Personality Profiles of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and...

Personality Profiles of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his

Biggest Opponent -the Progress Party Leader Alexej Navalny.

by Ganna Diedkova & Christ'l De Landtsheer

(Political Communication Research Unit, University of Antwerp,

Belgium)

Paper for the 2nd International PUPOL Conference at The Open

University, Milton Keynes 6-7 April 2017.

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. Christ’l De Landtsheer

Department of Communication

Political Communication Research Unit

Sint-Jacobstraat 2 (M.473) - 2000 Antwerp, Belgium.

https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/christl-delandtsheer/

T +32 (0)3 265 5586 F +32 (0)3 265 5789 M +32 (0)494 436224

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Abstract- Since the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin took the role of

the most unpredictable and ambiguous world leader. The evaluation of his personality is both

a necessary and a challenging part of any conclusion on the political line-up in the modern

Russia. The thirty-second President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt asked to judge

him on the basis of the enemies he has made. So we would venture to say that the image of

Russian politics in general and of Putin in particular is not complete without at least a brief

look at the Russian opposition leaders. This paper will focus on the profile of Vladimir Putin

and of one of his biggest critics -the Progress Party leader Alexej Navalny. The method of

Aubrey Immelman (2004) is applied for compiling the profiles remotely (‘assessment at a

distance’). The research will link the personality and leadership style components of both

leaders to their political activities and, in the case of Putin, his policy. In addition, conclusions

of the study will throw light on the underlying motives in the strategies of these politicians.

The purpose of the research is to assess the competitive ability of the main opposition leader

in Russia on the basis of his psychological profile.

Keywords: Elites, Methods, Political Methodology, Political Psychology

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Introduction

It would be naïve to say that the whole course of politics depends only on the personality of a

political leader. Nevertheless people look at history through the prism of steps and decisions

taken by leaders. For instance, we view nation’s foreign policy in terms of the personalities of

its leaders (Post, 2010). Personalities are held accountable, they are blamed and rewarded for

their political results. Personality is seen as a complex pattern of psychological characteristics

that are largely non-conscious and not easily altered, expressing themselves automatically in

almost every facet of functioning. These traits ultimately comprise the individual’s distinctive

pattern of perceiving, feeling, thinking, coping, and behaving (Millon, 1996). The role of

political leaders depend upon many circumstances, but personality is especially significant

when power is concentrated; when the situation is unstable and complex, and when

spontaneous and effortful behavior is required (Greenstein, 1969). One of the motives for

political personality studies was the need of politicians‟ to be better informed about their

allies or enemies and to know what to expect from each other during negotiation processes.

Post (2010) and Winter (2005) draw a line between this governmental perspective in

personality research and the academic perspective. The latter was primarily interested in

expanding knowledge concerning the psychology of leadership. A special feature of political

personality studies is the difficulty to access political leaders directly. Thus a broad range of

indirect measurements was developed, one of which is psychobiography. This method

attempts to explain actions and outcomes through the use of psychological theory (Winter,

2013). Runyan (1981) shows how far one can go with interpretations of someone else’s life.

He provides thirteen different convincing answers to the question “Why did Van Gogh cut off

his ear?” With the help of this example he demonstrates how tempting it is to grab one of the

alternatives and directly solve the puzzle. Another extreme choice is to suggest credibility of

all the explanations at the same time. Both ways might lead to dangerous misunderstandings

and false conclusions. We think this example is valid for any scientific effort. It encourages

researchers to be brave enough to ask critical questions about their own work. Another

method apart from psychobiography, content analysis, measures personality based on written

text and transcriptions of verbal text. It makes an important distinction between prepared and

spontaneous utterances. For example Weintraub (2003) uses grammatical and syntactical

analysis to assess key personality traits of politicians based on their spontaneous speeches.

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And finally – there is the method of theory based rating scales, that we will use in this paper,

in particular the method elaborated by Aubrey Immelman. It refers to Millon’s Inventory of

Diagnostic Criteria (MIDC), adapted by Immelman. As mentioned in “Handbook of

personology and psychopathology”, expected utility of this approach is associated with its

clinical background. The Immelman framework is founded on latent phylogenetic-

evolutionary principles rather than on observable characteristics and surface features. It

emerges from Millon’s assertion that personality disorders are simply pathological distortions

of normal personality attributes. So every “normal” pattern of personal traits (for example

forceful, confident, cooperative) corresponds one of the “pathological” patterns (for example

sadistic, narcissistic, dependent) (Immelman, 2005; Immelman, 2004; Winter, 2013). The

assessment procedure is called psycho-diagnostic meta-analysis. On the first stage it involves

collection of content in biographical sources. The analysis is based on observations of

biographers, psychobiographers, historians, psychohistorians, journalists, political analysts,

and political psychologists. The material has to be as diverse as possible. The next stage

implies the selection of diagnostically relevant items. Sources that are either highly idealizing

or demonizing should be treated choicely or not used at all. Further the material is sorted

according to MIDC scales and gradations. Personal traits can be coded only when two

independent sources confirm its presence. The process results in the construction of

personality profiles intended to describe, explain, and predict leadership behavior in political

contexts (Immelman, 2004; Middelhoff, Schijvenaars, De Landtsheer, 2015). The last phase of

the Immelman research method is devoted to an evaluation (inference). Theoretically based

descriptions are concluded from Millon’s theory of personality.

This introduction provided for a brief overview of political personality studies and a summary

of the Immelman method which is applied in this research. Further paragraphs give a glimpse

on political line-up in modern Russia. Final sections are devoted to reference information

about Vladimir Putin and Alexei Navalny for whom we draw personality profiles and examine

the theoretical links between their personality patterns and leadership styles (Steinberg &

Immelman, 2008).

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Political line-up in modern Russia: opposition vs. regime

Modern Russia has a hybrid political system, both democratic and authoritarian. Current

situation in the country can be viewed through the concept of a dual state. Despite proclaimed

democratic values, in reality political and social pressures weaken their fulfillment. Russia’s

constitutional state is challenged by an administrative regime that subverts the rule of law

and electoral competitiveness. So the transition to democracy cannot be completed: the

structure of power has changed; property relations are being transformed; but the ruling class

and some of its principles of governance remain. This has created a situation of permanent

stalemate: the country is unable to move towards democracy. On the same time its shift

towards full-scale authoritarianism is blocked (Sakwa, 2008; Sakwa, 2010).

A growing number of parties accompanied the fall of communism in Russia. This process was

followed by a high degree of political fragmentation, party volatility and nonrepresentation

(many citizens voted for parties that failed to cross the voting threshold). At the same time

social and economic dislocations increased the demand for governmental effectiveness. The

Russian party system was not able to reach the balance between representation and

effectiveness (Laverty, 2008; Bielasiak, 2005). Today the political line-up is characterized by

repeated defeats of opposition. This can be associated with the popularity of the president

(and his party) and the organizational weakness of the opposition parties (Gellman, 2005). The

situation is enhanced by a fear of lawlessness that remained in Russian society since the

collapse of Soviet Union. Stability became an important value (Shestopal, 2015). Under Putin,

presidency began to represent a center not only for the nation but also for political society.

