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Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of ContentAuthor(s): Derk PereboomSource: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology(1995), pp. 401-428Published by: Ridgeview Publishing CompanyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214228.

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Philosophical erspectives,, Al, Connectionism,ndPhilosophical sychology,995

CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE ANDTHE INDIVIDUATION OF CONTENTDerk PereboomUniversityf Vermont

Currentttemptso understandsychologicalontent ivide nto wofami-lies of views.Accordingoexternalistccountsuch s those dvanced y TylerBurgeand RuthMillikan,psychological ontent oes not supervene n thephysical eaturesfthe ndividualubject, ut s fixed artiallyythenatureftheworld xternaloher.' n therivalfunctionalole heorieseveloped yNedBlock andBrianLoar, content oes supervenen thephysical eaturesf theindividual,nd s, n addition,eterminedolelybythe ole tplays n the ausalnetworkfan ndividual'sensations,ehavior,ndmentaltates.2ver hepastfifteen ears, riticismf these wotypes f viewshas often ocussed ntheircapacity o individuate ontentn an acceptableway,and bothseemto bedeficientn thisrespect.A satisfactoryheorymust ndividuateontentt a level that aptureshegeneralizationsnpsychologicalxplanation ewant omake.Functionaloletheoryllows for n extremelyine-grainedpecificationfcontent,inceanydifferencen associated elief an make for differencen content. owever,thistypeof theoryeems to provideno principledriteria or ndividuatingcontentna waycoarse-grainednough o explain ow tmightemainhe amedespitedifferencesn associatedbeliefs,and thus content eterminedyfunctionalolewould eem o be incapable f sustainingheright sychologicalgeneralizations.3xternalistheories, y contrast,urnishnchors or ontentylinkinghe ognitive alueofconceptso entitiesn the xternal orld, ntitieswhich etainheirdentityhroughariationnassociated eliefs. utcritics avearguedhatnsomecasesextemalistheorieseverthelessut ontentoofinely,and furthermore,hat nother ccasions xtemalistndividuationstoocoarse.4In somecases,contentshat xtemalistheories istinguisheedto functionnthesametypeofrolefor xplainingnferencendbehavior,whereasn othersituationsontentshat heyrender quivalentmust ccountfor ignificantlydifferentatternsf inferencendbehavior.I believethatthe forceof thesecriticismsersists, espite ttemptsomitigateheirmpact, utthat heres a strategyor ndividuatingontenthatmightwellnotsuffer rom eficienciesn finenessr coarsenessfgrain.Thisapproachakes ts cue fromhe ndividuationf natural inds n sciences uch

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402 / DerkPereboomas chemistrynd biology. n these ciences, tructuraleaturesfentities lay aprominentole n characterizationsf thenatural inds f which hey remem-bers.Recent tudies n cognitivesychologyuggest hat sychologicalontentalso has various tructuraleatures.shall rgue hat hese eaturesan be appro-priated or he ndividuationfcontent,ndfurthermore,hat uch ndividuationhas a reasonable rospect f apturingundamentalntuitionsbout sychologicalexplanation, nd of providing rincipled riteria or dentity f content ndconcept.I

In psychological xplanation f inference nd behavior,propositionalattitudesuch s beliefs, esires,ndwishes ave a keyrole.Part fthe xplana-torypowerof a propositionalttitudes attributableo itsbeingthe kind ofattitudet s, for xample, tsbeing belief atherhan desire ra wish. Theremaining xplanatoryole of an attitude, y one taxonomy,s playedby itscontent,or xample, tsbeing belief hat s itraining, atherhan hat t s notraining. ut this axonomys notuniversal.n David Kaplan's semanticheory,for xample, content' efers o thepropositionxpressed y the that' clause,where heproposition ocrates s wise is the same propositions he is wise,given hatSocrates' nd he' are oreferential.5n his axonomy,esides ontentand type f attitude, propositionalttitudencludes haracter, hichncludesfeaturesfhow a subjectrepresents proposition.n Jerry odor's system,besidestypeof attitudendcontentn Kaplan's sense,propositionalttitudesinclude ehicle, he ymbol ymeansof which ne's contentsrerepresented,and functional ole, the causalrole a vehicleplays n a system f inferencepatterns.' discussion fcontent,herefore,equireshat ne setoutthedefini-tionofthenotion ne is using.Here shallbe using content'na way closelyrelated o thefirst nd broadestense discussed, s the featuresf an attitudeother han he kindof attitudet is. But as we shallsee,the distinctionshatKaplanand Fodormakeare mportant.Anyview about the content ndividuation ust sustain hecapacity fcontent o functionn thepsychologicalxplanationf individual ubjects'inferencesnd behavior.ndividuationfcontentmustbe fine-grainednoughtoaccount ordifferencesninferencendbehavior,ut tmust lso be coarse-grained nough ocapturealient imilaritiesntheproductionf nferencendbehavior romubject o subject,ndfor single ubject cross ime.7 rege'stest is stronglyvidential orfineness f grain n the intrapersonalase.8'Hesperus' nd Phosphorus'eferothe ame ntity,ut f he dentitytatementHesperus= Phosphorus ouldbe informativeor subject,hen nacceptablepsychologicalheorymustmakea distinctionetweenheconceptsHesperus'and Phosphorus' or hat ubjectsupposinghehas both oncepts), hich stosaythat n her case it mustmakea distinctionetween he contributionsocontenti.e. thecognitive alue)of these oncepts.n general,f a subject as



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Conceptual tructurendthe ndividuationf Content 403the onceptsA' and B,' and f A = B' wouldbe informativeorher, henA'and B' are differentoncepts or hat ubject, nd thusforhertheydifferncognitive alue.Let us recallwhyFrege'stestprovides trong vidence ordifferencesncontributiono contentn the ntrapersonalase. Content lays hepivotal oleinthepsychologicalxplanationf nferencend behavior.fHesperus Phos-phoruswould be an informativedentityor subject, henforthat ubjectbeliefs nd desires nvolvingheconceptHesperus'can make significantlydifferentontributionso explanationsf inferencendbehavior rom hoseinvolvingPhosphorus.'f Arianedoesnotknow hatHesperus Phosphorus,herbelief hatHesperus s a planet annot e regardeds having he ame con-tent s thebelief hat hosphoruss a planet, ecause hemight nfer hatHes-perus evolves round starfrom erbelief hatHesperuss a planet, ndyetfailto infer rom his ame belief hat hosphorusevolves round star.Andherdesire ovisitHesperusust oncecannot e countedhe ame as herdesireto visitPhosphorusust once,because upposing erdesire o visitHesperusustoncehas causedher o make rrangementso landonHesperus, hiswouldnotpreclude erfrommaking urtherlans o landon Phosphorus.hus a psycho-logical heoryhat imsto track ignificantlyifferentontributionso explana-tionsof inferencend behaviormustdistinguish riane'sconcept Hesperus'from her concept Phosphorus,'despite the fact thatthese conceptsarecoreferential.One mightworry hatFrege'stest s inadequate ecause t threatensodistinguishognitive alue whereverhere s any differencenfunctionalole,andthat hus his estwill also underminehepsychologicaleneralizationsewantto make. But thisworry an be set aside.Although, orexample, hefunctional oles ofmy conceptsfourteenays' and 'fortnight'redifferent,Frege'stestdoes not distinguishhem.My thoughtsnvolvingfortnight,'remore ikely o make me think whata quaint hought 'nd to call to mindBurge's rticleBelief ndSynonymy"han remy houghtsnvolvingfourteendays.'Butnevertheless,fortnightfourteen ays s not nformativeorme.Hence,there re differencesn functionalole whereFrege'stest will notdistinguishognitive alue.Frege's testposes a problemfor ome extemalist heories f content.Consider, or xample, he Millian ccount fproper amesdiscussed ySaulKripke, ccordingo which oreferentialroper ames re ntersubstitutablenbelief contexts alve veritate,nd makethe same contributiono semanticcontent.9n an extensionf this emantic iew to theexplanationfinferenceandbehavior,oreferentialroper ameswouldmake he amecontributionopsychological ontent.Kripke's puzzle about beliefprovidesa persistentdifficultyor uchan account, nd also, he argues, or ny theory f beliefattribution.10ierre omesto havea beliefwhichhe expressess "Londres stjolie." Bythe ules ftranslationnddisquotation,eEnglish-speakersttributeto him hebelief hat ondon spretty.ut PierreandsupinLondon,na bad



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404 /DerkPereboompart ftown, ndheacquires belief hat eexpressess "London s notpretty,"which, ythe ule fdisquotationandperhaps ranslationrom ierre'sdiolect)we attributeo himas thebelief hatLondon s notpretty. e all thewhilemaintainshebeliefLondres stjolie,' andthuswe wouldcontinueoattributetohim hebelief hat ondon s pretty.ccordingly,e attributeontradictorybeliefs o him, ut hiswould eem oinvolve mistake. heanti-Millianointof this ase is that ttributingcontradictionnbelief oPierre eemsunavoid-able ifcoreferentialroper amesmakethesame contributiono content. utKripke rgues hat hepuzzleraises problem ot ustfor Millianview,butfor ll theoriesf belief ttribution,ecause hey llwouldendorse herules ftranslationnddisquotation,nd it is notobvious hat nyother onceivablycontroversiallementsrerequiredoconstructhepuzzle.As Loar has shown, he anti-Millian ointof Kripke'spuzzle can beexpressedwithout singthenotion f contradiction.ven if we conceiveofPierreanding p in anupscalepart fLondon, ndforminghebelief hatheexpresses s "London s pretty," e couldnotcount hisnewbelief o be thesame as the beliefhe acquired n France, ince theyare not inferentiallyidentical.t seemsto follow hat oreferentialroper amesmust ometimesmakedifferentontributionsocontent." ndasAkeelBilgramirgues, oar'sargumentllowsus to see that heanti-Millianoint fKripke's ase canbeexpressedby a Fregeanpuzzle. For PierreLondres = Londonwould beinformative,ndthusforhim, heseproper amesdiffern cognitive alue.'2Hence,Frege's test provides trong vidence hatforPierre Londres' and'London'makedistinctontributionsocontent.Anotherxample f Kripke'sreveals hat n informativedentityanbeconstructedvenwhen he coreferentialroper ames rethesame whenthevehicles, n Fodor's sense,are the same). A subjectmay not realizethatPaderewskihe tatesmans identicalo Paderewskihepianist,ndthereforeheidentityaderewski Paderewksimaybe informativeor er. naddition, henthe Millian view is appliedto demonstratives,oreferentialemonstrativeexpressionsmake he amecontributiono content. urgepoints ut,however,that regean uzzlescanbe constructedotonlyfor oreferentialnd denticalproper ames, ut lsofor oreferentialnd denticalemonstrativexpressions.13This= this anbe informativef thefirstthis' is accompanied ya demon-strationfthe svelteOrsonWelles n TheLady rom hanghai ndthe econdbya demonstrationfa more orpulentWelles n Touch fEvil.Accordingly,n each of these ases,we havestrongvidence hat he woexpressionslankinghe dentityign ndicate ifferentontributionsocontent.As the Paderewski"xample hows, hedivergencencognitive aluebetweenthetwo expressions annot lwaysbe explained y a differencen vehicles.Moreover, venwhenvehicles re distinct,t is dubious hat hedistinctionbetween ehicles lwaysoreventypicallyccounts ordifferencesncognitivevalue. Plausibly, furtherontributions sometimes rovided y thebeliefsassociatedwith he xpressions.orexample,nKripke's ase,thebeliefs ierre



