People vs Alejandro

8/12/2019 People vs Alejandro

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94644 August 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL ALEJANDRO y MARIANO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Yulo, Aliling & Macanay Law Office for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

Michael Alejandro was convicted of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic

Act no. 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act,

and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 plus the

costs. 1 In this appeal, he asks for the reversal of his conviction or at least

the reduction of his penalty in the interest of the justice and equity."

The evidence for the prosecution consisted mainly of the testimonies of theNARCOM operatives who conducted the buy-bust operation that led to the

appellant's arrest and prosecution. 2

That evidence showed that about half past five in the afternoon of June 4,

1989, a confidential informer reported to Sgt. Amos Foncardas at the

NARCOM Headquarters in Calarian, Zamboanga City, that the appellant was

selling marijuana on Natividad St., Tetuan, Zamboanga City. Acting on this

information, the Commanding Officer, P/Major Claudio Cabayacruz,

organized a surveillance and buy-bust team with Sgt. Foncardas as leader

and CIC Bonifacio Morados and C2C Vicente Estillote as members. 3

Upon arrival of the team at the target area, the informer pointed to Alejandro,

who was standing near the Anaud Store at Natividad St., as the drug

trafficker. Foncardas forthwith told the informer to leave and instructed

Morados to pose as buyer, furnishing him for this purpose with a marked

P5.00 bill with serial number SN-LL742686. 4

Morados approached Alejandro and asked him in chavacano: "Tiene ba quita

alli?" (Do you have anything there?) The latter answered: "Tiene aqui valorde P5.00 lang de marijuana. (I have here worth only P5.00 of marijuana.)

Morados then said: "Saca yo se, compra yo conose." (I will take that, I will

buy it.) 5

Alejandro thereupon took from the right pocket of his shirt an object wrapped

in the piece of newspaper and handed it to Morados. After opening the parcel

and finding what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves with three rolling

papers, Morados gave the marked money to Alejandro. He then gripped

Alejandro's right hand, identified himself as a NARCOM agent, and placed

his quarry under arrest. 6

Foncardas and Estillote, who were about ten meters away from the two,

rushed to assist Morados. Foncardas retrieved the marked money from

Alejandro and received the wrapped parcel from Morados. The team then

took the accused to the NARCOM headquarters at Calarian, Zamboanga

City. 7

Custody to the accused, together with the seized parcel and the marked

money, was turn over to NARCOM Investigator Norberto Francia. Francia

prepared an Investigation Report, 8 Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, 9 and

a written request addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory for the examinationof the contents of the seizal parcel. 10

Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory,

subjected the contents of the parcel to physical, micro-chemical and

confirmatory or duoquinois test and found them positive for marijuana. Her

findings were embodied in her Official Dangerous Drugs Report, 11 which

was offered as an exhibit along with the marijuana and affirmed by her at the

trial. 12

The accused denied the charged against him and gave a different version of

the incident. He claimed that in the afternoon of June 4, 1989, he had gone


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on orders of his father to buy fish at the public market on Falcatan St. On his

way home, someone driving a motorcycle blocked his way and immediately

handcuffed him. The bicycle he was riding fell to the ground, spilling the fish

he had bought. He was then brought to the NARCOM headquarters. at

Calarian by several men who said they were NARCOM agents. 13

Abraham Narag and Norberto Feliciano testified that they were at the Anaud

Store and witnessed Alejandro's arrest. They also saw his parents standingon the other side of the street across the store, only about two meters away

from their son. Alejandro's father later picked up the fish that were scattered

on the street. 14

Alejandro swore that at the police headquarters, the NARCOM agent took his

wallet from his pocket and laid his money on the table. They then placed a

P5.00 bill on top, telling him it was the marked money. The accused denied

ownership of the bill but the agents insisted that it was his. The policemen

later returned his money but retained the marked bill. 15

Going over the appellant's brief, the Court notes that it does not point to anyerror committed by the trial court. It simply hints, and rather vaguely at that,

that the evidence may have been "planted" on Alejandro and points to

newspaper reports of abuses committed by the police who "blackmail and

profit from their alleged suspects." No evidence of this charge is offered. The

brief is practically an admission of guilt. The appellant is in effect throwing

himself at the mercy of this Court and praying that the original sentence "be

reduced to make itself more palatable to reason."

An appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case wide open for review and

empowers (indeed obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors asmay be found in the appellate court the appealed judgment even if they have

not been assigned. 16 However, a careful study of the record yields no

compelling reason for a reversal of the respondent court. The prosecution

has adequately established that the accused was caught in the act of selling

P5.00 worth of marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act.

The appellant's claim that he was a victim of the frame-up is not convincing.

It has not been shown that the NARCOM agents planted evidence on him in

order to extort money from him or to exact personal vengeance or to harass

him or to just strengthen an otherwise weak case. 17 This defense, like alibi,

is inherently weak, as easy to fabricate as it difficult to prove.

Alejandro's denial cannot prevail against his positive identification as the

marijuana peddler. As a mere negative self-serving averment, his defense

cannot have heavier evidentiary weight than the sworn declarations of the

police officers who testified affirmatively on his sale of the prohibited drugs.

The trial court considered it significant that when the appellant was blocked

and handcuffed, he did not even make any protest or outcry. We have noted

this too. No less strangely, his parents who, according to the appellant and

his witnesses, were only two meters away from him, did not even bother to

ask the policemen why their son was being arrested. There was no

explanation for this odd indifference. The parents were not even presented

as witnesses to corroborate their son.