Putin’s severe approach to politics and his plans for the future won the approval of the

overwhelming majority of the population. (Sakwa, 2008; Sakwa, 2010). At the same time the

institutional design with strong presidential power is by definition unfavorable to the

opposition (Gellman, 2008; Gellman, 2005). Nevertheless there are two other important

factors that led to the weakness of the Russian opposition. Firstly, the raise of the electoral

threshold, the complicity of registration rules and the prohibition of electoral blocks had a

critical role. The second factor is the problem of the "imposed consensus". Due to the

dominant position of the Kremlin all the segments of elites either have to take a subordinate

role or lose elite status. In these circumstances, any strategies of opposition prove to be

ineffective and lead to marginalization or to the co-optation to the ruling group. Thus, none

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of the opposition parties managed to maintain a strong position. Characteristics of the Russian

opposition parties are: a symbolic presence at different levels, a weak mobilization capacity

and a low level of public support. These trends have provoked nonpartisan opposition growth.

Protest meetings in Moscow and other cities in 2011-12 gave a hope that opposition will be

able to multiply its ranks, to change its leadership, to reach a “negative consensus”.

Nevertheless the optimism vanished after Putin won another resounding victory in the March

2012 presidential elections. Since then, the opposition has not been able to come to the front

stage of Russian politics. (Gellman, 2008; Gellman, 2005; Gellman 2015; The Guardian, 2015;

Forbes, 2016).

Vladimir Putin

This paragraph offers a number of biographical details about Vladimir Putin. The Russian

president was born in 1952 in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). His father served in the NKVD

(later KGB, Committee for State Security) during the Second World War. His mother worked

at a factory and at the local hospital. Putin’s family lived in a communal apartment. Up to the

present day the Russian president recalls his simple childhood in a house with no amenities,

emphasizing his connection with the common folk. Putin studied law in Leningrad State

University. During his student years, he got acquainted with the future mayor of Moscow,

Anatoly Sobchak. After his graduation, future Russian president began his service in the KGB.

For 5 years he was stationed in former East Germany, Dresden (Putin, 2016a; Putin,

Gevorkyan, Timakova, Kolesnikov, & Fitzpatrick, 2000). The political biography of Vladimir

Putin started in 1991 in St. Petersburg City Hall, where he spearheaded the Committee for

External Relations. Vladimir Putin has taken this position on the proposal of Anatoly Sobchak.

From 1996 he worked in Moscow as a Deputy Chief of the Presidential Property Management

Directorate. Soon he gained an image of one of the most influential political figures in the

Kremlin. He occupied positions of the First Deputy Chief of Staff in Presidential Office, and

director of the FSB (Federal Security Service). In August 1999, Vladimir Putin was appointed as

acting Prime Minister. In the same year former Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the official

televised address presented Putin as his successor. In March 2000, Putin won his first

presidential election and remained in this position until 2008. That year Dmitry Medvedev

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won the presidential elections and Putin became a Prime Minister. At a time when Dmitry

Medvedev was in power, Putin has continued to occupy a dominant position in the political

decision-making. That is why the Russian government firmly entrenched the notion of

"tandem". In 2011 President Dmitry Medvedev formally nominated Putin's candidacy for the

presidential elections in 2012. Putin won the race for the presidency again. After taking the

office, he proposed Medvedev as his Prime Minister (BBC, 2015a; Putin, 2016a). From 1983 to

2013, Vladimir Putin has been married to Lyudmila Putina. He has two daughters: Maria and

Ekaterina (Putin, 2016a).

Alexei Navalny

This paragraph offers a number of biographical details about Alexei Navalny. The biggest

opponent of Putin is a lawyer, a political and financial activist and an oppositional politician.

He was born in 1976 in the Moscow region in a businessman's family. Navalny studied law at

the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia and finance at the Financial University under the

Government of the Russian Federation. In 2000 he started as a lawyer in the Democratic Party

"Yabloko". He worked as a campaign manager of this party in the parliamentary elections in

Moscow three years later. In December 2007, he was expelled for criticizing the party

leadership (Navalny, 2012; The World Fellows, 2010). In 2004, he founded a civil movement

against corruption and violation of citizens' rights during the implementation of large

construction projects in Moscow. One year later he took part in creating a debate platform for

oppositional politicians. After repeated provocations on behalf of the authorities the project

was closed in 2008 (Navalny, 2012). In 2008 Navalny began blogging about alleged malpractice

and corruption at state controlled corporations. He has spearheaded legal challenges on

behalf of minority shareholders in big Russian companies, including Gazprom. As a result

companies disclosed more information to their shareholders. He has sued individual managers

for corrupt practices. In 2010, Navalny launched a public project RosPil. The project is aimed

against corruption, and provides information about the dubious public procurement. In 2010

he participated in The World Fellows program at Yale University. In September 2013 Navalny

ran in the Moscow mayoral election, challenging a Kremlin-backed incumbent for the seat. He

received 27 percent of the votes (BBC, 2014; The World Fellows, 2010; Yale Alumni Magazine,

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2013). Since the beginning of the 2010s Navalny has been involved in a number of lawsuits. In

2013, he was declared guilty of embezzlement (company "Kirovles" case) and sentenced to a

suspended term. Within a different trial the public prosecutor demanded ten years of

imprisonment for Navalny. The court accused the politician and his brother of fraud and

money laundering from cosmetics company “Yves Rocher Vostok”. The court sentenced Alexei

Navalny to 3 years and 6 months’ probation. His brother was sentenced to imprisonment for

the same term (Lenta.ru, 2014a; Lenta.ru, 2014b). In 2012 Navalny was described by The Wall

Street Journal as "the man who is the most feared by Vladimir Putin". In 2013, Navalny stated

his ambition to run for President in 2018, but in 2015 he was convicted of fraud. Also, he has

been found guilty at a retrial of embezzlement and given a five-year suspended prison sentence,

putting his proposed presidential run in 2018 in doubt (Alec Luhn in Moscow, Wednesday 8

February 2017 16.39 GMT The Guardian). Alexei Navalny is married to Yulia Navalnaya and

has two children: daughter Daria and son Zahar (Navalny, 2012; BBC, 2014).

Method

The method used is psychological profiling, the indirect assessment of political leader’s

personality, for which we employ the method by Aubrey Immelman.

The research will assess the competitive abilities of the major opposition leader Navalny and

of president Putin based on their personalities. Does the psychological profile of Navalny

explain his oppositional location in the Russian political line-up? Does he have a potential to

compete with Putin in the political field?

We see competitive ability as the significant presence of personal traits, that play a decisive

part in the emergence of leadership. We assume that the psychological profiles of Alexei

Navalny and Vladimir Putin will anyhow show a significant presence of personal traits relevant

for leadership.

The assessment of competitive ability will be based on personality patterns that have

significant scale values in the composed profiles. According to Steinberg & Immelman (2008),

personality patterns are linked to leadership behaviors. Dominance (the need for power), self-

confidence, ambitiousness (need for achievement), sociability (need for affiliation),

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conscientiousness are found to have relevance for leadership performance (Blondel, 1987;

Immelman, 2004; Immelman, 2005; Hermann, 2005). Presumed importance of these traits

goes in line with the “Big Five” concept and Winter’s (2013) emphasis on the role of power

motivation, affiliation-motivation, achievement motivation in his summary of contemporary

political leadership studies.

