Cefic Workshop Good Practices for Ship Vetting Brussels 12 October 2011.
Personnel security guidelines - Vetting practices
Transcript of Personnel security guidelines - Vetting practices
Personnel security guidelines Vetting Practices
Approved November 2014 Amended December 2017
Version 1.4
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Document details
Security classification Unclassified
Dissemination limiting marking
Publicly available
Date of next review
Authority Protective Security Policy Committee
Author
Protective Security Policy Section
Attorney-General’s Department
Document status Approved 4 November 2014
Amended April 2015
Amended June 2016
Replaces the Personnel Security Practitioners Guidelines Version 1.0 approved June 2010
Amended December 2017
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Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................1
1.1. Purpose ............................................................................................................................. 1
1.2. Audience............................................................................................................................ 1
1.3. Scope ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.4. Use of specific terms in these guidelines .......................................................................... 2
1.5. Vetting decisions/clearance status: .................................................................................. 2
1.6. Relationship to other documents ..................................................................................... 4
1.7. References to legislation in these guidelines .................................................................... 4
1.7.1 Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) ................................................................................... 4
1.7.2 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ............................................................................................. 4
1.7.3 Archives Act 1983 (Cth) ........................................................................................... 4
1.7.4 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ................................. 5
1.8. Avoiding bias and conflict of interest ................................................................................ 5
1.9. Sharing personal information ........................................................................................... 5
2. Competencies of vetting personnel ......................................................................................7
2.1 Assessing officer roles, qualifications and competencies ................................................. 7
2.1.1 Role of the assessing officer .................................................................................... 7
2.1.2 Additional duties for assessing officers ................................................................... 8
2.1.3 Qualifications for assessing officers ........................................................................ 8
2.1.4 Competencies of an assessing officer ...................................................................... 8
2.1.5 Ongoing assessment of competencies .................................................................... 8
2.2 Vetting managers’ role, qualifications and competencies ................................................ 8
2.3 Delegates’ role, qualifications and competencies ............................................................ 9
2.4 Outsourced vetting service providers ............................................................................... 9
2.5 Provision of training .......................................................................................................... 9
3. Initiating a clearance process ............................................................................................. 10
3.1 Provisional access ............................................................................................................10
3.2 Recognising existing security clearances ........................................................................11
3.3 Clearance pack requirements .........................................................................................12
3.4 Non-compliance with the submission of clearance pack information............................12
4. Clearance processing ......................................................................................................... 13
4.1 Justifying information required in a security clearance ..................................................13
4.2 Confirming eligibility (citizenship and background) for a clearance ...............................13
4.2.1 Confirming Australian citizenship ..........................................................................13
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4.2.2 Confirming the clearance subject has a checkable background ...........................13
4.3 Gaps, anomalies and discrepancies (GADs) ....................................................................16
4.4 Supporting documents required for security clearances ................................................16
4.4.1 Authenticity of documents ....................................................................................17
4.4.2 Statutory Declarations of authenticity ..................................................................17
4.4.3 Translation of documents ......................................................................................19
4.4.4 Requesting additional information from the clearance subject ............................19
4.5 Basis for assessing results of checks ...............................................................................19
4.6 Vetting assessment checks ..............................................................................................21
4.6.1 Analysis of personal information ...........................................................................21
4.6.2 Financial history checks .........................................................................................22
4.6.3 Digital footprint checks .........................................................................................23
4.6.4 Security incident and breach history .....................................................................23
4.6.5 Integrity checks......................................................................................................23
4.6.6 Professional and personal referee reports ............................................................24
4.6.7 Interviews ..............................................................................................................26
4.6.8 Supplementary interviews .....................................................................................26
4.7 Supplementary checks ....................................................................................................27
4.7.1 Medical checks ......................................................................................................27
4.7.2 Mental health checks ............................................................................................27
4.7.3 Psychological assessment ......................................................................................28
4.7.4 Qualifications checks .............................................................................................28
4.7.5 Employment details ...............................................................................................28
4.8 ASIO security assessment, Police records check (PRC), and Immigration movements records check .............................................................................................................................29
4.8.1 ASIO security assessments .....................................................................................29
4.8.2 Police Records Checks ............................................................................................32
4.8.3 Australian entry/exit check ...................................................................................33
5. Personnel security adjudicative guidelines .......................................................................... 34
5.1 Suitability to hold a clearance .........................................................................................34
5.2 Factor Areas ....................................................................................................................35
5.2.1 External loyalties, influences and associations .....................................................36
5.2.2 Personal relationships and conduct ......................................................................40
5.2.3 Financial considerations ........................................................................................43
5.2.4 Alcohol and drug usage .........................................................................................44
5.2.5 Criminal history and conduct .................................................................................46
5.2.6 Security violations .................................................................................................47
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5.2.7 Emotional/Mental health issues............................................................................49
6. Assessing officers recommendation to the delegate............................................................ 51
6.1 Meeting the principles of procedural fairness ................................................................51
6.2 Procedural Fairness Guidelines .......................................................................................51
6.2.1 What is procedural fairness? .................................................................................51
6.2.2 Is there a difference between natural justice and procedural fairness? ...............52
6.2.3 Procedural fairness and security clearance decisions ...........................................52
6.2.4 How does procedural fairness apply to a clearance subject who may be negatively affected by a Delegate’s decision? ..................................................53
6.2.5 How does procedural fairness apply to an assessing officer? ...............................53
6.2.6 How does procedural fairness apply to the Delegate? ..........................................54
6.3 ASIO adverse or qualified security assessments .............................................................54
6.3.1 Attorney-General’s Certificate ...............................................................................54
6.4 Making a recommendation .............................................................................................54
6.4.1 Recommending a clearance with specific clearance maintenance requirements .55
6.4.2 Recommending against a clearance .....................................................................56
6.5 Quality assurance ............................................................................................................56
7. Delegate’s decision ............................................................................................................ 57
7.1 Approval conditional to specific clearance maintenance ...............................................57
7.2 Documenting the delegate’s decision and reasons ........................................................57
8. Advising the clearance subject and sponsoring agency of the clearance ............................... 58
8.1 Clearance subject notification requirements ..................................................................58
8.1.1 Additional requirements when a clearance is cancelled or denied .......................58
8.2 Sponsoring agency notification requirements ................................................................58
8.2.1 Where a clearance is denied or cancelled .............................................................59
9. Review or appeal of a clearance decision ............................................................................ 60
9.1 Reviewing clearance decisions ........................................................................................60
10. Clearance maintenance ...................................................................................................... 62
10.1 Specific clearance maintenance requirements ...............................................................62
10.1.1 Specific clearance maintenance arrangements ....................................................62
10.1.3 Outcomes of specific clearance maintenance .......................................................62
10.1.4 Advising the agency to withdraw access ...............................................................63
10.1.5 Advising the clearance holder of the outcome ......................................................63
10.2 Clearance revalidation ....................................................................................................63
10.3 Review for cause .............................................................................................................64
10.4 Upgrades to clearances ...................................................................................................65
11. Personal Security File management .................................................................................... 66
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11.1 Classification of PSFs .......................................................................................................66
11.2 Transferring PSFs .............................................................................................................66
11.2.1 Permanent transfer ...............................................................................................66
11.2.2 Temporary transfers ..............................................................................................67
11.2.3 Contractors’ PSFs ...................................................................................................68
11.2.4 Removal of police records checks and other third party information from PSFs on transfer ............................................................................................68
11.2.5 Addressing anomalies in PSFs ...............................................................................68
11.3 Access by clearance holders to their PSFs ......................................................................68
11.4 Disclosure of security risk to sponsoring agencies ..........................................................69
11.5 The Archives Act 1983 .....................................................................................................69
11.5.1 Disposal in accordance with the Archives Act .......................................................70
Annex A - Useful links ................................................................................................................71
Annex B - Documents that can be used as evidence of Australian citizenship .........................73
Annex C - Alternate proof of identity documents .....................................................................74
Annex D - Documents, checks and inquiries required for security clearances .........................76
Annex E – Sample Financial History Check Questionnaire ........................................................80
Annex F - Example Financial Statement ....................................................................................81
Annex G - Example ‘Instrument of Approval’ ............................................................................84
Annex H - Template Privacy Notice and Security Clearance Informed Consent Form ..............85
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Amendments No. Date Location of amendment Details of amendment
1. April 2015 Section 4.6.3 Amend links to social media search sites
2. April 2015 Throughout Amend PSPF links
3. April 2015 Paragraph 87 Remove reference to Gold Standard Enrolment Framework – superseded by the National Identity Proofing Guidelines
4. June 2015 Section 1.7.2 Amend reference to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
5. June 2016 Section 9.10 Amend content of ‘Reviewing clearance decisions’
6. June 2016 Section 11.3 Amend content of ‘Access by clearance holders to their PSFs’
7. June 2016 Section 11.5.1 Amend content of ‘Disposal in accordance with the Archives Act’
8. August 2016 Throughout Update template, format and hyperlinks.
9. December 2017 Paragraph 61
Section 4.5 Table 1
Updated policies agreed Feb 2016:
Increase the revalidation period of NV2 and PV security clearances from 5 years to a period from 5-7 years.
Decrease the period of checking for PV security clearances from whole of life to 10 years or 16 years of age, whichever is greater.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose
1. The Australian Government personnel security guidelines—vetting practices have been
developed to support the protection of the Australian Government’s people, information
and assets, through sound personnel security practices. The guidelines provide advice to
agencies to assist in their application of the controls identified in the Australian
Government personnel security protocol.
2. These guidelines are for guidance only; agencies may use other controls and measures to
implement the requirements of the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF).
3. Personnel security is one element of good protective security management. The Australian
Government’s personnel security measures determine the suitability of personnel to access
Australian Government resources. A suitable person possesses integrity and reliability and
is not vulnerable to improper influence.
4. Effective personnel security provides assurance and confidence across government when
collaborating or sharing Australian Government resources. This approach mitigates the
threat from the trusted insider.
5. These guidelines should be read in conjunction with the PSPF—Personnel security core
policy, protocol and the Australian Government personnel security guidelines—Agency
responsibilities.
1.2. Audience
6. These guidelines are intended for use by agencies undertaking security clearance vetting
and by all personnel involved in the conduct of vetting.
1.3. Scope
7. These guidelines cover vetting agencies’ responsibilities for:
using competent and qualified vetting personnel
processing clearance requests and clearance packs
transferring existing clearances
conducting internal and external checks and interviews
actions required of the delegate when a clearance is recommended
actions required of the delegate when the recommendation is to deny or cancel a clearance
advice to clearance applicants of the review or appeal process if a clearance is denied
managing clearance maintenance requirements with the clearance holder’s agency, and
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management of Personal Security Files (PSFs).
8. These guidelines apply to all levels of security clearances, from Baseline to Positive Vetting
(PV). However, there are additional requirements for PV clearances as detailed in the
Australian Government Sensitive Material Security Management Protocol (SMSMP)
available to agency security management personnel.
1.4. Use of specific terms in these guidelines
9. In these guidelines the terms:
‘are to’ or ‘is to’—are controls identified in the Australian Government personnel security protocol
‘should’—refers to better practice; agencies are expected to apply better practice unless there is a reason based on their risk assessment to apply alternative controls.
personnel–refers to employees, contractors and service providers as well as anybody else who is given access to agency assets.
personal security file (PSF)–an electronic or paper file containing sensitive personal information and other information used to make a decision on a person’s suitability to hold and maintain a security clearance.
vetting agency–any agency undertaking security vetting, including Australian Government Security Vetting Agency (AGSVA), authorised agencies and State and Territory vetting agencies.
vetting personnel–all those involved in conducting the clearance vetting process, including administrative staff, checking officers, assessing officers, vetting managers and delegates.
assessing officers-a person who is appropriately qualified and competent to conduct personnel security clearance assessments in accordance with the procedures outlined in the PSPF.
Financial statement – provides a detailed summary of a clearance subject’s assets, income, liabilities and expenditure.
Financial history check - provides an overview of a clearance subject’s financial history.
1.5. Vetting decisions/clearance status:
10. The following definitions are to be used when defining vetting decisions or clearance
status.
11. Vetting decisions:
Ineligible–a determination by a vetting agency that a clearance subject is not eligible for an Australian Government security clearance as they do not:
- hold Australian citizenship, and/or
- have a checkable background.
Deny–a determination by a vetting agency that a clearance subject is not eligible to hold an Australian Government security clearance at one or more clearance levels.
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Grant–a determination by a vetting agency that a clearance subject is eligible and suitable to hold an Australian Government security clearance.
Grant: conditional–a determination by a vetting agency that clearance subject is eligible and suitable to hold an Australian Government security clearance with conditions and/or aftercare requirements attached to the clearance.
Cancel–security clearance initiated, but not completed by the vetting agency as either the:
- sponsorship of the clearance was removed at the request of the sponsoring agency
- sponsorship or clearance requirement could not be confirmed, or
- clearance subject was non-compliant.
12. Clearance status:
Active–a maintained security clearance that is:
- sponsored by an Australian Government agency, and
- being maintained by a clearance holder and sponsoring agency.
Inactive–a security clearance that is within the revalidation period, however the clearance is:
- not sponsored by an Australian Government Agency, or
- not being maintained by the clearance holder for a period greater than six months
due to long term absence from their role (for example maternity leave, leave
without pay, temporary deployment or posting)
- for Positive Vetting an annual security check was completed within the last two
years, (can be reactivated or reinstated provided the clearance is sponsored by an
Australian Government agency before the end of the revalidation period).
Expired–a security clearance that:
- is outside the revalidation period and is not sponsored by an Australian
Government agency
- is a PV clearance and did not have a Security Appraisal Form (SAF) completed
within a two year period
- cannot be reactivated and reinstated, and
- reverts to an initial security clearance assessment process if an Australian
Government agency provides sponsorship after the end of the revalidation period.
Ceased–a security clearance:
- that has been denied or revoked
- that may have time-based conditions on when a clearance subject or holder can
reapply for a security clearance, and
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- where the clearance subject or holder is ineligible to hold or maintain a security
clearance.
1.6. Relationship to other documents
13. These guidelines support the PSPF—Personnel security core policy and Australian
Government personnel security protocol.
14. These guidelines supersede:
Agency personnel security guidelines
Reporting changes in personnel circumstances guidelines
Contact reporting guidelines, and
Security clearance subjects guidelines.
15. Additional terms used in this guideline can be found in the PSPF—Glossary of Terms.
1.7. References to legislation in these guidelines
1.7.1 Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
16. These guidelines refer to sections of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (PS Act) relating to
employment conditions, the APS Values and the APS Code of Conduct for public servants
employed under the PS Act. Where a client agency employs staff under different legislation,
assessing officers should be aware of the client agency’s specific employment conditions.
17. The ability of an agency head of a vetting agency to delegate authority to grant or deny
clearances is based on Section 78 of the PS Act, allowing agency heads to delegate their
powers or functions. Authorised vetting agencies should refer to their own enabling
legislation.
1.7.2 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
18. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) contains the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) which regulate
the handling of personal information by Australian Government agencies and businesses.
Agencies should familiarise themselves with their obligations under the APPs, in particular
APP 5 and APP 6. More information can be found at www.oaic.gov.au.
1.7.3 Archives Act 1983 (Cth)
19. Vetting agencies need to be aware of their obligations regarding maintaining and disposing
of records including Personal Security Files (PSF) contained in the Archives Act 1983 (Cth).
20. Once a clearance is expired and the clearance holder no longer requires access to classified
material, the vetting agency should dispose of the PSF in accordance with Administration
Functions Disposal Authority 1764-1766 (AFDA), issued under section 24 of the Archive Act
1983 (Cth).
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21. The AFDA allows for the disposal of PSFs five years after separation from the Australian
Public Service or six years after the date of the last clearance check on file, whichever is
sooner.
22. For more information see www.naa.gov.au.
1.7.4 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act)
23. The ASIO Act provides a mechanism, for ASIO to provide Commonwealth agencies with
individual security assessments for the purpose of the security clearance process.
1.8. Avoiding bias and conflict of interest
24. Vetting agencies should ensure that there is no bias or perceived bias in the security
clearance process. For further information see section 6.2 – procedural fairness guidelines.
25. Vetting personnel should not be involved in any capacity in the clearance of anyone with
whom they are or have been in a personal or business relationship.
26. Vetting recommendations and decisions can affect a clearance subject’s employment.
Vetting personnel should be tolerant of the views of others and remain objective when
assessing people and situations. For further information Commonwealth Anti-
Discrimination Legislation.
1.9. Sharing personal information
27. Vetting agencies and agencies are to share information relevant to the ongoing suitability
of personnel to access Australian Government resources.
