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Italy and Qadhafis Libya haveenjoyed a privileged relation-ship for the last forty years.Trade relations have survivedeven the most acute politicalcontroversies. Libya plays anirreplaceable role in Italysenergy policy, not only be-cause of the amount of oilimported, but also because ofthe exceptional quality of Lib-

yan crude oil imports and thegeographic proximity thatmakes access to resourceseasier a variable that hasbecome even more importantin the last decade as a resultof Italys interest in Libyannatural gas. In 2010 Libyawas Italys biggest oil supplierand its third biggest naturalgas supplier. Almost 10 billioncubic metres of natural gas,

mainly used to generate elec-tricity, annually arrive in Italythrough the Greenstreamunderwater pipeline laid bythe Italian energy giant, ENI.

While Italy needed Libyan oiland gas, the regime in Tripolineeded Italy, above all as afundamental contributor to thestability of the rentier state,essentially based on the re-distribution of oil income1. Italy

1On the concept of the rentier

state, see the work by H.BEBLAWI - G. LUCIANI, in particu-

was the main importer of Lib-yan oil and the income gainedfrom it enabled Qadhafi todistribute it among the popula-tion, creating civil servicejobs, pursuing a policy ofstate-controlled prices andsetting up a system of subsi-dies for primary goods. ButItaly, with its know-how, wasalso needed to support

Libyas capacity both to ex-tract the oil that provided thatincome, and to bring into be-ing the process of redistribu-tion, which took place throughthe construction by Italiancompanies of civilian struc-tures and the importation ofprimary goods and finishedproducts.

During the 80s and the 90sItaly remained Libyas only

real Western reference point,reinforcing its complementaryfunction in the Libyan econ-omy. In Libya, Italian compa-nies built civilian infrastruc-tures and supplied primarygoods and finished productsto population.

Thanks to Libyas abundantfinancial resources, Italian

lar, H. BEBLAWI, The RentierState in the Arab World, in G.LUCIANI, The Arab State, London,1990, pp. 85-98.

No. 219 - JUNE 2012

Abstract

Italian government, as otherEuropean countries, was sur-prised by the first upheavals of

Arab Spring . Italy and L ibya haveenjoyed a privileged relationsh ipfor the last forty years. After thedecision of military intervention,preoccupied by the risk of geo-politi cal marginalization, Italygradually started to adopt abandwagoning policy. Libyaspresent difficult transition maybeprovides a new opportunity forEurope to be a key players in thecountry. Italy would profit fromgreater involvement in the stabi-lization of the country.

Arturo Varvelli, ISPI Research Fellow

(*) The opinions expressed herein arestrictly personal and do not necessar-ily reflect the position of ISPI.

Arturo Varvelli

Italy and new Libya between cont inui tyand change

(*)

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companies have won impor-tant contracts and Italy hasconsolidated its role. In 2008a number of favourable condi-tions allowed Italy and Libyato bring the political disputeon colonial past to an end withthe Treaty of Friendship, turn-ing over a new leaf and rein-vigorating bilateral relations.The most important conditionwas Libyas full reintegrationinto the international commu-nity after the sanctions im-

posed by the UN and the USwere revoked and US-Libyandiplomatic relations com-pletely re-established2. Thisnormalisation of internationalrelations, to which Italy con-tributed significantly,strengthened the regime,allowing it to relaunch its oilindustry and reinforce rela-tions, above all economicrelations, with various Euro-

pean countries.The Treaty of Friendship,signed on the 31st of August2008, between Prime MinisterSilvio Berlusconi and Libyanleader Muammar Qadhafi,paved the way for more stableco-operation between the twocountries, especially in sec-tors of more recent interestsuch as immigration. Interna-tional polemics followed the

Treaty, centred mainly on theappropriateness of Berlusconi Qadhafi tight connections.These polemics, which ap-peared mainly in the British,US and French press, high-lighted the fact that relations

2Important steps to the rap-

prochement between the U.S. andLibya were taken by Qadhafi when

he collaborated in the war on ter-rorism after the September 11,2001; and when he gave up thenuclear and chemical weaponsprograms in 2003.

with Tripoli had developed ina complex framework that hadto take account of nationalinterests as well as interna-tional concerns3.