Personalities that score on the dominance scale typically make effective leaders, being

talented in supervising and persuading others to work for common goals. They are

competitive and work hard to achieve their goals. Ambitious personalities naturally assume

positions of leadership, they act in a decisive manner. They are persuasive and have sufficient

charm to win others over to their own causes and purposes. Their ambitions often succeed,

and they prove to be effective leaders. Ambitious people know what they want, and they get

it. Many of them have the charisma to attract plenty of others to their goals. They know how

to motivate and lead the crowd. Outgoing persons at moderate levels have confidence in their

social abilities, feel they can influence and charm others, and possess a personal style that

makes people like them. Most enjoy engaging in social activities, and thrive on being the

center of social events. Their enthusiasms often prove effective in energizing and motivating

others. Conscientious types are motivated by power and pragmatism. They succeed as leaders

within cultures in which the work ethic thrives. (Immelman, 2004; Steinberg & Immelman,

2008).

Results: the Profile of Alexei Navalny

This part will report and elaborate the empirical results of the psychological profiling of Alexei

Navalny. The first section summarizes and interprets significant features of this political

leader. Results are illustrated by the score sheet (Table 1 on p. 16) and by graphical depiction

(Figure 1 on p. 17) in the profile form. Descriptions are drawn from typical features of the 12

MIDC patterns provided by Millon in the manual of Immelman (2004). Based on the Millon

Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria, the personality of Alexei Navalny shows the presence of the

dominant, the contentious, and the ambitious personality patterns (gradation “a”). The

dauntless pattern turns out to be prominent in his personality profile (gradation “b”). Alexei

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Navalny scores the most in attributes of Expressive behavior (A), Cognitive Style (C) and Self-

Image (E) (14, 9 and 8 respectively).

The dauntless personality pattern of Alexei Navalny shows a presence (gradation “a”) on all

attributes of MIDC-table with formal scores (A-E). He demonstrates prominence (gradation

“b”) of the dauntless pattern in attributes of the Expressive behavior, Cognitive style and Self-

image. Moreover results reach the gradation “c” (Mildly dysfunctional) on the scale of

dauntless pattern in the attribute of Expressive behavior (A). His general score for the

personality pattern 1B (dauntless) is 14. The scores on the attribute of expressive behavior

show that Alexei Navalny typically appears to others as an adventurous, fearless person. He is

attracted to challenges even when he realizes how risky his behavior is:

“Any person who undertakes independent action in Russia – in journalism, business, anything

– takes on risk," he said. "I can understand they can do whatever they want, but that won't

stop me.” (The Guardian, 2011)

This attitude often results in a tendency to undertake spontaneous and premature actions.

Exaggerated dauntless features occur in risk-taking while sometimes ignoring alternatives and

neglecting consequences. People with prominent adventurous features believe in themselves

and do not require social approval; they have a very strong opinion about what is right. They

turn out to be non-conformist, innovative and original leaders (Immelman, 2004). Navalny

appears as an idealistic leader. He shows strong attachment to his oppositional believes and

far-going views on the future of Russia:

“The life of the country can be completely changed in five years” (Esquire, 2011).

“The revolution is inevitable. Just because most people understand that the system is wrong”

(Esquire, 2011).

Moreover he sees strength and competence in himself to bring these ideas to life. Together

with his self-confidence (Dominant and Ambitious patterns) this might lead to difficulties with

compromising when his strongest believes are confronted. As another prove for the prevailing

of the dauntless pattern, he displays a carefree attitude supported by his sarcastic sense of

humor in stressful situations:

“When in the first half of the meeting the public prosecutor demanded 10 years in prison for

Alexei, and for Oleg - 8 years, Alexei was obviously somewhat stunned. “Good, that it’s easy

to calculate years, when I come out", - he said to the lawyers sarcastically” (BBC, 2014).

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Together with the dauntless pattern relevant diagnostic material shows a presence (gradation

“a”) of the dominant personality pattern. This pattern is represented by significant scores in

the attributes of Expressive behavior, Interpersonal conduct, Cognitive style and Self-image

(A, B, C and E respectively). The dominant personality pattern reaches the gradation “b” on

the attribute of Expressive behavior (A). The general score for personality pattern 1A

(dominant) is 8. As the pattern shows the general score of presence, Navalny can be described

as a strong-willed, commanding, assertive personality willing to speak up and defend his

positions:

“Everyone says corruption is everywhere, but for me it seems strange to say that and then not

to try to put the people guilty of that corruption away” (Guardian, 2011).

This characteristic goes in line with his desire to take huge responsibilities and risks without

fear of failure. According to Oldham and Morris (1995) people like this never back away from

a fight. They compete with the supreme confidence of champions (Immelman, 2004):

“Maybe it is a bad thing to say - but even "hostage-taking" will not stop me! Because life does

not make sense, if you tolerate endless lies,"- said Alexei Navalny in the last word” (BBC, 2014).

In the attributes of Interpersonal conduct and Cognitive style, this pattern leads to

commanding presence and demand to respect his views. Alexei Navalny is quick to

acknowledge and promote strength of his believes and their possible impact. In the attribute

of Self-image Alexei Navalny displays himself as assertive, daring and competitive. He grabs

chances to oppose existing system and declare himself as a competitive leader. His

argumentation is predominantly based on trueness of his beliefs and superior importance of

justice.

His contentious pattern supports a stereotypical image of an opposition leader. The scores on

the scale of the contentious pattern are not evenly distributed within attribute domains. This

feature is present only in two attributes of MIDC score sheet – Expressive behavior and

Cognitive style (A and C respectively). Nevertheless the results reach the gradation “b” in both

attributes and make this pattern third most pronounced in the personality profile of Alexei

Navalny. The general score for personality pattern 5B (contentious) is 6. As this pattern finds

expression only in two attributes, Alexei Navalny can be described as unconventional and

critical about the rules; he is the one to doubt authorities and challenge them with

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uncomfortable questions. He is inclined to direct negative evaluation of the government's

actions, expressed in colloquial or slang language (Potsar, 2012). His biting sense of humor

harmonically coexists with a cynical attitude to political system:

“I would really like to know how sincere Putin believes it all. If he sincerely believes that the

system he created will last. Especially after he saw footage of Gaddafi’s penalty. That one was

also a tough guy (Esquire, 2011).”

The public instantly adopts this sharp sarcastic remarks. That and his challenging

anticorruption activity serve as a guarantee to be in the spotlight:

“His knack for phrasing has branded Putin's United Russia as the "Party of Crooks and Thieves"

for all time (Time, 2012).”

“Alexei Navalny disturbs and annoys many people in power” (Institute of Modern Russia,

2013).