28. Vetting agencies are to obtain written informed consent from all clearances subjects to
share information with other agencies for the purposes of assessing their ongoing
suitability. A template consent form is provided at Annex H – template privacy notice and
security clearance informed consent form.
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Diagram 1 – Summary of the security clearance process
Diagram 1 broadly outlines the security clearance process.
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2. Competencies of vetting personnel 29. Vetting agencies are to provide appropriate training and ensure vetting staff attain and
maintain the required competencies. Vetting personnel are to hold appropriate
qualifications and demonstrate the required competencies to conduct security vetting.
30. Qualifications held by staff should be appropriately confirmed and recorded.
31. Vetting agencies are to ensure that all assessing officers operate in accordance with the
PSPF—Personnel security core policy and the Australian Government personnel security
protocol, prior to undertaking assessments of suitability to hold security clearances.
2.1 Assessing officer roles, qualifications and
competencies
2.1.1 Role of the assessing officer
32. An assessing officer is a person who is appropriately qualified and competent to conduct
personnel security clearance assessments in accordance with the procedures outlined in the
PSPF.
33. The assessing officer is responsible for assessing the clearance subject’s character and
identifying any vulnerabilities—i.e., factors that may expose the clearance subject to
improper influence or coercion and anything that may potentially expose Australian
Government resources to be compromised.
34. Assessing officers are to:
meet any obligations set out in legislation governing the Australian Public Service or the agency for which they are conducting clearances
comply with Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as they apply to security vetting, including being able to provide reasons for the collection, use and disclosure of personal information and conducting the checks undertaken as part of the clearance process
comply with the security provisions of the Crimes Act 1914(Cth) and the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth).
declare any real, perceived or potential conflict of interest, and
ensure sensitive information is secure and never used for personal gain or to prejudice fair decision making.
35. Assessing officers are not to use their position to benefit themselves or others.
36. Assessing officers have access to others’ personal information, some of which may be
sensitive, as defined in the APPs. The collection and use of this information may be of
concern to some clearance subjects. Assessing Officers should be sensitive to the privacy of
clearance subjects.
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37. The assessing officer is to assess security concerns or factor areas against those listed in
section 5 – personnel security adjudicative considerations.
2.1.2 Additional duties for assessing officers
38. The vetting agency may also require assessing officers to:
make recommendations to the delegate in relation to personnel security policy and procedures
manage other assessing staff ,and
liaise with internal and external clients.
2.1.3 Qualifications for assessing officers
39. Assessing officers undertaking Positive Vetting, Negative Vetting Level 2 or complex vetting
assessments are to hold a Certificate IV in Government Security (Personnel security stream)
or equivalent.
40. Assessing officers undertaking Negative Vetting Level 1 and Baseline Vetting assessments are
to hold a Certificate III in Government Security (Personnel security stream) or equivalent.
41. Unqualified, trainee assessing officers are to work under the close supervision of a qualified
assessing officer. The qualified assessing officers remain responsible for all vetting
recommendations to the delegate.
2.1.4 Competencies of an assessing officer
42. Assessing officers are to be trained and assessed as competent in:
applying relevant public sector legislation, including the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
applying the principles of natural justice/ procedural fairness (see section 6.2 – procedural fairness guidelines)
handling official information
workplace communications
relevant interviewing skills
data analysis, and
conducting personnel security assessments.
2.1.5 Ongoing assessment of competencies
43. Vetting agencies are to regularly assess the competencies of all assessing officers and
provide additional training and education to any officer with identified deficiencies.
2.2 Vetting managers’ role, qualifications and
competencies
44. A vetting manager:
manages teams of vetting personnel, workflow management, administrative duties, and
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provides advice and guidance to assessing officers on routine and problematic assessments.
45. Vetting managers that supervise staff which conduct vetting assessments are to hold a
Certificate III in Government Security (Personnel security stream) or equivalent.
46. Vetting mangers that make vetting recommendations in addition to their supervisor duties
are to hold a Certificate IV in Government Security (Personnel Security stream).
2.3 Delegates’ role, qualifications and
competencies
47. A security clearance delegate is a person formally authorised by the head of a vetting agency
to deny, grant, grant-conditional or cancel a security clearances.
48. Delegates, as the final decision maker, should have reasonable knowledge and experience of
the vetting process.
49. As an administrative decision reviewable under section 13(1) of the Administrative Decisions
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), the delegate’s decision needs to be formally recorded.
Where a review is requested, the Act requires the decision maker to provide a statement
setting out the findings on material questions of fact, giving the reasons for the decision and
citing the evidence or other material on which the findings were based.
2.4 Outsourced vetting service providers
50. Vetting agencies are responsible for the conduct of any security vetting by their contracted
service providers, and ensuring they comply with requirements of the PSPF. See the
Protective security governance guidelines—Security of outsourced services and functions.
51. Vetting agencies are to confirm that the service provider’s vetting staff are suitably trained
and competent in accordance with the PSPF.
2.5 Provision of training
52. Vetting agencies are to ensure that training for qualifications listed in sections 2.1 and 2.2
are provided by, Registered Training Organisation (RTO). RTOs are accredited training
providers which offer Nationally Recognised Training courses. A list of RTOs is available from
www.training.gov.au.
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3. Initiating a clearance process 53. Before the clearance process is started, vetting agencies are to confirm that all requests for
security clearances are sponsored by a Government agency.
54. State and Territory vetting agencies may only undertake vetting for clearances up to
Negative Vetting Level 2, identified by agencies of that State or Territory.
55. Vetting agencies should check that the clearance request includes:
a signed informed consent for the sharing personal information, including sensitive information, between the vetting agency and the sponsoring agency
details of any existing clearances and a transfer approval consent signed by the clearance subject
a request for priority processing, where appropriate
advice if short term temporary access is approved or confirmation of suitability for provisional access is requested, and
confirmation of eligibility (citizenship)—i.e.:
- certification that the agency has completed the appropriate Australian citizenship
checks for all employees, or
- an approved citizenship waiver with a detailed risk assessment for clearance
requests for non-Australian citizens.
confirmation that the clearance subject has a checkable background—i.e.:
- the agency has taken into consideration any significant periods of greater than 12 months (cumulative) that a clearance subject has spent out of Australia, and
- if a clearance subject has spent more than 12 months (cumulative) outside of Australia, an approved eligibility (background) waiver with a detailed risk assessment has been completed—vetting agencies may still find an individual subject to an uncheckable background waiver unsuitable for a clearance based on those grounds.
3.1 Provisional access
56. The decision to approve provisional access before a security clearance is granted rests with
the sponsoring agency after confirmation or receipt of a completed clearance pack with no
obvious areas of concern from the vetting agency.
57. Sponsoring agencies should confirm with the vetting agency whether the clearance subject
has previously held a security clearance. For further information see the Australian
Government personnel security protocol section 7.
58. The sponsoring agencies approving provisional access accepts the risk associated with this
action.
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59. The vetting agency is to advise the sponsoring agency of any areas of significant concern
identified during the clearance process for any clearance where provisional access has been
approved.
3.2 Recognising existing security clearances
60. Before commencing a new clearance process, if advised in the request for a clearance that
the clearance subject already holds a security clearance, vetting agencies are to confirm the
clearance details with the granting agency and obtain the personal security file.1
61. The vetting agency is to recognise a security clearance already held by the clearance subject
unless:
the clearance has expired—i.e. the period since the clearance was granted or last revalidated exceeds:
- for Baseline clearances : 15 years
- for Negative Vetting Level 1: 10 years
- for Negative Vetting Level 2: 5-7 years, or
- for Positive Vetting: 5-7 years with annual security appraisals in accordance with the
SMSMP.
the vetting agency has concerns that the incoming clearance subject is no longer suitable to access Australian Government security classified resources at that clearance level
the clearance was granted on the basis of an eligibility (citizenship or background) waiver, or
the clearance was granted subject to specific clearance maintenance requirements.
62. If the clearance is subject to an eligibility waiver or specific clearance maintenance
requirements, the vetting agency is to advise the gaining sponsoring agency. The gaining
sponsoring agency is to decide whether they will pursue their own waiver submission and /
or continue to accept / enforce the clearance maintenance conditions. If the sponsoring
agency does not approve a new eligibility waiver or accept existing clearance maintenance
conditions, then the clearance cannot be transferred.
63. When the clearance request is for a higher level security clearance, vetting agencies are to
initiate a new clearance at the appropriate level.
64. The vetting agency is to advise the clearance subject and sponsoring agency of any decision
to accept or not accept a transferred security clearance.
1 Some PSF’s cannot be transferred due to the requirements contained in the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) and the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth). Agencies should check the requirements
contained in their enabling legislation prior to transferring a PSF.
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3.3 Clearance pack requirements
65. In addition to the forms the clearance subject is required to complete, vetting agencies
should include the following information in the clearance pack:
a single point of contact for the clearance subject within the vetting agency
the due date for the return of the completed pack and supporting documents
details of the required document copies and the statutory declaration to be completed, and
a privacy statement and informed consent form, identifying that the information provided will be used for:
- the initial clearance assessment
- any subsequent reviews
- any subsequent security investigations involving the clearance subject
- assessing the ongoing suitability to hold and maintain a security clearance
- See Annex I – for a sample privacy notice and template security clearance informed consent form.
66. The vetting agency should advise the clearance subject that, if the required forms are not
fully completed and the requested documentation is not provided, the clearance process
may be delayed or cancelled.
67. Non-compliance with the clearance process can be an indicator of poor security behaviour
and will be considered as part of the assessment for the suitability to hold an Australian
Government security clearance.
3.4 Non-compliance with the submission of clearance pack information
68. For new clearances, clearance revalidations or other clearance reviews, vetting packs,
including supporting documents are to be returned within the required time set by the
vetting agency, unless the clearance subject contacts the vetting agency to make other
arrangements.
69. If a clearance subject fails to supply the required information in the time set by the vetting
agency, then the vetting agency is to cancel the process and, for revalidations or review for
cause cancel the existing clearance.
70. The vetting agency is to cancel any existing clearance held by a clearance subject where
there is non-compliance with the submission of documentation. The vetting agency is to
notify the clearance subject and the sponsoring agency that the clearance has been
cancelled.
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4. Clearance processing
4.1 Justifying information required in a security clearance
71. Assessing officers are to only ask questions for the purpose of assessing an individual’s
suitability to access Australian Government resources, when interviewing the clearance
subject or their referees. This may include questions about an individual’s integrity, character
traits, maturity, trustworthiness, honesty, tolerance, and loyalty. For further information see
the APS Code of Conduct.
4.2 Confirming eligibility (citizenship and background) for a clearance
72. Only Australian citizens with a checkable background are eligible for an Australian
Government security clearance, unless the eligibility requirements have been waived by the
sponsoring agency head.
73. Sponsoring agencies are to confirm all clearance subjects are eligible, by confirming
citizenship and checkable background requirements, prior to requesting a security clearance.
4.4.1 Confirming Australian citizenship
74. Vetting agencies are to confirm the citizenship status of all clearance subjects who are not
employees of the sponsoring agency. While agencies are responsible for confirming the
citizenship status of all employees during recruitment and before requesting a security
clearance, this may not be possible if the clearance subject is not employed by the agency.
For example, contractors, consultants and other sponsored recipients of classified
information. For further information see Annex B – Citizenship proof requirements.
75. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) is responsible for Australian
citizenship matters. If the vetting agency has any doubt about a clearance subject’s
Australian citizenship status, it should refer the matter to DIBP. For further information see
www.citizenship.gov.au.
76. Vetting agencies are to ensure that an eligibility waiver has been provided for non-Australian
citizens prior to processing a clearance request.
4.4.2 Confirming the clearance subject has a checkable background
77. A checkable background is established when a vetting agency has validated information
provided by a clearance subject with respect to their background from independent and
reliable sources – for example referees, previous employers.
78. A clearance subject has an uncheckable background when the vetting agency cannot
complete the minimum checks and inquiries for the relevant checking period, or the checks
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and inquiries, where able to be made, do not provide adequate assurance about the
clearance subject’s life or background. In these circumstances, the vetting agency may
decline the request for a clearance.
79. Any clearance subject that has spent greater than 12 months (cumulative) out of Australia
within the requisite background checking period is to be considered to have an uncheckable
background (if their periods of time out of Australia cannot be verified from independent
and reliable sources). If the clearance subject’s periods of time out of Australia cannot be
verified from independent and reliable sources, the subject is to be assessed by the vetting
agency as ineligible to be considered for an Australian Government security clearance.
80. Vetting agencies are to consider the security risk to the Australian Government as the
primary factor when assessing whether a person is considered to have a checkable
background, and therefore whether they are eligible to be considered for an Australian
Government security clearance.
81. For an individual to be eligible for an Australian Government security clearance, background
checks should generally be able to be undertaken in Australia. It is expected that individuals
sponsored by agencies for an Australian Government security clearance will have strong,
established ties to Australia.
82. A vetting officer is to be satisfied that enough credible and reliable information is available
about the clearance subject, over the assessable period, to make an informed, confident
recommendation as to the clearance subject’s suitability.
83. A clearance subject may be assessed as having an uncheckable background when the
assessing officer cannot complete the required minimum checks for a clearance because of
the unavailability of required information, or the assessing officer does not have sufficient
confidence in the quantity, quality, credibility or reliability of the information provided. For
example, a background may be assessed to be uncheckable because:
minimum checks cannot be conducted in certain countries of former residence
certain documents do not exist - either they never existed, no longer exist or it is not possible to get copies from the issuing authority
there are significant gaps in a clearance subject’s background – for example, periods spent overseas – for which insufficient information is available, and/or the risks associated with these gaps are not readily able to be mitigated, or
the source of the documents or information about the clearance subject may not be assessed as credible or reliable.
84. If a clearance subject has spent significant periods of time overseas, in certain circumstances,
it may be appropriate to undertake checks with authorities or individuals in other countries.
85. Overseas checking sources that may corroborate information provided in the clearance
subject’s completed security pack and during interview include but are not limited to:
government agencies and bodies
academic institutions
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local police records if available (obtained through liaison with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT))
humanitarian and aid agencies that maintain records for displaced persons
places of worship which often maintain birth, death and marriage information in lieu of government records, and
private companies with whom the clearance subject has been employed.
86. Immigration records may be useful in corroborating some information regarding the identity
and background of citizens not born in Australia. However, checks made under the Migration
Act 1958 (Cth) to assess a clearance subject’s suitability to hold Australian citizenship are
different from those required to assess suitability to hold a clearance. The vetting agency
should not use citizenship or residency status as a substitute for minimum checks and
inquiries.
87. Vetting agencies are to exhaust all reasonable and available checking avenues before
determining that a clearance subject’s background is uncheckable. The assessing officer is to
document the alternative measures undertaken. For examples of alternative checks refer to
the National Identity Proofing Guidelines.
88. The vetting agency should interview clearance subjects identified as having uncheckable
backgrounds. The interview is not a substitute for the mandatory background checks but can
be used to corroborate information collected from other sources or to address remaining
doubts or concerns.
89. The vetting agency may not be able to determine whether a background is checkable or not
until the majority of checks and inquiries have been completed, depending upon the
clearance subject’s circumstances.
90. If the vetting agency cannot confirm the clearance subject’s background the vetting agency is
to:
request an eligibility (background) waiver from the sponsoring agency where:
- there is insufficient information on a subject’s background to be able to make a fully
informed assessment
- there are no other concerns, and
- any identified risks can be mitigated, or
advise the sponsoring agency that the clearance cannot progress where:
- the checkable background is insufficient to enable an assessment to be conducted
against the Personnel Security Adjudicative guidelines
- there are other concerns, or
- the risk cannot be mitigated.
91. Where a security clearance is recommended for a clearance subject with an uncheckable
background, the assessing officer is to fully document how the identified risks were
mitigated.
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4.3 Gaps, anomalies and discrepancies (GADs)
92. GADs checking refers to the checking and cross referencing for consistency of supporting
documents and background personal information provided by clearance subjects in their
clearance packs. The vetting agency is to ensure that information provided by the clearance
subject is complete, consistent and accurate. Assessing officers should:
check that all documents requiring signature and witnessing have been signed and
that signatures and dates of signature match
confirm addresses and dates of residence with supporting documents
confirm employment and dates employed with supporting documents
confirm that identity details in background information are consistent with the birth
certificate, marriage certificate, passport and any other identity documents provided
check that appropriate referees and their contact details have been provided where
applicable, and
check the financial statement for completeness (if applicable).