We come now to the appellant's contention that the penalty of life

imprisonment imposed upon him for the sale of five pesos worth of marijuana

is excessive and grossly disproportionate to the offense, to the extent ofbeing cruel and unjust. He asks that the penalty be reduced if he cannot be

acquitted.

The law imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging

from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 regardless of the amount involved in the sale

of prohibited drugs. 18 This is not cruel punishment. It is settle that "it takes

more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a

penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution" as it may that it was prescribed

to prevent or discourage the proliferation of crimes that are especially hurtful

to the public interest.

As Justice Tuason said in People v. Estoista: 19

. . . The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very

security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to

promiscuous carrying the use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment

which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If prisonment from 5

to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain

circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason.

xxx xxx xxx


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It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or

severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the

punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and

unusual." (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held

that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly

oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock

the moral sense of the community." (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity forthe radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believed that

five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to

appellant's and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual,

barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience.

A similar justification was made in People v. De la Cruz, 20 where the

penalty of six months imprisonment and a fine P2,000.00 was imposed for

profiteering because the offense was specially inimical to the national

economy and the consuming public, and in People v. Dionisio, 21 where a

"bookie" was sentenced to one month imprisonment and the penalty,

although disproportionate to the offense, was sustained by this Court on theground that "the social scourge of gambling must be stamped out."

There is no question that the illicit distribution of drugs is one of the most

serious problems of our society and that nothing less than the most

determined efforts are needed to combat it. The stern penalties prescribed by

the Dangerous Drugs Act are intended to deter the aggravation of this

problem, which has already prejudiced the lives and the future of thousands

of our people, especially the youth. The persons who peddle prohibited drugs

are, as described in one decision, 22 "evil merchants of misery and death."

The penalties imposed on them are neither cruel nor inhuman but totallycondign, if not in fact even inadequate.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED and the appeal

DISMISSED, with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 61864-69 May 8, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE FAMILY BANK AND

TRUST COMPANY (Formerly Family Savings Bank), petitioners,

vs.

HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO as PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BRANCH II, AND HERNANI PALILLO,

respondents.

Silvestre L. Tagarao for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside and nullify the orders

of respondent Judge Benigno M. Puno in Criminal Cases No. 3485, 3486,

3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hernani

Palillo" filed before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II with

station at the City of Lucena, to wit: a) the order dated July 30, 1982, granting

respondent Palillo's Motion to Dismiss dated July 30, 1982 and ordering thedismissal of the aforementioned cases, the dispositive portion of which

reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finding the Motion to Quash filed by the accused

TENABLE, hereby DISMISSES the above-entitled cases.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED. (p. 27, Rollo)

and b) the order dated August 26, 1982, denying the separate motions for

reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 1982 filed by petitioner People of

the Philippines (People) and petitioner Family Bank and Trust Company

(Family), which reads:

AFTER a careful and thorough study of the allegations in the Motions for

Reconsideration, dated August 3, and 13, 1982, filed by the Prosecution,

together with the Opposition dated August 12, 1982 and the SupplementalOpposition dated August 21, l982, filed by the Defense, the Court finds the

said motion(s) without merit and, therefore, denies the same.

SO ORDERED. (p. 28, Rollo)

The facts of these cases are not in dispute. On December 23, 1981, the City

Fiscal filed against the accused an information (Criminal Case No. 10323) for

six (6) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, with the City Court of

Lucena, Branch I.

On March 3, 1982, the accused was arraigned by the court and she pleadednot guilty to the charge.

In compliance with a directive of the Ministry of Justice contained in a letter

from the Chief State Prosecutor dated March 9, 1982 in connection with the

criminal charges against private respondent Palillo, the Office of the City

Fiscal filed on March 22, 1982 six separate criminal informations for violation

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the then Court of First Instance of

Quezon, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488,

3489 and 3490, all entitled "People of the Philippines V. Hernani Palillo," to

wit:

Criminal Case No. 3485:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena,

Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54332 dated January 28,

1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank

and Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the

same was dishonored and was refused payment for the reason that the

drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not have sufficient funds in said


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bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein, the

Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and

refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said

check, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the

aforestated sum of P85,000.00 Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law. (pp. 32-33, Rollo)





feloniously issue and make out Check no. AA37-54330 dated January 28,





bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein, theFamily Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and



aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.



That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena,Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable







bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein the


refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover said check,

to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated

sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to Law. (pp. 36-37, Rollo)


That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena,Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable










check, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in theaforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to Law. (pp. 38-39, Rollo)





feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54331 dated January 28,1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank

and Trust Company, but When said check was presented for payment the







aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.



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1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bankand Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the







aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine currency.


On April 5, 1982, the City Fiscal filed a Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case

No. 10323, pending before the City Court of Lucena, on the ground that

proper informations have been filed with the Court of First Instance of

Quezon.

The counsel for the accused filed an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw on

the ground that the filing of so-called proper informations with the Court of

First Instance of Quezon is not a legal ground to withdraw the above-entitled

case, considering that the City Court of Lucena had already acquired

jurisdiction over the case and the accused had already been arraigned andhad pleaded not guilty to the charge.

On April 16, 1982, the City Court issued an order, dismissing Criminal Case

No. 10323, for lack of jurisdiction.

Subsequently, upon motion of private respondent through counsel, Criminal

Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490 pending in various

branches of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, were consolidated for trial

before Branch II of the aforesaid CFI, presided by the respondent judge.

