Performance of Levered and Unlevered Firms in · PDF fileThis study examines the performance...

International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences September 2012, Vol. 1, No. 5

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Performance of Levered and Unlevered Firms in Malaysia

Noriza Binti Mohd Saad Department of Finance & Economics, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN), 26700 Muadzam

Shah, Pahang, Malaysia Email: [email protected]

Nor Razuana Binti Amran Department of Finance & Economics, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN), 26700 Muadzam


Khairi Safwan Bin Mohd Shaufi Department of Finance & Economics, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN), 26700 Muadzam


Abstract This study examines the performance of levered and unlevered firms based on their profitability level using a sample of 142 companies listed in main market, Bursa Malaysia within a period of 2000 to 2009. Throughout this study, multivariate regression model, Pearson Correlation and ANOVA used for hypotheses testing. Overall, the result shows that there is a significance means difference between levered and unlevered firm based on their performance and profitability with a significant association among them. Keyword: Levered, Unlevered, Performance, Profitability Introduction Business was running smoothly depending on their adequacy of capital requirement in operating activities. Inadequate of its capital will force a firm to alter the existing capital structure by restructuring them according to the ratios of debt to equity. A levered firm refers to company who was used debt financing or issuing bond to the public otherwise unlevered firms refer to all-equity financing in their capital structure. In Malaysia, companies use leveraging to raise capital mostly for their operating activities. Nowadays, there are many successfully companies in Malaysia where some of them are listed in Bursa Malaysia. The main important element which company must focus in running their business is on the capital structure. Capital structure is a one of the most complex areas of financial decision making because of its interrelationship with other financial decision variables. Optimal capital structure decisions can lower the cost of capital, resulting in higher NPVs and more acceptable projects

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and thereby increasing the value of the firm. The amount of financial leverage employed by a firm directly affects its risk, return and share value. A leveraged company such as Berjaya Land Berhad and Mega First Corporation Berhad may have taken on debt to buy real estate or other assets, to fund an ongoing project, or for a variety of other purposes with objective to maximum the shareholders’ wealth by optimizing their capital structure. Graham (2000) found that a typical firm following a conservative debt policy could increase its value by about 15% if it used the optimal amount of debt. Remarkably, however, levered firms will bear a high cost of capital since it was cover cost to bondholder return in terms of interest payment and probably cost to shareholder incurred if equity financing was found. In other words, when a company becomes highly leveraged, it can be a cause for concern, as there may be worries that servicing the debt will eat up all of the company's income and energies. Contrary to unleveraged company such as Nestle Berhad and Appollo Berhad, the cost of capital is only the cost of equity, as there is no debt to account for. Since debt is more costly for companies to issue than equity, this creates economic advantages for companies that raise capital without tapping into the debt markets. Also, the companies that do not have debts on their balance sheet statement be apt to survive better during recession. Lemmon et al, (2008) suggests that conservative debt policies persist for long periods of time. If unlevered firms voluntarily choose to forsake debt financing. The main purpose of this study is to compare whether there is significance means difference between levered and unlevered firms beside to investigate an association between dependent and explanatory variables. Throughout this study, there are five proxies to represent dependent variables, which are i) Return on Asset, ii) Return on Common Equity, iii) Profit Margin, iv) Operating Profit Margin, and v) Earnings per Share. Otherwise, three proxies to represent independent variables, which are i) Long-term Debt to Total Equity, ii) Total Equity, and iii) Short-term and Long-term Debt to Total Equity. The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on levered and unlevered firms and firm’s performance. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the findings and discussion on the results while, section 5 concludes and recommendations. Literature Review Previous Studies On Levered And Unlevered Firm Modigliani et. al (1958) verified that to choice capital structure or leverage is not relevant to a company’s valuation. They found out that, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, a company’s value is unaffected by how it is financed, regardless of whether the company’s capital consists of equities or debt, or a combination of these, or what the dividend policy is. Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggest that a value maximizing manager may choose to retain debt capacity and optimally use low leverage. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argued that the presence of non-debt tax shields may reduce


