Consolidation of Fissile Materials in the Russian Nuclear Complex

Posted on July 15, 2008 | Printer-friendly version

Podvig, Pavel Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, TN, July 13-17, 2008

Russia is the country that has the largest amount of weapon-usable fissile materials in its disposal, most of which has been produced during the cold war. In the years following the end of the cold war Russia has undertaken significant effort to downsize its nuclear complex, leading to its serious transformation. This transformation, however, left the basic structure of the nuclear industry, most of the production facilities and most of the fissile material intact. Substantial amounts of weapon-usable fissile materials are still in storage, moved from one facility to another, or used for research and other purposes, creating security risks. Although the dangers associated with continuing presence of weapon material are generally acknowledged, the task of reducing this danger, by either eliminating the material or removing it from circulation and consolidating in a small number of safe and secure storage sites, has proven difficult. This paper analyses the progress that Russia has made so far in consolidating its weapon-usable materials and describes the challenges that it is facing in further advancing this goal.

Weapon-usable materials in Russia’s nuclear complex

Providing security of weapon-usable fissile materials emerged as one of the key security challenges of the post-Cold War era. The large nuclear weapon production complex that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union produced and routinely handled tens of tonnes of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and weapon-grade plutonium. This material has been scattered across a large number of sites, complicating the task of providing adequate security. As Russia is reducing its nuclear arsenal, it has to scale back its nuclear weapon production complex. This process presents important opportunities for consolidating weapon-usable materials and reducing the risks associated with them.

Today, Russia is not producing new fissile materials for weapons. The Soviet Union stopped producing highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in 1988.[1] Some weapon-grade plutonium is still produced, but since 1994 that plutonium has been sent to storage, so it could not be used for weapon purposes.[2] Two of the last three plutonium production reactors were shut down in April and June 2008 and one is scheduled for shutdown in 2010. Given the large amounts of fissile materials that have been produced already and the dramatically reduced size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, it is extremely unlikely that Russia will ever need to resume production of fissile materials for weapons. Russia and the United States have declared some of their fissile material excess – as part of this process Russia declared that it considers “up to” 50 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium as excess.[3]

The total amount of weapon-usable fissile material in the Russian inventory is known with a very large uncertainty. It is estimated that the Soviet Union produced up to 1400 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium.[4] Taking into account that almost 300 tonnes of HEU has been down-blended already as part of the U.S.-Russian HEU-LEU deal, the amount of HEU that Russia has can be estimated to be about 1100 tonnes.[5] Only part of this material is in custody of the Rosatom, which manages the Russian nuclear complex. Some of it is in weapons, and some is in naval reactor fuel.

In addition to HEU, Russia has a sizable stock of reactor-grade as well as weapon-grade plutonium. It is estimated that the total amount of weapon-grade plutonium that has been produced so far is about 145 tonnes.[6] Russia also has more than 41 tonnes of separated civilian plutonium.[7]

At the peak of the Cold War, in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union had more than 40,000 nuclear warheads of all types.[8] By 2007 that number has been drastically reduced – Russia is estimated to have about 3300 deployed strategic warheads and about 2300 non-strategic warheads. Taking into account the warheads that are in storage or awaiting dismantlement, Russia probably has about 15,000 nuclear warheads.[9]

The amount of fissile materials currently in warheads is not known, but a simple estimate shows that a significant fraction of the weapon-usable fissile material – probably as much as 500 tonnes of HEU and 50 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium – may still be in warheads.

The amount of material that is allocated to military naval reactors is estimated to be about 100 tonnes. However, only part of that material, the one that has been converted to reactor fuel, is transferred to the custody of the Russian Navy. The rest remains in custody of Rosatom.

Taking all these data in into account, we can estimate that the Russian nuclear industry currently has up to 600 tonnes of HEU and about 100 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium outside of warheads. These estimates are in general agreement with the number of 600 tonnes of weapon-usable material in Russia, which is usually used in the context of a material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) activity.[10] The discrepancy, of course, is very large, underscoring the fact that no accurate and reliable information about Russian fissile material stock is available.

Whatever the uncertainty, the amount of material in the Russian nuclear complex is unlikely to change significantly in the next decade or even in the longer run. The additional 200 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium for down-blending will most likely come from disassembled weapons. Russia has stated that it intends to stop down-blending after the HEU-LEU contract ends in 2013.[11] As for plutonium, Russia has made a commitment to eliminate about 34 tonnes of plutonium, but that process is unlikely to begin for a number of years.[12]

Nuclear weapon production complex

The industrial complex created by the Soviet Union to support development, production, and maintenance of nuclear warheads is a large conglomerate of enterprises that were traditionally managed by a single ministry in the government. For most of its history it was known as the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (or Minsredmash). As of 2008, the complex is managed by the state corporation Rosatom. Rosatom is responsible for most aspects of nuclear-related activity, whether military or civilian. Its enterprises and subdivisions manage all aspects of nuclear cycle – from uranium mining to fuel fabrication and spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposal. Rosatom and its daughter companies and research institutes are operating all civilian power production nuclear reactors, as well as most research nuclear facilities. On the military side, Rosatom is directly responsible for production of weapon-usable fissile materials and development and production of

nuclear weapons.

The core of the Rosatom nuclear complex consists of ten closed cities, all of which were involved in weapon-related activities in the past. Chelyabinsk-65 (currently known as Ozersk), Tomsk-7 (Seversk), and Krasnoyarsk-26 (Zheleznogorsk) were the main plutonium production centers. Enrichment facilities in Sverdlovsk-44 (Novouralsk), Krasnoyarsk-45 (Zelenogorsk), and Tomsk-7 were producing highly-enriched uranium. (The production complex also includes an enrichment plant in Angarsk, which has never been used to produce highly-enriched uranium.) The main chemical and metallurgical facilities for processing of the material and pit fabrication were located in Chelyabinsk-65 and Tomsk-7. These two cities most likely served as major storage sites for weapon-grade material. Substantial amounts of weapon materials were also stored and handled by the two nuclear weapon laboratories - VNIIEF in Arzamas-16 (Sarov) and VNIITF in Chelyabink-70 (Snezhinsk).

Production of nuclear weapons and their components was concentrated at the Avangard plant in Arzamas-16 and at the Electrochemical Instrument Combine in Sverdlovsk-45 (Lesnoy). These two plants appeared to have the capability to manufacture fissile material components, as well as perform weapon assembly and disassembly work. The other two assembly plants, in Penza-19 (Zarechny) and Zlatoust-36 (Trekhgorny), were assembling weapons and warheads from physics packages supplied by other production facilities. They were also involved in weapon disassembly work.

The restructuring of the Russian nuclear complex that took place after the end of the cold war and was largely completed by 2003 resulted in a number of notable changes in the flow of weapon-usable fissile materials. Production of new weapon-grade material for weapons purposes has stopped. Nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly activity has been concentrated at two sites – in Trekhgorny and Lesnoy. Uranium enrichment facilities no longer produce weapon-grade HEU. However, all of them (but Angarsk) are now involved in the HEU-LEU deal-related activities that include handling of HEU during down-blending process.

In 2007, Russian government initiated restructuring of the nuclear industry that included further consolidation of some nuclear power related activities. As part of that initiative, most of weapon-related activities have been discontinued in Seversk, Zheleznogorsk, and at the Avangard plant in Sarov/Arzamas-16.[13] At the same time, this change does not necessarily mean that all weapon-grade material has been removed from these sites.

Non-weapon facilities

In addition to the materials in the nuclear weapon development and production complex, substantial amounts of weapon-usable materials are used in applications that are not directly related to weapon production. Highly-enriched uranium is widely used in research reactors, critical and subcritical assemblies that were built in Russia as well as abroad. Some research facilities also use plutonium. HEU fuel is used in submarine and other naval reactors, as well as in the fast breeder reactors that were built in the Soviet Union. Fuel fabrication plants that produce HEU fuel routinely handle and ship out significant amounts of weapon-grade materials. Some highly-enriched uranium and plutonium is also present in research institutes that conduct research related to reactor fuel.

Although the quantity of material involved in non-weapon activities is relatively small compared to what is used in the weapon production complex, it amounts to several tonnes of weapon-usable material, primarily HEU. About 2.2. tonnes of Russian-origin HEU is estimated to be outside of Russia.[14]

This material is distributed among large number of facilities, which may not have the degree of centralized control over the material that is normally associated with weapon-related work. Consolidation of this material should therefore be a very important part of any program that aims at reducing the dangers associated with weapon-grade fissile materials.

About 20 organizations in Russia have research reactors and critical or subcritical assemblies that use HEU fuel (some of them have more than one installation of this type). In addition, more than 20 nuclear reactors and critical and subcritical assemblies built by the Soviet Union are currently located outside of Russia. By June 2008, all HEU fresh and spent fuel have been removed from five of these sites. Most other sites either have been shut down or had fresh HEU fuel removed from them. However, at least five reactors and five or six critical assemblies still have HEU on site.

In addition to research reactors and critical assemblies, Russia has an extensive fleet of military and civilian naval reactors. Most naval reactors, military or civilian, use highly-enriched uranium with enrichment levels of up to 90%, although average enrichment levels appear to be lower.[15]

Most of the fuel for nuclear reactors in Russia and abroad is manufactured by two major production facilities – the Machine-Building Plant (MSZ) in Electrostal and the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (NZKhK). The plant in Electrostal specializes in producing uranium oxide fuels. It manufactures fuel elements and assemblies for four types of power reactors of Soviet design – VVER-440, RBMK, EGP-6, and BN-600. It also supplies fuel to all military naval reactors and civilian transport reactors and to research reactors that use uranium oxide-based fuels. The Novosibirsk plant, is producing fuel for VVER-440 and VVER-1000 power reactors. It also produces a range of cermet (ceramic-metal) fuels that are used in research reactors. Most of these fuels contain highly-enriched uranium with enrichment of 36% and higher. The Novosibirsk plant also produces HEU fuel that is used in plutonium production reactors.

Possibilities for consolidation

Although some work has been done to downsize the complex and consolidate the materials, highly-enriched uranium and plutonium are still present at a large number of cities. In addition, substantial amounts of weapon-usable materials remain in circulation, mostly related to the HEU-LEU project and the continuing operations of nuclear-powered fleet and a number of research reactors.

Consolidation of weapon-usable materials at a smaller number of facilities would be a difficult task. The consolidation work that Rosatom has done so far was mostly done in response to the economic pressures in the 1990s and the incentives provided by the United States. Now that these factors play a far smaller role, Rosatom’s incentive to continue consolidation have changed. There is no reason to doubt that the Russian government and Rosatom are committed to the goal of reducing the risk that is associated with circulation of weapon-usable materials. This political commitment, however, should be translated into workable incentives and a set of specific actions that will help reduce the risk.

As for practical steps, Rosatom could concentrate its efforts in several areas – securing materials that are part of the weapon development and production cycle, further consolidation of the weapon production complex, cleaning out civilian research facilities, conversion of research and transport reactors to LEU fuel.

The nuclear weapon production complex continues to contain the largest amounts of weapon-grade materials, concentrated at several storage sites – at Ozersk, Seversk, Sarov, Snezhinsk, and probably Zheleznogorsk. Securing these sites should be one of the highest priority tasks. Attempts to

consolidate this material at a smaller number of storage facilities should be avoided, for such consolidation would require transporting hundreds of tonnes of weapon-grade material, creating serious additional security risk. At the same time, an effort could be made to improve the storage facilities and separate them physically and organizationally from the rest of the closed cities they are located in. This would create conditions for better protection and accounting of the material.

Russia could make one more step toward consolidation of its weapon assembly facilities by moving all assembly and disassembly activities that include HEU and plutonium components to Lesnoy, leaving Trekhgorny to continue it work on non-nuclear components and instrumentation.

As long as Russia continues its weapon assembly and disassembly, some weapon materials will remain in circulation, transported from one site to another. However, Rosatom could take steps that would minimize transfers of weapon material.

A large number of shipments are associated with the activities of the HEU-LEU program. Currently, the uranium that is removed from weapons at the plant in Lesnoy is shipped in metal form to two facilities – in Ozersk and Seversk, where it is converted to uranium dioxide, which is then converted to UF6 in Seversk or Zelenogorsk. Some of the HEU hexafluoride is then sent to Novouralsk for downblending. The program could be consolidated to eliminate unnecessary transfers of weapon-grade material. One way of doing so would be to move all metal to dioxide conversion to Ozersk and fluorination and downblending to Zelenogorsk. Another possibility is to concentrate all the activity in Seversk, which has all necessary facilities.

The shutdown of plutonium production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk also will offers important opportunities for consolidation. Reprocessing facilities at both sites could be then closed down as well and weapon-grade plutonium moved into storage. After that neither site will be involved in work with weapon-usable material, which would open a way for a complete cleanout. One possible exception is storage, but as discussed above, it should be separated from all other activities. It is also assumed that Seversk ends its participation in the HEU-LEU program. Another benefit of the consolidation of the HEU-LEU program activities would be a cleanout of the Novouralsk enrichment plant. The plant is licensed to produce HEU, but it appears that Russia has no demand for HEU at this point.

Further consolidation of activities in the nuclear weapon complex may include concentrating all pilot small-scale production of weapon components in Snezhinsk. In this case, production facilities in Sarov would be closed down, although it would probably continue research and development work with weapon materials.

On the civilian side, Russia should continue the effort to clean out various small sites as well as facilities within larger sites. A substantial part of this effort should be directed at converting research and civilian transport reactors to LEU fuel.

To demonstrate its strong commitment to the conversion program, Russia could set a goal of eliminating HEU from the Novosibirsk fuel fabrication plant. Most of the demand for HEU fuel from the weapon complex will stop in 2010, after a shutdown of the last plutonium production reactor. The tritium production reactors, which use HEU fuel produced in Novosibirsk, could probably use LEU fuel. As for research reactors, the Novosibirsk plant is already producing LEU fuel for the most popular types of reactors and could most likely develop LEU fuel for other reactors as well.

The MSZ fuel fabrication plant in Electrostal would most likely continue its work with HEU fuel, for it supplies fuel for military naval reactors. It also supplies HEU fuel for fast reactors and for

some research reactors. The conversion efforts of MSZ could be concentrated on development of LEU fuels for civilian transport reactors.

The consolidation steps outlined here would create a nuclear complex in which weapon-grade materials would be concentrated at four or five major storage facilities – Ozersk, Seversk, Sarov, Snezhinsk, and maybe Zheleznogorsk. Ozersk will remain the key site for all chemical and metallurgical activity involving uranium and plutonium. It will retain its pit production facilities and tritium production reactors (converted to LEU). Weapon research and development activity would continue at two weapon labs – in Sarov and Snezhinsk, although only Snezhinsk would have pilot-scale manufacturing capability. All HEU fuel production would eventually be concentrated at MSZ in Electrostal.

Zelenogorsk would continue to handle HEU conversion and downblending as part of the HEU-LEU program, but when this program ends in 2013, all enrichment facilities would be cleaned of HEU. Similarly, Seversk and Zheleznogorsk would be ready for a cleanout after shutdown of their production reactors in 2008 and 2010.

On the civilian side, Russia would still have a fairly large number of research facilities that have HEU or plutonium on their territory. At the same time, if the reactor conversion program is successful, it would eliminate HEU from all Russian-design research reactors abroad and from a number of sites in Russia. It could also remove HEU from Russian civilian transport reactors.

[1] Oleg Bukharin, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, “New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities,” (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, October 1999), p. 6

[2] Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 97. International Panel on Fissile Materials, The Global Fissile Material Report 2006 (Princeton, NJ: Program on Science and Global Security, September 2006), p. 20.

[3] Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, John P. Holdren, “Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan” (Cambridge, MA: Managing the Atom Program, 2003), p. 158. Russia and the United States have pledged each to dispose of 34 tonnes of this material. International Panel on Fissile Materials, The Global Fissile Material Report 2007 (Princeton, NJ: Program on Science and Global Security, October 2007), p. 33.

[4] Oleg Bukharin, “Analysis of the Size and Quality of Uranium Inventories in Russia,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1996), p. 68.

[5] Global Fissile Material Report 2006, p. 19 gives an estimate of about 1000 tonnes with uncertainty of 300 tonnes.

[6] Uncertainty of this estimate is about 25 tonnes. Of that amount, 34 tonnes is pledged for disposal, and some additional amount, probably 15 tonnes, may be declared excess. Global Fissile Material Report 2006, p. 6.

[7] The number reported in 2005 was 41.2 tonnes. Global Fissile Material Report 2007, p. 21.

[8] “Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, Vol. 62, No. 4 (July/August 2006), p. 66.

[9] “Russian nuclear forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 63, No 2 (March/April 2007), pp. 61-67.

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites,” GAO-03-482 (March 24, 2003), p. 89. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “MPC&A Program: Strategic Plan 2001” (July 2001), p. 4. A DoE estimate of the total amount of material available to Russia is more than 1250 tonnes of HEU and about 150 tonnes of Pu, which is also generally consistent with the numbers used here. GAO, “Additional Russian Cooperation Needed,” p. 80-81.

[11] Russia may choose to continue down-blending, but it is not clear if this choice would be economical – Russia uses more SWU capacity in the process of down-blending than it would have to use by enriching natural uranium. Oleg Bukharin, “Understanding Uranium Enrichment Complex,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2004), p. 204.

[12] Global Fissile Material Report 2007, p. 36-38.

[13] “On restructuring of the nuclear energy industrial complex of Russian Federation,” President of Russian Federation, Order No. 556 of 27 April 2007. Appendix No. 2.

[14] Global Fissile Material Report 2007, p. 31.

[15] Oleg Bukharin, “Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2006), p. 29.

The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s

Posted on June 27, 2008 | Printer-friendly version

Pavel Podvig, "The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s--A Research Note", International Security, Summer 2008, Vol. 33, No. 1: 118-138

The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t

Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s

Pavel Podvig

The decline of détente in the second half of the 1970s and the subsequent deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union brought the nuclear arms race between the two countries to a particularly dangerous level. One of the key developments that shaped this slide to confrontation was the strategic modernization program that the Soviet Union undertook in the 1970s and the growing sense of vulnerability that it caused in the United States.[1] Largely as a

reaction to the Soviet program, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States launched a massive military buildup that was supposed to restore the balance and force the Soviet Union to restrain its military and political aspirations.

At the center of the Soviet Union’s modernization effort was a substantial increase in the number of nuclear warheads carried on its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). That increase was made possible by the deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which were not constrained by the SALT treaty (named after the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), signed in 1972, and were only moderately limited by the follow-on agreement, SALT II, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded in 1979. Combined with the Soviet Union’s traditional reliance on its land-based ICBM force and the relatively large size of its missiles, the deployment of multiple warheads allowed the Soviet Union to overcome the United States in the size of the land-based leg of its nuclear triad. By the mid-1970s, the United States had completed deployment of its MIRVed missiles, the Minuteman III, and its ICBM force contained about 2,200 warheads.[2] Around this time the Soviet Union, which first deployed a MIRVed ballistic missile in 1974, had caught up with the United States and was adding about 500 warheads to its ICBM force annually. According to some intelligence projections, the Soviet Union was expected to have as many as 14,000 ICBM warheads by the mid-1980s.[3]

Although the United States maintained an advantage in the overall number of strategic nuclear warheads, as well as in other important areas (e.g., the survivability of its nuclear forces), it increasingly viewed the growing size of the Soviet ICBM force as a threat to the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Some measures of that balance appeared to demonstrate that the Soviet Union had a significant advantage that it could use to exert political pressure on the United States.[4] According to one of the arguments raised in the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union had an advantage in “residual potential”—that is, the combined throw weight of the strategic launchers remaining after an initial nuclear attack.[5] Although a number of U.S. experts questioned the relevance of this kind of measure, it nevertheless became a notable part of the public discussion in the United States.[6] Around 1976–77, the U.S. intelligence community adopted the use of measures based on residual potential.[7]

Over time, the argument about residual potentials and the U.S.-Soviet disparity in throw weight evolved into a more complicated discussion about the vulnerability of U.S. land-based ballistic missiles to a preemptive Soviet strike. In the late 1970s, the U.S. discussion of the strategic balance often assumed that “the Soviets will shortly have the theoretical capability to destroy about 90 percent of the U.S. ICBM force . . . by firing as few as 210 of their 1400 ICBMs.”[8] This perceived vulnerability of U.S. land-based ICBMs gave rise to doubts about the effectiveness of U.S. deterrence, even though the two other components of the United States’ strategic triad (and, to a large extent, the ICBMs that would survive an attack) had the capability to independently destroy “more than 70 percent of the Soviet economic value.”[9] Critics of the SALT II treaty, which largely preserved the Soviet advantage in ICBM throw weight, argued that having lost the only component of the strategic triad capable of attacking Soviet ICBM silos, the United States would be unable to initiate a retaliatory strike against Soviet cities, because the Soviet Union would still have enough missiles to respond with an attack against U.S. cities. This perceived vulnerability significantly influenced the U.S. decision to seek a survivable counterforce capability made up of land-based missiles that would allow the U.S. military to launch a retaliatory attack against Soviet silos. Still, U.S. proponents of this new capability argued that from the early 1980s—when the Soviet Union was expected to deploy ICBMs that could target U.S. silos—to the mid to late 1980s—when the United States planned to field its new missiles—the United States would confront a dangerous “window of vulnerability,” which the Soviet Union could exploit, if not to attack the United States then to challenge it on a range of international security issues, for example, by seeking to expand its area of influence.[10]

Even assuming that the Soviet Union had the theoretical capability to destroy the U.S. ICBM force, there was still the question of whether the Soviets could take advantage of it. Given the highly uncertain outcome of such an attack and the formidable deterrent potential of the U.S. strategic nuclear force, this theoretical capability probably could not have produced tangible political gains.

Nevertheless, an influential group of experts and politicians in the United States, many of whom were associated with organizations such as the Committee on the Present Danger, argued that the Soviet modernization program proved that Moscow was striving to obtain a first-strike capability against U.S. forces.[11] This view figured prominently in a report written by a panel known as “Team B,” which was formed in 1976 to provide an alternative assessment of U.S. intelligence data on the subject.[12] The conclusions of the panel influenced U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic intentions. According to these estimates, the Soviet Union “reject[ed] U.S. notions of strategic stability and sufficiency” and perceived mutual assured destruction as “neither desirable nor a lasting basis for the U.S.-Soviet relationship.” The goal of the Soviet Union, U.S. intelligence reported, was to “fight, survive, and win a nuclear war.”[13]

Although the Soviet Union denied that the purpose of its modernization program was to acquire a counterforce capability or to achieve military advantage, its protests had virtually no impact on the debate in the United States. Some experts in the United States did, however, question the alarmist interpretation of the Soviet program or point out that because of the uncertainties associated with any nuclear attack, it would be impossible for the Soviet Union to take advantage of its alleged counterforce potential.[14] Nevertheless, the issue of the United States’ “window of vulnerability” achieved prominence on the U.S. political agenda in the late 1970s and early 1980s, opening the way for the United States to launch its own strategic modernization effort, which included development of the MX ICBM and Trident II sea-launched ballistic missile, and eventually the Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense program.

Evaluation of the motives behind the Soviet modernization program of the 1970s has always been a difficult task. Testimonies of senior Soviet military officers involved in military planning in the 1970s and 1980s, collected after the end of the Cold War, strongly supported the view that the Soviet Union did not seek a first-strike or war-fighting capability for its strategic forces.[15] To be convincing, however, such testimonies require corroboration, including documentary evidence on the direction of the Soviet Union’s missile development efforts, as well as on technical details of its missile programs, in particular details about the accuracy of its missiles, warhead yields, and the hardness of its silos. Although there have been publications that describe some of these aspects, most of their relevant data were taken largely from U.S. sources.[16]

This situation has recently changed, as archival documents of the Soviet period have become available for the first time.[17] These documents, combined with information from other sources, such as official historical accounts published by various design bureaus within the Soviet defense complex and by the military, allow a reconstruction of key developments in the Soviet strategic modernization programs of the 1970s and 1980s. This essay introduces this new evidence and discusses some of its implications for the analysis of Soviet capabilities and intentions at the time.

Capabilities of the Soviet ICBM Force

The main contours of the Soviet modernization program in the 1970s were determined during an intense debate in the late 1960s to early 1970s, known as the “small civil war,” in which the Soviet Union’s military, industrial, and political leadership had to make a number of fundamental decisions regarding the country’s nuclear strategy—decisions that would determine the shape of its strategic forces for more than a decade. The focus of the debate was on whether the Soviet Union

should continue to maintain the force of vulnerable missiles that it had built in the 1960s, effectively restricting itself to a first strike posture, or whether it should move toward the deployment of more survivable missiles, as required by strategies based on retaliation. The outcome of the debate was a decision to concentrate on the deployment of multiple-warhead missiles in hardened silos that would provide the Soviet Union a second-strike capability.[18]

The modernization effort would involve three types of MIRVed ICBMs—the MR UR-100 (SS-17), the UR-100N (SS-19), and the R-36M (SS-18). These missiles carried four, six, and eight independently targeted warheads, respectively.[19] In addition, the Soviet Union would deploy UR-100K and UR-100U missiles, which were moderate upgrades of the original UR-100, deployed in the 1960s. Most of these missiles carried multiple, but not independently targeted, warheads.[20] The Soviet Union also kept a small number of solid-propellant single-warhead RT-2 (SS-13) missiles.[21] Table 1 shows the changes in the composition of the Soviet ICBM force after 1970: by 1978–79, when the Soviet Union had completed the first wave of its MIRVed missile deployment, its ICBM force included almost 500 multiple-warhead ICBMs, which carried more than 3,000 warheads.

Table 1. Soviet ICBM Force, 1970-90.

System WH Yield, MT 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

R-36 1 20 162 202 202 210 210 202 1731 8.3 46 46 46 46 46 46 431 6.9 12 12 12 12 12 12 12

R-36orb 1 2.3 12 18 18 18 18 18 18R-36M 8 4x1.0

+4x0.410 16 56

10 0.4 81 20 16

R-36MUTTH 10 0.51 20

R-36M2 10 0.8RT-2 1 0.43 40 40 60 60 60 60 50RT-2P 1 0.8 10UR-100N 6 0.4 60 90UR-100NUTTH 6 0.4MR UR-100 0.4 10 50MR UR-100UTTH 0.5Perimeter[d]UR-100 1 ? 982 990 955 830 610 390 350UR-100K 1 1 75 200 200 200

3 0.22 150 220UR-100U 3 0.22 100 120RT-23UTTH silo 10 0.4RT-23UTTH rail 10 0.4Topol 1 0.8

Total 1,254 1,308 1,293 1,251 1,166 1,264 1,416

System WH Yield, MT 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

R-36 1 20 122 62+ (60)[a]

(60)[a] 1 8.3 40 101 6.9 12

R-36orb 1 2.3 18 18 18R-36M 8 4x1.0

+4x0.4104 136 148 148 106 52

10 0.4 8 10 10 101 20 22 30 30 30 30 30 30

R-36MUTTH 10 0.5 60 120 172 226 2781 20

R-36M2 10 0.8RT-2 1 0.43 40 30 20RT-2P 1 0.8 20 30 40 60 60 60 60UR-100N 6 0.4 140 170 190 190 190 190UR-100NUTTH 6 0.4 20 110 110 140 330MR UR-100 0.4 80 110 120 120 80 40 10MR UR-100UTTH 0.5Perimeter[d]UR-100 1 ? 270 210 100+

(90)[a]100[b] 100[b] 100[b] 100[b]

UR-100K 1 1 200 200 200 200 200 200 2003 0.22 220 220 220 220 220 220 220

UR-100U 3 0.22 120 120 60 60 60 30 30RT-23UTTH silo 10 0.4RT-23UTTH rail 10 0.4Topol 1 0.8

Total 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,398 1,398 1,398 1,398

System WH Yield, MT 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

R-36 1 201 8.31 6.9

R-36orb 1 2.3R-36M 8 4x1.0

+4x0.410 0.41 20 30 30

R-36MUTTH 10 0.5 278 278 278 278 268 238 2201 20 30 30 30 30 30

R-36M2 10 0.8 10 40 58RT-2 1 0.43RT-2P 1 0.8 60 60 60 60 60 60 40UR-100N 6 0.4UR-100NUTTH 6 0.4 360 360 360 360 350 300 300MR UR-100 0.4MR UR-100UTTH 0.5 140 140 140 130 110 90 37Perimeter[d] 10[c] 10[c] 10[c] 10[c] 10[c] 10[c] 10[c]UR-100 1 ? 100[b]UR-100K 1 1 200 248 248 248 248 248 248

3 0.22 220 172 172 130 122 112 78UR-100U 3 0.22RT-23UTTH silo 10 0.4 20 56 56RT-23UTTH rail 10 0.4 3 12 24 33Topol 1 0.8 99 99 149 158 190 288

Total 1,398 1,397 1,398 1,398 1,398 1,398 1,398SOURCE: Figures are drawn from Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev, papers, 10 boxes, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 8, doc. 13.8. Older ICBMs are not shown. [a] Silos are undergoing reconstruction. [b] Missiles are deployed without warheads. [c] Only six out of ten missiles are Perimeter missiles. [d] MR UR-100UTTH missiles.

Although the numerical composition of the Soviet force was well known to U.S. intelligence, the capabilities of the deployed missiles were much harder to assess. Gradually, the question of the counterforce potential of the new force became increasingly contentious among U.S. analysts. Different assumptions about the accuracy of the Soviet missiles and therefore their ability to attack hardened targets, or about the ability of Soviet silos to withstand a U.S. attack, led to dramatically different conclusions about the intent of the Soviet military buildup.

When the Soviet Union began deploying its first MIRVed ballistic missiles in 1974, the consensus

of the U.S. intelligence community was that the accuracy of these missiles, though better than those deployed in the 1960s, was no greater than about 0.25 nautical miles (470 meters) circular error probable (CEP). At that time, the U.S. intelligence community estimated that the Soviet Union could improve the accuracy of its next generation of missiles, to be deployed in the early 1980s, to 0.15 nautical miles (280 meters).[22] These estimates meant that the Soviet Union did not have a significant counterforce capability and likely would not achieve one until the mid-to-late 1980s.

This consensus was challenged by the Team B panel, which had been charged with evaluating the Soviet missiles’ accuracy as part of its mandate. Although the U.S. intelligence community initially contested the conclusions of the panel, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) issued after 1976 generally assumed a higher level of accuracy (about 400 meters) for the first-generation of Soviet MIRVed missiles.[23] The revised estimate of the missiles’ accuracy from 470 meters to 400 meters was not a significant change in itself, for it did not fundamentally alter the estimate of the counterforce capability of the Soviet ICBM force. Combined with other developments, however, this revision proved highly consequential.

One development was the apparent change in the timeline of the Soviet missile modernization program. In October 1977 the Soviet Union began flight tests of the modified versions of its SS-18, SS-19, and SS-17 missiles with “improved tactical-technical characteristics.” These versions were known as the R-36MUTTH, the UR-100NUTTH, and the MR UR-100UTTH, respectively.[24] The U.S. intelligence community apparently considered these to be modernized versions of missiles that were not expected to arrive until the early-to-mid-1980s. Accordingly, U.S. intelligence estimated that the “UTTH” missiles had achieved a level of accuracy of 0.12–0.15 nautical miles (220–280 meters).[25]

Improved accuracy was indeed a main goal of the “UTTH” modernization program. According to Russian sources, most of the improvements were concentrated on the post-boost vehicle and the missile guidance system. Missile frames were almost unaffected, although the number of warheads carried by the R-36MUTTH missile increased from 8 to 10.[26]

Figure 1. Results of Flight Tests of the MR UR-100UTTH (SS-17 Mod 3) Ballistic Missile

SOURCE: Data drawn from Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev, papers, 10 boxes, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 46. NOTE: Figure shows miss distances of individual warheads. Radius of the circle is equal to the circular error probable as demonstrated in this series.

The Soviet modernization program did result in improved missile accuracy, but it remained significantly lower than in U.S. estimates. Figure 1 shows the results of flight tests of the MR UR-100UTTH missile, which indicate that the CEP, demonstrated in the test series, was about 400 meters. The R-36MUTTH and UR-100NUTTH missiles demonstrated similar performances.[27] Based on the results of these tests, Soviet military planners estimated that the accuracy of the “UTTH” missiles was 350–400 meters. These values, as well as the accuracies of other Soviet ICBMs, are presented in Table 2, along with data on the yield of the missiles’ warheads.[28]

Table 2. Characteristics of Soviet Ballistic Missiles Deployed in the 1970s and 1980s.

