PERFORMANCE AUDIT INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF GHANA ...

Performance audit report of the auditor-general on the administration of the Ghana National Service Scheme

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PERFORMANCE AUDIT INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF GHANA NATIONAL SERVICE SCHEME

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

1.1 Reasons for the audit

The Ghana National Service Scheme mobilises graduates from

accredited degree and diploma awarding tertiary educational

institutions to serve the nation by working in institutions, agencies

and communities assigned them for a period of one year to augment

the manpower needs of the country. From 2002 to 2006, a total of

103,893 completing students had been assigned to do service in

sectors of the economy with the most acute manpower needs. In 2005

and 2006 there were around 30,000 service personnel assigned to jobs

even in parts of the country that most workers do not find attractive.

Even though over the years the Scheme has helped in augmenting the

manpower needs of the country, there is still room for improvement

as the country 's manpower requirement continues to increase from

year to year.

2. Despite the achievement of the Scheme regarding augmenting

the nation’s manpower needs, concerns have been expressed about the

way the scheme is operated. The concerns raised include inability to

implement all aspects of the Scheme’s programme, misapplication of


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funds by the administrators of the Scheme, dissatisfaction by service

personnel regarding delays in posting, delays in payment of

allowances as well as complaints from user agencies of misalignment

of the service year with the academic year and unacceptable levels of

absenteeism among some service personnel.

3. The need to enhance the effectiveness of the Scheme so as to

better meet the ever-growing manpower needs of our economy was

the prime motivation for this study. The study was commissioned by

the Auditor-General in accordance with Section 13(e) of the Audit

service Act, Act 584 of 2000.

1.2 Purpose and scope of the audit

4. The purpose of the audit was to evaluate, how effectively

national service personnel were deployed to augment the manpower

needs of the country. It was also to evaluate the effectiveness of

monitoring of service personnel at their job locations by the various

regional and district secretariats of NSS as well as the management of

payment of allowances of service personnel.

5. The audit covered the period 2002 and 2003 to 2005 and 2006.

It was carried out in six regions, which were selected from the coastal,

mid-belt and northern sectors of the country. The Greater Accra

region was selected based on the fact that it has the bulk of service


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personnel. Two regions namely, Volta and Eastern were added to the

four selected earlier to enable the team quickly interact with service

personnel before they proceeded on leave prior to the end of their

period of service.

1.3 Method and implementation

6. The study consisted of interviews, focus groups and review of

documents to enable the team understand the activities and processes

pertaining to the placement of national service personnel in

establishments and communities throughout the country.

Interviews

7. We interviewed current service personnel, key officers in the

national secretariat, six regional secretariats, eighteen district offices

of the Scheme, the Budget, Planning and Monitoring unit of the

Ministry of Education Science and Sports as well as the external and

internal audit units that oversee the Ghana National Service Scheme.

We interviewed officials of the National Accreditation Board as to

how tertiary institutions and courses obtain accreditation. The team

interviewed schedule officers who dealt with the compilation of the

penultimate and final year lists of completing students in three

universities and six polytechnics as well as schedule officers in the

Internally Generated Funds and Budget divisions of the Ministry of

Finance.


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Focus Groups

8. To obtain first hand information about the experiences and

challenges faced by service personnel, focus groups were conducted

for personnel in three locations, namely, Ghana Education Service

Regional Accounts Office- Ho, Community Water And Sanitation

Agency (CWSA)-Koforidua and Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana -

Tafo.

Document Review

9. The audit team studied the Ghana National Service Act of

1980, Act 426 which established the Ghana National Service Scheme

with a view to determining whether the Scheme was performing its

functions as spelt out in the Act in relation to the deployment,

monitoring, payment of allowances as well as providing the welfare

needs of service personnel.

10. The team reviewed the GNSS Country reports for 2003, 2004

and 2005 to have insight into the activities of GNSS for the two years,

especially with regards to the deployment, monitoring and payment of

allowances to service personnel. Other documents reviewed include

Posting Rules and Regulations, National Service Rules and

Regulations and training manuals for national service personnel. We

further looked at the nominal rolls, payrolls and monthly expenditure

returns on monthly allowances for service personnel to ascertain the


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timeliness of payments of allowances and how the Scheme managed

unclaimed allowances.

1.4 Structure of the Audit Report

11. Chapter 2 gives a detailed description of the processes in place

for identifying prospective service personnel, processing national

service placements, monitoring service personnel on the job, paying

allowances to service personnel, catering for the social well being of

personnel and awarding national service certificates. This was done

in terms of goals and objectives, funding, current development, key

players and their main activities. Chapter 3 presents the findings, and

a summary of findings and conclusions of the audit. In chapter 4 are

the recommendations made to enhance the effectiveness and

efficiency of the administration of the national service Scheme.