93. The assessing officer should resolve any inconsistencies and gaps in residential and
employment addresses. If there are inconsistencies, the assessing officer should contact the
clearance subject for clarification or further information. Things to look for include periods of
residency in:
one country while working in another, and
one town while working in another, some distance away.
94. In some instances, the clearance subject may maintain a permanent residential address but
work away from home. The assessing officer should identify any temporary residential
addresses during these periods.
95. Where paper-based packs are used and the assessing officer amends or annotates
information provided by the clearance subject, the changes should be clearly identified as
being made by the assessing officer.
4.4 Supporting documents required for security
clearances
96. The vetting agency is to sight copies or originals of the supporting documents listed in Annex
D - Documents, checks and inquiries required for security clearances.
97. Vetting agencies should support the provision of supporting documentation through a range
of methods, such as receiving documentation via post, e-mail, and fax.
98. Vetting agencies are to maintain a record of supporting documents sighted.
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99. Once the clearance and any review or appeal of the clearance process is finalised, the vetting
agency is to return any original supporting documents listed in Annex D - Documents, checks
and inquiries required for security clearances.
100. In any subsequent Negative Vetting or Baseline clearance action, vetting agencies should not
request documents previously recorded as sighted unless there are concerns about the
authenticity of the documents.
4.4.1 Authenticity of documents
101. The assessing officer should satisfy themselves that copies of supporting documents
provided by the clearance subject have not been altered, particularly primary identification
documents. Where there are doubts about the authenticity of the documents, the vetting
agency may request that original documents be provided.
102. If there are concerns about the authenticity of the document supplied or if it appears to have
been altered, the assessing officer should check with the issuing agency.
103. The Australian Federal Police Forensic Document Examination Team can provide advice on
verification and authenticity, contactable at [email protected].
4.4.2 Statutory Declarations of authenticity
104. Vetting agencies are to ensure all clearance subjects sign a Statutory Declaration stating that:
the information provided is truthful and complete, and
all documents provided:
- are accurate and without amendment
- are as issued by the issuing authority, and
- relate to the clearance subject.
105. The clearance subject may also make Statutory Declarations in lieu of some supporting
documents where copies of documents cannot reasonably or readily be obtained from
issuing authorities within the time required.
106. The vetting agency may accept a Statutory Declaration in lieu of supporting documents
where a considerable delay is expected and where the clearance subject undertakes to
provide the documents as soon as they are received. In such instances, the assessing officer
should recommend the clearance be granted on the condition that the documents are
provided within a reasonable time. A date should be specified in the recommendation to
facilitate maintenance of the conditional clearance.
107. If a clearance subject fails to provide the documentation by the date specified the clearance
should be ceased.
108. Vetting agencies should not accept Statutory Declarations for:
primary identification documents issued by an Australian authority
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proof of current employment
proof of current residential address, or
primary identification documents issued by a foreign authority where it is possible to
obtain these documents.
109. Where a Statutory Declaration is provided in lieu of any primary identification from a foreign
authority due to unavailability or significant delays in gaining the document the clearance
subject may have an uncheckable background. For further information see section 4.2.2 -
confirming the clearance subject has a checkable background.
110. Where the clearance subject has taken all reasonable measures to source the documents,
the clearance subject may provide a Statutory Declaration for other supporting documents
such as:
proof of previous residential addresses, and
proof of previous employment.
111. A Statutory Declaration provided in lieu of supporting documents should state:
that the clearance subject does not have the document(s)
why the clearance subject is unable to provide the document(s)
what the clearance subject has done to find the document(s), and
that, if found, the document(s) will be provided.
112. The assessing officer should check that:
the witness to the declarant’s signature is an authorised witness in accordance with
the legislation
the declaration was signed and witnessed on the same day
if the text of the declaration is more than one page, that all pages are initialled at the
bottom by the signatory and the witness, and
if errors have been made, they have been ruled out (no correcting fluids can to be
used) and all corrections have been initialled by the signatory and the witness.
113. Where the requirements listed above are not met, the vetting agency cannot accept the
Statutory Declaration and should return it to the clearance subject for correction.
114. Further information about statutory declarations see the Attorney-General’s Department’s
publication on Statutory Declarations.
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4.4.3 Translation of documents
115. Where supporting personal documents are in a language other than English, the vetting
agency should advise the clearance subject to seek translations from a translator accredited
by the National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters or approved by the
vetting agency.
116. Following translation of the document(s), the clearance subject should provide the vetting
agency copies of the original document and the translation.
117. Exceptions can be made where the document provides information in English as well as in
the foreign language, or where the necessary information can be easily interpreted by the
vetting agency.
118. Some foreign government agencies will provide a translation or dual language original of
official documents such as birth certificates and marriage certificates. The vetting agency
should accept copies of these translated or dual language documents.
4.4.4 Requesting additional information from the clearance subject
119. The vetting agency should thoroughly review the returned security pack and supporting
documentation for GADs before contacting the clearance subject to seek additional
information.
120. Vetting agencies are to advise clearance subjects of any timeframes for the return of
additional documents or information requested as a result of GADs.
121. If additional information is not provided within the allowed time and other arrangements
have not been made, the vetting agency is to commence the process to cancel the clearance.
For further information see section 3.4 – non-compliance with the submission of clearance
pack information.
4.5 Basis for assessing results of checks
122. Vetting agencies should assess all information gathered against section 5 – personal security
adjudicative guidelines when assessing the results of any checks. A summary of checks is at
Annex D - – Documents, checks and inquiries required for security clearances.
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Table 1 – Minimum personnel security checks and requirements for initial clearances 1
Notes:
1. Suitability is assessed against the criteria contained in Section 5 2. Qualifications checks should be part of an agency employment screening process where qualifications are claimed and/or mandatory. 3. Financial statement – provides a detailed summary of a clearance subject’s assets, income, liabilities and expenditure. For further information see section 4.6.2. . 4. Referees are to collectively cover the whole checking period. Professional checks are to cover at least the preceding 3 months. Additional referees may be required. 5. The application of spent convictions legislation will vary dependent on the jurisdiction in which the offence occurred. 6. Identity checked in accordance with the Australian Identity Proofing Guidelines (level 3 for baseline and NV1 and level 4 for NV2 and PV). In addition to documentation to confirm residential addresses, employment, supporting
documentation is also required to confirm citizenship status, and if relevant overseas travel, see section 4.6. 7. For further details see the Sensitive Material Security Management Protocol 8. Financial history check - provides an overview of a clearance subject’s financial history. For further information see section 4.6.2. .
Postive Vetting
Psychological assessment
Negative Vetting 2 Financial probity check
Negative Vetting 1 Security interview Security interview
Digital footprint checks Digital footprint checks Digital footprint checks
Financial statement 3 Financial statement
3 Financial statement
3 and supporting
documents
Suitability screening questionnaire Suitability screening questionnaire Suitability screening questionnaire
Baseline Vetting ASIO assessment ASIO assessment ASIO assessment
Qualification verification 2 Qualification verification
2 Qualification verification
2 Qualification and document verification
Professional referee check 4 Referee checks (including 1 professional)
4 Referee checks (including 1 professional
and 1 un-nominated) 4
Referee checks (including 1 professional and 1 un-nominated)
4
Police Records Check (No Exclusion) 5 Police Records Check (Full Exclusion)
5 Police Records Check (Full Exclusion)
5 Police Records Check (Full Exclusion)
Financial history check8 Financial history check
8 Financial history check
8 Financial history check
8
5 year background check 6 10 year background check
6 10 year background check
6 10 year background check or from 16
years of age, whichever is greater 7
Official secrets declaration Official secrets declaration Official secrets declaration Official secrets declaration
Statutory Declaration Statutory Declaration Statutory Declaration Statutory Declaration
Identity verification 6 Identity verification
6 Identity verification
6 Identity verification
6
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4.6 Vetting assessment checks
4.6.1 Analysis of personal information
123. When analysing the personal background information provided in the clearance pack by the
clearance subject, the assessing officer should consider the following, in conjunction with the
factors listed in section 5 – personnel security adjudicative guidelines:
Overseas influences – Was the clearance subject born in another country? Do they have
family or friends in other countries that may have influence on the clearance subject?
Can the foreign country use the clearance subject’s family or friends to influence the
clearance subject?
Does the clearance subject have any outstanding military obligations to their country
of birth? – Some countries have compulsory military service. If the clearance subject left
the country before they met this obligation, they may be required to complete it or be
prosecuted for avoidance if they return to the country of origin. Becoming an Australian
citizen does not indemnify or exempt the clearance subject from this obligation.
Does the clearance subject hold dual citizenship? – Some clearance subjects may
concurrently hold citizenship of another country or countries. In such cases there is the
risk of divided or conflicted loyalties. The clearance subject should be asked to explain
why they have retained foreign citizenship. Some countries do not allow their citizenship
to be renounced and the clearance subject may not be aware that they are still a citizen
or that country and that they may have continuing obligations (including military
service), particularly if they came to Australia as a minor. Alternatively some countries do
not permit dual citizenships.
Family/relationship circumstances – Where a clearance subject has had a number of
partners, there may be concerns about their maturity, reliability, resilience and/or
tolerance. Where there have been multiple partners during the review period or if there
are any concerns about these relationships, the assessing officer should request
additional information from the clearance subject.
Clubs – Membership of sporting and/or community clubs is not normally a concern if for
social purposes. However, membership of a large number of clubs with gambling
facilities may indicate a gambling problem.
Associations – The assessing officer should ask the clearance subject to list and explain
all the associations they belong to. If unsure about the nature and purpose of the
association, further information should be sought from the clearance subject. For
example:
- membership of some religious or political associations may make the clearance subject susceptible to undue influence, and
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- some associations, particularly religious groups, may impose considerable financial obligations on the clearance subject. These should be considered when assessing the clearance subject’s financial position.
124. Where the assessing officer identifies concerns about a clearance holder which cannot be
mitigated, an interview for cause may be warranted. For further information see section 4.6.7 -
supplementary interviews. An interview for cause may be conducted by telephone call or, for
significant concerns, by face-to-face interview. Vetting agencies are to document
supplementary interviews on the PSFs.
125. For internal checks for positive vetting see the SMSMP.
4.6.2 Financial history checks
126. It is recommended that assessing officers undertake specialist training, or seek specialist advice
before undertaking complex financial analysis.
127. Issues to be considered include whether:
the clearance subject is living beyond their means, e.g. spending more than he/she earns
or is impulsive and irresponsible in his/her spending
there is any unexplained income, and
there is any history of indebtedness, failure to meet financial obligations (including
submission of tax returns, payment of rent and debts, bankruptcy and denial of credit).
128. Vetting agencies should complete a financial history check for all clearance subjects as detailed
in Table 1 (above) and Table 4 of the Personnel Security Protocol. For a sample financial history
check questionnaire see Annex E - sample financial history check questionnaire.
129. Vetting agencies are to complete a financial statement for all negative vetting and positive
vetting clearances, as detailed in Table 1 (above) and Table 4 of the Australian Government
personnel security protocol. Annex F – Financial statement is an example of a financial
statement.
130. Where the assessing officer has concerns about a clearance subject’s financial situation,
particularly unexplained wealth or a high level of debt, additional checks may be warranted.
Vetting agencies should determine appropriate checks on a case by case basis but may include
an examination of bank account records.
131. Where clearance subject has indicated that they have been bankrupt or insolvent, the vetting
agency should request a bankruptcy check in writing through the Insolvency and Trustee Service
Australia (ITSA).
132. If a clearance subject has a history of financial defaults, is in a difficult financial situation, or if
there are concerns about the clearance subject’s finances, the vetting agency may seek a credit
history check from an accredited financial credit check organisation. A number of private
organisations can provide credit checks on a fee for service basis. Additionally clearance
subjects can obtain a credit reference checks at no cost directly from a number of private
organisations.
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4.6.3 Digital footprint checks
133. A digital footprint is the unique pattern of electronic transactions made by an individual’s online presence. Publically available information relating to peoples personnel lives online has never been so prolific.
134. An assessment of an individual’s digital footprint can provide a comprehensive picture of their
life, their interactions and world view. This information may identify behaviours of security
concern that should be considered during the clearance assessment.
135. Vetting agencies should undertake digital footprint checks for all clearance subjects.
136. There are a number of ways vetting agencies can undertake a digital footprint check on a
clearance subject. Some examples of free digital footprint checks include:
Typing the clearance subjects full name in quotations (e.g. “John Smith”) in a search
engine such as Google or Bing. If multiple results are returned, the location of the
clearance subjects past residences can be added to refine the result returned (e.g. “John
Smith” AND “Canberra”).
The website Pipl assists in finding personal profiles, public records, and other people-
related documents. Searches can be completed by name, email address and username.
The website Yasni is search engine platform that provides details of a number of internet
subscriptions of the name entered; including: social network profiles, news articles,
websites, interests, employers, contact details, and documents.
137. In addition to the search engines above, there are number of social networking sites that may
contain publically available information on a clearance subject. Most social networking sites can
be viewed, dependant on the privacy settings of the individuals profile. Some example of social
networking sites that could be searched, include: Bebo, Myspace, Facebook, V Kontakte,
Linkedin and Qzone.
4.6.4 Security incident and breach history
138. The assessing officer should contact the clearance subject’s current and past
agencies/employers to confirm whether the clearance subject has had any security
infringements, breaches or violations if any concerns are identified during the security
assessment. The assessing officer should request any infringement or breach history from
government agencies, if not previously provided.
139. If the clearance subject has a history of security incidents or breaches, they may have a
disregard for security and their commitment to protecting Australian government resources
may be questionable.
4.6.5 Integrity checks
140. Vetting agencies should contact previous Government employers to determine if there is a
current investigation into a possible breach of the ‘code of conduct’ or any integrity issues; or if
the person has been found to have breached the code of conduct. Previous private sector
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employers may also be contacted if a supervisor referee report provided by that employer does
not confirm the clearance subject’s integrity.
141. Before contacting a current private employer, the assessing officer should confirm with the
clearance subject that the employer can be contacted. Contacting some private organisations
may put the clearance subject’s current employment at risk. Where a current supervisor cannot
be contacted the assessing officer should consider whether this constitutes an uncheckable
background – see section 4.2.2 –confirming clearance subject has a checkable background.
4.6.6 Professional and personal referee reports
142. The sponsoring agency is responsible for undertaking professional referee checks for all Baseline
security clearances for its own employees.
143. Vetting agencies are to obtain at a minimum:
for Baseline—one professional referee report. Sponsoring agencies should undertake a
supervisor referee check as part of the pre-employment screening. Where a supervisor
report has not been obtained by the sponsoring agency during pre-employment
screening, the vetting agency should seek to obtain a supervisor report from the
clearance subjects referees
for Negative Vetting Level 1, two referee reports including one professional referee
for Negative Vetting Level 2, three referee reports including one professional referee,
one personal referee and one un-nominated referee, and
for Positive Vetting further guidance is included in the SMSMP.
144. Referee interviews should be conducted by phone or, for complex issues, face-to-face where
practicable. If a verbal interview is not practicable or possible, a written referee report may be
requested. As it is more difficult to gauge potential areas of concern from written reports, the
written report form should be structured to address all the factor areas identified in section 5 –
personnel security adjudicative guidelines and any specific issues or concerns.
145. The assessing officer should substantiate any information provided by referees to avoid possible
conflict with the clearance subject over the accuracy of information. The information can be
substantiated by contacting additional referees or carrying out other supplementary checks.
146. At the beginning of the referee interview, the assessing officer should establish the nature of
the referee’s relationship with the clearance subject and how long they have known each other.
147. The assessing officer should avoid using family members as referees.
148. Referees should have known the clearance subject for a minimum of three months.
149. In accordance with the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), the assessing officer should advise the referee of
the purpose of the report and who will have access to the information provided. Referees
should be advised that the information may be passed to other Government agencies if/when
the clearance subject changes employment to or from an authorised agency.
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150. The assessing officer should advise the referees that the information will be treated
confidentially. However, if there is a request for review of a clearance process, or a freedom of
information request, the information may be provided to the clearance subject.
151. Assessing officers should ask referees whether they recommend the clearance subject as a
suitable person to hold a security clearance and why they recommend them. If the referee is
ambiguous or the recommendation is negative, the assessing officer should seek as much
information as possible from the referee to assist in substantiation with other referees or
supplementary checks.
152. The assessing officer should follow up with appropriate questions where the referee implies or
directly states the clearance subject is unsuitable to establish an understanding of the issues.
The assessing officer should confirm with the referee if he or she can be contacted again to
resolve any security concerns that may arise.
