Personal Notes - Persons and Family Relations Reviewer for 4th Exam

Personal Notes – Persons and Family Relation (4th Exam Coverage) Yveza June Romero Gementiza

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Art. 152: The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Art. 153: The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

Guidelines:

1. deemed constituted from time of actual occupation as a family residence 2. must be owned by person constituting it 3. must be permanent 4. rule applies to valid and voidable and even to common-law spouses under Articles 147 and 148 5. continues despite death of one or more spouses or unmarried head of the family for 10 years, or as long as a minor beneficiary lives 6. can constitute one (1) family home only

* Exemption from execution is not absolute as it is subject to certain limitation such as indebtedness in certain instances (to be discussed in the next articles)

GENERAL RULE: The family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or

attachment.

EXCEPTIONS: (PLMN) 1. debts incurred prior to constitution 2. debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men

and others who have rendered service or furnished materials for the construction of the building

3. debts secured by mortgages 4. non-payment of taxes

Art. 154: The beneficiaries of a family home are: 1. The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and 2. Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support

- The actual occupancy of the beneficiaries in a home may constitute the same as a family home as long as they have the consent of the husband or wife who own the house and lot even if the owners do not reside in them.

Art. 155: The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: 1. For nonpayment of taxes; 2. For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; 3. For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and 4. For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

- The whole value of the family home may be used to pay obligations under Art. 155.

Art. 156: The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property. Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home.

- The family home must be constituted at a place where there is a fixed and permanent connection with the persons constituting it.

Not considered: 1. Boat or vessel 2. Apartment or house being rented 3. House on another’s property Considered: Property where ownership is reserved to the one making the family home.

Art. 157: The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation. For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include

- Those above the amount stipulated (300,000 in urban, 200,000 in rural) will not be exempt from execution forced sale or attachment.

- Prior to the family code constitution of a family home was not automatic there was a need to file for such. If prior to the family code there are certain houses falling under the value of a family home at the time of the constitution of the family code (Aug. 3, 1988) provided for the family


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chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas.

home is deemed automatically constituted.

Art. 158: The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide

Written consent needed for the disposition of the family home: 1. Persons constituting the family home 2. Latter’s spouse 3. Majority of beneficiaries of legal age

Art. 159: The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

- Security of the family is the concern of the law thus they provide for a 10 year period despite the death of the person who constituted the family home. Furthermore the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefore.

Art. 160: When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.

- Bidders cannot bid below the amount of 300,000 - If the house is sold, 300,000 is given to the owner of the

house and the balance to the creditor to satisfy his debt. This happens even if the debt is not fully satisfied. (Idea is to give 300,000 so that the debtor can buy a house) This however does not apply when if the creditor is one of those mentioned in Article 155 (the debt must be satisfied even if nothing is left with the owner).

Art. 161: For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home.

Art. 162: The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.

LEGITIMATE ILLEGITIMATE NOTES

Children conceived or born during the marriage Children born or conceived outside a valid marriage or in a void marriage unless otherwise provided

Children as a result of artificial insemination are legitimate provided that both authorized or ratified the insemination in a written instrument signed by both of them before the birth of the child (registered with the birth certificate). I

If the requisites are not followed and the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, the child shall still be considered legitimate.

If husband is able to impugn legitimacy with regards to him child will simply not be related, but in relation to the mom the child will


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be considered illegitimate

Modequillo V Breva Facts: On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-appellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally to: ................................... On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares 01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

Ruling: Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.

Manacop V Court of Appeals Facts: Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a consequence of

Ruling: Lastly, petitioner is one of the belief that his abode at Quezon City since 1972 is a family home within the purview of the Family Code and therefore should not have been subjected to the vexatious writ. Yet, petitioner must concede that respondent court properly applied the discussion conveyed by Justice Gancayco in this regard when he spoke for the First Division of this Court in Modequillo vs. Breva.


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the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop, herein petitioner. In lieu of the original complaint, private respondent submitted an amended complaint on August 18, 1989 intended to substitute Manacop Construction with Florante F. Manacop as defendant who is "doing business under the name and style of F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.". After the motion for issuance of summons to the substituted defendant below was granted. In the CA the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment. CA decided in the negative hence petition to SC. Issue: Whether or not such family home was rightfully attached to satisfy claim.

Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in 1987 or prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22, Rollo). This fact alone will militate heavily against the so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in Modequillo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

Taneo Jr. V Court of Appeals Facts: As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment. one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968. To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property.Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Petitioner conteded further that the family home was established by their father before the effectivity of the family code and hence under Art. 243 of the Civil Code, since their home was registered in the ROD it should not be attached to satisfy debt. Issue: Whether a family home duly registered in ROD as such be levied to satisfy claim.

Ruling: The applicable law, therefore. in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. Art. 243 reads:

The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment,except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the declaration; (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

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The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2). Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated,"

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Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to no avail.

Patricio V Dario

Ruling:


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Facts: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On October 3, 2002,

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manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. An Appeal to CA was initially denied. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises. Issue: is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner: The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home.

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The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code. As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent’s minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.1Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino

Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

Cabang V Basay Facts:

Ruling: As defined, "[T]he family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime.

21 It is the dwelling house where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/nov2006/gr_170829_2006.html#fnt3

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/nov2006/gr_170829_2006.html#fnt15

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/mar2009/gr_180587_2009.html#fnt21


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Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. Said lot was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2,768 pursuant to Decree No. N-64 and issued on March 9, 1966. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot. Respondents bought said real property from the heirs of Felix Odong for P8,000.00. Consequently, OCT No. 0-2,768 was cancelled and in its stead, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22,048 was issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of plaintiff-appellants. The latter also did not occupy the said property. Petitioners on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings. On June 23, 1992, respondents Basay filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 92-20-127 for Recovery of Property against the petitioners. RTC ruled in favour of Petitioner Cabang. CA Reversed RTC’s decision. On appeal to SC petitioner contends that petitioners’ family home was still subsisting in the said lot and therefore cannot be adjudicated to the respondents. Issue: Was the petitioner’s contention tenable?

family reside, including the land on which it is situated.22

It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family."

23 Article 153 of the Family Code provides that –

The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution,

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constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.

27 "[T]he family home must

be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family."

28 In other words:

The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the latter.1 Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate court’s judgment.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION Art. 163: The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.

- Paternity and filiation refer to the relationship or tie, which exists between parents and their children.

Art. 164:Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. Art. 165: Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.

- Illegitimate children are those conceived and born outside a valid marriage or inside a void marriage.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: wife is artificially impregnated with the semen of her husband or with the semen of a third person.

- Child of artificial insemination is considered legitimate provided that both the husband and wife authorize or ratify such insemination in a written instrument and signed by them before the birth of the child and that it is recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

- If the requirements given are not followed and the husband does not impugn the legitimacy of the child on grounds provided by law within the prescriptive period the child will still be considered legitimate.

Rule on Children Conceived as a Result of Artificial Insemination

Status is legitimate child, provided both husband and wife authorized or ratified the insemination in a written instrument which they executed and signed before the birth of the child

Art. 166: Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: 1. That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:

Grounds to impugn legitimacy of the child:

1. Physically impossible for husband to have sexual intercourse with wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of child due to:

a. Physical incapacity

Art. 167: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

*Even if wife impugns legitimacy, child is still legitimate, only husband and in







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(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; 2.That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or 3. That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

b. Living separately: must be living in such a way that sexual intercourse is impossible. (Mere remoteness is not sufficient)

c. Serious illness - When a child is born inside a marriage, sexual intercourse is presumed to have occurred between the husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300-day period before the birth of the child. (Longest gestation period)

2. Biological or scientific reasons the child could not have been that of the husband (except for artificial insemination)—if for biological reasons offspring could not have been that of the husband like if the child was a different race from the father’s.

- Vasectomy is not enough proof because there are times when the sperm can re-channel itself and effect fertilization.

3. In case of artificial insemination the authorization or ratification was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence or intimidation or undue influence.

* In the event that any of the grounds are proven, the child will not be considered legitimate or illegitimate but that simply the husband and child are not related. In so far as the mother is concerned the child will be considered illegitimate. - Presumption is in favor of legitimacy.

proper cases the heirs can impugn the legitimacy. Unless: she did not

deliver the child herself, or did not come from her own womb. Legitimate Children

GENERAL RULE: Only those who are conceived or born during a

valid marriage

EXCEPTIONS: (CAVALAC)

Those children who are 1. Conceived as a result of artificial insemination 2. Born of a voidable marriage before decree of annulment 3. Conceived or born before judgment of annulment or absolute

nullity under Art. 36 has become final & executory 4. Conceived or born of subsequent marriage under Art. 53

5. Of mothers who may have declared against its legitimacy or was sentenced as an adultress 6. Legally adopted

7. Legitimated, conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents without

impediment at the time of conception and had subsequently married

Concepcion V Court of Appeals FAtcs: This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989.

2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s parents in Fairview, Quezon City.

3 Almost a

year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.4

Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.

5 He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had

married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that Mario

was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

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Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She moved for reconsideration of the decision in so far as the visitation rights is concern and she also maintained that the child’s family name be change to Conception. RTC denied Ma. Theresa’s motion and thus elevated the case to CA. CA ruled that the child is a legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and her husband being born within the

Ruling: Article 167 of the Family Code mandates: "The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress." Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.

Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/aug2005/gr_123450_2005.html#fnt2








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subsistence of their marriage. Gerardo shocked elevated the case to SC: Issue: whether or not Petitioner is the father or the child.

Estate of Rogelio Ong V Minor Joanne Facts: The RTC finally held:

The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz. Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid). The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of –

a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.

It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz. While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo. On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.

While case is pending in CA Rogelio died. His heir substituted in his behalf. CA ruled that DNA testing be done in order to determine the paternity of minor Joanne. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER

Ruling: The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the i innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence

28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any

person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus: SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of

DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing. And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_171713_2007.html#fnt28


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FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.

Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.

*merely suppletory, if there is better proof, such must be accepted (Sta. Maria) *Sexual act is presumed between spouses during their marriage (Sta. Maria) *Either way, child is legitimate. (Sta. Maria)

Subsequent marriage of the wife WITHIN 300 days after termination of the previous marriage:

1. If child is born 180 days after subsequent marriage is solemnized considered conceived during prior marriage, as long as the child is born WITHIN 300 days after termination of prior marriage. (Ex. Termination of 1

st marriage: Jan. 1, 2013; Celebration of Subsequent

marriage: July 1, 2013; Child was born on Aug.1, 2013) 2. If born after 180 days following the celebration of subsequent

marriage, even if born within 300 days after termination of prior marriage, considered conceived during the subsequent marriage. (Ex. Termination of 1

st marriage: Jan. 1, 2013; Celebration of Subsequent

marriage: March 1, 2013; Child was born on Sept.1, 2013)

Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.

The burden of proving legitimacy or illegitimacy of child born 300 days after termination of prior marriage is borne by whoever alleges such.