His freethinking nature combined with a prominent dauntless pattern makes him the loudest

of all Putin’s critics despite legal drawbacks piling up on his way. According to Oldham and

Morris (1995), if threatened, these normally easygoing individuals will vigorously defend their

fundamental right to do their “own thing” (Immelman, 2004). This is exactly what we can see

happening. Along with numerous court trials against Alexei Navalny, his anti-corruption

projects keep functioning. This opposition leader seems to value his independence as he

refuses to compromise with authorities. Strack (1997) notices that personalities like this are

suited to jobs that are not rule-bound, that give them a certain independence from

supervision, and that require unusual duties or creative expression (Immelman, 2004).

Relevant diagnostic material shows the presence (gradation “a”) of the ambitious pattern in

the personality of Alexei Navalny. The scores on the scale of the ambitious pattern are evenly

distributed within attribute domains (A-E). The general score for personality pattern 2

(ambitiousness) is 5. Alexei Navalny appears to others (Expressive behavior) and himself (Self-

image) as a confident and shrewd leader. He believes in his own capacity and shows to others

that he knows what he is doing:

“Alexei Navalny: Everyone must do their job. So what I'm doing now is: A. something I like; B.

It seems, I am not the only one who likes it; C. It is quite effective and helpful (Finamfm, 2011).”

According to Millon, leaders like this naturally assume positions of leadership and expect

others to recognize their qualities (Immelman, 2004):

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“…he has never been shy about his desire for power, which is why the Kremlin has been warily

dismissive of him (New Yorker, 2011b).”

Self-confidence of Alexei Navalny seems appealing and persuasive to other people. The

combination of the ambitious and the contentions pattern makes him convincing as he speaks.

Ambitious leaders have sufficient charm to win others over to their own causes and purposes

(Millon, 1994). He believes what he is saying. Moreover Alexei Navalny tries not to lose his

face under pressure. He saves an optimistic and imperturbable attitude of a leader:

“Maybe he's trying to seem cheerful in front of us, but you can never say that this is person

under home arrest (Sobesednik, 2014).”

Oldham and Morris (1995) notice, that ambitious leaders are extroverted and intensely

political. They know how to work the crowd, how to motivate it, and how to lead it

(Immelman, 2004). Navalny knows his audience - his ideas strongly progressive and business-

orientated:

“… if tomorrow ten businessmen spoke up directly and openly we’d live in a different country

(New Yorker, 2011a). ”

Strong believes in his own efficacy and fearless approach made Navalny one of the prominent

leaders during several mass protests in Russia in 2012.

We conclude that Alexei Navalny has a mixed personality, because his personality shows

features of various prototypes. Patterns blend of Alexei Navalny consists of the Dauntless, the

Dominant, the Contentious and the Ambitious patterns (given in descending order of

significance). The Dauntless, Ambitious and Dominant patterns in their coexistence create the

desire to build up a reputation of bravery and toughness. Alexei Navalny has features of a

prototype defined by Millon and Davis (2000) as reputation-defending antisocial. He attempts

to prove his significance. The opposition leader cannot stand when society to treats him with

indifference. If his status is attacked he would go after his rivals until they back down. In his

case, being tough and assertive is essentially a defensive act intended to prove strength and

courage. Being self-assured and energetic, he also shows a slight narcissistic component. The

Russian opposition leader tends to draw comparisons between himself and others. In

whatever sphere of activity, he invests his efforts to advertise his achievements and to make

everything he has done seem extraordinary and impressive, better than what others may have

done. Believing he is a special person, he sees little need to listen or to follow the dictates of

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anyone else. He tends to display arrogance and he is poorly suited to subordinate positions,

because of his truly superior self-image. Alexei Navalny fears being ordinary. Regardless of his

success, the opposition leader usually remains dissatisfied about his power and status. He

senses that he has been deprived of his share and never feels compensated for life’s

impoverishments (Immelman, 2004). The combination of the contentious and the dominant

patters makes minor frictions easily exacerbate into major and power struggles for him. He

takes a moral high ground and contemptuously exposes his enemies’ perceived sins (Millon &

Davis, 2000). He might take special joy in spotting inconsistencies in the behaviors or ethical

standards of his rivals. His arguments amplify observed contradictions, and he shoves these

squarely in the face of his “antagonists”. Like that he can find pleasure in undermining his

enemies’ self-confidence and watching them squirm (Millon & Davis, 2000; Immelman, 2004).

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Table 1. Score sheet MIDC Alexei Navalny

Aubrey Immelman and Aví A. T. Bahadoor Copyright 2000 Unit for the Study of Personality in Politic

16

Figure 1Alexei Navalny

Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria

Profile Form

40 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Markedly

36 - - - - - - - - - - e e disturbed

33 - - - - - - - - - - - -

30 - - - - - - - - - - - -

27 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mildly

dysfunctional 24 c c

21 - - - - - - - - - - - - Moderately

d d disturbed

18 - - - - - - - - - -

5 - -

12 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Prominent 10 b b - -

8 - -

6 - - - - - - - - - -

Present 5 a a - -

4 - -

3 - - - - - - - - - -

2 - - - - - - - - - -

1 - - - - - - - - - -

0 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Scale: 1A 1B 2 3 4 5A 5B 6 7 8 9 0

Score: 8 14 5 1 3 0 6 0 1 0 0 0

Aubrey Immelman and Aví A. T. Bahadoor; Copyright 2000; Unit for the Study of Personality in Politics

17

Results: The Profile of Vladimir Putin

Based on the Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria, the personality of Vladimir Putin shows

the presence of the outgoing pattern (gradation “a”); and prominence of the ambitious

personality pattern, the conscientious and the dominant patterns (gradation “b”). Moreover

there is evidence to suggest moderately disturbed personality functioning – gradation “e” of

the distrusting personality pattern.

Vladimir Putin has significant scores in all attributes of MIDC-table: Expressive behavior (A) -

23, Interpersonal conduct (B) – 16,Cognitive Style (C) - 25, Mood/Temperament (D) - 8 and

Self-Image (E) - 32.

The personality of Vladimir Putin shows identification of the distrusting pattern at the fourth

level (4 points, seriously maladaptive derivative personality pattern) in four out of five

attributes: Expressive behavior, Interpersonal conduct, Cognitive Style and Self-Image (A, B, C

and E). Further relevant diagnostic material demonstrates identification of a criterion at the

fifth level (scored 5 points, potential for markedly disturbed range) in three out of five

attribute domains (A, C and E). The general score for distrusting personality pattern (9) is 31.

The image of a former KGB employee totally corresponds with the results within this

personality pattern and perhaps even enhances public opinion about this political leader.

Vladimir Putin is often preoccupied with intentions of others and thus leaves an impression of

a defensive and highly suspicious person:

“The ex-KGB colonel is, deep down, extremely suspicious of everyone’s motives. ‘Putin thinks

like a spy’, says Markov. ‘If something bad happens, it’s because someone did it deliberately.’