153. In addition to providing advice on a clearance subject’s suitability to hold a security clearance,
referees can corroborate information provided by clearance subject such as current and
previous addresses, current and previous employment, overseas travel, financial status, and use
of alcohol or drugs. This may be used as a mitigation factor where other supporting
documentation is not available.
154. Vetting agencies should make reasonably practicable efforts to substantiate the accuracy of
information provided in referees reports in accordance with the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth).
Professional referee reports
155. Vetting agencies should seek supervisor referee reports that cover at least the preceding three
months. If the current supervisor has not been supervising the clearance subject for this time,
the vetting agency should contact previous supervisor(s) to make up the three month period.
156. Assessing officers should contact the clearance subject’s most recent significant supervisor.
Where this person cannot be contacted, a previous supervisor or another workplace referee
may be contacted. Workplace referees should be at or above the current level of the clearance
subject. Generally, lower level work colleagues or subordinates should not be used as
workplace referees.
157. Professional referee reports should include information on the clearance subject’s:
relationship with the supervisor and how long the clearance subject has been supervised
by the referee
reasons for leaving the workplace (if applicable)
attitude to security in the workplace
personality and behaviour in the workplace, including relationships with managers, peers
and subordinates
any security infringements, breaches or violations, and
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character traits such as integrity, honesty, trustworthiness, loyalty, maturity, resilience
and tolerance.
158. The assessing officer should confirm with the clearance subject that their current supervisor can
be contacted. Contacting referees in some organisations may put the clearance subject’s
current employment at risk.
Personal referee checks
159. Personal referees should cover the whole assessment period and may include more than one
referee where required.
160. Professional or workplace referees can provide personal referee reports where they can cover
the factor areas identified in section 5 – personnel security adjudicative guidelines. They can also
provide input on the clearance subject’s attitude to security in the workplace.
4.6.7 Interviews
161. Vetting agencies are to undertake an interview of the clearance subject for all Negative Vetting
Level 2 and Positive Vetting clearances. The interview should address all factor areas and any
specific areas of concern. Interviews may also be used to clarify information or address specific
concerns for all levels of clearance.
162. Vetting agencies are to conduct interviews with all clearance subjects with eligibility waivers at
the NV1 and NV2 levels to determine any issues of allegiance. It is recommended that
interviews be undertaken for clearance subjects with eligibility waivers at the Baseline level.
163. The assessing officer should review the PSF and referee reports before the interview to identify
any factor areas that may be of particular concern.
164. Vetting agencies are to document all interviews on the PSF.
4.6.8 Supplementary interviews
165. Supplementary interviews should be conducted for all clearance levels where specific areas of
concern arising from internal and external checking have not been adequately resolved by other
supplementary checks. Supplementary interviews should address the specific areas of concern
and any further concerns identified at interview.
166. Supplementary interviews should be conducted face-to-face wherever possible for significant or
complex issues. However, a telephone interview may be conducted for minor issues or where a
face-to face interview is not possible (e.g. the clearance subject is travelling overseas or is on
leave as a carer).
167. The assessing officer should, if possible, carry out one interview to resolve all issues identified.
168. Vetting agencies are to document all additional interviews on the PSF.
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4.7 Supplementary checks
169. Vetting agencies are to conduct any necessary supplementary checking to resolve any issues
identified during the clearance process. If the issues are not resolved the assessing officer is not
to recommend the clearance.
170. Some available supplementary checks are listed below. It is not an exhaustive list. Checks used
to resolve issues for higher level clearances may also be used at lower levels.
4.7.1 Medical checks
171. The vetting agency should seek the sponsoring agency’s agreement before undertaking any
medical checks as these may incur significant additional costs.
172. Supplementary medical checks should only be conducted where there is a health concern that
may impact on the clearance subject’s suitability to access classified material has been
identified. Where concerns are raised, advice should be sought from a medical practitioner
before undertaking checks.
173. A vetting agency can only request supplementary medical checks with the written consent of
the clearance subject for the medical practitioner to release information relating to the issue.
Further information can be found about requesting medical information and privacy at Office of
the Australian Information Commissioner.
174. The informed consent form as part of the normal vetting process is not sufficient for the release
of medical information from a medical practitioner. A separate release including the subject’s
consent will be required. Any medical request needs to:
identify to the medical practitioner the specific issue(s) of concern
explain why the issue(s) is/are relevant to the security clearance process, and
identify what information is required.
175. If the clearance subject refuses to give consent and the area of concern cannot otherwise be
mitigated, the vetting agency should not grant the clearance.
176. For further information see section 5.2.7 – emotional/mental health issues and section 5.2.4 –
alcohol and drug usage.
4.7.2 Mental health checks
177. Mental health assessments should only occur where the vetting agency identifies issues relating
to the clearance subject’s ability to protect Australian Government resources. Having a mental
health illness does not necessarily mean that a clearance subject would not be able to protect
classified information or resources.
178. Additional mental health checks may be warranted where the vetting agency is concerned that
the clearance subject’s emotional stability or psychological health may affect their ability to
protect Australian Government resources.
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179. If the clearance subject is, or has been, under treatment for an emotional or mental health
condition, information may be requested from a mental health professional. The request for
any medical information, including mental health concerns, should be undertaken in
accordance with section 4.7.1 – medical checks.
180. It may be necessary for a vetting agency to appoint a mental health professional if the clearance
subject does not have their own practitioner or if the concern is unrelated to current or
previous treatments. The vetting agency should brief the practitioner about the assessing
officer’s concerns and the requirements for the protection of classified information.
181. The vetting agency is not to grant the clearance, where:
the clearance subject refuses to consent to a check with their own practitioner, or
refuses to attend an evaluation with an appointed mental health professional, and
the assessing officer’s concern(s) cannot otherwise be mitigated.
182. For further information see section 5.2.7 – emotional/mental health issues.
4.7.3 Psychological assessment
183. An additional tool that vetting agencies can use to establish a clearance subjects identity and
suitability, is psychological assessments.
184. A typical psychological assessment consists of two parts: psychometric testing and the
psychological interview. Psychological assessments aim to establish the identity and general
suitability (character, attributes, background and actions) of the clearance subject.
185. Psychological assessments are undertaken by appropriately qualified psychologists and
primarily used to establish a clearance subjects’ suitability for a Positive Vetting clearance.
4.7.4 Qualifications checks
186. The sponsoring agency is responsible for verifying the qualifications of all personnel. This would
normally be part of employment screening. For further information see AS4811:2006
Employment Screening. The sponsoring agency should provide qualification details to the
vetting agency if required.
187. The vetting agency may also write directly to educational institutions if there is doubt about the
authenticity of a clearance subject’s educational qualifications.
4.7.5 Employment details
188. Subject to the clearance subject’s agreement, the assessing officer may contact current or past
employers to confirm employment for those periods where proof of employment is not
available.
189. It may not be possible to verify short periods of employment. The assessing officer should
consider whether the periods of employment are significant to the ‘whole of person’
assessment of the clearance subject before making any recommendation on an uncheckable
background.
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4.8 ASIO security assessment, Police records check
(PRC), and Immigration movements records check
190. The ASIO security assessment is to be completed after all checks and the clearance interview is
complete. This prevents any unnecessary checking by ASIO where the clearance subject would
not otherwise be recommended for a clearance. Vetting agencies should negotiate with ASIO
on a case by case basis where operational needs require the ASIO security assessment to be
conducted simultaneously.
191. It is better practice to complete all checks (including any supplementary checks) before
undertaking the PRC and Immigration check.
192. All checks, other than the ASIO security assessment, should be completed before conducting a
clearance interview (where required).
193. Unless resolved through supplementary checking, the assessing officer is to raise any concerns
identified in external checks at the clearance interview.
4.8.1 ASIO security assessments
194. An ASIO security assessment is to be conducted for all Negative Vetting and Positive Vetting
security clearance actions.
195. The vetting agency can request an ASIO security assessment for a baseline security clearance, if
there are any concerns that may impact on the national interest.
196. ASIO security assessments provide a recommendation to the vetting agency on the suitability of
the clearance subject to access security classified information, confidential and above. The
security assessment is not a recommendation to grant a clearance; that remains the vetting
agency’s decision. Before making a recommendation, the assessing officer is to take into
consideration any issues arising out of the internal and external checks, including the ASIO
security assessment.
197. In conducting a security assessment, ASIO takes into account matters such as the activities,
associates, attitudes and character of the clearance subject, as these relate to ‘security’ as
defined in the ASIO Act.
198. Vetting agencies are to only request an ASIO security assessment after all other checks have
been finalised to ensure that ASIO has access to the most comprehensive information available
relating to a clearance applicant, when providing as security assessment.
199. The vetting agency is to inform ASIO of any issues of security significance or suitability relating
to the clearance subject. Where issues arise which warrant a recommendation to not grant a
clearance, the assessing officer should not request an ASIO assessment or should cancel any
request already made.
200. If the clearance subject is not an Australian citizen, the assessing officer should attach a copy of
the eligibility waiver to the request to ASIO.
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Requesting an ASIO security assessment
201. Only AGSVA and Commonwealth authorised vetting agencies can request security assessments
for security clearances from ASIO.
202. State and Territory agencies' requests for security assessments will be coordinated by the Head
of their Premier’s or Chief Minister's Department and/or the Commissioner of Police or their
delegates, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding for the Protection of National
Security Information signed in April 2007.
203. State and Territory requests for ASIO security assessments may be submitted through the
Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) as the sponsoring Commonwealth agency. For further
information contact AGD’s Departmental Security Unit at [email protected].
204. Vetting agencies should include a completed ‘Request for Security Assessment’ form and a copy
of the completed personal background information form with all hardcopy requests to ASIO
from Commonwealth authorised agencies or AGD on behalf of a State or Territory agency.
AGSVA will lodge electronic requests which include a copy of the electronic personal
information forms.
205. If the vetting agency holds or subsequently receives any other information which may have a
bearing on the security assessment, including interview reports, this information is to be
included with the request or, if subsequently received, forwarded to ASIO.
206. ASIO will return an endorsed copy of the request form to the vetting agency but will not return
any other documents. Vetting agencies should only send original documents to ASIO in
exceptional circumstances. Vetting agencies should discuss such cases with ASIO before original
documents are dispatched.
207. ASIO will not assess incomplete forms. Personal background information forms are to be
completed in full before being submitted for ASIO assessment.
208. ASIO has developed the following guidelines for accepting paper personal background
information forms. Where the form was certified as completed:
less than six months ago: ASIO will proceed as usual
more than six but less than 12 months ago: ASIO will proceed with the assessment
provided the vetting agency has contacted the subject to confirm no details have
changed. The vetting agency should note the contact with the subject for this
information on the forms whether or not there are any amendments. The assessing
officer should note and date any changes of circumstances or note where there are no
changes, or
more than 12 months ago: The clearance subject should complete a new personal
background information form. ASIO will only accept forms over 12 months old in
exceptional circumstances. In such cases the assessing officer should discuss the
circumstances with ASIO before sending the forms.
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209. ASIO will not provide security assessments from personal background information forms that do
not meet these criteria. For further information relating to this process contact ASIO at
Requesting priority handling for an ASIO security assessment
210. Requests for urgent priority assessments will not be given priority unless there are exceptional
circumstances. Vetting agencies should contact ASIO to discuss these cases prior to sending
assessment requests.
211. Urgent priority requests for ASIO security assessments are processed by ASIO before routine
requests. Commonwealth authorised agencies and AGD should only request urgent handling
where there is a critical requirement for rapid resolution of the clearance. Such circumstances
may include, but are not limited, short notice clearances for overseas postings or deployments
and for national security operational purposes. The lack of organisational planning does not
constitute exceptional circumstances.
212. Vetting agencies should include a brief explanation of the urgency and the date by which a
response is required with all requests for priority handling.
Security assessment response
213. ASIO will provide one of three responses in accordance with Part IV of the ASIO Act:
Non prejudicial - ASIO does not object to a person having access
Qualified - ASIO does not object to a person having access, but that they have
information relevant to security that the agency should be aware of, and
Adverse - ASIO recommends that the person not be granted access or that his/her access
be limited or restricted in some way. ASIO will provide reasoning for this decision.
214. The vetting agency should consider ASIO’s response in conjunction with other information
presented in the clearance process before making a recommendation to a delegate.
Requesting an ASIO security re-assessment upon security clearance revalidation or
upgrade.
215. An ASIO security re-assessment is required for the revalidation of Negative and Positive Vetting
clearances.
216. Where a clearance subject has previously undergone an ASIO security assessment for a baseline
security clearance, the vetting agency should seek another security assessment if there has
been a significant change of circumstances, including but not limited to changes that may have
a bearing on the clearance subject’s security assessment. Vetting agencies are to consult with
ASIO to determine this requirement. For further information see section 8.1 of the Personnel
Security Guidelines – Agency Personnel Security Responsibilities.
217. If, the vetting agency is unsure whether to request a new ASIO security assessment, the vetting
agency may email the query to [email protected].
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218. A new ASIO security assessment is required for all upgrades of clearances. For example a new
ASIO security assessment is required for upgrades from Baseline to a Negative Vetting level
clearance, an upgrade from a Negative Vetting level 1 to a Negative Vetting level 2, or any
upgrade to Positive Vetting.
219. Requests for an ASIO security re-assessment from Commonwealth authorised agencies or AGD
on behalf of a State or Territory agency should have attached a completed ‘Review of Security
Assessment’ form and a copy of the completed current personal background information forms.
The current personal background information form is to be completed in full. A change of
circumstances form and a previous personal background information form is not sufficient. The
guidelines regarding the age of a personal background information form apply, for further
information see section 4.8.3 - ASIO security assessments. Vetting agencies should include any
other information relevant to security. The AGSVA will electronically lodge an updated personal
background information form.
4.8.2 Police Records Checks (PRCs) Australian PRCs
220. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) or CrimTrac carry out Australian PRCs in accordance with the
Spent Convictions Scheme. The scheme allows the clearance subject to withhold disclosure of
spent convictions unless an exclusion has been granted. For further information see the OAIC –
Spent Conviction Scheme Fact Sheet.
Level of PRC
221. Under the Spent Convictions Scheme, a Full Exclusion PRC under Commonwealth legislation
requires that all criminal offences be declared. Under a Partial Exclusion, only specified types of
offences need be declared. Where there is No Exclusion, the Spent Convictions Scheme applies
to all criminal offences and the clearance subject only needs to provide details of applicable
offences.
222. A ‘Full Exclusion’ PRC is to be sought for all new and revalidated Negative Vetting clearances.
Clearance subjects are to detail all convictions, regardless of the date of conviction or nature of
offence, as well as any cases currently pending or before the courts.
223. For Baseline Vetting clearances a ‘No Exclusion’ PRC is to be sought. Clearance subjects are not
required to divulge convictions, if any of the below conditions are applicable to that conviction:
it has been 10 years from the date of the conviction (or 5 years for juvenile offenders)
the individual was not sentenced to imprisonment for more than 30 months
the individual has not re-offended during the 10 year (5 years for juvenile offenders)
waiting period
a statutory or regulatory exclusion does not apply
224. For further information see the AFP’s publication on the Spent Conviction Scheme.
225. Assessing officers should be aware of sponsoring agencies that may have ‘Partial or Full
Exclusions’ under the agency’s legislation. Where the sponsoring agency undertakes a Partial or
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Full Exclusion PRC, it is considered an agency-specific character check. However, the sponsoring
agency may, with the clearance subject’s approval, provide the vetting agency with a copy of a
‘Nil Report’ result in lieu of a ‘No Exclusion’ PRC in the clearance process.
PRCs from other countries
226. The assessing officer may request a clearance subject to seek a PRC from another country when
the clearance subject has spent a considerable portion of the checking period living in another
country outside Australia, either working or travelling. It may not be worthwhile undertaking
checks for short periods outside Australia.
227. Before seeking an overseas PRC, the vetting agency should consider any consequences for the
clearance subject if that country is alerted that the individual may be undergoing a clearance
process in Australia.
228. In some countries the accuracy and reliability of a PRC is questionable. In such circumstances it
may be preferable to verify the clearance subject’s honesty and reliability through additional
referee checks.
229. For details on obtaining an overseas police certificate, see the Department of Immigrations and
Border Protection - Character and police certificate requirements and the Centre for the
Protection of National Infrastructure guide Overseas criminal record checks.
Action if a conviction is recorded
230. When a PRC is returned with an undisclosed conviction recorded, vetting agencies are to
conduct an interview for cause.
231. Undisclosed convictions that are closer to the present date may raise concerns over the
clearance subject’s honesty.