System Beginning of development

Years in service Warheads per missile and warhead yield

Accuracy (CEP), km

UR-100K 1969 1971-1991 1x1Mt 3x0.22Mt MRV

0.96 MRV: 1.2

UR-100U 1970 1974-1980 1x1Mt 3x0.22Mt MRV

0.96 MRV: 1.1-1.2

RT-2, RT-2P 1968 1972-1991 1x0.8Mt 1.8Temp-2S 1969 (1976) 1x0.8Mt 1.0MR UR-100 1970 1975-1983 4x0.4Mt 0.7MR UR-100UTTH 1976 1979-1994 4x0.5Mt 0.35-0.43R-36M 1969 1974-1983 1x20Mt

4x1Mt+4x0.4Mt 10x0.4Mt

0.7

R-36MUTTH 1976 1979-present 1x20Mt 10x0.5Mt

0.37

R-36M2 1983 1988-present 1x8.3Mt (1x20Mt) 10x0.8Mt

0.22 (GRV: 0.08-0.13)

(4x0.8Mt+ 6x0.15Mt GRV[a])

UR-100N 1970 1975-1983 1x5.3Mt 6x0.4Mt

0.65

UR-100NUTTH 1976 1979-present 6x0.4Mt 0.35-0.43RT-23 silo (15Zh44) Single warhead: 1976

MIRV: 1979Canceled in 1983 1x3.4Mt 0.3

RT-23 rail (15Zh52) 1979 1983-2002 (1x3.4Mt) 8x0.32Mt

0.35-0.43

RT-23UTTH silo (15Zh60) 1983 1987-2001 10x0.4Mt 0.22RT-23UTTH rail (15Zh61) 1983 1988-2005 10x0.4Mt 0.3-0.35[b]Topol 1977 1985-present 1x0.8Mt 0.35-0.43Kurier 1983 Canceled in 1991 1x0.5Mt 0.35-0.43Topol-M silo 1989[c] 1997-present 1x??Mt n/aTopol-M road 1989[c] 2006-present 1x??Mt n/aSOURCE: Figures drawn from Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev, papers, 10 boxes, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 8, doc. 13.8, pp. 34, 37, 60. NOTE: Systems and modifications that were never deployed are in parentheses. [a] GRV—reentry vehicle with terminal guidance. [b] This may be an early estimate of the accuracy of the missile. The actual accuracy may be comparable to that of the silo-based version of the RT-23UTTH (SS-24) missile. [c] As RT-2PM “Universal.”

As the data indicate, the U.S. estimates significantly overestimated the accuracy that Soviet missiles were able to demonstrate in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Soviet Union did indeed develop missiles with accuracies as high as 220 meters, but these missiles—the R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod 5) and the RT-23UTTH (SS-24)—were not deployed until 1988. In fact, the Soviet Union had not made the decision to proceed with the development of these two missiles until 1983.

U.S. estimates of the accuracy of the Soviet missiles had a direct effect on the projections of the counterforce potential of the Soviet ICBM force. Figure 2 shows projections made by the U.S. intelligence community in 1978 and 1979 of the number of Minuteman silos that could survive a two-on-one Soviet attack.[29] These estimates remained largely unchanged in the early 1980s; for example, in 1981 an NIE reported that “in a well-executed strike Soviet ICBMs would have the potential—using two RVs [reentry vehicles] against a Minuteman silo—to achieve a damage expectancy of about 75 to 80 percent today, and about 90 percent by the mid-1980s.”[30] Figure 2 offers a comparison of these estimates, with the estimate of the missiles’ actual capability that takes into account the data on accuracies and yields presented in table 2, as well as the actual composition of the Soviet ICBM force.[31] As Figure 2 demonstrates, only in 1991 did the Soviet Union barely reach the counterforce capability that the U.S. intelligence community reported it had achieved a decade earlier.

Figure 2. Counterforce Capabilities of the Soviet ICBM Force (2-on-1 attack. U.S. projections vs. estimated actual capability)

Vulnerability of the Soviet ICBM Force

Another important element of the Soviet Union’s missile modernization program in the 1970s was the hardening of its missile silos, which was designed to improve the missiles’ capability to withstand a nuclear attack. Although not directly related to the counterforce capability of the ICBM force, silo hardness influenced the strategic balance estimates of the late 1970s indirectly, through calculations of the residual potentials of Soviet and U.S. forces that could survive a first counterforce strike.[32] According to U.S. intelligence estimates made in 1978, about 650 of the Soviet Union’s 1,400 silo-based ICBMs could have survived a U.S. first strike, with this number gradually increasing throughout the 1980s. U.S. intelligence data projected that by 1988 the total number of Soviet silos would decrease to about 1,250, of which about 670 could withstand a two-on-one attack. The same estimate projected that by 1988 no more than about 17 of the United States’ 1,000 silo-based ICBMs could survive a two-on-one strike, painting a picture of alarming disparity.[33]

The Soviet Union did invest significant resources into hardening its ICBM silos, but its goal was relatively modest. Table 3 lists the distribution of silos by hardness and missile type in 1979 and in 1985: silos of UR-100 (SS-11) and R-36 (SS-9) missiles, which constituted the core of the Soviet ICBM force in the late 1960s and early 1970s, were extremely vulnerable, with their hardness not exceeding 30 pounds per square inch (psi). By 1979, about 40 percent of the Soviet Union’s 1,400 silos remained “soft.” Of the more than 800 silos that had undergone refurbishing, only about 330 were hardened to withstand 100 atm (1,500 psi), while the remaining 480 were hardened to 30 atm (450 psi) and 60 atm (900 psi). These figures differ dramatically from the U.S. estimates, which put the hardness of the Soviet missile silos at 5,000 psi and even 15,000–25,000 psi.[34]

Table 3. Number of Soviet ICBM silos by hardness, 1979 and 1985

System and silo hardness 1979 1985

100 atm (1,500 psi)

R-36M54 -

R-36MUTTH120 204

UR-100NUTTH110 170

MR UR-10020

MR UR-100UTTH30 50[a]

Total 100 atm334 (24%) 424 (31%)

60 atm (900 psi)

R-36M104 -

R-36MUTTH- 104

UR-100N110 -

UR-100NUTTH- 110

MR UR-10070 -

MR UR-100UTTH- 70

Total 60 atm 284 (20%) 284 (20%)

30 atm (450psi)

R-36M30 -

UR-100N80 -

UR-100NUTTH- 80

MR UR-10030 -

MR UR-100UTTH- 30

UR-100U60 -

Total 30 atm200 (14%) 110 (8%)

10 atm (150 psi)

RT-2P60 60

2 atm (30 psi)

UR-100100 80[b]

UR-100K420 420

Total 10 atm and 2 atm580 (41%) 560 (41%)

Total number of silos 1,398 1,378SOURCE: Figure drawn from Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev, papers, 10 boxes, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 48. [a] Ten are Perimeter silos. [b] Missiles deployed without warheads.

Even though a substantial number of its missiles were deployed in soft silos, by 1979 the Soviet Union could expect that more than 200 of its MIRVed missiles could survive a U.S. first strike. The total number of ICBMs available for a retaliatory strike was about 300—still substantial, but about 40 percent lower than the U.S. intelligence estimate. This number would steadily decline after 1979, as the United States began introducing more accurate missiles with higher-yield warheads.

The Soviet Union continued its silo-hardening program after 1979, with the deployment of the “UTTH” generation of MIRVed missiles. This program did not, however, result in significant changes in the number of hardened silos or in the level of protection. In 1985 less than one-third of the silos were hardened to 1,500 psi, and 40 percent were hardened to 150 psi or less. According to

Soviet plans from 1985, all silos were to be reinforced to the level of 100 atm (1,500 psi) in the 1990s, but it appears that these plans were not implemented.[35]

As these data show, the U.S. “window of vulnerability” did not exist. The Soviet ICBM force never had the capability to destroy most of the U.S. Minuteman force in a counterforce strike. The residual potential of the Soviet ICBM force, and therefore the Soviet Union’s ability to use its advantage in missile throw weight to implement various war-fighting strategies, also was seriously exaggerated.

Soviet Intentions

Did the United States correctly assess the Soviet Union’s intentions in launching its modernization program? An argument can be made that even though U.S. intelligence overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet strategic forces, the judgment about Soviet intentions may have been correct. The documentary evidence, however, strongly contradicts this interpretation of the Soviet program.

The U.S. estimates of the Soviet Union’s intent were largely based on the scale of the Soviet missile buildup in the 1970s. For example, the 1977 NIE concluded that “neither the creation of an acknowledged Soviet deterrence nor the achievement of acknowledged rough equivalence has caused any observable reduction in the trend and vigor of the Soviet program.”[36] The U.S. intelligence community observed that the Soviet military programs “have grown at a more or less steady pace for two decades,” a trend that it expected would continue.[37]

The increase in the number of missile warheads in the Soviet arsenal was indeed substantial. Yet, this increase was a direct result of decisions to deploy multiple-warhead missiles, which was motivated primarily by the need to expand the number of warheads that would be available in a retaliatory strike. Furthermore, the decision to proceed with three specific MIRVed systems—the MR UR-100 (SS-17), the R-36M (SS-18), and the UR-100N (SS-19)—was made largely to satisfy the design bureaus and to minimize the cost of silo conversion, which was apparently the main factor in limiting the systems’ deployment.[38] This established the basic structure of the Soviet ICBM force and set the pace as well as the limits of its growth.

According to plans developed during the “small civil war” debate of the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the Soviet Union wanted to increase its number of ICBM warheads to 6,200–6,500 by the early 1980s and to maintain that level throughout the decade.[39] U.S. intelligence, on the other hand, projected constant growth and predicted in 1981–82 that the Soviet Union would deploy about 10,000 ICBM warheads by 1988.[40] This figure, which assumed that the Soviet Union would not comply with the SALT II treaty, indicates that the United States did not understand the Soviet program. Documents suggest that the program was driven primarily by internal inertia, not by an effort to go beyond acknowledged rough equivalence with the United States. Similarly, the scale of the Soviet ICBM program was limited by internal factors and not necessarily by constraints imposed by arms control agreements.[41]

The Soviet Union’s intent in the area of qualitatively improving its ballistic missile force—that is, MIRVing its ICBMs, improving their accuracy, and hardening their silos—is somewhat harder to judge. Substantial investment in these areas might indeed suggest the intent to build a missile force capable of a first counterforce strike. The documentary evidence strongly suggests, however, that the Soviet modernization program in the 1970s concentrated on measures that would increase the retaliatory capability of the missile force, not its potential.

First, the Soviet Union paid special attention to ensuring that the newly deployed missiles could operate after being subjected to a nuclear attack. A program that provided this capability was part of every new Soviet missile development effort.[42] This included hardening missile silos against the physical effects of a nuclear blast, as well as improving the radiation hardness of ballistic missiles and their warheads.[43] Guidance systems that were developed in the 1970s were designed to support missile launch after a nuclear attack on the silo.[44]

In 1976 the Soviet Union initiated a program aimed at hardening its strategic launchers, warheads, and silos against the radiation effects of nuclear weapons.[45] As part of this program, in the late 1970s the Soviet Union conducted a series of nuclear tests that examined the radiation hardness of the missile bodies, warheads, electronics of its guidance systems, and basic electronic equipment.[46] The results of these tests identified electronic components as a weak point, which led the Soviet Union to initiate a large-scale program in the early 1980s targeted at improving the radiation hardness of the missiles’ electronics.[47] This work involved redesigning the missiles’ guidance systems, which proved to be a costly and complex task, mostly because of the inferior performance of the radiation-hardened components and their lower reliability.[48] The work was largely completed by 1985–86, and the missiles developed in the mid-1980s used radiation-hardened electronic components.

Moreover, Soviet missiles that were developed in the 1980s were also required to be hardened against the mechanical effects of a nuclear explosion, so that they could perform successful launches when adjacent silos were attacked or when the launch area was subjected to a disabling high-altitude nuclear explosion.[49] This was an important part of both of the Soviet Union’s silo-based missile development programs of the 1980s, involving the RT-23UTTH and R-36M2.[50]

Second, realizing the limits of silo hardening, the Soviet Union launched its mobile missile development program. The significant attention that this program received throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite a number of serious setbacks, provides strong evidence of the emphasis on survivability. Early Soviet attempts to build a mobile ICBM that could be transported on either a truck or a rail car date to the 1960s. The first such missile considered for deployment was the Temp-2S (SS-X-16), whose development began in 1969. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union planned to deploy about 260 of these single-warhead missiles by 1985.[51] The missile was not considered satisfactory, however, and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate it during the SALT II negotiations.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union continued with its other mobile missile development programs; the Topol (SS-25) road-mobile missile program began in 1977, and the RT-23 (SS-24) railroad-based missile began development in 1979.[52] Both systems were high-priority projects. The Topol missile was first flight-tested in 1983, and began deployment in 1985. Work on the RT-23 continued despite significant technical difficulties. In 1983, however, the RT-23 was replaced by the RT-23UTTH (SS-24), which was eventually deployed in silos and as part of a railroad-mobile system in 1987-88.[53]

Finally, in addition to missiles that could operate in a nuclear environment, the Soviet Union wanted to develop a command and control system and an early-warning system that would allow it to execute a retaliatory strike while under attack or after withstanding an attack. Soviet development of an automated command and control system dates to the late 1960s, but most of the work was done in the 1970s.[54] This system included a number of important components—the Signal-M system, which provided a high degree of automation in commanding the ICBM force; systems that provided proper authorization from the leadership; and communication systems designed to provide the required redundancy in the event of a nuclear attack.[55]

The concentrated effort to build an early-warning system began in the early 1970s. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union had completed deployment of a network of first-generation early-warning radars.[56] Construction of new, large, Daryal-type phased-array radars was under way, with the first radars in Pechora and Gabala expected to be operational by the early 1980s.[57] Another important element of the early-warning system—satellites that could detect missiles shortly after launch—was also in the last stages of development. Limited operations of that system began in 1978, and it was operationally deployed in 1982.[58]

Compared to the programs aimed at increasing the survivability of its missiles, the Soviet Union’s efforts to strengthen the counterforce potential of its ICBM force were relatively modest. Although improvement of missile accuracy was part of the modernization program of the 1970s, the available evidence suggests that it was not a high priority. For example, in the late 1970s the Soviet Union was developing a guided reentry vehicle that would have significantly improved the accuracy of its ballistic missiles.[59] Sometime in 1977–79 it apparently considered deployment of guided warheads.[60] These plans were not implemented, however, and none of the missiles deployed in the late 1970s and early 1980 carried guided warheads. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would have canceled this project had it been pursuing a counterforce capability.[61]

Overall, this analysis of the Soviet Union’s missile modernization program of the 1970s strongly suggests that its main goal was to build a strategic force that could survive a nuclear strike or launch a retaliatory strike while under attack. Nothing in the documents or in the details of the individual programs suggests that a first strike against the United States was an objective.

Conclusion

The Cold War was a complex phenomenon that cut across virtually every aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. It would therefore be wrong to assume that issues related to strategic nuclear weapons were solely responsible for the changes in the course of the confrontation. At the same time, these issues often played a central role, and the decisions about strategic nuclear forces, whether made in the United States or in the Soviet Union, were highly consequential. The legacy of the Cold War remains, in the thousands of nuclear weapons deployed by Russia and the United States and the host of nuclear proliferation problems that were inherited from that time or that emerged more recently. Understanding the dynamics and the driving forces of the Cold War nuclear confrontation would facilitate the two countries’ ability to tackle the problems confronting us today.

The data presented here demonstrate that concerns about the U.S. “window of vulnerability,” which figured so prominently in U.S. political discussions of the Soviet Union’s missile modernization program in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were unjustified. Contrary to the perception that existed at the time, the program did not have the potential to pose a serious threat to U.S. strategic forces. The evidence also strongly suggests that the Soviet Union had neither a plan nor the capability to fight and win a nuclear war.

This is not to say that the Soviet military programs were benign or that the Soviet Union did not strive for military or political advantage, or at least parity with the United States. As documentary evidence of the Soviet programs continues to emerge, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet military buildup was driven primarily by the inertia of the military industrial complex and by a lack of mechanisms to contain the country’s military programs. Political and ideological considerations also played a role, but that role was limited at best.

Overall, the data presented in this essay provide important new details about the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear forces, facilitating scholarly understanding of one of the key episodes of the Cold

War. This information should spur better understanding of U.S. and Soviet national security policies and force a critical look at the strategies the United States adopted to deal with the Soviet Union during that crucial period.

Pavel Podvig, editor of Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

I am grateful to David Hoffman for bringing the documents at the Hoover Institution archive to my attention and for providing me with some key U.S. documents. I also thank David Holloway, Sidney Drell, Matthew Evangelista, and Theodore Postol for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

[1] For a detailed history of that period, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994).

[2] For the data on U.S. forces, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data: NRDC’s Nuclear Program, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp.

[3] This was the high projection made in the 1974 National Intelligence Estimate. The low projection made that year was in the range of 7,000 ICBM warheads. Projections made in 1975-79 predicted 6,500-9,000 ICBM warheads. Directorate of Intelligence, “Intelligence Forecasts of Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces: An Evaluation of the Record,” Research Paper (Washington, D.C.: CIA, April 1989), p. 8.

[4] For example, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in his posture statement for 1978 stated, “The Soviets give evidence of moving toward a fundamental shift in the ‘correlation of forces’ that would give them peacetime and crisis leverage over the United States.” Quoted in John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 254.

[5] Paul H. Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 207-232 and Paul H. Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy, No. 25 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 195-210.

[6] For a discussion of the concept of residual potentials, see Jan M. Lodal, “Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 462-481. For a critical analysis of the residual potential methodology, see Garry D. Brewer and Bruce G. Blair, “War Games and National Security with a Grain of SALT,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1979, pp. 18-26.

[7] For example, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued in 1978 stated that “the trends in total remaining forces and destructive potential are highly relevant to the deterrence, strategic capabilities, and perceptions.” Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s, Vol. 1: Summary Estimate,” NIE 11-3/8-77 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, February 1978), p. 36.

[8] Warner R. Schilling, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), p. 69.

[9] Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through 1990, Volume 1 – Summary Estimate,” National Intelligence Estimate NIE 11-3/8-80 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, December 16, 1980), p. B-15.

[10] For an overview of the issues involved, see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 369-377. The “window of vulnerability” issue was put to rest only in 1983 by the Scowcroft commission, which reported that a disarming Soviet attack was virtually impossible and recommended deployment of MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos. Scowcroft Commission, “Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 17-18.

[11] Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” Commentary, July 1977, pp. 21-34; and Fritz W. Ermarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,” International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155. For a critical analysis of the approach that led to these assessments, see Raymond L. Garthoff, “On Estimating and Imputing Intentions,” International Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1978), pp. 22-32.

[12] Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis, “Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View: Report of Team B” (Washington, D.C.: CIA, December 1976), pp. 2-3. For the effect of the Team B report on intelligence estimates, see Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 248-257. For a detailed history of Team B, see Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Détente: the Right Attacks the CIA (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).

[13] CIA, NIE 11-3/8-77, p. 4.

[14] See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 325-334.

[15] The interviews were conducted in the early 1990s under a contract from the Office of Net Assessment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull, Soviet Intentions, 1965-1985, Volume 1: An Analytical Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Assessments during the Cold War, and Volume 2: Soviet Post–Cold War Testimonial Evidence (Germantown, Md.: BDM Federal, September 22, 1995). For an overview of the results of the project, see John A. Battilega, “Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War Interviews,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2004), pp. 157-159, 164.

[16] Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001); and E.B. Volkov and A.Yu. Norenko, Raketnoye protivostoyaniye (Missile standoff) (Moscow: SIP RIA, 2002).

[17] The main source of these data is the archival collection of Vitalii Kataev at the Hoover Institution Archive at Stanford University: Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev, papers, 10 boxes. The collection contains copies of official documents and notes taken at the time that describe various aspects of a number of Soviet strategic programs. Kataev was a senior adviser to the Secretary for the Defense Industry of the Central Committee of the Communist Party from 1974 to 1990.

[18] A detailed analysis of the deliberations of the late 1960s is beyond the scope of this article. This description is based on V.F. Utkin, Yu.A. Moszhorin, “Raketnoye i kosmicheskoye vooruzheniye (Missile and space armament)” in A.V. Minayev, ed., Sovetskaya voyennaya moshch ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (Soviet Military Power from Stalin to Gorbachev) (Moscow: Voyennyy

Parad, 1999), pp. 232-237; Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 130-131; G.K. Khromov, an official with the Military Industrial Commission (1966-1990), interview by author, Moscow, May 15, 2002; E.B. Volkov, acting director (1968-70) and director (1970-82) of the Central Research Institute of the Strategic Rocket Forces (TsNII-4), interview by author, Moscow, November 27, 2002.

[19] Some R-36M missiles were deployed with 10 warheads, and about 30 missiles of this type carried a single 20 Mt warhead. See Table 1.

[20] UR-100 missiles are known as SS-11 Mod 1. Some UR-100K missiles that carried single warheads would be classified as SS-11 Mod 2. UR-100U and UR-100K missiles that carried three not independently-targeted reentry vehicles would be SS-11 Mod 3. UR-100U missile was essentially the same missile as the UR-100K, but was deployed in a hardened silo.

[21] They were replaced by the RT-2P from 1976 to 1980.

[22] Robert L. Hewitt, John Ashton, and John H. Milligan, “The Track Record in Strategic Estimating: An Evaluation of the Strategic National Intelligence Estimates, 1966-1975” (Washington, D.C.: CIA, February 6, 1976), p. 8-9, in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001).

[23] Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 252.

[24] “UTTH” stands for “uluchshennyie taktiko-technicheskiye kharakteristiki” (improved tactical-technical characteristics). In the U.S. Department of Defense designation scheme, these missiles are known as the SS-18 Mod 4, SS-19 Mod 3, and SS-17 Mod 2 respectively. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 582.

[25] See, for example, an overview of the data on accuracy presented in Robert R. Soule, Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, January 1978) pp. 16-17. See also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 305, which indicates that in 1985 the accuracy of the SS-19 was revised downward from 0.12 to 0.21 nm.

[26] For some missiles, the upgrade was performed in silo and consisted of replacement of the warhead section of the missile without affecting the rest of the missile systems. S.N. Konyukhov, ed., Prizvany vremenem: Rakety i kosmicheskiye apparaty konstruktorskogo buro “Yuznoye” (Called up for Service by the Time: Missiles and Spacecraft of the “Yuzhnoye” Design Bureau), (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine: ART-PRESS, 2004), pp. 244-253.

[27] The flight tests in question were conducted from the Baykonur test site to the Kura test site at the Kamchatka Peninsula. The distance between these test sites is about 6,300 km, which is less than the 8,000-9,000 km distance between U.S. and Soviet ICBM bases. The CEP obtained in the flight tests would have to be recalibrated to reflect full-range accuracy. Details of the flight tests that would allow to do that, however, are unavailable.

[28] In the Soviet tradition, maximum error is used as a measure of missile accuracy. Maximum error is 2.7 times the standard deviation of the distribution of miss distances and is about 2.3 times larger than CEP. The CEP values listed in Table 2 are the maximum error values found in documents divided by 2.3 with subsequent rounding.

[29] Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the

Late 1980s, Vol. 1 – The Estimate,” NIE 11-3/8-78 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, January 16, 1979), p. 10; and Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s, Vol. 1 – Summary,” NIE 11-3/8-79 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, March 17, 1980), p. 13.

[30] Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1981-1991. Vol. 1 – Key Judgments,” NIE 11-3/8-81 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, March 23, 1982), p. 13. Charts that would show the evolution of projections were redacted from NIEs issued after 1979 during declassification.

[31] This estimate was obtained using a simple model that assumes that a Minuteman silo would be destroyed by a nuclear explosion if it fell within the range corresponding to overpressure of 1,500 psi. Overpressure values were calculated using the model described in Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and William M. Arkin, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change (New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, June 2001), pp. 161-189. The model used here also assumes that Soviet missiles have 85 percent reliability and that no fratricide takes place. Although the calculations used for the NIE projections employed a different procedure, the simple model used here agrees with the NIE results when it is used with the same assumptions about accuracy and warhead yields in NIEs. If anything, simple models tend to underestimate the counterforce potential of the attacking force. See, for example, John D. Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, “Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance between Prudence and Paranoia,” International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), p. 142 n. 3.

[32] See, for example, CIA, NIE 11-3/8-77, p. 36. Discussion of residual potentials was dropped from NIEs only in 1981.

[33] CIA, NIE 11-3/8-78, p. 10.

[34] McKinzie, Cochran, Norris, and Arkin, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan, p. 43. The authors estimated silo hardness based on the vulnerability numbers that they obtained from an official NATO target inventory publication.

[35] See Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 48.

[36] Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Strategic Objectives,” NIE 11-4-77 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, January 12, 1977), p. iii.

[37] Ibid., p. 2.

[38] The MR UR-100 and the R-36M used modified UR-100 (SS-11) and R-36 (SS-9) silos respectively, while UR-100N required construction of a new silo.

[39] The overall numbers remained the same even as the Soviet Union was changing specifics of the plan. For example, the 1977 plan called for the deployment of about 300 Temp-2S (SS-X-16) mobile missiles. The 1980 plan called for the development of a follow-on to UR-100NUTTH (SS-19). These systems were abandoned in favor of the Topol (SS-25) and the RT-23UTTH (SS-24) respectively. See Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 37; and G.K. Khromov, interview by author, Moscow, May 15, 2002.

[40] Directorate of Intelligence, “Intelligence Forecasts of Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces: An Evaluation of the Record,” Research Paper, (Washington, D.C.: CIA, April 1989), p. 8.

[41] One successful instance of arms control limitations was the ban on an increase in the number of warheads on existing missiles, negotiated as part of the SALT II treaty. Prior to that agreement, the Soviet Union considered a possibility of developing versions of the R-36MUTTH and UR-100NUTTH missiles with as many as 38 and 18 warheads respectively. Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 34. But even in this case, it is possible that the cancelation of these projects was simply a realization that these highly fractionalized missiles are impractical, rather than a response to arms control limitations.

[42] Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.7, p. 53.

[43] The first nuclear test that tested the ability of a R-36M missile warhead to withstand a nuclear blast was conducted in 1973. Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 47. (Most likely it was the test of October 26, 1973. See Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 523.)

[44] R-36M, UR-100N, and MR UR-100 missiles could be launched 2.5 to 3 minutes after an attack on a silo. Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 53.

[45] The program was outlined in the Decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers “On main directions of development of nuclear weapons in 1976-1985,” February 9, 1976. Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 47.

[46] The nuclear tests conducted within this program began in 1977. The purpose of the only test in 1977 (most likely the one on October 9) was to study the radiation hardness of electronics of some missiles. Three tests in 1978 studied the effects of hard X-ray radiation on electronics of missiles and their warheads, the capability of a R-36MUTTH warhead to withstand neutron flow, and the effects of hard X-rays on missile bodies (most likely these were the tests of September 20, October 15, and October 31). The purpose of the two tests in 1979 (one of these is most likely the test of September 27) was to study the effects of electromagnetic impulse and the radiation hardness of more than 1,000 various electronic components used in missile guidance systems. Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 47.

[47] Kataev, box 9, doc. 14.3; Utkin and Moszhorin, “Raketnoye i kosmicheskoye vooruzheniye,” p. 198. G.K. Khromov, interview by author, May 15, 2002.

[48] Utkin and Moszhorin, “Raketnoye i kosmicheskoye vooruzheniye,” pp. 199-200.

[49] Because of the geographic position of the Soviet Union it did not have the capability to implement a true launch-on-warning option, in which missiles would be launched before first attacking warheads arrive to their targets. A launch-from-under-attack, in which launches would be conducted in the environment of nuclear explosions at adjacent silos, was a more realistic option. See Pavel Podvig, “Reducing the Risk of an Accidental Launch,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 14, Nos. 2-3 (June 2006), pp. 75-115.

[50] Konyukhov, Prizvany vremenem, pp. 300-305, 305-316. Hardening against effects of a nuclear explosion was also part of the RT-2PM/Topol-M program, which began in 1989.

[51] Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 37.

[52] The RT-23 was initially developed as a single-warhead silo-based missile (known as 15Zh44). In 1979 the program was reoriented toward producing two multiple-warhead versions of the missile — silo-based 15Zh44 and rail-mobile 15Zh52. The 15Zh44 development was canceled in 1983 without producing an operational missile. The 15Zh52 program was suspended as well. One train

with three missiles was accepted for “experimental service.” Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 48; and Konyukhov, Prizvany vremenem, pp. 256-273.

[53] The RT-23UTTH program also called for development of a road-mobile version of the missile, known as Tselina. This project was canceled in 1984.

[54] Valery E. Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control, and Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2003), pp. 138-141; and I. Dmitriev, head of the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee of CPSU, “On Assessment of the Capability to Control Nuclear Forces of the Country during Military Actions,” Memo, February 1982, in Kataev, box 2.

[55] The 15A11 Perimeter missile, which was part of the Perimeter command and control system, designed to provide the necessary redundancy, was accepted for service in 1985. During the flight tests the missile and its payload were extensively tested for vulnerability to nuclear explosions. Konyukhov, Prizvany vremenem, pp. 253-256. See also Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), p. 51; and Yarynich. C3, pp. 156-159.

[56] These were Dnestr- and Dnepr-type radars, also known as Hen House. Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2002), p. 29.

[57] These radars became operational in 1984 and 1985 respectively. Ibid., p. 30.

[58] Ibid., p. 35.

[59] The warhead, known as 8F678, used a radar for terminal guidance. Flight tests of the warhead were conducted in 1978-1980. Konyukhov, Prizvany vremenem, pp. 324-328.

[60] Among the options that were considered in 1977-1978 was deployment of nineteen 500-kt guided warheads on a missile of the R-36M-class (SS-18) or nine 500-kt warheads on a missile of UR-100N class (SS-19). Kataev, box 8, doc. 13.8, p. 34.

[61] The guided warhead project, shelved in 1980, was resumed in 1984, with the development of a “next-generation” 15F178 warhead for the R-36M2 missile. Flight tests of this warhead began in 1990, but it was never deployed. Konyukhov, Prizvany vremenem, pp. 324-328, 300-305.

The truth about Russia's military "resurgence"

Posted on January 29, 2008 | Printer-friendly version

The Bulletin Online

By Pavel Podvig | 29 January 2008

By all indications, the Russian military has enjoyed a revival of sorts in recent years. 2007 was an especially notable year in this respect. In April, Russia completed construction of a strategic submarine of a new class, the first since the Soviet Union's dissolution. Despite a string of

unsuccessful flight tests, the military has continued to develop a new sea-launched missile for these submarines. In May and December, the Rocket Forces tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) equipped with multiple warheads. In August, President Vladimir Putin made a point to personally announce that he ordered strategic bombers to return to the Cold-War practice of conducting regular long-range patrol flights. The list goes on--Russia has been upgrading its network of early warning radars, plans to resume producing strategic bombers, and is considering developing another new ICBM. In October, Putin called Russia's plans to modernize its strategic forces no less than "grandiose."

Because it serves as a vestige of superpower status, many Russians look at such a "resurgence" with pride. Naturally, the buildup concerns the West, which also views it in Cold War terms, even though the scale is nowhere near that of Soviet deployments. Whatever the reaction, there seems to be consensus that the credit for this mini-renaissance belongs to the current Russian leadership and to Putin personally. This partly explains Putin's high-approval ratings in Russia and his recent selection as Time magazine's "Person of the Year."

But upon closer inspection, a different story emerges. It's a story of weak leadership, not one of strength. Instead of leading a resurgence, the current Russian leadership has given the military and defense industry a free hand in setting national security policy and uncritically accepted their narrow view of the world and its problems. Just like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, today's Russia has little control over its military-industrial complex. And since the military-industrial complex can only build missiles, submarines, and bombers, it's not surprising that Russia's security threats are now defined to require missiles, submarines, and bombers. The result is that the discussion of security issues in Russia is dominated by paranoid scenarios involving the United States destroying Russian missiles in a surprise attack and alarmist projections of how U.S. missile defense will affect Moscow's "strategic balance."

It's hardly surprising that the military-industrial complex is pushing the "resurgence" agenda--generals always fight the last war. There's little doubt that they will convince the government to keep its number of missiles and submarines at a "respectable" level. Or that the military will be able to maintain these missiles at a reasonable degree of readiness. With a strong economy, Russia can certainly afford strategic forces that would be considered impressive by Cold-War standards. But these standards are irrelevant today and the strategic forces designed to fight the Cold War are useless when it comes to the security threats that exist today. Therefore, this "grandiose resurgence" will eventually prove unnecessary, expensive, and dangerous.

The Russian Nuclear ArsenalPosted on November 1, 2005 | Printer-friendly version

Case Study, Columbia International Affairs Online

Pavel Podvig Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University November 2005

The history of the Russian nuclear forces begins at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union when Russia, as the legal successor of the nuclear power status, inherited all Soviet nuclear weapons and most of the military and industrial infrastructure that was involved in developing the country’s nuclear arsenal. The subsequent evolution of the Russian nuclear forces was a difficult

process of adjusting the size and role of the nuclear arsenal to the requirements of the post-Cold War security environment and to the realities of the new Russian economic and political system, which themselves were affected by developments in the nuclear complex. As a result, the Russian nuclear arsenal that exists today is more a product of this transition process than that of careful consideration and planning. To understand the current status of the Russian strategic nuclear forces we need to examine this transition and the internal and external factors that have shaped it.

The Soviet nuclear arsenal reached its peak in the mid-1980s, shortly before the United States and the Soviet Union began serious disarmament efforts. At the height of its development, the Soviet arsenal was estimated to include about 30,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons were deployed with a variety of delivery systems – land-based ballistic missiles, submarines, and bombers. About 10,000 nuclear warheads were considered part of the strategic force; the rest were deployed with theater forces and tactical units.

Operations of the nuclear forces were supported by extensive military infrastructure, which included early-warning radars, military satellites, nuclear weapon storage sites, as well as a command, control, and communication system that was designed to launch a nuclear strike.

Another important part of the nuclear forces infrastructure was the military-industrial complex that was responsible for the development and large-scale production of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This complex consisted of several ministries that were handling all aspects of nuclear weapon development – from uranium mining to production of weapon-grade fissile materials and warheads and from scientific research to mass production of missiles and aircraft. The core of the industrial complex included a number of research institutes and design bureaus, which played a key role in weapons development and production.

In the late 1980s, nuclear weapons were deployed across most of the territory of the Soviet Union. In addition, some tactical nuclear warheads were deployed in the Eastern Europe. However, by the time the Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991, the military had successfully removed all nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and were in the process of transferring all tactical nuclear warheads from the Soviet republics to storage sites located on Russian territory. This transfer was completed in spring of 1992.