On July 28, 1982, private respondent was again arraigned, now before the

Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and she entered a plea of "Not

Guilty" in all aforesaid six (6) criminal cases.

After entering her plea of "Not Guilty," private respondent f iled on the same

day a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned six (6) criminal cases on the

ground of double jeopardy, claiming that the City Court of Lucena City had

already acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323 and that,therefore, the dismissal of the last mentioned case, the very case bearing the

same causes of action as the six (6) criminal cases, constituted a dismissal

on the merits.

On July 29, 1982, the City Fiscal filed an Opposition to the aforesaid Motion

to Dismiss, citing as grounds therefore that the private respondent had not

been placed in jeopardy before the City Court since she was arraigned under

a defective information before the latter Court and such court had no

jurisdiction over the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 10323.

On July 30, 1982 the respondent CFI judge issued the first questioned ordergranting private respondent's motion to dismiss all the six (6) criminal

informations filed against her.

On August 5, l982, the complainant through Assistant City Fiscal Elviro Q.

Quitain of Lucena City filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order.

On August 12,1982, private respondent filed an Opposition to the City

Fiscal's motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, the A.M. Perez and Associates Law Office, through Atty.Dante T. Ramos, filed its formal appearance on August 12, 1982 as private

prosecutor in behalf of the Family Bank and Trust Company (herein private

petitioner) under the direct control and supervision of the City Fiscal in the six

(6) criminal cases before the CFI of Quezon.

On August 16, 1982, with the conformity of the City Fiscal, the private

prosecutor through the above-named counsel filed its own Motion for

Reconsideration of the respondent judge's order of dismissal.

On August 23, 1982, private respondent Palillo through counsel filed a

supplemental opposition to the prosecution s motions for reconsideration.


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On August 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued the second questioned order,

denying both the City Fiscal and the private prosecutor's motions for

reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition which the City Fiscal and the private prosecutor jointly

filed directly with this Court.

In his comment, the Solicitor General recommended that the questioned

orders of the respondent judge be reversed and set aside and that the case

be remanded to the court a quo for trial.

On the other hand, the counsel for the herein private respondent, after four

(4) motions for extension of time, failed to file his own comment.

Accordingly, an March 2, 1983, this Court issued a resolution dispensing with

the private respondent's comment, giving due course to the petition and

declaring the case submitted for decision.

In support of their petition, petitioners contend that, in issuing the orders

complained of, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or

in excess or lack of jurisdiction because:

a) The respondent judge was without jurisdiction to inquire into, much

less reverse the City Court's finding contained in its order dated April 16,

1982 that the City Court had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323,

the latter order having long become final and constituted res judicata

between the parties thereto.

b) The respondent judge had no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of

jurisdiction of the City Court over Criminal Case No. 10323, such

competence being in law reserved only to the Supreme Court.

c) The respondent judge's holding that the City Court had concurrent

jurisdiction with Court of First Instance of Lucena over the offense charged

under Criminal Case No. 10323 and that the dismissal of said case thereby

precludes further prosecution of the accused under the six (6) cases before

the Court of First Instance of Quezon finds no valid support in law and

jurisprudence.

d) The orders complained of effectively denies the prosecution of its

day in Court and of its right to due process.

e) The respondent judge gravely abused its discretion in not finding that

the accused, herein, respondent PALILLO, has waived the defense of double

jeopardy and is thus estopped from setting up said defense (p. 78, Rollo).

The main issue in this petition is whether or not the dismissal of CriminalCase No. 10323 pending before the City Court of Lucena, Branch I, for lack

of jurisdiction and the subsequent filing of other informations (Criminal Cases

Nos. 3485-3490) with the respondent Court against the same private

respondent for the same offenses had placed her in double jeopardy.

A careful scrutiny of the circumstances of these cases would clearly show

that no double jeopardy exists. It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of

double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy

must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been

validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same

offense, or the second offense include or is necessarily included in theoffense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same

or is a frustration thereof (People v. City Court of Manila, G.R. No. L-36528,

September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 175; Ada v. Virola, G.R. Nos. 82346-47,

April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 336).

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a

competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered;

and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express

consent of the accused (Tangan v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.

73963, Nov. 5, l987, 155 SCRA 435).

As correctly found by the City Court of Lucena, jurisdiction over the offenses

charged in Criminal Case No. 10323 exclusively pertains to the Court of First

Instance of Quezon.

Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides for a penalty of imprisonment

of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not

less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall

in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine or

imprisonment at the discretion of the court.


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The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948 provides that the municipal judges

in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall

have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with

an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the

penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or

imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand

pesos or both . . . (Section 87).

In determining whether a criminal case is within the jurisdiction of a Municipal

or City Court, the maximum punishment that might be imposed is controlling,

and the fact that the minimum punishment is within its jurisdiction is

immaterial.

Taking into account the amount of each check which is P85,000.00 upon

which the court may base the alternative imposable penalty of fine pursuant

to BP. Blg. 22, as alleged in the information filed in the City Court, it is clear

that the latter has no jurisdiction to try the case considering that the

imposable fine will be P85,000.00 at the very least up to the amount of

P170,000.00 which is way beyond the maximum amount of P6,000.00 fromwhich the City Court may validly draw concurrent jurisdiction over the case. It

is this alternative penalty of fine and not the penalty of imprisonment which

divests the City Court of its jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 10323.

Hence, the City Court of Lucena correctly dismissed said case and since the

dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the

prosecution of the same offense in the proper court. (U.S. v. Bernardo, G.R.