” (Bush, 2005: 56)

According to Oldham and Morris’s (1995) such people are scanning the situations, looking for

conspiracy and anticipating dangerous situations in order to be ready to react. In a

combination with the conscientious pattern this leads to high attention to details, distrust and

difficulties with forgetting insults:

“When I talked about the fact that he has a thin skin, I meant, that he is very easily offended

and, in general, is not inclined to forgive.” (Vladimir Posner, 2013)

Self-perception of distrusting individuals is characterized by lack of self-doubt and thus refusal

to accept advice from others. Vladimir Putin takes a critical view on every assumption, opinion

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and event. He tends to doubt and reevaluate antecedents of every situation, even the most

innocent one. Russian president shows himself as resistant to external control and

independent in his judgement (Immelman, 2004):

“For Putin, the answer seems to have been that you need to decide for yourself what the

‘truth’ is and what the highest value is, and serve those above all else. Never trust any

individual institution or any specific idea, and certainly not any person or narrow group

completely, even if you were closely associated with them. Watch and wait to see how thing

will turn out.” (Hill & Gaddy, 2013: 123)

The dominant pattern of Putin’s personality shows the biggest result among patterns varying

within “a”- “c” gradations (present to mildly dysfunctional). The general score for personality

pattern 1A (dominant) is 21 (gradation “b”; prominent and heading to mildly dysfunctional

level). This pattern is represented by significant scores in all of the attributes. The dominant

personality pattern demonstrates the gradations “a” and “b” in the attributes of Expressive

behavior, Interpersonal conduct, Cognitive style and Self-image (A, B, C and E respectively).

Relevant diagnostic material shows a gradation “c” of the dominant personality pattern in the

attribute domains of Cognitive style, Mood/Temperament, Self-image (C, D and E

respectively). The profile of Vladimir Putin demonstrates a general prominence of this

personality pattern, so we can consider him as a strong-willed and commanding person. A

prominent dominant personality pattern tends to be typical for political leaders. Based on the

results for the dominant personality pattern that reaches a gradation “c” in several attribute

domains, we can conclude the tendency of Vladimir Putin to show controlling and forceful

sides of his personality:

“The image of the ‘thug’, or the tough guy, has been central to Putin’s public persona, drawing

a line between him and the Moscow elite.” (Hill & Gaddy, 2013: 131)

According to Millon (1994) such leaders are attracted to power and experience of obedience

and respect to them. They gain satisfaction from dictating:

“As a partner, Putin demonstrates a high degree of domination.” (Strelets, 2013: 221)

High scores for this personality pattern imply Putin’s aptitudes in supervising others to work

for the achievement of common goals. Strack (1997) notices that dominant individuals often

express themselves by being argumentative and insensitive. The Russian leader likes to take

19

responsibility and to make sure the job gets done. Putin is a powerful and authoritative leader.

He might use intimidation and sarcasm in interpersonal relations in order to succeed:

“Everybody knowing what they have to do and when they have to do it – as well as knowing

what they will be accountable to the man at the top – is the idealized essence of Putin’s

system. […] The man at the top lays out the mission and sets the goals. Everyone else from

the top to the bottom of the federal state apparatus has a larger or smaller set of

responsibilities to achieve those goals.” (Hill & Gaddy, 2013: 232). Scoring high in the domain

of cognitive style, Putin shows his opinionated nature and strong attachment to his position:

“It is characteristic of Putin to make decisive choices and stick to them.” (Sakwa, 2004: 16)

He is ready to defend his beliefs even if this means ignoring alternatives (Immelman, 2004).

Together with high scores on the scale of dominance, Putin’s personality shows prominence

of the conscientious personality pattern (scale 6). The general score for this personality

pattern is 17 (gradation “b”). This pattern is represented by significant scores in all of the

attributes. The conscientious personality pattern reaches gradation “a” in all of the attribute

domains. It shows prominence (gradation “b”) in attribute domain of Expressive behavior,

Interpersonal conduct and Mood/Temperament (A, B, and D respectively). Relevant

diagnostic material indicates a gradation “c” of the conscientious personality pattern in the

attribute domains of Cognitive style and Mood/ Temperament (C and D respectively). Vladimir

Putin is well-disciplined, principled and organized. This makes him functioning efficiently and

successfully in most of his endeavors. People like Putin follow standards and act in the most

rational manner. They tend to moralize issues and to use normative labels of right or wrong

to solve complex problems (Millon, 1996, p. 519):

“Putin was showing that those who play by the rules will be treated as one of ours, and we

will not touch them. But those who do not agree to play by the rules will be dealt with, with

the full severity of the law.” (Hill & Gaddy, 2013: 243)

“There can be no democracy without implementation of the law and compliance with the law.

Everyone must observe the law - this is the most important thing, which we must bear in

minds. No one must forget that” (CBSN, 2015)

Vladimir Putin views himself as reliable, trustworthy and self-controlled:

“Putin in the December 1999 Duma elections sought to present himself as a symbol of

confidence and stability.” (Sakwa, 2004: 21)

20

Vladimir Putin feels restless until the job is done in the best possible way. As a downside he

can be overly perfectionistic, inflexible, and have difficulties accepting new ideas (Strack,

1997; Oldham and Morris, 1995). Russian president can be described scrupulous, cautious and

attentive to detail:

“People of this type are driven by a sense of duty.” (Bush, 2005: 56)

Russian president often appears to be emotionally controlled despite using a bit of dry humor:

"Ever seen Putin laugh? On each picture, in every TV fragment you can always see the same,

recognizable face: indifferent, confident, surly. It has become his trademark. [...] In

comparison to the stoic Putin Obama looks like an extroverted joker. "(Zaougui, 2013)

The ambitious personality pattern is present at the prominent level in the personality of

Vladimir Putin. General score for this personality pattern (2) is 14 (gradation “b”). This pattern

is represented by significant scores in all of the attributes. It shows gradation “a” in attributes

of Expressive behavior, Interpersonal conduct, Mood/ Temperament and Self-image (A, B, D

and E respectively). Relevant diagnostic material indicates prominence (gradation “b”) and

mildly dysfunctional level (gradation “c”) of ambitious personality pattern in attribute

domains of Cognitive style, Self-image (C and E respectively). Vladimir Putin shows himself as

confident, persuasive and stable leader. In his interpersonal contacts he strongly stands on his

positions and acts competitive and shrewd:

“At the rational level V.Putin is seen by the respondents as a strong and very active politician.

They give him the following behavioral and psychological characteristics: ‘he is strong and

decisive’, ‘tough, tough-minded, honest’ ‘reliable’, ‘confident’.” (Zatonskih, 2013: 272)

According to Millon (1994) people with such character have a deep belief in their talents. Thus

the Russian president displays extraordinary confidence in his own ideas and potential for

success. Thus Vladimir Putin has a high degree of self-worth, and that is why he can leave

impression of an arrogant person. As the ambitious pattern is prominent in his personality,

we can expect Vladimir Putin to believe that others share, or should share his sense of worth.

Vladimir Putin appears secure which helps to cover feelings of sensitivity to criticism and

rejection (Immelman, 2004):

“His tolerance of criticism is diminishing; he talks more and more about Russia’s glorious past

and the equally glorious achievements of his presidency, and less and less about real problems

and the future.” (De Vries & Shekshnia, 2008: 247)

21

He usually conceals his vulnerable side and remains self-controlled and optimistic under

pressure:

“He often responds to criticisms of his policies by pointing out similar shortcomings, real or

imagined, in the West.” (Bush, 2005: 56)

He might develop fantasies of success, rationalize his failures or even transform failures into

successes in order to inflate his self-worth. (Millon, 1996; Millon & Everly, 1985). In high-level

leadership positions, some individuals of this type may exhibit a messianic self-perception

(Millon, 1996).