The situation with strategic nuclear warheads was somewhat different. At the end of 1991, four countries of the former Soviet Union had strategic nuclear weapons on their territories. While most weapons were based in Russia, about 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles (almost a third of all land-based missiles of this kind) and their nuclear warheads turned up in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Ukraine and Kazakhstan also had about 80 strategic bombers deployed on their bases. None of these three countries, however, had the infrastructure that would have allowed them to maintain and operate nuclear weapons independently. In May 1992 they all pledged to remove nuclear warheads from their territories and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. Russia was declared the only successor to the nuclear status of the former Soviet Union.

Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to transfer all nuclear warheads as well as the missiles and aircraft that carried them to Russia. The transfer was completed in April 1994 and November 1996 respectively. Ukraine had returned all nuclear warheads to Russia by June 1996, but claimed ownership of the missiles and aircraft that were on its territory. Most of these have been liquidated, but some were sold to Russia in the late 1990s-early 2000s.

One of the reasons post-Soviet countries managed to resolve the issues related to nuclear warheads and delivery systems relatively quickly was the fact that these issues were covered by the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 (START). The treaty provided a legal framework

for the transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia, or for the elimination of those launchers that remained outside of its territory.

Unlike warheads and missiles, non-nuclear military facilities--that supported various aspects of operations of the strategic forces--were not covered by arms control arrangements, so Russia had to negotiate their status individually with its post-Soviet neighbors. Although most of the facilities were still in Russia, five out of nine early-warning radar sites were now located outside of its territory – in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Belarus. A number of strategically important objects were located in Kazakhstan: Baikonur – the primary Soviet space launch and missile testing site, the missile defense proving ground at Sary-Shagan, and the nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk.

Some of these bases or the facilities on them were shut down, but most continued to operate, even though it took Russia more than a decade to negotiate the terms of use with the host countries. Today, Russia continues to use the Baikonur space launch site, most of the early-warning radar systems that were operational in 1991, and the missile-defense testing ground in Kazakhstan. The Semipalatinsk nuclear test site has been closed.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union also resulted in significant changes in the military industry, affecting Russia’s ability to maintain and modernize its strategic forces. The missile production industry was affected the most, since many key research and production facilities were located in Ukraine. Other industries suffered major disruptions in their subcontractor chains. One notable exception was the nuclear weapons production complex, which historically had all its vital research and production facilities located in Russia.

Arms control process

Arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union historically played a very important role in determining the scope of strategic forces in both countries. Limits that arms control treaties placed on development and deployment of new systems ensured some predictability in the nuclear arms race. In addition to that, arms control negotiations provided a framework for a domestic and international debate on security issues. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the arms control process became even more important. It provided the institutional arrangements that helped Russia and the United States to develop their relationships and to discuss bilateral issues on a regular basis.

The two major arms control issues that shaped the U.S.-Russian relationships in the 1990s were reductions of strategic offensive forces and limits on missile defense development. The first issue was a subject of two strategic arms reduction treaties – START and START II. Missile defense development was limited by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. There were other arms control and disarmament agreements, which dealt with eliminating intermediate-range missiles, conventional force reductions, chemical and biological weapons, and a ban on nuclear tests, but their role was politically less prominent.

START was a treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, which was signed in July 1991, a few months before the breakup of the Soviet Union. After the breakup, the four former Soviet republics that had strategic nuclear weapons on their territories – Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus – signed a Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, in which they accepted disarmament obligations of the Soviet Union. All countries but Russia pledged to eliminate nuclear weapons on their territories.

The treaty called for an almost twofold reduction of the strategic forces from the levels that the United States and the Soviet Union achieved in the late 1980s. At the time of the treaty signing, these countries had more than 2,300 strategic delivery systems and more than 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads on each side. START established limits of 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 warheads associated with them but used complicated accounting rules, so the actual number of nuclear warheads that the sides were allowed to keep was somewhat higher. There were a number of other limits, which reflected the ideas about strategic stability and nuclear security prevalent at that time. The treaty provided very elaborate procedures for elimination of delivery systems, verification and information exchange.

The START reductions were to be completed in seven years upon the treaty’s implementation, after which time it was to stay in force for eight more years. The breakup of the Soviet Union caused a significant delay in the ratification of the treaty, as it had to be approved by all successor countries. It eventually entered into force in December 1994 and hence the treaty term will expire in 2009.

Even before the START ratification process was completed, Russia and the United States began negotiations on the next stage of nuclear arms reductions. The result of this effort was the START II Treaty, which was signed in January 1993. Unlike its predecessor, START II was a bilateral agreement between Russia and the United States that did not include any other former Soviet states.

The new treaty used the elimination and verification procedures specified in the START I Treaty, but called for steeper reductions in offensive weapons – to 3,000-3,500 nuclear warheads on each side. Among the few specific provisions of the START II Treaty was the complete elimination of land-based ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, MIRV), the requirement that would later prove the most controversial. Another controversial provision of the treaty was the timeline for the reductions – all weapons had to be eliminated by January 2003.

There were several reasons that led to the controversy that surrounded the START II Treaty. First, its provisions were structured in a way that allowed the United States to keep most of its missiles intact (although with fewer warheads), which theoretically allowed it to quickly reconstitute its strategic forces. Russia did not have this capability, for it had to liquidate most of its missiles to comply with the treaty provisions. The ban on land-based MIRVed missiles presented another serious challenge. If Russia were to keep its forces at the level of 3,000-3,500 warheads, as specified in the treaty, it would have to produce several hundred new single-warhead missiles to compensate for the elimination of multiple-warhead ones. Even though the treaty allowed ten years to complete all the changes in the strategic forces, a program of this kind was clearly beyond Russia’s economic capabilities. Moreover, given the unstable economic situation of the early 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in dismantling the existing weapons. Hence, the 2003 deadline for reductions looked increasingly unrealistic. While much of the criticism of these specific provisions of the START II Treaty were valid, the real reason they caused such controversy in Russia was the growing sense of frustration over the loss of the strategic balance vis-a-vis the United States, and Russia’s apparent inability to keep its strategic forces at the level that would preserve its status as one of two equal nuclear superpowers.

The concerns over the loss of strategic parity were exacerbated by U.S. missile defense development efforts and discussions that were questioning the viability of one of the key U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements – the ABM Treaty. Signed in 1972, the treaty prohibited the development and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that would have the capability to protect an entire territory of a country. The logic of the ban was to prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from attempting to gain strategic superiority by building a missile defense system. During the Cold War, legal provisions of the treaty were backed up by the capability of the parties

to prevent attempts of this kind by threatening to respond with an offensive weapons buildup. But after Russia all but lost this capability in the breakup of the Soviet Union, from its point of view the legal protection offered by the ABM Treaty was the only defense against the U.S. disrupting the strategic balance by building a strategic missile defense system.

The perceived disparity of the START II Treaty and the direction of the U.S. missile defense program only made these problems worse. Even though in the early 1990s the United States was not expressing interest in developing strategic missile defense systems, which would protect all its territory, its program was clearly moving in that direction. In 1994 Russia and the United States undertook an effort to reach an agreement that would preserve the ban on strategic missile defense systems while allowing development of non-strategic ones (which presumably could not disrupt the strategic balance), but the negotiations were moving very slowly.

In 1997, Russia and the United States made an attempt to resolve the issues of strategic arms reductions and missile defense. At the summit in Helsinki that year they agreed to extend the timeline for START II implementation by five years – to the end of 2007. The extension was supposed to give Russia enough time to carry out the reductions and the necessary modernization of its strategic forces. At the same time, the two sides agreed on the terms of a so-called demarcation agreement that was supposed to resolve the missile defense issue. The agreement, signed in September 1997, allowed development of most non-strategic missile defense systems that were under development in the United States.

The compromise that was reached in 1997 proved unsatisfactory. Russia believed that the 1997 demarcation agreement protected the ABM Treaty and demanded that this agreement should be ratified before START II could take effect. With this condition the Russian parliament ratified the START II Treaty in April 2000. However, by this time the United States had all but abandoned attempts to preserve the ABM Treaty in its initial form. Ratification of the demarcation agreement was never considered an option in the United States, which effectively precluded the implementation of START II.

In 2001, when the new U.S. administration made missile defense one of the priorities of its defense policy, tensions arose between Russia and the United States. However, by that time it was clear that even if Russia were to respond to the U.S. missile defense development, none of the steps it could realistically take – keeping its heavy missiles in service or deploying other missiles with multiple warheads – would seriously change the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. Nor was this balance in danger of being undermined by the missile defense systems that were under development – flight tests convincingly demonstrated that capabilities of these systems are quite limited. On the Russian side, practical considerations also played a significant role – the military saw an opportunity to reject the START II treaty, which imposed serious restrictions on the Russian strategic forces.

The political situation after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States made withdrawal from the ABM Treaty politically possible. In December 2001 the United States notified Russia about its intention to withdraw from the treaty. The reaction from Russia was very restrained. The only practical step was to withdraw from the START II treaty in June 2002, when the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was complete. This step, however, was expected and the START II Treaty could not have entered into force anyway.

The START II Treaty was replaced by an agreement that Russia and the United States signed in 2002. Known as the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty or the Moscow treaty, the agreement calls for reduction of operational nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. Unlike its START predecessors, the Moscow treaty does not set any limits on delivery systems and requires no transparency or verification. Since the treaty does not require elimination of launchers

or warheads, the United States and Russia could easily reconstitute their forces to the level that existed before the reductions. In practice, however, it is unlikely, for the evolution of strategic nuclear forces in both countries will almost certainly bring the number of nuclear warheads to much lower levels than those specified in the treaty.

The Moscow treaty is likely to be the last U.S.-Russian arms control agreement related to strategic forces. It demonstrated that both countries feel confident that their strategic forces provide adequate deterrence to the extent required by the current state of the U.S.-Russian relationships.

Structure of the Russian nuclear forces

The Soviet Union and the United States were the only two countries to built a complete nuclear triad – a strategic force that included land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic submarines with ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers equipped with gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles. The original logic behind this composition of the force was that the three legs of the triad would complement each other, taking advantage of their relative strengths and guarding against potential vulnerabilities. For example, the combination of accuracy and high-yield warheads made land-based missiles suitable for attacking hardened targets – missile silos or command posts. Submarines were valued for their survivability, which made them suitable for a retaliatory strike.

In reality, the makeup of U.S. and Soviet triads was determined by a number of factors, only a few of which were related to military capabilities of the weapon systems. For example, the Soviet Union traditionally considered land-based ballistic missiles to be the most important part of its strategic force, largely because the Soviet industry developed significant expertise in missile development and production at the very early stages. In addition, ballistic missiles had a strong advocate in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the service that was created in 1959 to operate them. In contrast, strategic aviation in the Soviet Union was relegated to secondary roles, since it had never enjoyed strong institutional support within the military or a successful development record similar to that of the missile industry.

Russia preserved the overall structure of the Soviet strategic forces and tried to maintain all components of the nuclear triad. However, in the new economic and political environment, the services had to compete for the limited resources that Russia was able to spend on its military. For most of the 1990s the military received only minimal funding, which did not allow serious restructuring or modernization of the strategic forces. The development funds allocated to strategic systems went primarily to the development of a new single-warhead land-based missile, known as Topol-M, which was supposed to replace the existing MIRVed missiles under the terms of the START II Treaty. In 1996, an attempt was made to launch construction of a new strategic submarine, but the lack of funds brought the construction to a virtual halt. The situation was made worse by the inability of the military and the industry to define clear priorities at the time of economic and political uncertainty of the 1990s.

In 1998 the Russian government undertook the first attempt to create a detailed development program for the strategic forces that would take into account the capability of the industry as well as Russia’s arms control obligations. The program took into account the START II requirements and called for modest modernization of all three components of the nuclear triad as well as of the early-warning network and the command and control system that supports operations of the strategic forces.

Although these decisions called for uniform development of all components of the strategic forces,

the Strategic Rocket Forces quickly emerged as a dominant service. In 1999 it suggested a plan that would combine all strategic forces under its operational command. In addition, the Strategic Rocket Forces would have taken control over most of the development and acquisition budget. These proposals led to a serious conflict within the Russian military, which put the Strategic Rocket Forces in confrontation with other services as well as with advocates of greater role for conventional forces. The conflict was resolved in 2000 in a decision that preserved the formally equal status of all components of the nuclear forces and made plans for their development that did not give clear priority to any service.

Since the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the subsequent demise of START II, the structure of the Russian strategic forces is no longer determined by arms control constrains (START I ceilings are too high to be of any practical importance, while the Moscow treaty does not really set any limits). As a result, the pace of the strategic modernization is now determined primarily by internal institutional interests of the services and by the ability of the military and the industry to manage development projects and production of weapons systems. Military requirements, as they were understood during the cold war, still play some role in determining the direction of the modernization, but this role appears to be secondary at best.

The Strategic Rocket Forces

At the peak of its development in the early 1990s, the Strategic Rocket Forces included almost 1,400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could carry about 6,600 nuclear warheads. At the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, only 735 of these were still operational and under Russia’s control, as shown in Table 1. About 400 older type missiles (SS-11, SS-13, and SS-17) had been deactivated, while others were based outside of the Russian territory: 104 SS-18 missiles were in Kazakhstan; 130 SS-19 and 46 SS-24 missiles were in Ukraine. In addition, 81 road-mobile SS-25 missiles, while formally under Russian control, were based in Belarus.

Table 1. Russia’s land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles

Designations Basing Warheads per missile 1991 2005 2012

(estimate)SS-18, R-36M, RS-20 silo 10 204 85 50SS-19, UR-100NUTTH, RS-18 silo 6 170 129 30SS-24, RT-23UTTH, RS-22 silo 10 10 – –SS-24, RT-23UTTH, RS-22 rail-mobile 10 36 – –

SS-25, RT-2PM Topol, RS-12M road-mobile 1 315 294 20

SS-27, RT-2PM2 Topol-M, RS-12M2 silo 1 – 40 50

SS-27, RT-2PM2 Topol-M, RS-12M2

road-mobile 1 – 0 50

Total 735 548 200One of the problems that Russia had to deal with in the 1990s was that the development and production of its most modern ICBMs remained in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Yuzhmash was producing the SS-18 and SS-24 missiles and was involved in the development of the early version of the SS-27 missile. Of the remaining Russian-produced missiles, the SS-19 had not been in

production since the mid-1980s, while production of the SS-25 was increasingly difficult because of disrupted links with subcontractors. Hence, Russia had to concentrate its efforts on moving development and production of SS-27 Topol-M missiles to Russian territory and on extending the service lives of the Ukrainian-produced SS-18 missiles. Another missile produced in Ukraine, the SS-24, also went through a service life extension program, but the extension was limited and all these missiles had been completely withdrawn from service by 2005.

Development and production of the SS-27 missile was successfully transferred to Russia, based at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and the Votkinsk plant respectively. The first flight test of this missile was conducted in 1994 and in December 1997 the Rocket Forces accepted the first two missiles of this type for service. In the last several years these missiles have been deployed at a rate of four-to-six per year. A road-mobile version of the SS-27 missile has been undergoing tests and is expected to be deployed in 2006.

The SS-27 Topol-M missile will eventually replace the SS-25 Topol road-mobile missile, although in smaller numbers. SS-25 missiles, which were deployed in 1988-1992, are now reaching the end of their operational lives. They have been withdrawn from service in the last few years and this process will be complete in 2010-2012.

One of the reasons the SS-24 and SS-25 are being decommissioned is that they are solid-propellant missiles, which require a complex and costly replacement of propellant to extend their service lives. A life-extension procedure for liquid-fuel missiles is much simpler and usually requires only periodic testing of the aging missiles. Russia has been conducting flight tests of this kind and now considers it safe to keep the liquid-fuel SS-18 and SS-19 missiles in service for about 25 years or even longer.

Even with this life extension program, Russia will have to remove most of its SS-19 and SS-18 missiles from service in the near future. The SS-19/UR-100NUTTH missiles that are currently in service were deployed in 1979-1984 and will have to be decommissioned by the end of the decade. However, some missiles of this type may stay – Russia has about 30 SS-19 missiles that it purchased from Ukraine in the early 2000s. If deployed, these missiles could probably stay in service for 20-25 years.

With the new production of Topol-M and various life-extension programs under way, Russia could maintain its land-based ICBM force at the level of 150-200 missiles-- which would carry about 800 warheads--by 2012, as summarized in Table 1. It could also keep about 50 newer SS-18 heavy missiles, and up to 30 SS-19 missiles. These silo-based multiple-warhead missiles would account for most of the warheads and could stay in service until 2015-2020. In addition to these, Russia is planning to have about 100 single-warhead SS-27 Topol-M missiles, which will be deployed in silos as well as on road-mobile launchers. Most of the SS-25 Topol missiles will have been decommissioned by 2010-2012.

Theoretically, in addition to the missiles described here, Russia could deploy one more missile as part of its land-based force. The Bulava missile is currently being developed as a sea-launched multiple-warhead missile. It shares some components with SS-27 Topol-M and can be deployed in silos on land. It is unlikely, however, that Russia will ever need a new silo-based multiple-warhead missile.

These plans reflect the consensus about the role and structure of the land-based missile force that emerged from the discussions of the last decade. They also allow to reconcile the development and modernization plans with the existing production capability of the industry. Another important consideration for Russia is that this structure of the strategic force, which preserves multiple-

warhead missiles and heavy missiles in particular, provides it with a certain degree of protection should the United States decide to pursue a large-scale missile defense program. However, a massive buildup in response to a program like that is highly unlikely, partly because it would require significant additional resources, but mostly because the projected missile force would preserve its retaliatory potential even in the presence of a missile defense. We also should not expect dramatic reductions in the number of missiles or warheads. Most missiles will probably not be removed from silos until the end of their service lives, although it is possible that some will be deactivated earlier.

Strategic fleet

Strategic nuclear-powered submarines constituted an important part of the Soviet strategic forces. As shown in Table 2, at the time of its breakup the Soviet Union had 49 modern ballistic-missile submarines, which carried more than 700 missiles and about 2,600 warheads. Strategic submarines were assigned to the Northern Fleet, which was based at the Kola Peninsula, and to the Pacific Fleet, based in the Far East region and at the Kamchatka Peninsula. The breakup of the Soviet Union did not affect the strategic fleet directly, for all ballistic missile submarines were based in Russia.

Table 2. Russian strategic submarines and sea-launched ballistic missiles

Submarines Missiles per submarine Warheads per missile 1991 2005 2012

(estimate)

Delta I, Project 667B 12 SS-N-8, R-29, RSM-40 1 18 – –

Delta II, Project 667BD 16 SS-N-8, R-29, RSM-40 1 4 – –

Delta III, Project 667BDR

16 SS-N-18, R-29R, RSM-50 3 14 6 –

Delta IV, Project 667BDRM

16 SS-N-23, R-29RM, RSM-54 4 7 6 6

Typhoon, Project 941 20 SS-N-20, R-39, RSM-52 10 6 – –

Borey, Project 955 12 SS-NX-30, Bulava, RSM-56 (?) – – 2

Total 49 12 8The task of maintaining nuclear submarines and the infrastructure that supported their operations presented Russia with a serious challenge. By the early 1990s Russia had a large number of ballistic missile and attack nuclear submarines that had reached the end of their operational lives and were awaiting dismantlement. However, the infrastructure that existed at that time was not sufficient to support the massive dismantlement effort that was required for elimination of all submarines. In addition to that, the dismantlement procedures included extensive operations with radioactive materials, which created a risk of radioactive contamination of the areas around submarine bases. Most of these problems have been solved with the help of the international community, but as of 2005, the elimination of old nuclear submarines has not been completed yet – about 120 submarines have been eliminated, while about 80 are awaiting dismantlement.

The difficult situation with decommissioning as well as general lack of funds in the military had a

serious negative impact on the fleet modernization program. Most submarine overhaul programs were brought to a halt. The main missile development program – modernization of the SS-N-20/R-39 missile, also known as Bark – encountered serious difficulties (all three flight tests of the missile ended in failure). This missile was being developed to replace old missiles on Typhoon submarines as well as for deployment on strategic submarines of a new type (known as Borey). In 1996 Russia launched construction of the first submarine of this type, but it proceeded extremely slowly. The future of Delta IV submarines was also in doubt, since their SS-N-23/R-29RM missiles were approaching end of their operational lives and there were no new missiles to replace them.

In 1998, the government drastically revised the strategic fleet modernization plans. It cancelled the SS-N-20 modernization, replacing it with a new missile development program. The contract for the new missile, known as Bulava, was given to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which was the primary contractor for the Topol-M land-based missile. Bulava was presented as a universal missile that could be deployed on land as well as on submarines. Another change in the fleet development plans introduced in 1998 involved resumed production of SS-N-23/R-29RM missile (or, rather, of its slightly modified version, known as Sineva). These missiles were to be deployed on Delta IV submarines during their overhaul.

These decisions resulted in several changes in the composition of the strategic fleet. Cancellation of the SS-N-20 program forced early retirement of Typhoon submarines. As of 2005 the only submarine of this class that is operational is the lead ship, Dmitry Donskoy, which was converted to a test bed for Bulava missiles.

The Bulava missile performed its successful flight test in September 2005 and may be ready for deployment some time in 2008. Missiles of this type will be deployed on two Borey submarines that are currently under construction – one launched in 1996, the other in March 2004.

In 2005, the Russian strategic fleet consisted of six Delta III and six Delta IV submarines. Not all of them are operational, though – missiles deployed on Delta III submarines are probably well beyond their original service lives. Only one submarine of this type seems to have operational missiles on board. Out of six Delta IV submarines only one has been equipped with new R-29RM Sineva missiles. Other submarines of this type are either in overhaul or have old missiles on board.

The difficulties experienced by the fleet led to a dramatic fall in the number of patrols performed by strategic submarines. While the Soviet fleet performed up to a hundred patrols in the mid-1980s, the Russian fleet has been able to perform no more than one or two in the recent years (and sometimes none at all, as in 2002). This, of course, reflects the changes in the U.S.-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War, but at the same time indicates that Russia is experiencing problems with keeping its strategic fleet operational.

According to the current development plans, Delta IV submarines will be refitted with R-29RM Sineva missiles. In addition to these, in 2007-2010 the fleet will receive at least two Borey submarines that are currently under construction. These submarines will carry Bulava missiles. It is possible that the fleet will receive one or two more submarines of this type or will refit one or two Typhoon submarines with Bulava missiles, but this is unlikely to happen before the end of the decade. Taking into account that Delta IIIs will be decommissioned by that time, Russia will have no more than eight ballistic missile submarines. Given that the Borey submarines will carry 12 Bulava ballistic missiles (there is no data on how many warheads this missile will have), we can estimate that the eight strategic submarines will have about 120 sea-launch ballistic missiles and about 500 nuclear warheads.

Strategic aviation

Strategic aviation was traditionally the least developed leg of the Soviet nuclear triad. Strategic bombers did not figure prominently in Soviet nuclear war plans and were relegated to supporting roles. Nevertheless, the strategic aviation was receiving its share of resources and by the time of its breakup the Soviet Union had a moderate strategic bomber force that included 23 modern supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack bombers and 88 Tu-95MS Bear turboprop bombers that carried nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (the force also included about 60 older Tu-95 bombers that were decommissioned in the early 1990s). The composition of the Soviet strategic air force is presented in Table 3. It should be noted that some of the aircraft listed in the table was deployed on bases outside of Russia – 19 Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95MS bombers in Ukraine and some Tu-95MS bombers – in Kazakhstan. Most of them were returned to Russia (in exchange for a payment in the case of Ukraine).

Table 3. Russian strategic bombers with air-launched cruise missiles

Bombers Cruise missiles 1991 2005 2012

(estimate)Tu-95MS Bear H 6 or 16 88 64 64Tu-160 Blackjack 12 23 14 15Total 111 78 79

In 1992, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia suspended production of strategic bombers. This suspension lasted until 1999, when the production was resumed. Since then the strategic aviation added two new Tu-160 aircraft to its force and expects to add one more in 2005-2006. In addition to this, in 2001 Russia initiated a modernization program that will equip the Tu-160 bombers with new avionics that allow them to use gravity bombs and conventional high precision weapons.

The Tu-95MS aircraft will probably get some avionics upgrades as well, but this improvement is likely to preserve their current role as nuclear cruise missile carrier. No significant reduction of the Tu-95MS bomber force is expected.

With air-launched cruise missiles remaining the primary weapon of strategic aviation, Russia is working on modernizing its Kh-55/AS-15 Kent missile, which is currently deployed with bombers. A modification of the Kh-555 missile will be replacing the Kh-55 in the coming years.

While it is unlikely is that the strategic aviation will change its status relative to other components of the Russian strategic forces, its role may undergo some serious transformation. In contrast to ballistic missiles, bombers offer a certain degree of flexibility in carrying out an attack and could, in some circumstances, be used for demonstration of force. Bombers could also carry out conventional missions, which makes them the only leg of the strategic triad that can be potentially “usable” in various conflicts. It is possible that with time an increasingly larger fraction of strategic bombers will be diverted to conventional roles.

Early warning and missile defense

Along with the strategic launchers and nuclear warheads, Russia preserved the key elements of the command and control system that supported operations of the strategic forces. This includes the early-warning system together with the various command and communication systems and facilities

that were supposed to support timely decision-making and disseminate launch orders.

An early-warning system is a key element of a strategy based on a launch on warning posture. This posture relies on timely detection of a missile attack to ensure that a retaliatory strike can be initiated before the attacking missiles hit their targets. This option in theory can enhance deterrence, since it effectively denies an attacker the advantage of a surprise. At the same time, it is quite dangerous, for it leaves very little time for decision-making and therefore creates an opportunity for an error.

One way to reduce the probability of an error is to have at least two types of early-warning systems that would use different physical principles to detect missiles. The detectors that are used in early-warning systems are 1) infrared sensors deployed on satellites, which can detect a missile plume shortly after a launch, and 2) radars, which can detect warheads at the later stages of flight.

The Soviet Union deployed systems of both kinds – a constellation of early-warning satellites and a network of radars. However, the deployment had not been completed by the time of the Soviet Union breakup, so these systems provided only limited early-warning capability. In the years after the breakup, the system has deteriorated further, so its capability is even more limited now.

Table 4. Soviet and Russian early-warning radars

Radar station Country Radars Year operational

Olenegorsk Russia Hen House 1976

Pechora prototype 1978

Mishelevka Russia 2 Hen House 1972-1976 Pechora never operationalPechora Russia Pechora 1984

Krasnoyarsk Russia Pechora never operational, dismantled in 1990

Balkhash Kazakhstan 2 Hen House 1972-1976

Pechora never operationalSevastopol Ukraine Hen House 1979Mukachevo Ukraine Hen House 1979 Pechora never operationalGabala Azerbaijan Pechora 1985Skrunda Latvia 2 Hen House dismantled in 1998

Pechora never operational, dismantled in 1994

Baranovichi Belarus Volga 2002Of the eight early-warning radar sites that were operational in 1991, five were outside of the Russian territory, as can be seen in Table 4. However, Russia has lost only the site in Latvia, where all radars have been demolished. Other sites remained operational and continued to provide Russia with early-warning information about missiles and space objects (the radars also work as part of the

space surveillance network). At the same time, Russia could no longer upgrade the radar network – most of the newer more powerful and more accurate phased-array radars of the Pechora type never went operational. The early-warning network relies mostly on older Hen House radars, which were built in the 1970s.

The existing network does not provide full coverage of all possible directions of attack. Dismantlement of the radar site in Krasnoyarsk in the late 1980s, done under pressure from the United States, as well as the loss of the radar site in Latvia have left gaps in radar coverage. However, the most important approaches are partially backed up by other radars (for example, by the new radar in Belarus), so the gaps do not significantly increase vulnerability of the strategic forces.

The situation with the space-based early-warning system is very similar. The system operates at a fraction of its full capacity, but still provided Russia with adequate information about a possible missile attack. Russia maintains two space-based early-warning systems – a first-generation one, known as Oko or US-KS, that relies primarily on satellites on highly-elliptical Molniya-type orbits, and the second-generation US-KMO, which includes geostationary satellites.

The US-KS system can detect only those launches that originate from U.S. territory. The full constellation of first-generation satellites, which can provide reliable 24-hour coverage, would include up to nine satellites on highly-elliptical orbits and one geostationary satellite. But for the past several years the system has been operating with just three satellites in it. Still, the satellites continuously cover the U.S. territory and would be able to give a warning about an attack, although not with the reliability that a full system would provide.

The second-generation early-warning system was built to detect launches of sea-based missiles as well as land-based ones. A full constellation of these satellites would include up to seven satellites on geosynchronous orbits, which would provide coverage of most of the Earth surface. However, as of 2005, there were no satellites of this type in orbit and it is not clear if this system will ever be fully operational.

Another important part of the Russian strategic forces is the missile defense system deployed around Moscow. The system consists of 100 nuclear-tipped interceptors and a battle-management center with a large phased-array radar in Pushkino. The system in its current configuration was accepted for service in 1994, replacing the old missile defense deployed in the 1970s. There are conflicting data on whether interceptors of the system are deployed with their nuclear warheads on a regular basis, but the battle-management radar is operational. It provides backup to the early-warning radar network and works as part of the space-surveillance system.

Tactical nuclear weapons

In addition to the strategic offensive arsenal, the Soviet Union built and maintained a large tactical nuclear force. Estimates put the number of tactical nuclear warheads at the end of the 1980s at about 15,000-20,000. These ranged from artillery shells and nuclear mines to short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and nuclear torpedoes.

Tactical nuclear weapons present a unique security challenge. Unlike their strategic counterparts, which are deployed as part of weapon systems that are under constant highly centralized control, tactical weapons can be quite compact, they are usually deployed in a decentralized manner and often lack the safeguards that exist in strategic weapon systems. All this potentially makes tactical weapons more vulnerable to diversion or unauthorized use.

Recognizing this threat, in September-October 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged unilateral initiatives that called for elimination of most of the tactical nuclear weapons or for their withdrawal from active service. Russia later confirmed the Soviet obligations and extended them to cover additional systems.

Russia agreed to eliminate all weapons deployed with its ground forces – short-range missiles (medium-range missiles were being eliminated in accordance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty), mines and artillery shells. Russia also agreed to remove all naval nuclear weapons – cruise missiles and torpedoes – from its ships, eliminate 1/3 of them and place the rest into storage. Another measure was the elimination of half of the air force and air-defense weapons and placing the rest into centralized storage.

Most of these measures, including the elimination of warheads removed from service, have been implemented by the end of the 1990s (some ground-forces weapons were still awaiting elimination as of 2000). However, tactical nuclear weapons still constitute an important part of the country’s nuclear arsenal and Russia’s political and military leaders would like to see an expanding role for these weapons. The prevailing mindset among the Russian leadership today is that tactical nuclear weapons can compensate for the weakness of Russia’s conventional forces. This argument, which first appeared in the early 1990s and mirrors the logic used by the United States and its allies in Europe during the Cold War, became more prominent with the expansion of NATO, the growth of China’s economic and military power, and the deterioration of Russia’s conventional military capability.

Even though tactical nuclear weapons have not been withdrawn completely, Russia has done a lot to reduce them. It is estimated that Russia has about 3,400 operational weapons while up to 10,000 to 12,000 weapons are in reserve or at various stages of dismantlement.

The number of deployed tactical weapons is still large enough to justify a concern about their theft or unauthorized use. Ensuring safety and security of these weapons is one of the major tasks that Russia is facing today. However, there are several factors that make the situation more stable than it was in the early 1990s. First, all weapons have been moved to centralized storage facilities. In normal circumstances they are no longer deployed with the units to which they are assigned (although they could probably be distributed to these units in a time of a crisis). Second, most of the storage facilities have been undergoing security upgrades (major funding for this program is provided by the United States). Although this program has not been completed yet, it has made significant improvements in warhead security.

It is unlikely that Russia will forgo its tactical nuclear weapons unilaterally or as part of an arms control agreement. Moreover, it is possible that it will reverse some of the steps taken after the 1991 declarations. For example, it is possible that a new short-range missile, known as Iskander, could be deployed with nuclear warheads. Given that the capabilities of Russia’s conventional forces are still in decline, the calls for an increased role of nuclear weapons and tactical weapons in particular will continue. In this situation it is important to keep the dangers associated with these weapons under control and continue to work on reducing them by providing incentives for further reductions and assistance to safety and security improvements.

Literature

There are several books that provide good reference information on the history and the current status of the Russian nuclear forces.

One of the most detailed and recent studies is Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Pavel Podvig, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). This book by Russian authors provides description of development and the current structure of the Russian strategic forces, of the military industry, including the nuclear industry, and of the Soviet nuclear testing program.

Another volume of this kind, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons, Thomas B. Cochran et al (New York: Ballinger, 1989), was based on the information that was publicly available in the United States in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, it provides very detailed and accurate information about the Soviet nuclear forces, which is still relevant today. The only exception is the chapter on the Soviet nuclear industry and this has been updated in Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin, Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), which contains a very detailed description of the Russian nuclear weapons producing complex. The Soviet Nuclear Weapons book is especially valuable because it provides detailed information on tactical nuclear weapon systems that were deployed by the Soviet Union.

A very good narrative but still technical and detailed account of the development of the Soviet and Russian forces can be found in The Kremlins’ Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000, Steven J. Zaloga (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 2002). A more scholarly publication, Russian Strategic Modernization, Nikolai Sokov (Lantham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), analyzes various aspects of the Russian modernization policy. In recent years the Russian military produced a number of official publications that contain descriptions of various weapon systems and components. An example of a publication of this kind is Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Volume 1: Strategic Nuclear Forces, Sergeyev, I., ed (Moscow: Oruzhie i Teknologii, 2000).

