People vs House of Representative Impeachment

7/31/2019 People vs House of Representative Impeachment

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE

VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE

FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD,petitioners,

ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-

intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKEROR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,vs.FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE

VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.

JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF


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THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR.,FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS,SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTONIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON,JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRANJUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DELDE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III,

AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERICSINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,

AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCISNEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO,JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAELDUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI

AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIOBADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE

ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIOIPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIODOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNARFALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUYELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HISCAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKEROR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003


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LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG,RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDOSARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIOMENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q.GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ,

ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSALOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,

ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON,VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, ANDEDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE

VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

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G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE

SENATE, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THEINTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERINGPROFESSION, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA,respondents.

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G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKEROR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE

GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.


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G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V.

ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR.,BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OFTHE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSEREPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES

AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSEREPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT

AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

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G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,vs.HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATIONOF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEFJUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE

VENECIA, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ANDTHE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICEHILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

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G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDINGOFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO,


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JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M.MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG,PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW,UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC],REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITEDMEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERICR. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE

VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTEDBY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OFCOMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA,

INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBUCHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBUCHAPTER, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,

AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLINDRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how

passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over thedetermination by the independent branches of government of the nature,scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where theConstitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional,at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equalbranches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving thelegislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart

antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonoussentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that thepresent controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing ofthe second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar providedin the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a politicalquestion has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the

view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution issufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that thisCourt unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resortto extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary norlegally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interestlie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.


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In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Courtis ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine ofseparation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branchesof government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the

discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it bythe sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which hasbeen carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts ofeach of these three branches must be given effect without destroying theirindispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republicangovernment, intended as they are to insure that governmental power iswielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship ofinterdependence and coordination among these branches where thedelicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws areharmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in thegreater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi estsuprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers andemployees must at all times be accountable to the people,serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, andefficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modestlives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members ofthe Supreme Court, the Members of the ConstitutionalCommissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed fromoffice, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpableviolation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft andcorruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Allother public officers and employees may be removed fromoffice as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have theexclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by anyMember of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upona resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, whichshall be included in the Order of Business within ten sessiondays, and referred to the proper Committee within threesession days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by

a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the


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House within sixty session days from such referral, togetherwith the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall becalendared for consideration by the House within ten sessiondays from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the Houseshall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution withthe Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override itscontrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall berecorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachmentis filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trialby the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated againstthe same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide allcases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, theSenators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President ofthe Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall beconvicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all theMembers of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend furtherthan removal from office and disqualification to hold any officeunder the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convictedshall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment toeffectively carry out the purpose of this section.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted

Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved theRules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House ImpeachmentRules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous HouseImpeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevantdistinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules areshown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESSRULES

12TH CONGRESSNEW RULES

RULE II

INITIATING

RULE V

BAR AGAINST

INITIATION OF


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IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode ofInitiating

Impeachment.Impeachment shallbe initiated only by averified complaint forimpeachment filed byany Member of theHouse ofRepresentatives or byany citizen upon a

resolution ofendorsement by anyMember thereof or bya verified complaintor resolution ofimpeachment filed byat least one-third(1/3) of all theMembers of the

House.

IMPEACHMENTPROCEEDINGSAGAINST THESAME OFFICIAL

Section 16. ImpeachmentProceedingsDeemed Initiated.

In cases where aMember of theHouse files a verifiedcomplaint of

impeachment or acitizen files a verifiedcomplaint that isendorsed by aMember of theHouse through aresolution ofendorsement againstan impeachable

officer, impeachmentproceedings againstsuch official aredeemed initiated onthe day theCommittee onJustice finds that theverified complaintand/or resolution

against such official,as the case may be,is sufficient insubstance, or on thedate the Housevotes to overturn oraffirm the finding ofthe said Committeethat the verified

complaint and/orresolution, as thecase may be, is notsufficient insubstance.

In cases where averified complaint ora resolution ofimpeachment is filed


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or endorsed, as thecase may be, by atleast one-third (1/3)of the Members of

the House,impeachmentproceedings aredeemed initiatedat the time of thefiling of suchverified complaintor resolution ofimpeachment

with the SecretaryGeneral.

RULE V

BAR AGAINSTIMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scopeof Bar. No

impeachmentproceedings shall beinitiated against thesame official morethan once within theperiod of one (1)year.