“Vladimir Putin’s two presidential terms brought with them structural changes in the media

and also in the discourse on national history, a change that would also be reflected in history

textbooks for secondary school. […] The good management of Putin’s government is

incontestable, and the ex-president takes the glory for everything.” (Linan, 2010: 172)

Scores for the outgoing pattern of Putin’s personality are not equally distributed throughout

attribute domains. The overall score for this pattern (3) is 8 - strong presence (gradation “a”).

Scores demonstrate gradation “a “ in attribute of Self-image (E). This pattern is represented

by (gradation “b”) in attribute domains of Interpersonal conduct and Self-image (B and E

respectively). This pattern reaches the highest gradation “c” (prominence) in attribute domain

of Self-image (E). Relevant diagnostic material shows that Russian president views himself as

animated, popular and charming. Addressing the US Secretary of State John Kerry he chose to

start the meeting with a joke:

“Today when I saw you going down the plane carrying your luggage I was a bit frustrated and

upset. On the one hand it is a quite democratic way of conduct, but on the other hand, I

thought probably the situation in the United States is not that good and there is no one to

assist secretary of state carrying his luggage.” (Kremlin, 2016),

Putin values his popularity and his ability to readily influence and charm others and possess a

personal style that makes people like them:

“Vladimir Putin: There is something that I have in common with every citizen of Russia – the

love of our motherland” (CBSN, 2015).

As the score for outgoing pattern reaches the exaggerated gradation only in the attribute

domain of Self Image (E) , we can expect Russian leader to perceive himself as stimulating,

popular, and gregarious. Given his appealing self-image, he is confident in his social abilities:

22

“Journalist (Charlie Rose): Are people in Russia fearful of you?

Vladimir Putin: I think not. I proceed from the fact that most people trust me, if the vote for

me a t the elections. And this is the most important thing. It places enormous responsibility

on me, colossal. And am grateful to people for this trust, but on the same time I feel this huge

burden of responsibility for doing what I do and for the results of my work.” (CBSN, 2015).

In politics, significant outgoing pattern can mean a strong attraction to permanent

campaigning ((Immelman, 2004; Millon, 1994; Millon, 1996,; Millon & Everly, 1985).

Not many people have a pure form of a prominent personality pattern. Normally individuals

have a blend of several orientations. Vladimir Putin is a good example of someone who scores

high on different scales and makes assumptions about his leadership style a complex task. The

“mixed pattern” of Vladimir Putin is formed by the Distrusting, Dominant, Conscientious,

Ambitious and Outgoing pattern. Here they are given in descending order of importance in

the personality of Russian president.

According to Millon (1996) owners of both the Conscientious and the Distrusting pattern like

Vladimir Putin can be described as puritanical compulsives. Such politicians instinctively

always seek bigger degrees of fundamentalism (Millon & Davis, 2000). Putin’s character

complex is formed by highly conscientious personality’s deep conflict between obedience and

defiance.

The combination of the Dominant and the Conscientious patterns creates a tendency to show

hostility and to act as if he has a monopoly on divining right and wrong. Vladimir Putin believes

he has a right and the obligation to control and punish violators, and that he is qualified to

determine how punishment should be meted out. This actions surely provoke opposition and

resistance, which in turn perpetuates ever-stronger countermeasures against real and

perceived enemies (Millon, 1996).

The ambitious and dominant patterns in their coexistence serve to create a false facade that

bears minimal resemblance to the person behind it. As a consequence of his sublime self-

confidence, Putin feels secure in his apparent superiority. Moreover the mix of scores on the

Ambitious and the Outgoing scales creates a background for clever image. He seeks to

cultivate his image and social luster.

The Conscientious and the Ambitious composite pattern show that the Russian leader is

controlling and moralistic. He has high expectations for perfection. Political opponents are to

23

his personal perception what invasive organisms are to the body’s immune system—and the

self-protective response is equally strong (Millon & Davis, 2000).

Vladimir Putin shows features of what Millon and Davis (2000) describe as bureaucratic

compulsive . Bureaucratic compulsives ally themselves with traditional values and established

authorities. The Russian leader feels comfortable in organizational settings and he is

empowered by clearly defined superior and subordinate relationships, definite roles, and

known expectations and responsibilities (Immelman, 2004).

24

Table 2. Score sheet MIDC Vladimir Putin


25

Figure 2 Vladimir Putin

Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria

Profile Form

40 - - - - - - - - - - - - Markedly

36 - - - - - - - - - - e e disturbed

33 - - - - - - - - - - - -

30 - - - - - - - - - - - -

27 - - - - - - - - - - - - Mildly

dysfunctional 24 c c

21 - - - - - - - - - - - - Moderately

d d disturbed

18 - - - - - - - - - -

5 - -

12 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Prominent 10 b b - -

8 - -

6 - - - - - - - - - -

Present 5 a a - -

4 - -

3 - - - - - - - - - -

2 - - - - - - - - - -

1 - - - - - - - - - -

0 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Scale: 1A 1B 2 3 4 5A 5B 6 7 8 9 0

Score: 21 1 14 8 2 1 1 17 3 1 31 4


26

Conclusion: the Competing leadership styles Authority vs. Opposition

This section will draw a comparison between Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Putin from the

perspective of leadership style (Steinberg & Immelman, 2008).

Alexei Navalny is predominantly motivated by power and, to some extent, ideology. As a

daring, risk-taking politician, with a strong nonconformity, he is less likely to be pragmatic in

his outlook. Putin’s motivation for leadership is based on issues of power, pragmatism and

ideology. Being overly controlling and perfectionistic, he tries to concentrate power in his

hands. He has an extraordinary confidence in his own ideas and may show motivation by

ideology and the wish to transform society. His ambition may also dictate a policy of

pragmatism as a way of ensuring continued success.

For both leaders goal orientation is prevailing in their leadership style. In the case of Alexei

Navalny this can be explained by his adventurous and innovative approach to policy.

Motivated by power, ideology and his own success, his interest in maintaining good relations

with colleagues is much less important than their ability to achieve goals. Putin has the same

priorities, but he still follows hard-work ethic and tries to maintain proper relationships among

colleagues.

Both leaders’ investment in job performance is more likely to be tireless rather than

circumscribed. Because of Putin’s attention to detail and managerial competence, his

leadership style turns around the need for productivity.

Putin and Navalny are more likely to act as advocates within their administration rather than

consensus builders or arbitrators. Although they have different reasons for this: Navalny is

determined, resolute and willful, he does not lose the chance to expose his attitude. For Putin,

on the other hand, policy choices often take on a black-or-white quality — a situation in which

the building of consensus plays a secondary role to the implementation of the morally

“correct” or the most efficient policy.