No. 6027, 19 Phil. 265; Cristobal v. People, G.R. No. L-1542, 84 Phil. 473)

It is noteworthy that the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323 and

the subsequent filing of the six (6) criminal informations with the Court of First

Instance were made in compliance with the directive of the Ministry of

Justice. Clearly, these were designed to correct the error committed with

respect to the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 10323.

Nevertheless, the Court finds that the error does not constitute substantial

prejudice to private respondent considering that no evidence yet has ever

been presented and the private respondent was never exposed to trial. Thus,

the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 were as though the

accused was being tried and prosecuted under an original information. The

constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going

through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceeding was dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the right to present its

own evidence to substantiate the allegations in the information, there is no

second jeopardy to speak of. Contrary to the stand of the private respondent

in its motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490, the City Court's order

of dismissal cannot be considered as a judgment of acquittal since, as

already pointed out, the said court has no jurisdiction to try the case.

Moreover, the assailed order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490

unjustly deprives the State of its right to due process.

This Court had occasion to rule in People v. Pablo, G.R. No. L-37271, June

25, 1980 (98 SCRA 289) that the court should bear in mind that it is the

guardian of the rights of the accused as well as of the people at large, and

that it should not unduly force the accused to go to trial, or for light cause,

jeopardize the rights or interest of the public. The rights of the offended

parties, who usually take active part in the trial, are equally entitled to the

protection offered by the courts to the public at large in the trial of a criminal

case. (People v. Declare, G.R. No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142)

In the earlier case of Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, G.R. No. L-

46366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 19, We ruled that:

The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given

the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court

has always accorded this right to the prosecution and, where the right had

been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action. We have

heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives

the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict, it denies the

prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an

acquittal) without due process, and, therefore null and void. Such dismissal is

invalid for lack of a fundamental pre-requisite, that is, due process, and,

consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double

jeopardy. We have likewise held that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a

timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an

order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the

case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to

prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of

justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be

prejudiced thereby. (People v. Navarro, etc., 63 SCRA 264).


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We disagree, however, with the petitioner's contention that respondent judge

had no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction of the City Court over

Criminal Case No. 10323. Respondent Court obviously has the competence

to pass upon the issue of the city court's jurisdiction over the first information.

It should be pointed out that in order to resolve whether or not an accused

has been placed twice in jeopardy, the court should first determine whether

or not a first jeopardy had legally attached. As already discussed before, a

legal jeopardy attaches only if the court which first tried the offense is a court

of competent jurisdiction. And since the herein private respondent interposed

the defense of double jeopardy on the basis that the city court had validly

acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323, it is necessary for the

respondent court to pass upon the said issue.

Anent the contention of petitioner that private respondent had waived the

defense of double jeopardy when she failed to plead the said defense at the

time of arraignment, suffice it to say that the promulgation of the 1985 Rules

on Criminal Procedure had effectively granted to an accused the right to

invoke the defense of double jeopardy even after arraignment. Thus, Sec. 8,

Rule 117 of the New Rules provides:

Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground

therefore.The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to

quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he

did not file a motion to quash, or failed to allege the same in said motion shall

be deemed a waiver with the grounds of a motion to quash except the

grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,

extinction, of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in

paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied).

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisitions with respect to the procedural

issues raised, this petition warrants the issuance of the writ of certiorari

prayed for, there being no double jeopardy in this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. These cases are hereby REMANDED

to the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Quezon to which Criminal Cases

Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490 are assigned to proceed with

the trial on the merits against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.


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SUPREME COURT

Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128540 April 15, 1998

EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of

Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing

the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been

promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity

arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the promulgation of

only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to

the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal

accountability.

The Case

This is the gist of this Court's resolution of the petition for review on certiorari,

assailing the November 5, 1996 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-

GR SP No. 41096. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, which set

aside the April 12, 1996 Resolution 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,

Pangasinan, Branch 39, 4 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 of

the respondent Judge is hereby SET ASIDE and he is ordered to set anew

the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the

judgment of conviction and sentencing the accused to serve imprisonment

for the duration stated in the decision of the said respondent Court dated

February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of the civil liabilities has been

promulgated earlier.

SO ORDERED. 5

The RTC Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals, disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that

the "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Promulgation" filed by the accused thru

counsel, is meritorious and accordingly, the same is hereby granted.

The Facts

The undisputed facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are

reproduced below:

On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court

of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos.L-3553 and L-3554, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Eduardo

Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and

therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of

[p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal

as [m]aximum, for each offense, with the accessories provided by law and to

pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael

Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the

amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the

modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The

dispositive portion of said Decision of this Court dated July 30, 1991 reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed from is hereby

MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo Cuison to indemnify the heirs of

Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also

the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency.


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The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R.

Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on

December 1, 1993.

The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39)

for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated

[on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to

the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail

to commence service of his sentence.

Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the

Solicitor General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed with

this Court to clarify the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the

Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On August 17, 1995, [the

Court of Appeals] rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions

thereof:

In the dispositive portion of this Court's decision, We simply modified the

appealed decision of the court a quo in one respect only the increase ofthe indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from

P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including that cited in

Our decision, People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.

In view of the foregoing, it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the

lower court was not touched on at all by this Court especially in the light of

[o]ur [o]bservation in the said decision, as follows:

After a careful review of the evidence on records, this Court entertains no

doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of

Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The court a quo has expressed the following

findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight

and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:

Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode or

manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that

the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the

same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) (CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp.

127-129)

Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby

declares that this Court had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with

regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial court's

decision.

Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The

accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the following

grounds:

1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on 4 April

1995 and therefore there is nothing to promulgate anymore.

2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate the

accused's constitutional right against jeopardy.

In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted theaforestated motion holding:

Now, the question is: May the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals

promulgated on 17 August 1995 which "clarified" the dispositive portion of its

original decision, be considered as an amendment, alteration or modification

of the decision? Here, we must not forget the basic rule that in the execution

of the judgment, it is the dispositive portion of the decision which controls.

We cannot also forget that, as already mentioned above, we have already

promulgated the said decision by reading to the accused the dispositive

portion, and that to the best of our knowledge, he had already complied

therewith by paying the damages which were awarded. It may be relevant at

this point in time, to cite the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the

case of Heirs of George Bofill vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 393 that

Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and precise in quoting data

from the records, it would have arrived at the right conclusion.

The Honorable Court of Appeals cited the decision of the Honorable

Supreme Court in the case of Partola-Jo vs. CA, 216 SCRA 692, that:


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Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the

dispositive portion of the decision, the Supreme Court may clarify such

ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final.

(emphasis supplied)

The above decision is in consonance with the decision of the Honorable

Supreme Court in the case of Buan vs. Court of Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA

424 wherein the Supreme Court said:

". . . Thus the respondent Court stated, "it is undisputed that the Decision of

the Court of Appeals . . . had become final and executory." Taken in this light

the respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue unresolved, a

final decision being unreviewable and conclusive.

But judging from the facts presented by this case, it is beyond doubt that

serious injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules

were to be followed. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but

mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when

rigid application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promotesubstantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend its operation.

(emphasis supplied)

It would seem from the above pronouncements of the Honorable Supreme

Court therefore, that it may suspend the operation of the rules of procedure

by virtue of its rule-making power. Certainly if the Honorable Supreme Court

has the power to promulgate the Rules of Court, then it has the power to

suspend its operation in order to promote substantial justice. Unquestionably,

however, the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have that rule[-] making

authority. Therefore it may not suspend the operation of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the above discussion refers to civil cases. Will the same doctrines

apply to criminal cases as in the cases before us? The accused thru his

counsels raised the issues of the effect of a promulgation already once made

arguing in the process that another promulgation can no longer be legally

feasible if the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy will

not be violated.

We are not unmindful of the injunction upon lower courts, which the

Honorable Supreme Court has imposed, i.e., to accept with modesty the

orders and decisions of the appellate courts. However, we feel that we must

equate this with another injunction, that trial judges must keep abreast with

the jurisprudence or run the risk of being found to be grossly ignorant of the

law. In short, this Court finds itself in the horns of a dilemma. Since the very

jurisprudential authority relied upon by the Honorable [Court] of Appeals

refers to the power of the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity, may not this

Court therefore conclude that the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have

the power to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision which has not only

become final, but has already been previously promulgated?

Finally, it appears to this Court that there is validity to the observation made

by counsel for the accused in paragraph 4 of their motion which we quote:

4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to promulgate as the same

had already been promulgated on April 4, 1995. Besides, there is, likewise,

nothing to promulgate in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated February 2,

1996 and much less in the alluded August 17, 1995 Resolution of the Court

of Appeals.

Indeed, the said Resolution did not authorize nor did it direct this Court to re -promulgate the Decision.

On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the

Philippines, filed [before the Court of Appeals a] petition for certiorari and

mandamus contending that the respondent Judge seriously erred and

gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of

imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals'] Decision of July 30, 1991 and

Resolution of August 17, 1995. He prays that the Order dated April 12, 1996

of respondent Judge be nullified and the penalty of imprisonment rendered

against the accused be enforced. 6

Ruling of the Appellate Court

In ruling for the People, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this way:

Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the penalty of

imprisonment was not affirmed by [the Court of Appeals] although it

increased the civil liability from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. He failed to

recognize the fact that the only modification made by [the Court of Appeals]

on the decision [was] to increase the civil liability, which would not have been

imposed if the accused was not found guilty of the charge. Had he looked


13/30

carefully into the text of the decision he would have found that [the Court of

Appeals] affirmed the decision of conviction, as borne out by the following

portions of said decision:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, this Court entertains no

doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of

Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The Court a quo has expressed the following

findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight

and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:

Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances:

1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together occupying the same

table with Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro drinking beer at the terrace upon the

arrival of Leo Petete and his companions;

2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to 15 minutes after

the arrival of Rulo Castro, Rafael Sapigao, Leo Petete and Agardo Reyes

and boarded the same yellow car owned and driven by accused EduardoCuison.

3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo, a resident of

Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, a disinterested witness in the evening of

May 27, 1986 infront (sic) of the house of said accused Eduardo Cuison in

Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Accused Eduardo Cuison alighted from his

car, proceeded to his house and after coming out of his house was seen

holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine pistol. Eduardo Cuison called for his

brother Warling to whom he handed the carbine pistol and received by the

latter.

Eduardo Cuison sent Domy Cuison to call for Bot Cuison. When Bot Cuison

arrived, he, Warling, Domy, Eduardo Cuison and two others inside the car

proceeded towards the north. Obviously, these two were Sgt. Castro and

Sgt. Bustarde.