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationf Content 405associateswith Londres'mightwell be differentromhebeliefs e associateswith London.' Buteven if we make thismove,Kripkewouldargue hat heproblem orbeliefattributionemains nsolved.We can imagine hatmanyFrench eople have ust the nformationboutLondonthatPierre cquired nFrance,ndthat ounterfactually,heywouldbe in Pierre's redicament.etwewouldwant o makeunembellishedttributions,ike Madeleinebelieves hatLondonis pretty,'o them.So ifwe were to apply our standards orbeliefattributiononsistently,e wouldstillwant o attributeo Pierrehebelief hatLondon s pretty,ndthis s whatgenerates ripke'spuzzle.A common bjection oBurge'sviewabout ontentndividuations thattsometimes enders ontents quivalentwhen theymustexplainsignificantlydifferentatternsf inferencend behavior,nd at other imesdistinguishescontentshatmust xplainvery imilar atternsf inferencendbehavior. oillustrate,et us examine caseBurgehas used to argueforhis view.'4Alfredis a member f theEnglish-speakinginguisticndsocial community,ndhecorrectlyppliesthe termarthritis'n many ituations. ut he has recentlydeveloped pain nhisthigh,ndhehas cometo believe I have arthritisn mythigh,"ven thoughnhis communityrthritiss classified y theexpertss adisease solelyof the oints.Now imagine counterparto Alfred,who isidentical o him in everynon-intentionalndividualisticeature, ut in hiscommunityheword arthritis'eferso certain heumatoidilments,ncludingarthritis,ut lso including ertainilmentsf themuscles ndtendons, nd nthiscommunityis belief expressedn his language) I have arthritisnmythigh" s true. We English-speakersould attribute belief nvolving urconcept f arthritiswith urword arthritis'nobliqueposition) o Alfred,utnot tohiscounterpart,venthoughhere re no non-intentionalndividualisticdifferences etween them. To attribute belief in our languageto thecounterpart,e wouldhavetodevisea translation,uch s 'tharthritis,'orhistermarthritis.' ence, he ontentfAlfred's ttitude,ndmore pecifically,isconcept farthritis,s dependentotsimply n non-intentionalndividualisticfacts bouthim,but also on facts bouthissocial environment.For the hought-experimentosupporturge'sview, tmust eplausible oattributeontentsncludingheconceptarthritis'oAlfred,ustas to anexperton earth,nd to deny heconceptarthritis'f Alfred's ounterpart.utmanyreporthe ndividualistntuitionhat hebehaviornd nferencesfAlfred ndhis counterpartre explained y the samepsychologicaltates.Furthermore,althoughhedifferencesnbehavior etween lfred ndthe xpertmightome-timesbe explained y the differentarthritis'eliefs heyhold,a significantenoughdivergencen such beliefscould conceivably orceus to attributedifferentoncepts o them.For the view thatconcepts,when attributednpsychologicalxplanations,recompletelyndependentfsurroundingeliefssimplausible.'5Burge ndothers avedeveloped heorieshat isavow uch ndividualistintuitions. y aim is to developa viewthatpreserveshese ntuitions hile



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406 / DerkPereboomexplaining he onsiderationshat ull n theopposite irection,nd n additionsupplies solutiono Kripke's uzzle, ndprovides methodfcontentndivid-uation hat an sustain hepsychologicaleneralizationse want o make. ucha viewwillnot bviously nderminen externalistosition f he ort hat urgehas advocated.But it will provide n alternativeo such a position, nd itsplausibilityillderive rom he orce fthe ndividualistntuitions,ndfrom heattractive ays n which t canmeet heother esiderata f a theory f content.II

BothKripke's uzzle ndBurge's hought-experimentsepend ruciallyntakingrdinaryttributionracticeo be stronglyndicative,fnotdefinitive,fthenature f the content fan attitude. ence, n developingn alternativeotheir xternalistheories, ne might ttempto underminehisconfidencenordinaryttributionractice. ne might egin ydifferentiatingwoperspectivesfromwhichattributionsan be evaluated.Burge himself,n a discussion fFrege's viewson the sense of beliefs nvolving roper ames nd indexicals,distinguisheshe ublicfrom he sychological unctionsf attribution.hat s"communicatedhrough rdinary anguagewhen propernames, or otherindexicals reused" s distinctromwhat s required to solvetheproblemsfcognitivealue ndobliquebelief ontexts."'6ohnerry,onaldDavidson, ndMichaelDevitthave also suggested distinctionfthis ort, nd Davidson ndDevitt have argued that it can be brought o bear on Burge's thought-experiments.17evitt rgues hat n attribution,he purpose fpsychologicalexplanationan be distinguishedrom he imoflearningbout heworld:

Folk scribe houghtsot nly or sychologicalurposesut lso to earnabout heworld. hisdualpurposeaiseshe ossibilityhathe olk o notregardllthe ontentheyscribes relevanto he xplanationfbehavior.'8I shall attempto develop his ype f suggestionngreater etail.Belief ttributionsave various urposes. negoal of belief ttributionsto communicateo othersvidence boutfeaturesftheworld epresentedyabelief.Thatthis s an importantunctionf belief ttributions clear.People'sbeliefs rea significantource f evidence boutwhat hey epresent,ndpublicattributionfbeliefss animportanteans or ommunicatinghis vidence.f,however,ommunicationf evidence bout heworldsone'saim nattributinga belief o a subject, he exactwaythesubject epresentshat videncemightwell notbe pertinent.or example, ven fa subject annot istinguishlmsfrommost ther eciduous rees,nd even fshebelieves hat lms ndbeechesarethe ametype ftree,he ttributionf herbelief s "She believes hat lmsare ubject oepidemics"anstill ommunicatevidencebout lms.Despite hesubject'smeager conceptual bility, f her beliefshave certain ontextualrelationsoelms,perhapsnvolving causalchain, ttributionsf herbeliefs s



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationf Content 407being bout lmscan stillprovide vidence bout lmsto an audience.Belief ttributionas anotherundamentalurpose,hepart t plays nthepsychologicalxplanationf nferencend behavior. ndwhen his sthemaingoal,attributionilltend o havedifferentmphases hantdoeswhen he imofcommunicationfevidencebout heworld ominates.When ommunicationof evidence bout heworld s the hief im,carefullyelineatingll aspects fa subject's ttitudes aybe irrelevant.ut specifyinghenature fa subject'sattitudesery recisely aybe criticalor sychologicalxplanation,ecause heexact nature f the attitude an make a differenceor her inferencesndbehavior.Whencommunicationf evidenceabouttheworldis at issue,beliefattributionan prescind rom he detailsof the ways in whichentities rerepresented.e re belief ttributionsften it hisdescription. hen make hede re attributionf Pierre's elief,London s such hat ierre elieves t not obepretty,'hemodebywhich ierre epresentsondonmight e ofnoconcernto mebecause n attributinghis elief am nterestedainlyncommunicatingevidence boutLondon.Andthat hemode bywhich ierre epresentsondonis of no concern o me may be indicated y the fact hat n myattributioncoreferentialxpressions-areubstitutableor London' alvaveritate. oreover,althoughn de dicto ttributionselineatinghe ubject'smodeof representationis always naim, ommunicationfevidencebout heworldmight unctionsanadditional urposehere swell, ndmight ave an effectn the haracterfthe attribution. y attributionPierrebelievesthat he capitalof England spretty'maycome closeto specifyingierre's ctualmode ofrepresentationfLondon,whilePierre elieves hat he argestityn Englands pretty'oesnot,and,accordingly,ubstitutionf coreferentialxpressionsalva veritatenmyattribution ails. But neverthelesshe precedence akenby the goal ofcommunicationfevidence bout heworldmight endermy specificationffurtheretails bout hewayPierre epresentsondonunnecessary.

Let us nowreexamine ripke's uzzlewith hese eflectionsnmind.Theattributiono Pierre f he elief hat ondon sprettyancommunicatevidencethatLondon is pretty. nd further,he attributiono him of the beliefthatLondon s notprettyan communicatevidencehat ondon snotpretty.utalthoughhese ttributionsight ommunicateonflictingvidence, ndthusprovide videncefor ncompatibletates f affairs, e haveyetno reason obelieve hat here s a contradictionnthewayPierre epresentsondon.For fPierre'spsychologicaltateswere more ccuratelypecified-describedmorepreciselyhan s required or heaim of communicationf evidence bout heworld-any suchcontradictionightwelldisappear.Furthermore,istinct asks in psychological xplanationmay demanddifferentevelsofprecisionnthespecificationfpsychologicaltates. fwewant o explainwhyPierre,while still nFrance, aysto the travel gent Jevoudrais ogayer'Londres,"we cando sopartlyyattributingo him hebeliefthat ondon spretty.fwe want oexplainwhy ierre, ow nEngland,hooses



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408 /DerkPereboomto getoverhis bad moodby isteningo music atherhan y taking walk,wecan do so partly y attributingo him hebelief hat ondon snotpretty,r nFrench, ue Londresn'estpas jolie. Givenour typical xplanatorynterestsnsuch ontexts, e neednotqualify ur ttributionfthe onceptLondon' oroftheconceptLondres' o Pierre, nd ndeed o far-andthis s often hecase-psychologicalxplanationoes notdemand reaterrecisionnthe pecificationof contenthan oescommunicationf evidence bout heworld.But whenwemustexplainhow he can believeboth Londres st olie' and London s notpretty,'ur haracterizationsfPierre'sttitudes ust ecomemore etailedndprecise.n particular, oremust e said about heway n whichhe is thinkingabout ondon-his modeofpresentationfLondon.One way oaccomplishhisis to hedge ur ttributionfthe onceptLondon'by specifyinghat e hasnotrealized hat ondres London, ndthereforeierre's eliefsnvolving isuseof Londres' re nferentiallysolated romhose nvolving isuse of London.'Throughout is article,Kripkestresses he point thatthere s someterminologyhat ufficeso explain ierre's ituation. e argues, owever, hatthisdoesnot solve hispuzzle.