*If there is no subsequent marriage after 300days following the termination of prior marriage, no presumption and thus convincing proof is necessary.

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.

Who can impugn? (1) the husband; or (2) husband’s heirs When to bring action to impugn? upon the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register by the one who brings the action. (1) within one year, if they reside in the place where the birth took

place or was recorded; (2) within 2 years, if they reside elsewhere in the Philippines; (3) within 3 years, if abroad; (4) if the birth was concealed, or unknown to the husband, upon

knowledge or discovery of the birth.

*knowledge of the child’s BIRTHNOT knowledge that it is not his child.

*Even if the birth was concealed, if it was registered and the father did not impugn the legitimacy of the child within the period provided, child is legitimate. (Constructive notice)

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Instances when the HEIRS of the HUSBAND can impugn the filiation of the child: 1. if the husband dies before prescription of action(art.170); 2. if he dies after institution of action w/o having desisted; or 3. if he dies before the child was even born.

BADUA VS CA (229 SCRA 468)

Spouses Vicente and Isabel, both deceased, left various properties. The sister and nephew of Vicente, namely Victoria and Feodor, prayed that Feodor be declared as the sole administrator

Issue: W it is an action to impugn the legitimacy of Marissa; NO. W Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the FCP applies? NO.


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of the deceased spouses’ properties, as he had no other heirs or relatives. This was opposed by Petitioner Marissa. She claimed that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente. To support her claim, she presented the following evidences: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and (4) School Records. Petitioner also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. The private respondents tried to prove that the deceased spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage. They presented testimonies to support their claims.

1. Dr. Lino Chipongian, brother of Isabel, admitted that they failed to beget a child;

2. Victoria categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate

3. Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years.

4. Neighbors of the spouses who testified that they never saw Isabel got pregnant.

Held:

Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the FCP do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.

BABIERA VS CATOTAL (333 SCRA 487) Presentacion filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera PRESENTACION asserted 'that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of the late spouses and without their knowledge, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own

eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista’s birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena, was already 54 years old; b)

Issue: W it is an action to impugn her legitimacy. NO. W Arts. 170 and 171applies. NO.

Ruling: Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171of the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack. This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents. Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not


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Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate.

TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Further, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student's Report Card x x x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation.

impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.

DE JESUS VS ESTATE (366 SCRA 499) During the subsistence of the marriage of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves-de Jesus, children, Jacqueline and Jinkie, were bon. Juan Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie as his own illegitimate children with Carolina. This written acknowledgement was duly notarized. Upon the death of Juan, Petitioners (Jacqueline and Jinkie) filed a complaint for partition of Juan’s estate. The surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not

Issue: W Jacqueline and Jinkie may be recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon. NO.

Ruling: There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there

is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in


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require a separate action for judicial approval.

wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners’ alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.

LIYAO, JR. VS TANHOTI – LIYAO (378 SCRA 563)

Note:

****Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.

Corazon and Ramon Yulo were married, but were separated in fact. During their marriage, Corazon had an affair with William Liyao Sr. and they begot a child, William Jr. During the birth of William Jr, William Sr. attended to the needs of Corazon, visited and stayed with her and the child at the hospital, paid for the hospitalization expenses. He brought the child to his office and introduced him as his son, he had photos with the child. Since birth, the child has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the said William Liyao through his direct acts. The children of Corazon with Ramon also acknowledged that William Jr. is the illegitimate son of late William Sr. RTC ruled that he is the illegitimate child of William Sr, but CA reversed RTC’s decision.

Issue: W the petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy. NO

Ruling: The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her

husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.

It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown,


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the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.

BRAZA VS CIVIL REGISTRAR (4 December 2009) Petitioner Ma. Cristina’s husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner made inquiries with the LCR Negros Occidental. On the annotation of Patrick’s birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito) as son on January 13, 1997; that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular Braza. Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co petitioners (her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the LCR. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue: W the court a quo may pass upon the questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. NO

Ruling: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

ARTICLE 172 – PROOF OF FILIATION The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate

- The record of birth appearing in the civil registry should have the

husband’s signature and such birth certificate signed by the parents is adequate proof of paternity without need for further court action. - Admission in public or private handwritten document is a complete act of recognition without need for court action

A mere instrument not in the handwriting o the parent or not a public instrument will not qualify.

- Open continuous possession means the father treats the child as his own directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment

Proofs of filiation: 1. Primary Evidence:

a. Record of birth b. Admission in a public document or in a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned 2. Secondary evidence

a. Proof of continuous open possession of the status of a legitimate child;

b. Any other evidence admissible under the Ruled of court or the law. - Baptismal certificate


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filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Must be spontaneous and uninterrupted

- Judicial admission - Family bible - Common reputation - Admission by silence - Testimony of witness

*NOTE: Secondary evidence is not admissible if the Primary evidence exists.

FERNANDEZ V. CA (petition for support) Violeta Esguerra, the mother and guardian of petitioners Claro Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, pointed to respondent Carlito S. Fernandez as the father of the petitioners. She claimed that she and Carlito started their illicit sexual relationship sometime in 1983, which resulted in the birth of the petitioners. Violeta averred that they were married in civil rites in October 1983. She also claimed that she did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. In March 1985, she however discovered that the marriage license they used was spurious. Petitioners presented the ff. evidence: (1) Certificate of live birth (identifying respondent as their father); (2) Baptismal Certficate of Claro (stating respondent as his father); (3) Photographs of respondent (taken during Claro’s baptismal) (4) Photographs of respondent and Claro (taken at the home of Violeta) (5) Witnesses Cantoria and Dr. Villanueva and Cu (who told the trial court that Violeta had at different times introduced respondent to them as his ‘husband’; and (6) Father Fernandez (who testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of the petitioner Claro during the latter’s baptism). Carlito denied and averred that he only served as sponsor in the baptism of Claro. Such claim was corroborated by an office who also stood as sponsor. He also claimed that he was named father in the birth certificate because of this suit for support.

ISSUE: Whether the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners was sufficient to prove their filiations NO HELD: Petitioners cannot rely on photographs taken in the baptism nor those taken in the house of Violeta, since they are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of Petitioner Claro. As explained he was merely a sponsor. The baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro naming respondent as his father has inadequate evidentiary value because there is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation (Canonical records do not constitute authentic document to prove legitimate filiations). The certificate of live birth of petitioners are also not competent evidence on the issue of paternity because records do not show that private respondent had a hand in the participation thereof.

FERNANDEZ V. FERNANDEZ The late Spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia being childless, purchased a baby boy which they named Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school. On 1982, Jose Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa and Rodolfo and an estate consisting of a parcel of land and a two storey residential building. Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa executed a deed of extra-judicial partition dividing and allocating to themselves the properties of Dr. Fernandez. On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, Rodolfo's son over the land and the residential building which was allocated to her. After learning of the transaction, Dr. Fernandez’s nephews and nieces filed an action to declare the Extra- Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They alleged that the Rodolfo and Eddie took advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa and that Rodolfo is not the son of the spouses. Meanwhile, Rodolfo presented his baptismal certificate and an application for recognition of backpay rights by Jose.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court may pass upon the legitimacy of Rodolfo in an action for declaration of nullity of two documents (deed of extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one's legitimacy) YES Whether Rodolfo’s baptismal certificate is admissible as proof of filiation NO HELD: Although respondents' principal action was for the declaration of absolute nullity of the documents. It is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial partition. While one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a DIRECT ACTION, but this doctrine has NO


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RTC declared the deeds null and void. In so ruling, the trial court found that Rodolfo was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of the spouses, hence he could not inherit from them.

APPLICATION in the instant case considering that respondents’ claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the spouses Fernandez (exception to the general rule that legitimacy can only be attacked directly). It is not a situation wherein they deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle’s wife. Petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament, but not the declaration made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation. Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation. As to the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the original copy, also the public document contemplated in Article 172 of the FC refer to written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation. Petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate between Generosa and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned.

LABAGALA V. SANTIAGO Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. However, his sisters sued him for recovery of 2/3 share of the land alleging that he had fraudulently registered it in his name. The trial court decided in favor of his sisters. Jose died intestate. His sisters then filed a complaint for recovery of the 1/3 portion of said property which was in the possession of Ida Labagala (who claimed to be Ida Santiago, the daughter of Jose). Proof of filiation presented by petitioner: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose’s daughter, and (2) Jose’s income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter (3) baptismal certificate The trial court ruled in favor of Ida Labagala. According to the trial court, the said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose’s 1/3 portion of the property as Jose’s daughter. When appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It took into account that Ida was born of different parents (not Jose and his wife), as indicated her birth certificate. Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of her claim.

ISSUES: Whether the respondents may impugn petitioner’s filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession YES Whether petitioner is entitled to Jose’s 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation NO HELD: Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods. The certificate of record of birth plainly states that Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Ida on the other hand did not present her birth certificate to support her claim though it would have been the easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal certificate she was born on Manila in 1969. But then, a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner cannot inherit from him through intestate succession. Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case; Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation.

LOCSIN V. JUAN LOCSIN JR. Respondent Juan Locsin filed a petition praying that he be appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Juan Locsin, Sr. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and that he is the only surviving legal hair of the decedent. The heirs of Locsin, Sr., herein petitioners, filed an opposition averring that respondent is neither a child nor an acknowledged natural child

ISSUE: Which of the two documents (the certificate of live birth from the local civil registrar [Exhibit D] or certificate of live birth from the civil registrar general [Exhibit 8]) is genuine? EXHIBIT 8 HELD: A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the CC and the Article 172 of FC, for


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of the former. To support his claim, respondent submitted the ff. proofs of filitation: (1) a machine copy of his certificate of live birth (presented the Local Registrar to prove its authenticity) (Exhibit D) (2) a photograph showing him and his mother in front of the coffin bearing Juan Locsin’s dead body. In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that the certificate of live birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of the certificate of live birth (Exhibit 8) found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan Locsin. Petitioners also presented a handwriting expert and testified that the signature in the certificate (Exhibit D) was forged. Trial Court found the certificate of live birth and the photograph sufficient proofs of respondent’s illegitimate filiation. CA affirmed.

purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity and nullity. In this case, respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (Exhibit D) has all the badges of nullity.

Local (Exhibit D) General (Exhibit 8)

*In a form printed in 1958 (NPO prints it) but the entries made in it were allegedly made in 1957 *The entry was merely pasted on the book, when the rest were sawn *No important particulars *The space which call for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank *photocopy *back of volume torn

*No signature of the late Juan C. Locsin

Where the glaring discrepancies between the Certificates of Live of Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry and the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, the latter prevails. Photographs will not constitute proof of filiation.

BERNABE V. ALEJO The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his father’s estate. Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation. CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.

ISSUE: Whether Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son YES HELD: The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Nonetheless, the FC provides the caveat, that rights that have already vested prior to this enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired. Art 258 is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining age of majority. Therefore, the FC cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition because the right had already vested prior to its enactment.