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debt-related tax incentives for a firm. These firms would increase leverage in response to an increase in the potential tax benefits of debt. Myers et. al (1984) based on their research, they propose that managers prefer to issue debt over equity when suggesting that owner-managers use external financing (debt or equity) only when there is insufficient internal financing available for new projects. This reinforces the view that debt is likely to be preferred over equity in smaller, private companies. Krishnaswami, S., and V. Subramaniam (1997) argue that an appropriate level of debt financing alters the shareholder incentives and mitigates the hold-up problem. Further, he also found out that at the optimal debt level, the firm produces its first best level of output. However, the use of debt and the consequent deviation in the firm’s output away from the value-maximizing level (away from the output level desired by the bondholders), exacerbates the conflict of interest between the bondholders and shareholders of the firm. Korteweg (2009) found that the under leverage result in his study is mainly due to zero leverage firms that also pay dividends. He concludes that the market expects them to lever up in the future to capture the benefits of leverage. Shaikh, Salman (2010) stated that leveraged firms can increase their returns in booms, but in slumps, they lose the edge and can even go bankrupt and make both their shareholders and creditors suffer. In economic booms, leveraged companies are more profitable than non-leveraged companies, but in recessions, leveraged companies are less profitable and hence riskier than non-leveraged companies. Thus, leveraged companies are depending on the assumption that the economic boom will last indefinitely. Erik Devos et al., (2012) examine the motivations for firms to remain debt free. Using a sample of firms that have no debt for three consecutive years, we find little support for the managerial entrenchment, flexibility, or the tax hypotheses. The authors found that the results are generalizable to leverage increasing decisions of already levered firms. A majority of the firms explicitly state in their 10-Ks that they raise debt to finance investments, strongly indicating a causal link between debt initiation and investments. Collins and Sekely (1983) state that several conclusions have found wide, if not total, acceptance and the one of these is that the level of financial leverage a firm can bear is a function of its business risk. Kale et. Al (1991) asserts that it is a consensus that business risk is one of the primary determinants of a firm’s capital structure. Kim and Sorensen (1986) concluded that high-operating risk firms used more debt rather than less debt. They found significant positive coefficients for the two commonly used measures of operating risk with which they worked in their study. Kale et al (1991) cited evidence from Long and Malitz (1985) that also supported an increasing relationship between business risk and financial leverage. Barton et al (1989) and Shyam and Myers (1999) found profitability strongly inversely related to financial leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found profitability significantly negatively associated with book leverage in three and with market leverage in four out of seven countries in their international study on capital structure. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts.


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Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that due to the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem, “firms expecting high future growth should use a greater amount of equity finance,” thus suggesting a negative relationship between expected growth and leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) also suggest a similar relationship but for the reason that firms with greater growth opportunity have more flexibility to invest sub optimally and thus expropriate wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Besides, they come out with the best summarize the thoughts of those theories who suggest a negative relationship between growth and financial leverage. Methodology The sample consists of 142 public-listed companies in the main market of the Bursa Malaysia for ten-year period from 2000 to 2009. Financial institutions are excluded because they are governed by special rules. For the purpose of collecting information on the levered and unlevered firms, this study was gathered secondary data from Bloomberg software from Bursa Malaysia. The study looks at the firm’s levered and unlevered performance based on proxies as shown in table 1 below: Table 1: Dependent And Independent Variables

Variables Proxies

· Return On Asset (ROA) · Return On Common Equity (ROCE) Dependent · Profit Margin (PM)

· Operating Profit Margin (OPM) · Earnings per share (EPS)

· Long Term Debt to Total Equity (LTD/TE)

· Total Equity (TE) Independent · Total Debt (TD)

Next, the relationship between the choices of capital structure and firm performance by levered and unlevered firms was estimated using the following multiple regression equations:

iiiii TDTETELTDROA )()()/( 321 ………………………… (eq.1)

iiiii TDTETELTDROCE )()()/( 321……………………… (eq.2)

iiiii TDTETELTDPM )()()/( 321………………………… (eq.3)

iiiii TDTETELTDOPM )()()/( 321………………………… (eq.4)

iiiii TDTETELTDEPS )()()/( 321………………………… (eq.5)


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In addition to finding evidence on existence of that such relationship, we are also interested in examining is there are significant mean different between levered and unlevered firms is justified by explanatory proxies. To achieve the objective, we examine using one-way ANOVA to investigate the mean difference between groups and within groups. Then, the hypotheses were developed to cater for the pooling regression model as below: Hypothesis 1:-

Ho1: There is no relationship between ROA and choices of capital structure. Ha1: There is a relationship between ROA and choices of capital structure.