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CHAPTER TWO

DESCRIPTIVE CHAPTER

2.1 Historical background

12. The national service idea was conceived during Ghana’s

Second Republic as a voluntary Scheme called the Ghana National

Service Corporation through an enactment by the Presidential

Commission and the National Assembly in 1971. It did not however

see the light of day before the Progress Party (PP) Government was

overthrown in a coup d ’etat in 1971. The National Redemption

Council Government established the Ghana National Service Scheme

through a decree, NRCD 208, 1973. Under the decree, graduates of

the nations universities were required to render a year voluntary

service to the state.

13. Another act, The Ghana National Service Scheme Act of 1980,

Act 426, repealed NRCD 208. Under Act 426, national service

personnel were to render a mandatory service for a period of two

years including a minimum period of six months military training.

However after two years of implementation, the policy of a two-year

national service period was changed to a one-year national service

period due to financial constraints.

14. Over the years, the number of national service personnel

deployed by the National Service Secretariat has increased


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tremendously. This is due to the increase in the number of graduates

who pass out of accredited tertiary educational institutions each year

and the establishment of more tertiary educational institutions in the

country. Currently, the Secretariat deploys about 30,000 service

personnel each year to both public and private institutions.

2.2 Goals and objectives

15. The objectives of the Scheme are to:

a. deploy all graduates of accredited tertiary educational

institutions on national service throughout the country

especially in deprived areas

b. augment the provision of competent personnel to areas

of the economy that suffers manpower shortfalls

c. organise military training for all service personnel and

instill in them self-discipline, alertness, physical fitness,

sense of patriotism and selfless devotion to work

d. extend the Scheme to cover all skilled retired persons

within the framework of a national volunteer

programme, and

e. make full use of its income generation potential in order

to reduce its dependence on the State for financial

support.


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2.3 Rules and Regulations

16. The Ghana National Service Scheme operates under Act 426 of

1980. The Act specifies persons legible to the Scheme and each year

the Scheme comes out with postings instructions to it’s regional and

district coordinators to regulate the deployment of national service

personnel to its user agencies. It also issues rules and regulations to

national service personnel as to how to conduct themselves during the

period of service and what is expected of them by the Scheme and its

user agencies.

2.4 Funding17. There are two sources of funding for the Scheme: Government

of Ghana funding through budgetary releases from the Ministry of

Finance and Internally generated funds. From 2001 to 2005,

Government spent ¢336.3 billion on the Scheme while it internally

generated ¢5.7 billion as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Sources of Funding

YEAR GOG (¢) IGF (¢) Total (¢)

2001 26,528,702,137.52 379,443,713.06 26,908,145,850.58

2002 37,430,691,003.90 554,143,820.43 37,984,834,824.33

2003 70,644,380,405.25 1,295,963,158.61 71,940,343,563.86

2004 72,905,099,456.92 1,403,290,678.73 74,308,390,135.65

2005 128,783,540,408.02 2,067,595,898.16 130,851,136,306.16

TOTAL ¢336,292,413,411.59 ¢5,700,437,268.99 ¢341,992,850,680.58

Source: GNSS Financial Record


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2.5 Current development

18. The Board is instrumental in instituting a 20% service charge

payable by all private organisations to which service personnel are

assigned as well as having to take up the payment of monthly

allowances to all those engaged by them. The Scheme has also

acquired household items to sell to service personnel on credit basis to

alleviate the difficulties that the fresh personnel face when they leave

home to do national service in remote areas. Furthermore, the Scheme

launched its volunteer programme in October 2003 and as at June

2006, it operates fully in seven regions with 2,300 volunteers on its

nominal roll.

19. In order to overcome challenges emanating from the Scheme’s

current mandate, the Board has submitted proposals for amendments

to the Act to make it more empowering and proactive, to diversify as

well as enrich its functions in line with a revised vision, mission,

goals and objectives.

20. To overcome the problems of delays in completing the posting

of service personnel, the Scheme has developed an internet-based

software that will enable prospective service personnel access

information about their posting at the Scheme’s website with effect

from the 2006 and 2007 Service Year.


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2.5 Organisational Structure

21. The Ministry of Education, Science and Sports has oversight

responsibility for the Scheme. The Ghana National Service Scheme

has at its apex an eight member Governing Board that provides

general policy direction for its operations and reports annually to the

President. An Executive Director assisted by one deputy manages the

Scheme. The national Secretariat is made up of eleven departments.