ECETA V. ECETA Petitioner Rosalina and her husband Isaac acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property. They begot a son (Vicente) who sired an illegitimate daughter (Maria Theresa), herein respondent. Isaac died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died and his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and her illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.

HELD: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.


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Respondent Maria Theresa filed a case before RTC for Partition and Accounting with Damages against petitioner alleging that by virtue of her father’s death she became petitioner’s co-heir and and co-owner of the disputed property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. RTC rendered judgement in favour of respondent and declared 1/4 undivided share as her rightful share. CA affirmed with modification, reducing respondent’s share to 1/8. ISSUE: Whether the admission made by petitioner that the respondent is her granddaughter is enough to prove her filiation with the only son of the petitioner

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. In the case at bar however, what was tried before the trial court and CA was for partition and accounting of damages only. The filiation or compulsory recognition by Vicente of Theresa was never put in issue. In fact both agreed in the trial court’s pre trial order that Theresa was Rosalina’s granddaughter. The deceased establishing acknowledgement of his paternity over Theresa nevertheless

signed the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the latter. Hence, the Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.

DELA ROSA ET AL. V. HEIRS OF DAMIAN One of those claiming the estate of the late spouses Rustia is Guillerma Rustia who claimed to be the illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia where she sought recognition on 2 grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. As proof of the latter, she presented her report card which identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. ISSUE: Whether Guillerma can claim compulsory acknowledgement from Guillermo Rustia NO

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974. The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. Did Guillerma’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.

RIVERA V. VILLANUEVA Petitioners are the half brothers, half sister and children of the half brother of the deceased, Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are the Heirs of Villanueva, represented by Melchor. They were allowed to be substitute for Villanueva upon his death. The remaining respondents are Angelina and her husband Victorino, are allegedly the daughter and son-in-law of the late Villanueva. From 1927 until 1980, Pacita cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to Amanda Musngi who died in 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the properties contested in this case. Pacita died without a will. In 1980, Villanueva

ISSUE: Whether respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent Gonzales NO HELD: According to the assailed decision, “the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ illegitimate child. It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez v. CA, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have


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and Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales’ estate comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina. Later on, the Petitioners filed a case for partition of Gonzales’ estate and annulment of titles and damages with the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.RTC- 2 Findings: 1. Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and 2. Respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the CA and the latter affirmed the RTC decision.

adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence. There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua v. CA that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several years. There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales’ daughter.

Rodriguez vs Lim G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995

Facts: Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for cancellation of certificate of title and injunction against

the spouses Rodriguez. Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged that his mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner of two parcels of land and were registered under her name. Dominga died and was survived by her only son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious son acknowledged and recognized by her.

The complaint also alleged that upon her death, Pablo Jr. succeeded to all her rights of ownership and possession. However, the spouses Rodriguez, despite their knowledge that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was now the owner and possessor of the subject lots, allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the subject lots from persons who were not the owners.

The spouses Rodriguez denied the allegations and alleged that Dominga was not the mother of Pablo Jr. They averred that the subject lots were the conjugal property of Frisco Gudani and his wife Dominga. When the latter died, Frisco Gudani was her sole surviving heir. They also alleged that Frisco and Dominga jointly exercised acts of ownership and possession over the subject lots. When Dominga passed away, Frisco Gudani executed an instrument of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased. By virtue of the said document, Dominga's share in the subject lots was adjudicated in favor of Frisco. Thereafter, Frisco Gudani allegedly sold the subject lots to Eduardo Victa who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses Rodriguez.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pablo Jr. The court found out that Dominga and Frisco executed a Marital Consent wherein Frisco renounced his rights in connection to the real and personal properties of his wife. After Frisco had left the conjugal abode, Dominga and Pablo Lim cohabited with each other as common law husband and wife and had a son (Pablo Jr.)

The court also explained that since Dominga died without a will, legal or intestate succession takes place following paragraph (1) of Article 960 of the Civil Code. Under the law on intestacy, particularly Article 998, the widower or widow who survives with illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the illegitimate children to the other half.

Held: Yes. The Court has laid down the manner of establishing the filiation of children, whether legitimate

or illegitimate, as follows:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in, any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to prove that he was the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. Among them were his certificate of birth.

The court a quo, as affirmed by the appellate court, likewise correctly nullified TCT in the name of petitioners. In fact, all the transactions relative to the affidavit of Frisco Gudani adjudicating to himself the subject lots and their purported sale by him to Eduardo Victa and by the latter to petitioners, were declared null and void by the court a quo on the ground that, as established by evidence, these were all made through the fraudulent machinations of one Atty. Aguilan. (2 years after Dominga’s death, Atty. Alejandro D. Aguilan went to see Frisco and informed the latter about the properties, including the subject lots, left by Dominga. Atty. Aguilan falsely made Frisco to believe that if he would not acquire the properties for himself, the same would be forfeited in favor of the government.)

The factual findings showed that the transactions involving the subject lots, particularly the transfers thereof from the deceased Dominga Goyma to Frisco Gudani and from him to Eduardo Victa were fraudulent and made through the machinations of Atty. Aguilan.


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On appeal to CA, Pablo presented his record of birth. It stressed that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was the son of the Dominga as evidenced by a voluntary acknowledgment made in his record of birth. On the other hand, Frisco Gudani could not dispose of the subject lots before partition of the estate of Dominga Goyma and without authority given by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. Issues:

1. Whether or not Pablo jr. is a co-owner of the properties and is entitled to 1/2 of the subject parcels of land and the alleged documents proving the voluntary acknowledgment suffice to prove his filiation to his parents.

Verceles vs Posada G.R. SP. 159785, 27 April 2007

Facts: Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada, a young lass from the barrio of Pandan. Catanduanes, met a close family friend. petitioner Teofisto Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then offered Posada a job. Posada accepted Verceles's offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor's office. Along with some other employees, Posada accompanied Vereceles to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. One day, Verceles started to make amorous advances on her. She panicked, and hurriedly left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as a casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects. On orders of Verceles, Posada went to Virac, (Iatanduanes, to follow up funds for hamrtgqy projects. She went to (Iatanduanes Hotel on instructions of Verceles who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor. Instead, however, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would ‘divorce’ her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the incident to herself. Posada missed her menstruation and she wrote Verceles that she feared she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter, Verceles told Posada that he should have no regrets should she become pregnant even unexpectedly, and that they shall both talte care of the child. Posada explained Verceles used an alias ‘Ninoy’ and addressed her as ‘Chris’, probably because of their 25-year age gap. In court, Posada identified Verceles’s penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office. On September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada. The Posadas filed a complaint for

Issue: Whether or not Verna Aiza is the illegitimate child of Teofisto

Held: A perusal of the complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states ‘Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite’, Posada’s averments therein, all clearly established a case for recognition of paternity. This Court has held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just aground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. The letters are private handwritten instruments of Verceles which establish Verna's filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, is convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, Verceles’s illegitimate child. Verceles not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. However, we cannot rule that the Posadas are entitled to damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with Verccles. Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.


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Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against Verceles. The trial court issued a judgment in favor of the Posadas. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, ordering Verceles to pay a monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada from her birth, and to pay damages to Maria Clarissa and her parents.

Fidel vs CA G.R. No. 168263 July 21, 2008

Facts: On February 21, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for

Annulment of Sale, Tax Declaration, Reconveyance with Damages against the petitioners Edgardo and Natividad Fidel and Guadalupe Espineli-Cruz Respondents alleged that they are compulsory heirs of Primitivo Espineli, the only child of Vicente and his first wife, Juliana Asas. Respondents further alleged that they discovered that the abovementioned parcel of land owned by the late Vicente was sold on October 7, 1994 to the petitioners despite the fact that Vicente died intestate on June 4, 1941. They argue that the sale is void and simulated because Vicente’s signature appearing on the deed of sale is a forgery. In her Answer, Guadalupe, the only surviving child of Vicente and his second wife, Pacencia Romea, denied any knowledge of the deed of sale allegedly signed by Vicente. She, however, admitted selling the property but by virtue of another deed of sale signed by her as heir of Vicente and in representation of her nephews and nieces who are children of her deceased siblings, all children of Vicente and Pacencia. She further denied knowledge of Vicente’s alleged first marriage with Juliana Asas. She argues that the heirs of Primitivo must first establish their filiation from Vicente, prior to instituting the complaint for annulment of sale. Guadalupe further stresses that the petitioners Fidel have been able to register the sale of the property and to obtain Tax Declaration in their name. The RTC ruled in respondents’ favor ordering the annulment of the sale in favor of the defendants spouses Edgardo and Natividad Fidel of the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. The instant petition by the spouses Edgardo and Natividad Fidel, alleging that the appellate court erred in upholding the decision of the trial court, considering that private respondents have no legal personality to institute the action. Private respondents must first establish the same in proper action to prove their filiation likewise committed error in recognizing and/or admitting the baptismal certificate of Primitivo as proof of filiation

Issue: Assuming petitioners have personality to raise the issue of filiation,

whether or not the baptismal certificate of Primitivo is valid and competent evidence of his filiation as child of Vicente. Held: Records show that Primitivo was born in 1895. At that time, the only

records of birth are those which appear in parochial records. It was held that as to the nature and character of the entries contained in the parochial books and the certificates thereof issued by a parish priest, the same have not lost their character of being public documents for the purpose of proving acts referred to therein, inasmuch as from the time of the change of sovereignty in the Philippines to the present day, no law has been enacted abolishing the official and public character of parochial books and entries made therein. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such they may issue certified copies of the entries contained therein in the same manner as do keepers of archives.

The baptismal certificate of Primitivo is, therefore, a valid and competent evidence to prove his filiation by Vicente.


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that Vicente is his father.

Dela Cruz vs Gracia G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

Facts: Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth

because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

Issue: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased

father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity. Held: Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits

an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument. Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument. The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Nepomuceno vs Lopez G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010

Facts: Archbencel, represented by her mother, filed for recognition

and support against Nepomuceno. Nepomuceno denies that Archbencel is his illegitimate daughter. Lopez bases her claim that she and Nepomuceno had an extramarital affair which bore the child Archbencel. Nepomuceno also refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth but executed a handwritten note where he would give Archbencel financial support each month.

Issue: Whether or not the note would be sufficient for filiation of an

illegitimate child? Held: No. Archbencel’s demand for support is dependent on the

determination of her filiation (Art. 195 par. 4). The note not containing any statement on Archbencel’s filiation to Nepomuceno does not fall under Art. 172(2) vis-à-vis Art. 175 which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child since it must be notarized and must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Both requisites in this case is missing.

Another is that the only other documentary evidence submitted by Archbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of

Action to claim legitimacy is imprescriptible if it is the child who claims it. He can bring the action during his or her lifetime (not the lifetime of the parents) and even after the death of the parents.