Butbewaref ne ource f onfusion.t sno olutionn tselfoobservehatsome thererminology,hich vades he uestion hetherierre elievesLondons pretty,ay e sufficiento statell the elevantacts...Butnoneof his nswershe riginaluestion.oes Pierre,rdoeshenot, elievehatLondons pretty?know fno nswero hisuestionhateemsatisfactory.'9As wehave seen,ourattributionfbeliefs o Pierre an communicatevidencethat ondon s prettyndevidencehat ondon snotpretty. ecan egitimatelymake uch ttributions,iven heunderstandinghat hey eflectot heprecisenature f Pierre's sychologicaltates, ut he videncebout heworld hat isbeliefs anprovide,s well as therequirementsf many asesofpsychologicalexplanation. ut inKripke'scase,psychologicalxplanationequires moreprecise pecificationf howPierre epresentsondon, ndthuswe wouldnotattribute is French elief imply s "Pierre elievesthatLondon s pretty."Rather, e wouldstress hedetails f his mode ofpresentationy hedgingnyless precise ttributions.s a result, herewill not be an unqualified es/noanswer o Kripke'squestion.Butthisraisesno intractableroblem orbeliefattribution.usts for nswers o "Was French oreign olicy esponsibleor hegeopolitical eclineof Spain in the seventeenthentury?"nd "Is the oceanblue?"an answer oKripke's uestionmust equalified. ealitys toocomplexfor impleyes/no esponseso suchquestionso be satisfactory.hecontentfPierre's ttitudes too intricate,erhaps oth n itsconceptualnd indexicalfeatures,orKripke's uestion ohave anunqualified es/nonswer.20We canalso use these bservationsoexplorenalternativenalysis ftheissues raisedby Burge'sexample.Burgeprovides oodreason o believethatordinary eliefattributions oftennon-individualisticn the sense thatour



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationfContent 409ordinaryttributionsf contentredependentn facts bout subject's hysicaland social environment.rom hisfact bout rdinaryttributionse concludesthat elief ontentshemselvesave extemalistndividuation-conditions.et us,however, ttempt o develop an accountof content hattakes seriously heindividualistntuitionshat sychologicalxplanationould equire he ognitivevalueofAlfred's ndhiscounterpart'sonceptso be the ame, ndthe ognitivevalue of Alfred's ndthe expert's oncepts o differ. ather han oncedeanexternalistosition boutcontentndividuation,e might hen nstead egardthese ntuitions s providingvidence gainst aking rdinary ttributionsdeterminativefcognitive alue. Throughoutiswritings, urge ssumes hatordinaryttributionractice ields notion f ontentdequate or sychologicalexplanation.2' ut while ordinary ttributionracticemay be adequatetopsychologicalxplanationn typical ases, tmight e that nmore hallengingcases,thosethatmore accurately isclosethereal nature f attitudeontents,ordinary ractices inadequate.Let us reexamineurge'sthought-experimento see whetherhe ntuitionsthat oppose his view can be accommodated, hile keeping n mind thedistinctionetween ttributionimedat communicationf evidence bout heworld and attributionearedto psychological xplanation.Alfred nd hiscounterpartre identicalwithrespect o all non-intentional,ndividualisticcharacteristics.lfred'sEnglish-speakingociety ses 'arthritis'o refer o arheumatoidilment fthe oints,while n thecounterpart'society his erm sused to refer otonlyto this ilment f the oints,but also to ailmentsf themuscles and tendons.Burge argues convincinglyhat we would ordinarilyattributeeliefs sing ur ermarthritis'-withoutualification-not nly o theexpert,ut oAlfredswell.Butthisfactmight e explained your nterestncommunicating,ymeans fbelief ttribution,vidence bout hefeaturesftheworld epresentedya belief, ndbythe equirementsfpsychologicalxplana-tion nmanyordinaryontexts. irst, hegoal of communicationf evidenceabout heworld hroughttributionequireshatwe use terms hat avepubliclinguisticmeanings,nd thatwe use these ermsnaccordance ith heir ubliclinguisticmeanings. nd thus hisgoal givesus reason o makeattributionsfAlfredmployinghe ermarthritis' ith tspublic inguistic eaning,ndnotusing arthritis' hile ntending linguistic eaning therhan hepublicone,orusing made-up erm ot nthepublic anguage-even fthe ermarthritis'fails to capture he nature f his concept ccurately. urther,ven thoughAlfred's nowledgef arthritisstoo limitedoprecludevenfairlylementaryerrors-measured gainstthe standard f public linguisticmeaning-thecombinationf hisconceptualnd contextualelationso arthritis ightwell besufficientor ttributionf his beliefs s being bout rthritiso communicateevidence egardingherheumatoidilmentftheoints.GivenAlfred's oncep-tualand contextualelationso arthritis,herefore,ttributionssingthe term'arthritis,'nhedged, ith tspublic inguistic eaning,mightwell be sufficientto satisfy he aim of communicationf evidence bouttheworld,even if



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410 /Derk Pereboompsychologicalxplanationould require hatwe not attributeo himthe sameconcept s the xpert.Moreover,ttributionoAlfred sing urtermarthritis,'unhedged, ould ikely e sufficientormany ases of psychologicalxplana-tion.But if we want o specifyhe nature f hisconceptmoreprecisely-andperhapswe mustdo so inorder o explain omeof thedifferencesetweenheinferencesnd behavior fAlfred ndthe expert-attributionsf ourconcept'arthritis'o Alfredmightwell have tobe qualified.Ourpredispositionodeny ttributionf ourconceptarthritis'o Alfred'scounterpartight lso be explained y theaimof communicationf evidenceaboutthe world. n his thought-experiment,urge specifies hat he publiclinguistic eaning f arthritis'n the ounterpart'sommunitys not he ameas the inguisticmeaning f arthritis'n ourcommunity.ence, o attributebeliefusingourtermarthritis'oAlfred's ounterpartouldbe to attributeohim termntendinglinguistic eaning oreigno his community.ostoftencommunicationf evidencebout heworld y ttributionsdirectedowardshesubject'sown community.ypically,herefore,ttributionsing he inguisticmeaningsf he ubject's ommunityacilitatesommunicationf videncebouttheworld,while uch ommunications frustratedy attributionsing inguisticmeanings oreigno the subject'scommunity.onsequently,ur attributionpractices stronglyisinclinedo attributeo a subject ermsntendinginguisticmeanings lien to his community,nd we are accordinglyverseto using'arthritis'with our linguisticmeaning n makingattributionso Alfred'scounterpart.evertheless,fouraim is psychologicalxplanation,urattribu-tions, ogether ith urhedgingsndqualifications,ayyet e forcedo exhibita convergencef theconcepts f Alfred ndhiscounterpart.Many philosophers,uch as Loar, Block, and Fodor,have argued hatvariation n standards f attributionndicate hatthere are two typesofcontent-wide,externalist ontent, nd the narrow contentrequiredforpsychologicalxplanationf nferencendbehavior.n theview amdevelopinghere, s inBilgrami's,ontents unitary,nd ts rue haracters most ccuratelyapproximatedn the context f psychologicalxplanation. he argumentsfBurge nd others o not, ll by themselves,howthat widecontent"ualifiesas a separate ind frealpsychologicalontent.Widecontent,"t would eem,is derivedfrom ttributionshat n partaim to facilitateommunicationfevidence bout heworld. ut his urposemighte viewed shaving tendencyto deflectheaimat truth bout he attitudesf thesubject n the nterestfcommunicatingvidenceabout the features f theworld thatthe attituderepresents.hus whenourinterests in communicationfevidence bout heworld,we attributeo Pierre hebelief hat ondon s pretty,isregardinghemore complexnature f his representationf London.In thiscase, we, asattributors,ightegardurselvess not ngaged olely nspecifyinghat s inPierre'smind-in describinghe realnature fhis attitudes-but lso bytheadditionalndpotentiallyonflictingoalofcommunicatingvidencebout hefeatures f the worldthatPierre'sbeliefs re about.When,by contrast,ur



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationf Content 41 1interestspsychologicalxplanation,urfocus s solely n Pierre's sychology,andon representingierre's ttitudesccurately,r as accuratelys the articulartask npsychologicalxplanationequires.n thispicture,herefore,ttributionof "wide content"ncorporatestendencyo representhe ontent fa subject'sattitudesmprecisely,hereaswhenourinterests psychologicalxplanation,attributions seen as approachingontents it really s.Correlatively,nthis iew t snot he ase that herere wodifferentypesof truth-conditionsor ontentttribution.hen ne aimsat communicationfevidence bout heworld, heremaybegood reasons or ttributing"content"thatdiverges rom he realnature f theattitude. uchdivergencemay havegenuine ragmaticalue,but t does not im solely t truthbout he ontent fthe ttitude. ndthus uccess n thepursuitf communicationfevidencebouttheworldmight uite eadilyonflict ith he atisfactionf he ruth-conditionsof content ttribution.incepursuit fthegoal of communicationf evidenceabout heworldhas a tendencyo motivaten impreciseharacterizationf thecontents f subjects' ttitudes,twouldbe a mistake oposit n additionalortof truth-conditionhat orrespondso thispurpose.When,by contrast,ne'squest nattributionspsychologicalxplanation,ne aimsmore irectlynd essequivocally t the truth bout subject'sattitudes,nd thereforelso at thesatisfactionf thetruth-conditionsf attribution.