In this respect, Italys bilateralrelations with Libya in recentyears have revived one of themost historically typical char-acteristics of Italian foreignpolicy and rhetoric: even themost controversial bilateralrelations are justified in multi-

lateral fora as being bridgesbetween the institutions inwhich Italy is a member andthe others. They are not,therefore, vindicated in termsof freedom of action, but arebasically seen as a way ofdirectly strengthening Italysinfluence with the more impor-tant ally thanks to the offer ofprivileged relations with otherpartners. At the same time,they aimed at preserving thestability of the Libyan regimeperceived as a fundamentalpartner for Italy4. But this pol-

3 For example, in September 2009,US ambassador in Rome, David

Thorne, expressed his discomfortwith Italys close relations withLibya. But this has not kept Italyfrom encouraging the United Statesto enter into dialogue with Libyawith extemporaneous initiatives,

which is what the meeting betweenObama and Gadhafi at the LAquilaG8 summit appeared to be. M.CAPRARA, Lambasciatore Usaavverte lItalia Dipendenza ener-getica, un rischio, in Corrieredella Sera, 16 September 2009.4 G. BONVICINI - A. COLOMBO(Eds.), La politica estera dellItalia,IAI-ISPI, Bologna, 2010, pp. 17-20.In the past, this policy has beenfollowed several times: the at-tempts to mediate betweenReagan and Qadhafi in the eight-

ies, the Italian contribution in thevarious attempts to thwart coupsagainst the regime, Italian strugglefor the removal of internationalsanctions have always been in-

icy was going on not withstrategic vision but with ex-temporaneous initiatives,which is what the meetingbetween Obama and Qadhafiat the LAquila G8 summitappeared to be5.

Italy and Libyan cris is:from rhetoric ofstatus quoto bandwagoning

Italian government was sur-prised by the first upheavals

of Arab Spring between De-cember 2010 and January2011 in Tunisia and Algeria.The then-Minister of ForeignAffairs, Franco Frattini, andthe Prime Minister, Silvio Ber-lusconi, looked at the riotswith the old perspectives ofIslamic fundamentalism andinternational terrorism. In-deed, on January 17 Frattinitold the press that the first

priority for Western countrieswas the prevention of funda-mentalism and terrorism; and,thanks to the high level ofinclusion of civilians inside thepolitical process and system,Qadhafis Libya was a modelto pursuit for countries in theMiddle East North Africa(MENA) area6.

On the eve of Egyptian riots,Italy continued to underesti-

mate the regional dimensionof protests and their interna-tional implications. The maingoal was to support the status

tended to preserve the stability ofthe Libyan regime.5

A. VARVELLI, Italy and Libya:Renewing a Special Relationship,in The International Spectator:Italian J ournal of InternationalAffairs, vol. 45, no. 3, 2010, pp.

117-130.6 M. CAPRARA, Frattini: Arginareil fondamentalismo. questa lapriorit dell'Europa, in Corrieredella Sera, 17 J anuary 2011.

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quo and, consequently, theexisting dictatorial regimes.As the US rhetoric about hu-man rights and self-determination grew up andHosni Mubarak was thrownout on February 11, alsoRome had to change its atti-tude towards protests. How tocombine freedom and democ-ratic values, the stability of thearea and national interests,such as avoiding illegal immi-gration from MENA, became

the primary target for the Ital-ian government.

When the Libyan crisiserupted, Berlusconi and Frat-tini initially thought they couldcontinue with business asusual, opting for a wait andsee approach, possibly ex-pecting Qadhafi to re-establish quickly his grip onpower7. On the internationalstage, Rome proposed itselfas privileged European part-ner of Libya, especially in-forming United States aboutthe developments of the situa-tion. This trend was clearlyunsustainable when Libyanmilitary and politicians, aboveall the Ministries of Interior(Younis) and Justice (Abdel-J alil), began to defect ArmedForces and Qadhafis gov-ernment. Italian misjudgement

was challenged further onwhen rebels formed the Na-tional Transitional Council(NTC), as an alternative to theexisting regime. Rome had tochoose a player to support8.

7Libia, la repressione fa pi di 100

morti. Berlusconi: Non disturboGheddafi, in La Repubblica, 19

February 2011.8 K. MEZRAN, La rivolta, in K.MEZRAN - A. VARVELLI, Libia.Fine o rinascita di una nazione?,Donzelli ed. Roma, 2012.

