Patriot Quest

8/10/2019 Patriot Quest

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Matt Erickson

The Patriot Questto

Restore Our American Republic

Second Edition


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The Patriot QuesttoRestore OurAmerican Republic

Second Edition, released into the Public Domain

December 26, 2015

(The First Edition was released into the Public Domain on January 1, 2015)

Patriot Questmay be (printed &/or) distributed (as is) by anyone and may also be used in any

manner, in whole or in part, without compensation and without credit to the author (but ifmodified, then both the book title and authorship must be changed).

Patriot Questis available as a free electronic download at:

www.PatriotCorps.org

www.Scribd.com/Matt_Erickson_6

www.Archive.org

On the Cover: Original artwork before modification in Photoshop 1915 Poster: The Empire Needs Men! Original creator: Arthur Wardle.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, WWI Posters, ReproductionNo. LC-USZC4-10913. Public Domain.


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To my loving wife, Pam; for all her love and support.And also to my parents, Helen and the late Vinton Erickson;

for their strong values, steadfast integrity, unfailing honesty, and hard work.

Restoring Liberty and Justice, Once and For All

Vancouver, Washington

www.PatriotCorps.orgwww.Facebook.com/PatriotCorps.org


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The Patriot Quest

Second Edition

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. The Golden Rule ................................................................ 1

Chapter 2. Legal Tender Paper Currencies ......................................... 15The Legal Tender Cases; Passage Number One ............................. 19

The Legal Tender Cases; Passage Number Two ............................. 25

Chapter 3. In all Cases whatsoever ..................................................... 41

Chapter 4. The Bank of the United States .......................................... 57

Chapter 5. Arbitrary Government ...................................................... 61

The Legal Tender Cases; Passage Number Three ........................... 64

Chapter 6. Government By Deception Through Redefinition............ 69

Chapter 7. The Remedy ...................................................................... 77

Cohens v. Virginia; Passage Number One ...................................... 78

Cohens v. Virginia; Passage Number Two ...................................... 79

Cohens v. Virginia ; Passage Number Three .................................... 80

The 11th

Amendment ...................................................................... 81The Once and For All Amendment ................................................. 83

Chapter 8. In Conclusion ................................................................... 87


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1

Chapter 1. The Golden Rule

The Golden Rule of American Government, which Patriots disregard

to their peril, is that no one entrusted with the exercise of federal authorityis empowered to change the extent of that authority (only ratified

amendments change the Constitution [and only the States are empowered,

by Article V of the U.S. Constitution, to ratify amendments]).

Two crucial implications necessarily follow:

1. Since no federal action has therefore actually ever changed the

Constitution, the Constitution of original intent remains fullyintact, except as modified by the 27 Amendments which the States

have ratified to date.

2. Since the federal government cannot change its power, the nearly

unlimited discretion federal authorities have long-exercised must

therefore necessarily come from somewhere within their delegated

powers.

Properly understanding this rule and its implications allows Patriots to

ignore as irrelevant side-shows the idea of an ever-changing Constitution

(outside of ratified amendments) so efforts may instead be concentrated on

discovering exactly howone of the federal governments delegated powers

has yet allowed the tyranny which is becoming increasingly evident the

chance it needed to ever gain an improper foothold in the first place.

Although proponents of strict construction of the Constitution oftenassert that their opponents ignore or reinterpret the Constitution at will

(yet with impunity), Patriot Quest shows in reality there is only strict

construction of the Constitution, and those who act contrary to the spirit

of the Constitution are, surprisingly, the ones who necessarily hold its letter

up to its strictest terms.

But Patriots havent yet learned that important lesson, instead they are

hopelessly stuck in a quagmire based upon mistaken assumptions that federalauthorities are able to change, bend, or ignore the Constitution without

penalty (which explains why Patriots fail in their efforts because they

wholly-misunderstand their opponents actions, methods, and successes).


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3

The examination herein of the courts justification of legal tender paper

currencies actually provides Patriots the necessary blueprint to follow in

other instances also, because even though the particulars may vary between

seemingly-different issues, the various paths toward tyranny all follow thesame methodology.

The vast multitude of seemingly-different issues, of government acting

without apparent restriction in most any field of action, are therefore really

but many different manifestations of a much deeper, single cause of

government being able to act in all cases whatsoever.

The decided benefit to Patriots of a single cause of tyranny is that oneneednt otherwise chase the multitude of irrelevant symptoms when the

true cause of our seemingly-separate problems is properly understood and

dealt with once and for all.

Neither is there any need to propose a large number of different

constitutional amendments to address immaterial symptoms (and the

proper barometer for needed change to our beloved Constitution is

decidedly notwhatever is simply better than our current condition toaccept things as they currently appear as our indicator for needed

constitutional change is to admit defeat, discard greatness and settle for

mere mediocrity).