Furthermore,fordinaryontentttributionerves artiallyo communicateevidence bout heworld, nd thispurpose ends o conflict ith epresentingcontent s itreally s, then oncepts s they re employed n ordinaryontentattributiono nothave externalistndividuation-conditionsf the ortwe haveexamined. or if the factorsn thought-experimentshatgeneratexternalistconclusions an be explained s a function f the goal of communicationfevidence bout theworld, nd if thispurpose eflects he aim at truthboutattitudeontents,henwe shouldnot ookto attributionsart f whosepurposeis communicationf evidence bout heworldfor he ndividuation-conditionsofconcepts. hese ndividuation-conditionsrenotbest evealed y nstances fpragmaticallyaluable ttributionractice hich asa tendencyogeneratealseattributions,utrather yattributionshat im at truthbout ttitudeontents.In summary,urobjectivewas to developa view that olvesKripke'spuzzleandexplainsheresults fBurge's hought-experimentshilepreservingthekey individualistntuitions.n thepicturewe have constructed,ttitudeattributionsave at east) wo ims, ommunicationfevidencebout heworldand psychologicalxplanation. rdinaryttributionypicallyombines othpurposes. utordinaryttributioneednotberegardedsunequivocallyendingto accuracy boutthenature fattitudes.or whilethegoal ofpsychologicalexplanationnclines osubservingruthnattribution,he urposef ommunica-tion f evidence bout heworldhas a tendencyo deflecthe im attruthboutattitudes.naddition, sychologicalxplanationypicallyoesnotrequiremaxi-mal precisionn specificationf attitudes. hus theordinaryttributionsfKripke'spuzzleandBurge'sthought-experimentseednotbe viewed s repre-



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412 /Derk Pereboomsenting ttitudesccurately. onsequently,heremightwell be room for heconcepts fAlfred nd his counterparteing he ame, nd perhapslso for heconcepts fAlfred nd the expert eing different,nd Pierre'sbeliefsmightreallynotbe puzzling fter ll.III

Ouraccountmust owprovide method or ontentndividuationhat ansupport hepsychologicaleneralizationse want o make.Let us first onsiderthecausal theories, eveloped y Dretske,Millikan,nd Fodor,which upplymethod or ontentndividuationhathas becomeprominentnrecent ears.22The common lement n thesecausal theoriess that he cognitive alue orpsychological eaning frepresentationss provided y ntitiesrpropertieshatcausethem. ausal theories ifferntheir ays fhandling hat s perhaps heirdeepest ifficultly,hedisjunctionroblem, hich asbeenoutlinedy Fodor.23To illustrate,cow' representationsre causednot only by cows but also bybushes n darknights, nd thus simple ausaltheory ouldhave cow' meannot ust cow but rather ow orbush-or-a-dark-night.he disjunctionroblemforces ausal theories oprovide way of selectingheright ausesfrom ll thepossiblecauses of a representation.n Millikan'stheory,heright auses aresingled ut bythenotion f proper iological unction.n one statementf thisview, the contentf a belief s C just in case therole that eliefs f this ypeplay, whenthemechanismshat roduce hisbelief re fulfillingheir roperfunctionss determinedyevolutionaryiology,nvolves eing ausedbyC's.24In Fodor'sasymmetricalependenceheory,cow' means ow andnotcoworbush-on-a-dark-nightecause cow' tokens recaused by things n virtue fbeing ows, ndthe xistencef cow' tokens ausedby thingsnvirtuef theirbeingbushes n dark ights epends nthe xistence f cow' tokens ausedbythingsnvirtue f theireing ows, ndnotvice-versa. odor's dea sthat hereis a hierarchyf causal dependencemongcauses of tokensof a mentalrepresentation-type,ndthepropertyhatpecifieshepsychological eaningrcognitive alueof that epresentations causallymostfundamental.Manydifficultiesave beenraisedfor ach of these heories.25problemfromheperspectivef someonewayed y ndividualistntuitionss that ausaltheories ould eem oacquiesce oBurge's nalysis fhisthought-experiments.For example,by a causal theory,he arthritis'oncepts f Alfred nd hiscounterpartouldhave to differ,incetheir xternal-worldausesdiffer-thediseasecalled "arthritis"n earths not the same disease as the disease called"arthritis"n twin arth.n addition,he arthritis'oncepts f Alfred nd theexpert ould eem o be identical,omatter owdifferenthe ssociated eliefswere, s long s these oncepts ere ausedbythe amedisease.Causaltheories,therefore,eemunable opreservehe ndividualistntuitions.A furtherroblemor ausal heories ould oncernnyone, hetherrnother ntuitionsre ndividualist.neofthemajordifficultiesor ausalviews s



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationfContent 413that hey ail oaccommodatehe esultsf Fregeanests. oar's revised ersionofKripke'spuzzleabout elief s especiallyllustrativeere.Pierre cquires hebelief Londres stjolie' in France, ndthen andsup in a prettyart fLondon,wherehe acquires hebeliefLondon s pretty,' ithoutealizinghat ondres= London.By Frege's test,his conceptLondres' s distinctorm is concept'London.' Psychologymusthold them istinct,ecause hey laysignificantlydifferentoles nPierre'snferencesnd n theproductionf his behavior. uttheir auses might e preciselyhesame-indeed, theviews of London thatcaused the Londres'conceptmight e thevery ame as those hat aused the'London' concept.26Fodor proposes o handle his bjection ysaying hat lthoughhebeliefcontents f Pierre'sbeliefs Londres st olie' and Londonis pretty're thesame,nonethelesshebeliefs iffer.27enceFodorhopes oretain causal heoryofcontent, hile schewing causal theory fbelief.As we haveseen,Fodor'sview is that a belief s a functionf fourfactors, ypeof attitude,ontent,vehicle, nd functionalole.According ohis analysis f Kripke'spuzzle,thecontentsndtype fattitudef Pierre's wo beliefs re the ame,whereas heirvehicles, rthefunctionalolesof their ehicles, iffer.Such a solutionwould be satisfactory,f, amongother hings, odorprovided s with n account f the ndividuationfvehicles ndtheir unctionalrolesthatwouldsustain lausible eneralizationsn psychologicalxplanation.But surprisingly,odor rgues hat sychologicalxplanationan dispensewithvehicleand functional ole,and embrace nlycontentn his ownsense and,presumably,ype f attitude.28odorhopes to excludevehicles ndfunctionalrolesfrom sychologicalxplanationreciselyn order o avoidtheirmessyindividuation-conditions,hileheretainsausallyndividuatedontentndtypeof attitude ecause heir ndividuation-conditionsre essproblematic.imitedby the resources f typeof attitudend contentn Fodor's sense,however,psychology ill be unable o explain hedifferencesn inferencend behaviorthat merge rom ierre's ailure o identifyondon ndLondres.By Fodor'scharacterizationfcontent,he ontentsfPierre's eliefsLondres stjolie' and'London is pretty' re the same,and they hereforelay the same role inpsychologicalxplanation.odor doeshave elementsn his theoryhat ouldexplain hedifferencesn inferencend behavior esultingrom ierre's ailuretoidentifyondon ndLondres. utsincehelacks waytospecify hen heseelementsre the ameandwhen hey redifferent,istheoryails o solveoneofthe fundamentalroblems or ccounts fpsychologicalxplanation.One ofthe main reasonswhy heoristsave beendrawn o causalviewsabout ontents toprovide theoryhatmeets herequirementsfnaturalism,and causal theoriesre regardeds sufficientlyaturalisticn virtue f theircapacityoincorporateeductionism.utnaturalistequirements,believe, anbemetwithoutny ype f reductionism.nmyview,furthermore,eductionisttheoriesfcontenthould erejectedor he eason hat hey annotndividuatecontent ith heaccuracy equired orpsychologicalxplanation.While will



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414 / Derk Pereboomnot arguefor his general laim here, t is well-illustratedy one of Fodor'scounterexampleso Millikan'sbiological heory f thecontent f desires.

According o Millikan'sview, the content f a desire s provided y itsproper iologicalfunction.n one formulationf her ccount, he content f adesire s C just in case the role that desiresof this type play, when themechanisms hatproduce his desire are fulfillingheirproperfunctionssdeterminedy evolutionaryiology, s to cause the organism o secureC's.29Fodor's counterargumentxaminesour desire for sweets. By evolutionarybiology's account f the proper unction f the mechanismshatproduce hedesire or weets, herole of thisdesire s to get heorganismo ingest ugars.Consequently,n Millikan's heory,hedesire or weetss correctlyescribedas a desirefor ugars.But the desirefor weets s satisfied y saccharine ndNutra-Sweet,nd thus, hecontent f thedesire or weets s ust what t seemsto be, for sweets, nd notfor sugars. The content f the desirefor sweets,therefore,annot e derived rom ts proper iologicalfunction.30Millikanmight espond hat hedesire or weetsmight eally e thedesirefor ugars espite odor'scounterexample,ecause hepossibilityf a desire orA being atisfied y somethinghat nly ppears o be A provides o reason obelievethat hedesire s really or omethinghat ppears o be A. The desirefor omethingweet eing atisfied y Diet Coke which ontains utra-Sweet)ismuch ike a desire or Vermeer ainting eing atisfied y a van Meegerenforgery.hedesire or heVermeereing atisfiedytheforgeryoesnotmeanthat hedesire or Vermeers reallyusta desire or paintinghat ooks ikea Vermeer. ence, hepossibilityf oursystem's eingfooled y Nutra-Sweetis not adequate eason o reject hebiological ccount f desire ontent.One oddconsequencef his esponses that espite ppearances,iet Cokereallyfailsto satisfyhe desirefor weets, ust as theforgeryeallydoesn'tsatisfyhedesire or Vermeer. his s counterintuitive,erhaps ecause fonewere sked f one's desire or weetswas satisfied ftert was pointed utthattheDiet Coke one ustconsumedontained osugars, nemight ellsay "yes,"whereasfone were sked fone's desire or Vermeer as satisfiedftertwaspointed utthat hepaintingne ust acquireds a forgery,newould ay"no."Thisprovides eason o believe hat odor's "desire or weets" ase is notoneofbeingfooledby appearances.But furtherounterexampleight rovemore onvincing.y evolutionarybiology'saccount ftheproper unctionsfthemechanismshat roduce hedesire or ex,theroleof thisdesire s togetthe ubject oreproduce.husonMillikan's ccount, esire or ex must ctually e thedesire or eproduction.An unintuitiveonsequence f thisview s that esire or ex would notreallybe satisfiednless eproductionere ttained. nemight oldoutfor he laimthat esire or ex sonly pparentlyatisfied hen eproductionsnot chieved,butthisview s farfrom lausible.At theroot f thedifficultyorMillikan'sview s that esire or explaysa role npsychologicalxplanationhats systematicallyifferentromherole