The Scheme is represented by a Regional Coordinator in every region

and in all 136 districts by a District Coordinator.

2.6 Key players and activities

22. To deploy service personnel to areas and institutions where

their expertise are most required, the Scheme collaborates with other

key-players. Itemised below are the key-players and the activities they

undertake:


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Table 2: Key players and their activities

Key player Activities

Office of the President Appointment of Governing Board

Ministry of Education Scienceand Sports

Supervisory responsibility for the Scheme. All correspondence to the Presidency should be routed through this Ministry. Budgetary responsibility for the Scheme. All correspondence to the Ministry of Finance should be routed through this Ministry.

Ministry of Finance Provides funds for the running of the Scheme as well as paying the monthly allowances of service personnel.

Governing Board of Scheme General control and management of the Scheme on matters of policy.

Tertiary institutionsProvides the Scheme with data on final and penultimate year students which serves as the basis for the generation of the posting list of service personnel

Public /Private organizations Furnish the Scheme with their personnel requirements for the subsequent year so the Scheme could assign personnel to them.Heads of these organisations endorse appointment letters of service personnel to confirm that these personnel have reported for duty.Private organisations to which Service personnel are assigned are required to pay these personnel from their own resources.Private organisations to which such personnel are assigned are required to pay 20% of the allowance paid to each service personnel assigned to them as service charge to the Scheme

Regional Coordinating Councils Provides office accommodation for Scheme's Regional Secretariats as well as assist in providing residential accommodation for the Scheme’s region officers.

District Assemblies Provides office accommodation for Scheme's District Secretariats as well as assist in providing residential accommodation for service personnel

Source: Ghana Audit Service


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2.7 System description of the Scheme

23. The Scheme’s main activity is the deployment of graduates of

accredited tertiary educational institutions to do a mandatory one-year

national service in the various sectors of the economy, particularly in

areas experiencing shortfalls in manpower. Deployment of graduates

by the Scheme for national service entails the following activities:

identifying and registering of graduates who are eligible

for service.

organising orientation programmes for them

posting them to the various sectors of the economy in

good time.

organising military training for them whilst at post

during the service year

monitoring them whilst at post to ensure that they

deliver value for money

paying them monthly allowances

helping them to secure accommodation upon posting

and taking care of their health needs, and


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issuing certificates to deserving personnel at the end of

service.

24. In return, the personnel are to serve diligently in the various

organisations they are assigned to and are to abide by the rules and

regulations of both the organisations they serve and the Scheme.

25. The Scheme collaborates with institutions such as the AIDS

Commission to ensure that its personnel are properly sensitised about

the dangers of irresponsible sexual behaviour during their tenure as

service personnel. It engages in community development activities

and skill training programmes for unschooled and unemployed youth

using its personnel in deprived communities as facilitators. It also

engages its personnel in income generation activities.


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CHAPTER THREE

FINDINGS

3.0 Introduction

26. The Scheme’s core activity of deploying graduates to do a

mandatory one – year national service has improved the manpower

needs of areas experiencing shortfalls.

27. We found during the audit that the impact of the Scheme will

be further enhanced if it overcomes the underlisted challenges:

Service personnel were not adequately orientated before

they assumed duty with the organisations they have

been posted to

Service personnel were not given military training to

make them physically and mentally alert

the procedures followed in posting service personnel

were not efficient

Service personnel were not properly monitored on the

job to ensure they gave value for the money they earned


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the Scheme did not refund unclaimed national service

personnel monthly allowances to the consolidated fund

contrary to laid down Regulation, and

monthly allowances due the service personnel were not

paid promptly.

3.1 Service personnel are not adequately orientated before they assumed duty

28. Orientating service personnel before they commence service is

one of the challenges that face the Scheme. Orientation entails

conscientising the personnel on the operations of the Scheme, what

they are to expect as service personnel and how they can serve

effectively. The Scheme is supposed to organise a minimum of two

orientation programmes for all prospective service personnel before

they assumed duty at their place of posting. The first orientation takes

place on campus before prospective graduates take their final year

examination and is therefore referred to as “on campus orientation”.

29. The prospective personnel are assembled and educated on

issues concerning the operations of the Scheme. They are also taught

how to fill the national service forms. The second orientation is

known as “off campus orientation” as it takes place after posting but

just before service personnel assume duty. It is usually organised by


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the Regional and District Secretariats with the emphasis on making

the personnel aware of the unique socio-cultural practices of the

localities where they will live and do service. Issues such as HIV

AIDS are discussed. Personnel posted to certain jobs that require

specific hands on skills such as teaching are given additional training.