Hypothesis 2:- Ho2: There is no relationship between ROCE and choices of capital structure. Ha2: There is a relationship between ROCE and choices of capital structure.

Hypothesis 3:- Ho3: There is no relationship between Profit Margin and choices of capital structure. Ha3: There is a relationship between Profit Margin and choices of capital structure.

Hypothesis 4:- Ho4: There is no relationship between OPM and choices of capital structure. Ha4: There is a relationship between OPM and choices of capital structure.

Hypothesis 5:- Ho5: There is no relationship between earnings per share and choices of capital structure. Ha5: There is a relationship between earnings per share and choices of capital structure.

Hypothesis 6:- Ho6: There is no significance means difference between levered and unlevered firm. Ha6: There is a significance means difference between levered and unlevered firm.

Findings Descriptive Statistics Analysis For Levered And Unlevered Firms Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Results For Levered And Unlevered Firms

Panel A: Unlevered Firms Panel B: Levered Firms

N Min Max Mean Std. Dev N Min Max Mean

Std. Dev

ROA 972 -20.70 72.36 5.60 5.79 411 -46.04 105.45 4.76 9.69 ROCE 972 -33.88 135.32 9.51 11.15 411 -58.92 215.76 11.70 23.47 PM 972 -

578.38 708.89 8.56 33.49 411 -

108.83 166.58 9.88 18.67

OPM 972 -453.27

60.53 10.88 19.62 411 -83.71 68.32 16.32 17.20

EPS 972 -1.77 10.02 0.21 0.41 411 -11.00 45.00 0.34 2.32 LTD/TE 972 0.00 264.09 17.30 30.08 411 0.00 1140.67 43.82 74.28


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TE 972 0.00 21072.17 795.64 2052.95 411 -420.84

26046.30 2608.89 4500.07

TD 972 0.00 11851.97 296.87 946.07 411 0.00 37530.54 3484.90 7342.47 Valid N (listwise)

972

411

From the table 1, results of descriptive statistics show that the mean for return on assets for unlevered and levered firms is 5.60% and 4.76% respectively implying that in average for 10 years study, the unlevered firms perform better based on their equity financing as compared to levered firms. Similar results to total debt and long term debt to total equity that the company have shows unlevered firms (269.87 million and 43.82% respectively) is in stable financial condition compared to levered firms (3 484.90 million and 17.30% respectively) since the lower level of debt is better. However, means results for the other proxies indicate different finding whereby levered firms is perform better than unlevered firms in their return on capital employed (11.70% as compared to 9.51%), profit margin (9.88% as compared to 8.56%), operating profit margin (16.32% as compared to 10.88%), earnings per share (RM0.34 as compared to RM0.21) and total equity (2608.89 million shares as compared to 795.64 million shares). Concluding remark can be done based on mean whereby the company high level of equity and debt financing that is levered firms can generate higher level of earnings and return since they can optimizing their level of operations activities. Refers to level of risk which is representing by standard deviations shows that unlevered firms managed better since most of the variables proxies indicate low risk as compared to levered firms. This result was supported by Barton et al (1989) and Shyam and Myers (1999). Multivariate Regression Analysis For Unlevered And Levered Firms Table 3 Panel A: Multivariate Regression Results For Unlevered Firms

ROA ROCE PM OPM EPS

Constant 25.940 20.666 4.657 11.543 11.715 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

LTD/TE -3.963 0.019 1.013 2.692 -0.871 0.000 0.985 0.311 0.007 0.384

TE 5.083 2.414 5.612 1.446 3.946

0.000 0.016 0.000 0.149 0.000

TD -3.115 -1.174 -3.661 0.516 -0.029 0.002 0.241 0.000 0.606 0.977

F-value 22.921 2.655 11.515 8.362 15.391 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000