232. On occasion, the AFP or CrimTrac may provide incorrect responses, e.g. where there is a
number of people with the same or similar name and the same date of birth. The vetting agency
should follow the AFP or CrimTrac resolution processes before questioning the clearance
subject’s integrity. Another PRC may be required if there are discrepancies.
4.8.3 Australian entry/exit check (Immigration movement records)
233. If the assessing officer needs to verify a clearance subject’s entry to or exit from Australia, the
Department of Immigration and Border Protection can provide a movement record of all
Australian entries and exits. For further information see the Department of Immigration and
Border Protection - Movement Records.
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5. Personnel security adjudicative guidelines
234. The personnel security adjudicative guidelines have been developed to assist assessing officers
and delegates assess the clearance subject against common factor areas that may impact on the
clearance subject’s suitability to hold a security clearance. They apply to considerations for
initial or continued suitability for access to security classified material.
235. In evaluating the relevance of any conduct, the assessing officer and delegate should consider
the:
nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct
circumstances surrounding the conduct including the degree of willing and/or
knowledgeable participation
frequency and currency of the conduct
clearance subject's age and maturity at the time of the conduct
presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioural changes
motivation for the conduct
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress, and
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
236. Clearance subjects must be assessed on their own merits, and the final determination remains
the responsibility of the delegate. Any doubt concerning the clearance subject’s suitability must
be resolved in favour of the national interest.
5.1 Suitability to hold a clearance
237. A clearance subject is suitable to hold a security clearance at any level, where it is established,
to the appropriate degree of satisfaction, that the clearance subject possesses and
demonstrates an appropriate level of integrity, i.e., a soundness of character and moral
principle. In the security context, integrity is defined as a range of character traits that a
clearance subject should possess and demonstrate in order for the Government to have
confidence in that clearance subject’s ability to protect security classified resources. These
character traits are:
honesty – truthful and frank, and do not have a history of unlawful behaviour
trustworthiness – responsibility and reliability and maturity
maturity – capable of honest self-appraisal and able to cope with stress; age is not
necessarily a good indicator of maturity
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tolerance - an appreciation of the broader perspective even when holding strong
personal views, able to remain impartial and flexible (an inability to accept other
peoples’ life choices or respect cultures can indicate intolerance); and accept differences
in people, opinions or situations through respect, understanding and empathy.
resilience – ability to adapt well in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats or
significant sources of stress, and
loyalty – a commitment to the democratic processes of the Australia Government,
loyalty is not confined to the nation but also includes the objectives, ethos and values of
the working environment (strong political views incompatible with the Australian
Constitution may put in doubt a person’s loyalty).
238. Reference to a number of factor areas of the clearance subject’s life, including personal
relationships, employment history, behaviour and financial habits contributes to an assessment
of a clearance subject’s integrity. Agencies should be confident that clearance subjects who are
responsible for security classified resources possess a sound and stable character.
239. Clearance subjects must also demonstrate that they are not unduly vulnerable to influence or
coercion.
5.2 Factor Areas
240. The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuance of a security clearance is
consistent with the national interest must be an overall common sense determination based
upon careful consideration of the whole person in the context of the following:
External loyalties, influences and associations
Personal relationships and conduct
Financial considerations
Alcohol and drug usage
Criminal history and conduct
Security attitudes and violations, and
Mental health disorders.
241. These factor areas may have a bearing on one or more of a clearance subject’s character traits.
242. Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an
unfavourable determination, the clearance subject may be denied the clearance if available
information reflects a current or recurring pattern of:
questionable judgment
dishonesty
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intolerance/ inflexibility
immaturity
untrustworthiness
irresponsibility
vulnerability to influence or coercion, or
emotionally unstable behaviour.
243. Reliable and significant adverse information may lead the delegate to deny the clearance.
244. When information of security concern becomes known about an clearance subject who
currently has access to security classified material, the delegate and assessing officer should
consider whether the person:
voluntarily reported the information
responded to questions truthfully and completely
sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate
resolved or appears likely to favourably resolve the security concern, and
has demonstrated positive changes in behaviour and employment before determining
whether clearance suspension or revocation is warranted.
245. If after evaluating material of security concern, the delegate decides that the material is not
serious enough to warrant a recommendation of denial or revocation of the security clearance,
it may be appropriate to recommend granting the clearance with a warning that future
incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.
5.2.1 External loyalties, influences and associations The concerns
246. All people working on behalf of the Australian Government must have a commitment to the
democratic process and a respect for the processes by which the elected government functions.
If clearance subjects express political or personal views incompatible with Australia’s
constitutional, democratic system of government, doubts arise about whether they can remain
loyal to the Australian Government. Conflicts of view or conscientious objections could arise in
some cases. However, the issue is whether clearance subjects recognise their individual
responsibilities to their employing agency, the elected government and the public interest.
247. When a clearance subject acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country
over Australia, then he/she may be prone to act in a way that is harmful to the national interest
of Australia.
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248. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it
poses a conflict with a clearance subject's security responsibilities and could create an increased
risk of unauthorised disclosure of security classified information.
249. A security risk may exist when the clearance subject or their immediate family, including
cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or
obligation are not Australian citizens or may be subject to duress. These situations could create
the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of security classified
information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries
are also relevant to security determinations if they make the clearance subject potentially
vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
250. Involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any act of:
espionage
sabotage
sedition
terrorism
treason
politically motivated violence
communal violence
attacks on Australia’s defence system, or
acts of foreign interference
251. Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing,
any of the above acts.
252. Association or sympathy with persons or organisations that advocate, threaten, or use force or
violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
overthrow or influence the Australian Government or any state or local government
prevent federal, state, or local government personnel from performing their official
duties
gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, state, or local government,
and/or
prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of Australia or
of any state or territory.
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253. Contact with a family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is
a citizen of, or resident in, a foreign country, if that contact creates an unacceptably heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
254. Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict
of interest between the clearance subject's obligation to protect security classified resources
and the clearance subject's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that
information.
255. Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that
relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign or criminal inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion.
256. A substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-
owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the clearance subject to heightened
risk of foreign influence or exploitation.
257. Failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national.
258. Unauthorised association with a suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign
intelligence service.
259. Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the
vulnerability of the clearance subject to possible future exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion.
260. Conduct, especially while travelling outside Australia, which may make the clearance subject
vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government or
country.
261. Exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming an Australian
citizen. This includes but is not limited to:
possession of a current foreign passport
military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country
accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other such benefits from a
foreign country
residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements
using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country
seeking or holding political office in a foreign country, or
voting in a foreign election.
262. Action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an Australian citizen.
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263. Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of
a foreign person, group, organisation, or government in conflict with Australia’s national
interest.
264. Any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than Australia, for example,
declaration of intent to renounce Australian citizenship, or the renunciation of Australian
citizenship.
265. Any employment or service, whether compensated or voluntary, with:
the government of a foreign country
any foreign national, organisation, or other entity
a representative of any foreign interest
any foreign, domestic, or international organisation, including media, or person engaged
in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defence, foreign affairs,
protected technology or protective security, or
failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is required.
266. Ongoing voluntary association with individuals or groups of an extremist nature e.g. - those that
espouse beliefs incompatible with a liberal democracy.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
267. Mitigating factors may impact one or more areas of concern:
The clearance subject was unaware of the unlawful aims of an individual or organisation
and severed ties upon learning of these.
The clearance subject’s involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of
an organisation such as those referred to in A7.
Involvement in activities of concern occurred for only a short period of time and was
attributable to curiosity or academic interest.
The involvement or association with such activities occurred under such unusual
circumstances, or so much time has elapsed, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the clearance subject’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or loyalty.
The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons
are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it
is unlikely the clearance subject will be placed in a position of having to choose between
the interests of a foreign individual, group, organisation, or government and Australia’s
national interest.
There is no conflict of interest, either because the clearance subject’s sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the
clearance subject has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in Australia
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that they can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favour of Australia’s
national interest.
Contact or communication with foreign citizens is casual and infrequent and there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.
The foreign contacts and activities are on Australian Government business and/or are
approved by the agency security adviser.
The clearance subject has promptly complied with agency requirements regarding the
reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organisations from a
foreign country.
The value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is
such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used to influence,
manipulate, or pressure the clearance subject.
Where reasons for possession or acquisition of multiple citizenship are not a security
concern, including, but not limited to:
o multiple citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign
country
o marriage, and
o convenience of travel.
The clearance subject has expressed a willingness to renounce other citizenships.
Exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the
clearance subject became an Australian citizen or when the clearance subject was a
minor.
The use of a foreign passport is approved by the agency security adviser.
The foreign passport has been destroyed, surrendered, or otherwise invalidated.
The vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the Australian Government.
5.2.2 Personal relationships and conduct The concerns
268. Conduct involving questionable judgment, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations can raise questions about the clearance subject's reliability, trustworthiness and
ability to protect security classified information.
269. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security
clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. The
following will normally result in denial or revocation of a security clearance; or administrative
termination of further processing for a security clearance assessment:
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refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate with security
clearance processing, including but not limited to meeting with an assessing officer for a
security interview, completing security and/or consent forms and cooperation with
supplementary evaluations and periodic reviews, or
refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to relevant questions of assessing
officers, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security
determination.
270. Sexual behaviour that involves a criminal offence indicates a personality or emotional disorder
reflects a gross lack of judgment or discretion, or which may subject the clearance subject to
undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise questions about the clearance
subject's reliability, trustworthiness and maturity. Sexual orientation is not relevant to these
considerations.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
271. Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security
questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to determine security clearance
suitability; or providing misleading information assessing officers or other officers involved in
the clearance process.
272. Credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an
adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a
whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candour, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other
characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard official information.
273. Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may
not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all
available information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable loyalty,
trustworthiness, honesty, maturity, tolerance or vulnerability to coercion or influence. This
includes but is not limited to consideration of:
untrustworthy or unreliable behaviour including breach of client confidentiality, release
of proprietary information, unauthorised release of sensitive corporate or other official
government information
disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behaviour in the workplace
a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, or
evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources.
274. Sexual behaviour of a criminal nature, whether or not the clearance subject has been
prosecuted.
275. A pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual behaviour that the person is unable
to stop or that may be symptomatic of a personality disorder.
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276. Sexual behaviour that causes the clearance subject to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or
duress (refer to guideline G).
277. Personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as:
engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or
community standing, or
while in another country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is
legal in that country but illegal in Australia and may serve as a basis for exploitation or
pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other group.
278. Violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the clearance subject to the employer
as a condition of employment.
279. Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns2
280. Mitigating factors may impact one or more areas of concern:
The behaviour occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no evidence of
subsequent conduct of a similar nature.
The behaviour no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or influence.
The clearance subject made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts.
The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused by or
associated with improper or inadequate advice of government officers or legal counsel.
Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information,
the clearance subject cooperated fully and truthfully.
The behaviour or offence is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behaviour is so
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the clearance subject's current reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment.
The clearance subject has acknowledged the behaviour and obtained counselling to
change the behaviour or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors,
circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate
behaviour. There is evidence that this treatment has been effective and such behaviour is
unlikely to recur.
2 The assessing officer and delegate should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct or mental health
disorders, in determining how to resolve any security concerns raised by sexual behaviour.
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The clearance subject has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability.
Association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or occurs under
circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the clearance subject's reliability,
trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations.
5.2.3 Financial considerations The concerns
281. Failure or inability to live within one's means, satisfy debts, or meet financial obligations may
indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations.
This may raise questions about a clearance subject's honesty, trustworthiness, maturity, and
vulnerability to coercion or influence.
282. A clearance subject who is financially overextended may be at a heightened risk of engaging in
illegal acts including espionage to generate funds. This risk is further heightened if the financial
difficulties have arisen from compulsive behaviour, e.g. gambling.
283. Unwillingness to pay debts where means are available may indicate untrustworthiness or lack of
conscience regarding obligations.
284. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a concern as it may
indicate proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
285. Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts.
286. Indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending and the absence of any evidence of
willingness or intent to pay the debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt.
287. A history of not meeting financial obligations.
288. Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, theft, fraud, tax evasion or other
intentional breaches of trust.
289. Consistent spending beyond one's means, which may be indicated by excessive indebtedness,
significant negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis.
290. Financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling addiction, or other
matters indicating compulsive behaviour or emotional or psychological instability that may have
implications for the clearance subject’s maturity, trustworthiness and vulnerability to coercion
or influence (refer to guidelines D and G).
291. Repeated failure to meet Australian taxation requirements.
292. Unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard of living, increase in net worth, or
money transfers that cannot be explained by subject's known legal sources of income.
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293. Compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an unsuccessful attempt to stop gambling,
‘chasing losses’ (i.e. increasing the bets or returning another day in an effort to get even),
concealment of gambling losses, borrowing money to fund gambling or pay gambling debts,
family conflict or other problems caused by gambling.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
294. Mitigating factors may impact one or more areas of concern:
The behaviour happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the clearance
subject's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.
The conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's
control (e.g. loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency,
or a death, divorce or separation), and the clearance subject acted responsibly.
The person has received or is receiving counselling for the problem and/or there are
clear indications that the problem is being resolved and/or is under control.
The clearance subject initiated good-faith efforts to repay overdue creditors or otherwise
resolve debts.
The clearance subject has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the debt and
provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue.
The affluence resulted from a legal source of income.
5.2.4 Alcohol and drug usage The concerns
295. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the
failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about a clearance subject's reliability and
trustworthiness and ability to maintain discretion.
296. Use of illegal drugs or misuse of prescription drugs can raise questions about a clearance
subject's trustworthiness and honesty, both because it may impair judgment and because it
raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and
regulations. Use of illegal drugs or misuse of prescription drugs may also make the clearance
subject vulnerable to coercion or influence.
297. Drugs are mood and behaviour altering substances and include, but are not limited to, drugs,
materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in Schedule VI of the Customs
Act 1901, and inhalants and other similar substances.
298. Drug abuse is the use of an illegal drug, or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from
approved medical direction.
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Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
299. Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting,
child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of
whether the clearance subject has been diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent.
300. Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for duty in an intoxicated or impaired
condition, or excessive drinking while at work.
301. Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment.
302. Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g. physician, clinical psychologist, or
psychiatrist) of alcohol, or drug abuse or dependence.
303. Identification of alcohol or drug abuse or dependence by an accredited clinical social worker
who is a staff member of a recognised alcohol or drug treatment program.
304. Relapse after diagnosis of alcohol or drug abuse or dependence and completion of an alcohol or
drug rehabilitation program.
305. Criminal charges relating to alcohol or drug abuse or possession.
306. Failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol or drug education, evaluation, treatment, or
abstinence.
307. Any drug abuse
308. Testing positive for illegal drug use.
309. Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or
distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia.
310. Expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to
discontinue drug use.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
311. Mitigating factors may impact one or more areas of concern:
So much time has passed, or the behaviour was so infrequent, or it happened under such
unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the clearance
subject's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.
The clearance subject is participating in an alcohol counselling or treatment program, has
no history of previous treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress.
o the clearance subject acknowledges his or her alcohol dependence or abuse and
has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient alcohol counselling or
rehabilitation along with any required aftercare
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o has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as adherence
to a program, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organisation, and
o has received a favourable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or an
accredited clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognised alcohol
treatment program.
A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as:
o disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts
o changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used
o an appropriate period of abstinence, and
o a signed statement of intent with automatic review for cause of clearance for any
violation.
Abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness during which these
drugs were prescribed, and the abuse has since ended.
Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including but not
limited to, rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a
favourable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or an accredited clinical
social worker who is a staff member of a recognised drug treatment program.
5.2.5 Criminal history and conduct The concerns
312. Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, maturity
and honesty. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply
with laws, rules and regulations.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
313. A criminal offence, or multiple lesser offences, or a conviction in an Australian or foreign court,
including a military court-martial, for a crime.
314. Discharge or dismissal from the Australian Defence Force or police force under adverse
conditions.
315. Credible allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was
formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted.
316. The clearance subject is currently on parole or probation.
317. Violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-mandated rehabilitation
program.
318. Voluntary association with criminals.
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Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
319. Mitigating factors may impact one or more areas of concern:
So much time has elapsed since the criminal behaviour happened, or it happened under
such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the
clearance subject's reliability, honesty, trustworthiness or good judgment.
The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no
longer present in the person's life.
Persuasive evidence that the person did not commit the offence or the conviction for the
offence was subsequently overturned.
There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to the passage of
time without recurrence of criminal activity, evidence of remorse or restitution, job
training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community
involvement.