30. Our visits to 13 districts in six regions revealed that all the six

regions organised “on campus orientations” for service personnel

assigned them in the 2005 and 2006-service year. However only three

out of the 18 districts visited organised “off campus orientations” for

service personnel in the 2005 and 2006 service year. Our interviews

with both the service personnel and officers of the Scheme showed

that all the “on campus orientations” organised were poorly attended

with less than 50% of prospective service personnel attending. This

was largely due to the fact that the “on campus orientation” was

organised during revision/examination week. Ten out of the 18

districts visited were unable to organise the “off campus orientation”

because of lack of logistics. Twelve out of 18 service personnel

interviewed in the Koforidua municipality claimed they knew little of

the area before assuming duty there.

31. Failure of the Scheme to adequately orientate service personnel

before they start service negatively impacts on their performance. We

were told by 16 out of the 40 national service personnel interviewed


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in the Volta and Eastern regions that lack of adequate knowledge of

the job they were assigned adversely affected their performance. This

is more so because the personnel are relatively younger and find it

difficult to adjust to their new environment when they have to live

away from their usual homesteads for the first time.

32. We also noted instances of conflict of culture, which resulted

in frictions between the service personnel and the residents. In an

instance a service personnel claimed that he had contracted an

incurable skin disease because he had eaten gari in the market, which

was a taboo in the area. Fifteen percent of the personnel assigned to

teach in the Ho district claimed that initially, controlling the pupils

was difficult because they lacked the basic skills in teaching

methodology.

3.1 The Scheme is not able to organise military training for service personnel

33. Section 4 of the GNSS Act of 1980 requires that the period of

National Service shall include a minimum of six months military

training. Also Section 10 of the GNSS Rules and Regulations requires

service personnel to undergo military training in every service year.

The main objective of military training for service personnel was to

imbue in them a high sense of punctuality and selfless attitude to

work during the tenure of the service and during their post service

working life.


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34. Despite the laudable objectives of this activity, GNSS has for

several years not been able to organise military training for service

personnel as directed by the Act. During separate interviews with the

Director of the Scheme and two members of the governing board,

(chairman and acting Secretary/member), they all attributed their

inability to organise the military training to budgetary constraints, as

its annual budgets are drastically slashed by the Ministry of Finance.

For instance in 2005 the ¢13.06bn the Scheme budgeted for service

activity was slashed to ¢0.55bn representing a 95.8% cut. Also the

¢3.50bn budgeted for administrative activity was reduced to ¢0.45bn,

a cut of 87.4%.

3.2 The process of posting personnel for service was not done in an efficient manner

35. Posting is the core activity in the deployment of National

Service personnel and is undertaken by the National, Regional, and

District secretariats of the service respectively. The process starts with

the publishing in the Daily Newspapers of invitations to organisations

that need service personnel to submit requests and ends with the

posting of prospective service personnel to serve in various sectors of

the economy in various districts of the country. In placing the

graduates for service, the Scheme considers the interplay of the

following factors: national programmes, priorities of Scheme, courses

of study pursued by graduates, requests of user agencies, locality of


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choice of graduates, health status of graduates and national

integration.

36. To meet the policy of personnel serving for a period of one

year and to achieve targets set by the Scheme with regard to posting

of service personnel, the activities involved in postings with an

interplay of the above considerations must not only be time-bound but

must also be done in an efficient manner. The audit however noted

that postings were not only done late, but also took a long time to

complete.

37. Analysis of the times posting started and ended during the

period reviewed as shown in Table 3 revealed that throughout the

period from 2002 to 2006, posting was never done on time to enable

the period of service to actually last for eleven months. We further

noted that the policy of aligning the beginning of the service year with

the beginning of the academic year is not adhered to as is shown by

Table 3.

Table 3: Alignment of academic year with start of posting


Year Date academic year begun

Month posting started Month posting completed

2002/03 September November March

2003/04 September November February

2004/05 September November March

2005/06 September November February


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38. The undue delays in placements and completion of the posting

process were attributed to the following:

interference in the posting process

late and prolonged placement process

eagerness to internally generate funds from user fee

3.3.1 Undue public interference in the posting process

39. The Ghana National Service Scheme Act 426 of 1980

mandates the Scheme to post service personnel to designated sectors

of the economy, especially sectors that face manpower shortfall.

40. Our interviews with officials of the Scheme revealed that much

as the Scheme is trying to carry out its mandate of posting personnel

to areas where they can give optimum value to the nation, there is

serious interference by the public in the posting process. People in

influential positions such as politicians, senior public servants, chiefs,

businessmen and women put officials of the Scheme under so much

pressure that they sometimes succumb and manipulate the process to

benefit those persons. Such persons request that their favourites are

posted to specific organisations and location of their choice.