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationf Content 415playedby desire or eproduction,espite hefact hat he volutionaryurposeof thedesirefor ex is to get the organismo reproduce. his problem, nemight ote, s generatedotby assumingntrinsicntentionality,r supposingprivilegedntrospectiveoint fview, r assuminghat ausalpowers annot erelationallyndividuated,ut solelyby reflectionn the actual practice fpsychologicalxplanation. nd thus herelation etween volutionaryiologyand psychologys not as close as Millikanmakes t out tobe. Evolution anachieve tsaimsby grantings a systemf beliefs nd desires-a psychology.But thispsychologys significantlyndependentf evolutionaryheoryor heindividuationf tskinds. nthecase ofsexualdesire,we form desirenotforreproduction,utfor he ntimacynd ensoryleasuresssociated ith ex.Thisstrategys perhaps betterway for volution o secure eproductionhanbyhaving s form desire oreproduceerse. Similarly,iven urnatural nviron-ment, desire or he ensory leasure rovided ysweet astesmaywellbe amore fficient aytomakeus ingest ugars hanwoulda desire or ugars erse, especiallyfthis lternative ould nvolve epresentingheirhemicaltruc-ture.nboth ases,psychologicalontentannot e determinedy evolutionarybiological onsiderationslone.These reflectionsuggesthat t s advantageouso regardndividuationfpsychologicalontents argelyndependentf volutionaryiological onsidera-tions.A reductionistvolutionaryiological heoryeemsunable o individuatepsychologicaltateswith he accuracy equired orpsychologicalxplanation.More generally, favor he nonreductiveiew according o whichcontentindividuations largelyndependentf all morebasic scientificheories.3'nrecent apers, tephentich nd MichaelTyehave argued onvincinglyhat henonreductivetrategyan be applied o a theoryfcontent.32heymaintain,correctly,believe, hat or ontento be naturalistic,t neednotbe reduced othenon-intentional,or fpsychology eets he riteriaf a true cientia n itsownright,ndthe ntitiestposits reconstitutedyentitiesverwhich hysicsquantifies, orriesbout ts naturalisticredentialsanbe laidto rest.IV

If one wishes o reject he variouswell-knownxternalisms,uch as theviews ofBurge ndMillikan,nd fonewants oprovidedequate oundationsforpsychology,ne must rovide eason o believe hat satisfyinglternativetheoryfpsychologicalontentndividuations inthe ffing.xternalistheoriesprovide workable,lthougherhapsmperfectheoryf contentndividuation,andifone hasno indication fa betterption,t would be bestto appropriatesomeformfexternalismespitets ounterintuitiveeatures.sychologysverylikely o require omemethod f contentndividuation,nditmight avetosettle or hebestoneavailabledespitemperfections.shallargue hat heresa promising lternativeo the foremost xternalistheories, nd thatthisalternativehat oesnot ufferrom hedifficultiesaced ythefunctionalole



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416 /Derk Pereboomtheories hathavebeen advanced.According o functionalole theories,he content f a mental tate s afunctionf theperceptualnputs, ehavioralutputs,ndthe thermental tatesto which he tates causally elated. hemainproblem or his ype f view sthat tappears o ack nyprinciplednd atisfying ethod or lassifyingoken-distinct sychologicaltates s having he same content.My belief hat t israining ikelyhas a somewhat ifferentausal role thanyourbelief hat t israining, nd so functionaloletheorymightwell class them s beingbeliefs fdifferentypes.But this methodof individuation recludes he kinds ofgeneralizationsn psychologicalxplanationhatwe want omake.A strategyor ontentndividuationithin frameworkhat ejects ertainwell-knownxternalismsas recentlyeendeveloped yBilgrami. ccordingohis proposal, he ognitive alue of a subject's oncept s individuatedolelybythebeliefs ssociatedwith hat oncept.33is strategy,s hehimself oints ut,musthavethe resources o solvethree roblems.34he first f thesewe havealready explored:A theoryn which the cognitive alue of a concept sindividuatedolelybythebeliefs ssociatedwith he onceptat a time)will cutcognitive aluetoofinely,incewhen ognitivealue s determinedn thiswayitwill not sustain lausiblepsychologicaleneralizations.econd, f all of asubject's ssociated eliefswere elevanto individuatinghe ognitive alue ofa concept, nychangenbeliefwould mounto a changenthe ognitive alueofa concept.And f ny hangenbeliefwould mount o a changencognitivevalue, hen subject ouldnotdeepen rbroaden ergrasp fanyoneconcept.Third,fthe ognitivealueof a conceptweredeterminedyassociated eliefs,then concepts hatthese beliefs nvolvewould constitutehe psychologicalmeaning although erhapsnot the linguisticmeaning) f thatconcept, ndhence, heywouldbe analytic f t in one traditionalense).35 theoryf thissort, herefore,ould seem to reintroduce version ftheanalytic/syntheticdistinction,hich, orQuinean easons,might e unappealing.

Bilgrami roposesosolvethese roblemsyanappeal o context. nly nsome abstractense s thecognitivealue for ometerm ndividuatedyall ofthe ubject's eliefs ssociatedwith t. n any pecific ituation,he ontext illselect a subset fthosebeliefs o determinehecognitive alue for heterm.Alfred ndtheexpertmay hare hebelief hatAlfred'smother as arthritisnherfingers,npart ecause n the ontextf attributionllofthebeliefs elevanttoindividuatinghe ognitivealueforarthritis'repossessed yboth ubjects.In addition, hangeof belief s possiblewithout hangeof cognitive aluebecausethe beliefs hat context esignates s relevant o individuatinghecognitive alue for termmaynot nclude hose hat hange.36inally, incedistinct eliefs re selected o provide hecognitive alue or psychologicalmeaning ora termn differentontexts,t couldwell be thatno particularconcepts rovide hepsychological eaning or term n all contexts,nd thusnoparticularonceptswouldbe analyticf a term.37Bilgrami oes not ellusinanydetail, owever,owcontextmight lay he



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationfContent 417rolehe envisions,or xample, owcontextndicates hich eliefs fAlfredndthe doctorwould be relevanto individuatinghecognitive alue for heterm'arthritis.'hedetails fhis contextualheoryre mportant,ecause heywouldconstituteheprincipleshat etermineowgeneralizationsnpsychologyre obe made, and how cognitivevalue can remain tabledespite variationnassociated eliefs. he seriousnessf theproblem ecomes learwhenwebringto mind hat theoryfattribution,t minimum, ustmeet worequirements.First, t must lluminate,ather hanmerely educe o, our intuitionsboutattributionnparticularases.Second, he heorymust e testable gainst uchparticularntuitionsboutattribution.f,however, ilgrami ails to provideprincipleshat pecify herelationsetweenontextsnd attributions,he heorydoes indeedthreateno reduce o ourintuitionsbout particularases. If heinsists hatneverthelesshe heory oes morework han uch ntuitionso,buthe suppliesno principles hat specify he relations etweencontexts ndattributions,e will haveno clearway ofdistinguishingetween he deliver-ancesofthe heorynd our ntuitions. nd fwe cannotmake hese istinctions,wewillhavenowayoftesting hetherhe heorys true.It s doubtful,owever,hat heprinciplesilgrami eeds o supplementiscontextualheoryan be provided. erhaps herelationsetween ontextsndattributionsremuch oo complex o be formulatedna usefulway. Onemightthus rgue hat contextualccountwithouteneral rinciplesor ndividuationof contentmight e thebest heory vailable.But oneshould gree hatftherewere theoryhat upplied uchprinciples,hen herewouldbe somereason ofavor uch a view.V

Practices n othersciences suggesta more promising trategy orindividuatingontent.Whenwe classify ntities s members f the same ordifferentinds nchemistryndbiology,weoftenook to structuraleaturesfthese ntities. he stuffn streamsnd thestuffn oceans s of thesametypebecause thasthe amechemical tructure. econsider ifferentuman eingsto bemembers f thesamespeciespartly ecauseofsimilar enetic tructure.Recentwork n cognitive sychologyndicateshatmany oncepts lso havestructurefvarious orts, ndconsequentlyheremight e a basis,similar othose nother ciences, or valuating uestionsbout ameness nddifferenceof these concepts, nd also of the content f which these conceptsarecomponents.nthe ast wodecades, ignificantnsightnto onceptualtructurehas been achieved.But muchmore emainso be done, ndaccordingly,hatfollows s notmeant o constituten actual heoryfcontentndividuation,utrather suggestionor hedirectionucha theorymight ake.Conceptualtructureill bevaluable orndividuatingonceptsndcontentif from mongthe beliefsassociatedwitha concept t provides way ofselecting ome as moreweightyhan others. ince concepts re essentially