In addition to these books, there are a number of reports published by non-governmental organizations and academic centers that provide information on various aspects of the Russian nuclear forces.

A report by the Bellona foundation, “The Russian Northern Fleet”, Bellona Report 2, 1996, is probably the most comprehensive study of the Russian fleet and the problems associated with it available in the open literature. Another report, “The Russian Nuclear Industry – The Need for Reform”, Bellona Report 4, November 2004, provides a good overview of the recent developments in the Russian nuclear industry.

The following report provides an up-to-date analysis of the issues related to safety and security of the Russian nuclear warheads and materials: “Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives”, Matthew Bunn, Antony Wier, Project on Managing the Atom, May 2005 (http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp).

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published a regular column that provides an update of the status of the Russian nuclear forces. The most recent publication is “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Robert S. Norris, Hans Kristensen, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2005, pp. 70-72 (earlier versions and updates are available at http://www.thebulletin.org/nuclear_weapons_data/)

Another sources of information on the current status of the Russian nuclear forces is the web site Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (http://www.russianforces.org), which is updated regularly to reflect changes in the Russian forces.

Russia and Military Uses of SpacePosted on July 1, 2004 | Printer-friendly version

Pavel Podvig

Working paper, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences Project "Reconsidering the Rules of Space", June 2004

Russia is one of the few countries that carry out full range of activities in space. It supports a number of space programs that range from manned flights to civilian and military communication, navigation, and imaging satellite systems. The launchers and launch facilities that Russia has in its disposal can deliver a range of payloads to almost any orbit. These capabilities make Russia an important actor in all developments related to military uses of space and especially in those that are related to weaponization of space.

Another reason Russia has an important role in future development in space is that Russia remains a nuclear state with sizable offensive strategic nuclear forces. Although the relationships between Russia and the United States (as well as other nuclear states) no longer have the adversarial nature that characterized them during the cold war, expansion of U.S. military capabilities in space may affect Russia’s security calculations and force it to take measures that would protect its strategic status vis-à-vis the United States.

Russia also has a significant capability to carry out its own military space program. Despite the setbacks of the last decade, when all military programs have suffered due to lack of adequate funding, recent steps of the Russian leadership indicate the intent to expand the military space program development. While it is not clear whether Russia could succeed in maintaining its military presence in space at the level that would allow it to be a peer competitor with the United States, these programs will be an important benchmark that would certainly affect the U.S. policy with regard to its military systems.

And, last, but not the least, Russian space industry could be an important source of space-related technologies for the countries that currently do not have space capabilities of their own. Whether deliberate or not, the spread of these technologies, military as well as civilian, will be a very important factor that would shape the future of space.

This paper presents an overview of the past and current military-related Russian space programs from the point of view of their ability to contribute to developments of space-based weapons or space-based systems. The paper attempts to estimate Russia’s capability to sustain its effort in development of military space programs and to see how these might affect the debate on weaponization of space.

Military space programsVirtually all currently active Russian military space programs were initiated in the Soviet Union. Even in those cases when the first launch was conducted after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the research and development had been largely completed by that time. During the 1990s, the primary challenge that Russia was facing was to preserve the military programs that it inherited and to prevent deterioration of the infrastructure that supported space operations. To a certain degree Russia has been successful in meeting this challenge, as it managed to keep most of its military

space systems in operation. However, as wee will see below, in most cases the systems in question were operating at a level that did not provide full operational capability and had to rely on equipment that were manufactured before the Soviet Union’s breakup.

As part of its extensive space program the Soviet Union developed and deployed military space-based systems in virtually all categories – from missile early warning to reconnaissance and from communication to satellite navigation. The extent to which these systems are supported today can help determine priorities of the Russian armed forces, although one has to take into account that in reality the support depends on a number of factors – from real operational needs of the armed forces to an ability to manufacture spacecraft and launchers in Russia and interests of the space industry. This makes determining the priorities more difficult, but still allows us to make conclusions about the direction of development of the Russian military space program.

As of 2004, Russia maintained active military space programs in five areas – early warning, optical reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and signal intelligence.

Early-warning satellites

Sensors deployed in space are traditionally considered a vital component of an early-warning system if it is to provide a timely warning about a missile attack. Since sensors in space can be made capable of detecting ballistic missiles almost immediately after their launch, they can provide the maximum possible warning time – up to 30 minutes in the case of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union began development of its space-based early-warning system in 1971 and was able to deploy it by 1982.[1] Early-warning satellites of the system complement a network of radars that are deployed along the periphery of the Soviet territory.

The space-based early-warning system, known as Oko or US-KS, in its full configuration consists of up to nine satellites on highly-elliptical orbits and one satellite on a geostationary orbit. This configuration allows the system to perform continuous coverage of ICBM bases on the U.S. territory. Submarine patrol areas in the ocean are not covered by this system, so it cannot detect launches of sea-based ballistic missiles.

To maintain continuous coverage of U.S. ICBM bases the system is required to have at least four satellites on highly-elliptical orbits (HEO). Filling all nine HEO slots in the constellation as well as adding a geostationary satellite to it increases reliability of detection, but does not extend the coverage in a substantial way.[2] Until mid-1990s Russia had managed to maintain the Oko system in almost full capacity and had the capability to reliably detect launches of U.S. land-based missiles. This required conducting about three launches every year to replenish the constellation, and Russia was able to do that despite serious financial difficulties of that period. The capabilities of the system began deteriorating in 1997-1998, after a series of malfunctions caused premature termination of operations of some deployed satellites. By the end of 1999, the system was operating at the minimum possible level of four satellites on highly-elliptical orbits.

Table 1. Recent launches of early-warning satellites

NORAD number

Launch date

Inclination, degrees

Perigee, km

Apogee, km

End of operation

Comment

US-KS/Oko

Cosmos-2345

24894 1997/08/14

3.6 35118 36466 02/1999 24W

Cosmos-2351

25327 1998/05/07

64.6 3210 37200 05/2001

Cosmos-2368

26042 1999/12/27

63.1 2394 37977 12/2002

Cosmos-2379

26892 24.08.01 0.6 35770 35804 Active 24W

Cosmos-2388

27409 02.04.02 64.3 490 39842 Active

Cosmos-2393

27613 24.12.02 63.0 879 39454 Active

US-KMO

Cosmos-2350

25315 1998/04/29

2.1 35758 35808 06/1998

Cosmos-2397

27775 24.04.03 2.0 35545 35908 05/2003

The system suffered further setback on May 2001, when a fire destroyed the system’s command and control center at Serpukhov-15 near Moscow. As a result of the fire Russia lost control over all four satellites deployed at the time and for about four months did not have a capability to detect missile launches from space.[3] All four satellites have been eventually lost and were replaced by two satellites on highly-elliptical orbits, Cosmos-2388 and Cosmos-2393, and one geostationary satellite, Cosmos-2379. The system operates in this configuration, which theoretically allows maintaining continuous coverage of U.S. ICBM fields, albeit with reduced reliability, since the end of 2002 and the Russian military has not attempted to add more satellites to the constellation.

Since the capabilities of the Oko/US-KS do not allow it to detect launches from areas other than continental United States, in 1980s the Soviet Union began development of a new generation of early-warning satellites. The new satellites were to have capability to detect missiles against a background of Earth’s cloud cover and were to be deployed both on highly-elliptical and geostationary orbits. The new system was designated US-KMO.

The first early-warning satellite of the new generation was launched in 1991. By 2004, the number of US-KMO satellite launches reached six, the last one being Cosmos-2397, launched in April

2003.[4] None of these satellites is operational today, as the program has been plagued by satellite malfunctions, which significantly shortened satellites’ lifetimes. This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that all three satellites of the US-KMO system launched since 1994 ended their operations prematurely.[5]

Despite these setbacks, Russia seems determined to continue development of the US-KMO early-warning system. In 1998 it completed construction of a command and control station on the Far East, which is necessary to support operations of satellites that would be deployed over the Pacific.[6]

Optical reconnaissance

Russia is operating at least six different types of optical reconnaissance satellites, which vary in their capabilities and missions – from wide area cartography to detailed photography of specific areas of interest. As it is the case with other systems, photo-reconnaissance programs can be divided into legacy programs that continue from the Soviet time and the newer ones that became active after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The older programs, which still constitute the core of Russia’s imaging capability, are systems of the Yantar family. There are three types of satellites that are known as Yantar – Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt, Yantar-4KS1 Neman, and Yantar-1KFT Kometa. Although the spacecraft are quite different in their mission and capabilities, they share design features as they were built around a common platform.

Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt is a detailed-imaging photo-reconnaissance satellite that carries a photo camera and two capsules that allow it to return the exposed film to the earth during the mission. At the end of a flight the spacecraft itself is returned to the ground, working as a third reentry capsule. The flight time of a spacecraft of this type is typically about 60 days, so the film is returned with about 20 days intervals. Kobalt satellites have been deployed on a low Earth orbit with inclination of about 67 degrees and orbit’s perigee and apogee of about 170 km and 350 km respectively.

During the 1980s, when the Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt was the primary Soviet reconnaissance satellite, the Soviet Union was launching up to nine satellites of this type annually in order to provide timely collection of imaging data. As a rule, there was at least one spacecraft of this type on orbit at any given time. By the end of 1990s the launch rate has dropped to one satellite in one or two years, so Russia could no longer constantly keep an operational satellite on orbit, even though duration of the mission was almost doubled and reached about four months. The last launch of a Kobalt satellite, that of Cosmos-2387, was performed in February 2002. The satellite worked about four months and reentered in June 2002.

Table 2. Recent launches of optical reconnaissance satellites

NORAD number

Launch date

Inclination, degrees

Perigee, km

Apogee, km

End of operation

Comment

Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt

Cosmos-2348

25095 15.12.97 67.1 176 370 14.04.98

Cosmos-2358

25373 24.06.98 67.1 167 334 22.10.98

Cosmos-2365

25889 18.08.99 67.1 166 342 15.12.99

Cosmos-2377

26775 29.05.01 67.1 176 382 10.10.01

Cosmos-2387

27382 25.02.02 67.1 176 369 27.06.02

Yantar-4KS1 Neman

Cosmos-2359

25376 25.06.98 64.9 240 302 12.07.99

Cosmos-2370

26354 03.05.00 64.8 240 300 04.05.01

Yantar-1KFT Kometa

Cosmos-2349

25167 17.02.98 70.4 228 286 02.04.98

Cosmos-2373

26552 29.09.00 70.4 265 285 13.11.00

Orlets-1 Don

Cosmos-2399

27856 12.08.03 64.9 205 326 24.11.03

Orlets-2 Yenisey

Cosmos-2372

26538 25.09.00 64.8 201 313 20.04.01

Arkon

Cosmos-2344

24827 06.06.97 63.4 1509 2748 10/1997

Cosmos-2392

27470 25.07.02 63.5 1507 1834 07/2003

On of the most serious drawbacks of film-based reconnaissance satellites is their inability to provide data in a timely manner and their limited life span, determined by the amount of film a satellite can carry on board. Photo-electronic reconnaissance satellites have clear advantage in these areas and it was natural that the Soviet Union began working on a reconnaissance system with satellites of this type. The satellites, which are known as Yantar-4KS1 Neman, use electronic transmission of imaging information (using geostationary relay satellites when necessary).

Regular launches of Neman satellites began in 1984. Usually, a mission would last from six to eight months, after which the satellite would reenter the atmosphere. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was launching about one or two satellites of the Neman type each year, in order to have at least one operational spacecraft on orbit. The situation changed in the late 1990s. After 1995 there were only two launches of Neman satellites – one in 1998 and one in 2000.

The third system of the Yantar family is the Yantar-1KFT Kometa topographic imaging satellite. These film-based satellites provide wide-area imaging data for military as well as for civilian purposes. These satellites began operations in early 1980s and were launched at a rate of about one satellite annually (nominal duration of a mission is about 45 days). As with other reconnaissance satellites, the launch rate has been decreased in the 1990s – the last two satellites of this type were launched in 1998 and 2000.

In addition to the Yantar systems described above, Russia is developing at least three other photoreconnaissance satellite systems. Two of them use film-based satellites – Orlets-1 Don and Orlets-2 Yenisey, and one includes an electronic reconnaissance satellite – Arkon.

The main distinguishing feature of Orlets-1 and Orlets-2 is the increased number of film capsules that could be returned to the ground during satellite’s mission – Orlets-1 has eight capsules and Orlets-2 is reported to have 22. In addition, it is likely that the optical system of the satellites allows them to get images with higher resolution than that achieved by the satellites of previous generations. Since the satellites rely on film for recording images, their lifespan is relatively short – from 40 to 60 days.

Orlets-1 is an older program – satellites of this type have been in operation since 1989. During the 1989-1993 period these satellites were launched annually, but after that there were only two launches – in 1997 and 2003. The last satellite of the Orlets-1 type, Cosmos-2399, ended its operations in November 2003.

Although the Orlets-2 program began in the late 1980s, the first launch of a satellite of this type was conducted only in 1994. That first flight, that of Cosmos-2290, lasted for more than seven months and seemed to have experimental nature. The next launch was conducted only in 2000. As of mid-2004, it remains the last launch of a satellite of this type. It appears likely that the Orlets-2 is still largely an experimental program.

Another optical reconnaissance program under development is known as Arkon. Development of

this system began in mid-1980s, but it was not before June 1996 that a satellite was ready for a launch. The new satellite, Cosmos-2344, was deployed on a relatively high orbit with perigee of about 1500 km and apogee of about 2700 km, which is unusual for imaging satellites that tend to be deployed on lower orbits in order to get better spatial resolution. The satellite transmitted imaging information to the ground control center electronically, using geostationary relay satellites when necessary.

It is likely that one of the reasons for the choice of the unusual orbit was to facilitate longer lifetime of a satellite, which at high altitudes would be unaffected by atmospheric drag. However, the actual lifetime of the satellites proved to be fairly short. The first satellite ceased operations only four months after launch because of a malfunction. The second (and so far the last) launch of Arkon was conducted in July 2002. That satellite worked over one year, after which it stopped operations, apparently far short of the intended end of its operational life.[7]

As we can see from the brief overview of the Russian optical reconnaissance programs, Russia does not have the capability to maintain continuous coverage of the Earth with its satellites. Moreover, even if all its satellites were operational, Russia would have rather limited capability of getting high-resolution imaging data in a timely manner. New systems that are supposed to provide that kind of capability still seem to be at experimental stages.

Naval reconnaissance and signal intelligence

The Soviet Union invested considerable resources into development of a system that would provide the capability to detect ships at sea and direct missiles to them. The first version of this system began operations in the early 1970s. It included satellites of two types – passive signal intelligence satellites, known as US-P or EORSAT, and active radar surveillance satellites US-A or RORSAT. During the time the system has been in operation, the satellites and their mission profiles underwent a number of modifications. Operations of the active system, US-A, were discontinued in 1988, primarily because of the concern about nuclear reactors that were used to provide power for satellite systems. The modified version of the US-P system that is currently in operation, is known as US-PU.

The US-PU/EORSAT system includes satellites that can track surface ships by detecting their radio communications, radar emissions etc. A full constellation of these satellites includes three or four spacecraft deployed on circular orbits with altitudes of about 400 km. A US-PU satellite usually stays in orbit for about two years, after which it reenters the atmosphere. Until 1997 Russia had been launching one or two satellites of this type every year in order to keep the system operational. After 1997, however, intervals between launches increased to almost two years and as a result there was no more than one working satellite on orbit at any given time.

Table 3. Recent launches of signal intelligence satellites

NORAD number

Launch date

Inclination, degrees

Perigee, km

Apogee, km

End of operation

Comment

US-PU/EORSAT

Cosmos- 25088 09.12.97 65 410 410 19.11.99

2347

Cosmos-2367

26040 26.12.99 65 404 418 19.07.02

Cosmos-2383

27053 21.12.01 65 410 410 20.03.04

Cosmos-2405

28350 28.05.04 65 412 427 Active

Tselina-2

Cosmos-2333

24297 04.09.96 71 848 852

Cosmos-2360

25406 28.07.98 71 848 852

Cosmos-2369

26069 03.02.00 71 848 854

Cosmos-2406

28352 10.06.04 71 850 890 Active

It was reported that the US-PU system is being discontinued and Comos-2383, which was launched in December 2001 and reentered in March 2004, was though to be the last satellite of this type. However, in May 2004 the Space Forces launched a new satellite of the US-PU type, indicating that Russia intends to keep the system in operation.

In addition to the US-P system, which was dedicated to observing electronic signatures of surface ships, the Soviet Union deployed a number of general-purpose signal intelligence and electronic reconnaissance systems of the Tselina family. The first two generations of signal intelligence satellites, Tselina-O and Tselina-D, were in operation until 1984 and 1994 respectively. The system that is currently in operation is known as Tselina-2. Its development began in mid-1970s and the first spacecraft was launched in 1984.

Tselina-2 satellites are deployed on relatively high circular orbits (altitude about 850 km). A full Tselina-2 constellation would consist of four satellites in four orbital planes. Until mid-1990s Russia has managed to maintain an almost full constellation, but by the beginning of 2004 there was only one operational satellite on orbit. In June 2004 the Space Forces launched a new satellite of the Tselina-2 type, bringing the number of operational satellite to two.

It is not clear to what extent the Russian military will continue to rely on the Tselina-2 system in the future. The spacecraft and the launcher that is used to place it into orbit, Zenit-2, are produced in Ukraine, which probably makes a long-term commitment to this system unlikely.

There have been reports that Russia is developing a new system, which will replace both Tselina-2 and the US-PU systems, but the details are scarce.

Navigation satellites

There are two major military navigation systems that are currently in use in Russia. The first one is known as Tsiklon or Parus, includes satellites on circular orbits with altitudes of about 1000 km. The accuracy provided by this system is about 100 m. This system was initially developed as a military system, but later was widely used for navigation by the Soviet (and now Russian) civilian ships. In the recent years Russia has been launching about one satellite a year, which was probably enough to keep the system operational.

Another navigation system, known as Glonass, is the Soviet/Russian equivalent of the U.S. Navstar/GPS system. Like its U.S. counterpart, it includes satellites deployed on semi-synchronous circular orbits with altitudes of 20000 km. There are also differences in configuration – the Russian system includes 24 satellite deployed in three orbital planes (as opposed to four orbital planes for GPS). The accuracy provided by the Glonass system (assuming that the full constellation is deployed) is comparable to that of GPS.

Table 4. Recent launches of navigation satellites

NORAD number

Launch date

Inclination, degrees

Perigee, km

Apogee, km

End of operation

Comment

Parus

Cosmos-2334

24304 05.09.96 82.9 968 1009

Cosmos-2341

24772 17.04.97 82.9 977 1014

Cosmos-2346

24953 23.09.97 82.9 968 1009

Cosmos-2361

25590 24.12.98 82.9 969 1013

Cosmos-2366

25892 26.08.99 82.9 963 1013

Cosmos-2378

26818 08.06.01 82.9 963 1010

Cosmos-2389

27436 28.05.02 82.9 950 1017

Cosmos-2398

27818 04.06.03 82.9 950 1017

Glonass

Cosmos-2362

25593 30.12.98 64.8 19119 19128 08.05.03 Glonass 786

Cosmos-2363

25594 30.12.98 64.8 19119 19128 14.07.03 Glonass 784

Cosmos-2364

25595 30.12.98 64.8 19119 19128 31.12.02 Glonass 779

Cosmos-2374

26564 13.10.00 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 783

Cosmos-2375

26565 13.10.00 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 787

Cosmos-2376

26566 13.10.00 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 788

Cosmos-2380

26989 01.12.01 64.8 19119 19128 08.01.03 Glonass 790

Cosmos-2381

26988 01.12.01 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 789

Cosmos-2382

26987 01.12.01 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 711

Cosmos-2394

27617 25.12.02 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 791

Cosmos-2395

27618 25.12.02 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 792

Cosmos-2396

27619 25.12.02 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 793

Cosmos- 28113 10.12.03 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass

2402 794

Cosmos-2403

28114 10.12.03 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 795

Cosmos-2404

28112 10.12.03 64.8 19137 19137 Unknown Glonass 701

Deployment of Glonass satellites began in 1982, but the system had not reached initial operational capability until 1989. After the breakup of the Soviet Union the system has been suffering from mismanagement and inadequate funding. The Russian government has tried several times to commercialize the system, but they were unsuccessful. As a result, the system is being kept in operation, but the number of working satellites is rarely higher than ten. Consequently, the ability of the system to provide accurate navigation information is very limited. Another problem that holds back development of the Glonass system is the lack of equipment that would allow Russian military and civilian users to take advantage of the data supplied by the system.[8]

Despite of the existing problems, Russia seems determined to continue operations of the Glonass system and is launching about tree satellites a year to replenish the constellation. It is currently working on a new modification of Glonass satellite, known as Glonass-M, which will have longer lifespan and therefore will require fewer launches. The first satellite of this type was launched in December 2004. Development of the new satellite is one of the main component of the current plan of the Glonass system development, which envisions bringing the number of operational satellites to 18-24 during the next decade.[9]

Communication satellites

There are three general categories of space-based communication systems that are maintained by Russia – low-earth orbit relay satellites, satellites on highly-elliptical orbits and geostationary satellites. Although most of these systems have been developed with military applications in mind, they or their modifications are also used for civilian purposes.

The Strela-3 communication system, which includes satellites on low-earth orbits, was developed for the military intelligence. The satellites work in store-dump mode, receiving information as they pass over the sender and sending it to the recipient when they go over him. A full constellation includes 12 satellites deployed in two orbital planes at altitudes of about 1400 km.

The system became operational in late 1980s, replacing an earlier similar system. In addition to the military Strela-3 system, in 1992 Russia began deployment of its civilian counterpart, known as Gonets-D and Gonets-D1. Satellites of this system are currently deployed in the same orbital planes that are used for with the military ones and are likely to be used for military applications as well.

Deployment of the system was interrupted in 1998-2001, when there were no launches of new satellites for more than three years. In December 2001 launches were resumed and by 2004 the Space Forces deployed seven new satellites, indicating that Russia intends to continue maintaining this system.

Two communication system that include satellites on highly-elliptical orbits, are Molniya-1 and

Molniya-3. The orbits that are used for deployment of these satellites are named after the satellites and known as Molniya orbits. An orbit of this type has a perigee of 400-1000 km and an apogee of about 40000 km. A spacecraft that occupies this orbit spends most of the time during a revolution at the apogee (which in the case of Molniya is located over the Russian territory) allowing it to provide better coverage of the country than a geostationary satellite.

Molniya satellites are used as relay satellites for general-purpose military and civilian communication. To maintain the constellations Russia has been launching about one satellite of each type annually. There were some exceptions to this, but the pattern of launch activity suggests that Russia will continue maintaining these systems in the future.

Table 5. Recent launches of military communication satellites

NORAD number

Launch date

Inclination, degrees

Perigee, km

Apogee, km

End of operation

Comment

Strela-3

Cosmos-2337

24725 14.02.97 82.6 1409 1409

Cosmos-2338

24726 14.02.97 82.6 1409 1409

Cosmos-2339

24727 14.02.97 82.6 1409 1409

Cosmos-2352

25363 16.06.98 82.6 1300 1870

Cosmos-2353

25364 16.06.98 82.6 1300 1870

Cosmos-2354

25365 16.06.98 82.6 1300 1870

Cosmos-2355

25366 16.06.98 82.6 1300 1870

Cosmos-2356

25367 16.06.98 82.6 1300 1870

Cosmos-2357

25368 16.06.98 82.6 1300 1870

Cosmos-2384

27055 28.12.01 82.5 1415 1447

Cosmos-2385

27056 28.12.01 82.5 1415 1447

Cosmos-2386

27057 28.12.01 82.5 1415 1447

Cosmos-2390

27464 08.07.02 82.5 1467 1507

Cosmos-2391

27465 08.07.02 82.5 1467 1507

Cosmos-2400

27868 19.08.03 82.5 1459 1502

Cosmos-2401

27869 19.08.03 82.5 1466 1501

Molniya-1

Molniya-1-90

24960 24.10.97 64.1 1117 39237

Molniya-1-91

25485 28.09.98 64.0 988 39372

Molniya-1-92

27707 19.04.03 63.3 586 39765

Molniya-1-93

28163 18.02.04 62.9 791 39563

Molniya-3

Molniya-3-49

25379 01.07.98 62.8 466 40770

Molniya-3-50

25847 08.07.99 62.5 472 40813

Molniya-3-51

26867 20.07.01 62.7 255 40811

Molniya-3-52

26970 25.10.01 62.9 646 40658

Raduga

Raduga 1-4

25642 28.02.99 3.6 35783 35787 Active 35E

Raduga 1-5

26477 28.08.00 1.2 35775 35792 Active 45E

Raduga 1-6

26936 06.10.01 0.4 35777 35795 Active 70E

Raduga 1-7

28194 27.03.04 1.2 35766 35804 Active 85E

Geizer

Cosmos-2371

26394 05.07.00 1.3 35770 35806 Active 80E

Another class of relay systems includes satellites of two different types deployed on geostationary orbits. Satellites of one of them, Raduga-1/Globus-1, are used for general-purpose communication and were reported to have secure channels used for communication between the military leadership. Satellites of the Raduga-1 type are deployed at four points on geostationary orbit over the Indian ocean. The system has been in operation since 1989 and has been maintained with regular launches.[10]

The second military communication system on geostationary orbit, Geizer, is used as a relay for low-earth orbit satellites, including imaging and communication satellites. The satellites also seem to have spare bandwidth capacity that can be used for civilian applications. Geizer satellites have been in operation since 1982. A full constellation would include three satellites, but since 2000 Russia has only one operational satellite of this type in orbit.

Supporting infrastructure

Launch sites

By the beginning of 1990s, the Soviet Union had two primary space launch centers – Baykonur

(also known as Tyuratam) in Kazakhstan and Plesetsk near Arkhangelsk on the north of Russia.[11] The centers held the status of test sites of the Ministry of Defense and along with space launch facilities included a number of military installations, used for tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The centers were operated by the military space forces with participation of the Ministry of General Machine Building, which had the responsibility for the Soviet space program.

Baykonur has always been the main space launch site. In particular, all launches of manned spacecraft and all launches into geostationary orbits have been conducted from there. The unique role of the Baykonur site forced Russia to seek a leasing agreement with Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The agreement that has been reached asserts Kazakhstan sovereignty over the site and requires Russia to pay an annual fee for using it. A January 2004 agreement extended the lease until 2050 and made provisions for development of joint Russia-Kazakhstan projects.[12]

Terms of the lease apparently allow the Russian armed forces to continue using the site for military-related space and ballistic missile launches. At the same time, Russia has been looking for ways to move all its military activity to sites on the Russian territory, which was stated as a long-term goal.[13] In order to do so, Russia has initiated construction of a new launch complex at the Plesetsk launch site and is building a new launch site, Svobodnyy on the Far East. If this work is completed, Russia will be able to conduct all its military-related launches from is own territory. Baykonur will most likely be used as a primary launch site for manned flights and for scientific and commercial activity.

Baykonur

The Baykonur space launch site was established in 1955 and since then was the primary launch site for most of the Soviet space programs. It is located in Kzyl-Orda region of Kazakhstan, at the latitude of 46º North and longitude of 63º40’ East. The northern location of the site limits inclination of orbits satellites can be inserted into (no orbits with inclinations less than 46 degrees are possible) and imposes a penalty in payload weight compared with the launch sites located closer to the equator.

The launch site territory contains a number of launch complexes designed to support launches (and rocket and satellite preparation) of a specific launcher type. Each complex includes one or two launch pads (or silos).

Two launch complexes with one launch pad each – launch complexes No. 1 and No. 31 – support launches of the so-called R-7 family, which includes space launchers that are based on the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile design. Among these are Vostok, Voskhod and Soyuz launchers used in the manned space program, Molniya launchers used for launching satellites into highly-elliptical orbits, and modification of these launchers used for various missions. The R-7-family launchers can deliver up to 8 metric tons (MT) payload into a low-earth orbit (depending on configuration).

Launch complexes 81 and 200 service the Proton heavy launcher (each complex has two launch pads). Proton can lift up about 20 MT payload into a low-earth orbit and about 5 MT into a geosynchronous orbit. It is the heaviest space launcher available in Russia and is used for all launches of geostationary satellites. Baykonur is the only launch site that has Proton launch facilities.

Figure 1. Space launch sites and the network of control and measurement complexes

Another dedicated space launch complex at Baykonur is the launch complex 45, which includes two launch pads for Zenit launchers (one of these launch pads was almost completely destroyed during a failed launch in 1990). Zenit is a relatively new launcher, which began flights in 1985. It can deliver about 13 MT into a low-earth orbit and as far as military applications are concerned, has been used primarily for launches of reconnaissance and signal intelligence satellites.[14] Since the launcher is produced in Ukraine, its use for military launches will probably decrease in the long run.

Launch complex 90 is used for launches of a Tsiklon light launcher, which is also produced in Ukraine. The launcher was built as a modification of a R-36 (SS-9) missile and has been used for a variety of military and civilian applications. It can deliver about 3.5 MT into a low-earth orbit and has been recently used for the launch of a new US-PU naval intelligence satellite.

Other launch complexes at Baykonur are ICBM missile silos, modified to accommodate space launches that are performed by converted missiles. These are launch complex 175 of Rokot launcher (converted UR-100NU/SS-19 missile) and launch complex 109 of Dnepr launcher (converted R-36M/SS-18 missile). Used as space launchers, these missiles can deliver into a low-earth orbit about 1.8 MT and 4.5 MT payloads respectively. Despite their military origin, these launchers have not been used in the military space program.

Launch complexes 110 and 250 have been built for the Buran-Energia project (although some facilities date back to the N-1 lunar program). These complexes were used for launches of the Energia heavy launcher in 1987 and 1988. The program was terminated and the launch facilities have been mothballed. It is highly unlikely that the Energia system will resume or that these facilities could be used without substantial modification and upgrade.

In addition to the existing launch facilities, Russia and Kazakhstan in January 2004 agreed to begin joint work on a project that would include construction of a new launch complex, which will be used for the Angara launcher. This launcher has been developed in Russia with the intent to move launches of military satellites from Baykonur to Plesetsk.

Plesetsk

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Plesetsk was the only launch site at the Russian territory. Established in late 1950s as a base of R-7 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Plesetsk site later became a major space launch site that was servicing the Soviet space program as well as a test site used in development of ballistic missiles. The Plesetsk launch site is located in the northern Arkhangelsk region of Russia (63º North and 41º East). The northern position of the site further limits the range of inclinations of directly accessible orbits and imposes even larger penalty in terms of payload, compared with Baykonur or other launch sites. Despite this, Plesetsk is being developed as Russia’s main launch site, especially in regard to the military space program. The main reason for this is that the site already has extensive launch support infrastructure.

Plesetsk has two launch complexes for missiles of the R-7 family (Soyuz and Molniya) – complexes 43 with two launch pads and complex 16 with one. These have been used for launches of reconnaissance satellites, communication satellites, and early-warning satellites deployed on highly-elliptical orbits.

Each of the launch complexes 132 and 133 has one launch pad of Kosmos-3 rocket. This light launcher (about 1500 kg into a low-earth orbit) was built as a modification of the R-14 ballistic missile. It has been used to deliver communication, navigation and signal intelligence satellites into low-earth orbit. The launch complex 133 also includes a launch pad that was converted from

Kosmos-3 to Rockot launcher.

Plesetsk site also support launches of Tsiklon rockets. These launches are conducted from two launch pads at the launch complex 32. The complex is used for launches of naval reconnaissance satellites.

In the 1980s the Soviet Union began a construction of a complex that would support launches of Zenit rockets. After a series of delays, however, the plans to launch Zenits were reconsidered and the complex was reoriented for Angara launchers. The initial plans called for the beginning of Angara launches in 2003-2004, but it now clear that the work is behind the schedule.[15]

Svobodnyy

Until 1991, the Svobodnyy launch site was one of the operational bases of UR-100/SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missiles. After the missiles were decommissioned during START reductions, the base was chosen as a location of a new space launch site. The site, which is located at the latitude of 52º North, can potentially provide better conditions for access to a wide range of orbits than the site in Plesetsk.

The current development plans for the space launch site in Svobodnyy envision construction of launch complexes for Rockot and Angara launchers.[16] So far, the only space launches conducted from the site were those of Start-1 launcher. This launcher is a converted Topol/SS-25 ballistic missile, which can deliver about 600 kg payload to a low-earth orbit. It is launched from a road-mobile platform and therefore does not require construction of a launch pad.

Satellite control and space surveillance networks

The scale of the Soviet space program, both civilian and military, required substantial investment into ground facilities and infrastructure that would support operations of satellites. In addition to space launch sites, the Soviet Union built a network of ground control and measurement facilities that are used to control satellites, as well as stations that received information supplied by space-based sensors, processed it, and delivered to military and civilian users. The Soviet Union also developed a network of satellite tracking facilities that allowed it to monitor space activities of other countries.

Control and measurement centers

Every space system includes a ground segment that allows operators to control satellites and use process the data supplied by them. The ground equipment that allows to do that is usually installed at one of eleven stationary control and measurement complexes (OKIKs), dispersed throughout the territory of the Soviet Union (see Table 6 and Figure 1). Some of these complexes specialize in certain tasks – the center in Galenki on the Far East, for example, has an antenna that allows it to communicate with interplanetary spacecraft. But usually a complex’s mission is determined by requirements of a particular system. Different programs may share installations when possible, but usually each program has its own dedicated equipment.