4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison, Warling

Cuison, Domy Cuison, Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro at the driveway of the

Tropical Hut on board the car of accused Eduardo Cuison, each of them with

the use of their respective firearms simultaneously fired several shots in the

air;

5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their guns to [sic]

Sapigao. Then Sgt. Castro fired the fatal shot to [sic] Sapigao;

6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison, Eduardo

Cuison, Bot and Domy Cuison turned at [sic] Sapigao obviously to see to it

and make sure Sapigao was already dead;

7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead, accused Eduardo

Cuison called for Rulo Castro to come outside the restaurant and when Rulo

Castro emerged at the door, accused Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison, Bot

Cuison, Domy Cuison and Sgt. Bustarde simultaneously pointed their guns

and shot at Rulo Castro hitting the latter;

8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are brothers and

uncles of Bot and Domy Cuison. Eduardo Cuison being a kagawad enjoyed

moral influence upon his brother Warling and his two nephews Bot and

Domy;

9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison knew each other

before the incident;

10. After shooting the victims to death, the accused Cuisons went away

from the scene of the crime on board the same car.

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode o[r]

manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that

the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the

same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Colman, et al. 55

O.G. 2392 (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, '88 ed., Vol. 2, p.

560).

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged,

but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,

conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be

accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts

towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part

so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and


14/30

cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a

concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual

meeting among them for concerted means is proved (People vs. Colman, et.

al., 55 O.G. 2393).

In the appealed decision, the trial court had ordered the accused-appellant

"to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao [in] the amount of P30,000.00 and

to [sic] the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00" (Decision, p.

24). In accordance with the new policy of the Supreme Court on this matter,

the above-specified amount of P30,000.00 should be increased to

P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646).

It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals] increased the civil liability

in accordance with new rulings of the Supreme Court without finding that the

accused [was] guilty of the offense of homicide. Thus, the promulgation of

the civil liability only and omission of the criminal liability is an error.

Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the ambiguity in the

dispositive portion through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 whichcategorically stated that the court affirmed the decision of the respondent

court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon the accused.

This clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or alteration

to an already final decision. It is conceded that such cannot be done

anymore. The Court of Appeals simply stated in categorical terms what it

obviously meant in its decision that the conviction of the accused is

affirmed with the modification that the civil liability is increased. The

dispositive portion of the decision may not have used the exact words but a

reading of the decision can lead to no other conclusion.

It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to go scot-free after

paying the heirs the civil indemnity imposed by the Court for his participation

in the act of killing the two (2) victims in these cases, because of a wrong

interpretation of a decision. 7

Hence, this appeal. 8

The Issues

In this appeal, Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the following "assignment of

errors":

I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its

discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to establish the

requisites for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its

discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to show the

existence of the elements for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.

III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its

discretion in not holding that the promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot be

modified, over objection of the accused.

IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its

discretion in not holding that the filing of the Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus dated June 28, 1995 by the Solicitor General violates the

constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.

V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its

discretion in deciding as it did and in denying herein petitioner's motion for

reconsideration. 9

Simply put, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the writs of

certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by the Court of Appeals, and

(2) whether petitioner's right against double jeopardy was violated.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

First Issue: Certiorari and Mandamus Justified

A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

provided the following requisites are present: (1) the writ is directed against a

tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)

such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the


15/30

ordinary course of law. 10 Grave abuse of discretion " . . . implies such

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of

jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or

despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so

patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual

refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."

11

Petitioner points out that the solicitor general's petition for certiorari and

mandamus before the Court of Appeals failed to show grave abuse of

discretion in the assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the trial court. In the

said Resolution, the trial court declined to order the incarceration of petitioner

and, thus, effectively refused to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA Decision

which, in turn, clarified that the CA's earlier Decision dated July 30, 1991

merely increased the amount of indemnity but did not delete the penalty of

imprisonment. In justifying its said Order, the trial court insisted that it had

already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA Decision when it ordered

petitioner to pay the increased amount of indemnity. Petitioner argues that

the trial court's Order, "far from being whimsical, capricious or malevolent,[was] valid and substantial, to say the least, and the impugned [R]esolution

was issued after a careful deliberation and weighing of the facts, issues and

points of applicable law." 12

We disagree. While its language may have been a little faulty, it is still quite

obvious that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision

convicting Petitioner Eduardo Cuison of double homicide. The dispositive

portion of the CA Decision, therefore, cannot be construed to mean that the

appellate court merely imposed an indemnity and deleted the penalty of

imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision in no

way communicated that the appealed Decision of the trial court was modified

only in regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it be gleaned that

the penalty of imprisonment was deleted. In fact, the CA Decision and the

entire records of this case contain no legal or factual basis for acquitting

petitioner or dismissing the criminal cases against him.

In granting petitioner's motion, the trial court judge capriciously and arbitrarily

decided not to promulgate the Court of Appeals' July 30, 1991 Decision. 13

He had no discretion to refuse; his refusal was thus a glaring transgression of

his jurisdiction.

We must also emphasize that we dismissed the petition questioning the

Court of Appeal's July 30, 1991 Decision, thereby affirming the conviction of

petitioner. The trial court's assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution was therefore

"tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court of

the land affirming the judgment of conviction of respondent Court" and

"unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion." 14

Manifestly erroneous then is the trial judge's justification that he has

previously promulgated the Court of Appeals' Decision on April 4, 1995. As

already stated, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was

imprisonment plus a higher amount of civil indemnity. In ordering only the

payment of the indemnity, the trial court failed to execute the CA Decision in

its entirety. Notwithstanding the subsequent CA Decision clarifying and

this Court's dismissal of the petition questioning the said earlier CA

Decision, the trial court still adamantly refused to do so. The persistent

refusal of the trial court is a clear display of grave abuse of discretion.