5.2.6 Security violations The concerns
320. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with procedures, rules and regulations for protecting
security classified or other sensitive information, including on information and communications
technology (ICT) systems, raises doubt about a clearance subject's trustworthiness, judgment,
reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious security
concern.
321. ICT systems include all related computer hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the
communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of security
classified information.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
322. The unauthorised:
viewing
disclosure
collecting
storing
handling
destruction
manipulation, and/or
modification of official or personal information.
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323. Deliberate disregard of agency procedures or guidelines for the handling, use and storage of
official or personal information.
324. Copying official or personal information in a manner designed to conceal or remove
classification or other document control markings.
325. Viewing or downloading information from a secure system beyond the clearance subject’s
need-to-know.
326. Any failure to comply with rules for the protection of security classified or other sensitive
information.
327. Negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counselling by management.
328. Failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in damage to national security,
regardless of whether it was deliberate or negligent.
329. Illegal or unauthorised:
entry into any ICT system
modification
destruction
manipulation
and/or denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in an ICT
system.
330. Use of any ICT system to gain unauthorised access to another system or to a compartmented
area within the same system.
331. Downloading, storing, or transmitting security classified information on or to any unauthorised
software, hardware, or ICT system
332. Unauthorised use of a government or other ICT system.
333. Introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to or from any
ICT system without authorisation, when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or
regulations.
334. Any misuse of ICT, whether deliberate or negligent, that results in damage to the national
security.
335. Misuse of both Government and private information and ICT systems are of concern.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
336. Mitigating factors may impact one or more areas of concern:
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So much time has elapsed since the behaviour, or it has happened so infrequently or
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on
the clearance subject's current reliability, honesty, trustworthiness, or good judgement.
The clearance subject responded favourably to counselling or remedial security training
and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security
responsibilities.
The security violations were due to improper or inadequate training.
The misuse was minor and done only in the interest of a bona fide emergency or
operational imperative when no other timely alternative was readily available.
The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a prompt, good-faith
effort to correct the situation and notify a supervisor.
5.2.7 Emotional/Mental health issues The concerns
337. Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or
trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under
this guideline.
338. A duly qualified mental health professional (e.g. clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) employed
by, or acceptable to and approved by the agency, should be consulted when evaluating
potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this guideline.
339. No negative inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely based on
seeking mental health counselling.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
340. Behaviour that casts doubt on a clearance subject's judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness that
is not covered under any other guideline, including but not limited to emotionally unstable,
irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or bizarre behaviour.
341. An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the clearance subject has a
condition not covered under any other guideline that may impair judgment, reliability, or
trustworthiness.
342. The clearance subject has failed to follow treatment advice related to a diagnosed emotional,
mental, or personality condition, e.g. failure to take prescribed medication.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
343. Mitigating factors may impact one or more areas of concern:
The identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the clearance subject
has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan.
The clearance subject has voluntarily entered a counselling or treatment program for a
condition that is amenable to treatment and the clearance subject is currently receiving
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counselling or treatment with a favourable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health
professional.
Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by, or
acceptable to and approved by the agency seeking the clearance that a clearance
subject's previous condition is under control or in remission, and has a low probability of
recurrence or exacerbation.
The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g. one caused by death,
illness, or marital break-up), the situation has been resolved, and the clearance subject
no longer shows indications of emotional instability.
There is no indication of a current problem.
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6. Assessing officers recommendation to the delegate
344. Vetting agencies need to apply procedural fairness without compromising the national
interest.
345. The assessing officer is to make a recommendation to the delegate, whether to grant or deny
a clearance.
346. The assessing officer should remove from the PSF any information not relevant to the
current clearance process before passing it to the delegate. For further information on
obligation under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) or www.oaic.gov.au.
6.1 Meeting the principles of procedural fairness
347. When the principles of procedural fairness are applied in a security clearance process, it
reduces the likelihood of requests for review or appeal and, where an appeal or request has
been lodged, of the process being declared flawed and/or a new clearance process being
ordered.
348. If the assessing officer intends to recommend against the approval of a clearance at the level
sought or to recommend that the clearance be approved with specific clearance
maintenance requirements, the clearance subject is to be given a chance to respond before
the final recommendation is made.
349. Any information the assessing officer uses to make a decision should be substantiated,
particularly when the information is from a referee who may be biased or have a conflict of
interest.
350. Vetting agencies should provide the clearance subject with a written statement identifying
any concerns. Vetting agencies should give the clearance subject a reasonable period
(normally two weeks from the date of advice) to respond to the concerns before a final
recommendation is made.
351. The clearance subject’s response is to be provided to the delegate so she/he may make an
informed decision based on all the material available.
352. If a procedural fairness issue involving an outsourced vetting services provider arises, vetting
agencies should consider whether the outsourced vetting service provider is able to manage
the issue.
6.2 Procedural Fairness Guidelines
6.2.1 What is procedural fairness?
353. Procedural fairness is concerned with the procedures used by a decision-maker, rather than
the actual outcome reached. It requires a fair and proper procedure be used when making a
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decision. A decision-maker who follows a fair procedure is more likely to reach a fair and
correct decision.
354. The two primary rules of procedural fairness are:
‘the hearing rule’ – which requires that a person be given an opportunity to be heard
and express their views to a decision maker; and
‘the bias rule’ which requires a decision maker to be impartial.
6.2.2 Is there a difference between natural justice and procedural fairness?
355. The term procedural fairness is thought to be preferable when referring to administrative
decision-making because the term natural justice is associated with procedures used by
courts of law. However, the terms have similar meaning and are commonly used
interchangeably. For consistency, the term procedural fairness is used in these guidelines.
6.2.3 Procedural fairness and security clearance decisions
356. Vetting agencies must apply the rules of procedural fairness to security clearance decisions
which are adverse to a clearance subject, including decisions to deny or revoke a security
clearance.
357. As part of the security clearance decision making process, and in accordance with the
‘hearing rule’, where an adverse decision is proposed to be made, vetting agencies must tell
the clearance subject the case to be met (to the fullest extent possible consistent with
national security) and give them the chance to reply before the Delegate makes a decision.
Specifically, vetting agencies must ensure that the clearance subject:
is provided with an opportunity to reply
is told the case to be met before preparing his/her reply, including being provided
with a description of the proposed decision, the criteria for making that decision and
the information on which any such decision would be based. Negative information an
agency has about the clearance subject should be disclosed to him/her to the extent
possible consistent with national security. It is sufficient that a summary of the
information being considered be provided to the clearance subject, original
documents and the identity of confidential sources do not have to be provided
is provided with a reasonable opportunity to consider their position and prepare a
response, and
have his/her reply considered by the Delegate before the decision is made.
358. Further, the ‘bias rule’ requires that a delegate making a security clearance decision:
not have an interest (either direct or indirect) in the matter being decided, and
not bring, or appear to bring, a biased or prejudiced mind to making the decision.
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A delegate must be, and appear to be, impartial. Vetting agencies must establish
processes to ensure application of the ‘bias rule’.
6.2.4 How does procedural fairness apply to a clearance subject who may be negatively affected by a Delegate’s decision?
359. If a clearance subject will be negatively affected by a Delegate’s decision he/she is entitled to
expect that the assessing officer and Delegate will follow the rules of procedural fairness
before reaching a conclusion. In particular, a clearance subject is entitled to:
be told the case to be met (for example, that an agency is considering denying or
ceasing a clearance, or imposing conditions on the clearance), including being
provided with a description of the proposed decision, the criteria for making that
decision and the information on which any such decision would be based. Any
negative or prejudicial information relating to the clearance subject should be
disclosed to him/her to the extent possible consistent with national security, and
an opportunity to reply to the case to be met. A clearance subject will be invited to
provide a written reply or submission. In very exceptional circumstances, a delegate
may determine that it is appropriate that a face to face meeting be facilitated.
360. In submitting a reply to the delegate, a clearance subject may, among other things, wish to:
deny the allegations
provide evidence she/he believes disproves the allegations
explain the allegations or present an innocent explanation, or
provide details of any special circumstances she/he believe should be taken into
account.
6.2.5 How does procedural fairness apply to an assessing officer?
361. An assessing officer must take into account the requirements of procedural fairness during
the clearance process including when undertaking a security clearance assessment, and
preparing a recommendation for a Delegate.
362. In making a recommendation to a Delegate, an assessing officer should:
consider all submissions made by a clearance subject
take into account only relevant information
ensure that any recommendation made is based on evidence that is relevant and
supports the recommendation
act fairly and impartially
conduct the clearance process without unnecessary delay, and
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ensure that a full record of the clearance process has been made.
6.2.6 How does procedural fairness apply to the Delegate?
363. In making a security clearance decision a Delegate must comply with the rules of procedural
fairness and ensure that:
a clearance subject has been provided with an opportunity to be heard, or provide a
clearance subject with an opportunity to make submissions if this has not already
occurred, and
he or she acts fairly and impartially. This includes ensuring that from an onlooker’s
perspective there is no reasonable perception of bias on the part of the Delegate.
6.3 ASIO adverse or qualified security
assessments
364. If ASIO provides an adverse or qualified security assessment, the assessing officer should
inform the clearance subject of that security assessment, subject to any Attorney-General’s
Certificate being issued.
365. The Attorney-General, may issue a certificate that states either:
the notice should be withheld from the person subject to the security assessment, as
it is essential to the security of the nation, or
the disclosure of the grounds contained in the security assessment, if released to the
person subject to the security assessment, would be prejudicial to the interest of
security.
366. For further information see section 38 of the ASIO Act.
6.3.1 Attorney-General’s Certificate
367. In accordance with the Attorney-General’s Certificate, ASIO will provide guidance to the
vetting agency on what information can be given to the clearance subject and the sponsoring
agency about the adverse or qualified assessment.
6.4 Making a recommendation
368. Vetting agencies are to resolve any doubts about the clearance subject’s suitability in the
national interest prior to making a recommendation.
369. The assessing officer should review the clearance subjects PSF before making a
recommendation. The assessing officer should ensure that all issues have been identified
and all possible areas of concern mitigated. If questions remain, supplementary checks
should be undertaken.
370. The recommendation should be supported by a summary of relevant information, including:
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any gaps in the checking period where supporting documents were not available, how the gaps were covered/mitigated and what supplementary checks were undertaken to fill or explain the gaps
any anomalies or issues identified, how those anomalies and issues were mitigated and what supplementary checks were undertaken in relation to the anomalies or issues
any issues or anomalies that could not be mitigated after supplementary checks
an adverse or qualified ASIO assessment, and
any recommended clearance maintenance requirements and the reasons for recommending those requirements.
371. It is not necessary to list all checks undertaken if these are normally part of the clearance
process and no issues were identified.
372. An assessing officer should recommend that:
the clearance be granted at the level sought, with or without specific clearance maintenance requirements, or
the clearance be denied.
373. Where a security clearance is not recommended, the assessing officer should specify how
long before a new clearance process can be considered or when a review can be undertaken,
as well as the reasons this recommendation.
374. The vetting agency should advise the delegate of the review and appeal processes open to
the clearance subject. The delegate should also be aware the clearance subject may appeal
in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal against any assessment or any decision made as a
result of the ASIO assessment.
375. The vetting agency should ensure the clearance subject has been:
advised of any adverse or qualified ASIO assessment, taking into account any restrictions imposed by an Attorney-General’s Certificate, and of the appeals process through the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and/or
given a chance to respond to any other suitability concerns. Any response by the clearance subject should be included on the PSF.
6.4.1 Recommending a clearance with specific clearance maintenance requirements
376. Where there are ongoing concerns, but they are not sufficient to cancel the clearance, the
vetting agency may, after consultation with the sponsoring agency recommend specific
clearance maintenance requirements to mitigate these concerns.
377. All ongoing concerns are to be resolved in favour of the national interest.
378. Specific clearance maintenance may include, but is not limited to:
provision of missing documents that could not be provided within a reasonable period but are covered by a statutory declaration
undertaking additional checks where there have been minor incident(s) in the checking period and confirmation that the incident(s) were isolated events
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additional financial checks where there is a concern that the clearance subject may be at risk because of financial hardship or where there has either been reluctant to service debt or difficulty servicing debts
additional medical checks where there is concern over possible drug or alcohol abuse
additional or ongoing medical or other professional checks where there is concern about physical or mental health issues that may affect the clearance subject’s suitability to access classified material, and/or
more regular revalidations than the Personnel Security Management Protocol requires for the level of clearance.
379. The vetting agency should include a timeframe for meeting any time critical clearance
maintenance requirements.
380. The vetting agency should advise the sponsoring agency’s security adviser of any
recommendation to limit the clearance subject’s access so that the sponsoring agency can
take appropriate/necessary action to limit, withdraw or closely monitor the clearance
subject’s access while the delegate is considering their decision.
6.4.2 Recommending against a clearance
381. In recommending that a clearance not be granted, the assessing officer is to be confident
that the clearance subject poses a risk to the national interest and does not meet the
minimum requirements for the requested clearance level.
382. In finalising the recommendation to the delegate, the assessing officer needs to clearly
identify areas of specific concern and mitigations to the delegate. The delegate also needs to
include any further information or comment provided by the clearance subject in accordance
with procedural fairness. For further information see section 6.2 – procedural fairness
guidelines.
6.5 Quality assurance
383. A different assessing officer should review the completed clearance before the PSF is
forwarded to the delegate. This is to ensure that all issues have been identified and any
mitigation taken into account.
384. A senior assessing officer should review all complex cases.
385. If the assessing officer reviewing the clearance determines the assessment underpinning the
vetting recommendation or the process is incomplete the clearance should be returned to
the original assessing officer to address the concerns before the clearance goes to the
delegate.
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7. Delegate’s decision 386. The delegate is to apply procedural fairness in all decisions. Before making a decision on
granting a clearance, delegates are to refer to:
section 5 – personnel security adjudicative considerations, and
section 6.2– procedural fairness guidelines.
387. If the delegate is not satisfied that all issues raised in the clearance process have been
addressed or if they do not agree with the assessing officer’s recommendation, they should
return the clearance to the assessing officer for further action.
388. If the delegate is aware of relevant additional information that is not in the PSF, the delegate
is to return the PSF to the assessing officer to re-evaluate the clearance subject’s suitability,
taking into consideration the additional information.
389. A different delegate to the original delegate should review the revised assessment. For
further information (see the Bias Rule in section 6.2– procedural fairness guidelines).
7.1 Approval conditional to specific clearance
maintenance
390. Where the delegate believes there are unresolved concerns about the clearance subject’s
suitability that can be mitigated by appropriate clearance maintenance requirements, they
may grant a security clearance with those specific requirements. The clearance maintenance
requirements may be in addition to any recommendation made by the assessing officer.
391. The delegate should return the PSF to the assessing officer to complete this additional
action. The delegate should indicate their reasons for the additional clearance maintenance
requirements.
392. Any variation by the delegate of the assessing officer’s recommendation is to be recorded on
the PSF, including the delegate’s reasons. The PSF should also record what actions were
taken by the delegate to provide procedural fairness.
7.2 Documenting the delegate’s decision and
reasons
393. A clearance subject may request a review where a clearance has been denied, granted or
where specific clearance maintenance requirements have been imposed. For this reason, it is
imperative that the delegate fully and clearly document their decision and the reasons for
making that decision. The vetting agency is to retain this decision on the PSF.
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8. Advising the clearance subject and sponsoring agency of the clearance
8.1 Clearance subject notification requirements
394. The vetting agency is to advise the clearance subject in writing as soon as possible of the
outcome of the clearance process. The letter of advice is to include:
the level of clearance the subject is being assessed against
the grant, grant-conditional, cancel or denial date
any eligibility (background or citizenship) waiver granted in the clearance process and any restrictions that is placed on the clearance subject’s access because of the waiver
any specific clearance maintenance requirements imposed as part of the clearance
the date for revalidation, and
details of the review and appeals processes open to the clearance subject (if the clearance has been denied, canceled, or granted -conditional).
8.1.1 Additional requirements when a clearance is cancelled or denied
395. Unless it is not in the national interest, the vetting agency should advise the clearance
subject, in writing, of the reasons for the clearance being denied or cancelled.
396. Vetting agencies need to include information about the review and appeal processes open to
the clearance subject in the letter of advice. Vetting agencies should give a reasonable
period to lodge an appeal or request a review. The period will depend on the complexity of
the issues and any operational constraints within the sponsoring agency.
397. Vetting agencies are to include advice on when the vetting agency would be prepared to
consider a new clearance process.
8.2 Sponsoring agency notification requirements
398. The vetting agency is to advise the sponsoring agency’s security section of the clearance
outcome.