41. Interference in posting takes two forms: “pre-posting” where

requests are made for favourites to be posted to certain

organisations/locations before the release of the posting master list


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and ‘post-posting” where requests are made for changes to be made in

the organisations/locations to which favourites have been posted after

the release of the posting master list. Interference by the public results

in prolonged posting periods, and imbalances in the distribution of

service personnel.

3.3.2 Prolonged period of posting

42. Analysis of the times posting started and ended during the

period reviewed and shown in Table 4 revealed that throughout the

period (2002 to 2006), posting was never done on time to enable the

period of service to actually last for eleven months. The national

service year ends in July to enable service personnel go on leave

during the month of August. From the Table, the longest period that

service personnel served during the entire period of four years was 9

months, that is, November to July and the shortest period was 5

months as was the case in 2004/5.


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Table 4: Posting Schedules 2002-2006

Year Posting End of Service Duration of Service

2002/3 November July 9December July 8

January July 7February July 6





March July 52005/6 November July 9

December July 8January July 7February July 6


43. Interviews with the officers of the Scheme and service

personnel as well as review of documents revealed the following

reasons for the anomaly:

placement of personnel, which is usually done in

September, takes five months to complete instead of the

three months stipulated


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some district coordinators do not officially write to user

agencies asking them to submit their requests for

service personnel

changes and review of original postings delay the

completion of the posting process

some tertiary institutions do not send their final year

list to GNSS in a timely manner, and

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning sometimes

delays in the release of funds to the Scheme.

44. Late postings and the resultant inability of the service

personnel to serve the full eleven-month period distort the

programmes of the user agencies. Ghana Education Service is most

affected since majority of the service personnel are posted to the

teaching field. As the period of posting is prolonged, the first and

second cycle institutions go half-way through the first term before

service personnel report for work. The national service personnel are

also affected by the inability of the Scheme to run for the full twelve

months. Twenty-two out of 40 service personnel interviewed in the

Koforidua municipality claimed that they would have liked to serve

for a period of 12 months since that would have given them more

working experience.


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3.3.3 Imbalances in posting of service personnel

45. Article 3 (1) of Act 426 directs the postings of service

personnel to the following sectors of the economy: agriculture, co-

operatives, education, health, local government, military, rural

development, youth programmes and any field that the Board may

prescribe. In recent times, the Scheme posts service personnel to

private sector organisations who are enjoined to pay the allowances of

service personnel as well as pay 20% of such allowance to the

Scheme as user fee.

46. Our review of posting records revealed that posting to the

private sector is increasing steadily. The 2003/4 Country report states

that only 5% of service personnel were posted to the private sector

and this increased to 10% in 2005/6 as stated in page 2 paragraph 8 of

the 2005/6 posting instructions. Thus, posting to private sector

organisations increased by 100% within two years. Officials of the

Scheme attributed the steady increase in posting to the private sector

to the increasing attention to the sector by government as well as the

Scheme’s eagerness to generate substantial revenue from the 20% of

individual allowances paid to it as user fee. We found that posting to

the private sector adversely impacts on posting to the public sector.

The GES is affected more as shortage of teachers in the service is

increasing annually while the number of service personnel posted to it

is also decreasing.


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47. Page 29 paragraph 4 of the 2003/4 Country report states that

80% of the service personnel posted to GES are sent to teach. It

further states that the current usage shows that despite the deployment

of service personnel to teach in schools, an additional 16,000 teachers

were still needed to teach various subjects throughout the country. In

our view, that is where there is an acute shortage of manpower and we

expect postings to the teaching field especially to rural schools to be

increasing annually to match the decrease in teachers and not postings

to the private sector.

3.4 Service personnel were not properly monitored on the job to ensure they gave value for the money they earned

48. Monitoring is the key activity that the GNSS undertakes to

ensure that service personnel give value for the allowances that they

earn. The monitoring exercise starts when personnel assume duty and

lasts till they complete service. This is supposed to be done in an

effective manner to ensure that service personnel are not paid

allowances when they have not worked. Effective monitoring entails:

drawing up monitoring programmes at the national,

regional and district levels

obtaining documents from heads of user agencies

testifying that service personnel are at post and working


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conducting regular spot checks on service personnel to

ascertain that they are at post, and

preparing monitoring reports at the district, regional and

national levels.

49. Information gathered from our fieldwork showed that

monitoring of service personnel was not done in an efficient manner.