Instances when heirs can impugn legitimate filiation:

1. When the child dies during minority; 2. When the child dies in a state of insanity even if he/she is of legal


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insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

If the heirs are the ones claiming, they are only given 5 years to institute the action

age; 3. If the child should die after he/she already commenced the action.

Heirs cannot impugn the filiation of the child when the latter died after he/she already commenced an action if the one claiming filiation is illegitimate child.

Marquino vs. IAC GR No. 72078, June 27, 1994

Facts: Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of

Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

Issues:

1. Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs and 2. Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect. Held:

SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child can not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father. IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquinos dismissed.

Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.

The rights of legitimate children, conferred under Article 174 cannot be renounced.

The legitime of each child is half of the parents' estate divided by the number of legitimate children.

Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as

Illegitimate Children

In general, all children born of parents who are not united by a valid marriage are illegitimate.

However, children born of marriages under Art. 36 and

In Article 175:

Proof of illegitimate filiation – same evidence as provided in Art. 172 Example of proof of filiation of an illegitimate child:


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legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Art. 53 are legitimate.

Family code abolished all distinctions between illegitimate children. All children conceived and born out of wedlock are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.

There are only 2 groups:

1. Those conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who at the time of conception of the children were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (formerly natural children)

2. All other illegitimate children * The former can be legitimated, while the latter cannot be.

1. Acknowledgment of paternity with the father signing at the back of the birth certificate

2. Acknowledgment of paternity in a public document (notarial will) or a private handwritten instrument (holographic will or diary)

If secondary proof is relied upon the child, the action to claim filiation must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged father; that is to give the father a chance to defend himself.

Difference between Legitimate and Illegitimate:

The action to claim legitimate filiation does not prescribe. On the other hand, the action to claim illegitimate filiation is barred if the action is brought after the death of the alleged parent when the evidence to prove filiation is secondary.

* If primary proof is used, the action to claim illegitimate filiation can be brought after the lifetime of the alleged parent. If secondary proof is used, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. This is to give the parent the opportunity to refute the allegations of the illegitimate child.

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

(As amended by RA 9255)

RA 9255 amended Art. 176, providing that illegitimate children can now use the surname of their father under certain conditions.

IRON RULE: All illegitimate children have no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Rights of Illegitimate Children:

Use the surname of the mother (or father under certain conditions RA 9255)

To be under the parental authority of the mother

To be entitled for support

To the legitime, which is ½ of the legitime of a legitimated child and other successional rights.

Chapter 4. Legitimated Children Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated

(As amended by RA 9858)

The child of a couple, either or both being minors (non-age impediment) can now be legitimated.

* The parent will file an affidavit of legitimation and submit it to the local civil registrar.

Not all illegitimate children can be legitimated. Those born of parents who could not be validly married due to some impediment at the time of conception of the child cannot be legitimated.

Illegitimate children, who, because of the subsequent marriage of their parents are, by legal fiction, considered

Legitimation – It is a remedy by means of which those who in fact were not born in lawful wedlock and should therefore be considered illegitimate children, are by fiction considered legitimate, it being supposed that they were born when their parents were validly married. Requisites:

1. The child was conceived and born outside of wedlock; 2. The parents, at the time of the child's conception, were not

disqualified by any impediment to marry each other or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below 18 years of age.


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legitimate.

Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.

If the subsequent marriage of the parents of the natural child is void, in legal effect there is no marriage; hence the child is not legitimated.

Annulment of marriage of the parents does not affect the legitimation of the child.

Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.

Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth.

Effect of retroactivity to successional rights of a child: The hereditary rights of the child, as a legitimate child, began from the date of his/her birth.

De Santos vs. Angeles G.R. No. 135817 November 30, 2006

Facts: Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, and were

blessed with a daughter, petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship soured and thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court.

Antonio was aware that the Philippine jurisdiction did not recognize divorces, so Antonio proceeded to Tokyo to marry Conchita, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced 11 children. In 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, Antonio and conchita contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City. Subsequently, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15 mil.

Conchita went to court asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and Maria. There being no opposition, her petition was granted.

After 6 years, petitioner decided to intervene. She argued that Conchita's children were illegitimate. Conchita admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death.

RTC approved Conchita's account of administration declared her 10 children legitimated and along with petitioner and Conchita, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.

Issue: Whether or not natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized. Held: No. (Case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code)

Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."

In the case at bar, there is no question that all the children born to Conchita and deceased Antonio were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. The divoirce decree obtained in Nevada does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time.

The marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning" because it was bigamous. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.

In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter. However, this does not include the right to be legitimated for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of the


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MOR of Maria was denied. She filed for certiorari contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared her half brothers and sisters as legitimated.

rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children.

Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. The rights of other children, like petitioner Maria, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.

See RA 9858 Legitimation of children born to parents born to parents below the marrying age

ADOPTION RA NO. 8552 ( February 25, 1998)

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

ARTICLE 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec.1. Title: "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998" Sec 2. Declaration of Policies -(b) in all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child his.her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Sec.3. Definition of Terms :

Child- below 18 years old

Voluntary committed child - is one whose parents knowingly and willingly relinquishes parental authority to the Department.

Involuntary committed child - is one whose parents known or unknown has been permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial, continuous or repeated neglect; abuse or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities.

ARTICLE 2 PRE ADOPTION SERVICES

Sec.4 Counseling Service- the Department shall provide the services of licnsed social workers to the following:

Biological Parents

Prospective Adoptive Parent

Prospective Adoptee Sec.5 Location of Unknown Parent (s). Duty of the Department to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parents. Sec.6 Support Services - The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program. ARTICLE 3 ELIGIBILITY

Sec.7 Who may Adopt:

Any Filipino Citizen, of legal age, possessed full civil and legal rights, good moral character has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, atleast 16 years older that the adoptee, able to support and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family. * the requirement of 16 year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when:

A. Adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee B. Spouse of the adoptee's parent.

B. Any Alien possessing the same qualification mentioned above. Provided:

C. The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial responsibilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

If One spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other

If one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child provided, the other spouse has signified his consent

If the spouse are legally separated from each other. * in case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

Sec 8. Who may be adopted:

Any person below 18 yrs. Old who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption.

Legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse

An illegitimate child by a qualified adopter to improve its status to that of legitimacy

A persons of legal age, if prior to adoption said person has been consistently considered and treated the adopter as its own child since minority

A child whose previous adoption has been rescinded

A child whose biological or adoptive pare has died. Provided, that no proceedings shall be initiated within 6 months from time of death of said parents.

Sec. 9 Whose consent is necessary to the adoption: the adoptee, if 10 years of age or over Biological parents of the child,if known or the legal guardian or the proper govt. Instrumentality which has legal custody of the child


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His/her conutry has diplomatic relations with the Philippines

Been living in the Phils. For atleast 3 continuous years prior to the filing of application of adoption and maintains residence until the adoption decree is entered.

Has been certified by his consular office or any appropriate govt. Agency that he/she has legal capacity to adopt in his/her country

His govt allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as adopted child. Provided that the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt his/her country my be wived for the following:

4. Former Filipino who seeks to adopt within the 4

th

civil degree of consanguinity or affinity 5. One who seeks to adopt the illegitimate child of

the Filipino spouse 6. One who is married to a Filipino and seeks to

adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4th

degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.

The legitimate and adopted children, 10 years of age or over of the adopters and adoptee if any, The illegitimate children, 10 years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter spouse if any; and The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

ARTICLE IV - PROCEDURE

Sec. 10 Hurried Decisions Sec. 11 Case Study - no petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social worker of the Department. Sec. 12 Supervised Trial Custody- no petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the adopter(s) has been given b the court a supervised trial custody period for atleast 6 months within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. Sec. 13 Decree of Adoption - .. The court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee , a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. Sec. 14 Civil Registry Record - as amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter (s) by being registered with his/her surname. Sec. 15 Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records - all

ARTICLE V - EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

Sec. 16 - Parental Authority - all legal ties between the biological parents(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s). Sec. 17 - Legitimacy - the adoptee shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter (s) for all intents and purposes and entitled yo all rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate child. Sec. 18 Succession -min legal and intestate succession, the adopter (s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.

ARTICLE VI - RECISSION OF ADOPTION

Sec. 19 - grounds for recission of adoption: 1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter (s) despite

having undergone counseling 2. Attempt on the life of the adoptee 3. Sexual assalut or violence 4. Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. Sec. 20 - effects of recission- a) the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent (s), if known, or

the legal custody of the department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

b) The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee

to each other shall be extinguished. c) Civil registar to cancel the amended certificate of birth d) Succession of rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only

as of the date of judgment of judicial recission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial recission shall be respected.


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hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public.

ARTICLE VII - VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES Sec. 21 - Violations and Penalties. Sec. 22 - Rectification of Simulated Birth

ARTICLE VII - FINAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 23 - Adoption Source and Referral Office Sec. 24 - Implementing Rules and Regulations Sec. 25 - Appropriations Sec. 26 - Repealing Clause Sec. 27 - Separability Clause Sec. 28 - Effectivity Clause - February 25, 1998

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9523 - MARCH 12, 2009 AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTER-COUNTRY DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Sec. 1 declaration of policy Sec. 2 definition of terms Sec. 3 Petition - the petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. It shall contain facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall state the circumstances surrounding the abandonment or neglect of the child. Sec. 4 Procedure for the filing of the petition - it shall be filed in the regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.

Sec. 5 Declaration of availability for adoption - the secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legally available for adoption within 7 working days from receipt of the recommendation. Sec. 6 appeal - the decision of the secretary shall be appealable to the court of appeals within 5 days from receipt of the decision by the petitioner, otherwise the same shall be final and executory. Sec.7 declaration of availability for adoption of involuntary committed child and voluntary committed child.

Sec. 8 Certification - the certification that a child is legally available for adoption shall be issued by the DSWD in lieu of a judicial order, thus making the process administrative in nature. This certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available in a domestic adoption proceeding. Sec. 9 Implementing Rules and regulations Sec. 10 Penalty Sec. 11 Repealing Clause Sec. 12 Separability Clause Sec. 13 Effectivity

R.A. NO. 10364, SECTION 12 (k) - Expanded Anti Trafficking of Persons Act of 2012) - immediate recission of the decree of adoption.

LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC

Facts: Elaine, Elma and Eugene were the children of Amelia and late Manuel Ramos. When Manuel died the children were left to their paternal grandmother because Amelia left for Italy. When the grandmother died, they were left to their uncle. Petitioner wanted to adopt the minors alleging that Amelia abandoned them. Stating she is a widow

IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION

Facts: Petitioner and his husband Primo Lim is childless and was entrusted by a certain Lucia Ayuban with 2 child named Michelle and Michael. The spouses reared and cared for the two as if it is their own. Primo Lim died and petitioner married another man who is an American citizen. Petitioner then filed a separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael, the husband of the petitioner also executed an affidavit of consent for the


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and and her children promised to support her and have given consent to the adoption. DSWD then conducted a case study and thereafter a report was made stating that Amelia consented to the adoption. During trial Landingin failed to adduced documentary evidences that indeed Amelia dissented to the adoption and there was no proof of abandonment. Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of the biological mother. Ruling: NO, written consent of the natural parents is an indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of the others does not constitute abandonment. To dispense the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

Amelia left without intention of abandoning her children. She was impelled to leave the country by financial constraints but she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing her children.

adoption. The certification of the DSWD shows that Michelle is an abandoned child and her parents whereabouts were unknown and the DSWD issued similar certification for Michael. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. Issue: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. Ruling: NO, it is undisputed that, at the time of petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions without being joined by her husband. This is expressly stated in Sec. 7 Art. III of RA no. 8552. The fact that her husband gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that his husband must comply being an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in RA No. 8552 sec. 7. Petitioner also contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority is untenable. Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

Facts: Petitioner Honorato Catindig who is a widower wanted to adopt his illegitimate child Stephanie and that his surname be changed to Catindig from Garcia. The trial court granted both the petitions of Honorato. He filed another action station that Stephanie be allowed to use her mother's surname as her maiden name. The trial denied her petition stating that is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Issue: WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Ruling: YES, Stephanie may use her mother's surname as her maiden name. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that"the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.

REYES VS. SOTERO

Facts: Respondent Chicioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administrations and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the nice and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.

Petitioner Reyes filed an opposition to the petition claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. Subsequently, petitioner filed a supplement to the opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption form the LCR office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of Judicial form and a certification issued by the clerk of court. Respondents filed a comment to the opposition stating that the reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner's claim that she was legally adopted due to alleged to certain " badges of fraud". The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Sanots spouse since, " imputations of Irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt." Issue: WON the petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities. Ruling: NO, petitioner no need to prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court. An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the LCR's office as well as the court which the court rendered the judgment.


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Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name –

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176

11 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act

Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of

the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."

Documents consisting of entires in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. As such, the certifications issued by the LCR civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner;s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner;s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to its contrary is offered.

See: A.M. No 02-6-02-SC

See: RA NO 8043 – Inter Country Adoption Act of 1995

SUPPORT

Art 194.Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.

What support comprises.

Everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

Education – includes the recipients schooling and training for some profession, trade or vocation even after reaching the age of majority.

Transportation – includes expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.

Basis of support. “A human being coming to life with an end assigned to him by his own nature, has a right to exist and develop according to his capabilities; that he has an absolute right of self preservation.” Kinds of Support:

1. As to Amount a) Natural support – absolutely indispensable (eg. Food,

dwelling, clothing) b) Civil support –necessary to maintain oneself in

accordance to his civil or social life (eg. education) 2. As to source

a) Legal Support – provided by law b) Voluntary/Conventional support – created by will of

man (also patrimonial support) c) Judicial Support – springs from the decision of

tribunals. (eg. Support pendene lite) 3. As to duration

a) Permanent/general support – last during life time. b) Temporary/accidental support – last during the

minority of the recipient.

Educational support does not end upon reaching the age of majority. When support ceases:

1. Death of the obligor 2. Obligor has no resources 3. Recipient no longer needs allowance 4. Recipient committed an act that give rise to disinheritance 5. Art 196 6. Art 198

Characteristics of support:

1. Personal 2. Exempted from attachment and execution 3. Future support cannot be compromise 4. Demandable from the time the recipient needs it 5. Payable within the first five days of each corresponding month 6. Variable in amount 7. Reciprocal on the part of those bound to support one another

Jurisdiction: RTC Wife is not a “Dependent for Support, if separated From husband.



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Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.

Persons obliged to support each other: 1. Spouses - Arises from the fact of marriage, “render mutual help and support” - Upon annulment of marriage, the obligation to support ceases. But duty to support subsists even if the latter is actually engaged in a gainful occupation, as long as there is still a need for support. - Adulterous wife loses the right to be supported. - Mere allegation of adultery is not enough to bar the wife from support pendent lite. It must be proved by competent evidence, at least prima facie evidence. - If both spouses commit concubinage/adultery they are in pari delicto and deemed to have acted in good faith, in such case, the wife can legally demand support from the husband.

2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants - No matter what degree - Grandchildren cannot demand support from their grandparents if they have parents who are capable of supporting them. - Relationship between partied has to be establish first before support can be demanded. - Support not allowable when child’s status is denied. - Husband not obliged to support adulterous child of wife. - Unborn child is entitled for support. 3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; 4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and 5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood. Nature of application for support pendente lite. - The court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief.

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.

Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership.

Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.

Proceedings covered: 1. Legal Separation 2. Annulment of marriage 3. Declaration of nullity of marriage

During the proceedings, support shall come from the community/conjugal property of the spouses. When there is no community property or conjugal property but either spouses is possessed of sufficient separate property, may the spouse in need of support demand from the other? - if the proceeding is for ANNULMENT or DECLARATION OF NULLITY, support can be demanded because before the annulment the marriage is still subsisting - in the proceeding is one for LEGAL SEPARATION, the defendant cannot ask support pendent lite, because the cause for legal separation committed by the defendant would be a ground for termination of his/her right to support.

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195


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support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters.

- Only in default can move to the next closest relative. -Action for support may be integrated in an action for recognition. Action for recognition may be joined in a claim for inheritance.

more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred.

Two or more Obligors - General Rule: Payment of the support shall be divided between

them in proportion to the resources of each. -Exception: When there is urgent need. (One will pay, subject to reimbursement) Two or more Recipients - Give them the needed support, unless no sufficient means. - If no sufficient means, Child is preferred over spouse. Obligation is NOT SOLIDARY.

and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.

-Amount of support is variable. This is the reason why even judicial decisions granting support do not come final in sense. -Support to an illegitimate, not more than that of legitimate. -Reduction of support should not affect vested rights. -Past payments if excessive, cannot be offset or refunded. -Support not limited by amount of deduction for a child fixed under the income tax law. - Husband not estopped from applying for reduction, despite stipulation of waiver of right to move for additional decrease. - Husband cannot be compelled to make payments in excess of sum provided in judgment, without modification of said judgment.

Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand. Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance.

- The right to support is not demandable by the mere fact of

relationship but is anchored on the imperative necessity of the obligee which must be made known to the obligor. - The need for support cannot be presumed. It must be told or demanded from the obligor. - Demand is JUDICIAL when case for support is filed on court, it is EXTRAJUDICIAL, when the demand is made outside court. - When NO EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND, payment of support must commence from the time of judicial demand. If THERE IS EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND, followed by a complaint in court, payment shall commence from the time of extrajudicial demand as this is sufficient to place the obligor in delay. - GR: Judgment for support does not become dormant not does it prescribe. EX: Installments uncollected within 10 years. - When payment shall be paid? Made monthly and within the first 5 days of each month. - No more application for support pendente lite after final judgment or during pendency of appeal. - Order granting support is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

- Options: a. to pay the fixed allowance b. to receive and maintain the oblige in the family dwelling (cannot be availed if there is moral or legal obstacle) - The option is given to obligor, not obligee.

Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses


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as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution.

to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed.

Requisites to recover: 1. Support is given to the dependent of one bound to give

support but who failed to do so. 2. Support was supplied by the stranger. 3. Support was given without the knowledge of the person

charged with the duty.

or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed.

Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.

GR: The right to receive support as well as money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. EX: in cases of contractual support or support given by will, if there is an excess beyond the amount that required for legal support. - Contractual support, subject to adjustment. - No adjustment in support given by will. - Extrajudicial contract for support, to be followed. - Support in addition to damages for death by crime or quasi-delict is demandable for a period not exceeding 5 years.

SUPPORT CASES

DE ASIS VS CA

FACTS Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.

ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support. HELD: The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.

GAN VS. REYES

Facts: Bernadette C. Pondevida instituted in behalf of her daughter,

immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The second

Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice.


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Francheska Joy, a complaint against herein petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. For failure to file an answer within the reglementary period, petitioner was declared in default. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex-parte. After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to recognize Francheska as his illegitimate child and to support her monthly (20,000 a month to be paid every 15th starting April 15, 2000). Likewise, petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Bernadette moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution citing as reason herefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling. Petitioner questioned the issuance of the writ of execution by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing. Ruling of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are

challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution? Held: No. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, hence, denied the petition. According to the Court, Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance execution will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. To consider petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absolutasententiaexpositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. On the validity of the writ Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case that there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its

On the issue of Paternity We note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There maybe instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano: The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enroll in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed.


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great hindrance and chief enemy.

MANGONON VS CA

FACTS: On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge EleuterioAgudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following: a) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina b) Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per year. c) Unfortunately, petitioner’s monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college educational support. d) Neither can petitioner’s present husband be compelled to share in the general support and college education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own daughter(also in college) to attend to. e) Worse, Rica and Rina’s petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected by the U.S.Department of Education.

the latter being generally known to be financially well-off. ISSUE: Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her granddaughter’s educational support HELD: ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education but being restricted by their financial income- respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters’ education. Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Respondent Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in this case since there are circumstances, legal or moral, between respondent and petitioner which should be considered. Respondent Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco


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On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco,

has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors, thus the amount of support should be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. The Decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision.**Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite In arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies

LIM VS LIM

FACTS: In 1979, Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward's ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward's family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation". Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000pendente lite.

ISSUE: The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents. HELD: We rule in the affirmative. here is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. . . .By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much — they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children's minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter's offspring ends with them.

DOLINA VS VALLECERA

Facts: In 2008, CherrylDolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In

Ruling: Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order


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the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the child’s father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child?

against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.

SEE: RULE 61 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Support Pendente Lite) SEE: AM No. 02-11-12-SC – Rule on provisional orders

PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Article 209 Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)

Parental Authority is known in the roman law as Patria Potestas. It is the mass of rights and obligations which parents have in relation to the person and property of their children, until their majority age, and even after this under certain circumstances. (Manresa)

Characteristics of PA:

. It is a natural right and duty of the parents.

. It cannot be renounced, transferred or waived except in the cases authorized by law. . It is jointly exercised by the father and the mother. . It is purely personal and cannot be exercised through agents. . It is temporary and will end when the child is emancipated or can otherwise take care of himself and his property, or the parent is unable to properly exercised the authority.

PA includes:

. The caring for and rearing of children for civic consciousness and efficiency, and . The development of the moral, mental and physical character and well-being of said children.

Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a)

Waiver of parental Authority is allowed only in cases of: . adoption . guardianship . commitment of the child in an entity or institution engaged in child care or in a children’s home.

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)

Step-parents cannot exercise PA, only the surviving spouse An adopted child is under PA of his adopter Illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother.

Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage


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of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)

In case of absence or death of either parent, PA shall be exercised by the parent present

In case of remarriage of the surviving parent, PA is exercised by the surviving parent unless the court appoints a guardian over the child.