In the breakup of the Soviet Union Russia lost significant part of the Soviet control and measurement complexes infrastructure. Ukraine had three complexes of this type, one of which, in Yevpatoriya, was dedicated to deep-space communication and served as a node of the regional

network. One of the complexes in Ukraine served as a regional center for navigation and communication satellites.[17] A similar complex, which provided support for communication and navigation satellites, was deployed at Priozersk in Kazakhstan, close to the Sary-Shagan test site. A complex of a different kind was deployed in Kitab, Uzbekistan. It was one of the newest additions to the control and measurement network and was equipped with laser measurement systems.[18]

In addition to the network of control and measurement centers, Russia maintains a network of smaller orbit measurement facilities, which includes more than a dozen of small centers that provide trajectory and orbit measurements. Some of these facilities are deployed along the trajectories followed by ballistic missiles during their tests, some are located in the vicinity of space launch sites. To supplement stationary systems Russia operates a number of smaller mobile trajectory-measurement systems that are deployed as necessary. The Soviet Union also had five ship-based measurement systems, but none of them is in use today.

Table 6. Control and measurement complexes

Location Designation Comment

Russia

Eniseisk OKIK-4

Vulkannyy OKIK-6

Barnaul OKIK-7

Krasnoye Selo

OKIK-9

Kolpashevo OKIK-12

Nizhniye Taltsy

OKIK-13

Shchelkovo OKIK-14

Galenki OKIK-15 Deep-space communication

Solnechnyy OKIK-17

Vorkuta OKIK-18

Lekhtusi Training OKIK

Ukraine

Dunayevtsy Navigation and communication

Yevpatoriya Deep-space communication

Simferopol

Kazakhstan

Priozersk Navigation and communication

Uzbekistan

Kitab Included laser ranging systems

Most of these control and measurement complexes and facilities are managed by the Main Space Systems Center (GITsIU KS) located in Krasnoznamensk (also known as Golitsyno-2) near Moscow. The center is a main control unit of the space forces. It accumulates data about operations of almost all military space-based systems and directs their activities. Control over civilian satellites is usually transferred to their own separate control facilities shortly after their launch (which is managed by the space forces). However, some civilian systems use the hardware of the space forces’ control and measurement network.

There are subdivision within the main center that are responsible for specific programs. For example, control of the Glonass system is the responsibility of a separate center, also located in Krasnoznamensk.[19] Some military systems, however, are managed completely separately. Among these programs are the US-KS and US-KMO early-warning systems, which have their own control center in Kurilovo, Serpukhov region,[20] and the US-PU naval intelligence system, which has been traditionally subordinated to the Navy.[21]

Space surveillance and tracking system

As many other components of its space program, the space surveillance and tracking system that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, has been adversely affected by the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Soviet space tracking system relied primarily on early-warning radars, deployed along the periphery of the Soviet territory. By the time of the breakup, most of the newer Daryal/Pechora radars have been at the stage of construction and then were left outside Russian territory. As a result, Russia has to rely on older radars, some of which have been in operation since the early 1970s, for its space tracking (and early warning) needs.[22]

At the core of the radar network that provides Russia with capability to track objects in space, are the Dnestr-M/Dnepr/Hen House radars at Olenegorsk (Murmansk region, Russia), Mishelevka (Irkutsk region, Russia), Balkhash (Kazakhstan), Sevastopol (Ukraine), and Mukachevo (Ukraine), Daryal/Pechora radars at Olenegorsk, Pechora (Russia), and Gabala (Azerbaijan), and the Volga radar in Baranovichi (Belarus). As can bee seen from this list, many of these radars are outside Russia, so it has to negotiate the terms of using the radars with the host country.

In addition to the dedicated early-warning radars, Russia uses radars of the Moscow missile defense system to track objects in space. It was reported that the Don-2N/Pushkino radar of that system provides the most accurate tracking information.

To track objects at high altitudes, where radars cannot see, Russia operates optical surveillance facilities. The most advanced of them is the Okno system, located in Nurek, Tajikistan. Construction of this system began in the 1980s, but it reached operational status only in 1999. The Okno system allows to detect spacecraft at altitudes of up to 40,000 km.[23] Scientific telescopes of the Academy of Sciences can also be given assignments to track space objects if necessary.

Anti-satellite systemThe Soviet Union was the only country that developed and operationally deployed an anti-satellites system (ASAT), designed to attack satellites on low-earth orbits . The United States also worked on its own ASAT systems during the cold war, but abandoned its projects at the early stages of development.

The development of the Soviet ASAT system began as early as the early 1960s and the first test flights of maneuverable spacecraft were performed in 1963-1964. The development was managed by the TsNII Kometa design bureau of the Ministry of Radio Industry. The space launcher used in the system was a modified R-36 (SS-9) missile, developed by OKB-586 design bureau (now Yuzhnoye Design Bureau). Design of the interceptor spacecraft was assigned to the Lavochkin Design Bureau. In addition to the space launcher and interceptor spacecraft, the system included a network of space surveillance radars and the command and control center.

The first tests of the system were conducted in 1968. During subsequent tests, the system demonstrated its capability to destroy satellites on low orbits with altitudes of up to 1000 km. The system was tested with different intercept geometries, onboard sensors, and proximity fuses (infrared and radar).

The system was accepted for service and commissioned for active duty in 1979. The launchers – modified R-36 (SS-9) missiles – were deployed at the Baykonur test site. Testing continued until 1982, after which in November 1983 the Soviet leadership announced a unilateral moratorium on further ASAT tests and the system was put on hold.

The status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur has never been officially disclosed, but it is certain that the system is no longer operational. There were reports that the system underwent modernization in 1991, but since it was done without flight tests it is highly unlikely that this modernization involved any significant upgrades. Significant parts of the space surveillance network that is an integral part of the system, have been lost during the break up of the Soviet Union. Although Russia has not formally announced that the system is decommissioned, the current structure of the Russian Space Forces does not include any units that could operate the system, which means it is no longer functional.

Organization of the industry and the military

Space Forces

The current structure of the military space program is a result of a series of reorganizations conducted in the last decade. In today’s Russia, all military space-related activities are managed by the Space Forces, which is a separate branch of the armed forces, subordinated directly to the General Staff. This status makes the Space Forces independent from main services of the armed forces (i.e. from Air Force, Navy, or Army). In its current form the Space Forces were created in June 2001 by a presidential decree, which transferred to the newly created branch of the armed forces all the units that were responsible for operating space-related facilities and satellite systems. In addition, the Space Forces include the units that are operating the early-warning system, space surveillance and tracking system, and the Moscow missile defense.

In the Soviet Union space operations and early-warning and missile defense systems belonged to different services and branches. Initially, all space-related activity was part of the Strategic Rocket Forces (and its predecessor), where it was managed by a separate directorate. In 1982 that directorate, the Main Space Systems Directorate (GUKOS), was removed from the Strategic Rocket Forces and was subordinated directly to the General Staff. In 1986 its name was changed to the United Space Systems Directorate (UNKS). In 1992, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the units of the directorate were transformed into the Military Space Forces, which remained under direct control of the General Staff.

During a major reorganization of the Russian armed forces in 1997, the Military Space Forces were again subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces. This time they also included early-warning, space surveillance, and missile defense units, which were transferred there from the disbanded Air Defense Forces. All these units were transferred to the Space Forces during the 2001 reorganization, which created the Space Forces as a separate branch of armed forces.

The 1997 reorganization was a major change in the traditional structure of the Soviet/Russian armed forces. Historically, early warning of a missile attack, tracking space objects, and operating missile defense systems were among the missions of the Air Defense Forces, a separate service of the armed forces that was responsible for strategic defense of the country. In many important ways its structure and responsibilities were different from those of space directorate or Strategic Rocket Forces, so integration of these units into the Military Space Forces after the 1997 reorganization was a rather difficult process (although the situation appeared to improve after the 2001 reform).

As a result of all reorganizations, the Space Forces currently include the following main units:

• Space launch sites – Baykonur, Plesetsk, and Svobodnyy

• Space Systems Control Center and the network of control and measurement centers

• Space and Missile Defense Army, which includes divisions that provide early warning, space surveillance, and missile defense

• Other units, which include military academies and a directorate that is responsible for construction of space and missile defense facilities

The Space Forces are headed by Lt.-Gen. Vladimr Popovkin, who was appointed to this post in

March 2004. His predecessor, Col.-Gen. Anatoly Perminov, was transferred to the Federal Space Agency, which is responsible for the civilian program.

Space Industry

The practice of research and development that existed in the Soviet Union gave ministries of the defense industry very prominent role in the development and production process. The armed forces were responsible for developing technical requirements for new systems and then for accepting them for service. Financing research, development, and subsequent production of a new system was the responsibility of the industry. Coordination of efforts of various ministries that were involved in large research and development projects, was the job of a special interagency government body, the Military-Industrial Commission.[24]

Development and production of space systems was the responsibility of the Ministry of General Machine-Building. The ministry was handling development and production of ballistic missiles, space launchers, satellites and the supporting equipment. It was managing most of the civilian space programs and provided oversight of the military programs.

Development of missile defense and early-warning systems was the responsibility of a different defense ministry – the Ministry of Radio Industry. Design bureaus and enterprises of this ministry worked directly on development of large radars used in early-warning, missile defense, and space surveillance and were primary integrators in other projects in these areas that involved other ministries of defense industry. For example, the Ministry of Radio Industry was responsible for programs like the space-based early-warning or anti-satellite system, but the launchers and spacecraft used in these programs were developed and produced by the Ministry of General Machine-Building.

In the years after the breakup of the Soviet Union the defense industry has undergone radical transformation, which seriously changed the structure of the industry and the way it handles development and production of new military systems.

In the early 1990s, as old Soviet defense ministries were being abolished, the key design bureaus and production plants of the space industry were transferred to the Russian Space Agency, which provided coordination of civilian space projects (including projects that involved international cooperation). At the same time, the role of the new agency was not as far-reaching as that of the ministry during the Soviet times and it was largely limited to handling civilian projects in space.

The situation with other military industry enterprises, including those of the Ministry of Radio Industry, was different. They were first transferred to the Ministry of Economics and then to its successors, as they have been undergoing a number of reorganizations. None of the successor governmental agencies, however, had the authority or the necessary organizational structure to manage or coordinate new development projects. Besides, in the 1990s the Russian government could not provide financial resources to sustain spending in the defense industry at the level that existed in the Soviet Union. As a result, much of the organizational and physical infrastructure of the defense industry has been lost.

In recent years the Russian government undertook several attempts to restructure the defense industry and streamline the development and acquisition process. The structure that resulted from the reorganizations repeats the one that existed in the Soviet Union in some important aspects, but in others, not less important, is different from it. The acquisition process in the armed forces is still managed by special departments inside individual services. However, they now have to deal with

defense industry design bureaus and companies directly, rather than going through interagency process managed by defense industry ministries and the Military Industrial Commission. The Ministry of Defense is also supposed to manage development and production budget, which previously went directly to the industry.[25]

The main difference between the traditional Soviet system of research and development and the current Russian one is that the latter lacks an agency that coordinates efforts of various defense industry companies and determine long-term research and development plan. This applies to the defense industry in general and to its individual branches. For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to note that neither the military space industry nor the industry that was responsible for missile defense and anti-satellite weapons in the past retained organizational structure for managing development of new systems. Given that development work in these areas has traditionally required significant amount of coordination of efforts of various companies and ministries, that means that Russia probably does not have the capability to undertake large development programs in military space or related fields.

An attempt to correct this situation was undertaken during the major reorganization of the Russian government carried out in March 2004. As part of the reorganization, the Russian Space Agency was transformed into a Federal Space Agency and was subordinated directly to the prime minister. As it was already mentioned, the new director of the agency, Col.-Gen. Anatoly Perminov, was the commander-in-chief of the Space Forces before being appointed to lead the civilian space program. This appointment indicated an intent to strengthen both the civilian and the military space program.

Despite these efforts, Russia is yet to demonstrate that it can successfully manage a large-scale research and development project, whether military or civilian, in space. In fact, as we have seen, even without new programs Russia has enough problems maintaining the programs and infrastructure that it inherited from the Soviet Union.

ConclusionAs we can see from the overview of the Russian space program, despite recent downturns, the scale of the program, the existing industrial infrastructure, and the breadth of expertise that is still retained by the Russian companies, will make Russia an important actor in any development related to militarization or weaponization of space. At the same time, the exact role that Russia could play in this process, is still to be determined.

One possibility would be for Russia to fill the role of a peer competitor of the United States in space (and in military area in general) that was played by the Soviet Union in the past. This view of the future of the Russian space program is fairly popular among Russian political and military leaders, which could be explained by the fact that space remains one of the few areas in which Russian technologies remain competitive internationally. They see space as an area in which Russia can, and therefore should, maintain parity with the United States.

The attention that the Russia leadership has been paying to the space program in recent years seems to indicate that Russia is setting the goal of developing and supporting the full range of military space systems. If these plans materialize, Russian military satellites could be considered potential targets for space-based weapon systems (or ground-based anti-satellite system). In addition, the missile defense and anti-satellite programs that the Soviet Union had in the past seem to suggest that Russia could initiate new development effort in these areas as well, which would make it to deploy its own space-based weapons to counter the military space systems deployed by the United States. Although it is highly unlikely that the relationships between Russia and the United States

would reach a point of competition or even arms race in space, the possibility of a development of this kind has been widely used to justify space weaponization programs. It is therefore important to consider whether realities of the current Russian space program would support the role of Russia as a U.S. competitor.

First, we should consider Russia’s ability to deploy a range of space-based military systems that would support operation of the Russian armed forces – optical reconnaissance, navigation and signal intelligence systems. Russia does have a number of systems of this kind in operation, but, as we have seen, none of them operates at full capacity. Besides, most of these systems have been developed in the 1980s and have not been modernized for quite substantial period of time, which makes them hardy suitable for support of modern military operations.

In many cases Russia also has to deal with the low reliability of satellites developed in the Soviet Union. It was not a serious problem in the past, when the military had access to virtually unlimited launch capacity. It is a problem for Russia now, since it requires large number of launches just to maintain constellations in a very limited configuration.

There is another potentially even more serious problem with the current Russian military space programs. Utilizing full potential of space requires significant investment into creating an infrastructure that would allow the troops to use information and capabilities provided by the space segment of a system. While Russia has been improving its capability to launch satellites and maintain and operate satellite constellations, development of infrastructure on the ground remains the weakest link, undermining much of the efforts directed toward broader use of space systems.

The Glonass satellite navigation system provides a very good illustration to all these points. It was developed in the 1970s and became operational in mid-1980s. In recent years Russia has invested considerable efforts into deploying a full constellation of 24 Glonass satellites in orbit. In order to achieve that, it had to upgrade the spacecraft to extend their lifetimes, because otherwise it could not provide enough launches to replace the satellites on orbit.[26] But even if the plan to populate all slots in the constellation succeeds, the ground infrastructure does not seem to be ready to take advantage of it. For example, it was reported that aircraft of the military transport aviation do not have Glonass receivers onboard and rely on the U.S. GPS system instead.[27]

Most of the same problems are also common to photo-reconnaissance and signal intelligence systems. While Russia has the capability to collect imaging information and monitor communications, these capabilities are not integrated into the command structure of the armed forces to the extent that would make these systems directly usable in military operations. The launch schedule of satellites that provide these capabilities seems to confirm that – for example, there have been no serious effort to maintain constant presence of imaging satellites in orbit. The same is true about signal intelligence satellites, where Russia does not maintain fully operational constellations. While partly this may be explained by the lack of sufficient funding, the example of other systems, namely communication satellites, shows that funding was probably not the only, or even the main, factor. As can be seen from the recent history of communication satellite launches, Russia has been investing considerable effort into supporting operations of its space-based communication network. Partly this was due to the dual-use nature of the satellites, which are used for civilian communications as well. However, military systems, like the Strela system, have also been maintained in close to full capacity.

The situation with early-warning satellites is also very characteristic for the current Russian space program. While the space-based early-warning system is considered an important element of the strategic command and control system, Russia, in effect, discontinued its efforts to maintain a full constellation of satellites on orbit after 2001. It seems satisfied with the rather limited capability

provided by the few satellites it can support. Expansion of the system does not seem to the have the urgency that would have justified efforts to deploy the constellation in its full capacity.

All these factors make Russia’s space systems a very unlikely target for any space-based or anti-satellite weapons. Although theoretically attacking some of the Russian military (or civilian) space assets can adversely affect its capability to conduct military operations, in practice, none of the currently deployed military systems in space is advanced enough for an attack of this kind to make real difference from a military point of view.

This situation, of course, could change if Russia undertakes an effort to modernize its military systems in space and to integrate them better into operations of the armed forces. For example, if Russia completes deployment of its Glonass navigation system, it could employ it to expand use of high-precision munitions. Another development of this kind would be deployment of a naval intelligence system of the US-P/US-A (EORSAT/RORSAT) type that would allow detection of aircraft carriers and other ships. This example is usually cited (although in the U.S.-China context) as potentially justifying development of anti-satellite capability that would prevent deployment and operations of a system of this kind.[28]

While a large-scale development effort of the kind described above cannot be ruled out completely, experience of the last years has demonstrated that it would be highly unlikely. For example, as we have seen, Russia is experiencing substantial difficulties with the Glonass system. Similarly, deployment of a new naval intelligence system (or of other military system) would require a development effort of the kind that Russia has not yet been able to successfully manage.

Another possibility, that of Russia developing it own capability to deploy weapons in space or to build an anti-satellite system, seems to be even more remote. First of all, Russia would certainly not be the country that would be the first to develop and deploy a space-related weapon system, as this would contradict its long-standing policy on the question of weaponization of space and the practice of following the United States in most technological developments. Besides, it is unlikely that without the United States committing itself to space weapons development Russia would be able to make a decision to initiate any substantial effort of its own.

Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia would be unlikely to follow. Its own experience with anti-satellite programs is rather discouraging – capabilities of the system were very limited and its use would have virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to operate its space-based systems. Now that the U.S. capabilities in space increased, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be even less useful. Among other factors that would certainly make development of space-related weapon systems less likely are the very high cost of systems like that and the lack of proper organizational structure that would be able to support development project in this area.

It would be more likely for Russia to turn to a policy of “asymmetric response”, planning for measures that would counter the systems developed by the United States should they present a threat to Russia’s space assets. This policy would be relatively easy to implement, for, as we already noted, the extent to which Russia relies on its space systems does not make its armed forces overly susceptible to an attack on space assets.

As we can see, Russia does not have many options when it comes to development of its own weapon systems in space or to its reaction to development of this kind of capability in other countries, namely the United States. However, this does not mean that there will be no reaction from Russia should the United States decide to go ahead with weaponization of space. As it was the case with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the reaction might not be very visible, but

strong nonetheless. For example, Russia has used the abrogation of the ABM Treaty as an excuse to extend service life of its multiple-warhead ballistic missiles and taking other measures that did not help make nuclear arsenals safer or more secure.

Eventually, it is measures like these that is the most significant and the most dangerous contribution to the cost of new military developments, whether it is missile defense or space-based weapons. The fact that they are not immediately apparent does not mean that they do not exist or that they should not be taken into account. Benefits of introducing weapons into space are highly questionable – there are very few, if any, cases that could possibly justify development of space-based weapon capability. If these benefits are weighed against the costs, the case for weaponization of space would be virtually indefensible.

[1] Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System”, Science and Global Security, Vol. 10, No 1 (2002), pp. 21-60.

[2] Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System”, Science and Global Security, Vol. 10, No 1 (2002), pp. 21-60.

[3] Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System”, Science and Global Security, Vol. 10, No 1 (2002), pp. 21-60.

[4] I. Safronov, “Moskva ustanovila nad mirom protivoraketnyy control”, Kommersant, April 28, 2003.

[5] K. Lantratov, E. Fedorov, “Otstavka kosmicheskogo naznacheniya”, Kommersant, August 25, 2003.

[6] V. G. Morozov, “Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, April 14, 2000.

[7] K. Lantratov, E. Fedorov, “Otstavka kosmicheskogo naznacheniya”, Kommersant, August 25, 2003.

[8] Andrey Liscovich, Global Navigation Satellite System: Problems and Prospects, Center for Arms Control Studies Working Paper, Dolgoprudny, 2004.

[9] Anatoly Perminov, Internet interview, Federal Space Agency Web Site, http://federalspace.ru/perminov_brifing_1.asp, accessed on June 2, 2004.

[10] Yu. Zhuravin, “Na orbite – novaya Raduga”, Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 10, 2000.

[11] Another test site that was used for launching small spacecraft into space, Kapustin Yar in Orenburg oblast, has not been used in this capacity since 1988. In 1999, the site was used for a commercial launch and may be used in auxiliary role in the future.

[12] Agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia on further development of cooperation in effective operation of Baykonur, Astana, 4 January 2002.

[13] A. Bogatyrev, “Severnye starty”, Krasnaya zvezda, October 30, 2003.

[14] A. Zak, Russian Space Web, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/zenit.html, accessed on 12 October 2003.

[15] Yu. Zhuravin, “Plestsk poluchit razvitiye”, Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 3, 2002.

[16] “Zapuski s kosmodroma Svobodnyy nachnutsya ne ranshe 2005 g.” SpaceNews.ru, http://www.spacenews.ru/spacenews/live/full_news.asp?id=9209, accessed on June 24, 2004.

[17] Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily, Vol. 3, Moscow, 2001, p. 180.

[18] Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily, Vol. 3, Moscow, 2001, p. 187-188.

[19] I. Gorbunov, “Troistvennaya druzhba”, Vremya novostey, April 5, 2004.

[20] Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System”, Science and Global Security, Vol. 10, No 1 (2002), pp. 21-60.

[21] A. I. Savin, G. F. Zotov, Yu. Ye. Petrushchenko, “Sistema morskoi razvedki i tseleukazaniya”, http://www.navy.ru/science/sor7.htm, accessed on 14 October 2003.

[22] Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System”, Science and Global Security, Vol. 10, No 1 (2002), pp. 21-60.

[23] M. Sevastianov, M. Davidenko, “Okno v kosmos”, Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 9, 2003.

[24] Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, MIT Press, 2001, p. 44.

[25] N. Poroskov, “Kaska davit na mozgi”, Vremya novostey, May 31, 2004.

[26] Andrey Liscovich, Global Navigation Satellite System: Problems and Prospects, Center for Arms Control Studies Working Paper, Dolgoprudny, 2004.

[27] N. Poroskov, “My vynuzdeny letat po amerkansroi sisteme”, Vremya novostey, July 1, 2004.

[28] Michael E. O'Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, Constraining the Military Uses of Space, Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

A desperate pursuit of parityPosted on October 21, 2002 | Printer-friendly version

A review by Pavel Podvig

The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, By Steven J. Zaloga, Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002, 292 pages; $45.00

Science and Global Security, Vol. 10 (2002), pp. 223-225

Full version of the article in PDF format (32 kb)

The history of strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the United States that shaped much of the second half of the last century could be described as a desperate attempt of the Soviet Union to match the technological, military, and political power of the United States against its strong determination not to let it happen. In the course of this competition both countries invested enormous amounts of effort and capital (financial as well as technological, scientific, and human) into building strategic nuclear arsenals that they hoped they would never use. In his new book, Steven Zaloga describes the Soviet side of the story, documenting development of the Soviet strategic forces and tracing their evolution from the post-World War II days to the end of the century.

The strength of the book is that Zaloga concentrates on development of military hardware -- bombers, missiles, and submarines. In doing so, Zaloga uses his profound knowledge of technical issues as well as Soviet organizations that were involved in development of strategic weapons -- design bureaus and military institutions. As the book convincingly shows, tough technical choices the Soviet designers had to make, institutional cultures, and personal and institutional rivalries played very important roles in shaping Soviet strategic weapon programs. More often than not, these factors proved stronger than any political or doctrinal considerations.

The book covers all key aspects of the Soviet strategic weapons program, with most attention paid to the Strategic Missile Force, which from the very early days was the strongest and most important component of the Soviet strategic triad. That does not mean, however, that the two other components, the strategic submarine force and the strategic aviation forces, are not discussed in considerable detail. In addition to this, Zaloga presents a very good description of the evolution of the strategic defense and the strategic command and control system.

Zaloga begins with a short description of the Soviet efforts to produce its first nuclear bombs and quickly moves on to document development of systems that were necessary to deliver nuclear weapons to the U.S. territory. The book then pays considerable attention to probably the most interesting period in the strategic arms race in the late 1950s-late 1960s. Zaloga describes how progress in missile technologies and the logic of the arms race had led to profound changes in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union and the United States found themselves in a situation with thousands of nuclear weapons targeted at each other.

After it achieved numerical parity with the United States, the Soviet Union was confronted with a much more difficult task. Not only did it have to produce missiles, submarines, and bombers to sustain the parity, it had to build a mechanism that would allow it to be done efficiently. And this was where the Soviet Union had largely failed. In the description of the Soviet strategic development during the 1970s and the early 1980s, Zaloga presents compelling evidence of the Soviet Union's inability to efficiently use the little resources it had and to counter the U.S. technological advantages in the area of warfare. The most notorious, but by no means the only, example of the wastefulness of the Soviet program was the story of development of UR-100N (SS-19) and MR UR-100 (SS-17) missiles, described in the book in great detail. Unable and unwilling to make a choice between the two, the Soviet leadership ended up authorizing deployment of both systems.

At the end, however, the picture presented in the book convinces the reader that "the creation of the Soviet nuclear deterrent force was a remarkable technological achievement." As the book demonstrates, despite all problems and inefficiencies, "Soviet engineers had managed to create a force rivaling that of its far richer nemesis, the United States."

The book concludes by describing the transition of the nuclear forces to Russia that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the most recent developments in the Russian strategic force. A set of appendices presents detailed technical characteristics of land-bases and sea-based missiles, tables that show evolution of the numerical strength of the Soviet force, and a description of Russian designations and a table that lists them along with the Western ones. Of course, there is only so much the book can cover. It has virtually no discussion of the Soviet nuclear weapons production complex or nuclear testing program and says very little about tactical nuclear weapons. The discussion of the impact that the U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations had on the evolution of the Soviet strategic forces is also fairly brief.

The book has something to offer to every reader. For those who are new to the history of the Soviet strategic forces, it presents a detailed and accurate yet compact account of the main developments. Those who know the subject will find enough details and observations to make the book very valuable reading. The book is very well organized and well written. In discussing technical developments Zaloga gives enough details to satisfy a technically-minded reader, but never lets those confuse someone who does not know technical jargon. The result is a book that has a broad appeal and should be essential reading for those who work on technical and political aspects of arms control.

History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System

Posted on March 15, 2002 | Printer-friendly version

Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System”, Science and Global Security, Vol. 10 (2002), pp. 21-60

Full version of the article in PDF format (700 kb)

ABSTRACT: The article presents an overview of the history of development and the current status of the Soviet and Russian early-warning system, which was built to provide the Soviet strategic forces with information about a missile attack in an event of a nuclear conflict with the United States. Two main components of this system are considered--the network of early-warning radars and the space-based early-warning system, which includes satellites on highly-elliptical and geosynchronous orbits. The system appears to be capable of detecting a massive attack, but cannot be relied upon to detect individual missile launches.

During the cold war the Soviet Union and the United States not only created massive arsenals of strategic offensive weapons, but also developed and deployed the infrastructure that would provide their offensive forces with the support necessary for implementing various deployment and attack options. One of the most important systems that constituted this infrastructure was a system that would provide early warning of a ballistic missile attack. The United States and the Soviet Union were the only states that deployed early warning systems and gave them prominent roles in their nuclear planning.

The primary mission of an early warning system is to detect a missile attack before the missiles reach their targets. A timely detection of an incoming strike would make it possible to determine the

scale of an attack and its origin, estimate potential damage, and choose an appropriate response. An early warning system is absolutely necessary for implementation of a launch-on-warning posture, which assumes that a retaliatory strike would be launched before attacking missiles reach their targets.

Creation of an early warning system that would be capable of fulfilling its mission is a very challenging task. To accomplish its mission, an early warning system must be able to detect a missile as early as possible and provide reliable information about the scale of an attack. Since the system can issue a warning only when an attack is already underway, the time that is available for detection, assessment of the information, and generating an alert is extremely limited.

The short times that are available for detecting an attack and making a decision about an appropriate response call for very tight integration between early-warning and command and control systems. Given the limited time, the procedures for information assessment and decision-making have to be almost automatic. This requires an unprecedented degree of reliability of the early-warning system, since if it generates a false alarm, there might be little or no time to recognize, not to mention to correct, an error.

The important role that early warning systems play in nuclear command and control procedures and the unacceptably high cost of a potential error are the primary reasons why these systems and launch-on-warning strategies they rely on have been receiving so much attention in the recent years. The status of the Russian early warning system is the cause of the most serious concerns, since there are many visible signs of deterioration of that system.

The analysis, presented in this article, of the history of the Russian early warning system and of its current status shows that the system is indeed in decline. In fact, in many cases the decline is much more serious than it may appear. As the analysis shows, the prospects for improvements are not very good and it is likely that Russia will not be able to reconstitute its early warning system.

However, it would be premature to conclude that the dangers associated with the decline of the Russian early-warning capabilities are as grave as its status may imply, since the history of the development of the system shows that the role given to the Russian early warning system in nuclear operations is rather limited.

The main reason for this is that the Soviet Union had never had a complete early-warning system that would be able to detect all possible missile launches. The lack of complete coverage was mainly a result of technical difficulties that the Soviet Union encountered. But partly it reflected the attitude toward early-warning that existed in the Soviet Union, which reveals itself in almost all decisions about the early-warning system made during the Soviet times and in today's Russia.

Although the stated goal of the program was to build an early warning system that would provide comprehensive coverage, the objective at the level of practical decisions seems to be have been more realistic and therefore more limited. The major requirement of the early-warning system was that it had to be able to detect a large-scale attack that could endanger the ability of the Soviet Union (and now Russia) to launch a retaliatory strike. In practical terms, this meant that the system was not required to detect isolated launches or to cover all possible launch areas. In fact, the Soviet/Russian early-warning system has never had this kind of capability.

Since the system was never able to provide warning against all possible threats, the recent loss of early-warning capabilities will not necessarily result in an overall decline of the reliability of the command and control system. Very much depends on the role that early warning plays in the command and control procedures and on the ability of the military to change these procedures to

take into account the diminishing quality of early-warning information. Despite the dramatic loss of capabilities, the early warning system is still capable of detecting a massive missile attack, which is its primary mission. The system was never required to detect isolated missile launches and the nuclear command and control system has never relied on this capability. This means that the current decline of the early warning system, which may have led to a loss of this capability, is very unlikely to affect the command and control procedures in a way that would increase risk of an error or misunderstanding.

Early warning system developmentThe Soviet Union began the development of systems that would provide early detection of a ballistic missile attack in the early 1960s. The first two generations of early-warning radars, deployed in the late 1960s?early 1970s, were modifications of radars that were developed for space-surveillance and antisatellite systems. The primary mission that was most likely assigned to the early warning system was to support missile defenses rather than provide a warning required to achieve a launch-on-warning capability.

The concept of an integrated early-warning system that would include radars as well as satellites and that would be capable of providing the command and control of the strategic forces with the capability necessary for implementing a launch-on-warning option, did not appear until about 1972. This concept was a result of the effort that the Soviet Union undertook in the early 1970s in an attempt to streamline all its programs in the areas of missile defense, anti-satellite warfare, space-surveillance, and early-warning.[1]

The draft project, prepared in 1972, called for development of an integrated early-warning system that would include above-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars, as well as early warning satellites. The early warning satellites and over-the-horizon radars were supposed to detect launches of ballistic missiles during boost phase of their flight, i.e. almost immediately after their launch. The satellites rely on infrared sensors that can directly detect radiation emitted by the missile plume. An over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, like all radars, detects reflections of electromagnetic signal that it sends in the direction of a target. OTH radars deployed on the Soviet territory were able to detect missile launches on the territory of the United States by using reflections of electromagnetic impulses from Earth?s ionosphere.

The project also called for deployment of a network of early-warning above-the-horizon radars that were supposed to detect incoming missiles and warheads as they approach their targets on the Soviet territory. The radars were intended to provide an important second layer of early warning sensors, which were based on physical principles different from those deployed on satellites. Besides, radars could provide more accurate than satellites information about trajectory of incoming missiles, which allows estimates of scale of an attack.

Another important role that was assigned to the early-warning radars was space-surveillance. The project called for close integration of all existing and future radar facilities that would provide the capability to track objects in outer space and determine parameters of their orbits.

The subsequent development of the early-warning system went largely according to the plan developed in the 1970s. The Soviet Union deployed all three components of the system?satellites and both types of radars. Of these three, the over-the-horizon radars failed to live up to their expectations and did not play any significant role in the early-warning system operations. The satellite and radar deployment programs were more successful and eventually provided the capability they were designed for. However, as shown later in the article, both programs experienced considerable delays during their implementation and suffered serious setbacks at the

time of the breakup of the Soviet Union. As a result, the current system is very far from the comprehensive integrated multi-layered early-warning system envisaged by the original plan.

Early warning radars

History of development

The Soviet Union began construction of its first early warning radars in 1963?1964. The first early warning system consisted of two Dnestr-M (Hen House) radars, built at sites in Olenegorsk, Kola Peninsula, and Skrunda, Latvia, and a command center near Moscow. The construction was completed in 1968?1969, and in August 1970 the system was accepted for service.[2] The configuration of the first early warning system strongly suggests that its primary mission was limited to detecting ballistic missiles launched from U.S. territory or sea-based missile launched from the Norwegian Sea and North Sea. It is likely that the main mission of the radars in Olenegorsk and Skrunda was to provide the Moscow missile defense system with early warning information.[3] Figure 1 shows the coverage that was provided by the first two Dnestr-M radars when they became operational as well as the coverage provided by the radars of the Moscow ABM system.