Qadhafi was the first option.This choice revealed itself inopposition to the calculusmade in Washington, Parisand London. Berlusconi andhis inner circle tried to medi-ate while seeking to maintainthe longstanding relationshipwith Tripoli alongside the tra-ditional solidarity with EUpartners and NATO allies. Butthat effort proved very difficult.French activism against Qad-hafi, backed by Britain and US

attitudes, put Italy in a harshposition9. The weak mediationproposals of Rome calling fora peaceful conciliation be-tween Libyan regime andrebels, without any externalinterferences, collapsed whenNicolas Sarkozy declared thatQadhafi must leave the powerand requested the Interna-tional Criminal Court to inter-vene10.

To European partners, Italianposition looked like a nonsen-sical defense of the dictator-ship11. Therefore Rome,pushed by the public opiniontoo, was forced to mutate itsinitial approach, thus optingfor a reactive one. The firstmeasure taken was the sus-pension of the Treaty ofFriendship on February 26.The President of the Republic

of Italy, Giorgio Napolitano,

9R. SANTINI - A. VARVELLI, The

Libyan Crisis Seen from EuropeanCapitals, Brookings Institutions,

J une 2011. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/06/01-libya-santini.10

All Voices, France claims thedeparture of Muammar Gaddafi, 25February 2011, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/8306074-france-claims-the-departure-

of-muammar-gaddafi.11Lira della Ue contro la FarnesinaNon pu difendere un dittatore inLa Repubblica, 22 February2011 (online).

contributed to shift the posi-tion of Rome towards a moreintervening one with thespeech at the UN HumanRights Council on March, 4.The next day, Frattini affirmedthat naval and air bases onthe Italian soil were availablejust for eventual humanitarianoperations. On rumours con-cerning the imposition of a no-fly-zone over Libya, the Minis-ter declared that it could bepossible only with a clear UN

mandate.

Preoccupied by the risk ofgeopolitical marginalization,underlining Romes traditionalpreoccupation about its rank-ing rather than its actual role,Italy gradually started to adopta bandwagoning policy. Atthis point, by distancing itselffrom the Libyan dictator onlyafter all the other Westernallies had taken sides againsthim, Italian government lostits leverage with the Libyanopposition and effectivelyabdicated from its potentialrole as international mediator.Last hopes for a mediationrole were ultimately madeimpossible by the approval ofUN Security Council Resolu-tion 1973 (17 March), whichallowed the imposition of anynecessary measures to pro-

tect civilians. Meanwhile, Frat-tini assured Hillary Clinton,US Secretary of State, thatItaly would have avoided toparticipate in any military op-eration, particularly bombings,due to its colonial past inLibya. However, he confirmedthe availability of seven Italianbases for the allies to applythe no-fly-zone12.

12Clinton credited with key role in

success of NATO airstrikes, Libyan

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NATO involvement andItalys recovering position

Once that the coalition of thewilling was formed by France,Great Britain, United Statesand Arab countries, and thefirst bombings struck Qad-hafis Armed Forces, Italy wasforced to evolve once againits attitude. The ghost of isola-tion disclosed itself twicewhen Italy was excluded froma conference call on Libyas

future by US, France, Britainand Germany. Napolitanoimplicitly called the govern-ment for a greater involve-ment in order to defend hu-man rights and dignity; inother words, he invoked theresponsibility to protect. Sub-sequently, the Italian Parlia-ment approved two resolu-tions which affirmed that thecountry should have partici-pated actively in the applica-tion of UN Resolution 1973side-by-side the other in-volved countries and the in-ternational organizations.Government had no choiceand decided that there was nopossibility of going back tothe future for its Libyan poli-cies. Given the uncertainsituation in Libya, the ItalianGovernment took action toprotect its strategic interests

as best it could and finallyRome went to war with Qad-hafi.

Shoulder to shoulder withUnited States and Britain, andin opposition to France, Italytried to involve NATO in theaction. Thanks to a deter-mined ad coordinated diplo-matic initiative, by the end ofMarch NATO took the overallcommand of operations. The

rebels, in Washington Post, 31October 2011.

main goal of Rome then be-came to contribute substan-tially to political and militaryactivities in order to gain, aspayoff, equal opportunities inthe crisis management13. Italyabandoned the reluctanceabout participating directly inbombing Libya. On April,pushed by US pressures andtrying to stop French activismin its courthouse, Romeannounced its full involvementin NATO operation Unified

Protector14. Meanwhile, thegovernment recognized theNTC as legitimate representa-tive of Libyan people.