R-square 0.066 0.008 0.034 0.025 0.046

Adj. R 0.063 0.005 0.031 0.022 0.043


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Table 4 Panel B: Multivariate Regression Results For Levered Firms

From the table 3 and 4, ROA for equation model 1 justify there is a significant relationship at 1 percent level with capital structure therefore null hypothesis 1 was rejected. The association for unlevered firms is significant to all proxies with positive relation and the only one proxy (that is total equity with p value of 0.960) out of three was insignificant with capital structure for levered firms. Based on results of model equation 2, this study is failed to reject null hypothesis since both unlevered and levered firms just indicated only one proxies (i.e; total equity and long term debt to equity at 1 percent level with p value of 2.414 and 4.227 respectively) of capital structure is significant to return on capital employed. Different results gathered for model equation 3 whereby the null hypothesis was rejected for unlevered firms but failed to reject for levered firms. Model equation 4 shown similar result with model equation 2 that this study is failed to reject null hypothesis 4 since both unlevered and levered firms just indicated only one proxies (i.e; long term debt to equity and total equity at 1 percent level with p value of 2.692 and 4.609 respectively) of capital structure is significant to operating profit margin. Model equation 5 on EPS for levered firms failed to reject null hypothesis 5 since result revealed that there is no significant relationship between earning per share and all capital structure proxies. Similar result should be blotch to unlevered firms as only one out of three proxies had shown significant value. R-squared and adjusted R-squared for unlevered firm’s performance and capital structure proxies indicate results between 0.008 to 0.066 and 0.005 to 0.063 respectively and for levered firms indicate results between 0.001 to 0.156 and -0.006 to 0.150 respectively. Therefore it was explaining a somewhat not strong relationship because only 7 to 16 percent of the variation in

ROA ROCE PM OPM EPS

Constant 7.845 6.477 6.510 12.127 1.940 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053

LTD/TE 2.544 4.227 0.014 1.124 0.309 0.011 0.000 0.989 0.262 0.758

TE 0.960 0.536 2.509 4.609 0.703

0.338 0.592 0.012 0.000 0.483

TD -2.903 -1.346 0.547 0.724 -0.466 0.004 0.179 0.585 0.470 0.642

F-value 4.766 5.957 7.527 25.049 0.194 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.900

R-square 0.034 0.042 0.053 0.156 0.001 Adj. R 0.027 0.035 0.046 0.150 -0.006

Note: **. A relation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. A relation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).


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firm’s profitability performance proxies is explained by the variation in the capital structure. F-statistics had shown significant value for all variables at 1 percent confident level meaning that the relationship was exists for each model equation except for earnings per share. ANOVA Analysis Table 5 Results Of ANOVA

Sum of Squares df

Mean Square F Sig.

ROA Between Groups

202.962 1 202.962 3.945 0.047

Within Groups 71055.18 1381 51.452

Total 71258.14 1382

ROCE Between Groups

1378.169 1 1378.169 5.494 0.019

Within Groups 346448.7 1381 250.868

Total 347826.8 1382

PM Between Groups

505.958 1 505.958 0.567 0.452

Within Groups 1231935 1381 892.06

Total 1232441 1382

OPM Between Groups

8548.838 1 8548.838 23.843 0.000

Within Groups 495146.7 1381 358.542 Total 503695.5 1382

EPS Between Groups

4.263 1 4.263 2.475 0.116

Within Groups 2378.453 1381 1.722

Total 2382.716 1382

The ANOVA results in the table 5 analyzed the mean square of between groups and within group of firms to reveal the finding hypothesis 6. Observed on firm’s profitability, there is no significant mean different for unlevered and levered firms in their return on assets, return on capital employed and profit margin but significant mean different to the other two proxies, which are profit margin and earnings per share. Details reported such significant F-value for ROA, ROCE and OPM is 3.945, 5.494 and 23.843 respectively. Meaning that, the choices of capital structure does not give a significant mean different for levered or unlevered forms towards their only profit margin and earnings per share. However, the impact on return on assets, return on capital employed and operating profit margin was proven carry different level of performance by company. Therefore, Ha6 was accepted for this study.