Figure 1. Early warning and missile defense radars in 1972.

In 1967?1968, in parallel with construction of the Olenegorsk-Skrunda system, the Soviet Union began deployment of four additional Dnepr early warning radars. These radars, which were modification of the Dnestr-type radars, are known in the West by the same designation?Hen House. Two of these radars were located at the sites in Balkhash, Kazakhstan, and Mishelevka, near Irkutsk, which had Dnestr space-surveillance radars deployed there.[4] One radar was built at the Skrunda site, next to the Dnestr-M radar, and one?at a new site in Sevastopol.[5]

Radar Western designation

Type Wave-length range

Number of antenna faces, their size and azimuthal sector covered by one face

Main features

Dnestr Hen House Phased array Azimuth scanning by frequency modulation No elevation scanning

1.5?2 m 2 faces 200x20 m 30 degrees

Space-surveillance radar

Dnestr-M Hen House Phased array Azimuth scanning by frequency modulation No elevation scanning

1.5?2 m 2 faces 200x20 m 30 degrees

Early-warning radar. Dnestr-M is a modification of the space-surveillance Dnestr radar.

Dnepr Hen House Phased array Azimuth scanning by frequency modulation No elevation scanning

1.5?2 m 2 faces, 200x20 m, 60 degrees

Early-warning radar. Modification of the Dnestr/Dnestr-M design. Some Dnepr radars use Dnestr and Dnestr-M buildings.

Daugava Pechora Phased array 1.5?2 m Transmitter, 30x40 m ~60 degrees

A prototype transmitter station for Daryal radars

Daryal, Daryal-M,

Daryal-UM

Pechora Phased array 1.5?2 m Transmitter

30x40 m and

receiver 80x80 m separated by 0.5?1.5 km, ~110 degrees

Early-warning radar

Dunay-3 Dog House Continuous-wave phased array Azimuth scanning by frequency modulation

~0.1 m Transmitter and receiver separated by 2.4 km,

~45 degrees

The radar was built as part of the A-35 Moscow ABM system. Two radars are deployed back-to-back at one site.

Dunay-3U Cat House Continuous-wave phased array Azimuth scanning by frequency modulation

~0.1 m Transmitter and receiver separated by 2.8 km,

51 degrees

The radar was built as part of the A-35 Moscow ABM system. Two radars are deployed back-to-back at one site.

Volga Continuous-wave phased array Azimuth scanning by frequency modulation

~0.1 m Transmitter and receiver separated by 3 km, ~50 degrees

Early-warning radar

Don-2N Pill Box Phased array ~0.01 m 4 faces, receiver antenna 16 m in diameter and transmitter antenna 10x10 m,

90 degrees

The radar is the battle-management radar of the A-135 Moscow ABM system

Table 1. Main characteristics of Russian early-warning, space-surveillance, and ABM radars.

The four new radars were intended to increase the coverage provided by the network of early warning radars to include North Atlantic, areas in Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as the eastern Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 2). The radars seem to have been built as part of some system, but there is very little information about the exact configuration of that system or about how it was supposed to be integrated into the command and control of nuclear forces. It is possible that these radars were intended to support operations of missile defense systems that the Soviet Union considered deploying.[6]

Figure 2. Early warning and missile defense radars deployed by 1979.

By 1972 the industry presented a draft design of an integrated early-warning system. Since the new system was intended to be fully integrated with the existing and future Moscow missile defense system, the first step of the program was to include the radars of the A-35 Moscow missile defense system?Dunay-3 (Dog House) in Kubinka and Dunay-3U (Cat House) in Chekhov?into the early warning network.[7] This work began in 1973 and continued until 1978.[8]

In addition to finishing construction of Dnepr radars that were built at sites in Balkhash, Mishelevka, Sevastopol, and Skrunda, the program called for construction of an additional Dnepr radar at a new site in Mukachevo, Ukraine.[9] These Dnepr radars complemented the existing Dnestr-M radars in Olenegorsk and Skrunda and formed the backbone of the new early warning system.[10] The system was brought into operation in two parts. The first part, which consisted of radars in Olenegorsk, Skrunda, Balkhash and Mishelevka, was commissioned for combat duty on 29 October 1976.[11] The second one, which included radars in Sevastopol and Mukachevo, went operational on 16 January 1979.[12] Figure 2 shows radar coverage that was provided by the early warning radars in 1979.

The next stage of the development of the early warning radar network was the effort to deploy large phased-array radars of the Daryal (Pechora) type.[13] An important feature of the new radar was that its receiving (or transmitting) station could use the existing Dnepr transmitting (or, correspondingly, receiving) stations. The first pilot receiver of the Daryal (Pechora) type, also known as Daugava, was built at the site in Olenegorsk, next to the Dnestr-M (Hen House) radar deployed there, which apparently worked as the transmitter.[14] In 1975, based on the experience of Daugava operations at Olenegorsk, the Soviet government ordered construction of two Daryal radars at new sites in Pechora and Gabala, Azerbaijan.[15]

The Daryal (Pechora) type radars in Pechora and Gabala were intended to complement the network

of Dnestr-M and Dnepr (Hen House) radars that was still under construction. This network was eventually completed in January 1979, when the radars in Sevastopol and Mukachevo were brought into operation. Soon after that, in September 1979, the Soviet government approved a plan for the next stage of development. This plan called for modernization of the Dnepr radars, completing construction of two Daryal radars in Pechora and Gabala, and construction of a series of new Daryal-type radars.[16] Two radars of the Daryal-U type were to be built at sites in Balkhash and Mishelevka. A Daryal-U radar was to be built at a new site in Yeniseysk, near Krasnoyarsk.[17] At a later stage of the program, two radars of the Daryal-UM type were to be built in Skrunda and Mukachevo.[18] Figure 3 shows the coverage that a system of Daryal radars was supposed to provide.

Figure 3. Planned coverage of the Daryal (Pechora) radar network.

The program approved in 1979 also called for construction of a number of Volga radars, which were to provide additional coverage in sectors between those of the Daryal radars.[19] In 1982, construction of the first Volga radar began at a site in Belarus, near Baranovichi.[20] This radar, if completed, would have provided the Soviet Union with an early-warning capability against launches of intermediate-range ballistic missiles based in Europe.[21]

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was carrying out a series of major projects, which, if completed, would have significantly improved its early warning capabilities. In 1984 and 1985, five years behind the schedule, the new Daryal radars in Pechora and Gabala went operational.[22] New Daryal-U radars were under construction in Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk), Balkhash, and Mishelevka. Construction of new Daryal-UM radars had begun at sites in Skrunda and Mukachevo. The Volga radar in Baranovichi would have provided coverage of Europe.

These plans, however, never materialized. By the end of the 1980s none of the projects was completed. In addition, work on the radar in Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk) had to be suspended after the

United States challenged its compliance to the ABM Treaty. In 1989, the Soviet Union admitted violation of the ABM treaty and pledged to demolish the radar.[23] In addition to that, the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in termination of some of the construction projects and delayed implementation of others. The most significant losses were the new Daryal-UM radars in Skrunda, Latvia and Mukachevo, Ukraine. Work in Mukachevo was suspended in 1991 and has never resumed. The Latvian government, after gaining independence from the Soviet Union, insisted on demolishing the radar buildings in Skrunda, which was done on 4 May 1995.[24] Construction of Daryal-U radars in Mishelevka and Balkhash has not been completed as well.[25]

The only addition to the system that took place in the late 1980s was the Don-2N (Pill Box) radar of the A-135 Moscow missile defense system, located in Pushkino. This large phased-array radar reached full operational capability around 1989 and was integrated into the early warning network. Built as a missile defense battle-management radar, Don-2N can cover all elevation or azimuth angles. The radar in its early warning role replaced the old Dunay-3 and Dunay-3U radars that were part of the first Moscow ABM system.

Location and radar Coordinates Azimuth

Olenegorsk

Dnestr-M/Dnepr 68.1141N 33.9102E 323? and 293?

Daugava 68.1169N 33.9200E 308? Daryal-type transmitter

Skrunda

Dnestr-M/ Dnepr 56.7156N 21.9682E 323? and 293? The first Dnestr-M, built in 1968. Dismantled in 1998

Dnestr-M/Dnepr 56.7082N 21.9410E 8? and 248? Dismantled in 1998

Daryal-UM Receiver 56.7242N 21.9761E Transmitter 56.7283N 21.9833E

308? Demolished in1994

Balkhash

Dnestr (SKKP) 46.61N 74.53E 270? Space-surveillance

Dnestr-M/Dnepr 46.61N 74.53E 180? and 124? Operational in 1972

Dnestr-M/Dnepr 46.61N 74.53E 60? Operational after 1972

Daryal-U 46.61N 74.53E 152? (estimate)

Mishelevka

Dnestr (SKKP) 52.88N 103.28E 265? Space-surveillance

Dnestr-M/Dnepr 52.88N 103.28E 70? and 200? Operational by 1972

Dnestr-M/Dnepr 52.88N 103.28E 135? Operational after 1972

Daryal-U Unknown 135? (estimate)

Sevastopol

Dnepr 44.5788N 33.3862E 172? and 230? Operational after 1972

Mukachevo

Dnepr 48.3777N 22.7042E 196? and 260? The last of Dneprs

Daryal-UM Receiver 48.3857N 22.8007E Transmitter 48.3887N 22.7935E

218? Construction stopped in 1991

Pechora

Daryal 65.2N 57.3E 2? (estimate)

Gabala

Daryal Receiver 40.8716N 47.8089E Transmitter 40.8682N 47.7958E

162?

Yeniseysk

Daryal 58.1N 92.7E 40? (estimate) Dismantled after 1989

Baranovichi

Volga Receiver: 52.8621N 26.4674E Transmitter: 52.8351N

262.5?

26.4753E

Kubinka

Dunay-3 Receivers: 55.4796N 36.6482E Transmitters: 55.4940N 36.6821E

150? and 330? Dog House

Chekhov

Dunay-3U Receivers: 55.2307N 37.2948E Transmitters: 55.2057N 37.2949E

280? and 100? Cat House

Pushkino

Don-2N 56.1732N 37.7692E 60?, 150?, 240?, 330?

ABM battle-management radar

Table 2. Early warning and missile defense radar sites (NOTE: Coordinates of radars and their orientation were determined from satellite imagery, provided by National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The imagery is available to the public at geoengine.nima.mil. A collection of images is also presented at www.globalsecurity.org.)

Despite the problems with completing construction of the radars, the radar early warning network that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union was capable of providing adequate coverage of approaches to Russian territory. The only gap in the coverage existed in the northeastern direction that was supposed to be covered by the radar in Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk). This gap, however, did not represent a serious problem, since the only U.S. missiles that could exploit this gap were C-4 missiles on Trident I submarines patrolling in the Pacific. These missiles did not have counterforce capability and therefore were a very unlikely weapon for a first disarming or incapacitating strike. The lack of warning from the northwest direction, therefore, did not present a serious risk.

A much more serious problem developed in the northwestern direction. According to an agreement that Russia reached with Latvia in 1994, the Dnestr-M radar in Skrunda, which covered the North Atlantic, ceased operations in August 1998.[26]

The radar in Skrunda occupied a unique position and its loss opened a gap that was not covered by the adjacent radars in Olenegorsk and Sevastopol. The gap to some extent is covered by the Don-2N missile defense radar, located near Moscow. However, because of its location inside Russia, the Don-2N radar provides somewhat shorter warning times.[27] Besides, while the radar in Skrunda was a dedicated early warning radar, Don-2N is supposed to carry other missions, so it may not be able to provide adequate replacement for the dismantled radar.

In an attempt to fill the gap opened by the loss of the radar in Skrunda, Russia renewed its efforts to complete work at the Baranovichi site in Belarus. Construction of the Volga radar at this site, which was all but suspended in the beginning of the 1990s, was resumed in March 1999.[28] Tests of the new radar began in December 1999 and it is expected to reach operational capability in the first half of 2002.[29] However, since the Volga radar was never intended to replace radars in Skrunda, it

will not compensate for the loss of the latter completely. Launches of SLBMs from some areas of the North Atlantic could still be detected only by the Don-2N radar in Moscow.

Figure 4. Early warning and missile defense radars in 2002.

The map in the Figure 4 shows the status of the Russian early warning radar network in 2001. The network includes old Dnepr (Hen House) radars located in Olenegorsk and Mishelevka (Russia), Balkhash (Kazakhstan), Sevastopol and Mukachevo (both Ukraine). There are two working Daryal (Pechora) radars?one in Pechora (Russia) and one in Gabala (Azerbaijan). The Volga radar in Baranovichi (Belarus) is undergoing tests and is expected to begin operations in 2002. The Don-2N radar of the Moscow ABM system also seems to take part in the early warning network.

Early warning satellites

According to the project of the early warning system, which was drafted in the beginning of the 1970s, the system was to include a space-based component in addition to the network of above-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars. Satellites were necessary to extend the capabilities of the early warning system, for they were capable of detecting ballistic missiles almost immediately after launch.

Initially, work on the space-based component of the early warning system was assigned to design bureau headed by A. I. Savin. In 1973, this design bureau was reorganized into the TsNII Kometa (Central Scientific Research Institute Kometa), which became the primary developer of the space-based component of the early warning system.[30] Development of spacecraft platform was assigned to the S. A. Lavochkin Design Bureau.

According to the design developed at TsNII Kometa, the space-based early warning system, known as ?Oko? or US-KS, included a constellation of satellites deployed on highly elliptical orbits and a

command and control center near Moscow. The satellites were equipped with infrared and visible-spectrum sensors capable of detecting a burning missile motor against a background of space (but not against a background of Earth surface). The system began limited operations in 1978 and was placed on combat duty in 1982.[31]

As the work on the US-KS (Oko) system progressed, the military produced a set of requirements for a new space-based system, designated US-KMO (in the West this system usually referred to, somewhat incorrectly, as Prognoz). This system was to provide coverage of possible SLBM launch areas from oceans, as well as from U.S. and Chinese territory. In order to do so, the satellites had to have a so-called look-down capability, which is an ability to detect missile launches against a background of Earth surface. Development of the US-KMO system was ordered by a Central Committee and the Council of Ministers decree of 3 September 1979.[32]

Work on the new system, however, was delayed by problems with the old one. The Oko program was plagued by spacecraft malfunctions and software problems.[33] Although the system was able to begin operations in 1982, the problems continued after that. In 1983 the system almost generated a serious false alarm, which was later attributed to problems with the software being unable to cope with sun reflections properly.[34] The satellites continued to suffer from explosive disintegration until 1984.

Satellite Type

NORAD number

International designation

Launch date (DD.MM.YY)

Launch time (UTC)

Orbital plane or GEO station

Estimated end of life DDMMYY

Comment

Cosmos-520

HEO

6192 1972-072A 19.09.72 19:19:03

4 Unknown

Cosmos-606

HEO

6916 1973-084A 02.11.73 13:01:56

4 30.04.74

Cosmos-665

HEO

7352 1974-050A 29.06.74 15:59:58

2 07.09.75

Cosmos-706

HEO

7625 1975-007A 30.01.75 15:02:00

7 20.11.75

Cosmos-775

GEO

8357 1975-097A 08.10.75 00:30:00

na Unknown Orbit was not stabilized

Cosmos-862

HEO

9495 1976-105A 22.10.76 09:12:00

5 15.03.77 Self-destructed

Cosmos-903

HEO

9911 1977-027A 11.04.77 01:38:00

7 08.06.78 Self-destructed

Cosmos HE 10059 1977-047A 16.06.77 04:58:0 9 30.03.79 Self-

-917 O 0 destructed

Cosmos-931

HEO

10150 1977-068A 20.07.77 04:44:00

2 24.10.77 Failed to reach the working orbit. Self-destructed

Cosmos-1024

HEO

10970 1978-066A 28.06.78 02:58:00

2 24.05.80 Moved off station in October 1979

Cosmos-1030

HEO

11015 1978-083A 06.09.78 03:04:00

4 10.10.78 Self-destructed. Orbit was not stabilized

Cosmos-1109

HEO

11417 1979-058A 27.06.79 18:11:00

9 15.02.80 Self-destructed. Orbit was not stabilized

Cosmos-1124

HEO

11509 1979-077A 28.08.79 00:17:00

4 09.09.79 Self-destructed. Orbit was not stabilized

Cosmos-1164

HEO

11700 1980-013A 12.02.80 00:53:00

9 Launch failure

Cosmos-1172

HEO

11758 1980-028A 12.04.80 20:18:00

9 09.04.82

Cosmos-1188

HEO

11844 1980-050A 14.06.80 20:52:00

2 28.10.80

Cosmos-1191

HEO

11871 1980-057A 02.07.80 00:54:00

4 16.05.81

Cosmos-1217

HEO

12032 1980-085A 24.10.80 10:53:00

2 20.03.83

Cosmos-1223

HEO

12078 1980-095A 27.11.80 21:37:00

7 11.08.82

Cosmos-1247

HEO

12303 1981-016A 19.02.81 10:00:00

5 20.10.81 Self-destructed

Cosmos-1261

HEO

12376 1981-031A 31.03.81 09:40:00

6 01.05.81 Self-destructed

Cosmos-1278

HEO

12547 1981-058A 19.06.81 19:37:04

4 05.07.84 Self-destructed in December 1986

Cosmos-1285

HEO

12627 1981-071A 04.08.81 00:13:00

6 21.11.81 Failed to reach the working orbit. Self-destructed

Cosmos-1317

HEO

12933 1981-108A 31.10.81 22:54:00

9 26.01.84 Self-destructed

Cosmos-1341

HEO

13080 1982-016A 03.03.82 05:44:38

5 01.02.84

Cosmos-1348

HEO

13124 1982-029A 07.04.82 13:42:00

9 22.07.84

Cosmos-1367

HEO

13205 1982-045A 20.05.82 13:09:00

1 30.09.84

Cosmos-1382

HEO

13295 1982-064A 25.06.82 02:28:00

7 29.09.84

Cosmos-1409

HEO

13585 1982-095A 22.09.82 06:23:00

2 05.01.87

Cosmos-1456

HEO

14034 1983-038A 25.04.83 19:34:00

4 13.08.83 Self-destructed

Cosmos-1481

HEO

14182 1983-070A 08.07.83 19:21:00

6 09.07.83 Failed to reach the working orbit. Self-

destructed

Cosmos-1518

HEO

14587 1983-126A 28.12.83 03:48:00

5 01.06.84

Cosmos-1541

HEO

14790 1984-024A 06.03.84 17:10:00

3 31.10.85

Cosmos-1546

GEO

14867 1984-031A 29.03.84 05:53:00

1, 4 16.11.86

Cosmos-1547

HEO

14884 1984-033A 04.04.84 01:40:04

7 23.08.85

Cosmos-1569

HEO

15027 1984-055A 06.06.84 15:34:00

5 26.01.86

Cosmos-1581

HEO

15095 1984-071A 03.07.84 21:31:00

8 19.08.85

Cosmos-1586

HEO

15147 1984-079A 02.08.84 08:38:00

4 01.04.85

Cosmos-1596

HEO

15267 1984-096A 07.09.84 19:13:00

9 26.11.86

Cosmos-1604

HEO

15350 1984-107A 04.10.84 19:49:13

1 27.09.85

Cosmos-1629

GEO

15574 1985-016A 21.02.85 07:57:00

4, 3, 1 16.01.87

Cosmos-1658

HEO

15808 1985-045A 11.06.85 14:27:00

6 03.09.87

Cosmos-1661

HEO

15827 1985-049A 18.06.85 00:40:26

na 21.10.89 Moved off station from the beginning of operations

Cosmos-1675

HEO

15952 1985-071A 12.08.85 15:09:00

8 18.01.86

Cosmos-1684

HEO

16064 1985-084A 24.09.85 01:18:10

4 09.03.89

Cosmos-1687

HEO

16103 1985-088A 30.09.85 19:23:00

2 30.09.85 Orbit was not stabilized

Cosmos-1698

HEO

16183 1985-098A 22.10.85 20:24:00

3 24.08.86

Cosmos-1701

HEO

16235 1985-105A 09.11.85 08:25:00

8 23.11.87 Moved off station in December 1986

Cosmos-1729

HEO

16527 1986-011A 01.02.86 18:11:56

5 14.05.88

Cosmos-1761

HEO

16849 1986-050A 05.07.86 01:16:47

3 23.10.88

Cosmos-1774

HEO

16922 1986-065A 28.08.86 08:02:43

7 17.07.88

Cosmos-1783

HEO

16993 1986-075A 03.10.86 13:05:40

1 03.10.86 Failed to reach the working orbit

Cosmos-1785

HEO

17031 1986-078A 15.10.86 09:29:18

9 16.01.91 Moved off station in December 1989

Cosmos-1793

HEO

17134 1986-091A 20.11.86 12:09:20

2 13.08.91 Moved off station in June 1990

Cosmos-1806

HEO

17213 1986-098A 12.12.86 18:35:36

5 20.11.88

Cosmos-1849

HEO

18083 1987-048A 04.06.87 18:50:23

1 20.05.90

Cosmos-1851

HEO

18103 1987-050A 12.06.87 07:40:28

6 23.11.89

Cosmos-1894

GEO

18443 1987-091A 28.10.87 15:15:00

1 22.12.91

Cosmos-1903

HEO

18701 1987-105A 21.12.87 22:35:42

8 11.11.92

Cosmos-1922

HEO

18881 1988-013A 26.02.88 09:31:12

5 30.07.90

Cosmos-1966

HEO

19445 1988-076A 30.08.88 14:14:54

3 14.12.90

Cosmos-1974

HEO

19554 1988-092A 03.10.88 22:23:39

7 20.05.93

Cosmos-1977

HEO

19608 1988-096A 25.10.88 18:02:31

6 12.07.90

Cosmos-2001

HEO

19796 1989-011A 14.02.89 04:21:11

4 15.03.93

Cosmos-2050

HEO

20330 1989-091A 23.11.89 20:35:44

9 08.10.93

Cosmos-2063

HEO

20536 1990-026A 27.03.90 16:40:08

2 21.06.95

Cosmos-2076

HEO

20596 1990-040A 28.04.90 11:37:02

1 30.10.92

Cosmos-2084

HEO

20663 1990-055A 21.06.90 20:45:52

6 21.06.90 Failed to reach the working orbit

Cosmos-2087

HEO

20707 1990-064A 25.07.90 18:13:56

6 21.01.92

Cosmos-2097

HEO

20767 1990-076A 28.08.90 07:49:13

3 30.04.95

Cosmos-2105

HEO

20941 1990-099A 20.11.90 02:33:14

3 04.04.93 Moved off station in February 1992

Cosmos-2133

GEO

21111 1991-010A 14.02.91 08:31:56

4, 3, 2, 1, 4

09.11.95

Cosmos-2155

GEO

21702 1991-064A 13.09.91 17:51:02

1 16.06.92

Cosmos-2176

HEO

21847 1992-003A 24.01.92 01:18:01

6 13.04.96

Cosmos-2196

HEO

22017 1992-040A 08.07.92 09:53:14

5 23.06.94

Cosmos-2209

GEO

22112 1992-059A 10.09.92 18:01:18

1 16.11.96

Cosmos-2217

HEO

22189 1992-069A 21.10.92 10:21:22

8 07.11.96

Cosmos-2222

HEO

22238 1992-081A 25.11.92 12:18:54

1 03.12.96

Cosmos-2224

GEO

22269 1992-088A 17.12.92 12:45:00

2, 1, 2 17.06.99

Cosmos-2232

HEO

22321 1993-006A 26.01.93 15:55:26

4 04.06.98

Cosmos-2241

HEO

22594 1993-022A 06.04.93 19:07:27

7 30.01.97

Cosmos-2261

HEO

22741 1993-051A 10.08.93 14:53:45

9 06.03.98

Cosmos-2282

GEO

23168 1994-038A 06.07.94 23:58:51

1 29.12.95

Cosmos-2286

HEO

23194 1994-048A 05.08.94 01:12:22

5 07.03.98

Cosmos-2312

HEO

23584 1995-026A 24.05.95 20:10:10

2 08.12.97

Cosmos-2340

HEO

24761 1997-015A 09.04.97 08:58:45

8 10.05.01

Cosmos-2342

HEO

24800 1997-022A 14.05.97 00:33:58

6 28.10.01 As of 1.01.2002

Cosmos-2345

GEO

24894 1997-041A 14.08.97 20:49:14

1 30.02.99

Cosmos-2350

GEO

25315 1998-025A 29.04.98 04:36:54

4 29.06.98

Cosmos-2351

HEO

25327 1998-027A 07.05.98 08:53:22

1 10.05.01

Cosmos-2368

HEO

26042 1999-073A 27.12.99 19:12:44

3 Operational

As of 1.01.2002

Cosmos-2379

GEO

26892 2001-037A 24.08.01 20:34 4, 1 Operational

As of 1.01.2002

Cosmos-2388

HEO

27409 2002-017A 01.04.02 22:07 Failed to reach the working orbit

Table 3. Early warning satellites.

Deployment of the US-KMO (Prognoz) system did not begin until February 1991, when the Soviet Union launched its first second-generation satellite. The satellite reportedly had genuine look-down capability, which means it could detect missiles against a background of Earth surface. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union slowed down development of the system. Although it was reported that in 1996 the military accepted for service the first tier of the US-KMO system,[35] in 2002 it still remains an essentially experimental program.

First-generation satellites

Spacecraft and ground support systems

A first-generation (Oko) spacecraft consists of three main subsystems: engine block, device compartment, and optical compartment. All the systems are mounted on a cylindrical frame that is 2 m long and has diameter of 1.7 m.[36] Total mass of a satellite at launch is estimated to be 2400 kg, of which 1250 kg is dry mass.[37] The engine compartment of an Oko satellite includes fuel and oxidizer tanks, four orbit correction liquid-fuel engines and 16 orientation and stabilization liquid-fuel engines.[38] The stabilization engines provide active 3-axis attitude control, necessary for telescope orientation.[39]

The telescope system of a first-generation satellite includes a telescope with a mirror of about 50 cm diameter.[40] The detection system includes a linear or matrix infrared-band solid-state sensor that detects radiation from missiles.[41] In addition to this, the satellite has several smaller telescopes that most likely provide a wide-angle view of the Earth in infrared and visible parts of spectrum, which is used by operators of the system as an auxiliary observation channel.[42]

The satellite transmits the images formed by its telescopes directly to the ground control station in real time. The control station facility Serpukhov-15 is located near a village of Kurilovo in the Kaluga region, about 70 km southwest from Moscow. The facility includes antennas that are used for communication with the satellites and the data storage and processing facility.[43] The center was built as a dedicated facility, the only mission of which was to control the early warning satellites.

Launches of early-warning satellites into highly elliptical orbits are performed by Molniya-M launchers from the Plesetsk launch site in the northern Russia. To support the launches, the space forces built a dedicated technical facility at the site and upgraded one of the Molniya launching

pads.[44] Launches were performed by space forces crews, but immediately after launch, control over the satellite was transferred to the control station of the Air Defense Forces.[45]

In the beginning of the program, there were serious problems with reliability of the satellites. Of the first 13 satellites, launched in 1972?1979, only seven worked more than 100 days. The satellites were equipped with a self-destruct package that was activated if the satellite lost communication with ground control. Until these packages were removed in 1983, 11 out of 31 satellites were destroyed that way.[46]

As of January 2002, there have been 86 launches of first-generation satellites, 79 of which were launched into highly elliptical orbits. The other seven first-generation satellites were launched into geosynchronous orbit by the Proton launchers. These seven launches, which were conducted from the Baykonur launch site, were all successful.[47]

Of the 79 launches of early warning satellites into highly elliptical orbit, three were launch failures.[48] The other 76 satellites could be divided into three groups, according to their lifetimes. The first group consists of satellites that worked less than one year. This is significantly less than the average lifetime of early warning satellites and indicates that these satellites ended their operation because of a catastrophic failure.[49] This group consists of 21 satellites and includes satellites that were launched during the early days of the program as well as relatively recent ones.

The second group comprises working satellites that were launched before 1985. These satellites worked 20 months on average. The third group consists of satellites that were launched after 1985. The lifetime of these satellites was almost twice as long as that of the satellites in the second group, 40 months on average.

The analysis of the lifetime data strongly indicates that in the mid-80s the designers carried out an upgrade that almost doubled satellite life span. It is likely that the measures that extended the operational life of satellites were included into the program that led to deployment of the first-generation satellites on geosynchronous orbits. The first launch of an operational early warning satellite into the geosynchronous orbit was carried out in 1984. Since the cost of these launches was substantially higher than that of the HEO launches, the program required a longer-living satellite.

Observation geometry

The choice of observation geometry and of the highly elliptical orbits has been usually attributed to the lack of proper infrared sensors and data processing capabilities that are required for obtaining a look-down capability.[50] According to this logic, in the absence of suitable sensors, the Soviet Union had to rely on a the grazing-angle observation geometry, which allowed the use of less sophisticated sensors than those used by the United States.

While the lack of sensors certainly was one of the factors in the choice of the configuration for the first-generation US-KS (Oko) system, other factors seem to have played an equally important role. First of all, the system was apparently not required to provide complete coverage of the Earth surface. Instead, the system was expected to provide much more limited capability of detecting ICBM launches from U.S. territory. Launches of sea-based missiles were deliberately left outside of the system?s scope, since they alone did not pose a serious threat to the Soviet strategic forces. The SLBM threat was not considered significant enough to warrant the efforts required to provide reliable detection of sea-based missile launches.

Then, practical considerations precluded the choice of geostationary satellites. First, a geostationary satellite that would be able to monitor U.S. territory would be out of sight of any ground control

station located on the Soviet territory. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union either was unable to deploy ground relay stations at territories of its allies or was unwilling to do so (or both). Finally, despite the fact that the HEO constellation required more satellites that a GEO one, the GEO satellites would have been less cost-effective, since the early Soviet early-warning satellites had very short nominal lifetimes (about two years on average). Launching short-lived satellites on geosynchronous orbit would have been more expensive than placing them onto HEO orbits.

The system was configured in such a way that a satellite would be placed into an orbit that had inclination of about 63 degrees. The orbits have apogees of about 39,700 km and perigees of about 600 km. A satellite on this orbit has orbital period of approximately 718 minutes, and makes exactly two revolutions a day.[51]

Figure 5. Elevation angle at which a satellite on highly-elliptical orbit is seen from U.S. ICBM bases when it passes the working apogee of the orbit. The satellite can detect a missile against a background of space if the elevation angle is less than about 12 degrees.

Figure 5 shows the change of the elevation angle at which a satellite is seen from a burnout point of a Minuteman missile trajectory. The satellite can see the missile exhaust plum against the background of space if this angle is less than about 12 degrees. As can be seen from the figure, this means that a satellite is in a position to detect a missile launch for about 6 hours every day.[52]

Station-keeping

The ability of a satellite to maintain favorable observation geometry depends on the synchronization between its orbital movement and rotation of the Earth. To keep its orbit within operational limits, a satellite must perform regular station-keeping maneuvers. The HEO early warning satellites use station-keeping procedures that cleverly take advantage of the unique character of perturbations that affect their orbits. For highly elliptical orbits of the kind used by the early warning satellites, the main cause of the drift are perturbations caused by non-spherical shape of the Earth.[53] If uncompensated, these would cause satellite?s groundtrack (measured as a drift of the longitude of the ascending node of the orbit)[54] to drift westward at a rate of about 0.13 degrees/day. However, early warning satellites are placed into orbits on which they initially have an orbital period of about 717.5 minutes, which is slightly less than 718 minutes required for the satellite to make exactly two revolutions a day (which would keep the groundtrack constant). This difference results in an eastward drift of the ascending node of the groundtrack at a rate of about 0.25 degrees a day. These two trends combined result in eastward drift with a rate of about 0.12 degrees a day.

The subsequent character of the orbit?s evolution is determined by other perturbations, which result

in a slow decrease of orbital period of the satellite at a rate of about 0.008 minutes a day. The decreasing orbital period slows the eastward drift. When the period reaches 717.75 minutes, the drift reverses its direction. Westward drift quickly accelerates and the ascending node of the orbit soon reaches the longitude from which the cycle started. At this point the satellite performs a maneuver, which decreases its orbital period back to 717.5 minutes. The whole cycle takes from 70 to 90 days, during which the longitude of the ascending node of the satellite?s orbit stays within a band of about 3?4 degrees.

If a satellite stops performing maneuvers, its orbit drifts off the working station after several months and the satellite loses the ability to detect missile launches from U.S. territory. This means that by looking at the changes in orbital period of a satellite, one can reliably determine its operational status. Figure 6 shows how the orbital period of one of the early warning satellites (Cosmos-2312) has changed during its lifetime. As can bee seen from the figure, the satellite ceased operations in December 1997.

Figure 6. Evolution of mean motion (number of revolutions a day) of Cosmos-2312. To keep parameters of the orbit within operational limits, the satellite regularly performed station-keeping maneuvers. The maneuvers stopped in December 1997, indicating end of operations of the satellite.

The constellation

Since one satellite can be in a position that allows it to detect missile launches only for about six hours a day, providing 24-hour coverage of the U.S. ICBM bases requires at least four working satellites. The system, however, was designed to include up to nine satellites simultaneously. Satellites in the constellation were placed into one of nine orbital planes, which were separated by about 40 degrees from each other. Figure 7 shows the configuration of orbital planes that existed in January 1995.

Figure 7. Orientation of orbital planes and relative positions of satellites as existed in January 1995 (view from north).

One reason the system was designed to include satellites in nine separate orbital planes was to increase its reliability and to make sure that a loss of one satellite would not create a gap in coverage. A more important reason, however, was that the chosen configuration made it possible for several satellites to observe the same area simultaneously. The advantage of this is that simultaneous observation is that it reduces the chances that all the satellites that are in a position to detect a launch could be simultaneously blinded by direct sunlight or reflections off clouds.