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418 /Derk Pereboomconnected ith complex f abilities hat ncludes lassification,dentification,and recognition,nemight imto isolate heassociated eliefs hat remostsalient or hese bilities.Cognitive sychologistsave recently rguedforwhat has come to beknown s psychologicalssentialism.38This is not the view that hings aveessences,but rather hat our representationsf thingsof some kinds arestructuredy beliefs f them s having ssences.Accordingo this heory,heseexperimentallydentifiableeliefs lay a muchmore mportantart han thersin our classificationfsuchthings. or example,manynatural ind ndsomeartifactonceptsre structuredy an assumptionhat nternal ropertiesf thethings alling nder hoseconcepts re causallyresponsible ortheir urfaceproperties,nd hat hesenternalropertiesremore mportanthan heir urfaceproperties orthe things eingwhatthey re.Hence, whenwe classify uchthings,heirnternalropertiesave muchmore nfluentialunctionncarryingout hese asks han otheir urface roperties.ometimesctual onceptsftheinternal ropertieslay hecrucial art n the tructureftheconcept, utoftena placeholder conception, ike 'whatever he experts elieve to cause thesymptomsfthedisease alled arthritis"'r whatevernternalropertieseallycause thesymptomsf thediseasecalled "arthritis"'as thedecisive ole.39One of themost ignificanteaturesf psychologicalssentialisms thattprovides principlednd empiricallyestableway to determine hichbeliefsplay the centralrole in structuringertain oncepts.Let us consider woexamples.noneexperimenterformedySusanGelman nd HenryWellman,four- ndfive-yearlds wereaskedfor tems ikedogs and cars whetherheirinsides or their utsideswere more mportantor being what they re. Forexample, heywere sked oconsider hefollowingituations:Whatfyoutakeout thestuffnside dog,theblood and bones nd thingsike that ndgotridof it andall youhaveleft rethe outsides?" nd"What fyoutake the stuffoutside f thedog, youknow, hefur nd gotridof tandall youhave eft rethe nsides?"Theywere asked two kindsof questions boutthe transformedentity,n identityuestionike"Is it still dog?"andafunction uestion uchas "Can it stillbark nd eatdog food?"Forthe dentityuestion, 2% oftheresponsesndicated hat heentitysno longerwhat twas when he nsides reremoved, hile35% indicatedhat t s no longerwhat twas when heoutsidesare removed. 2% indicated hat hefunctionsre lostwhen theinsides reremoved,9% when he utsidesreremoved.40xperimentsf his ort rovideevidence hatyoung hildren's onceptionsf internalropertiesfdogs andcars-despitetheir ack of detailed nowledgef these roperties-playmorecrucial ole nclassifyinguch hingshan o conceptionsf surface roperties.Inanothertudy, elman ndWellman oldfour-yearldsabout nanimalthat was brought p in an environmentuited to a differentpecies,andquestionedhechildrenn order o determinehetherhey elieved he nimaldevelopednnate otentialities,r nstead isplayedhe ropertiesssociated iththeenvironmentfupbringing.orexample, hey sked bout cow whowas



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationfContent 419raisedby pigswhather mature hysical eatures ould be like,forexamplewhether er ailwouldbe straightr curly, ndwhathermature ehaviorwouldbe like,for nstancewhetherhewould ay "moo"or "oink."Overall, hildrenanswered n thebasis of nnate otential 5% ofthe ime. xperimentsike hisprovide vidence hatyoungchildren's onceptionsf internal ropertiesfanimals iguremore rominentlyn nferencesbout ategory embership-howit is to be classified-than o conceptionsf environmentnd nurture.41Ifpsychologicalssentialisman be established,hen rom mong hemanybeliefs ssociatedwith ertain ypes f entities, e can experimentallysolatecoregroupthat s most significantor classification. ne shouldnote thatpsychologicalssentialismoesnot pecifyhat he nly eliefs tthe ore f hestructurefa concept, ven fornatural ind oncepts,re about ssences. sy-chological ssentialism arks nly hebeliefs speciallymportantor ne typeof conceptualbility, lassification.imilar esearchmight e carried ut forother bilities ssociatedwith oncepts,uch as identificationndrecognition,anditmight eveal pecific ypes f core beliefs onnected ith hese bilitiesas well.In addition, ot every lassificatoryoncept as the ort f psychologicalessentialisttructuree haveencountered.unctionaloncepts, or xample, renot likely to involve supposition f an internal ssence that is causallyresponsible or surface roperties.ut at the core of the structuref suchconceptswe mightwell find belief bout a functionalefinitionr about acorrespondinglaceholderonception.tthe ore f he onceptcarburetor' emightdiscover he beliefthata carburetors a device thatmixes air withgasolinefor nternal ombustion,nd for hosewho cannotproduce uch adefinition,emight ind hebelief hatneverthelesshere s a definitionorcarburetornd thatmechanics nowwhat t s.Butstill, sychologicalssences fthe ort hatGelman ndWellman aveinvestigatedrovide paradigmor ndividuatinghe ognitivealueofconceptsbystructuraleatures.y appealing o similaritiesnddifferencesnthe coregroupof beliefs ssociatedwithcertain onceptswe can udge thecognitivevalueof various nstantiationsf these onceptso bethe ameor different.hekindsof testsGelman,Wellman nd others ave developed an be used toconfirmypothesesbout imilaritynconceptualtructureothwithin ersonsover time and acrossdifferentersons. sychologicalssentialism,herefore,provides s with good example fthetype fstructureconceptmayhave,a modelfor ndividuatinghe ognitivealueofconcepts ysuch tructure,ndempirical roceduresor eterminingtructuralntra-nd nterpersonalimilarity.

Furthereflectionndicates ow individuationf thecognitive alue ofconceptsby their tructuraleaturesmight lluminatehe threedifficultiesBilgrami aisesfor heories hatndividuateontentyassociated eliefs: irst,theproblemffindingmethodor voidingndividuationfcontenthat s toofine-grained,nd,morebroadly,ffinding method or ndividuatingontentin ustthe ight ay; econd, he pecterf osing hedistinctionetweenhange



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420 / DerkPereboominbelief ndchange nmeaning;nd hird,he hreatfreintroducingnalyticity.On thefirstssue, ndividuationyconceptualtructureemedies unctionalrole theory'sack of a principlednd satisfying ethod or lassifyingoken-distinct sychologicaltates s having he amecontent.We might ndorse, orexample, heprinciple hat eliefs bout ssential ropertiesarrymoreweightfor ndividuationhando beliefs bout ccidental roperties,s well as similarprinciples erived rom studyf dentificationndrecognition.uppose, hen,that wo scientists re thoroughlynowledgeablebout arthritis,ut yetthefunctionaloles f heirarthritis'oncepts ifferomewhat.We canneverthelessattributehesameconcept o them t least n partbecausethey gree on thedefining ropertiesf arthritis,nd theyuse a similar etof core beliefs oidentifyndrecognize rthritis.Individuationyconceptualtructureanalso help ccount or he ntuitionthat,nBurge's ase,psychologicalxplanationouldrequirehatAlfred ndtheexpert e attributedistinctarthritis'oncepts. upposethatAlfred as somebeliefs bout rthritis,utdoesnotknow ts defining roperties.e also hasaplaceholder onception onstitutedy the belief that arthritiss a diseasecharacterizedy whatever nternal ropertiesxplainthesymptoms f whatpeople nhis society all "arthritis".n addition, e has somefalsebeliefs boutarthritis,ndhe lacks significanteasure f thebeliefs hatwould nablehimto identifynd recognize rthritist the expert evel. In this situation,hedifferenceetween hecore tructureshat unctionnAlfred'snd theexpert'sconceptions f arthritismightwell be significantnough to constitutedistinctionn theirconcepts'cognitive alue. Individuationy conceptualstructureight,herefore,istinguishetweenoncepts'ontributionso contentwhere ome externalistiewswouldprescindrom uch difference.ndthusthismethod otentiallyrovides betterccount f certain ey ntuitionsboutthekinds fgeneralizationse needto make npsychologicalxplanation.In addition,ndividuationy conceptualtructurean also account or heintuitionhat nBurge's ase,psychologicalxplanationouldrequirehat lfredandhiscounterparte attributedhe ame arthritis'oncepts.uppose gain hatAlfred nd his counterparto notdiffer ithrespect o anynon-intentionalindividualisticeature. othbelievethat heword arthritis'efers o certainrheumatoidilments otonlyof theointsbut lso of themuscles nd tendons.Both acka significantroportionfthebeliefshatwould nable hem,n theirrespectiveocietiesnd nvironments,oclassify,dentify,ndrecognizerthritisat the xpertevel.And eachhasa placeholderonceptionhat e would xpressas "a disease haracterizedywhatevernternalropertiesxplain he ymptomsof whatpeople in my society all "arthritis"." nderthesecircumstances,individuationy tructuraleaturesfconcepts ould uthorizettributionfthesame arthritis'oncepts oeach,despite hefact hat hestandardsfordinaryattributionracticewouldprevents from oing o.But how couldan attributionracticendicate he imilarityntheir eliefcontents?twouldbemisleadingo do so by attributingoeachtheunqualified



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationf Content 421beliefthat he has arthritisn his thigh.For as we have argued, lthoughattributingo Alfred he beliefthathe has arthritisn his thighwould bewarranted y ordinary ractice,t mightwell be mistakeno take it as anaccurate eportf his attitude.o capture lfred's oncept recisely, e mightneed to hedge ur attributions we ust did,byspecifyinghat lthough lfredhas such ndsuch placeholderonception,elacks significanteasure fthebeliefs t thecore of the arthritis'oncept.'And thus he similarityn theirattitude-contentsould notbe captured ccuratelyy attributingo each theunqualified elief hathe hasarthritisn his thigh.Butperhapsttributingoeach qualifiedarthritis'oncept,n a single an-guage,mightndicate he imilarityccuratelynough. or hepurposes fcom-municationf evidence bout heworld t wouldnotbe pragmaticallyaluableto attributeo Alfred r to his counterpartconcept n a language hat heaudience-typically is owncommunity-does ot speak. But if we prescindfrom hatpurpose, he peculiarityanishes. or the purpose f psychologicalexplanation, e mayneedto attributehe same concept o Alfred nd hiscounterpart,ndthere ouldwellbe differentanguages ywhich o characterizethat oncept.These claims have implicationsor the truth-conditionsf beliefs. nBurge'sview, he ontent fAlfred's elief,which ne might rdinarilyxpressby thathehas arthritisnhis thigh,'makes contributionoa truth-conditionthatscontext-dependentnly or he ndexicalomponentspecifiedy he' and'his.' But ifwe suppose hat hebeliefs f Alfrednd his counterpartave thesamecontent,ndthatAlfred's elief s falsewhereas he ounterpart'ss true,then hetruth-conditionf Alfred's elief annot e context-dependentnly othisdegree.Fornothinglse besides context-dependentlement f thetruthconditions fthe wobeliefs ouldmake hedifferencen their ruth-values,ndwhatmakes hedifferencenthese ruth alues s independentf he ontributionofthe ndexicalshe' and his.' It clearlywouldhave to be thecontributionotruthonditionsf arthritis,'r whatever ords rphrases ccupy hepositionofthistermn an accurate ttribution,hatmakesfor headditional ontext-dependencen thetruthonditions.A goodcandidate or context-sensitiveomponentn Alfred'sarthritis'concept s theplaceholderonception.n theplaceholderonceptiona diseasecharacterizedy whatevernternal ropertiesxplainthe symptomsfwhatpeople nmy ociety all "arthritis"'heres indeed context-sensitivelement.ForAlfred,hedescriptionwhatpeople nmy ocietyall"arthritis"'ill referto the disease called "arthritis"n English,whereasforthecounterparthisdescription illrefer o thediseasecalled"arthritis"ntwin-English.r iftheplaceholderonceptionmakes xplicit eferenceoexperts,n Alfred's oncep-tiontheterm theexperts'will refer o theexperts n earth,whereas n thecounterpart'sonceptionhe ermtheexperts'willreferothe xpertsntwinearth.Hence,conceptshatnBurge'sscheme o not ntroduceontext-depen-dence nto ruthonditions o introduceuch ontext-dependencen theviewwe