27

Given Navalny’s risk-taking, and adventurousness, he is more likely to exhibit a high degree of

involvement in managing information. Because of his scepticism and critical attitude, he

prefers direct involvement in the search for and analysis of policy-relevant data as well as the

use of a variety of sources to remove doubts about the accuracy of the reports they receive.

Putin’s high degree of involvement in managing information can be justified by love for

overcontrol; his orderliness, perfectionism and activism.

In the area of personnel management these two leaders show completely different patterns.

Putin can be expected to be highly interactive with his personnel. Because of his concern with

power he is very demanding and even manipulative to his subordinates, being afraid

something escapes his eye. Unlike Putin, Navalny is moderately interactive with civil servants

and personal staff, given his tendency to act in a notably autonomous fashion and his

disinclination to adhere to conventional standards. He treats his subordinates in a jovial and

convivial fashion. However, when obstructed or crossed, he may become confrontational,

demanding and difficult.

In his dealings with his allies and rivals, Alexei Navalny is more likely to remain uninvolved or

exhibit competitive and oppositional rather than cooperative behaviour. When problems of

control arise he might become demanding. Putin to the contrary can be expected to behave

in dutiful fashion. If he views political allies as equals, he will be more likely to behave in a

cooperative way. He views opposition as a potential source of challenge to his leadership. In

his dealings with opposition parties, Vladimir Putin is likely to behave competitive and even

controlling. When it appears that behaving in a cooperative manner will further their interests,

both leaders are willing do so for instrumental reasons.

In the arena of public relations Alexei Navalny enjoys harmonious relations with the media.

He often acts unexpectedly, failing to plan ahead or heed consequences and appears in the

spotlight. Nevertheless, lacking trust and being sceptical, he remains careful and rarely sincere

with the media. He would welcome the press, if he feels that media can be manipulated. In

his dealings with the public, Alexei Navalny is active rather than passive. Given his self-

confident, outspoken personality he shows a preference for personally articulating and

defending his positions. Compared to this, the Russian president wants to dominate and to

28

control the media. Nevertheless he attempts to be reasonably open, reasonably cooperative,

yet polite in a formal manner. In his dealings with the public, Putin can be expected to be

active rather than passive. Given his strong-willed, confident and dutiful personality, he also

prefers to present his views personally (even though he might not always enjoy it because of

perfectionist nature) (Steinberg & Immelman, 2008).

Discussion

The psychological profiles of Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Putin show significant presence of

personal traits relevant for successful leadership. Both political leaders are dominant,

ambitious and self-confident. In addition to that, Alexei Navalny has naturally critical attitude

to politics. He is eager to gain respect and prove he is worth something. Navalny cannot stand

the deprivations from which oppositional parties suffer in Russia. His prevailing dauntless

pattern makes him adventurous and even reckless enough to engage in fights that he knows

he cannot win. On the other hand Putin’s scores on conscientious scale make him greatly well-

tailored for formal institutions. His position is even more suited for him knowing that he

played the main role in constructing this perfectly functioning political hierarchy. Putin

carefully preserves his creation by building up a wall of distrust and suspicion to defend

himself.

The psychological profile of Alexei Navalny explains his oppositional location in the Russian

political line-up. Navalny as an opposition leader has a potential to challenge Putin’s “unique”

right on power. But this challenge is very unlikely to grow into an actual competition in current

alignment of forces and namely - the Russian party system. Putin’s dominance has embraced

this field as part of his “perfect order” and Navalny is way too contentious to fit in there.

Moreover he so strongly believes in his own ideas of “right and wrong” that he would be most

likely to refuse any offer to cooperate with authorities. Based on what he shows to the public

he deeply despises Putin’s system. Since he is quick to challenge rules and authority, he is

more comfortable when he himself constitutes the authority. He makes a perfect opposition

leader, but with Russia’s current institutional design he can only count on the role of

challenger.

29

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ECPR General Conference in Prague

(September 7-10), in the panel “Leadership perception in complex political decision making

and media environments”. The authors are grateful to the panel discussant Peter Bull

(University of York, Department of Psychology) and to Helen Shestopal (Lomonosow

Moscow State University) for their helpful comments. They also thank Emilie Genbrugge

who in 2014 initiated the data-collection for making up the psychological profile of Vladimir

Putin using non-Russian source materials.

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Most”,http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203986604577257321601811092

Time (2010), “Russia's Erin Brockovich: Taking On Corporate

Greed”,http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1970475,00.html

Time (2012), “TIME 100: The List, Alexei Navalny Watchdog”,

http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2111976_21121

67,00.html

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Голос Америки (Golos Ameriki) (2015), Alexei Navalny: interview, http://www.golos-

ameriki.ru/content/navalny-interview-voa-rferl/2796991.html

Relevant diagnostic material. Vladimir Putin

Barry, E. (2012), ‘Putin aide says foreign hands are behind protests’, New York Times,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/world/europe/putin-aide-promises-significant-

changesin-russian-political-system.html?_r=0

BBC (2014), Profile: Vladimir Putin, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/667749.stm

Bush, J. (2005), ‘Deciphering Putin’, Business Week, 28.2.2005: 55-56

Business Insider (2016), Putin defends Russia's recent aggression, blames US and Europe for

rising tensions, http://uk.businessinsider.com/vladimir-putin-interview-bild-obama-russia-us-

2016-1?r=US&IR=T

CBSN (2015), Charlie Rose interviews Vladimir Putin,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8k2pWbCjrw,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cB3sW3W8HQ&nohtml5=False,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tNlTifCWyk&nohtml5=False

De Cock, J. (2004a), ‘Beter dan de vorige? Analyse. Waarom Poetins stalinistische score bitter

weinig protest uitlokt’, De Standaard, http://www.standaard.be/cnt/gmt4jtdn

De Cock, J. (2004b), ‘Poetin wankelt (nog) niet’, De Standaard,

http://www.standaard.be/cnt/gn88hotl

De Cock, J. (2012), ‘De Lada van Vladimir Poetin: De Poetinshow / De man zonder gezicht –

Kysia Hekster / Masha Gessen’, De Standaard, http://www.standaard.be/cnt/5a3mu9bo

De Foer, S. (2014), ‘Interview Rik Coolsaert “Blufpoker is een gevaarlijk spelletje” ’, De

Standaard, 91, 52:

De Smet, D. (2014), ‘Een korte stok om Rusland te slaan’, De Standaard, 91, 54: 12

De Standaard (2004), ‘Westerse politici vallen Poetin aan in open brief’, De Standaard,

http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf29092004_004

De Standaard (2011), ‘Gorbatsjov noemt Poetin verwaand’, De Standaard,


35

De Standaard (2012a), ‘Poetin na verkiezingszege: ‘Tranen kwamen door de wind’ ’, De

Standaard, http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20120305_005

De Standaard (2012b), ‘Waar zit Vladimir Poetin?’, De Standaard,


De Standaard (2013a), ‘Poetin feliciteert FSB voor ontmaskeren van 200 spionnen’, De

Standaard, http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20130214_107

De Standaard (2013b), ‘Poetin, de hondenliefhebber’, De Standaard,


De Standaard (2013c), ‘Op avontuur met Vladimir Poetin’, De Standaard,


De Standaard (2013d), ‘Stephen Fry vergelijkt Poetin met Hitler’, De Standaard,


De Standaard (2013e), ‘Poetin voorgedragen voor Nobelprijs voor Vrede’, De Standaard,