With a reinvigorated will, Italytried to regain its specialrelationship with Libya bydefinitely adopting a perspec-tive of regime change.Strengthening political, eco-nomic and military links withNTC were just the first steps.Competing with Paris was thebiggest problem. Rome senton the ground military advi-sors and mentors to trainrebels, following in Franceswake. The Italian proposal ofa creation of a trust fund toeconomically help the interimgovernment was very appre-ciated by rebels representa-tives. Diplomatically, agree-ments and memorandum of

understanding have beensigned by Italy and NTC sinceMay. But French-Italian rivalrynever disappeared, projectinga shadow upon the future ofthe special relationship be-tween Rome and Tripoli.

13A. CERRETELLI, Compromesso

sulla Nato, in Il Sole 24 Ore, 23March 2011, p. 2.14

Italian Government, Libia: collo-quio telefonico Obama-Berlusconi,25 April 2011.

The instability of newLibya: the challengesfor Rome

After the breakdown of theregime and the death of Qad-hafi, NTC leaders were toplease all their potential futurepartners because of the enor-mous economic, social andpolitical challenges they willface. The risk of a protractedinstability of Libya could haveserious consequences for

Italy, first of all about illegalimmigration and energy sup-ply. The new Italian govern-ment has noticed that it truststhe work of new Libyan PrimeMinister, Al-Keib. On J anuary,21 Prime Minister MarioMonti, accompanied by theForeign and Defense Minis-tries, Giulio Terzi and Giam-paolo Di Paola, visited Tripoli.The rhetoric of both govern-ments seems to be very dif-ferent from the past. The Lib-yan-Italian joint declarationaffirmed that the two countrieshave mutual interests instrengthening the friendshipon bilateral and multilateralbasis, in accordance to theprinciples of glorious Revolu-tion. More pragmatically, acloser cooperation was estab-lished on military and medicalareas: e.g. Italy prolonged

mentoring and training activi-ties for Libyan security forces.No explicit references havebeen made to the Treaty ofFriendship.

Today, despite the regimesbreakdown, the death ofMuammar Qadhafi, and thescheduled elections in J une,there remains a concretepossibility that a pacific transi-tion to democracy will falldown. Protracted instability ofthe country could have seri-ous consequences not only

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for the South Mediterraneanregion but also for Europeancountries and Italy in particu-lar. The need for a nationalreconciliation process inLibya, the creation of newinstitutions, and a renewedbalance between the variouspower components requires amajor effort and commitmentto state building by bothdomestic and internationalactors.

This mission is by no meanseasy to accomplish. Severalcleavages and internal con-frontations between differentcenters of powers can beoutlined. There are somecentrifugal forces, whileothers are centripetal. Theformer are the militias, thenumerous political parties andthe regional groups claimingautonomy from Tripoli15. Thelatter are the central authority,Islam16, and the rentier stateaspect.

The most important of thecentrifugal forces are the mili-tias, a result of the old tribalmembership. Most of thesemilitias, which took part in thestruggle against the regime,are geographically rooted,identified with specificneighbourhoods, towns andcities such as Zintan andMisrata rather than joinedby ideology or ethnicity; theyseldom possess a clear politi-cal agenda beyond securingtheir area. This peculiarityimplies the emergence ofseveral micro-power groups

15In eastern Libya, a push for more

autonomy from Tripoli, Reuters, 5March, 2012.16

On Islam role in Libya, see Y.M.SAWANI, Post-Qadhafi Libya: aninteractive dynamics and politicalfuture, in Contemporary ArabAffairs, J anuary 2012.

with limited territorial control,but they are making unifiedadministration of the countryvery complex17.

These groups seem to bereluctant to recognize thecentral authority of the NTCwithout first negotiating theirpeaceful participation in themanagement of power in thecountry. They are competingwith each other and they wantto have guarantees before

they lay down their arms

18

.A further problem is the cen-tral authoritys legitimacy:weak domestic legitimacycompensated by strong exter-nal legitimacy. Many Euro-pean countries, the UnitedStates and Turkey have madeofficial visits and given sup-port to the NTC. But the latteris increasingly in trouble,forced between the needs of

its international protectors andlocal factions various re-quests for participation in themanagement of power.