Section 17. BarAgainst InitiationOf ImpeachmentProceedings.Within a period ofone (1) year fromthe dateimpeachmentproceedings aredeemed initiated asprovided in Section16 hereof, noimpeachmentproceedings, assuch, can beinitiated against thesame official. (Italicsin the original;emphasis andunderscoringsupplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directedthe Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachmentcomplaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violationof the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, RonaldoB. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House


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Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2)of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed

by any Member of the House of Representatives or by anycitizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Memberthereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business withinten session days, and referred to the proper Committee withinthree session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its reportto the House within sixty session days from such referral,together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shallbe calendared for consideration by the House within ten session

days from receipt thereof.The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the firstimpeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss thesame on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date,the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House inplenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of theConstitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first

complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee onJustice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filedwith the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (ThirdDistrict, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., foundedon the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint wasaccompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by atleast one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the secondimpeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision ofSection 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachmentproceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than oncewithin a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging

that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines touse all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment,that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition andMandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was avictim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure inImpeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits thathis right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman

Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrarychanges in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on

November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1)


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Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereofbe declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamusdirecting respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with

Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the

second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of theHouse of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistentwith the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondentHouse of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachmentcomplaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizensand taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendentalimportance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of

a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives fromfiling any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with theSenate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondentsSenate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles ofImpeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate hasaccepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and SoledadCagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the IntegratedBar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involvespublic interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conductthe impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for theissuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting furtherproceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that thisCourt has recognized that he has locus standito bring petitions of thisnature in the cases ofChavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari CoastalBay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the

second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayersand members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibitionfor an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives fromdrafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the secondimpeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno fromtransmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina andDeputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the Houseof Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that onlyconstitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petitionfor Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and anyact proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming thatthey have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending oftaxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the SupremeCourt, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their


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petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit"and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachmentcomplaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared nulland void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President

from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the secondimpeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding theSenate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting anyproceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whosemembers are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes,a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in theirpetition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the

second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest andpray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and thesecond impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared nulland void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizenand a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Barof the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as ataxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary RestrainingOrder and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representativesfrom proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, allegingthat it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold theConstitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the HouseImpeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House ofRepresentatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the secondimpeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in hispetition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rulesbe declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc.,et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is aclass suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which wasfiled in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance

of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senatefrom conducting further proceedings on the second impeachmentcomplaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the secondimpeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House ofRepresentatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio CallanganAquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of nationaland transcendental significance and that as an official of the PhilippineJudicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in theunhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging


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their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of awrit prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articlesof Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same orgiving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, allegesin his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro atthe time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutelywithout any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as faras the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of theChief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest inthe subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as itpertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in theminds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives beenjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles ofImpeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared nulland void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., withoutalleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment

complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the JudicialDevelopment Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that theHouse of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in theexamination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare ComplaintNull and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the secondimpeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging thatthe issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve

matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition forCertiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and allproceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondentHouse of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles ofImpeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited fromaccepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting anyproceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens

and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) thesecond impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsementand impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declarednull and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President FranklinDrilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment againstthe Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, thatthey be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayedfor the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary


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injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting theArticles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaintto the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewiseprayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment

Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition,petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that HouseResolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administrationby the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine ofseparation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principleof fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House ofRepresentatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachmentcomplaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carriedbecause the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 andas reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to beforwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining orderand/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October

28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but theCourt rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but theCourt directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in itsResolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions;(b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as wellas the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on

November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legalexperts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners andrespondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and othersacting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that wouldrender the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representativesthrough Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by wayof special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court

has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House ofRepresentatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch ofgovernment under the Constitution, from the performance of itsconstitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On evendate, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion toIntervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "theconsolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court overthe issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power,authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try

and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice


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is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions ofArticle XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court

resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b)require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. ofNovember 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through SenatePresident Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as itis concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in lawor in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no

justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty toconstitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receiptof the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principalissues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in theHouse of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave toIntervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court onOctober 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress

and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissalof all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicialdetermination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete QuirinoQuadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Interveneand to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of thePhilippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave toIntervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel'sComment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Interventionwere admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiaeandthe arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and AttorneyMakalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issuesoutlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may beinvoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time;and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:


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a) locus standiof petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases ofimpeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases ofimpeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachmentvis-a-visSection 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issuesarising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments andopinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, thisCourt has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the thresholdand novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends tothose arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not theessential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review havebeen fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These mattersshall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power ofjudicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachmentcomplaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch ofthe government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether ornot there has been a grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the partof any branch or instrumentality of the government.(Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded uponby Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case ofAngara v. ElectoralCommission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whoseprovisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the presentprovision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes.

Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:


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x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, thegreat landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten ormarred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, thejudicial department is the only constitutional organ

which can be called upon to determine the properallocation of powers between the several departmentsand among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lackingperfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within thepower of our people, acting through their delegates to soprovide, that instrument which is the expression of theirsovereignty however limited, has established a republican

government intended to operate and function as a harmoniouswhole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject tospecific limitations and restrictions provided in the saidinstrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertainlanguage the restrictions and limitations upongovernmental powers and agencies. If theserestrictions and limitations are transcended it would beinconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for amechanism by which to direct the course of governmentalong constitutional channels, for then the distribution ofpowers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mereexpressions of sentiment, and the principles of goodgovernment mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitationsand restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as theyshould be in any living constitution. In the United States whereno express constitutional grant is found in their constitution,the possession of this moderating power of the courts,not to speak of its historical origin and development there, hasbeen set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of morethan one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderatingpower is granted, if not expressly, by clear implicationfrom section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent ofsuch powers? The Constitution itself has provided forthe instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.And when the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiorityover the other departments; it does not in reality nullify orinvalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts thesolemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by theConstitution to determine conflicting claims of authorityunder the Constitution and to establish for the partiesin an actual controversy the rights which thatinstrument secures and guarantees to them. This is intruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicialsupremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review


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under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicialreview is limited to actual cases and controversies to beexercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, andlimited further to the constitutional question raised or the very

lis motapresented. Any attempt at abstraction could only leadto dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterileconclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function isin this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions ofwisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislativeenactments, not only because the legislature is presumed toabide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in thedetermination of actual cases and controversies must reflect

the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed throughtheir representatives in the executive and legislativedepartments of the government.24 (Italics in the original;emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determinethe proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of governmentand "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" isinherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial poweritself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is notexplicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has"been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than oneand a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case ofMarbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulatedby Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaringwhat shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitutionitself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United Statesgenerally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance ofthe constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution ofthe United States confirms and strengthens the principle,supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,

that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; andthat courts, as well as other departments, are bound bythat instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grantin the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by ourcourts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out bynoted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in


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fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 ofthe Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their

violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, orcustom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent withthe Constitution, the former shall be void and the lattershall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulationsshall be valid only when they are not contrary to thelaws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeedan integral component of the delicate system of checks and balanceswhich, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, formsthe bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vastpowers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle inour system of government. It obtains not through express

provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Eachdepartment of the government has exclusive cognizance ofmatters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its ownsphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the threepowers are to be kept separate and distinct that theConstitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained andindependent of each other. The Constitution has providedfor an elaborate system of checks and balances tosecure coordination in the workings of the various

departments of the government. x x x And the judiciaryin turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exerciseof its power to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of theConstitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice FlorentinoFeliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and

enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powersamong the three great departments of government through the definitionand maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control betweenthem."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium ofparticipation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in thatbalancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuseof discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," theafore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for thefirst time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded


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certiorarijurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for whichare mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of itsproponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner RobertoConcepcion:

x x x

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. Itsays:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and insuch lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read itfirst and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable and to determine whether or notthere has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the

government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually aproduct of our experience during martial law. As a matterof fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role ofthe judiciary during the deposed regime was marredconsiderably by the circumstance that in a number ofcases against the government, which then had no legaldefense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense ofpolitical questions and got away with it. As aconsequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writof habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order therelease of political detainees, and other matters related to theoperation and effect of martial law failed because thegovernment set up the defense of political question. And theSupreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have noauthority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciaryfeels that this was not a proper solution of thequestions involved. It did not merely request anencroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, ineffect, encouraged further violations thereof during themartial law regime. x x x

x x x

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits ofpower of the agencies and offices of the government aswell as those of its officers. In other words, the

judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or


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not a branch of government or any of its officials hasacted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, orso capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretionamounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of

jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a dutyto pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, whichmeans that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty tosettle matters of this nature, by claiming that suchmatters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in theoriginal; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, thisCourt must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs thewell-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in theConstitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technicalterms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure

Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice EnriqueFernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in oursearch for its meaning. We do not of course stop there,but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that thewords in which constitutional provisions are couchedexpress the objective sought to be attained. They are tobe given their ordinary meaning except where technicalterms are employed in which case the significance thusattached to them prevails. As the Constitution is notprimarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of

law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people'sconsciousness, its language as much as possible should beunderstood in the sense they have in common use. What itsays according to the text of the provision to beconstrued compels acceptance and negates the power ofthe courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framersand the people mean what they say. Thus these are the caseswhere the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of theConstitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of itsframers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is theintention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, ithas been held that the Court in construing a Constitutionshould bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished byits adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or


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remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light ofthe history of the times, and the condition and circumstancesunder which the Constitution was framed. The object is toascertain the reason which induced the framers of the

Constitution to enact the particular provision and thepurpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order toconstrue the whole as to make the words consonant tothat reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speakingthrough Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keepingwith the fundamental principle of constitutionalconstruction that the intent of the framers of theorganic law and of the people adopting it should begiven effect. The primary task in constitutional construction isto ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purposeof the framers and of the people in the adoption of theConstitution. It may also be safely assumed that thepeople in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainlyby the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasisand underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpretedas a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through ChiefJustice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Conventioncould not have dedicated a provision of our Constitutionmerely for the benefit of one person without

considering that it could also affect others. When theyadopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, thatsaid provision should function to the full extent of itssubstance and its terms, not by itself alone, but inconjunction with all other provisions of that greatdocument.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Courtaffirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutionalconstruction that no one provision of the Constitution isto be separated from all the others, to be consideredalone, but that all the provisions bearing upon aparticular subject are to be brought into view and to beso interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of theinstrument. Sections bearing on a particular subjectshould be considered and interpreted together as toeffectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution andone section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by


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any reasonable construction, the two can be made tostand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,

and must lean in favor of a construction which will render everyword operative, rather than one which may make the wordsidle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resortto other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debatesand proceedings of the constitutional convention in order toarrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,resort thereto may be had only when other guides failas said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms ofthe Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates inthe constitutional convention "are of value as showing theviews of the individual members, and as indicating the reasonsfor their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of thelarge majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of ourfellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument

the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construethe constitution from what appears upon its face." Theproper interpretation therefore depends more on how itwas understood by the people adopting it than in theframers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinementand jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that

respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentelraise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachmentproceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al.that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicialcharacter. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of theimpeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "solepower to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application ofjudicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power todetermine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachmentproceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents SpeakerDe Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on

American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case ofNixonv. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial reviewover impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the


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framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to tryimpeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks andbalances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the

judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning

relief.51

Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitutionto show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases ofimpeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, theAmerican Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited tosupport the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decideimpeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of theConstitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all

issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusionof the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse ofthe impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretationthat it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power todetermine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the AmericanConstitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controllingwithin our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar asPhilippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case ofGarcia vs.COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should notbe beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicablebecause they have been dictated by different constitutional settings andneeds."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its originsto that of the United States, their paths of development have long sincediverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut theumbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme

Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicialreview is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and isdiscretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court andlower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just apower but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition toinclude the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part ofany government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the

Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House ofRepresentatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House ofRepresentatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in theHouse of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachmentcases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power asembodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. Theselimitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and theone year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.


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Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachmentsundermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congressand the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicialstatesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should

defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing fullwell the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted theabove-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that theConstitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the solediscretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits,or in the language ofBaker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" fordetermining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the

power of judicial review.The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited byrespondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power isbeyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concernthe denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature toperform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the powerof judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power

of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of theCourt to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation ofthe Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of theirfunctions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify anact of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened theConstitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy andthat when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to haveinfringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty

of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Courtdeclared null and void a resolution of the House of Representativeswithdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressmanas a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that theresolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on

Appointments was based on proportional representation of the politicalparties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to

judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of

Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission onAppointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it heldthat although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vestedexclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courtsto pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v.Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assemblyof the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election iscontested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge theduties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.