In case of legal separation, the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, under Art 63

In case of Separation in fact, the court shall award the care, custody and control of each child as will be or its best interest, permitting the child to chose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, poverty, contagious disease. No child under seven years shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Is prostitution a valid ground for unfitness? YES in the case of Sempio-Diy

Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)

Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)

EXCEPTIONS: . if the testimony is not against the parent or grandparent . if the testimony is voluntary . if testimony is not used in a criminal case. This privilege does not extend to civil cases. It does not apply to uncles, aunties, brothers or sisters.

Responsibilities of the Child Article 4 of PD 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) Article 4. Responsibilities of the Child. - Every child, regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status, political antecedents and other factors shall: (1) Strive to lead an upright and virtuous life in accordance with the tenets of his religion, the teachings of his elders and mentors, and the biddings of a clean conscience; (2) Love, respect and obey his parents, and cooperate with them in the strengthening of the family; (3) Extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness, and helpfulness, and endeavor with them to keep the family harmonious and united; (4) Exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service, particularly by undergoing a formal education suited to his abilities, in order that he may become an asset to himself and to society;


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(5) Respect not only his elders but also the customs and traditions of our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of our country, and the principles and institutions of democracy; (6) Participate actively in civic affairs and in the promotion of the general welfare, always bearing in mind that it is the youth who will eventually be called upon to discharge the responsibility of leadership in shaping the nation's future; and (7) Help in the observance of individual human rights, the strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of world peace.

CASES: . ESPIRITU VS CA (242 SCRA 362)

Facts:

At Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding began with a common law relationship. Their relationship resulted to Rosalind, their daughter who was born on August 16, 1986. When they were on brief vacation in the Philippines, they got married. Upon returning to United States, their second child Reginald Vince was born. On January 12, 1988. Their relationship went sour and they decided to separate some time on 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a change as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but he was sent back by his company to Pittsburg. He had to leave his children with his sister, co petitioner Guillerma Layug. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because she was afraid of being arrested since Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against her. On 1992, she returned to the Philippines and filed the petition of writ of habeaus corpus to gain custody over her children. The trial court favored Reynaldo for the children chose him over their mother. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed for review to the Supreme Court contending that the Court of Appeals awarded the custody of the children to the mother through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso that children below 7 shall not be separated from their mothers.

Issue: Between the father and the mother, who is more suitable and better

qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood Held:

In ascertaining the best interest of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years old, the law presumes the mother is the best custodian. However, it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by “compelling reason”. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to third party as it deem fit under the circumstances. Both children Reginald Vince and Rosalind are now over 7 years old, capable of fair and intelligent decision. Their best interest would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency for which they mother Teresita sorely is incapable or lacking. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is “unfit” under the Family Code. Moreover, the children’s clear choice is their father.

2. SANTOS, SR. VS CA (242 SCRA 407) Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr & Julia badia was married in 1986. Their union begot one child Leouel, Jr who was born on 1987. The child was in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Res. Spouses alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as their

Issue: WON the CA erred in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents and not to his father. HELD: YES. The CA erred. Parental authority and responsibility are alienalable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The


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subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so. julia left for the US in May 1988 to work. Julia had been sending financial support to respondents for her son. On Sept 1990, petitioner visited the Bedia household. Respondents contended that petitioner abducted the boy. Spouses Bedia filed a petition for care, custody and control of minor ward Leouel, Santos Jr. TC awarded the custody to the spouses. CA affirmed it. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

law allows waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship, and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, what is given is a temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. Only in case of the parent’s death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent (Art 214, FC).

3. ESLAO VS CA January 16, 1997 Facts: Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married of whom two children were begotten, namely, Leslie and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria, while Angelica stayed with the husband’s mother, Teresita. When Reynaldo died, Maria intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, she reasoned out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. Maria got married to certain Dr. James Ouye and migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, joining her new husband. Maria then returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States; she then informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education. However, Teresita resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.

Issue: Whether or not the mother have the right to the custody of her daughter. Ruling: The court reiterated its ruling in Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, that parental authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar. Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

LAXAMANA VS LAXAMANA 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in1983. Petitioner, who came from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while respondent, a holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank. They

ISSUE: WON the TC considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to Lourdes. Held: Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering


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got married and the union blesses with three children.All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable, thus,respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, and the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner. RTC ordered to remain the custody under the respondent and parties are enjoined to comply with the terms and condition stated in the visitation arrangement.

that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficientto justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family andt he youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely stated that: “The children were asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner but there are indications that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent.” There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampo’s report and the capacity of both parties to raise their children. Case is remanded to RTC.

GUALBERTO VS GUALBERTO V (June 2005) FACTS:Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him. The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations. Court of Appeals - The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code

ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother. (Yes, Crisanto did not present sufficient evidence against the fitness of the mother that will compel the court to rule against the mandatory character of Art. 213) Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration,especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,unless the parent chosen is unfit.” No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when the parents separated,legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”


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SALIENTES VS ABANILLA (August 29, 2006) FACTS: Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of theminor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that theytransfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanillaleft the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing hisson. • Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus and custodybefore the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court orderedthe Salienteses to produce and bring before the court thebody of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child shouldnot be discharged from restraint. • Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but itwas dismissed. CA stated that the order of the trial court didnot award custody but was simply a standard order issuedfor the production of restrained persons. The trial court wasstill about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR waslikewise denied. • Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: Issue: 1.Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order 2.Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father Ruling: 1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari. The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. An interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order. 2. Habeas corpus is available to the father • Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto.

GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs CA FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA whichgranted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter Simone.Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court,CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simonebe brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child.Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied

Issue:WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below. Held:The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of theminor child to both parents.The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome onlyby compelling evidence of the mother ’s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment,immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction witha communicable disease.Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable ofcaring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.

DACASIN vs DACASIN FACTS: Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995. • In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the CircuitCourt, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinoiscourt dissolved the marriage of

Issue: WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child Held/ Rationale: The trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not o nits lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree


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petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondentsole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcementpurposes. • On January 28, 2002, both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody overStephanie. • In 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised solecustody over Stephanie contrary to their agreement. o The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over thesuit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce itsdivorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie torespondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the“nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is voidfor contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibitingcompromise agreements on jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

stripped itof jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the actionlies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called “retained jurisdiction.

Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

Substituteparental authority cannotbeconcurrentlyexercisedwithparentalauthoritybutparentalauthority can be concurrentlyexercisedwithspecial parental authority.


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(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.

Kinds of childrenwhohasnoparentalauthority:

Foundling- one whose parents are unknown (e.g. babies placed outside the gate of the house)

Abandoned- one who has no parental care or whose parent or guardian have deserted him for at least 6 yrs.; completely forsaken child

Neglected- those who receive inadequate care either by intention or omission or insufficient means

Abused- those who suffer maltreatment whether physical or sexual

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

Special Parental Authority: concurrent with theparentalauthorityof the parents and rests on the theory that while the child is in care and custody of the person or persons exercising special parental authority, the parents temporarily relinquish parental authority over the child to the latter. Special parental authority and responsibility apply to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. It applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

Thoseexercisingspecial parental authorityareprincipallyandsolidarilyliablefor damages causedbytheactsoromissionsofthe unemancipated minorwhileunder their supervision, instructionor custody. The said liability is subjecttodefense that thepersonexercisingparentalauthorityandresponsibilityexerciseproper diligence requiredbytheparticularcircumstances. Parentsare just subsidiarily liable in caseof insolvency.

Cases: 1. St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos

FACTS: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner should be held liable for the damages. HELD:NO. CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva


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admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

2. School of the Holy Spirit v. Taguiam (2008) Facts: Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City. The principal authorized the year-end celebration and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this connection, respondent distributed the parent's/guardian's permit forms to the pupils. Chiara Mae Federico's permit form was unsigned. Respondentconcluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. Petitioners issued a Notice of Administrative Charge to respondent for alleged gross negligence and required her to submit her written explanation. Thereafter, petitioners conducted a clarificatory hearing which respondent attended. Respondent also submitted her Affidavit of Explanation. Petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence. In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the

Issue: Whether respondent's dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid. Held: YES. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Thecourtconcluded that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Mae's permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Second, it was respondent's responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.


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pupils without any adult supervision. He also noted that the absence of adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool. The Labor Arbiter further concluded that although respondent's negligence was not habitual, the same warranted her dismissal since death resulted therefrom. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which ruled in her favor. The appellate court observed that there was insufficient proof that respondent's negligence was both gross and habitual

R.A No. 10165 FosterAct 2012

Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties: (1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship; (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (6) To demand from them respect and obedience; (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Parents arestill liable foractsdonebytheirchildevenifthelatterbe 18- 21 yrs. Old, providedthatthechildisstillliving in theircompany. DefensesofParents:

1. Observance of diligence underthecircumstances like diligence ofa good father of afamily;

2. Thechildisnotundertheirparentalauthority; 3. Thechilddoesnotliveintheircompany.

Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so AlthoughunderArt. 220, the parents


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requires. (317)

arethelegalrepresentativesofthechildrenincourtproceedings, thisarticleprovidesforsubstituterepresentation when theinterestsof the childissorequire.

Guardianadlitem A.M. No. O3-02-05-SC

Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)

Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a)

The person exercising parental authority has therighttodisciplinethe children under hisauthority. Thediscipline, however, must bereasonableandisintendedforcorrection than punishment. Ifaparentfinds that the discipline imposed uponthe child failstocorrecthim, this articleprovidesfor a civilremedy.

RA No. 8972 "Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000."

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - Whenever used in this Act, the following terms shall mean as follows: (a) "Solo parent" - any individual who falls under any of the following categories: (1) A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, That the mother keeps and raises the child; (2) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to death of spouse; (3) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least one (1) year; (4) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner; (5) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year, as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children; (6) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a church as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children; (7) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year; (8) Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his child/children instead of having others care for them or give them up to a welfare institution; (9) Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child or children; (e.g.

single woman taking care a child [not her biological child], is considered as solo parent. (10) Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of the parents or solo parent. A change in the status or circumstance of the parent claiming benefits under this Act, such that he/she is no longer left alone with the responsibility of parenthood, shall terminate his/her eligibility for these benefits.