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Table 6: Pearson Correlation Results

ROA ROCE PM OPM EPS LTD/TE TE TD

ROA 1 .726** .358** .207** .520** -0.041 -0.018 -.112**

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 0.503 0.000

ROCE .726** 1 .217** .217** .181** .137** 0.041 0.024

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.382

PM .358** .217** 1 -.056* .205** 0.008 .140** .074**

0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.758 0.000 0.006

OPM .207** .217** -.056* 1 0.045 .140** .238** .216**

0.000 0.000 0.036 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000

EPS .520** .181** .205** 0.045 1 0.019 .064* 0.031

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.476 0.018 0.255

LTD/TE -0.041 .137** 0.008 .140** 0.019 1 .210** .379**

0.129 0.000 0.758 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.000

TE -0.018 0.041 .140** .238** .064* .210** 1 .734**

0.503 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000

TD -.112** 0.024 .074** .216** 0.031 .379** .734** 1

0.000 0.382 0.006 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.000

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The Pearson correlations results in table 6 reported all p-value of correlation are relatively low justifiable that no multicollinearity problems exist as mentioned by Gujarati (1995), where when the correlations value exceeded 0.80 mean there have a multicollinearity problems among variables. The correlation results of firm’s unlevered and levered are in consistent to all proxies where there are positive correlation between profitability performance (return on assets, return on capital employed, profit margin, operating profit margin and earnings per share) and negative correlation to gearing ratios (long term debt to equity, total equity and total debt). Profitability performance proxies show all result have significant correlated at 1 percent and 5 percent level to capital structure except for earning per share. Other capital structure also shown a significant correlation to this firm’s profitability but the result is mixed, for instance return on capital employed is significant correlated to long term debt to equity (0.137 at 1 percent level) but insignificant to profit margin (0.008 percent at 1 percent level). Conclusion This study has 2 main objectives, which are to identify there is a significance means difference between levered and unlevered firms beside to investigate the relationship between


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dependent and explanatory variables. Overall, the first objective can be conclude that there is a significant means different between unlevered and levered firms in terms of their return on assets, return on capital employed and operating profit margin. The levered and unlevered firms have its own advantages (refers to results of profitability performance) and disadvantages (choices of capital structure) in carry out its purpose of operation. It probably depends on many factors to say that which type of firm is better such as business sectors, economic conditions, inflation, recession, and etceteras. The second objective can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between unlevered and levered firm’s profitability performance with their capital structure. The study believes that for future research, a bigger sample should be use. The restriction of the data gathered from internal and external sources reduce the research scope of the firm which only 142 companies that consist of levered firm and unlevered firm to draw conclusions on its profitability and performance. References Barton, Sidney L., Ned C. Hill and Srinivasan Sundaram. (1989). An empirical test of stakeholders

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financial and quantitative analysis, 33, 335-359. Korteweg, A. (2009). The net benefits to leverage, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. Krishnaswami, S., and V. Subramaniam. (1997). Information Asymmetry, Valuation, and the

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Appendices List Of Company And Stock Code From 2000 – 2009 Unlevered Firms

NO. CODE NAME

1. LONBISC (7126) LONDON BISCUITS BHD 2. LHH (4839) LEONG HUP HOLDINGS BHD 3. AJI (2658) AJINOMOTO (M) BHD 4. GOLDIS (5606) GOLDIS BHD 5. LATITUD (7006) LATITUDE TREE HOLDINGS BHD

6. APOLLO (6432) APOLLO FOOD HOLDINGS BHD 7. JERASIA (8931) JERASIA CAPITAL BHD 8. NESTLE (4707) NESTLE (M) BHD 9. PADINI (7052) PADINI HOLDINGS BHD 10. AHEALTH (7090) APEX HEALTHCARE BHD 11. ASIAFLE (7129) ASIA FILE CORPORATION BHD 12. WINGTM (2976) WING TAI MALAYSIA BERHAD 13. ENGKAH (7149) ENG KAH CORPORATION BHD 14. FPI (9172) FORMOSA PROSONIC INDUSTRIES 15. UMW (4588) UMW HOLDINGS BHD 16. PPB (4065) PPB GROUP BERHAD