In all the six regional secretariats and the 18 district secretariats

visited, officials did not have any monitoring programmes. Out of the

18 districts, only one wrote monitoring reports. The National

Secretariat did not produce any evidence to the effect that it required

its district and regional secretariats to regularly furnish it with reports

on their monitoring activities. At best, monitoring was carried on as

and when the situation could allow or when it was suspected that

something was wrong. The reasons for the inability of the Secretariat

to effectively monitor service personnel was due to the following:

lack of resources, lack of collaboration with other stakeholders, and

posting skewed towards Ministries, Departments Agencies.

3.4.1 Lack of resources

50. Officials of the regional and district Secretariats visited

attributed the ineffective monitoring to lack of logistics like

stationery, office equipment and vehicles. All the regional and district

secretariats were without vehicles until the middle of 2006, when each


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of the 10 regional secretariats was provided with a double cabin pick-

up each Six of the 18 districts visited were without typewriters and all

18 districts claimed that they had never been supplied with stationery.

The National Secretariat admitted that it was provided with funds

from the consolidated fund for administrative expenses, albeit

meager, hence its inability to properly resource its district secretariats

with stationery and office equipment.

51. Inadequate staff at the district secretariats has also contributed

to the ineffectiveness of monitoring. Thirty-one of the Districts

visited were without functioning secretariats as shown in Table 5

whilst the existing secretariats are Understaffed. Twelve out of 18

district secretariats visited were run by a lone officer, meaning that

the office was locked up anytime the officer had engagements

elsewhere. The situation is worse where the district coordinator also

has oversight responsibility for another district as is the case of the

Bawku East coordinator who also oversees the Bawku West and Garu

Tempane districts, in such cases the coordinators reassign some of the

service personnel to be with them and assist them. Some of the

national service personnel who are assigned to work with the District

co-ordinators are at times sent out to monitor their colleague national

service personnel at their job locations.


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Table 5: Districts without coordinators

Source: GNSS Internal Audit Unit

3.4.2 Lack of collaboration with other stakeholders

52. Another reason why the Scheme is not able to effectively

monitor the service personnel at post is the lack of collaboration with

other government agencies. Greater contact with other organisations

such as the G.E.S would enable the Scheme depend on the resources

of other better-endowed agencies to good advantage. Lack of

effective monitoring results in the service personnel sometimes not

working but still enjoying their monthly allowances. Some personnel

posted to rural areas stay in the big towns but report occasionally at

work and are as such reckoned to have reported to work and are

therefore paid.

Northern Region

Upper West

Upper East

Brong –Ahafo

Ashanti Western Region

Central Volta Region Eastern Region

Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo

.Sawla-Tuna-Kalba

Central Gonja

West Gonja

West Mamprusi

Nanumba South

Zabzgu –Tatale

Tamale –Metro

Sassala West

Wa East

Wa West

BolgatangaMunicipal

Garu-Tempane

Builsa

Talensi Nabdum

Kintampo North

Tano North

Asunafo South

Jaman North

Tain

Pru

Sene

Sunyani

Atwima Nwabiagya

Amansie Central

Bia Assin North

Krachi East

Adaklu Anyigbe

Kwahu West

East Akim


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3.4.3 Posting is skewed towards Ministries, Departments and Agencies

53. Since its inception the policy of the Scheme has always been to

post most service personnel to G.E.S. especially rural schools. This

according to GNSS officials is to help augment the perennial problem

of shortage of teachers. In page 29 of its Country report for 2003 and

2004, the GNSS states that, “ A bulk of the national service

personnel, nearly 80% are posted to the GES to undertake teaching

assignments in secondary and technical schools throughout the

country, as this is our most desired need”.

54. We found that in the case of regional distribution of service

personnel posted to the GES from 2002 and 2003 to 2005 and 2006,

the Scheme did not properly address the manpower shortfall in the

country contrary to its stated policy. For instance, the percentage of

service personnel posted to the Greater Accra region was 27.6% in

2003 and 2004, even though it has the largest concentration of trained

teachers in the country. This figure increased to 32.6% in 2004 and

2005 and then 40.7% in 2005 and 2006. On the other hand, the

percentage of personnel posted to the Upper East region which least

attracts trained teachers was 2.2% in 2002 and 2003, then rose to

2.5% in 2004 and 2005 but fell to 1.3% in 2005 and 2006.