We find misleading the claim of petitioner that the Court of Appeals itselfacknowledged that the latter's July 30, 1991 Decision was "ambiguous and

obscure." 15 Such claim is bereft of factual basis. Nowhere in its Resolution

16 did the CA so describe its previous Decision. It merely restated the import

of its July 30, 1991 Decision. Evidently, this was either misunderstood or

distorted by the trial court, which stated that "it is ineluctable that the penalty

imposed by the lower court was not touched on at all by [the Court of

Appeals] . . . ." 17

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for issuing a writ of

mandamus, in view of the trial court's refusal to perform its ministerial duty of

promulgating the appellate court's Decision in its entirety. Under Section 3,

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted "[w]hen

any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting

from an office, trust, or station . . . ." 18 Obedience to a superior court's order

is a ministerial duty of lower courts.

Lastly, petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court

of Appeals was improper, because the People had not filed a motion for

reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order. 19 This contention is bereft

of merit. A motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for


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certiorari where the questioned resolution was a patent nullity, as in this

case. 20

Second Issue: Promulgation of Conviction

Not Barred by Double Jeopardy

Petitioner submits that the trial court's promulgation of the CA Decision on

April 4, 1995 "cannot be set aside and a second promulgation be ordered" 21

because to do so would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy.

22 He contends that the judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has

become final 23 and that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over the case. 24

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:

. . . (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first

jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be

for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily

included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to

commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted).


competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been

entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the

express consent of the accused (citation omitted). 25

Petitioner contends that "the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995

of the Respondent Court's decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its

dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the

petitioner . . . ." 26 In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy

attached at that point.

The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil

action for the recovery of indemnity. 27 Hence, a decision in such case

disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused.

Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the

criminal.

As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete.

In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also

void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially

incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his

April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered

the aforementioned act of the trial court void. 28 Since the criminal cases

have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence,

double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. 29

We must stress that Respondent Court's questioned Decision did not modify

or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of

the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier

imposed on petitioner.

Cases Cited Not Applicable

People vs. Hernando, Ramos vs. Hodges and Republic vs. Court of Appeals,

cited by petitioner, are not applicable because they refer either to the lower

court's proceeding that is not void or to errors of judgment, not to lack or

excess or abuse of jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Hernando, 30 the Court

ruled that the questioned proceedings of the court a quo "were not an

absolute nullity as to render the judgment of acquittal null and void,"considering that the prosecution was not denied due process. In Ramos vs.

Hodges 31 the Court found that the trial judge's erroneous conclusion merely

constituted "errors of fact or of law," and not of jurisdiction. Lastly, in Republic

vs. Court of Appeals 32 the Court held that the lower court committed merely

"an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as there was no clear

showing [that it] exercised its power in [an] arbitrary or despotic manner by

reason of passion or personal hostility, or that its act was so patent and gross

as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or

to act in contemplation of law."

Epilogue

This Court takes this occasion to remind members of the bench to be precise

in their ponencias, most especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and

clarity in substance and in language are revered objectives in decision-

making.

Having said that, we also lament the trial court's convoluted attempt at

sophistry, which obviously enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his

imprisonment and to unnecessarily clog the dockets of this Court and of the

Court of Appeals. His Honor's expressed desire "to accept with modesty the


17/30

orders and decisions of the appellate court" was, in truth and in fact, merely a

sarcastic prelude to his veiled rejection of the superior court's order

modifying his earlier decision. His sophomoric justification of his refusal to

obey for fear of "being found to be grossly ignorant of the law" does not

deserve one whit of sympathy from this Court. Lady Justice may be

blindfolded but she is neither blind nor naive. She can distinguish chicanery

from wisdom, fallacious argument from common sense.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED


18/30

People Vs Alejandro

FACTS : Michael Alejandro was convicted of violating Section 4, Article II of

Republic Act no. 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous

Drugs Act, and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 plus

the costs. The evidence for the prosecution consisted mainly of the

testimonies of the NARCOM operatives who conducted the buy-bust

operation that led to the appellant's arrest and prosecution.

ISSUE : WON the sentence was cruel or inhumane

HELD : The law imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine

ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 regardless of the amount involved in

the sale of prohibited drugs. 18 This is not cruel punishment. It is settle that

"it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or

severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution" as it may that it was

prescribed to prevent or discourage the proliferation of crimes that are

especially hurtful to the public interest.

There is no question that the illicit distribution of drugs is one of the most

serious problems of our society and that nothing less than the most

determined efforts are needed to combat it. The stern penalties prescribed by

the Dangerous Drugs Act are intended to deter the aggravation of this

problem, which has already prejudiced the lives and the future of thousands

of our people, especially the youth. The persons who peddle prohibited drugs

are, as described in one decision, "evil merchants of misery and death." The

penalties imposed on them are neither cruel nor inhuman but totally condign,

if not in fact even inadequate.


19/30

People Vs Martinez

FATCS : These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses

under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to

quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute

an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by

the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R.

No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and

dismissed the case.

ISSUE : WON BP 22 violates the Constitutional rights against imprisonment

due to debt

HELD : The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making

and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its

presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the

law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay

his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,

the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because ofits deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the

law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an

offense against public order.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential,

insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things

hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. 24 It is a power not

emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state,

plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the

conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the

government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend

thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct

unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal

peace, safety, good order and welfare."

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter

of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed

public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end.

Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the

statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its

enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing

checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when

overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 minion

to 80 million pesos a day

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private

interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the

interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a

wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful

practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a

thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce,

injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the

public interest.