399. Vetting agencies are to advise sponsoring agencies of any information provided as part of the
vetting process including that which is related to any vulnerabilities or risk factors or ongoing
clearance maintenance that may impact on a person’s suitability to access Australian
Government resources or where risk mitigation measures are required.
400. Vetting agencies are to consult with sponsoring agencies before granting a security clearance
that imposes additional clearance maintenance conditions.
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401. If mitigation is not satisfied by agreement to additional clearance maintenance conditions by
either the clearance subject or sponsoring agency, the vetting agency is to deny the
clearance
8.2.1 Where a clearance is denied or cancelled
402. The vetting agency should ensure that any reasons provided to a sponsoring agency for a
clearance not being granted, or being granted at lower level, is in accordance with the APP’s.
403. The vetting agency is to advise the sponsoring agency, when concerns about the clearance
subject’s suitability are identified, so that access to security classified information or
resources can be withdrawn or restricted pending the outcome of the clearance process. The
vetting agency is to confirm with the sponsoring agency that access needs to be withdrawn
or restricted.
404. Vetting agencies should advise sponsoring agencies not to terminate a clearance subject’s
employment before any reviews or appeals are finalised. In accordance with its human
resources policies, the sponsoring agency may redeploy or suspend the clearance subject
during this period.
405. The vetting agency is to advise the sponsoring agency’s security section where the clearance
subject has advised that they will appeal an ASIO assessment or seek a review of the
clearance decision.
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9. Review or appeal of a clearance decision
406. Any decision to deny, cancel or grant - conditional clearance at a level below that requested
may have implications for the clearance subject’s suitability for employment. For this reason,
such decisions are more likely to be subject to requests for review or appeal.
9.1 Reviewing clearance decisions
407. The denial, grant or cancel of a security clearance, with or without specific clearance
maintenance requirements, is an administrative decision and is reviewable. The avenues for
review vary depending on the applicable vetting agency, sponsoring agency and the status of
the clearance subject.
408. For APS employees administrative review is available through the following processes:
Primary review by the relevant vetting agency — an employee can seek an initial review conducted by the vetting agency. The employee has 120 days from notification of the security decision to request a review under regulation 5.24(1) of the Public Service Regulations 1999.
Secondary review by the Merit Protection Commissioner — an employee can seek an independent review if they are dissatisfied with a decision arising from the vetting agency’s review or have been advised that the matter is not reviewable. An employee has 60 days from the time they are advised of the decision of the relevant vetting agency’s review to make an application for review by the Merit Protection Commissioner under regulation 5.29(1) of the Public Service Regulations 1999. An employee seeking review must lodge their application with the vetting agency. The agency has 14 days to forward the application to the Merit Protection Commissioner with all of the relevant paperwork from the primary review.
409. For the Australian Defence Force (ADF) – members may seek an internal review via the
procedures outlined in Defence Complaints and Resolution Manual which is available to ADF
members.
410. Non-APS employees may have access to internal review procedures set by the relevant vetting
agency.
411. APS and non-APS employees may also lodge a complaint with the Commonwealth
Ombudsman. ADF members can seek review by the Defence Force Ombudsman. An
Ombudsman will generally only investigate a complaint if other review processes have been
completed within the relevant agency. If an employee or ADF member is dissatisfied with the
Ombudsman’s decision whether to investigate a complaint, they can seek an internal review of
the decision within 3 months.
412. In relation to a decision to deny a security clearance, a vetting agency review can confirm the
original decision, direct the application be reassessed, or substitute a new decision.
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413. Secondary review by the Merit Protection Commissioner cannot reverse a decision made by
the delegate, under regulation 5.28 of the Public Service Regulations 1999. Instead, the
Commissioner must make a recommendation to the relevant vetting agency. The agency may
confirm the action, vary it, or set the action aside and substitute a new action in response to
the recommendation under regulation 5.32. The agency must advise the Merit Protection
Commissioner of its decision. If the Merit Protection Commissioner is not satisfied with the
vetting agency’s response, section 33(6) of the Public Service Act 1999 allows for the matter to
be reported to the agency’s minister, the Prime Minister and the Parliament.
414. The clearance subject may also make a formal complaint to:
the Privacy Commissioner, if they feel that there was a breach of the Privacy Act 1988 in the way information was handled, or
the Human Rights Commissioner, if they feel that they have been unfairly discriminated against. Under section 20 of the Human Rights Commission Act 1986, the Commissioner will investigate a complaint or provide written notice explaining why the complaint will not be investigated. If the complaint refers to an action by an intelligence agency, the Commissioner will refer the complaint to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
415. An employee may seek judicial review of a vetting decision in the Federal Court of Australia or
High Court of Australia under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 or section 75(v) of the
Constitution.
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10. Clearance maintenance 416. The vetting agency is responsible for the periodic reassessment and review of the
clearance holder’s ongoing suitability to hold a security clearance.
417. Sponsoring agencies have responsibility for clearance maintenance including ongoing
security awareness training and for advising vetting agencies of any concerns about the
clearance subject, such as:
significant changes of personal circumstances
significant security concerns
patterns of behaviour that demonstrate a disregard for security, and
any security violations or breaches.
10.1 Specific clearance maintenance
requirements
418. Where specific clearance maintenance requirements have been made, the vetting agency
is to document key dates and outcomes. Vetting agencies are to advise clearance holders
and the sponsoring agency of these requirements and key dates. The PSF should also
include details of clearance maintenance requirements yet to be met.
419. The vetting agency is to record the date of completion of any specific requirements.
10.1.1 Specific clearance maintenance arrangements
420. The vetting agency is to advise the clearance holder of any requirement to provide
information relating to the specific maintenance requirements of their clearance, including
any reporting schedules and timeframes. The advice should include:
any documents to be completed by the clearance holder
a list of supporting documents to be provided by the clearance holder
date/time of an interview, if applicable, and
the process for handling a clearance holder that does not cooperate or participate in the clearance maintenance arrangements.
10.1.2 Outcomes of specific clearance maintenance
421. Based on the checks undertaken as part of the clearance maintenance process, the
assessing officer should recommend to the delegate that:
the specific clearance maintenance requirements have been met and can now be finalised, or
clearance maintenance should be continued or repeated, or
the requirements have not been met and access should be reconsidered.
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422. Vetting agencies should cancel the clearance where the clearance subject has not
cooperated in meeting the specific clearance maintenance.
10.1.3 Advising the agency to withdraw access
423. Where specific clearance maintenance requirements have not been met or where the
clearance holder has not participated or cooperated in the process, the vetting agency is to
advise the sponsoring agency to withdraw the clearance holder’s access to security
classified information and resources pending the completion of a review for cause of their
suitability.
10.1.4 Advising the clearance holder of the outcome
424. The vetting agency is to advise the clearance holder of the outcome of the clearance
maintenance process, including any continuing conditions.
425. The vetting agency is to advise the clearance holder where:
the clearance maintenance requirements were not met, or
there are ongoing conditions approved by the delegate that were not part of the original requirements when the clearance was granted.
426. The vetting agency is to advise the clearance holder of any avenues for review of new
clearance maintenance requirements.
427. The vetting agency is to advise the clearance subject and sponsoring agency in writing of
the decision to grant including any risk mitigations, deny, deem ineligible (citizenship or
background) or cancel a security clearance and any conditions imposed.
10.2 Clearance revalidation
428. The vetting agency should commence the revalidation process before the due date so that
the process can be completed by that date. See the Australian Government personnel
security protocol for minimum timeframes and checks required for revalidations.
429. The vetting agency should contact the clearance holder’s agency before commencing a
revalidation to confirm the security clearance requirements. If a higher level clearance is
required, a new clearance process will be necessary.
430. Where the clearance holder has left an agency or, for a contractor, the vetting agency is
not certain of the clearance holder’s current sponsor, the vetting agency should contact
the clearance holder directly for details of their current employment.
431. If the clearance subject cannot be located or no longer works for a government agency as
an employee or contractor, a clearance is no longer required and the clearance is to be
cancelled as a revalidation will not be necessary.
432. When a sponsoring agency advises that the clearance required is now at a lower level than
currently held, the vetting agency may extend the clearance to the period allowed in the
Protocol for that lower level of clearance. The only exception to this would be where the
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sponsoring agency has identified specific concerns about the clearance holder that warrant
a review of suitability.
433. A revalidation is to cover the period since the initial clearance or last revalidation was
completed, unless there are significant concerns that raise doubts about the previous
assessment. The revalidation is to meet the relevant minimum standards listed in the
Protocol.
434. The vetting agency is to investigate any significant changes of circumstance or any
concerns raised by the:
supervisor
PRC
financial history
referees, and
for Negative and Positive Vetting, ASIO assessment where required.
10.3 Review for cause
435. A vetting agency may initiate a review for cause where there is concern about the
clearance holder’s suitability to access Australian government resources. This concern may
arise from:
advice from the clearance holder of a change of circumstance
concern raised by the clearance holder’s sponsoring agency
a security incident involving the clearance holder, or
other information or advice of concern received by the vetting agency about the clearance holder.
436. A review for cause is not an alternative to human resource/performance management
within an agency and should only be used to consider suitability to access Australian
Government resources.
437. Vetting agencies should consider if a review for cause satisfies the requirements of a
revalidation to avoid unnecessary duplication of vetting where the review identifies no
cause for concern.
438. If, in the course of conducting a review for cause, the assessing officer considers that the
clearance holder should not continue to have access to security classified information or
resources at their current level, the vetting agency is to advise the sponsoring agency to
consider suspending or limiting the clearance holder’s access until the review has been
completed.
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10.4 Upgrades to clearances
439. Where a sponsoring agency has requested a clearance upgrade, a new clearance process is
to be initiated.
440. Assessing officers are to consider information already collected as part of any previous
vetting action to determine whether it is sufficient to meet the minimum controls for the
new clearance level.
441. Upgrades of Baseline clearances to Negative Vetting clearances will need a personal
particulars form that covers the 10 year checking period and a Full Exclusion PRC.
442. A new ASIO assessment is required for all security clearance upgrades.
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11. Personal Security File management 443. Vetting agencies are to create a Personal Security File (PSF) for each clearance applicant.
The PSF records the checks undertaken for each clearance applicant.
444. PSFs are to be either hard copy or electronic files. This is to ensure that all records will be
on one file.
445. All information on a PSF is considered personal and is covered by the Privacy Act 1988
(Cth).
11.1 Classification of PSFs
446. The PSF, including file notes, contains significant amounts of personal information that may
harm or disadvantage the clearance subject if used inappropriately as well as information
that is identified as ‘sensitive information’ under Part 6 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
447. The PSF should have the Dissemination Limiting Marker ‘Sensitive: Personal’. Individual
records may also contain security classified material and are to be classified at the
appropriate level for the document. If individual documents are security classified, the
overall classification of the PSF will be at the level of the highest classified document on the
file. For further information see the Australian Government Security Classification System.
11.2 Transferring PSFs
448. PSFs should be transferred to the relevant responsible vetting agency for permanent
moves or where the period is of a duration where there is an ongoing need to access
classified information or for assurance purposes or where ongoing clearance maintenance
is required by the hosting agency for secondments and temporary transfers see section
11.2.1 – permanent transfers.
449. The PSF should only be transferred if the vetting has been undertaken in accordance with
the PSPF.
450. Informed consent is to be sought at the initiation of vetting undertaken by vetting
agencies.
451. A vetting agency can only request the transfer of PSFs for clearance subjects with the
consent of the clearance holder.
11.2.1 Permanent transfer
452. When a clearance holder transfers permanently to another agency, the gaining vetting
agency is to request the PSF. A copy of the clearance holder’s consent should also be
provided where:
an existing or previous clearance is identified on the security clearance request, or
another vetting agency has confirmed the existence of a current clearance.
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453. Some agencies have legal restrictions on the transfer of PSFs. This includes, but is not
limited to:
the Department of Defence, which cannot transfer PSFs of Regular or Reserve Australian Defence Force personnel, and
ASIO, which can only transfer PSFs to other AIC agencies. ASIO can only provide a statement of clearance to other vetting agencies.
454. Agencies should check the requirements contained in their enabling legislation prior to
transferring a PSF.
455. The vetting agency transferring the PSF should do so as soon as reasonably practicable. In
some instances it may not be possible to transfer PSFs immediately. This can include where
the clearance holder is:
still employed by the losing agency
under investigation for a security breach or violation; the gaining agency should be advised and given an indication of when the investigation will be completed
being revalidated, with the review yet to be finalised; the gaining agency should be given the option of completing the revalidation as it may need to upgrade the clearance, or
undergoing a review for cause; the gaining agency should be advised and given an indication of when the review is likely to be completed.
456. Where a gaining agency requires an NV clearance and a PV clearance is held, the losing
vetting agency should only provide proof of clearance and copies of personal documents.
457. A vetting agency should not request personal information already on transferred PSFs
unless the vetting agency uses electronic clearance packs. If electronic packs are used,
information may be regathered electronically to populate the electronic record once. This
should occur at the next revalidation or review of the security clearance.
458. Vetting agencies should not request copies of supporting documentation if there is a copy
already on the PSF or there is a record that the document (or copy) has been previously
sighted. The exception would be where there are concerns about the authenticity of the
document originally supplied.
11.2.2 Temporary transfers
459. PSFs for employees on temporary transfer should not be transferred unless the gaining
agency requires a higher level of clearance or the clearance expires during the period of
the temporary transfer. In these instances, the gaining agency is responsible for the
upgrade of the clearance.
460. The vetting agency is to seek informed consent from the clearance subject to share
personal information, including sharing of the PSF. For further information see Annex H–
sample privacy notice and template security clearance informed consent form.
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11.2.3 Contractors’ PSFs
461. Where the contractor requires access to more than one agency, the vetting agency for the
sponsoring agency should hold the PSF.
462. Where requested by another interested party, the vetting agency holding the PSF is to
confirm the level of clearance and any conditions. The vetting agency holding the PSF
should also allow access to the PSF when requested by another vetting agency
representing an interested party.
463. Where a contractor works with multiple agencies, vetting agencies should advise all
interested parties of any changes of circumstances, to assist in ongoing clearance
maintenance.
464. If the vetting agency has not received confirmation of a contractor’s clearance requirement
one year after the expiry of a clearance, the vetting agency should contact the sponsoring
agency to clarify whether the clearance is still required.
465. If the sponsoring agency cannot confirm the requirement, the vetting agency should
contact the contractor to ask for a new contact in the sponsoring agency to confirm the
requirement for a clearance.
11.2.4 Removal of police records checks (PRCs) and other third party information from PSFs on transfer
466. Prior to sharing a PSF that retains a PRC, the vetting agency needs to ensure that any
previous convictions recorded, are not spent. For further information on the spent
conviction scheme see Privacy Fact Sheet 41- Commonwealth spent convictions scheme.
467. If a PRC is not shared, the gaining vetting agency is to decide whether to request a new PRC
on transfer of the PSF or at the next revalidation.
11.2.5 Addressing anomalies in PSFs
468. The gaining vetting agency is to address any anomalies within the incoming employee’s PSF
at the time of transfer.
469. The gaining vetting agency is to decide whether the anomalies warrant a review for cause,
which will usually require additional vetting. The vetting agency is to advise the sponsoring
agency of any review for cause as it may impact on the agency’s decision to grant access.
470. Vetting agencies should identify any areas of incompleteness in the PSF that may impact
on the clearance subject’s ongoing suitability to access Australian Government resources,
and take necessary steps to mitigate the risk including notifying the sponsoring agency.
11.3 Access by clearance holders to their PSFs
471. A clearance subject may seek access to their personal information under the Freedom of
Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act). Under the FOI Act, every person has a legally
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enforceable right to access documents in the possession of the Australian Government
unless a document is exempt under the legislation.
472. Vetting agencies should have administrative access procedures to permit clearance holders
to access the personal information held on their PSFs. This does not mean that individuals
have unrestricted access to their file. It may be appropriate to withhold the following
information under an administrative access procedure:
certificates issued by the Attorney-General and information covered by such certificates in order to protect national security interests;
documents containing material obtained in confidence, such as third party referee reports;
documents affecting national security, defence or international relations;
documents affecting enforcement of law and protection of public safety;
information to which secrecy provisions apply;
documents subject to legal professional privilege;
documents relating to personal privacy.
473. Where information is withheld, the clearance holder should be advised of the decision
(unless covered by an Attorney-General’s certificate).
474. The administrative access procedures should ensure that information is not removed or
altered.
11.4 Disclosure of security risk to sponsoring
agencies
475. Where vetting agencies become aware of information about a clearance subject which
relates directly to a security risk the vetting agency is to disclose the information to the
sponsoring agency concerned. Additionally, if the concerns relate to a suspected criminal
offence or affects national security, the vetting agency is to advise the AFP or ASIO
accordingly.