55. Again page 2 of the GNSS posting instructions for 2005 and

2006 states that “The policy of posting service personnel to the public


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sector has not changed. The Secretariat still attaches greater

importance to postings to the GES especially to rural schools. The

Scheme is determined and committed to improving access to quality

education at all levels especially among the rural populace. As a

result, 60 to 70% of the 2005 and 2006 total posting will go to the

education sector”. We found that this target was never met. An

analysis of sectoral posting of service personnel to various regions

from 2002 and 2003 to 2005 and 2006 shows that the Scheme was

barely able to fulfill its stated policy objective. On the whole it posted

more personnel to MDAs than to the GES.

56. The team found that even in the regions where the Scheme

seemed to be attaining its stated policy objective of posting majority

of personnel to GES, the percentages are declining markedly over the

years. In the Volta region for instance, the percentage of personnel

posted to the GES declined from 81.9% in 2003 and 2004 to 74% in

2004 and 2005 and to 56.3% in 2005 and 2006. Similarly in the

Western region the percentage posted declined from 62.3% in 2003

and 2004 to 60.9% in 2004 and 2005 and 57.7% in 2005 and 2006. As

a result, a lot of the rural schools are without teachers as most of the

service personnel are assigned to work in MDAs and with

organisations with offices in the urban areas. This observation was

further corroborated by the Upper East regional directorate of the

GES which declared it had vacancies for 2,396 teachers in the 2004


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and 2005 academic year as is reflected in Table 6.The GES however

did not submit any formal request for the allocation of service

personnel.

Table 6: Teacher vacancies in schools in the Upper East Region (2006/7)

Source: Human resource e Division of G.E.S Bolgatanga

3.5 Scheme did not refund unclaimed monthly national service

allowances to the consolidated fund

57. Section 45 of Financial Administration Regulation 2004

requires that, any overpayment should be recovered immediately and

paid into the account from which it was originally paid. This is to

safeguard against misapplication of funds and possible fraud. Our

examination of reports on the payment of service personnel

allowances for the period 2002 to 2005 showed that a total ¢ 831.31

million was refunded to the National Service by the ten Regional

Secretariats of the Scheme as unclaimed service allowances. The

National Secretariat was yet to pay this amount into the Consolidated

Fund.

Type of institution No. of vacanciesTraining colleges 26Second cycle 152Basic (J.S.S) 218Basic (primary) 2,000Total 2,396


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58. Our audit further revealed that the Scheme did not have an

adequate mechanism in place to ensure that the exact amounts of

unclaimed allowances were promptly paid by the district secretariats

to the national secretariats through their respective regional

secretariats. As a result, district coordinators paid unclaimed

allowances to their respective regional secretariats as and when they

deemed fit. Details of cumulative payments made to the respective

Regional Secretariats are provided in Table 7.

Table 7: Payment of OPRS By Regional Secretariat to the National Secretariat. (¢‘Million)

Region 2002 2003 2004 2005Ashanti 3.05 85.80 96.42 18.39Gt. Accra - - 45.00 Brong Ahafo 3.62 14.58 9.13 -Central 29.48 105.26 16.23 50.85Western - 2 .67

1.28

96.78Eastern 11.81 113.96 - 33.07Northern 30.55 8.17 2.00 -Upper East 1.41 0.54 1.54 -Upper West 17.98 2.68 12.52 5.85Volta - - 10.69 -TOTAL 97.90 333.66 149.81 249.94Source: Ghana National Service Scheme

59. The accountant explained that the Scheme anticipated that it

required 13.09bn to effectively fulfill its operations relating to

monitoring, district level pre-service orientation, and a special


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orientation for personnel to be assigned to teaching, among others.

The Ministry of Finance slashed the vote for service and

administration to ¢ 0.60bn and the Scheme was compelled to use the

unclaimed allowances to cover operational costs and then request for

retrospective approval from the Ministry of Finance which they were

yet to obtain by the end of the audit.

3.6 Welfare of national service personnel was not adequately taken care of

60. The Scheme is responsible for the well being of service

personnel. This takes the form of paying monthly allowances to

service personnel, assisting them to get accommodation and access

medical care.

61. About 40% of service personnel interviewed in the Volta and

Eastern regions claimed the district assemblies could only offer

accommodation to about 2% of service personnel posted that the rest

had to look for their own accommodation. They claimed that the

Scheme did not offer them loans to pay the rent advances that the

landlords were asking for. Others said they had to use most of their

meagre allowances to pay transport fares because the accommodation

they got was far from their job locations. Some district coordinators

interviewed said they could not assist the personnel in their districts

when they fell sick and had to go to hospital because the Scheme did

not release funds to them for that purpose.


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62. Another area of concern with regard to the welfare of service

personnel is the late payment of monthly allowances to personnel.

Having rendered service to the nation, the personnel expected to be

paid on time since that money was their sole source of paying for their

rent, buying food, paying transport fares and paying for any

medication they may need.