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Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that theexercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset thesystem of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpretedas a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both

are integral components of the calibrated system of independence andinterdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond thepowers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power ofjudicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, issubject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversycalling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the actmust have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question ofconstitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis motaof the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actualcases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity ofargument by the parties, and limited further to the

constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics andbarren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated toactualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the

judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice orexpediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord thepresumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, notonly because the legislature is presumed to abide by theConstitution but also because the judiciary in the determination

of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom andjustice of the people as expressed through their representativesin the executive and legislative departments of thegovernment.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will

sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is beingchallenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party allegessuch personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues uponwhich the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutionalquestions.69

IntervenorSoriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contendsthat petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice hassustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae formerJustice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.


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Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners havestanding since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount publicinterest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are

subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches ofthe government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitutionand the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72

Amicus curiaeDean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of thesame opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenchedrule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicatehis rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justicewho, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of thisCourt, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interestand the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of thearguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiteratethe ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locusstandi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party ininterest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important tonote . . . that standing because of its constitutional and publicpolicy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating towhether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or hascapacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directedtowards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain anaction, standing restrictions require a partial consideration ofthe merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to theproper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because insome cases suits are brought not by parties who have beenpersonally injured by the operation of a law or by official actiontaken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters whoactually sue in the public interest. Hence the question instanding is whether such parties have "alleged such a personalstake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation ofissues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination

of difficult constitutional questions."

x x x

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" iswhether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured bythe judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76(Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by thealleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the


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petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the ChiefJustice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their ownrights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in aclass suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which

were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the Houseof Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers andlegislators when specific requirements have been met have been givenstanding by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing theconstitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be ableto show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but alsothat he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injuryas a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby insome indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has beenor is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfullyentitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penaltiesby reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when theproceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that heis a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim thatpublic funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflectedto any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public fundsthrough the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before hecan invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specificallyprove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure ofmoney raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as aresult of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is notsufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of

the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not ataxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing tomost of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impendingtransmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuingtrial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of publicfunds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of anyofficial action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing tomaintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by theConstitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcomewill affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Barof the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty topreserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true,


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does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It isshared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of thepetitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deservethe attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight

as precedents.86

It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules onstanding and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of allcitizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protectthe interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with allinterests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whetherfavorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicataprinciple,binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the

court.

89

Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficientlyrepresented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerouspetitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers,however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole groundof transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No.160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, thefollowing instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme CourtJustice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the fundsor other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case ofdisregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the publicrespondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lackof any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising thequestions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court issatisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental

importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on thelocus standiof a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue oftranscendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are ofparamount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however,mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in thematter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead theexistence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial

notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in thecase. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of theRules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in thematter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interestagainst both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distributionor other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officerthereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by


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the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirementsof the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's

case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262.Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and thesame standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et.al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion forLeave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invokingtheir right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if thisinsidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representativesis successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had beencomplied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were oftranscendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of thePhilippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" toraise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachmentcomplaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the

grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II VeteransLegionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matterin litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for thelimited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs

with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court'sjurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independenceof the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles ofImpeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter inlitigation, he being a member of Congress against which the hereinpetitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantialissues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was grantedand he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must bedenied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet thestanding requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve theexpenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do saidpetitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted andspent in violation of specific constitutional protection againstabuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of


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such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money isbeing deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitionersseek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds throughthe enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94

(Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allegethat the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public fundsor in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally,his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe himwith standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, heldthat for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisitethat something had by then been accomplished or performed by eitherbranch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may thecourts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter ischallenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filingof the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in

accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12thCongress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned actshaving been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had beenfiled with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have alreadybeen already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the allegedunconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, asTan v. Macapagalholds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant

petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R.Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render adecision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions ofconstitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in theHouse and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Lawwho suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts toencourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw

their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide foran opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselveswhen the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmitto the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming thatthe Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise theissue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by theRepresentatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the HouseImpeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such awithdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment


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complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and(3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners wouldcontinue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from eitheror both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by thefact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives northe Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on theissue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings orotherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlierquoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be soughtfrom a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice RobertoConcepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, whatit means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. Inother words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, itrefers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are tobe decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in

regard to which full discretionary authorityhas been delegatedto the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It isconcerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, notlegality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly withoutany rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of takingcognizance of cases which involved politi

People vs House of Representative Impeachment

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