De Standaard (2014a), ‘Geloofwaardigheid Europa staat op het spel’, De Standaard, 91, 47:

18

De Standaard (2014b), ‘Poetin wijkt niet’, De Standaard, 91, 54:1

De Standaard (2014c), ‘Clinton vergelijkt Poetin met Hitler’, De Standaard,


De Standaard (2014d), ‘Sancties laten Poetin koud’, De Standaard, 91, 65:1

De Vries, M.K. & Shekshnia, S. (2008), ‘Vladimir Putin, CEO of Russia Inc. The legacy and the

future’, Organizational Dynamics, 37, 3: 236-253

Duk, W. (2014), Poetin: straatvechter bedreigt wereldorde, Amsterdam: Prometheus – Bert

Bakker

Evans, A.B. (2011), ‘The failure of democratization in Russia: a comparative perspective’,

Journal of Eurasian studies, 2, 40-51

Hancke, C. (2013a), ‘Poetin lacht in zijn vuistje’, De Standaard,


Hancke, C. (2013b), ‘Amnestieregel in Rusland: Poetin wrijft over zijn hart’, De Standaard,


36

Hancke, C. (2013c), ‘Een strateeg met een goed gevoel voor public relations’, De Standaard,


Hancke, C. (2014a), ‘Onvoorspelbare Poetin speelt als een kat met de muis’, De Standaard,


Hancke, C. (2014b), ‘Poetin heeft zich diep ingegraven op de Krim’, De Standaard, 91, 58: 16-

17

Hancke, C. (2014c), ‘Poetin heeft eerste buit’, De Standaard, 91, 66: 14-15

Hill, F. & Gaddy, C.G. (2013), Mr.Putin: operative in the Kremlin, Washington: Brookings

Institution Press

Holmes, S. & Krastev, I. (2012), ‘The weakest strongman: are Russia’s protests the beginning

of the end for Vladimir Putin?’, New Republic, 243, 1: 10-13

Hunin, J. (2014), ‘De start van WOIII met Poetin als Hitler’, De Standaard, 91, 54: 12-13

Jansen, M. (2009), ‘De tandem van Medvedev en Poetin: wie heeft de macht in Rusland?’,

Internationale Spectator, 63, 1: 20-23

Krastev, I. & HOLMES, S. (2012), ‘Putinism under siege: an autopsy of a managed democracy’,

Journal of democracy, 23, 3: 33-45

Kremlin (2016), http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51562/videos

Linan, M.V. (2010), ‘History as a propaganda tool in Putin’s Russia’, Communist and

postcommunist studies, 43, 167-178

Moïsi, D. (2012), A Russian spring?,

http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2012/january/arussian-spring-/73136.aspx

Neefs, E. (2014), ‘Interview Salome Samadashvili “EU en Navo lieten Poetin vrij spel” ’, De

Standaard, 91, 54: 14

Piontkovsky, A. (2012), ‘The Russian spring has begun’, Wall Street Journal,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203518404577094780010444466.html

Putin, V. (2014), Vladimir Putin: personal website, http://eng.putin.kremlin.ru/

Reynebeau, M. (2014), ‘President Poetin geeft een les geschiedenis: lang leve onze goede

tsaar!’, De Standaard, 6.2.2014: 18-19

Robertson, G.B. (2009), ‘Managing society: protest, civil society and regime in Putin’s Russia’,

Slavic Review, 68, 3: 528-547

37

Sakwa, R. (2004), Putin: Russia’s choice, Londen: Routledge

Sakwa, R. (2008), ‘Putin’s leadership: character and consequences’, Europe-Asia studies, 60,

6: 879-897

Schepp, M. & NEEF, C. (2011), ‘Interview Michail Gorbatsjov: ‘Ik had alles moeten opblazen’ ’,

Knack Extra, 3, 18: 6-10

Shevtsova, L. (2012), ‘Implosion, atrophy, or revolution?’, Journal of democracy, 23, 3: 19-32

Shlapentokh, V. (2008), ‘Putin as a flexible politician. Does he imitate Stalin?’, Communist and

post-communist studies, 41, 205-216

Strelets, I. (2013), ‘Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev: a political psychology

analysis of presidential personalities’ in Shestopal, E. (ed.), Citizens and leaders in a

comparative perspective: what can political psychology tell us about recent trends and

events in politics, 217-222, Moskou: Moscow University Press

Tayler, J. (2013), ‘Letter from Moscow: Putin’s progress’, The American Scholar, Spring 2013:

6-11, http://theamericanscholar.org/moscowputins-progress/#.UzppGqI_V0E

The Economist (2011), ‘Briefing Russia: the long life of Homo sovieticus’, The Economist, 401,

8763: 27-

The Economist (2012a), ‘Russia’s president: alone at the top’, The Economist, 405, 8813: 29-

30

The Economist (2012b), ‘Putinomics’, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/

blogs/easternapproaches/2012/11/russian-politics?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4

f0f060a07

The Economist (2013), ‘Repression in Russia: put in his place’, The Economist, 407, 8831: 28

The Economist (2014a), ‘Beyond the spectacle of the Sochi Olympics is a crackdown on

Russia’s media’, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21596580-

beyondspectacle-sochi-olympics-crackdown-russias-media-dreams-about-russia

The Economist (2014b), ‘Russia and the world: the triumph of Vladimir Putin’, The Economist,

410, 8872: 7

The Economist (2014c), ‘Putin’s inferno’, The Economist, 410, 8875: 7

The Economist (2014d), ‘Leaders: kidnapped by the Kremlin’, The Economist; 410, 8877: 9

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The Economist (2014e), ‘Russia and Ukraine: The home front’, The Economist,

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21599061-kremlins-belligerence-ukraine-

willultimately-weaken-russia-home-front

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/alexei-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-

found-guilty-embezzlementT

Van Baelen, J. (2011), ‘Interview Garri Kasparov: ‘Natuurlijk werd er in de Sovjet-Unie

gelachen’ ’, Knack Extra, 3, 18: 26-27

Vergauwen, E. (2014), ‘De waarheid over Oekraïne volgens Poetin’, De Standaard,


Vladimir Posner (2013), “Про имидж Владимира Путина” (About Vladimir Putin's image),

http://www.1tvnet.ru/video/show_rubric/vladimir-pozner/

Vladimir Posner, (2012) "Это последний срок Путина" (“This is the last term of Putin”),

http://vladimirpozner.ru/?p=9593

Woussen, W. (2014), ‘Iemand Poetin gezien?’, De Standaard,


Zaougui, C.E. (2013), ‘Column: Poetin, een dictator 2.0’, De Standaard,


Zatonskih, A. (2013), ‘Influence of leader’s personality on perception of political parties’

images in contemporary Russia’ in Shestopal, E. (ed.), Citizens and leaders in a comparative

perspective: what can political psychology tell us about recent trends and events in politics,

270-278, Moskou: Moscow University Press

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