476. The sponsoring agencies and vetting agencies need to ensure all personal information is
handled with sensitivity, on a strict need-to-know basis, and in accordance with the APP’s.
11.5 The Archives Act 1983
477. Commonwealth vetting agencies need to manage PSFs in accordance with the Archives Act
1983 (Cth) (Archives Act). State and Territory vetting agencies should refer to their own
archival requirements.
478. The Archives Act also requires that some data be kept by vetting agencies after the
disposal of a PSF.
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11.5.1 Disposal in accordance with the Archives Act
479. This section refers to the Administrative Functions Disposal Authority 1764-1766
(Administrative Functions Disposal Authority Express classes 20306, 20313, 20307). The
Administrative Functions Disposal Authority identifies minimum retention periods for
Commonwealth records and authorises the destruction of Commonwealth records. Some
agencies have specific records authorities that may conflict with the Administrative
Functions Disposal Authority.
480. Agencies are encouraged to consult with their records management area when considering
disposing of PSFs. A ‘Notification of Records Destroyed’ (NAS45 form) needs to be sent to
the National Archives of Australia whenever PSFs are destroyed.
481. All PSFs need to be disposed of in accordance with the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth),
Administrative Functions Disposal Authority and the Australian Government information
security core policy.
482. Where an agency seeks to destroy a PSF, it should be done in a secure manner.
483. Vetting agencies should review all expired PSFs at least annually and dispose of them
accordingly.
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Annex A – Useful links Legislation
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A01697
Archives Act 1983 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A02796
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2007A00020
Australian Citizenship (Transitionals and Consequentials) Act 2007 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2007A00021
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A02123
Migration Act 1958 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C1958A00062
Migration Amendment (Employer Sanctions) Act 2007 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2007A00007
Privacy Act 1988 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A03712
Public Service Act 1999 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A00538
Statutory Declarations Act 1959 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C1959A00052
Fair Work Act 2009 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A03679
APSC Publications
APS Values http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/aps-values-resources
APS Code of Conduct http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/aps-values-resources
Conditions of Engagement http://www.apsc.gov.au/working-in-the-aps/conditions-of-engagement
Citizenship in the Australian Public Service http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/archive/publications-archive/citizenship-in-the-australian-public-service
Termination of employment http://www.apsc.gov.au/trash/termination
Other useful links
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner http://www.oaic.gov.au/
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner Advice on the Spent Convictions Scheme http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-sheets/law-enforcement/privacy-fact-sheet-41-commonwealth-spent-convictions-scheme
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National Archives of Australia http://www.naa.gov.au Attorney-General’s Department Statutory Declaration advice http://www.ag.gov.au/statdec
DIBP advice on Visa Entitlement Verification Online (VEVO) for Organisations http://www.immi.gov.au/managing-australias-borders/compliance/info-employers/evo-orgs.htm
DIBP advice on Visas and Immigration http://www.immi.gov.au/employers
DIPB advice on movement records https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Ente/Goin/monitoring-people-movement
DIPB advice on foreign police checks Character Requirements and Penal Clearance Certificates https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa/Char
National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters http://www.naati.com.au/
Veda Advantage credit history checks http://www.vedaadvantage.com/home/home_default.aspx
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Annex B – Documents that can be used as evidence of Australian citizenship
484.
Were you born in Australia? Birth Certificate & Certificate
of Australian Citizenship
Yes
No
Were you born after 20
August 1986?
Australian Birth Certificate No
Australian Birth Certificate
Yes
An Australian Passport
issued on or after 1 Jan 2000
for a period of at least one
year.
Plus one of the Following
Certificate of Australian
Citizenship
Certificate of evidence of
Australian Citizenship
Proof of one parent’s
Australian citizenship at the
time of your birth
One parent’s Australian Birth
Certificate, or Australian
Passport.
One parent’s Australian
Citizenship Certificate, issued
before your birth
Proof of one parent’s
Australian permanent
residence at the time of your
birth If you cannot otherwise confirm
Australian Citizenship, contact the
Department of Immigration and Border
Protection 13 881 or see
www.immi.gov.au
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Annex C – Alternate proof of identity documents
The following information may be used by clearance subjects if any information identified on the
consent form is unavailable.
Other primary evidence
other international travel documents with the same characteristics as a passport.
Other secondary evidence
confirmation from a financial institution e.g. bank, building society, credit union or similar registered
organisation that the signatory is a known customer of at least 12 months.
written references signed by an “acceptable” referee confirming the identity of the clearance
subject.
a statement or form endorsed by community elders, elected members of Aboriginal or Torres Strait
regional or land councils/commissions, or staff members of local land councils confirming the
identity of the clearance subject as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander. This document needs to
include all names by which the clearance subject has been known.
Other documents
The name and address of the clearance subject verified by:
a document held by a cash dealer/other financial body giving security over the clearance subject’s
property
a current employer within the last two years
a rating authority
the Credit Reference Association, and/or
land titles record office.
Supporting documents
inclusion of the name, address and telephone number in the telephone book and confirmation call
and/or
marriage certificate.
Name of clearance subject verified from:
credit card (1 only)
council rates notice
telephone account
foreign driver’s licence and/or
Medicare card.
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Name and address verified by:
notification from the Australian Electoral Commission confirming inclusion on the electoral roll
a statement from the manager of accommodation rented by the clearance subject
records from a public utility
records of another financial body used by the clearance subject
other records under law
records of educational organisation(s) attended by clearance subject in last 10 years, and/or
trade or professional association records.
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Annex D – Documents, checks and inquiries required for security clearances
Documents
Document Purpose Comment and further action by assessing officer
Full birth certificate
A prime means to identify clearance applicant that:
provides citizenship details
provides birth dates and birth places of clearance subject, and
can provide birth dates, birth places and occupation of parents.
If full birth certificate not available, the following are acceptable:
extract or notarised record of birth
certificate of adoption
statutory declaration
other documents such as religious records (especially for overseas births) in conjunction with the statutory declaration
Formally check with relevant Registrar of Births Deaths and Marriages if there are concerns.
Deed poll A legal document that:
advises a formal change of name, and
states the previous name and the current name.
Formally check with appropriate Registrar of Titles Office if there are concerns.
Citizenship certificate
Document confirms citizenship and the date and location of the grant of citizenship.
Formally check with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship if there are concerns.
Certificate of evidence of Australian Citizenship
Marriage or divorce certificates
Marriage certificate provides details of spouse and witnesses, location of nuptials (helps to corroborate other information).
Divorce certificate (decree nisi or decree absolute) to corroborate other information - required for each divorce.
Applicant does not need to provide other evidence of previous marriages if he/she provides divorce papers (decree nisi or decree absolute). Where a marriage certificate is not available (e.g. some countries do not issue them) a person who witnessed the marriage may sign a statutory declaration.
Formally check with:
the relevant Registrar of Births Deaths and Marriages if there are concerns about Marriage certificate, and
the Family Court of Australia or the relevant overseas issuing authority if there are concerns about the divorce papers.
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Document Purpose Comment and further action by assessing officer
Travel or residency documents
Examination of the passports may help identify citizenship of, residence in, or visits to foreign countries.
For concerns about authenticity of passports formally contact:
DFAT Passports Fraud Section for Australian passports, or
DIAC for concerns about fraudulent or incomplete contents for foreign passports
Provide copies of cover pages and any long term residency visas
Current driver’s licence
Helps corroborate the clearance subject’s identity, as well as evidence of current, and possibly previous, residential addresses.
Required for police check
Evidence of current residential address
Establishing the current and previous residential addresses will assist in further corroborating his or her identity.
Cross check information about the clearance subject against a number of sources such as telephone directories and electoral rolls.
Proof of the clearance subject’s current and previous residential addresses is evidenced by any one, or a combination, of a number of items such as:
utilities and telephone bills
rental agreements
land titles, and
personal documentation such as driver’s licences.
If personal documents provided for establishing identity are also sufficient evidence of the clearance subject’s current residential address, additional documents are not required.
Educational documentation
Courses taking during the required checking period can help when cross-referencing past and present addresses, periods of unemployment and overseas travel
For concerns about academic qualifications, formally contact the appropriate educational facility.
Evidence of previous employment
If previous employer checks are not possible, employment documentation will assist in corroborating employment history (e.g., pay slips, group certificates). Employment history may corroborate personal information, including, for example, qualifications and travel history.
Assessing officers must by law obliterate tax file numbers on the PSF copy.
Assessing officer is to check with the clearance subject whether such inquiries could jeopardise current employment or, in the case of overseas inquiries, be detrimental to the wellbeing of the clearance subject or the clearance subject’s family. The AGSVA or authorised vetting agency is to evaluate the information provided by the clearance subject on this question and consider the balance between the interest of the clearance subject and the need for the agency to conduct meaningful inquiries.
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Document Purpose Comment and further action by assessing officer
Discharge certificate or military service record
Provides details about the clearance subject’s service in the armed forces – helps check identity and confirm employment.
Formally contact the appropriate military service if there are concerns about the document provided.
Recent photograph
To corroborate the validity of identity documents that contains photographic identification of the clearance subject, and to assist identify applicant to referees
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Checks and inquiries
Check Purpose Other comment
Financial history checks and financial statement
Provides insight into the clearance subject’s financial history or current situation
Assessing officers are to make inquiries relating to a person financial history. Annex E provides a same financial history check questionnaire. Annex F provides a sample financial statement
Police records checks
Corroborates claims made by clearance subject concerning criminal history
Applicants to complete Consent to Obtain Personal Information or Police Record Check form.
Obtain from the Criminal History Unit of the AFP or CRIMTRAC
ASIO security assessment
Assesses clearance applicant in relation to national security matters, as defined in Part IV of the ASIO Act
Workplace and personal referees
Corroborate information provided by the clearance subject.
Comment on the honesty, trustworthiness, maturity, tolerance and loyalty of the clearance subject.
Clearance subject interviews
Clarifies any information provided by the clearance subject or obtained through inquiries.
Resolves any doubts and anomalies that emerge as a result of inquiries.
Examines areas of potential personal vulnerability.
Helps evaluate the clearance subject’s character, values, loyalty and attitudes in so far as they are relevant to security.
AGSVA or authorised vetting agencies is to conduct interviews for:
Negative Vetting Level 2 clearances
uncheckable backgrounds
other levels of security clearance where the assessing officer has any concern or need to resolve any discrepancies or anomalies (known as supplementary interviews)
reviews for cause
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Annex E – Sample Financial History Check Questionnaire
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Annex F – Example Financial Statement
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Annex G – Example ‘Instrument of Approval’
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Annex H – Template Privacy Notice and Security Clearance Informed Consent Form Your personal information is being collected to assess your ongoing suitability to hold
and maintain a security clearance and to access Australian Government official
resources. Australian Government official resources include people, information and
assets.
Personal information, including sensitive information, may be collected from and
disclosed to any entity or person listed in the Privacy Statement to assess your ongoing
suitability to hold and maintain a security clearance.
Without your personal information your suitability to hold security a clearance cannot
be assessed. The inability to obtain a security clearance may have an adverse effect on
your employment, where it is a condition of engagement to hold and maintain a security
clearance.
Where you are simultaneously engaged by more than one agency, each agency will have
access to your personal information, including sensitive information. The security
clearance assessment, involves a series of assessments and background checks to
determine if you are a suitable person to access security classified information, and
other Australian Government official resources.
It is your responsibility to provide accurate information and continue to update your
personal information by advising [Vetting Agency Name] of any changes in
circumstances [insert link to change of circumstances form].
The security clearance process is intrusive by its nature. However, your privacy and
dignity will be respected. If you have any enquiries relating to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth),
or how your information will be collected, used or disclosed, please email [insert
person’s and position] [[email protected]] or call (0X) XXXX XXXX.
[Vetting agency’s] privacy policy can be found at [insert website]
The privacy policy contains information on how:
to access and seek correction of your personal information held by [vetting
agency name];
to make a complaint about a breach of the Australian Privacy Principles by the
[Vetting Agency name]; and
the [Vetting Agency name] will deal with such a complaint.
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Privacy Statement
The [Vetting Agency Name] recognises and respects your privacy and is committed to
the Australian Privacy Principles set out in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The collection and
use of your personal information is required in accordance with the Australian
Government’s Protective Security Policy Framework.
By signing the consent form contained in this security clearance pack, you consent to
the collection, use and disclosure of your personal information as described below and
for your Personnel Security File (PSF) to be transferred to [Vetting Agency Name] and to
be shared with the current and any future sponsoring agency.
How your information will be collected
During the security clearance assessment process and while you continue to hold an
Australian Government security clearance, we may collect personal information,
including sensitive information, from:
your current and previous or future private and Government employers. If you
do not consent to your current employer being contacted, please notify [Vetting
Agency Name] with the reasons for the denial of consent;
your referees (both nominated by you and not nominated by you);
third parties relevant to assessing and monitoring your ongoing suitability to
hold and maintain a security clearance. your Personnel Security File (if
applicable) from the relevant Commonwealth, State or Territory Agency in
relation to any existing or previous security clearances held by you;
other service providers, such as contracted vetting providers, and medical or
psychological practitioners, used during the clearance process;
financial institutions and financial checking institutions
agencies to confirm residential addresses
the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade to check any naturalisation and/or citizenship
documents and international movements;
medical professionals to clarify any medical conditions, with your consent; and
State and Territory Registries of Births, Deaths and Marriages.
you directly
the Government agency which has sponsored your clearance
Government agencies which have investigated any suspected breaches of law or
Australian government policy
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AFP and state and territory law enforcement agencies
ASIO, and
Educational institutions in relation to education documentation.
Disclosure of your information
During the security clearance assessment process and while you continue to hold an
Australian Government security clearance, we may disclose your personal information,
including sensitive information with:
you directly
the Government agency that has sponsored this clearance and any previous
Government agencies which have employed you or engaged you as a contractor,
and any future sponsoring or interested vetting agencies;
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) [or S&T Police Name];
financial institutions and [Financial checking agencies]; and
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).
your previous and current and or future private and/or Government employers;
including any employers that you worked for as a contractor. If you do not
consent to your current employer being contacted, please notify [Vetting Agency
Name] with the reasons for the denial of consent;
your referees (both nominated by you and not nominated by you);
third parties relevant to assessing and monitoring your ongoing suitability to
hold and maintain a security clearance
your Personnel Security File (if applicable) from the relevant Commonwealth,
State or Territory Agency in relation to any existing or previous security
clearances held by you
other service providers, such as contracted vetting providers, and medical or
psychological practitioners, used during the clearance process
financial institutions and financial checking institutions
agencies to confirm residential addresses
the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade to check any naturalisation and/or citizenship
documents and international movements;
medical professionals to clarify any medical conditions, with your consent; and
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State and Territory Registries of Births, Deaths and Marriages
the Government agency which has sponsored your clearance
Government agencies which have investigated any suspected breaches of law or
Australian government policy
AFP and state and territory law enforcement agencies
ASIO, and
Educational institutions in relation to education documentation.
Limited amounts of your personal information may also be disclosed to overseas
recipients if you are required to access foreign government resources. The information
that may be disclosed includes your clearance status, your full name and date of birth,
and your position.
The [Vetting Agency Name] will not use or disclose your personal information that is
collected for the purpose of assessing your ongoing suitability to hold and maintain a
security clearance, to any other person or organisation, other than those listed above,
unless:-
it would be reasonably expected by you that such a disclosure would occur, in
relation to your security clearance;
disclosure is required or authorised by or under Australian law or a
court/tribunal order;
a permitted general situation exists in relation to the use or disclosure of the
information, as defined in section 16A of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); or
the use or disclosure of the information is reasonably necessary for one or more
enforcement related activities conducted by, or on behalf of, an enforcement
body.
Sample – Consent to collect, use and disclose personal information
I have received and read [the Privacy Statement and Notice. I understand that:
a). My personal information, including sensitive information, may be collected from and disclosed to the
persons and entities listed in the privacy notice.
b). My personal information, including sensitive information, will be used to assess and monitor my
ongoing suitability to hold and maintain a security clearance and to access Australian Government
resources, while I continue to hold a security clearance.
c). It is my responsibility to notify the vetting agency of any change in circumstances, using the change of
circumstances form.
I consent for my personal information, including sensitive information, to be collected from and disclosed to
the persons and entities listed in the privacy notice and statement for the purpose of assessing and
monitoring my ongoing suitability to hold and maintain a security clearance and to access Australian
Government resources, while I continue to hold a security clearance.