63. Our analysis of dates on which allowances were paid as shown

in Table 8 revealed that payments were delayed for between two to

five weeks every month. The inability of the Scheme to adequately

cater for the welfare of service personnel at post invariably affects

their output. This is more serious during the first two months of the

service year making the personnel go back to their parents to look for

money to live on till they are paid. Service personnel use these

opportunities to abscond.


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Table 8: Pay days to personnel allowances

Source: GNSS UER Secretariat, Bolgatanga

3.7 Summary of findings and conclusions

64. GNSS has since its establishment in 1973 been mobilising

graduates from accredited degree and diploma awarding tertiary

educational institutions to render voluntary service in key areas of the

Ghanaian economy such as education, agriculture, health, local

government and rural development. Inspite of the tremendous strides

made in these areas in addressing critical manpower shortfalls there is

the general feeling among Ghanaian that GNSS could do better. The

purpose of the audit was to evaluate the administration of the Scheme

with regard to such activities as budgeting, orientation, posting,

monitoring and payment of allowances to service personnel.

Month First day of payment

Period of delay

Nov 2005 January 6 5 weeksDec. 2005 January 6 1 weekJanuary 2006 January 26 On timeFebruary 2006 March 3 On timeMarch 2006 April 13 2 weeksApril May 17 2 weeksMay June 2 On timeJune June 29 On timeJuly August 4 1 weekAugust August 4 On time


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65. The Scheme is required to organise two orientation

programmes for the service personnel; the on-campus and off –

campus orientation programmes. On compus orientation programmes

were poorly attended with less than 50 percent of prospective service

personnel attending. This is because they were organised at a time

students were preparing for end of semester examinations.

66. Posting of national service personnel by GNSS is characterised

by a number of lapses:

GNSS has not been able to post all service personnel to

locations where their services are most needed

Due to late posting, user organisation are not able to

fully utilise the services of service personnel especially

those who teach in schools

67. To ensure the maximum use of services rendered by service

personnel and that allowances are not paid to non-performing

personnel, there is the need for effective monitoring. We however,

found that payment of allowances by GNSS to service personnel

because of inadequate staff and logistics and also its low level of

collaboration with stakeholders like the GES and District Assemblies.


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68. The prompt payment of monthly allowances could boost the

morale of service personnel. We however found that payment of

allowances by GNSS to service personnel was sometimes delayed

five weeks. Under the circumstances service personnel posted to

locations and travel to their parents for financial assistance.

69. GNSS has failed to ensure that the right amount of unclaimed

allowances of service personnel are promptly paid by District

Coordinators to the national secretariats though their respective

regional secretariats. Additionally the national secretariat failed to pay

unclaimed allowances received from the districts to government chest

but rather misapplied them. The programme to provide military

training to service personnel as contained the GNSS Act, 1980 has not

been fulfilled due to budgetary constraints.


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CHAPTER 4

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Posting Activities

Postings to the private sector should be reviewed to enable

the GNSS meet its policy objectives of supplementing the

manpower needs of government agencies especially GES

Since it takes about three months to process the national

service applications, the GNSS can start processing the

applications earlier to avoid late start of the service.

2. Weak Administrative Capacity.

The GNSS should properly time the “on campus”

orientation to attract more participation from prospective

service personnel.

GNSS must promptly pay allowances to avoid personnel

leaving their job locations in search of financial assistance

GNSS should draw up and implement comprehensive

monitoring plans to ensure that service personnel give

value for their earned allowances

GNSS must increase the staff strength in the district offices

and revive and adequately equip all non – functioning

secretariats and under staffed offices


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GNSS must endeavour to appoint a coordinator for every

district so as to ensure effective monitoring of all service

personnel at their job locations and,

Effective monitoring of personnel by officers of the district

secretariats should be a matter of priority since that is the

only way performance of personnel can be assessed.

Others.

The GNSS must deepen collaboration with all relevant

stakeholders before and after posting so that the expertise

of would be service personnel can be put to optimum use

The Scheme should seek retrospective authorisation from

the Ministry of Finance for the use of unclaimed

allowances or otherwise take steps to recover and pay all

such monies back to government chest

GNSS should seek authorization from the Ministry of

Finance to enable it apply any unclaimed allowances it

holds towards financing the military training component of

the national service Scheme and,


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GNSS should hold further discussions with the Ministry of

Defence and the Ministry of Manpower and Employment

to explore opportunities for the three bodies to consider

jointly funding the military training component of the

Scheme.

PERFORMANCE AUDIT INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF GHANA ...

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