Therefore, what is needed isnot simply the re-constructionof political, social, legal andeconomic institutions in Libya,but the establishment of a realrule of law and all the legalmechanisms mutual obliga-tions and checks-and-

balances that distinguish amodern state. However, Libyais a rentier state and willprobably remain such in thefuture. Rentier states (or dis-tributive states) create a spe-cific social contract between

17 Disarming Libyas Militias, Car-negie Endowment for InternationalPeace, 16 February 201218

J . PECK - B. BARFI, In Wars

Wake. The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya, The WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, Pol-icy Focus 118, February 2012;Disarming Libyas Militias cit.

citizens and rulers. In produc-tive economies, taxation gen-erally requires the implicitacceptance of those beingtaxed, linking the process tolegitimacy and, ultimately, tosome form of political contes-tation. In distributive statestaxation is superfluous andthere are no formal represen-tations this is the reverse ofthe no taxation without repre-sentation principle that con-tributes to state formation

dynamics in Europe19. In dis-tributive states, the stateseconomic role encourageswealth-for-power trading.Given Libyas accessibility ofenergy resources, it is surethat its new rulers whoeverthey are will pursue thesame social pact. In late Feb-ruary, the NTC issued a law toredistribute 2,000 dinars(roughly 1,200 euro) to every

Libyan family to celebrate theanniversary of the revolution,with an additional 200 euro toevery member of the familywho is not married20.

The future shape of Libya willreflect the combination ofrentier state peculiarities andhistorical cleavages of itssociety. The wealth of thecountry, coupled with conflict-ing individual European inter-

ests the rivalry betweenFrance and Italy was evident,could exacerbate the competi-tion between different powergroups, complicating thesituation further. Anyway,central authority could bestrengthened by next J uneselections, if they are credible.

19

D.J . VANDEWALLE, Libya SinceIndependence: Oil and State-Building, 1998.20

National Transitional Council(NTC), Law n. 10, 2012.

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Italys policy options

If the Libyan crisis providedthe EU with an opportunity toverify itself as a globalplayer, this opportunity waslargely lost. The EU remainedsilent when the protests ineastern Libya erupted in mid-February 2011, but the UKand France quickly assertedthemselves as the revolutionsprotagonists. They pushed theUS to intervene with a no-fly

zone despite EU foreign pol-icy chief Catherine Ashtonsinitial objections, vocal oppo-sition from the Italian andGerman governments andcriticism by other NATOmembers, especially Turkey,as already outlined.

But Libyas present instabilityand difficult transition maybeprovides a new opportunity.What margin for manoeuvre

does the EU (and Italy) havetoday? Is it possible to stabi-lize the country and to pro-mote democracy in such afragile rentier state? Europeanplayers should weigh theneed to not overly interfere inLibyas affairs against theobligation to not becomeoverly complacent about thecountrys still-fragile future.

According to an article on

Foreign Policy of Italian For-eign Minister Terzi, the Italianapproach should be based onthree main priorities. First,international communityneeds to be more determinedin helping build a secureLibya. Second, it needs amore ambitious plan to investin Libyas human capital. Thatmeans launching training andeducation programs in differ-

ent areas, from state admini-stration to economic man-agement, from free media todemocratic civil society. Third,

there needs to be a medium-term strategy to integrate thenew democratic Libya moreclosely with Euro-Atlanticinstitutions. As Libya con-solidates its democratic insti-tutions and rule of law, theEuropean Union should beready to engage in negotia-tions for a new trade and as-sociation agreement. Like-wise, Libya should be encour-aged to join NATOs Mediter-ranean Dialogue21.

So, targeting these goals,Italian government could fo-cus on the main urgency, theinternal stability. It should be apriority for Italy to concentratemore on the so-called cen-tripetal forces than on thecentrifugal ones. Moreover,the European Union, sided byNATO allies, should be in-volved in delegitimizing localmilitias. Indeed, popular intol-erance of their violence isincreasingly widespread inLibya, but the central govern-ment has so far failed incommunicating the strategicrisks of their activities in someareas, such as the capital.