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422 /DerkPereboomare considering.Let us nowturnothe econddifficultyilgrami aises. fa concepts toretaintscognitivealuedespite hangenassociated eliefs,ome nchormustbe available o provide tabilityor ognitive aluewhen uch change ccurs.The reason hat unctionalole heoriesavefailed osupplyuch nchorss thattherequired istinctionsmong hebeliefs ssociatedwith concept-distinc-tions hatwould llowsomeofthese eliefs oplay moreprominentole hanothersndetermininghecognitive alueof a concept-havenotbeenmade na principled ay.Butpsychologicalssentialism'slluminationfclassification,and similar esults ordentificationndrecognition,ould llowfor rincipleddistinctionsasedonconceptualtructure.fwe individuatehe ognitivealueof a concept ycorebeliefs,hen t canremainhe ame despite hange n thebeliefs therhan hose t the ore.Change fcognitivealuewouldoccur nlywhen hange ccurs nthebeliefs tthecoreoftheconcept's tructure.The third roblem ilgrami oints ut s thatndividuatinghecognitivevalueof a concept ythebeliefs fthe subject isksmaking ertainonceptsanalytic f that oncept.And indeed, ndividuationn accordwith tructuralfeaturesikethoseposited y psychologicalssentialismntails hisresult, orconceptsnvolvednbeliefs ound tthecoreofa conceptwouldconstitutetspsychologicalmeaning,ndwould, nonesense, e analyticf t. Butas HilaryKornblithoints ut, his dmission oesnot ontraveneheQuinean ppositiontoanalyticity.42uine'soppositionocusses nthe onnectionetween nalytic-ityand apriority,utthetypeof investigationntothe structuralore of aconceptwe have considereds decidedlympirical.n theviewwe have beendeveloping,onceptualnalysiss a significantnd fruitfulroject, ut t doesnotmanifesthe bjectionableeatureshat re hallengedyQuine'sarguments.Thus we can see how an appealto conceptualtructure ight olvethekindsofproblemshat risefor theoryfcontentnwhich ndividuationyassociated eliefs lays centralole.An account fthiskindprovidesriteriafor onceptualdentitynd difference,llowsus todistinguishetweenhangeof psychologicalmeaning nd changeof belief, nd showshow a theory fcontentan accommodate plausible otion fanalyticity.rejectionfrecentexternalistiews aboutcontent,herefore, ightwell be compatiblewithapsychologyhat s plausible, rincipled,ndempirical.Let us now considerwoobjectionsotheviewwehavebeendeveloping.First, ne might rguethat he belief ttributionsade in thepsychologicalessentialistxperimentshemselvesave spurposesoth sychologicalxplana-tion ndcommunicationfevidencebout heworld.Andthus hese ttributionscannot e assumed o indicate sychologicalontentnequivocally.Muchthatmay eemtobe ofpsychologicalnterestnthese ttributionsay ubservehegoal ofcommunicationfevidence bout heworld, ndnot ofpsychologicalexplanation,ndhence, ymyownconjecture,heymaydeflecthe imattruthaboutpsychologicalontent. onsequently,have not shown hat theoryfpsychologicalontentan avail itself ftheclaimsaboutconceptualtructure



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationf Content 423made by theoristsike Gelman ndWellman.But thisobjection s mistaken.As becameclear in our discussion fKripke'spuzzle,our attributionsight im mainly) t one goal ratherhan heother, nd differencesn purposewill result n differencesn attribution.incethedominanturpose f thepsychologicalssentialistxperimentss to provideinstrumentsor explaining nferencend behavior, nd not to communicateevidence boutthe objectsused in the experimentso an audience,we havereason o believe hat he ttributionsn the xperimentsre aimed t specifyingpsychologicalontent. oreover,t sdifficulto see how the rucial eaturesfthe experiments,orexample, heattributiono thechildren f theview thatinternal ropertiesf animals remore mportanthan urface ropertiesorbeing what they are, mightbe understood s a function f the aim tocommunicatevidence bout hese nimals o an audience. he mplausibilityfthisconjecture rovides urthereason o take thecrucial ttributionsn thepsychologicalssentialistxperimentso illuminateealpsychologicalontent.A furtherbjectionerives romnanti-individualistrgumentor rototypetheory eveloped yBernard obes.43 obes points ut hat,n general,sychol-ogyaims to explainnotonlybehavior, utalso a subject's lassificatoryuc-cesses ndfailures. ut,he argues,his ormativeimensionannot efacilitatedif a concept's angeof correctpplications explained olely n terms f theindividualubject's rticulationsnd dispositions. subject's rticulationsnddispositionsreoften nsufficientor pecifyingherange f correctpplicationof theconceptshehas,while he s yet ommittedo there eing uch rangeof correctpplication.his backgroundommitment,hen, hould eadus to fixtherange f her oncept's pplicationon-individualistically:it s fixed n partbythesubject'snaturalndsocialenvironment.""Thisobjectionransfersasily o the sychologicalssentialistiewwe havebeen onsidering:lthoughhe rticulationsnddispositionsf he ubjectsnthepsychological ssentialistxperimentsre insufficiento specify herangeofcorrectpplicationf their oncepts,hese ubjects reyetcommittedo therebeingsucha range.We must hereforendividuatehesubjects' oncepts on-individualistically,nd we arethus ed backto anexternalistccount f the ortBurgehas advocated. ut, nreply,heres an account ftherange fcorrectapplicationftherelevantoncepts orwhich he rticulationsnddispositionsof thesubjectdo suffice. or the commitmentf thesubjects o a rangeofcorrect pplication,nd the deference o experts nd to the worldthat hiscommitmentnvolves,will be reflectedn sucharticulationsnddispositions.Thiscommitmentanbeexplainedythe ort fplaceholderonception e havebeendiscussing. placeholderonceptionoes not pecifyherange fcorrectapplicationnthewaythat completedciencewould, utrather ith he idofconceptionsike whatever heexperts elieveto cause thesymptomsf thedisease called "arthritis"' r 'whatevernternal roperties eallycause thesymptomsf thedisease called "arthritis."' o discover heextensionf aplaceholder onceptionwe mustcertainlyxaminethe worldbeyondthe



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424 /DerkPereboomindividual,ust as is thecase for onceptionsike the first erson orn n thetwentiethentury'nd thatmanover here.' ut we have ncounteredoreasonto thinkhat placeholderonceptiontselfs to be individuated ith eferencetofactors eyond he ndividualubject's rticulationsnddispositions.Let me make hree oints fclarificationbout he ccount s ithas beendevelopedo far. irst,ndividuationf contenty structuraleatures ay erveas a welcome upplementofunctionalole heory.uch view bout ndividua-tion mightwell supplytheprincipledriteria orsameness f content hatfunctionalole theories equire.But one might lso accept ndividuationystructuraleaturesnd rejectfunctionaloletheory f one were to deny thatcontents solely functionfrelationsoperceptualnputs,ehavioralutputs,andothertates.45econd, t is consistent ith his ccount,whichfocusses nthepsychologicalxplanation f inferencend behavior,hat here re otherbranches fpsychology orwhich ttributionsfcontenthould e externalistnone or more of the senseswe have discussed.Perhaps he psychology fperceptions one ofthosebranches, ut shallnot takea stand n this ssuehere.46 hird,for all I have argued o far, heremay be externalistactorsrelevanto contentttributionvenwhen sychologicalxplanationf nferenceand behaviors at issue. haveargued hat or hepsychologicalxplanationfsuchphenomena,ertainrominentxternalismsaywellbe nappropriate,ndthat n order o specify ameness nd differencef content, ne might urninstead o structuraleaturesfconcepts. his eavesroomfor he ppropriate-ness of other orts f externalistharacterizationsf content or histypeofpsychology. ut shallnotpursue his ssueanyfurtherere.VI

Insummary,everal rominentxternalistheories fcontentonflict ithsome of our intuitionsboutpsychologicalxplanation. nd thus, lthoughindividuationf contentn accordwith hese xternalismsould uffice ormostepistemicndpsychologicalurposes,uchviewsmight ellbeinadequate hencertainecalcitrantases ofpsychologicalxplanationreat ssue.Furthermore,functionalole theories eem to lackanyprincipledndsatisfying ethod fclassifyingoken-distinctsychologicaltatesshavinghe ame ype fcontent.Recent xplorationf the structuraleatures fconcepts, owever, otentiallysupplies hekinds fresources eeded o ndividuateontentn a waythat ieldsthegeneralizationsnpsychologicalxplanation ewant omake.At this tagea theoryf contentndividuationlongthese inescan be neitherully pelledout nor confirmed. ut such a theory oes underwriten ongoing mpiricalresearchrogramhatwillultimatelyeterminetsprospects.47Notes1. Hilary utnam,Themeaningf meaning',"n Hilary utnam, hilosophicalapers,