17. LIIHEN (7089) LII HEN INDUSTRIES BHD 18. TWS (4421) TRADEWINDS (M) BHD 19. YHS (4642) YEO HIAP SENG (M) BHD 20. UPA (7757) UPA CORPORATION BHD 21. APB (5568) APB RESOURCES BHD 22. APM (5015) APM AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS BHD

23. CCB (2925) CYCLE & CARRIAGE BINTANG BHD 24. DAIBOCI (8125) DAIBOCHI PLASTIC AND PACKAGING 25. DELLOYD (6505) DELLOYD VENTURES BHD 26. HEVEA (5095) HEVEABOARD BHD 27. HIRO (9644) HIROTAKO HOLDINGS BHD

28. JTIASA (4383) JAYA TIASA HOLDINGS BHD 29. KINSTEL (5060) KINSTEEL BHD 30. KKB (9466) KKB ENGINEERING BERHAD 31. KSENG (3476) KECK SENG (M) BHD 32. LEADER (4529) LEADER UNIVERSAL HOLDINGS BHD 33. LEWEKO (8745) LEWEKO RESOURCES BHD 34. MAEMODE (7075) MALAYSIAN AE MODELS HOLDINGS 35. MELEWAR (3778) MELEWAR INDUSTRIAL GROUP BHD 36. MSC (5916) MALAYSIA SMELTING CORPORATION


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37. NYLEX (4944) NYLEX (M) BHD 38. PETGAS (6033) PETRONAS GAS BERHAD 39. PIE (7095) P.I.E. INDUSTRIAL BHD 40. RUBEREX (7803) RUBBEREX CORPORATION (M) BHD 41. SUBUR (6904) SUBUR TIASA HOLDINGS BHD 42. TAANN (5012) TA ANN HOLDINGS BERHAD 43. TASEK (4448) TASEK CORPORATION BHD 44. TEKALA (6378) TEKALA CORPORATION BERHAD 45. AJIYA (7609) AJIYA BHD 46. CHOOBEE (5797) CHOO BEE METAL INDUSTRIES BHD 47. WTK (4243) WTK HOLDINGS BERHAD

48. YLI (7014) YLI HOLDINGS BHD 49. AZRB (7078) AHMAD ZAKI RESOURCES BHD 50. BPURI (5932) BINA PURI HOLDINGS BHD 51. BREM (8761) BREM HOLDINGS BHD 52. CRESBLD (8591) CREST BUILDER HOLDINGS BHD 53. EKOVEST (8877) EKOVEST BERHAD 54. GCORP (3166) GENERAL CORPORATION BHD 55. HSL (6238) HOCK SENG LEE BERHAD 56. IJM (3336) IJM CORPORATION BERHAD 57. KEN (7323) KEN HOLDINGS BERHAD 58. PLB (7055) PLB ENGINEERING BERHAD 59. SBCCORP (5207) SBC CORPORATION BHD

60. WCT (9679) WCT BERHAD 61. ZELAN (2283) ZELAN BHD 62. MITRA (9571) MITRAJAYA HOLDINGS BHD 63. AIRPORT (5014) MALAYSIA AIRPORT HOLDINGS BHD 64. AMWAY (6351) AMWAY (M) HOLDINGS BHD 65. ANALABS (7083) ANALABS RESOURCES BHD 66. BJLAND (4219) BERJAYA LAND BHD 67. ENGTEX (5056) ENGTEX GROUP BHD 68. EPIC (8265) EASTERN PACIFIC IND. CORP 69. FIAMMA (6939) FIAMMA HOLDINGS BHD 70. HUBLINE (7013) HUBLINE BHD

71. ILB (5614) INTEGRATED LOGISTICS BHD 72. KAMDAR (8672) KAMDAR GROUP (M) BHD 73. KFC (3492) KFC HOLDINGS (M) BHD 74. KFIMA (6491) KUMPULAN FIMA BHD 75. KONSORT (6157) KONSORTIUM LOGISTIK BHD 76. MBMR (5983) MBM RESOURCES BHD 77. MFCB (3069) MEGA FIRST CORPORATION BERHAD 78. MISC (3816) MISC BHD 79. MTD (9032) MTD CAPITAL BHD


