fa
to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property,
Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals9andJocson v. Court of
Appeals,10among other cases, where this Court held that a property register
the name of a certain person with a description of being married is no proof t
the property was acquired during the spouses marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation11
and Wong v. IAC,12
contends that Metrobank failed to overcom
legal presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He asserts that
Metrobanks arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only
postulate needs to be shown for the presumption in favor of conjugal owners
to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses,
inapplicable, FranciscoandJocson,noting that they are relevant only when th
is no indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property alleged to b
conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had
virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three
instances. The first was when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Cas
No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as "spouses" in
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petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Then came the published
notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again designated as co-
mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter13to vacate the disputed lot,
Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as "spouses," albeit the finality of
the decree of nullity of marriage between them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First,while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art.
116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was
acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that,
before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a showing
that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds.Contrary to
Metrobanks submission, the Court did not, inManongsong,14
add the matter of
the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for the presumption of
conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a
necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal
presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed
n Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This
article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of thepartnership.The presumption applies even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear.15
(Emphasis supplied.)
Second,FranciscoandJocsondo not reinforce Metrobanks theory. Metrobank
would thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the
registration of the property in the name of "Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson
Pascual" operates to describe only the marital status of the title holder, but not
as proof that the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the
acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The correct lesson
of Francisco andJocsonis that proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is
a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugalownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by
the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that
the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.16
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding
Metrobank having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to
question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the
former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of F lorencia or
her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve
nto the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised only for the first time in
this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was designated below does not really
change, one way or another, the classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime doesnot ipso factoEnd the Nature of Conjugal Ownership