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationfContent 425v. 2 (Cambridge: arvardUniversityress, 1975), pp. 215-271;Saul A. Kripke,Naming ndNecessityCambridge: arvard niversityress, 980); APuzzleAboutBelief," n Meaning nd Use, ed. A. MargalitDordrecht,. Reidel,1979); TylerBurge, IndividualismndtheMental,"n Midwest tudies nPhilosophy. VI, eds.P. French, . Uehling, . WettsteinMinneapolis: niversityf Minnesota ress,1978), pp. 73-121; see also, his "OtherBodies," n Though nd Content,d. A.Woodfield Oxford:OxfordUniversityress, 1979), pp. 97-120;"Two ThoughtExperimentseviewed," otre ame Journal fFormal ogic,23 (1982), pp. 284-293; "Individualismnd Psychology,"hilosophical eview 5 (1986), pp. 3-45;"Individuationnd Causation n Psychology,"acifc Philosophical uarterly 0(1989), pp. 303-322;LynneR. Baker, avingBelief Princeton:rinceton niversityPress, 1987); RuthMillikan, anguage,Thought,nd OtherBiologicalCategories(Cambridge: IT Press, 984), Thoughts ithoutaws: CognitivecienceWithoutContent," hilosophical eview 5 (1986), pp. 47-80; Daniel Dennett,Evolution,Error, nd ntentionality,"nThe ntentionaltance Cambridge: IT Press,1987),pp. 287-321.2. NedBlock, AnAdvertisementor Semantics or sychology,"nMidwest tudiesinPhilosophy,.X,ed. P. French, . Uehling, . WettsteinMinneapolis: niversityof Minnesota ress, 1986, pp. 615-678; BrianLoar, "Conceptual ole and TruthConditions,"otre ame Journalf FormalLogic 23 (1982), pp.272-283, SocialContentndPsychological ontent,"nContentsf Thoughts,d. R. H. Grimm ndD. D. Merill Tucson:The Universityf Arizona ress,1985),pp.99-110. n somefunctionaloletheories ontent oes notsupervenen thephysical eatures f theindividual;ee, forexample,Gilbert arman, Functional ole Semantics," otreDame Journal fFormal ogic 23 (1982), pp. 242-256, nd "Wide Functionalism,"in TheRepresentationf Knowledge nd Belief, ds. R. Harnish nd M. Brand(Tucson:Universityf Arizona ress,1986).3. NedBlock, AnAdvertisementor Semanticsor sychology;"erryodor,BanishDisContent,"nLanguage,Mind, ndLogic, d. J.ButterfieldCambridge: ambridgeUniversityress, 1986), reprintednMind and Cognition,d. WilliamG. Lycan(Oxford:Blackwell,1990), pp. 420-438, "MeaningHolism," n Psychosemantics(CambridgeMIT Press, 1987),"Substitutionrgumentsnd the ndividuationfBeliefs,"nA TheoryfContentndOther ssays Cambridge: IT Press, 990),pp.161-176, tpp. 161-2.4. See, forexample, rianLoar,"Social ContentndPsychologicalontent;" keelBilgrami, elief ndMeaning Oxford: lackwell, 992),pp. 1-63.5. DavidKaplan, Demonstratives,"nPropositionsndAttitudes,ds. Nathan almonand Scott oames Oxford: xford niversityress,1979).6. Jerryodor, Substitutionrgumentsndthe ndividuationfBeliefs," 67-8.7. See, for xample, odor, Banish isContent"ndBilgrami, elief ndMeaning, p.30-1.8. Gottlob rege,"On Sense and Reference,"n Translationsf thePhilosophicalWritingsfGottlobrege, ds.P. Geach ndM. Black Oxford: lackwell, 966).9. Saul A. Kripke, amingndNecessity;A PuzzleAbout elief," tpp.241-2.10. Ibid.pp.241-2.11. BrianLoar, Social ContentndPsychologicalontent."12. Bilgrami, elief ndMeaning, 6-19.13. TylerBurge, Sinning gainst rege," hilosophical eview1979), pp.398-432.



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426 / DerkPereboom14. TylerBurge, IndividualismndtheMental."15. In "Social Content ndPsychologicalontent"oar argues hat Fregean uzzlereinforceshese orts f problemsorBurge's nti-individualistheoryf cognitivevalue.The followingase llustratesoar's contention.uppose hat lfreds French,andhebelievesJ'ai de l'arthrite'ma cuisse,' ndwe thereforettributeohim hebeliefhat ehas arthritisnhis high,sing ur onceptf arthritis-aoncept hichwe also attributeo theexperts. n one occasionhe travels o England,wherehelearns,n English,hemeaningf the xperts' onceptionf arthritis,'ncludinghatit referso a disease f the oints.Reflectingn thepain n his high,ndthefact hatthe thigh s not a joint,he comesto believe heEnglish entenceI do nothavearthritisnmy high.' ut hemaintainshebeliefJ'ai de l'arthrite' ma cuisse'formanymonths, otrealizinghat rthrite arthritis.ut then ne dayhe makes heconnectionhat rthrite arthritis,hich s informativeorhim. This beliefhasprofoundffectsnhis nferences,hefirst fwhich s the bandonmentfthebelief'J'ai de l'arthrite' macuisse.'This s intendedo show hat he ognitivealueofthe xpert's oncepts distinctromhat fAlfred's riginalarthritis'oncept. nemight magine similar xample, ll in English,nwhich or time fterAlfredlearns romhe xpertshat rthritiss a disease f theoints, e believes hat herearetwodiseases alled rthritis.Perhaps e believes hatarthritis's like fruit,'word with wodistinctefinitionshose extensionsverlap.By bothdefinitionsapplesare fruits,ut peas are so by onlyone.) Butthenhe comesto believe hatarthritis arthritis,hich orhim, tthat ime, s informative.This type f Fregean uzzledoes not,however,elp o show hat hecognitivevalue fAlfred'snd he xpert'sonceptsredistinct.ne should ote hat tdepartsfromhe ormfFrege's riginal uzzle, ince t ims odemonstraten nterpersonalratherhan n intrapersonalifferencen cognitivealue-a differencen cognitivevaluebetween lfred ndthe xpert atherhanwithin lfred. ut uch xtensionfFrege's testwould drawdistinctionsn cognitive aluewhere heydo not exist.Consider his ounterexample.upposeAlfred's renchounterpartaspreciselyhesame beliefsbout rthritishat lfred as, xcept hathe ounterpartould xpressthemnFrench, nd that he nferencend behaviorssociatedwith hese arthritis'concepts re as similars they an befor eoplewho peakdifferentanguages.Wewouldwant o make sychologicaleneralizationshat egardhese onceptsshavingthe amecognitivealue.Butwe could magine lfredravellingoFrance, earninghis counterpart'sarthrite' eliefs, elieving,or time, hathe has twodifferentailmentsnhis thigh,nd ater omingothe nformativeealizationhat rthritisarthrite. ence,this nterpersonalregean estwould llegitimatelyistinguishheconceptsf Alfrednd hiscounterpart.16. TylerBurge, Sinning gainst rege," t p. 419; see also his "IndividualismndPsychology,". 7, and Belief e Re,"Journal fPhilosophy6 1978),pp.338-362.17. John erry,Belief ndAcceptance," idwesttudiesnPhilosophy (Minneapolis:Universityf Minnesota ress, 1980), pp. 533-542;DonaldDavidson, KnowingOne's OwnMind," residentialddress, acificDivisionMeetingf theAmericanPhilosophicalssociation, arch 8, 1986,ProceedingsftheAmericanhilosoph-icalAssociation,p.441-458, tp. 449;Michael evitt,ANarrow epresentationalTheoryof theMind" in Mind and Cognition,d. WilliamG. Lycan (Oxford:Blackwell, 990),pp.371-398.18. Devitt, . 389.19. "A PuzzleAbout elief," . 259.



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Conceptual tructurend the ndividuationfContent 42720. In the unarticulatedonstituent"ccount f MarkCrimmonsnd John erry"ThePrince ndthePhoneBooth:Reportinguzzling eliefs," heJournalfPhilosophy86 (1989), pp. 685-711)andin the"hidden ndexical"heory f Stephen chiffer("BeliefAscription,"heJournal f Philosophy9 (1992), pp. 499-521),ordinarybelief ttributionsre construeds alwaysmakingmplicit eferenceo modesofpresentation.hus Pierre elieves hat ondons pretty'pecifies ot imply two-place relationetween ierre nd thepropositionhat ondon spretty,ut three-placerelationmong ierre, he roposition,nd n unarticulatedode fpresentationunder hich ierre elieveshe roposition.f the narticulatedodes fpresentationforPierre's wo beliefs redifferent,henwe havea solutiono Kripke'spuzzle.These emanticalccountsrecompatible ithmyviews, ut thoroughxaminationof essentiallyemanticalssues s beyondhe copeofthis rticle.21. See, for xample,IndividualismndPsychology,". 7.22. FredDretske,nowledgendthe lowof nformationCambridge: IT Press, 981);RuthMillikan,anguage, hought,ndOther iological ategoriesCambridge: ITPress, 1984), "ThoughtsWithout aws: Cognitive cience WithoutContent,"Philosophical eview 5 (1986), pp.47-80;Jerry odor,A Theoryf ContentndOther ssays Cambridge, IT Press,1990),pp.51-136; ee also MohanMatthen,"Biological unctionsnd Perceptualontent,"ournal fPhilosophy5 (1988),pp.5-27.23. Jerryodor,A Theoryf Contentnd Other ssays,pp. 59-61.24. RuthMillikan,Thoughts ithoutaws,CognitivecienceWithoutontent,"p.67-71.25. Fodorprovides splendidataloguefthese roblemsnhisA TheoryfContentndOther ssays,pp. 51-136.See also William eager, Fodor'sTheory f Content,"PhilosophyfScience 0 (1993),pp. 262-277.26. Bilgrami, elief nd Meaning, p.58-60.27. Jerryodor, Substitutionrgumentsndthe ndividuationfBeliefs."28. Ibid,pp. 168,174-5.29. RuthMillikan,Thoughts ithoutaws,CognitivecienceWithoutontent,"p.63-67. The view citedhere s similar o Fodor'srefinementf Millikan's dea inATheoryfContentpp. 69-70).DanielDennettemarks,itingMillikan...soevolutioncan select norganforts apacityo oxygenatelood, anestablisht s a lung.Andit sonly elativeosuchdesignchoices" revolution-"endorsed"urposes-raisonsd'etre hatwecan dentifyehaviors,ctions, erceptions,eliefs,rany f the thercategories f folkpsychology""Evolution, rror, nd Intentionality,"n TheIntentionaltance Cambridge: IT Press,1987),pp.287-321, tp. 300).Onemightuggesthat biologicalccount fpsychologicalonten

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