So, while awaiting the elec-tions, the UN mission in Libya(UN Support Mission in Libya,UNSMIL) has to be empow-ered. Italy has an interest inpushing diplomatically to-wards this outcome. Thismission is tasked to buildnational institutions and pro-tect human rights, and it couldpotentially evolve into apeacekeeping mission if thesituation deteriorates. Italy,sided by European partnersand Arab countries, could call

21

G. TERZI Di SANTAGATA, WhyLibya Matters, in Foreign Policy,May 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/22/why

_libya_matters.

for a new summit of theFriends of Libya group,which met several times dur-ing the civil war. Consideringthe Afghan and Iraqi lessonslearned, and particularly theneed for the state buildingprocess to remain in localauthorities hands, Italy wouldprofit from greater involve-ment in the stabilization of thecountry. It is at risk indeed:Libya is on the brink of anar-chy, a sort of protracted low-

intensity conflict.

In the energy sector, it isunlikely that existing contractswill be modified soon. Cer-tainly, it is foreseeable thatthere will be more competitionon future contract opportuni-ties. This could affect the gassector, where an Italian su-premacy still remains, as wellas the oil sector, where theold Libyan partners couldcome back to negotiationsover passing previous politi-cal-bureaucratic difficulties.Moreover, new competitorscould enter this business. Bythe end of the civil war, Libyahas reactivated its energyproduction faster than ex-pected bringing it to higherlevels than 2010, when wasroughly 1.6 million per-day.

Today, there is a clear pre-dominance of the Libyantechnocrats over the man-agement of some key sectors,like oil. Abdal Raman BenYezza has been appointed asMinister of Oil by the transi-tional government: he previ-ously worked for LNOC, forthe American consortiumOasis (which operates in Li-bya, too) and for ENI. Thisdemonstrates that the NTC is

determined to leave the oilsector in the hands of expertswith important international

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links, thus taking it away frompolitical battles between fac-tions. Hence the governmentseems to consider thatstrengthening relationshipswith international companiesis a preliminary target for alarger exploitation of nationalresources.

In the long term a harsh issuecould be the rise of new play-ers with an ideological-radicalview, in opposition to a prag-

matic-realistic one. Given thatmaintaining strong linkageswith foreign importers is anational interest priority for arentier state like Libya, somedoubts still persist on the po-litical orientations of the futureLibyan administration and theenergy relations with the his-torical partners as Italy; in-deed, it could exploit economyand energy policies in order togain an easy and fast con-sensus among people22.

In conclusion, for these moti-vations, rather than startingdetrimental competitions for aprivileged position in Libya,Italy and the relevant Euro-pean powers should focus onimproving societal securityand political stability by facili-tating the dialogue betweenthe different power groups.They also should improve thepopulations welfare by reacti-vating wealth-redistributionmechanisms. European eco-nomic and energy interestsshould be pursued only afterthese priorities have beenaddressed.

22 A. VARVELLI, Le prospettive delsettore energetico della nuova

Libia e lItalia, in La Primaveraaraba e gli scenari energetici:prospettive di policy per lItalia,Ricerca ISPI per il Ministero degliAffari Esteri, novembre 2011.

La ricerca ISPI analizza ledinamiche politiche, strategi-che ed economiche del siste-ma internazionale con il dupli-ce obiettivo di in formare e diorientare le scelte di policy.

I risultati della ricerca vengo-no divulgati attraverso pubbli-cazioni ed eventi, focalizzatisu tematiche di particolareinteresse per lItalia e le suerelazioni internazionalie artico lati in:

9 Programma Africa9 Programma Caucaso e

Asia Cent rale9 Programma Europa9 Programma Mediterraneo

e Medio Oriente9 Programma Russia e

Vicini Orientali9 Programma Sicurezza e

Studi Strategici

9

Progetto Argentina9 Progetto Asia Meridionale9 Progetto Cina e Asia

Orientale9 Progetto Diritti Umani9 Progetto Disarmo9 Progetto Emergenze e

Affar i Umanitar i9 Progetto Internazionaliz-

zazione della PubblicaAmminist razione

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ISPIPalazzo Cleric iVia Cleric i, 5I - 20121 Milanowww.ispionline.it

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ISPI 2012