20/30

People Vs Cudia

FACTS : On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay

Santa Inez, Mabalacat Pampanga, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed

revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City,

where he was detained. the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an

information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,

docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542,

The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City

Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not guilty to

the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the

parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed

the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.

On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also

filed an information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal

possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No.

11987. The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to

Dismiss/Withdraw the Information

On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No.

11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal

possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned

in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed despite his

opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash

ISSUE : WON there is a violation of the constitution

HELD : In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the

following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached

prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;

and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second

offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first

information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.[5]

In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is

necessary to prove the existence of the following:

(a) Court of competent jurisdiction

(b) Valid complaint or information

(c) Arraignment

(c) Valid plea

(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed

or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused

As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent

jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in

jeopardy.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the

President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983

Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as

apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the

judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over

instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is

conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.

With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the

City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information,

the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is

beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9

of the Administrative Code of 1987,

Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

x x x x x x x x x

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,

misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their

respective

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor,

who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga

but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a

public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[8] It must be exhibited

or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If

not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction


21/30

People Vs Puno

FACTS : On December 23, 1981, the City Fiscal filed against the accused an

information (Criminal Case No. 10323) for six (6) counts of violations of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, with the City Court of Lucena, Branch I.

On March 3, 1982, the accused was arraigned by the court and she pleaded

not guilty to the charge.

In compliance with a directive of the Ministry of Justice contained in a letter

from the Chief State Prosecutor dated March 9, 1982 in connection with the

criminal charges against private respondent Palillo, the Office of the City

Fiscal filed on March 22, 1982 six separate criminal informations for violation

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the then Court of First Instance of

Quezon,On April 5, 1982, the City Fiscal filed a Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case

No. 10323, pending before the City Court of Lucena, on the ground that

proper informations have been filed with the Court of First Instance ofQuezon. The counsel for the accused filed an Opposition to the Motion to

Withdraw

On July 28, 1982, private respondent was again arraigned, now before the

Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and she entered a plea of "Not

Guilty" in all aforesaid six (6) criminal cases. After entering her plea of "NotGuilty," private respondent filed on the same day a Motion to Dismiss the

aforementioned six (6) criminal cases on the ground of double jeopardy,

claiming that the City Court of Lucena City had already acquired jurisdiction

over Criminal Case No. 10323 and that, therefore, the dismissal of the last

mentioned case, the very case bearing the same causes of action as the six

(6) criminal cases, constituted a dismissal on the merits.

On July 30, 1982 the respondent CFI judge issued the first questioned order

granting private respondent's motion to dismiss all the six (6) criminal

informations filed against her.

ISSUE : WON there is double jeopardy

HELD : A careful scrutiny of the circumstances of these cases would clearly

show that no double jeopardy exists. It is a settled rule that to raise the

defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first

jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must

have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the

same offense, or the second offense include or is necessarily included in the

offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same

or is a frustration thereof


competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered;

and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express

consent of the accused

Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides for a penalty of imprisonment

of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not

less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall

in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine or

imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948 provides that the municipal judgesin the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall

have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with

an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the

penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or

imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand

pesos or both

Taking into account the amount of each check which is P85,000.00 upon

which the court may base the alternative imposable penalty of fine pursuant

to BP. Blg. 22, as alleged in the information filed in the City Court, it is clear

that the latter has no jurisdiction to try the case considering that the

imposable fine will be P85,000.00 at the very least up to the amount of

P170,000.00 which is way beyond the maximum amount of P6,000.00 from

which the City Court may validly draw concurrent jurisdiction over the case. It

is this alternative penalty of fine and not the penalty of imprisonment which

divests the City Court of its jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 10323.

Hence, the City Court of Lucena correctly dismissed said case and since the

dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the

prosecution of the same offense in the proper court.


22/30

It is noteworthy that the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323 and

the subsequent filing of the six (6) criminal informations with the Court of First

Instance were made in compliance with the directive of the Ministry of

Justice. Clearly, these were designed to correct the error committed with

respect to the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 10323.

Nevertheless, the Court finds that the error does not constitute substantial

prejudice to private respondent considering that no evidence yet has ever

been presented and the private respondent was never exposed to trial. Thus,

the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 were as though the

accused was being tried and prosecuted under an original information. The

constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going

through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceeding was dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the right to present its

own evidence to substantiate the allegations in the information, there is no

second jeopardy to speak of. Contrary to the stand of the private respondent

in its motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490, the City Court's order

of dismissal cannot be considered as a judgment of acquittal since, as

already pointed out, the said court has no jurisdiction to try the case.


23/30

People Vs obsania

FACTS : On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the

alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents,

Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of

Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery,

After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for

further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for

rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint,

with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd

designs".

The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel

moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was

fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent

information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the

jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quogranted the motion and ordered

dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by theoffended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with

'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this

order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.

ISSUE : WON there is a violation of the constitution

HELD : In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in

favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the

original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent

court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant

was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or

otherwise terminated without his express consent.

The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the

court a quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the

record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence,

the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case

was without the express consent of the accused.

The doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy states that when the case is

dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not

be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in

having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or

privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding

to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

The doctrine of estoppel says that an accused cannot now be allowed to

invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing the trial court to commit an

error which otherwise it would not have committed. In other words, appellee

can not adopt a posture of double dealing without running afoul with the

doctrine of estoppel. It is well-settled that the parties to a justiciable

proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which

People vs Alejandro

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