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80. NATWIDE (9806) NATIONWIDE EXPRESS COURIER SER 81. NCB (5509) NCB HOLDINGS BHD 82. OCB (5533) OCB BHD 83. PRKCORP (8346) PERAK CORPORATION BHD 84. QSR (9415) QSR BRANDS BHD 85. SEG (9792) SEG INTERNATIONAL BHD 86. SRII (9989) SRII BHD 87. SURIA (6521) SURIA CAPITAL HOLDINGS BHD 88. TSTORE (5711) THE STORE CORPORATION BHD 89. UTUSAN (5754) UTUSAN MELAYU (M) BHD 90. VADS (7150) VADS BHD

91. WARISAN (5016) WARISAN TC HOLDINGS BHD 92. KPS (5843) KUMPULAN PERANGSANG SELANGOR 93. TA (4898) TA ENTERPRISE BHD 94. PUNCAK (6807) PUNCAK NIAGA HOLDINGS BERHAD 95. JERNEH (6394) JERNEH ASIA BERHAD 96. KAF (5096) KAF-SEAGROATT & CAMPBELL BHD 97. ENG (8826) ENG TEKNOLOGI HOLDINGS BHD 98. HTPADU (5028) HEITECH PADU BHD 99. SAM (9822) SAM ENGINEERING & EQUIPMENT 100. MSNIAGA (5011) MESINIAGA BHD


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Levered Firms

NO. CODE NAME

1. AFFIN (5185) AFFIN HOLDINGS BHD 2. CIMB (1023) CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS BHD 3. TENAGA (5347) TENAGA NASIONAL BHD 4. YTL (4677) YTL CORPORATION BHD 5. RHBCAP (1066) RHB CAPITAL BHD 6. LMCEMNT (3794) LAFARGE MALAYAN CEMENT BHD 7. IPMUDA (5673) IPMUDA BHD 8. GENTING (3182) GENTING BHD 9. GENP (2291) GENTING PLANTATIONS BHD

10. SUNCITY (6289) SUNWAY CITY BHD 11. SUNWAY (4308) SUNWAY HOLDINGS BHD 12. POHKONG (5080) POH KONG HOLDINGS BHD 13. NAIM (5073) NAIM HOLDINGS BHD 14. LBS (5789) LBS BINA GROUP BHD 15. MAA (1198) MAA HOLDINGS BHD 16. GAMUDA (5398) GAMUDA BERHAD 17. ESSO (3042) ESSO MALAYSIA BHD 18. DFZ (5177) DFZ CAPITAL BHD 19. BAT (4162) BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO (M) BHD 20. HLBANK (5819) HONG LEONG BANK BHD

21. KLK (2445) KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 22. MEDIA (4502) MEDIA PRIMA BHD 23. BERNAS (6866) PADIBERAS NASIONAL BHD 24. TCHONG (4405) TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS BHD 25. TGOFFS (7228) TANJUNG OFFSHORE BHD 26. TEXCHEM (8702) TEXCHEM RESOURCES BHD 27. YTLPOWR (6742) YTL POWER INTERNATIONAL BHD 28. SPSETIA (8664) SP SETIA BHD 29. TALIWRK (8524) TALIWORKS CORPORATION BHD 30. FRB (9008) FORMIS RESOURCES BHD 31. SMI (4375) SOUTH MALAYSIA INDUSTRIES BHD

32. SILVER (7136) SILVER BIRD GROUP BHD 33. PBBANK (1295) PUBLIC BANK BHD 34. PRESTAR (9873) PRESTAR RESOURCES BHD 35. PHARMA (7081) PHARMANIAGA BHD 36. PASDEC (6912) PASDEC HOLDINGS BHD 37. MUHIBAH (5703) MUHIBBAH ENGINEERING (M) BHD 38. KASSETS (6653) KRISASSETS HOLDINGS BHD 39. KPJ (5878) KPJ HEALTHCARE BHD 40. HLIND (3301) HONG LEONG INDUSTRIES BHD


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41. CCM (2879) CHEMICAL COMPANY OF MALAYSIA BHD 42. AFG (2488) ALLIANCE FINANCIAL GROUP BHD

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