Figure 8. Coverage provided by the constellation of early-warning satellites on highly-elliptical orbits during 25 January 1995. The triangle shows the time of launch of a sounding rocket from the Andoya missile range in Norway, which was detected by the Russian early-warning system.

The system was designed in such a way that at any given moment there is more than one satellite

that can detect a launch. Figure 8 shows coverage periods provided by individual satellites. As can be seen from the figure, in a full constellation coverage periods overlap to provide the necessary redundancy. It should be noted that the system does not have to switch between different ICBM bases, since they are all covered simultaneously.

Beginning in 1984, the constellation of HEO early warning satellites was complemented by satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Satellites that were placed into geosynchronous orbit were the same first-generation satellites that were deployed in highly elliptical orbits. A satellite placed into the point with longitude of 24 degrees on geosynchronous orbit would see missile launches from U.S. territory at exactly the same angles as an HEO satellite during the working part of its orbit. In addition, a geosynchronous satellite has the advantage of not changing its position relative to the Earth, so one satellite can provide continuous backup of the HEO constellation.[55]

The introduction of geostationary satellites made the system considerably more robust, for it became much more tolerant to a loss of HEO satellites. As was already discussed, without the GEO satellite the system cannot provide continuous coverage of the U.S. territory with fewer than four satellites. With the GEO satellite present, the system could still detect launches even if there are no HEO satellites deployed. The quality of coverage may suffer and detection may not be reliable enough, but the system would not be completely blind.

History of deployment

The first satellite that was placed into the highly elliptical orbit characteristic of the early-warning satellites was Cosmos-520, launched on 19 September 1972. The exact nature of its mission is unclear, since there are not enough data to see if the satellite performed any maneuvers or orbit corrections, but it was reported to be a success.[56]

Figure 9. Launches of early-warning satellites and distribution of the satellites among the slots on highly-elliptical and geosynchronous orbits.

In the following three years there were four more launches on highly-elliptical orbits, all of which seem to have been experimental.[57] In addition to this, the Soviet Union conducted an experimental launch of one of the early warning satellites, Cosmos-775, into a geostationary orbit.[58]

Beginning in 1977, the Soviet Union undertook a series of launches that seemed to be an effort to built a working prototype of the early warning system. In contrast with previous launches, which sometimes placed satellites into non-standard orbits, in the series that began in 1977 satellites were placed into orbits that would allow them to work together. The resulting constellation was still experimental, for the satellites were deployed on orbits in such a way that their groundtracks were shifted about 30 degrees westward from the position that will later become nominal. The satellites in those orbits could not detect launches from operational ICBM bases. Most likely they were observing test launches of U.S. missiles from the Vandenberg Air Force base, since they would be able to see them under observation conditions that were very similar to the nominal ones.

Judging by the history of deployment, the prototype system was to include four satellites that would provide the minimum capability, ensuring that at least one satellite was in a position to detect a launch at any given moment. However, because of the series of malfunctions and failures, it was not until 1980 that the number of working satellites reached four.

Despite the fact that the system experienced serious problems and the number of satellites would not exceed two for most of the time, in 1978 the Soviet military accepted the space-based early warning system for limited combat service.[59] In reality, however, until 1981 the system was deployed in experimental configuration, with groundtracks shifted westward.

In the beginning of 1981 Soviet Union began building an operational constellation that would be capable of detecting launches from the U.S. ICBM bases. In order to do so, in February?March 1981 the four satellites that were in orbits at that time performed maneuvers that synchronized their orbital motion in a way that would allow the satellites to observe launches from ICBM bases. Groundtracks of their orbits were moved about 34 degrees eastward and reached position in which the longitude of the ascending node of the orbit was about 55 degrees west. In addition to this, new launches began filling the slots that had not been previously occupied.[60] In February 1981 the number of working satellites reached five for the first time.[61]

The next milestone was achieved in 1982, when after a series of launches in March?June, the number of satellites in the constellation reached seven.[62] This meant that the system was capable of monitoring U.S. ICBM launch areas continuously and for most of the day these areas were monitored by more than one satellite. The system therefore reached operational capability and in 1982 was formally accepted for service and began combat operations.[63]

In 1984 the Soviet Union began the program of deploying early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit. As discussed above, at that point these were the same first-generation satellites that were deployed in highly-elliptical orbits and that were limited to the grazing-angle observation geometry. Nevertheless, deployment of these satellites in geosynchronous orbit must have significantly increased the overall reliability of the system.

The first operational early-warning satellite in geosynchronous orbit was Cosmos-1546. In May 1984 it reached the point with longitude of 24 degrees west (this point is known as Prognoz-1), from which it was able to detect launches of U.S. ICBMs. Since that time, at least one satellite has been deployed at the Prognoz-1 geostationary point almost all the time, providing support for the HEO constellation.[64]

For several years the military managed to keep seven or more working satellites in the HEO constellation by replacing satellites regularly. It was not until June 1987, however, that the number of working satellites in HEO orbits reached the maximum?nine.[65]. In December that year the system reached its maximum strength?nine HEO satellites complemented by a geostationary satellite.[66]

The system worked in full configuration, with eight or nine satellites in HEO orbits and one geostationary satellite, until 1996. In November 1996 the geostationary satellite that was providing support to the HEO constellation, did not perform a regular station-keeping maneuver.[67] This marked a beginning of the decline of the capabilities of the space-based early warning system that Russia is currently struggling to keep under control. By the end of 1996 the system lost one of its HEO satellites as well.

In 1997 Russia launched two HEO and one GEO satellite in an attempt to replenish the deteriorating system. These launches help to maintain the system for a while at a level of six HEO satellites, but three of them soon ceased operations. As a result, in March 1998 the system included only three HEO satellites in addition to a geostationary one. The HEO constellation was not able to detect missile launches for a significant portion of a day.[68] Although the GEO satellite prevented a complete loss of detection capability, reliability of the system must have significantly degraded.

In another setback, the only geostationary satellite that was providing support to the weakened HEO constellation, Cosmos-2245, stopped operations in March 1999. As a result, the reliability of the space-based early-warning system suffered dramatically. The gap in coverage, during which no satellite was in a position to detect U.S. launched, reached almost five hours a day. For the rest of the day, an ICBM launch could be detected by only one satellite, which was most likely insufficient for reliable detection.

The situation changed only when Cosmos-2368, launched on 27 December 1999, closed the gap in the HEO coverage. The constellation of four satellites created after the launch was able to provide continuous coverage of the U.S. territory. However, since the HEO constellation did not have support of a geostationary satellite and at no time more than one satellite was in a position to observe launches, the quality of that coverage was probably rather poor.

The constellation of four HEO satellites continued to work with no visible attempts to amend it until 10 May 2001, when a fire at the ground control station damaged the system almost beyond repair. The fire destroyed one of the buildings and cables at the Serpukhov-15 control station, which led to a loss of communication with all four satellites in orbit.[69] A few days later the Military Space Forces announced that control over the satellites was restored with the help of other stations.[70] However, all four satellites stopped maneuvering and started drifting off stations, indicating that the control was not fully re-established.

The control station was able to resume operations only on 20 August 2001.[71] About a month later, on 14 September 2001, one of the HEO satellites, Cosmos-2368, began a series of maneuvers that seem to have the goal of placing it back to an operational orbit. Three other satellites, Cosmos-2340, Cosmos-2342, and Cosmos-2351, remain inoperational (although Cosmos-2342 performed a maneuver in October 2001). These satellites are very unlikely to recover, since they have drifted too far off their stations.

In another important development, a new geostationary early warning satellite, Cosmos-2379, was launched on 24 August 2001. The satellites was initially placed into the point at 80 degrees east (point known as Prognoz-4), but was then transferred into the Prognoz-1 point at 24 degrees west, from which it can provide support to the HEO satellites.[72] On 1 April 2002, after the launch of

Cosmos-2388, the number of HEO satellites reached two.

As a result, in the beginning of 2002, the constellation of early warning satellites in highly elliptical orbits included only two operational first-generation satellites, which were unable to provide uninterrupted coverage of ICBM launches from the territory of the United States. As for launches of sea-based missiles or any launches from outside U.S. ICBM bases, the constellation of first-generation satellites, whether complete or not, was not able (or indeed intended) to detect them. That mission was assigned to satellites of the second-generation system.

Second-generation satellites

Early warning satellites of the second generation were developed as part of the US-KMO (Prognoz) system, which was supposed to complement and then replace the US-KS (Oko) space-based early warning system. Development of the US-KMO system began in 1979.[73] In contrast to the first-generation system, which was designed to detect only launches of ICBMs from bases in U.S. territory, the US-KMO system was designed to provide coverage of SLBM launches from oceans as well.

The most important distinguishing feature of the second-generation satellites was their look-down capability.[74] These satellites were to be deployed in geosynchronous orbits, from which they could provide coverage of most of the oceans. It is likely that these satellites are supposed to replace the US-KS (Oko) first-generation satellites in HEO orbits as well. Deployed in highly elliptical orbits, second-generation satellites could provide coverage of polar regions in addition to the coverage of U.S. territory and the oceans.[75]

Details of the US-KMO (Prognoz) system architecture are unknown, but it seems that the system in its full configuration would include up to seven satellites in geosynchronous orbits and about four satellites in highly elliptical orbits. All satellites are supposed to have the capability of detecting launches of ballistic missiles against background of Earth surface and cloud cover.

In 1981, when the Soviet Union began to work on the US-KMO (Prognoz) system, it registered seven positions for geostationary satellites (and frequencies for their transmitters) with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Table 4 lists these points, which are commonly known as Prognoz, and dates of their registration and beginning of operations. The initial application submitted to ITU stated that operations in points Prognoz-1?Prognoz-4 would begin in 1982. Satellites in Prognoz-5?Prognoz-7 points were not expected to begin operations until 1990.

Geostationary point

Longitude Declared start of operations

Actual start of operations

Prognoz-1 24 West 1 June 1984 1 June 1984

Prognoz-2 12 East 20 January 1985 27 January 1992

Prognoz-3 35 East 10 April 1985 23 May 1985

Prognoz-4 80 East 30 January 1985 13 March 1985

Prognoz-5 130 East 1 July 1990 ?

Prognoz-6 166 East 1 July 1990 ?

Prognoz-7 159 West 1 July 1990 ?

Table 4. Prognoz points on geostationary orbit.

The difference in the dates of beginning of operations reflected the structure of the planned system. Satellites in points 1 to 4 were intended to provide coverage of the U.S. territory, the Atlantic Ocean, Europe, and probably China. These satellites could use the already existing control and communication facilities in Serpukhov-15. Satellites in points 5 to 7, which would provide coverage of the Pacific Ocean, would not be able to communicate with the control station in the Moscow area. Deployment of satellites in these points therefore requires construction of a new control station in the Far East. Until this station was built no satellites could be placed in points Prognoz-5?Prognoz-7. For a number of reasons, construction of the eastern control center was not given a high priority. It was reported to be completed in 1998,[76] but to this day no satellites have been deployed in the eastern Prognoz points.

It is difficult to determine whether a specific satellite in geosynchronous orbit is a first-generation US-KS (Oko) or a second-generation US-KMO (Prognoz) satellite. It is believed that the first second-generation satellite was Cosmos-2133, launched on 14 February 1991.[77] Other satellites that are considered to be second-generation early-warning satellites are Cosmos-2209 (10 September 1992), Cosmos-2224 (17 December 1992), Cosmos-2282 (6 July 1994), Cosmos-2350 (25 April 1998), and Cosmos-2379 (24 August 2001).

The number of satellites that are believed to be second-generation early warning satellites is too low to draw any conclusions about their operational lives. The longest-living second-generation satellite, Cosmos-2224, was operational for 77 months, setting a longevity record for all early warning satellites.[78] Cosmos-2133 worked for 56 months and Cosmos-2209?for 50 months, which probably mean that their operations were successful. Cosmos-2282 ceased operations after 17 months, most likely because of a malfunction. Cosmos-2350 ceased all maneuvers only after two months of work, which also indicates a failure. Cosmos-2379, launched in August 2001, continues to work.

The history of deployment of the US-KMO satellites suggests that the program is still in the development phase. It was reported that in 1996 ?the first echelon of the system of detection of sea-based missiles? was accepted for service.[79] At that time there were two operational second-generation satellites: Cosmos-2209 at the Prognoz-1 point and Cosmos-2224 in the Prognoz-2 point. These satellites, indeed, were capable of detecting SLBM launches in the Atlantic Ocean. However, Cosmos-2209 stopped operations in November 1996 and Cosmos-2224?in June 1999. Since neither of the satellites has been replaced, the coverage of the Atlantic that they provided was lost.

The only second-generation satellite that was operational in the beginning of 2002, Cosmos-2379, was placed into the Prognoz-1 point. Located at this point, the satellite can support the first-generation satellites in highly elliptical orbits and provide limited coverage of the Atlantic Ocean.

Current status of the early-warning systemIn 2001 the Russian early warning system probably reached its nadir. The loss of the radar in Skrunda opened a serious gap in the coverage provided by the radar network. The gap was supposed to be closed by the radar in Baranovichi, but the beginning of its operation continues to be

postponed. Besides, the Russian military admitted that in any event the radar will not be able to operate at full capacity.

The program of deployment of Daryal (Pechora) radars has effectively ground to a halt. Construction of the radar in Mukachevo is very unlikely to be resumed; the prospects for completing radars in Balkhash and Mishelevka remain dim. In addition to this, legal problems has long complicated operation of the Daryal (Pechora) radar in Gabala, Azerbaijan.[80] Similar problems could potentially affect the status of the radars in Balkhash, Kazakhstan.

The Dnepr (Hen House) and Dnestr-M (Hen House) radars, which provide the largest share of the early warning radar coverage, are about 25 years old and will soon reach the end of their operational lives. A loss of these radars would leave Russia without early warning coverage in very important directions.

The space-based early warning system suffered a severe setback in May 2001, when a fire destroyed the ground control station and resulted in a loss of communication with those few satellites that Russia was able to keep in orbit. Although Russia eventually recovered one of the four satellites and managed to launch new ones to support the existing satellites, the system cannot provide reliable detection of missile launches.[81] Given the rate at which Russia was able to launch early-warning satellites in recent years, it may take two or three years to bring the system back to operation.

The problems experienced by the Russian early warning system stem from a combination of factors. The problems caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union were exacerbated by the chronic underfinancing of the military during most of the 1990s. Another important factor was the mismanagement of the system, in particular during 1997?1999, when all early-warning units were subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces.[82]

The reorganization of 2001, which placed all early-warning facilities under command of the Military Space Forces, may lead to a recovery of the early warning system. However, the extent to which this would be technically possible is unclear. To provide complete radar coverage, Russia would have to finish construction of Daryal (Pechora) radars and deploy a series of new radars that would replace the aging Dnepr (Hen House) radars in Ukraine and fill the gap created by the loss of radars in Skrunda and Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk). Eventually, Russia would have to build radars that would replace the existing ones in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Implementation of this program would require a massive effort that Russia is unlikely to be able to afford.

The situation with the space-based system is somewhat better. The US-KMO (Prognoz) system, which has the capability to provide coverage of most of the areas from which ballistic missiles can be launched, seems to have reached initial operational capability. At the same time, operation of the system would require deployment and maintenance of a constellation of about ten satellites, which may also be outside of Russia?s capabilities.

Overall, the Russian early warning system seems to have reached the point at which it virtually lost its importance as an integral component of the command and control system of nuclear forces. Quality of the information about missile launches that the system can provide and its reliability seem to be so low that it is highly unlikely that this information will ever be used as a basis for a decision to initiate a launch-on-warning strike. The only marginal capability the system seems to provide is detection of a massive missile attack.

It is important to underscore that the Russian military must be very well aware of the current limitations of the system, which has been in decline for a number of years, and must have

downgraded the role it plays in the command and control system. This means that a probability that an error that may result from the inadequate performance of the early warning system would result in an irreversible decision (such as missile launch) is virtually nil. Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia will ever be able to restore the capabilities of its early warning system to the point at which it could be relied upon for decisions of this kind and at which it could allow implementation of launch-on-warning posture of its strategic forces.

The real question, however, is not whether Russia can afford rebuilding and maintaining its early-warning system. The most serious questions are why Russia needs to build one and what role the early-warning system should play in the Russian military doctrine. So far, there has been little public debate in Russia on these questions. However, changes in the U.S.-Russian relationships, especially if they result in substantial reductions of strategic nuclear arsenals, will inevitably raise questions about utility of the early-warning system. It is very likely that this would result in serious changes in the current early-warning development programs and, quite possibly, termination of most of them.

[1] The major part of this effort was a reorganization of enterprises of the Ministry of Radio Industry, undertaken in 1970. The reorganization resulted in creation of one large holding, TsNPO Vympel (Central Scientific Production Association Vympel), which included production facilities as well as scientific research institutes and design bureaus.

[2] V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000. According to Votintsev, the system did not become fully operational until 1976. See Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 33.

[3] Although the early warning radars did provide information to the Moscow ABM system, there were serious problems with compatibility of these two systems. Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 34.

[4] There radars, constructed in 1967, were prototype to the Dnestr-M radars. They are also known as Hen House.

[5] Soviet Strategic Defenses, NIE 11-3-71, 25 February 1971, p. 36. It is possible that the radar in Skrunda was a modified Dnestr-M radar, rather than Dnepr.

[6] Until 1967, the Soviet Union was working on a national missile defense system, which used the same technology as the A-35 (Galosh) Moscow missile defense (Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Pavel Podvig, ed. (MIT Press, 2001) p. 419). Later, in 1968?1970, there were several projects of missile defenses that would protect missile deployment areas (V. F. Utkin, Yu. A. Moszhorin, ?Raketnoye i kosmicheskoye vooruzheniye (Missiles and space weapons),? in Sovetskaya voyennaya moshch ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (Soviet military power from Stalin to Gorbachev), Moscow: Voennyi Parad, 1999, pp. 232, 235). The radars may have also intended to be part of the Ekvator early warning system, which was developed in Radio-Technical Institute in 1969. Viktor Sloka, ?50 Years of The Mints Radio-technical Institute,? Military Parade, July-August 1996.

[7] Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 34.

[8] This work was completed in 1978, when the Dunay-3U radar became fully operational. Soviet Strategic Defense, NIE 11-3-72, 2 November 1972, p. 19; ?Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s,? NIE 11-3/8-76, p. 41; Oruzhiye Rossii, Katalog (Russian Weapons, Catalog), Vol. IV, Military Parade, 1997, p. 102.

[9] A map of Soviet early-warning facilities in Soviet Strategic Defense, NIE 11-3-72, 2 November 1972, p. 19 did not show the Mukachevo site. It appears on a map in ?Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s,? NIE 11-3/8-76, 1976, p. 41.

[10] An additional Dnestr-M radar in Skrunda was under construction at that time.

[11] G. A. Sukhina, V. I. Ivakin, M. G. Dyuryagin, Raketnyi shchit otechestva (Missile shield of the Motherland) (Moscow, TsIPK RVSN, 1999) p. 171.

[12] V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000.

[13] The first draft design of a radar of this type was drawn in the late 1960s by a team at the Radio-Technical Institute, which designed Dnestr and Dnepr radars and was responsible for designing an early warning system at that time. See Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 35.

[14] The receiver began operations sometime after 1972, but it was not accepted for service until July 1978. V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000.

[15] The decree was issued on 14 April 1975. Construction of the first radar?in Pechora?began in September 1975. See V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000; Sergey Martynov, ?Sobytiye. Istoriya Daryala prodolzhaetsya (History of Daryal continues),? Krasnaya zvezda, 13 September 2000, p. 2.

[16] An initial plan, drawn in 1976?1977, suggested building Daugava/Daryal-type receivers at sites in Balkhash and Mishelevka and transmitters in Skrunda and Mukachevo. These plans were later modified to include construction of both transmitters and receivers at all Daryal sites. V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000.

[17] The decision to build the radar near Krasnoyarsk led to a very well known controversy about its compliance with provisions of the ABM Treaty, which required all new large phased array radars to be deployed along the periphery of national territory and oriented outward (Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty). The Soviet Union hoped that it could avoid conflict with the ABM Treaty by classifying the new radar as a space-surveillance, rather than as an early-warning one. The ABM Treaty allowed deployment of large phase-array radars within national territory if the radar was used ?for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space? (See Agreed statements to the ABM Treaty, Statement [F]). However, while the Daryal radar in Yeniseysk would certainly have been used for space-surveillance purposes, it was of the same type as early warning Daryal radars in Pechora and Gabala and therefore should have been considered as an early-warning radar.

[18] By 1983 the construction in Balkhash and Mishelevka, as well as in Yeniseysk was in progress. Work at the Skrunda and Mukachevo sites began later. See map in ?Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1983-93,? NIE 11-3/8-83, p. 25.

[19] G. A. Sukhina, V. I. Ivakin, M. G. Dyuryagin, Raketnyi shchit otechestva (Missile shield of the Motherland) (Moscow, TsIPK RVSN, 1999) p. 171; Sergey Sokut, ?Zapadnyi strazh (Western guard),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 20 August 1999, p. 6.

[20] Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Pavel Podvig, ed. (MIT Press, 2001) p. 425.

[21] As a temporary measure, the Dunay-3U (Cat House) radar of the Moscow ABM system was upgraded to provide coverage of the territory of West Germany. This work was completed shortly after 1983. Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9, 1993, p. 34.

[22] Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 35. Votintsev mentions serious problems with data processing hardware and software.

[23] Thomas Friedman, ?U.S.-Soviet Talks End With Progress on Arms Control,? New York Times, 24 September 1989, p. 1.

[24] Carol J. Williams, ?Despite Kremlin, Latvia Blasting Radar Facility,? Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1995, p. A10.

[25] In 1999 the United States offered its help to Russia in completing the radar in Mishelevka. Michael Gordon, ?U.S. Asks Russia to Alter Treaty for Help on Radar,? New York Times, October 17, 1999, p. 1. The radar at the Balkhash site was not working in 1997 and there were no reports about a change in its status since then. ?Tridtsat let protivostoyaniya (Thirty years of confrontation),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 17 October 1997, p. 3.

[26] The agreement between Russia and Latvia was signed on 30 April 1994. According to the agreement, the radar had to stop operations no later than 31 August 1998 and be demolished by 29 February 2000. The radar was dismantled ahead of schedule, by October 1999. Yuri Golotyuk, ?Dyra v rossiiskom nebe i latviiskom budgete (A hole in Russian sky and in Latvian budget),? Izvestia, 22 October 1999.

[27] The Don-2N radar would detect a missile launched from the North Atlantic about 2 to 4 minutes later than a radar in Skrunda. This should be compared to the flight time of a missile, which for an SLBM aimed at Moscow could range from 17 to 22 minutes.

[28] Yuri Golotyuk, ?Moskva vse zhe prismotrit za amerikanskimi raketami (Russia will keep an eye on American missiles after all),? Izvestia, 4 August 1999.

[29] Mikhail Getman, ?PRO bez contra (ABM without counterarguments),? Armeiskii sbornik, No. 3, March 2001, p. 13. The radar, however, will not be able to begin operations in full configuration. This may mean that it will be operating at a fraction of its projected capabilities; Sergey Sokut, Rossiya latayet yadernyi shchit (Russia is patching the nuclear shield),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 4 August 1999, p. 2.

[30] A. I. Savin was appointed the head of the TsNII Kometa and was the General Designer of the space-based early-warning system. Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei

sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 38.

[31] Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 38. It is not clear, however, how the system could be operational in 1978, for during that year there was never more than two working satellites in orbit. Most likely it was the ground command and control center that began operations in 1978.

[32] G. A. Sukhina, V. I. Ivakin, M. G. Dyuryagin, Raketnyi shchit otechestva (Missile shield of the Motherland) (Moscow, TsIPK RVSN, 1999) p. 171.

[33] Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 38.

[34] For an analysis of the incident, see Geoffrey Forden, ?Reducing a Common Danger,? Policy Analysis Paper No. 399, CATO Institute, 3 May 2001, pp. 5?6.

[35] V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000.

[36] Nicholas Johnson at al., History of On-orbit Satellite Fragmentation, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, July 31, 1998, p. 110.

[37] V. Pavlyuk, ?Rassekrechen voyennyi sputnik (A military satellite is declassified),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 1,2, 1993; Nicholas Johnson at al., History of On-orbit Satellite Fragmentation, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, July 31, 1998, p. 110.

[38] V. Pavlyuk, ?Rassekrechen voyennyi sputnik (A military satellite is declassified),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 1, 1993, pp. 19?21.

[39] Nicholas Johnson at al., History of On-orbit Satellite Fragmentation, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, July 31, 1998, p. 110.

[40] V. Pavlyuk, ?Rassekrechen voyennyi sputnik (A military satellite is declassified),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 2, 1993.

[41] B. Kagan, Soviet ABM Early Warning System (Satellite-Based Project M), Delphic Associates, 1991.

[42] Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 38.

[43] M. Tarasenko, ?Zapushchen ISZ Kosmos-2340 (The launch of Cosmos-2340),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 8, 1997.

[44] K. Lantratov, ?Shtrikhi k istorii SPRN (Moments from the history of the EW system),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 2, 2000, p. 48.

[45] After a series of reorganizations, the units that were formerly part of the Air Defense Forces and those that was part of GUKOS, became subordinated to the unified Missile Space Forces in 2001. This, however, did not affect their responsibilities or changed the fact that the

tracking and control systems that they operate are incompatible.

[46] Nicholas Johnson at al., History of On-orbit Satellite Fragmentation, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, July 31, 1998, p. 15?17, 110.

[47] This includes the launch of Cosmos-775, which failed to stabilize its orbit, but nevertheless was considered a successful launch. See Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily (Military Space Forces), Vol. 2, Moscow, Military Space Forces, 1997, cited in K. Lantratov, ?Shtrikhi k istorii SPRN (Moments from the history of the EW system),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 2, 2000, p. 48.

[48] These were Cosmos-1164 (12 February 1980), Cosmos-1783 (3 October 1986), and Cosmos-2084 (21 June 1990).

[49] This group includes eight satellites that failed to stabilize their orbits and therefore are classified as unsuccessful launches: Cosmos-931, Cosmos-1030, Cosmos-1109, Cosmos-1124, Cosmos-1261, Cosmos-1285, Cosmos-1481, and Cosmos-1687.

[50] See, for example, Geoffrey Forden, ?Reducing a Common Danger,? Policy Analysis Paper No. 399, CATO Institute, 3 May 2001.

[51] A siderial day, to be precise. Siderial day is about 4 minutes shorter, than a solar day. To keep its position relative to Earth constant, a satellite should make certain number of revolutions per a siderial day.

[52] For a more detailed discussion of the observation geometry, see Paul Podvig, ?The Operational Status of the Russian Space-Based Early Warning System,? Science & Global Security, 1994, Vol. 4, pp. 363?384.

[53] The perturbations in question are caused by Earth?s second zonal harmonic.

[54] Longitude of the ascending node of an orbit is the longitude of the point at which a satellite crosses Earth?s equatorial plane as it ?ascends? (hence the name) from south to north.

[55] The satellite, however, would be susceptible to blinding effects of direct sunlight and reflections off clouds.

[56] NORAD was able to obtain orbital elements on a regular basis only in the end of December 1972, when the satellite was already non-operational. It is possible that the satellite performed maneuvers during the three months it was not tracked by NORAD. About the success oft he mission, see Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily (Military Space Forces), Vol. 2 (Moscow: Military Space Forces, 1997) p. 15, quoted in K. Lantratov, ?Shtrikhi k istorii SPRN (Moments from the history of the EW system),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 2, 2000, p. 48.

[57] The last of these satellites, Cosmos-862, was the first early-warning satellite that exploded in orbit. The explosion occurred on 15 March 1977. Nicholas Johnson at al., History of On-orbit Satellite Fragmentation, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, July 31, 1998, p. 110.

[58] The launch was reported a success, although the satellite did not manage to stabilize its position in the geosynchronous orbit. K. Lantratov, ?Shtrikhi k istorii SPRN (Moments from the history of the EW system),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 2, 2000, p. 48.

[59] Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown

forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 38.

[60] Before 1981, all satellites were deployed in stations 2, 4, 7, and 9 (with the exception of Cosmos-862). Launches of Cosmos-1247 on 19 February 1981 and of Cosmos-1261 on 31 March 1981 were intended to fill stations 5 and 6 respectively. Only Cosmos-1247 reached the working orbit.

[61] This, however, did not last long, since one of those five, Cosmos-1191, self-destruct on 14 May 1981. Nicholas Johnson at al., History of On-orbit Satellite Fragmentation, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, July 31, 1998, p. 154.

[62] Only two slots were left empty?slot 4 and 6.

[63] Yu. V. Votintsev, ?Neizvestnyye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy (Unknown forces of the vanished superpower),? Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1993, p. 38.

[64] There was no satellite in the Prognoz-1 point since December 1986, when Cosmos-1629 stopped working, till December 1987, when Cosmos-1824, launched on 28 October 1987, reached the point.

[65] This important milestone was achieved after a launch of Cosmos-1849 on 4 June 1987.

[66] This happened after Cosmos-1894, launched on 28 October 1987, reached the Prognoz-1 point in geosynchronous orbit. In addition to this, there were working satellites that were deployed off station. They were most likely used for experimental purposes. The total number of operational satellites was sometimes as high as 12.

[67] It was a second-generation Cosmos-2209, launched on 10 September 1992.

[68] The gap was partially closed after the launch of Cosmos-2351 on 7 May 1998, but soon after that it was restored anew?Cosmos-2232 did not perform a scheduled maneuver in June 1998.

[69] Sergey Topol and Ivan Safronov, ?U Rossii problemy s PRO (Russia has some problems with ABM),? Kommersant-Daily, 11 May 2001.

[70] This seems unlikely, for the early-warning satellites are incompatible with other space systems. K. Lantratov, ?Shtrikhi k istorii SPRN (Moments from the history of the EW system),? Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 2, 2000, p. 48.

[71] Ivan Safronov, ?Novosti. Raketa-nositel popala v neletnuyu pogodu (News. A launcher did not start because of the weather),? Kommersant-Daily, 25 August 2001, p. 3.

[72] This transfer was completed by 17 December 2001.

[73] G. A. Sukhina, V. I. Ivakin, M. G. Dyuryagin, Raketnyi shchit otechestva (Missile shield of the Motherland) (Moscow, TsIPK RVSN, 1999) p. 171.

[74] Theodore A. Postol, ?The Nuclear Danger from Shortfalls in the Capabilities of Russian Early Warning Satellites,? Presentation at the Lincoln Laboratory, 12 April 1999.

[75] The U.S. early-warning satellite program, which has long relied on geostationary DSP satellites, plans to deploy some of next-generation SBIRS-High satellites in highly-elliptical orbits,

specifically to provide coverage of polar regions. ?OSD Approves SBIRS High Restructure, Two-Year Procurement Delay,? Inside the Air Force, 14 December 2001, p. 1.

[76] V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000.

[77] See, for example, The Satellite Encyclopedia by Tag?s Broadcasting Services at <http://www.tbs-satellite.com/tse/>. As a rule, satellites of the first generation are deployed in Prognoz-1 point, while second-generation satellites move between different points. The exceptions from this rule are Cosmos-1546 and Cosmos-1629, which visited other Prognoz points, but are still considered to be first generation satellites.

[78] The longest-living first-generation satellite to date was Cosmos-2232, which was operational for 64 months.

[79] V. G. Morozov, ?Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),? Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 April 2000.

[80] Russia and Azerbaijan signed an agreement that regulates the status of the radar in Gabala only in January 2002. According to the agreement, the property rights to the radar were given to Azerbaijan, which leased the radar to Russia until 2010. Russia agreed to pay $31mln in back pay and will pay $70 mln for the remaining years of the contract. Andrey Rumyantsev, ?Tsena druzhby?101 million dollarov (The price of friendship is $101 mln),? Vesti nedeli, RTR Television broadcast, 27 January 2002.

[81] As of 1 January 2002, Cosmos-2368 had returned to the working orbit and could provide coverage of U.S. ICBM bases for about 6 hours a day. Cosmos-2342 was still off station and could detect missile launches for only about 3 hours a day.

[82] In a clear sign of the problems that the early-warning units experienced after they were subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces, in January 1999 the commander of the early-warning army, Gen.-Let. A. Sokolov, and four his deputies submitted their resignations in which they cited irreconcilable differences with the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces. ?Obzor tekushchikh sobytii (Current events),? IMS Consulting, 15 January 1999.

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces in Transition

Posted on November 3, 2001 | Printer-friendly version

Pavel Podvig, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces in Transition”, An afterword for the English edition, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Pavel Podvig, ed., Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001

The Russian edition of this book appeared in November 1998, and the bulk of the research that went into it had been completed long before that. Since then the Russian strategic forces have undergone a series of important transformations that need to be reflected in the book if it is to provide an accurate account of the current situation.

With a few notable exceptions, the changes, however profound, are mostly the result of a natural evolution of the nuclear complex. A number of old missiles or systems were withdrawn from service, and some new weapons were introduced. Since this book is intended to be used as a reference, these changes have been introduced into the text of the book whenever it was possible. The authors hope that this has resulted in a book that correctly describes the current state of the Russian nuclear complex and strategic arsenal.

Some of the developments in the Russian nuclear complex, however, require a separate description, either because they affect more than just one system or because they give a better view of the future of the Russian nuclear complex if they are brought together. These developments are described in this afterword, which attempts to present an overview of the most important events of the last three years and discuss their impact on the future of the Russian nuclear complex.

