Personalityandsocialbehavior

AldoRustichiniConferenceonMeasuringandAssessingSkills

Chicago,October1-2

Outline:Threemainthemes

• Conscientiousnessandstrategicbehavior• Intelligenceandstrategicbehavior• Neuralanalysisofpersonalityadeconomicbehavior

Thanksto

• ColinDeYoung• DanielHawes• ClaudiaCivai• JeremyGray• RachelGrazioplene• Sephira Ryman• RexYoung• ClaudiaRapallini

• EugenioProto• Andis Sofianos• MattMcGue• BillIacono• RobKirkpatrick• Itai Sher• MelissaKoenig• LucaPolonio

Mainhypothesis

Cooperatingandtrustingbehaviormaybeexplainedbypersonalitiesreflecting:

• Preferencesoversocialoutcomes(Agreeableness).

• Compliancewithnormsandrules(Conscientiousness).

Controltreatment

• Eachsubjectperformstwoseriesof10additionsof5two-digitsnumbersin4minuteseach;andathirdserieswheresheaddsthetwopreviouslyobtainedseriesofnumbers.

• Thesubjectispaidproportionallytothenumberofcorrectanswerstothelastseries,sothethreeseriesofadditionsareperfectlycomplementarytoobtaintherightnumbers.

Co-productionTreatment

• Eachsubjectispartofateamoftworandomlyandanonymouslymatchedindividuals

• Thetasksareidenticaltothecontroltreatment,butsubjectsexchangethesecondseriesofadditionwiththepartner.

• Intheco-productiontreatment,thefinaloutcomeofeachteammateisdependentontheeffortofboth.

Interpretation:asymmetric,simultaneoustrustgame• Inthestandardtrustgame,thefirstplayerdecideswhetherandhowmuchtotrustthesecond;theseconddecideswhethertoreciprocate,conditionallyontheactionofthefirst

• Inthegameweuse,bothplayersinthefirstmoveofthecooperativetreatmentdecidewhetherandhowmuchtotrusttheother;andinthesecondmovedecidetoreciprocatethehypotheticalmoveoftheother

Trustandaltruisminco-production

• Whentheydothefirstadditionsubjectshavetoanticipatethequalityoftheinputthatotherswillprovidethem;sotheireffortwillbehigheriftheytrustothers.

• Whentheydothesecondaddition,theymightconsiderthattheiroutputwillinfluencethepaymenttoothers;sotheireffortwillbehigheriftheycareabouttheoutcomeofothers

Correct1(Trust)(shaded:cooperative)

Correct2(Altruism)(shaded:cooperative)

Monetaryeffortexperiment:design

Summary

INTELLIGENCEANDSTRATEGICBEHAVIOR

Hypothesis:Higherintelligencereducesbehavioralbiases,andoutofequilibriumbehaviorTrueforstrictlycompetitivegameswithasingleNashWhenefficiencygainsarepossible,therelationismuchmorecomplex

HIT15GAMETRUSTGAME

Hit15game

PearsoncorrelationwithRavenscore(SPM):0.81

TrustGame

TrustGame

Sampleandagedistribution

• ChildrenpredominantlyCaucasian,nativeEnglishspeakers

• FrommiddletohighSES• Theentireexperimentlastedapproximately65minutes.

StickerGame(BeautyContext)Instructions

• “I’mgoingtogiveyouandher(theExperimenter1;E1)eachabasketand5stickers.Youcanputhowevermanystickersyouwanttointothebasket:1,2,3,4,or5!Afteryoudothat,Iamgoingtolookinyourbasketsandcountyourstickers.

• Ifyouputasmallernumber ofstickersinyourbasket,thenyougettokeepyourstickersandE1doesn’tgetany.

• ButifE1hasasmallernumber ofstickersinherbasket,thenshegetstokeepherstickersandyoudon’tgetany.

• IfyouandE1havethesamenumberofstickers,thennoonekeepstheirstickers.”

• StickerGamewasplayedfor10rounds.

Choiceofstickersbyage;firstmove

Intelligence

Choiceofstickersbyage;firstmove

Backtogrownups:ForwardInduction

Eyetrackingforsecondplayer

O M

Multistagegames Matrixgames

CRT RAPM CRT Raven Ad

Choices

FIeq. 0.27*** 0.14

eq. -0.02 0.09

Proportionof

Transitions

𝑨 ↔ 𝑨 0.15 0.27*** 0.22** 0.26***

𝑩 ↔ 𝑩 -0.018 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04

𝑨 ↔ 𝑩 -0.11 -0.22** -0.05 -0.07

𝑶 ↔ 𝑴,𝑶 0.24** 0.20**

FixationTime

Outopt.A 0.32**** 0.10

Outopt.B 0.12 0.09

* < 0.1, ** < 0.05 , *** < 0.001, **** < 0.0001.

Correlations:intelligencescores,andchoices,transitions,fixationtimes

Repeatedrepeated game(DalBOFrechette)

Ourdesign

• Probabilityofcontinuationdelta=.75• Stagegame:

Experimentaldesign• Firstday:Wetestedsubjectsonmanyindividualcharacteristics,includingIQ(RavenAM);

• Intermediateweek:Wesplitsubjectsintwogroups:lowIQ(belowsamplemedian)andhighIQ;

• Secondday:Playtherepeatedgamewithrandommatching,inhighandlowIQgroups,separately,repeatedly;

• WethenanalyzethecooperationrateinthehighandlowIQgroups…

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Timetodecide

Summarystatistics

HIGHIQARENOTUNCONDITIONALCOOPERATORS

Samepayoff,delta=0.5

Howintelligenceaffectsstrategicchoices

• InPD,atanycooperationequilibriumthereisatradeoffbetweencurrentgainandcontinuationvalueloss

• Thiscomparisonissubtle:itinvolvestheestimationofeffectofthecontinuationprobability,theforecastonthebehaviorafterdeviation,gainfromcurrentdeviationandcontinuationvalue

• PDisalsotheonly2x2gamewiththisproperty

Prisoner’sDilemma

BattleofSexes

StagHunt

HOWISINTELLIGENCEAFFECTINGSOCIALANDECONOMICBEHAVIOR?

INTELLIGENCEMODULATESREWARDPROCESSING

ExperimentalDesign

CAUDATEISALSOSPECIFICALLYACTIVATEDINASEQUENTIALCHOICETASK,ATTHEFIRSTOFFER

INTELLIGENCEANDCAUDATEVOLUME

resultfrom3MRIstudiescombined

DiffusionTensorImaging(DTI)

RegionsdisplayingpositiveassociationIQandFractionalAnisotropy(FA)

Conclusions

• Measurementofpersonalitytraitsbasedonchoiceandneuralanalysisismoreeffectivethanmeasurementbasedonsurvey

• Intelligencehasacomplexroleinstrategicbehavior:

1. Instrictlycompetitivegameshigherintelligencebringsclosertobehaviorpredictedbygametheory

2. Ingamewhereefficiencygainsarepossible,intelligencemakesthesegainsmorelikely

THANKS