R.A No. 10165 Foster Act 2012

Section 3. Definition of terms (b) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age, or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect oneself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. (c) Child Case Study Report refers to a written report prepared by a social worker containing all the necessary information about a child. (d) Child with Special Needs refers to a child with developmental or physical disability. (e) Family refers to the parents or brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood, of the child. (f) Foster Care refers to the provision of planned temporary substitute parental care to a child by a foster parent. (g) Foster Child refers to a child placed under foster care. (h) Foster Family Care License refers to the document issued by the DSWD authorizing the foster parent to provide foster care. (i) Foster Parent refers to a person, duly licensed by the DSWD, to provide foster care. (l) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of a child with foster parent and family members based on the capacity and commitment of the foster parent to meet the individual needs of the particular child and the capacity of the child to benefit from the placement. Section 4. Who May Be Placed Under Foster Care. – The following may be placed in foster care:


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(b) "Children" - refer to those living with and dependent upon the solo parent for support who are

unmarried, unemployed and not more than eighteen (18) years of age, or even over eighteen (18) years but are incapable of self-support because of mental and/or physical defect/disability. (c) "Parental responsibility" - with respect to their minor children shall refer to the rights and duties of the

parents as defined in Article 220 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines." (d) "Parental leave" - shall mean leave benefits granted to a solo parent to enable him/her to perform

parental duties and responsibilities where physical presence is required. (e) "Flexible work schedule" - is the right granted to a solo parent employee to vary his/her arrival and

departure time without affecting the core work hours as defined by the employer. [Benefits of a Solo Parent]

Section 6. Flexible Work Schedule. - The employer shall provide for a flexible working schedule for solo parents: Provided, That the same shall not affect individual and company productivity: Provided, further, That any employer may request exemption from the above requirements from the DOLE on certain meritorious grounds. Section 7. Work Discrimination. - No employer shall discriminate against any solo parent employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his/her status. Section 8. Parental Leave. - In addition to leave privileges under existing laws, parental leave of not more than seven (7) working days every year shall be granted to any solo parent employee who has rendered service of at least one (1) year.

(a) A child who is abandoned, surrendered, neglected, dependent or orphaned; (b) A child who is a victim of sexual, physical, or any other form of abuse or exploitation; (c) A child with special needs; (d) A child whose family members are temporarily or permanently unable or unwilling to provide the child with adequate care; (e) A child awaiting adoptive placement and who would have to be prepared for family life; (f) A child who needs long-term care and close family ties but who cannot be placed for domestic adoption; (g) A child whose adoption has been disrupted; (h) A child who is under socially difficult circumstances such as, but not limited to, a street child, a child in armed conflict or a victim of child labor or trafficking; (i) A child who committed a minor offense but is released on recognizance, or who is in custody supervision or whose case is dismissed; and (j) A child who is in need of special protection as assessed by a social worker, an agency or the DSWD. Provided, That in the case of (b), (c), (f), (h), (i), and (j), the child must have no family willing and capable of caring and providing for him. Section 5. Who May Be a Foster Parent. – An applicant who meets all of the following qualifications may be a foster parent: (a) Must be of legal age; (b) Must be at least sixteen (16) years older than the child unless the foster parent is a relative; (c) Must have a genuine interest, capacity and commitment in parenting and is able to provide a familial atmosphere for the child; (d) Must have a healthy and harmonious relationship with each family member living with him or her; (e) Must be of good moral character; (f) Must be physically and mentally capable and emotionally mature; (g) Must have sufficient resources to be able to provide for the family’s needs; (h) Must be willing to further hone or be trained on knowledge, attitudes and skills in caring for a child; and


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(i) Must not already have the maximum number of children under his foster care at the time of application or award, as may be provided in the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of this Act. Provided, That in determining who is the best suited foster parent, the relatives of the child shall be given priority, so long as they meet the above qualifications: Provided, further, That an alien possessing the above qualifications and who has resided in the Philippines for at least twelve (12) continuous months and maintains such residence until the termination of placement by the DSWD or expiration of the foster family license, may qualify as a foster parent. Section 14. Termination of Placement. – Termination of placement shall be done by the DSWD, upon recommendation of the agency, on the following grounds: (a) Return of the child to biological parents; (b) Placement for adoption of the child; (c) Death of the child; (d) Death of both foster parents; (e) Expiration of the FPA; and (f) In all cases where placement becomes prejudicial to the welfare of the child, such as, but not limited to, abandonment, maltreatment, sexual assault, violence or other forms of abuse. Provided, That in the case of (f), the foster child, with the assistance of a registered social worker, shall have the option to apply for termination of placement.

Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the


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ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)

Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)

Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. (322a)

Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently: (1) Upon the death of the parents; (2) Upon the death of the child; or (3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

Except in casesofemancipationbylawanddeathofthechild, thereisnoabsoluteterminationofparentalauthorityinthe cases mentioned in these articles. Upon the death of the parents, while the child is still a minor, the grandparents, brothers or sisters, or guardian may exercise substitute parental authority over the child. Upon the adoption of the child by another, the adopting parents will exercise parental authority Parental authority in these cases terminates permanently because there is no possibility of revival.

Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: (1) Upon adoption of the child; (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian; (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose; (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a)

Parentalauthority in cases mentioned in this article may be revived by final judgement: 1. Rescinding theadoptionofthechild; 2. Terminating thejudicial guardianship over the child; 3. Restoring parental authority to the parent who has returned home after abandoning the

child or who has been divested of parental authority for any other reason; or 4. Restoring parental authority to an absent parent who has returned or formerly

incapacitated parent who has regained his or her capacity.

Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)

Thereisnoneedofacourt order reinstating the parental authority of the parent over the child because such authority is automatically revived.

Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty; (2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; (3) Compels the child to beg; or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.


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The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. lawphi1.net If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)

Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n)

Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Teachers, thoughexercisingsubstituteparentalauthority, are prohibited to spank, pinch or slap a pupil.

TITLE X EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY

Art. 234. AmendedbyRANo. 6809

Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed. Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one. "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice. Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved: December 13, 1989

Art. 235. Repealedby RA No. 6809

Art. 236. AmendedbyRANo. 6809

Art. 237. Repealedby RA No. 6809

FUNERALS

Regulation of Funerals – aims to address controversies that arise in

Article 305 – The duty and the right to make arrangement s for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order

Art. 306 – Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased


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connection with burial of the dead Judicial Nature of Corpse – The corpse cannot be the subject of rights, because judicial personality is extinguished by death

A corpse is an object or thing but not a property

Not susceptible of appropriation

Does not form part of the property

Cannot be the subject to a lien for price of goods furnished to the deceased while alive, or for value of casket or coffin

Purposes of Legal Protection given to corpses

To protect feelings of those related to the deceased

To avoid dangers to health of the living

To allow scientific investigation and study Right to the Corpse

Corpses are outside the commerce of men

Contract for valuable consideration disposing of the corpse, except when expressly permitted by law, is void for being contrary to morals

All acts, except in relation to funeral or autopsy are void Contracts on Funeral Services – valid when the general subject matter is not the corpse, but the services in relation to the funeral or disposal of the corpse

established for support, under article 294 (Art. 199 FC). In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

Right to make funeral arrangements

In the order according to Art. 199 of the FC 1. Descendants of the same degree—OLDEST shall be

preferred

2. Ascendants—PATERNAL shall have the better right o If the corpse has no relatives, or if they cannot

pay for funeral expenses, the duty shall devolve upon MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

Subject to Waiver – right may be waived expressly or impliedly, in which case the right and duty immediately descend to the person next in the order prescribed by law

o Spouse should promptly assert the right of possession of the corpse, or right shall be held to have been waived in favor of the relative next in the order

o Right is not deemed waived, except upon CLEAR and SATISFACTORY proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end

Extent of Right - more of common decency and social propriety than legal right; members of the family , other relatives and friends cannot be excluded from visiting where the corpse lies in state, or from witnessing the internment, as this may amount to an abuse of right under Art. 19, or may be contrary to good customs, under Art. 21 of the civil code.

Sanction for enforcement of the article is not provided, but o if surviving spouse spends lavishly for the funeral,

disproportionate to the social position and small estate, the heirs may question the deduction from the estate; or

o if the spouse gives a very miserable funeral, even when the deceased has a large estate and has a prominent social position, his other relatives may treat the act as DISRESPECT to the dead and may recover damages under ART. 309

Art. 307- The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same after consulting the other members of the family.

Priority is given to the WISHES of the deceased in relation to his funeral

Right of a person to provide for the disposition of his own body after death is generally recognized, as long as these wishes are not contrary to law

o Revised Admin Code states the limitations: 1. Sec. 1073 - Prohibition against burial in

unauthorized places – except in cases of

Art. 308 No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in articles 294 (Art 199, FC) and 305.

Retention of Corpse – the law must prevail over the will of persons who have the right to control the burial

o In case of necessity, incident to investigation of crime , the authorities may retain corpse and delay burial ( Sec. 1089 – Revised Administrative Code)

Exhumation – when use of cemetery is discontinued/ removal of bodies is required by law, such removal must be made in a decent manner, and notice should be given to all persons in interest

o voluntary removal – must first obtain the

Art. 309 – Any person who shows disrespect to the dead or wrongfully interferes with the funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.

Disrespect to the dead : o Withholding the body from those entitled to possession o Performing an unauthorized autopsy o Mutilating the corpse in any way o Removal of the body by the undertaker and refusal to

disclose its whereabouts o Unauthorized use of the photograph of a malformed

deceased child o Wrongful burial of body at sea o Retention of the body after it has been cremated (to

secure payment of debts)


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emergency, it shall be unlawful to bury in any place other than those designated as burial sites

2. Sec. 1087 – Requirement of certificate of death – by whom to be issued – except in emergency cases, no body shall be buried without a properly/validly issued death certificate

necessary permit from the proper government authorities ( sec. 1095 -1097, Revised Administrative Code)

Evidential Purposes – where there is no other way to prove a material fact except by exhumation of a body, the court may order its exhumation and examination

Disposition of Corpse by the deceased – deceased may provide for how he wants his body disposed of

RA 309 – act recognizing the validity of an authorization given by a person to use parts of his corpse for medical, surgical, and scientific purposes ( sec. 1-3, RA 309)

Corpses buried at public expenses may also be used for scientific purposes (Sec. 1107, Revised Admin Code)

Mutilation of Corpses – amounts to disrespect for the death, actionable under Art. 309 of the New Civil Code

Performance of Autopsies o may be private or official o Private - the person with the right to the corpse,

must give consent, and sets the limitations and conditions

o Official – necessary for the detection and prevention of diseases, and for the discovery and prosecution of crimes; may be ordered by the proper public office without the consent of the family of the deceased.

o Casket left outdoors at point of transfer, where the rain damaged the casket and the body

Interference with burial – it is the right and duty of the living to bury their dead, and they have such interest in the remains as to enable them to carry the dead body to the graveyard, and give it a decent internment, without interference from anyone

Recoverable Damages - persons entitled to the corpse may bring an action under this article

o Order of who may bring an action and recover damages (art. 2217): 1. Spouse 2. Descendants 3. Ascendants 4. Brothers and Sisters

Art. 310 – The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed pat of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the

conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.

CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

Article 356 – Every child: 1. Is entitled to parental care; 2. Shall receive at least elementary education; 3. Shall be given moral and civil training by the parents

or guardian; 4. Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his

physical, moral and intellectual development

P.D. 603 – Child and Welfare Code – enumerates the rights of children in Art. 3 Article 3. Rights of the Child. - All children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. (1) Every child is endowed with the dignity and worth of a human being from the moment of his conception, as generally accepted in medical parlance, and has,

Article 357 – Every child shall:

1. Obey and honor his parents or guardian; 2. Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons

holding substitute parental authority; 3. Exert his utmost for his education and training; 4. Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for

the good of the same.