The most important change that has occurred since 1997 is the structural reform of the Russian armed forces, which is described in the first section of this afterword. The reform has been quite radical in the sense that it has already resulted in the elimination of one of the armed forces services, and it will probably bring more changes in the next few years. At the same time, the impact that the reform has had on the existing military structures that are included in the strategic forces has not been that serious. As a result, almost all information about the structure of the strategic forces presented in this book remains accurate.

The second section of the afterword is devoted to the main arms control developments of the last three years, two of which are most important: ratification of the START II Treaty and strengthening of Russia's opposition to the U.S. missile defense plans. The outcome of the missile defense debate and progress at U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of nuclear forces will play a very important role in determining the future of the Russian strategic forces.

Among other factors that will shape the future of the Russian nuclear arsenal is the capability of the Russian leadership to complete the restructuring and down-sizing of its nuclear complex. The measures that have been taken so far and the general overview of the effect of these efforts are described in the afterword's third section.

Structural ReformIn 1997, after several years of deliberations and internal debates, the Russian leadership began the structural reform of the armed forces. In July 1997 the Russian president signed a decree that authorized the beginning of the transformation.[1] The underlying idea of the reform was to move away from the traditional five-service structure of the Soviet forces, which included the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy, the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the Air Defense Forces. By the time the transformation began, there seemed to be general agreement in the military that the armed forces should consists of only three services: the Air Forces, Navy, and Ground Forces—one for each sphere of operations. The specifics of the transition, however, were to be determined and remain highly contested even at the present time.

The main provisions of the July 1997 presidential decree ordered dissolution of the Air Defense Forces, which were to be split between the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Forces.[2] The Missile and Space Defense Forces, which had control over the early-warning, missile defense, and space surveillance systems, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Strategic Rocket Forces. In addition, the Military Space Forces, which had been a separate branch of the armed forces since 1982, were subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Air Forces and the remainder of the Air Defense Forces, which included radio-technical and surface-to-air missile troops and air defense

fighter aviation, were merged to form the new Air Forces.

The intention of the reform was to reduce the number of personnel, streamline development and acquisition procedures, and get rid of parallel structures that existed in the old system. By this logic, it was natural that the Strategic Rocket Forces, which had significant expertise in procuring and maintaining missiles, would take over other missile-related branches, the Military Space Forces in particular.

As far as Missile and Space Defense Forces are concerned, the rationale behind merging them with the Strategic Rocket Forces was that the latter is the only strategic service that could make full use of the information provided by the early-warning system to launch its missiles promptly. It was believed that closer integration of the early-warning system and the Strategic Rocket Forces' command and control would facilitate a more stable and reliable force posture. Since all components of the Space Defense Forces are closely linked to one another, missile defense and space surveillance systems were transferred to the Strategic Rocket Forces as well.

The merger of the Strategic Rocket Forces with the Military Space Forces and the Missile and Space Defense Forces was largely completed by November 1997 and was accompanied by a 30 percent cut in personnel. Nevertheless, it was announced that the new service is more effective than its predecessors combined.[3] As it turned out, however, while the merger did allow some streamlining of development and acquisition, the Strategic Rocket Forces have not been very successful in managing space-related missions, previously assigned to the Military Space Forces, or in maintaining the complex information-management structure that forms the core of the early-warning and space surveillance systems. As a result, three years later, in August 2000, the Military Space Forces and Missile and Space Defense Forces were slated to be removed from the Strategic Rocket Forces' jurisdiction to form separate branches of the armed forces.

The transformation of the Air Forces seems to have been more successful. As the result of this merger of the Air Forces and the Air Defense Forces units, the number of personnel was cut by about 45 percent and the number of regiments by a third.[4] All of the strategic aviation units in the two services were combined into an air army of the Supreme High Command.[5] The transition to the new structure of the Air Forces was completed by the fall of 1998.[6]

In summer of 1998, while the first steps toward restructuring of the armed forces were in progress, the Russian president signed a document that outlined a broader concept of military reform up to the year 2005.[7] The concept was set to continue the restructuring initiated a year earlier and called for cutting the number of Russian military personnel to 1.2 million by the end of 1998. In the next stage, which was to begin in 2000 and end in 2005, the armed forces were to undertake a transition from a four-service to a three-service structure.[8]

The three services envisioned by the outline of the military reform were to correspond to three spheres of operations: ground, air and outer space, and sea. A structure like this would have problems accommodating the Strategic Rocket Forces, which has traditionally been one the most powerful services in the Soviet and Russian military. This consideration was one of the factors that led the Ministry of Defense to come up with a plan of creating a Joint High Command of Strategic Deterrence Forces. The proposed structure was supposed to bring all strategic nuclear forces—that is, ICBMs, strategic missile submarines, and long-range aviation, under operational control of the Joint High Command, which would be directly accountable to the Supreme High Command.[9]

Under the plan, proposed by the Minister of Defense, the transition to the three-service structure was to be completed in 1999. The Joint High Command and its strategic nuclear forces would form a structure separate from all other services. The Strategic Rocket Forces would form a core of the

new command. In its most extreme version the plan called for subordinating the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, as well as conventional units that support operations of nuclear forces, to the new command.[10]

The idea of such a Joint High Command was met with very strong opposition from the General Staff, which has traditionally carried out most, if not all, of the functions of the proposed Joint Command. An intense discussion ensued, in which the General Staff was supported by other services. As a result of this discussion, the proposal to form a Joint High Command was withdrawn by the fall of 1999.

In 2000, when the transfer to the three-service structure of the armed forces was supposed to begin, the General Staff unveiled a proposal that called for a strong shift of priorities away from strategic nuclear forces to conventional forces. Among other measures, the proposal envisioned deep cuts in the number of deployed nuclear warheads and missiles. Since the cuts would have led to the Strategic Rocket Forces' losing many of its regiments and much of its manpower, it was to be demoted to a branch of armed forces and subordinated to the Air Forces.

The new proposal was no less controversial than the idea of the Joint High Command. It was considered among other proposals at a special session of the Security Council on 11 August 2000, which was supposed to finalize the military reform plans for the next decade. The result of that session was to refrain from any radical measures that would affect the Strategic Rocket Forces. Instead, the most important outcome of the meeting was the announcement of further cuts of military personnel: The armed forces that report to the Ministry of Defense are to be cut by 375,000 by 2005.[11] It was also announced that the transition to a three-service armed forces would proceed as planned and be completed by 2005. During this transition the Military Space Forces and the Missile and Space Defense Forces will be removed from the Strategic Rocket Forces' jurisdiction, although no further information was given in the August 2000 announcement as to the fate of those two organizations.

The problems created by the proposed military reform were again considered at another session of the Security Council in November 2000. This session largely upheld the previously made decisions about restructuring and personnel cuts. It was announced that the Military Space Forces and Missile and Space Defense Forces would be transformed into a single separate branch that reports directly to the General Staff. The Strategic Rocket Forces will lose the status of a military service and in 2002 will also be transformed into a branch of the armed services.[12] The plan for the transition to a three-service structure became more concrete in the November 2000 Security Council announcement, so the restructuring should be completed by the 2005 deadline envisioned when the idea was first discussed. The Security Council instructed the General Staff to prepare the documents for the corresponding government and presidential decisions, which are expected in March 2001.[13]

For the moment it seems that the debate about the structure of the Russian armed forces is largely over. Despite the profound changes, most services and branches (with the notable exception of the Air Defense Forces) emerged from this debate weakened but intact. This means that although Russia is moving toward a more compact and modern military, the politics of decision making within the military will remain essentially unchanged.

The Arms Control AgendaThe main question that was on the political agenda in 1998 was the ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Duma. Although in 1997 Russia and the United States signed a number of

agreements that were supposed to facilitate the START II Treaty's coming into force, closing the deal proved very difficult. As a result, by the beginning of 2001 the START II Treaty had been ratified, but serious doubts remained as to whether the treaty would ever enter into force. The future of the next arms control agreement, START III, also remained uncertain.

During the summit in Helsinki in March 1997 the presidents of Russia and the United States agreed to extend the START II implementation time by five years, so the reductions required under the treaty will now have to be completed by 31 December 2007. The protocol to the treaty that contains these provisions was signed in September 1997 in New York. In addition to this protocol, Russia and the United States signed a number of documents that were intended to clarify certain provisions of the ABM Treaty.[14]

The protocol to START II was intended to remove the most serious obstacles on the way to ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Duma. The extended implementation period would give Russia more time to complete the reductions and to allow it to withdraw its strategic weapon systems gradually as they reach end of their operational lives. The protocol does not, however, address some of the issues raised by the opponents of the treaty in Russia, namely, the problem of U.S. breakout potential.[15] Instead, the United States and Russia reached an understanding that these problems will be addressed in the START III Treaty, with the expectation that the new treaty would enter into force before the START II reductions are implemented.

In April 1998 the protocol to the START II Treaty was sent to the Duma for ratification. The package of documents sent to the Duma also included the ABM Treaty documents—a memorandum of understanding and agreed statements known as the demarcation agreement. The Duma postponed ratification of the treaty, since the president did not include in the draft legislation any specific provisions for future arms reduction negotiations. Eventually the Duma drafted its own legislation that specified these provisions explicitly. This process was completed in December 1998, and the Russian president introduced the respective bill in the Duma on 22 March 1999.[16] The Duma was originally expected to vote on the ratification of the START II Treaty in early April 1999, but that vote was canceled when the United States and its NATO allies began a military campaign against republics of the former Yugoslavia.The START II ratification bill was returned to the Duma floor in 2000, after the parliamentary elections of December 1999, which dramatically changed the composition of the Duma in favor of parties that support the government, and after presidential elections, which were held in March 2000. The new president expressed his unequivocal support for the START II Treaty, and the Duma voted for its ratification on 14 April 2000. The upper house of the Russian parliament promptly approved the Duma's decision, and on 4 May 2000 the Russian president completed the ratification process by signing the law passed by the parliament.[17]

The Russian law that ratified the START II Treaty includes several important conditions that have to be met before the treaty can enter into force. First and foremost, the United States must ratify the START II protocol that extends its implementation time, which was negotiated after the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the original version of the treaty.[18]

Another condition set by the law is much more serious. It says that exchange of START II ratification documents can begin only after the United States completes ratification of the ABM Treaty documents signed in September 1997.[19] Since it is highly unlikely that the ABM Treaty documents in question will be approved by the U.S. Senate, this condition effectively prevents the START II Treaty from entering into force.

The link between the ABM Treaty documents and START II, established by the Duma in the

ratification law, reflects sharp disagreement between the United States and Russia on the future of another important arms control agreement, the ABM Treaty. The documents in question, known as the demarcation agreement, were the result of very difficult negotiations in which the United States and Russia sought to define a set of criteria that would allow those in charge of evaluating compliance to distinguish between strategic missile defenses, which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and non-strategic systems, which would not be constrained by its provisions.

The demarcation agreement talks began as an attempt to clarify some provisions of the ABM Treaty in order to allow development of non-strategic missile defenses. The negotiations showed, however, that separating strategic and non-strategic defenses is a very difficult technical problem that most likely does not have a satisfactory solution. A more important outcome of the discussion was the growing concern in Russia about the U.S. missile defense plans.As Russia's opposition to the U.S. missile defense plans grew stronger, conclusion of the demarcation agreement was perceived in Russia as the primary means of preserving of the ABM Treaty. So when the Duma was drafting the START II ratification law, approval of the demarcation documents was included in it as an attempt to show Russia's disagreement with the U.S. position on missile defense and to deter the United States from breaking out of the ABM Treaty.

By the time Russia ratified the START II Treaty, however, the missile defense debate had shifted away from the question of constraints on development of non-strategic systems. In January 1999 the United States made a formal proposal to Russia to modify the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of a strategic National Missile Defense system. In May 1999 the U.S. Congress passed a bill that declared deployment of a missile defense the policy of the United States. An attempt undertaken before the U.S.-Russian summit in Moscow in June 2000 to find a compromise that would allow the United States to begin deployment of a National Missile Defense by modifying the ABM Treaty was unsuccessful.

Russia responded to the U.S. attempts to change the ABM Treaty by intensifying its efforts aimed at preserving it. First, Russia on several occasions reiterated the Soviet position of linking START I to the ABM Treaty.[20] Moreover, Russia insisted that in the event of a U.S. breakout from the ABM Treaty, Russia might consider withdrawal from other arms control agreements, including the treaties that ban intermediate-range missiles and limit conventional forces in Europe.[21]

The immediate pressure on the ABM Treaty was relieved when the United States announced in September 2000 that the final decision on deployment of a National Missile Defense system (and therefore withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) has been postponed. The new Republican administration, however, is set to continue the missile defense programs, and it is unlikely that Russia's opposition to those plans will prevent the United States from withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

Despite its sharp disagreement with the United States about the future of the ABM Treaty, Russia does not seem to be willing to begin a confrontation with the United States or to reverse the nuclear disarmament process. As an important sign of its adherence to the arms control process, Russia ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which banned all nuclear weapon tests.[22] In November 2000 Russia's president unveiled a plan that calls for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals that reduce them to the required level of 1,500 or fewer nuclear warheads on each side.[23]

Most of the reductions suggested by Russia are motivated by economic considerations, so it is in Russia's interest to preserve the existing arms control agreements and continue the bilateral U.S.-Russian dialogue. A U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could seriously set back the nuclear disarmament negotiations, but is unlikely to stop the dialogue completely.

Strategic ModernizationBeginning in 1998, the Russian leadership made a number of important decisions that to a large extent ended the uncertainty that plagued the Russian nuclear complex and its strategic forces in the preceding years and outlined the main directions in their development for the next ten to fifteen years. These decisions were prompted partly by the fact that in 1997 Russia successfully negotiated a protocol to the START II Treaty that extended its implementation period. The extension allowed Russia to make its weapons modernization program more realistic. In addition to this, the Russian leadership believed that by negotiating the aforementioned demarcation agreement, it had secured U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty, which allowed Russia to plan for reductions of its strategic forces.

The future of the Russian strategic forces was the subject of a Security Council meeting of 3 July 1998. The modernization program that the council approved included a number of steps that confirmed Russia's intention to comply with the provisions of the START II Treaty. Another important feature of the approved program was the decision to continue maintaining all three main components of the strategic triad: land-based missiles, strategic submarines, and strategic aviation.[24]

It was decided by the Security Council that the Russian land-based missile forces would rely on the new Topol-M (SS-27) systems, which will be deployed in both silo-based and road-mobile variants. The new Topol-M missile systems will eventually replace all currently deployed missiles as the latter reach the end of their operational lives or are eliminated as part of the START I reductions.

The modernization program the council approved acknowledged that Russia could not keep its MIRVed missiles indefinitely and therefore will have to comply with the START II provision that bans them. At the same time, the program apparently made provisions to extend operational lives of R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod 5/6) missiles to keep them in service until 2008. This arrangement was made possible by the extension of the time by which these missiles have to be eliminated, negotiated in 1997 as a protocol to the START II Treaty. Although the protocol requires the missiles to be deactivated, it allows them to be kept in silos, so they could be brought back into operation if necessary. This was considered a very important hedge against future developments, such as U.S. breakout from the ABM Treaty. Besides, the issue of heavy missiles' having to be eliminated before they reach the end of their operational lives was a very sensitive one in the public debate in Russia over the START II Treaty, so the option of keeping them in service was instrumental in gaining support for START II ratification in the Duma.

The program outlined by the council apparently called for gradual withdrawal of all other land-based missiles from service.[25] The core of the land-based missile force will instead consist of the new Topol-M (SS-27) missile system in both its ground-mobile and its silo-based versions. By the time of the Security Council deliberations on the program, two silo-based Topol-M systems had already been deployed.[26] The modernization program adopted by the Council called for deployment of 350-400 of these systems by 2010.[27] The plan also called for an increase in the annual production rate of the Topol-M systems from 10 in 1999 to 50 by 2005.[28]

In its proposed plan, the Security Council made a number of very important decisions on the future of the strategic nuclear fleet. The first one was to cancel the development of the missile that was supposed to be deployed on Project 941 (Typhoon) submarines and on the new submarines of the Yuri Dolgorukii class.[29] The program for the development of this missile was several years behind schedule, and all test launches of the new missile to that point had been unsuccessful. By canceling this program, the Security Council in effect made a decision to withdraw Project 941 submarines from active service.[30] Construction of the lead ship of the Yuri Dolgorukii class also

was to be postponed, since it was designed to accommodate the missile the development of which was cancelled.

The canceled missile was to be replaced, according to the plan, by a new one known as the "Bulava." In a highly unusual decision, the development of this missile was assigned to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, heretofore the head developer of land-based missile systems.[31] One of the arguments used in favor of this arrangement was that the new missile will be made compatible with the Topol-M (SS-27) missile and therefore will be cheaper to develop and manufacture.[32] According to the final plan, the first Yuri Dolgorukii-class submarine that would carry the new missile would enter service in 2007.[33]

The decisions the Security Council made in July 1998 meant that the core of the Russian strategic fleet in the next 10 to 15 years will consist of six or seven Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines that carry R-29RM (SS-N-23) missiles. These submarines could stay in service until 2010-2015 as long as they are properly maintained and equipped with newly manufactured missiles. Therefore, to keep the Project 667BDRM submarines operational, the Russian government resumed production of the R-29RM missiles, which had been discontinued in the mid-1990s.[34]

The air-based component of the strategic triad received a significant boost from the Security Council's decision to proceed with development of a new long-range air-launched cruise missile that will replace the currently deployed Kh-55 (AS-15). The plan discussed by the Security Council called for a strategic air force consisting of six Tu-160 Blackjack and 30-40 Tu-95MS Bear H bombers.[35] These projections underwent significant change, however, in 1999. First, Russia was able to find resources to complete assembly of one Tu-160 aircraft that was mothballed at the time the production of strategic bombers was suspended. This aircraft completed tests in December 1999 and entered service in 2000.[36] Second, in July 1999 Russia and Ukraine began negotiations that resulted in an agreement under which Ukraine transferred to Russia eight Tu-160 Blackjack and three Tu-95MS Bear H bomber[37] as well as several hundred Kh-22 (AS-4) short-range cruise missiles.[38] As a result of these transfers, the Russian strategic aviation grew considerably stronger than had been projected in July 1998.

The decisions the Security Council made in July 1998 determined the structure of the Russian strategic forces for the next 10 to 15 years. If we take into account the changes in production and deployment rates that have become evident since the Security Council's program was adopted, then by 2010 Russia may have a strategic force that will consist of up to 300 single-warhead silo-based and mobile Topol-M (SS-27) missile systems; seven Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines, which will carry 448 nuclear warheads; and a strategic air force that will consist of 15 Tu-160 Blackjack and about 30 Tu-95MS Bear H bombers, which together could carry up to 360 long-range air-launched cruise missiles. The total number of nuclear warheads that Russia will be able to deploy will therefore not exceed 1,100.

This estimate shows why Russia has publicly advocated reductions in the number of deployed nuclear weapons to 1,500 on each side and probably less than that. If the next nuclear arms reduction treaty establishes a higher number, Russia will probably be unable to maintain the level allowed by the treaty.

The program of maintaining Russia's strategic capability, which was considered in the summer of 1998, was not limited to the problems of strategic offensive forces. Among the items considered were measures aimed at maintaining and modernizing the country's command and control system, the early-warning network, and the space surveillance system.[39]

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has been putting considerable effort into keeping its

early-warning network operational. Although the country's difficult economic situation has prevented it from maintaining the kind of capability that existed in the Soviet Union, Russia has nevertheless managed to prevent complete disintegration of its early-warning network. Still, the number of satellites that Russia was able to keep in orbit by 1998 provided only very minimal coverage of U.S. territory. Most of the early-warning radars (which also provide space surveillance capability) were operating at a fraction of their capacity. Although in 1997 the Russian government in a special agreement with Ukraine secured operations of the two radars in the Ukrainian territory, the loss of the early-warning radar in Skrunda, Latvia, which ceased operations in August 1998, opened a gap in Russia's radar coverage.

Despite all these problems, Russia has continued to replenish the constellation of early-warning satellites on highly elliptical orbits that provide surveillance coverage of U.S. territory. So long as it maintains four satellites in these highly elliptical orbits, the constellation can detect any launch of a U.S. land-based missile. In addition to this, Russia has been working on second-generation geostationary early-warning satellites that would provide coverage of the oceans and therefore could detect missile launches from submarines. In 1998 the Missile and Space Defense Forces opened a Far East satellite control center that is to be used to control geostationary satellites that provide coverage of the Pacific Ocean.[40] Although Russia has not had operational geostationary early-warning satellites since June 1999 and the control center has operated only in a trial mode thus far, its opening was a very significant development.

To compensate for the gap in the radar coverage created after the radar in Skrunda stopped operations, Russia intensified efforts to bring online the Volga radar, deployed in Belarus. This radar entered trials in December 1999 and by November 2000 was ready to enter combat service.[41]

In addition to its early-warning missions, the Russian radar network is used to track satellites in space.[42] To provide better coverage of outer space, Russia has deployed two Krona surveillance systems[43] and brought into trial service the Okno optical surveillance system.[44]

It is still far from certain whether Russia will be able to find the resources necessary to maintain its extensive early-warning and space surveillance networks. So far there has been almost no public debate in Russia as to what kind of capability is required to support operations of the country's strategic offensive and defensive forces. In recent years the Russian leadership has undertaken significant efforts to keep all options in this area open, but it will eventually have to scale back and optimize its early-warning network to keep it from disintegrating.

Russia was confronted with a similar choice when it considered the future of another important component of the nuclear complex: the industry that provides development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, which is managed by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). The nuclear weapons production complex was built to provide support for the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which consisted of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. This capability is excessive for maintaining the current or projected nuclear arsenal, so there was no reason why Russia should maintain it. To maintain the capability to produce nuclear weapons and provide the nuclear arsenal with adequate maintenance, Russia had to downsize its nuclear complex.

Restructuring of the nuclear complex proved to be a difficult task, however, and only in June 1998 did the Russian government finally adopt a program that outlined the plan for the needed reform.[45] As part of this program, Minatom has closed serial weapon production lines at two of its four warhead production facilities: Arzamas-16 and Penza-19. By 2003 these facilities will also stop their work on nuclear warhead dismantlement. The program also called for significant reductions in the number of personnel that work on serial production facilities for warheads.[46] Although the

nuclear weapons production complex will still have excessive capability after implementation of the measures outlined in the 1998 program and other documents, the measures will be a major step toward providing a foundation for more efficient operation of the complex.

The nuclear test ban that Russia agreed to observe when it signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty imposes serious constraints on modernization and maintenance of nuclear weapons. To compensate for its inability to conduct nuclear explosions under the treaty, Russia is carrying out a program of so-called hydro-dynamic experiments at the Novaya Zemlya test site. In addition to this, the Novaya Zemlya test site is maintained in readiness to resume underground nuclear explosions should Russia decide to do so.

ConclusionThe measures that Russia has taken during the last several years to restructure its strategic forces and nuclear warhead production complex indicate that in about a decade it will reduce its nuclear forces to the level of approximately 1,000 strategic warheads. It is very unlikely that any upcoming arms control agreement could affect the current plans significantly, for Russia is planning to implement these reductions in any event. Besides, it seems very unlikely that the United States and Russia will reach any new arms control agreement any time soon.

If anything could force Russia to reconsider its plans, it would be the United States' deployment of a national missile defense system. Should the United States decide to proceed with deployment of such a system, which will require its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia may respond with a number of measures that could keep the number of weapons in its arsenal at a level higher than that currently projected. Among the options that Russia has in this regard are deployment of the Topol-M (SS-27) system with a multiple-warhead missile (rather than the currently planned single-warhead missile)[47] or development of a new multiple-warhead missile to replace the aging R-36M2s (SS-18s). Neither of these options, however, would be likely to raise the number of weapons in Russia's arsenal above the limit of 3,500 warheads set forth by the START II Treaty.

Although Russian opposition to the U.S. missile defense plans is currently very strong and the conflict over the plans shows no sign of getting any less tense, any decisions that Russia could make in response to a U.S. missile defense deployment would be limited by the same economic constraints that exist now. It is therefore in Russia's interest to avoid confrontation with the United States and concentrate on protecting its long-term capability to maintain a viable nuclear arsenal. All this means that despite serious disagreement with the United States on a number of arms control and broader political issues, Russia will try to reach a compromise on those issues, which might be possible if the United States is willing to cooperate.

Ultimately, Russia's success in downsizing and reforming its nuclear complex and strategic forces will depend primarily on its ability to find the resources necessary for a full-scale military reform and to manage these resources effectively. The signs of economic recovery that have appeared in Russia in the last two years present the country with a rare opportunity to transform its military. The new Russian leadership seems to understand that the ultimate goal of the reform should be the creation of a professional, well-trained, well-equipped army.[48] The next several years will show whether it is ready to take advantage of this opportunity.

[1] “O pervoocherednykh merakh po reformirovaniyu VS RF I sovershenstvovaniyu ikh struktury (On the First-Order Measures to Reform the Russian Armed Forces and to Improve Their

Structure)” Presidential Decree No. 725S, 16 July 1997.

[2] As another major measure, the decree downgraded the Ground Troops by transforming the High Command of thre Ground Troops to the main Directorate. This measure effectively demoted the ground troops to the status of a branch of the armed forces.

[3] Vyacheslav Terekhov, “Reforma (The Reform)”, Interfax-AiF, 24 November 1997.

[4] Ivan Safronov, “VVS i PVO nesut tyazhelyie poteri (Air Force and Air Defense Suffer heavy Casualties)”, Kommersant-Daily, 25 March 1998.

[5] Another Air Army of the Supreme High Command comprises military transport aviation. Valentin Rog, Aleksndr Drobyshevsky, “Improvizatsii ne bylo (There Has Been No Improvisation)”, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 15 december 2000.

[6] Interfax report, Segodnya, 12 August 1998.

[7] The document, called “Osnovy (kontseptiya) gosudarstvennoi politiki po voennomu stroitelstvu na period do 2005 goda (Basics (Concept) of the Sates Military Development Policy Until 2005)” was signed by Boris Yeltsin in August 1998 (Vadim Soloviyev, “President utverzhdayet plan voennoy reformy (President Approves the Plan for Military Reform)”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 August 1998).

[8] Main provisions of the concept were described in an earlier article by the Minister of Defense: Igor Sergeyev, “Programma voyennogo reformirovaniya (The Program for Military Reform)”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 September 1997.

[9] Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev officially unveiled this plan in October 1998 (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 October 1998).

[10] Oleg Odnokolenko, “Armiya razvalivayetsya deleniyem (The Army is Disintergation by Fission)”, Segodnya, 21 November 1998.

[11] Total cuts of all military forces will amount to 600,000 personell (Interfax, 9 November 2000).

[12] The current plan envisions that in 2006 the Strategic Rocket Forces will be turned over to the Air Force (Vadim Soloviyev, “Umozritelnyi rezultat (Imaginary Results)”, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 29 December 2000).

[13] Andrey Korbut, Sergey Sokut, “President povelel nachat reformu (President Ordered to Begin the Reform)”, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 24 November 2000.

[14] These documents included a Memorandum of Understanding that names Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as the successor states of the Soviet Union, and so-called demarcation agreement—agreed statements that specify which missile defense systems are considered non-strategic and therefore not limited by the ABM Treaty, and outline confidence-building measures realted to non-strategic missile defenses.

[15] This refers to a problem that resulted from the provisions of the START II treaty, that lifted restrictions on “downloading”, which is carrying out warhead reductions by simply reducing the number of warheads that is attributed to a launcher without destroying the warheads or

launchers. See Article III.2 of the START II Treaty.

[16] Among these measures is the provision that requires the United States and Russia to conclude a new arms reduction agreement by December 31, 2000. This agreement has to include specific provisions that would correct the most serious shortcomings of the START II treaty. If Russia and the United States fail to negotiate the new agreement by the end of 2003, the law will authorize the president to consider withdrawing from the treaty (Article IV of the ratification law).

[17] Federal Law No 56-FZ of May 4, 2000 “On Ratification of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”.

[18] Resolution of ratification passed by the U.S. Senate on January 26, 1996.

[19] Article IX of the ratification law. The documents listed in the article are the memorandum on succession, two agreed statements, and the agreement on confidence-building measures.

[20] According to the Soviet unilateral statement made on June 13, 1991, the Soviet Union would consider U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty as an extraordinary event that may jeopardize its national interests and prompt Soviet withrawal from the START I treaty.

[21] Transcript of President’s address to the Duma in connection with ratification of the START II treaty, Kommersant-Daily, 15 April 2000.

[22] The treaty was ratified by the Duma on 21 April 2000.

[23] “Vladimir Putin: Pauzy v yzdernom razoruzhenii ne dolzhno byt (Vladimir Putin: There Should Be No Pause in Nuclear Disarmament)”, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 14 November 2000.

[24] Evgeny Krutikov, “Doletit li yadernaya troika do 2010 goda? (Will the Nuclear Triad Survive Until 2010?)” Segodnya, 4 July 1998.

[25] The currently deployed UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) missiles will reach end of their lives in 2003–2005, the RT-23UTTH (SS-24) missiles will have to be withdrawn from service by 2002, the lat Topol (SS-25) missile systems will have to be decomissioned in 2008–2010 (Paul Podvig, “The Russian Strategi Forces: Uncertain Future”, Breakthroughs, Security Studies Program, MIT, Spring 1998, vol. VII, No. 1, pp. 11-21).

[26] Sergei Sokut, “Ministr posadil Topol (The Minister Planted a Topol)” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 25 December 1997.

[27] Ivan Safronov, Ilya Bulavinov “Boris Yeltsin podnyal yadernyi shchit (Boris Yeltsin Raised the Nuclear Shield)” Kommersant-Daily, 4 July 1998.

[28] Yuri Maslyukov, “Dogovor i sudba strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii (The Treaty and the Future of the Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces)” Izvestiya, 16 December 1998.

[29] The missile was known as R-39 Variant 2, Bark, or SS-NX-28.

[30] The R-39 (SS-N-20) missiles, deployed on these submarines, were approaching the end of their service lives and had to be eliminated. Project 941 (Typhoon) submarines were to be

equipped with a missile that was being developed as a follow-on to the R-39, so the cancellation of this program left these submarines with no missiles to be equipped with (Dmitri Litovkin, “Tayfuny derzht kurs na utilizatsiyu (Typhoos Are Heading Toward Dismantlement)” Yadernaya Bezopasnost, No. 31, December 1999).

[31] The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology was the head developer of Pioner (SS-20), Topol (SS-25), Topol-M (SS-27), and a number of other land-based missile systems.

[32] Viktor Litovkin, “Yuri Dolgoruki budet peredelan esche na stapele (Yuri Dolgoruki Will Be Redesigned While It Is Still In Dock), Izvestiya, 9 September 1998.

[33] Yuri Maslyukov, “Dogovor i sudba strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii (The Treaty and the Future of the Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces)” Izvestiya, 16 December 1998.

[34] Dmitri Litovkin, op. cit. There were no confirmation that the decision to resume the production of R-29RM missiles was made in July 1998. Most likely, it was made about a year later, in 1999, when it became clear that the development of the new SLBM is falling behind the schedule.

[35] Yuri Maslyukov, “Dogovor i sudba strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii (The Treaty and the Future of the Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces)” Izvestiya, 16 December 1998.

[36] Agentsvo Voyennykh Novostey, 14 December 1999. According to this report, there are two more mothballed Tu-160 aircraft at the Kazan Aviation Plant.

[37] Sergei Sokut, “Vzaimovygodnoye resheniye (Mutually Beneficial Solution)”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 July 1999.

[38] Ekaterina Kats “Poderzhannye ‘inomarki’ dlya minoborony (Used ‘Foreigners’ for the Ministry of Defense)”, Segodnya, 20 October 1999.

[39] Yuri Maslyukov, “Dogovor i sudba strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii (The Treaty and the Future of the Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces)” Izvestiya, 16 December 1998.

[40] Vladimir Morozov, “Vsevidyascheye oko Rossii (Russia’s All-Seeing Eye)”, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 14 April 2000.

[41] Ilshat Baichurin, “RLS v Baranovichakh: idut ispytaniya (Radar in Baranovichi: Trials are Under Way)”, Krasnaya zvezda, 20 January 1999; Denis Voroshilov, “Volga pregradit put’ raketam (Volga Will Block Incoming Missiles)”, Rossiya, 1 November 2000.

[42] Another important mission of the early warning network is to provide targeting information to the Moscow missile defense system.

[43] The systems reportedly include radar and laser sensors (Yuri Golotyuk “Orbitalnaya oborona rossii (Russia’s Orbital Defense)”, Izvestiya, 10 November 1999).

[44] The station, which is deployed on the territory of Tajikistan, began trial service on 19 December 1999 (Evgeni Shalnev, “Okno s vidom na kosmos (Window That Looks Into Space)”, Krasnaya zvezda, 3 October 2000).

[45] The program “On Restructuring and Conversion of the Nuclear Weapons Complex in

1998–2000” was part of a broader plan to restructure Russia’s defense industry (Oleg Bukharin, “Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure”, PU/CEES Report No. 323, Princeton University, May 2000).

[46] Bukharin, op. cit.

[47] Igor Korotchenko, “Yuri Solomonov: Topol-M sposoben preodolet perspectivnuyu PRO lyubogo gosudarstva (Yuri Solomonov: Topol-M Can Penetate Any Missile Defense System)”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 February 1999.

[48] Vitali Tretiakov, Tatiana Aldoshina, Mikhail Leontiev, “Armiya dolzhna byt’ professionalnoi (The Army Should Be Professional)”, excerpts from interview with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Nezavisimoye Voyennoe Obozreniye, 29 December 2000.