Responsibilities of a Child – Art. 4, PD 603 Article 4. Responsibilities of the Child. - Every child, regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status, political antecedents and other factors shall: (1) Strive to lead an upright and virtuous life in accordance with the tenets of his religion, the teachings of his elders and mentors, and the biddings of a clean conscience; (2) Love, respect and obey his parents, and cooperate

Art. 358 – Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly by precept and example, imbue the child with high mindedness, love of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.

Art. 359 – The Government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish whenever possible:

1. Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;

2. Puericulture and similar centers; 3. Councils for the Protection Children; and 4. Juvenile courts

State Intervention - The highest mission of the family, the bringing


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therefore, the right to be born well. (2) Every child has the right to a wholesome family life that will provide him with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral and material security. The dependent or abandoned child shall be provided with the nearest substitute for a home. (3) Every child has the right to a well-rounded development of his personality to the end that he may become a happy, useful and active member of society. The gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement to develop his special talents. The emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted child shall be treated with sympathy and understanding, and shall be entitled to treatment and competent care. The physically or mentally handicapped child shall be given the treatment, education and care required by his particular condition. (4) Every child has the right to a balanced diet, adequate clothing, sufficient shelter, proper medical attention, and all the basic physical requirements of a healthy and vigorous life. (5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character. (6) Every child has the right to an education commensurate with his abilities and to the development of his skills for the improvement of his capacity for service to himself and to his fellowmen. (7) Every child has the right to full opportunities for safe and wholesome recreation and activities, individual as well as social, for the wholesome use of his leisure hours. (8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, hazards, and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral development. (9) Every child has the right to live in a community and a society that can offer him an environment free from pernicious influences and conducive to the promotion of his health and the cultivation of his desirable traits and attributes. (10) Every child has the right to the care, assistance, and protection of the State, particularly when his parents or guardians fail or are unable to provide him with his fundamental needs for growth, development, and improvement.

with them in the strengthening of the family; (3) Extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness, and helpfulness, and endeavor with them to keep the family harmonious and united; (4) Exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service, particularly by undergoing a formal education suited to his abilities, in order that he may become an asset to himself and to society; (5) Respect not only his elders but also the customs and traditions of our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of our country, and the principles and institutions of democracy; (6) Participate actively in civic affairs and in the promotion of the general welfare, always bearing in mind that it is the youth who will eventually be called upon to discharge the responsibility of leadership in shaping the nation's future; and (7) Help in the observance of individual human rights, the strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of world peace.

Effects of Child’s Misconduct – parent or person having substitute parental authority may use reasonable measures to discipline a child who fails to observe the duties imposed upon him by law

o School Administrators, teachers, individuals engaged in child care exercising special parental authority are prohibited to inflict corporal punishment – art. 233, FC

o Parents are not exempted from prohibition – parents should never be excessive or beyond what is reasonably required; should not be harsh or cruel, or amount to maltreatment.

o Excessive measures may result to suspension or termination of parental authority – (Art. 231, FC)

up of children cannot be left exclusively in the hands of the family. o The state has a decisive interest in seeing to it that its

future citizens be useful men and women. The State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.


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(11) Every child has the right to an efficient and honest government that will deepen his faith in democracy and inspire him with the morality of the constituted authorities both in their public and private lives. (12) Every child has the right to grow up as a free individual, in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and with the determination to contribute his share in the building of a better world.

Art. 360 – The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among other functions:

1. Foster the education of every child in the municipality; 2. Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents; 3. Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans; 4. Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency; 5. Adopt measures for the health of children; 6. Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds; 7. Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.

RA 9344 – Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act o The term juvenile delinquent is no longer used as it is derogatory; SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and Shaming. -

the competent authorities must refrain from branding or labeling children as young criminals, juvenile delinquents, prostitutes, young hoodlums, gangsters, etc..,

o proper term is CHILD/REN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW o Juvenile Courts are now generally called FAMILY COURTS

USE OF SURNAMES

Concept of Name – a word or combination of words by which a person is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him or in speaking of or dealing with him.

o 2 parts 1. Given or proper name – is that which is given to the individuals at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other

individuals; may be freely selected by the parents for the child. 2. Surname or family name – is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to

child; surname is fixed by law

Characteristics of Name 1. It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others 2. It is obligatory in certain respects for nobody can be without a name 3. It may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. 4. It is outside the commerce of man, and therefore, inalienable and intransmissible, by act inter vivos or mortis causa. 5. It is imprescriptible.

Right to Surname not exclusive – the surname does not pertain in ownership to any determinate person; it is common to members of a family. However, it is not the property of a family. It is transmitted by inheritance. It is not an exclusive right from which others can be excluded; as a matter of fact, there are often persons and families with the same names and surnames.

Art. 364 Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father

Art. 365 – An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter

Art. 366 – A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized but only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. Art. 367 - Natural children by legal fiction shall principally employ the surname of the father Art. 368 – Illegitimate children referred to in art. 287 shall bear the surname of the mother

R.A. 9255 (Revilla Law) – amended art. 176 of the FC -- Illegitimate

children may now use the surname of their father, as long as the father acknowledges them as his children Article 176 - Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiations have been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

RA 9048 - CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL – is now authorized to CORRECT A CLERICAL RA 10172 – Typographical/ clerical errors in the day and month in the


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OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Section 1. Judicial order is not needed for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname; can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general Section 2. Definition of Terms – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: (3) "Clerical or typographical error" - mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. Section 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. 1. Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname -- in person, in the civil register of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept. 2. petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country - in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition. 3. Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries - in person, at the nearest Philippine Consulates. * All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be availed of only once. Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Section 5. Form and Contents of the Petition 1. Form - an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oath 2. the affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show that the petitioner is competent to testify 3. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made. The petition shall be supported with the following documents: (1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed. (2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the correction or change shall be based; and (3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

same supporting documents are required In case of change of first name or nickname

petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation

date of birth, or sex may now be corrected without a judicial order, amending RA 9048

petition must be accompanied by earliest school record or earliest school documents such as, but not limited to:

o medical records o baptismal certificate o other documents issued by religious authorities

correction of any entry involving change of gender corrected must be accompanied by a certification issued by an accredited government physician attesting to the fact that the petitioner has not undergone sex change or sex transplant

The petition for change of first name or nickname, or for correction of erroneous entry concerning the day and month in the date of birth or the sex of a person, as the case may be, shall be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation

Other details, procedure, requirements, fees, etc. – the same as in

RA 9038


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the petitioner shall submit police and/ or NBI clearance

the petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: a.first copy to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or the consul general; b.second copy to the Office of the Civil Registrar General; c.third copy to the petitioner.

Sec. 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General. 1. examine the petition and its supporting documents 2. post the petition in a conspicuous place provided for that purpose for ten (10) consecutive days after he finds the petition and its supporting documents sufficient in form and substance 3. act on the petition and shall render a decision not later than five (5) working days after the completion of the posting and/or publication requirement. 4. transmit a copy of his decision together with the records of the proceedings to the Office of the Civil Registrar General within five (5)

working days from the date of the decision

1. Republic v CA G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998

Facts : Evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much her real father, Pablo

Vicencio, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken Vicencio’s place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and other related activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to her parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname; causing much embarrassment on her part. In two occasions when she ran as a beauty contestant for Lion’s Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her name was registered as Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had given his consent thereto upon prior consultation with him. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), having participated in the cross examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses, manifested opposition over the petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of the petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the petitioner to consider adoption , failure to observe the process should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to legally change her name, in addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve her personality and welfare under a socially recognized surname, that of her stepfather. The Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted the petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same was affirmed by the CA. The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private respondent’s change of surname. Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondent’s step-father has two (2) children with her mother. In the event of her step-father’s death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a “legitimate” daughter. In his memorandum, the Solicitor General, opines that “ Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.” Issue: Whether or not the appellate court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming the decision of

the trial court to allow the change in private respondent’s surname to that of her stepfather’s surname.

Held: We find merit in the Solicitor General’s contention. We find merit in the Solicitor General’s

contention. “The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought.” The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. A legitimate child, such as the petitioner generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right. Confusion might arise with regard to private respondent’s parentage because of her surname with grave legal consequences if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. Private respondent, might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-father’s legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place. It is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, however, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondent’s desire to use her stepfather’s surname. Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private respondent was already 18 years old but still considered a minor because RA 6809, lowering the age of majority, was then in effect. However, regardless of private respondent’s age, our conclusion remains considering the circumstances before us and the lack of any legally justifiable cause for allowing the change of her surname.

2. Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998 Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld, gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar Calasan (married),

signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an

Held: No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall use the

surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the


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affidavit admitting paternity of the child. The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother. Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration. Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an

illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity?

surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname. Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law. Case Doctrines: ● Illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother, and this is rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity.

● Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law

3. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155 Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang

who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name. After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC. Issues: Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Ruling: Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further

distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. Case Doctrines:


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● The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child contains a given name, a middle name and a surname. ● Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. ● That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from one's registered complete name.

4. N THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga

Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name. The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother. ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her

natural mother as her middle name.

RULING: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,

to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter. Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

5. Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007 Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of

her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the

Ruling:

1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. 2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. 3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy


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court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. Issues:

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted. 2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial? 3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding? 4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?

thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough. 4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petitionWhether or not the petition for change of name should be granted. Case Doctrines: ● A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it cannot be decided through a summary proceeding ● The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. ● A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. All the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.

6. SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC, October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto”

to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality. The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

RULING: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where

the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the

birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

7. REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN, September 12, 2008 (G.R. No. 166676)

FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries

in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

RULING: Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various

degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male


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She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.

8. REMO v DFA, GR No.169202 March 5, 2010 EFFECTS OF NULLITY: ON THE USAGE OF SURNAMES FACTS: Petition is for Maria Virginia Remo Rallonza to use her maiden name “Remo” in her passport

renewal. Original passport is issued using married surname Rallonza. Petitioner is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. The husband is alive and the couple is neither annulled nor divorced. The DFA denied request. Office of the President denied appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration. CA denied petition and motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: WoN a married woman can use her maiden name in her passport renewal after using her married

surname in her prior passport

RULING: Petition denied.

Article 370 of the NCC: A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

Petitioner is neither divorced, widowed, or annulled. When a woman gets married, she does not change her name. Only her civil status. A woman is not obliged to changed her name upon marriage, she has the option not to. She is not required to have judicial authority to do so. In the present case, however, petitioner requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.” The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239. In the present case, the petitioner is already using her married name and wants to revert back to her maiden name. Petitioner consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s present request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will.

Personal Notes - Persons and Family Relations Reviewer for 4th Exam

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