Neither can addressing various symptoms with constitutional

amendments even correct our ills; we must dig deeper and address the

fundamental problem facing America in order to succeed.2

2. Looking at a perennial favorite of proposed amendments a BalancedBudget Amendment is helpful, to show an example.

This amendment is supposedly-needed because conservatives havent beenable to properly restrain their opponents to the Constitutions mandates andlimitations and thus the federal government gets involved in many issues where ithas no legitimate business.

Doing more things naturally leads to bigger government, which of coursespends more money, even more than the vast sums government has coming in.

From the viewpoint of a common citizen who must live within a budget,conservatives propose capping government expenditures to government income.


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4 Chapter 1. The Golden Rule

Patriot Quest was written following the 2014 mid-term elections,

meaning that the 2016 Presidential election season was just getting

underway.

History will undoubtedly prove that the 2016 Presidential election

wasnt any cheaper than either the 2012 or 2008 elections, where two

billion dollars was ultimately spent in each of those election seasons just to

choose a President.

An optimistic view of such unfathomable expenditures seeking to win

the coveted four-year position which pays but $400,000 per year would be

that it provides ample evidence of an active and engaged citizenry.A more cynical view holds such extravagance as reciprocal back-

scratching, as those persons who are willing and able attempt to buy the

best government money can, in hopes of ensuring a fabulous return on

their investment.

(2. contd). While this may work for individuals, there is little evidence thiswould stop any government which can simply raise taxes, only now under anexpress constitutional mandate that expense cannot exceed income (or, statedfrom a progressives viewpoint, income must now constitutionally equal orexceed expense [and since conservatives didnt actually ever learn how to capexpenses only to properly-enforced constitutional restraints {but insteadexpediently sought to cap expenses only to income} more taxes must now beraised to equal or exceed that greater expense which never ceased]).

Not everything government can somehow afford is proper! The mere abilityto pay for a thing is not a valid constitutional parameter. And capped limitsoffer no protection whatsoever for prioritizing expenditures to ensure thatgovernment is spending money on things it should (over things it shouldnt).

If conservatives cannot now enforce the Constitution, what makes them thinkan amendment which will modify the Constitution will be followed as theyoriginally envisioned?

It is first absolutely necessary to learn precisely how the Constitution hasseemingly been subverted and once one learns that, one will see that a widenumber of amendments are not only unnecessary, but even harmful.


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This author wouldnt necessarily argue against either position, yet offers

that vast federal election expenditures ultimately rest upon the pervasive

but false view of a winner-take-all form of politics whereby the winner is

supposedly able to steer the government ship in most any direction desiredover the next four years (at least if Congress &/or the courts can be swayed).

While it is readily understandable why proponents of a progressive

form of government would subscribe to such a view (as it supports a

pliable Constitution, allowing the Constitution to be bent to any

particular way of thinking), why on earth would limited government

advocates ever accept such nonsense?

The short answer is because we advocates of limited government under

strict construction of the whole Constitution really have no clue as to what

is actually going on and nothing better comes to mind.

Thus, out of sheer desperation in attempt to Do Something and hope

it sticks, Patriots otherwise fighting for limited government sadly accept

offered parameters which ensure they will ultimately fail, as ever-increasing

numbers of Americans line up for a feeding frenzy at the governmenttrough, overpowering all uninformed opposition which stands in their way.

But voting and elections cannot be the end-all in American

government, even though that is the only maxim upon which all sides now

agree (that no matter which way one votes, just make sure one votes).3

3. The drive to push voting and elections front-and-center has been on-going for

many generations and is now well-ingrained. For example, 10 constitutionalamendments deal either with voting and/or federal elections:

Amendment Year ratified Topic

12th 1804 President and Vice-President15th 1870 Voting w/o consideration of Race or Color17th 1913 Direct Election of Senators19th 1920 Voting w/o consideration of Sex20th 1933 Presidential/Congressional Terms

22nd 1951 Presidentnot over two terms23rd 1961 Electors for D.C. act as if it were a State24th 1964 Poll Taxes forbidden25th 1967 Presidential Succession26th 1971 Age (18-year olds may vote)


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It is necessary to graft a new branch of a different type of tree into the

oak tree to ever hope to produce a different type of fruit.

The amendment process is the Constitutions delineated process by

which the tree of government is allowed to be grafted in effort to produce adifferent kind of fruit. And that amendment process is dictated by Article

V of that Constitution.

The crucial point to take away from Article V is that even though

Congress may propose amendments to the U.S. Constitution, only the

States may ratifythem: and neither the President of the United States nor

the courts have any role in either proposing or ratifying amendments.5

As no other article, section or clause of the Constitution allows changes

by any other process, the obvious implication from Article V is that not

only may no President ever steer government in a new direction which is

not already allowed by the Constitution, but neither may Congress nor the

courts! No branch of the federal government individually or even in

concert with other branches may ever actually changethe Constitution.

Those who are delegated federal authority within the Constitution (theCongress, the President, andthe courts [9]) are powerless to change it; they

only appear to change it by deception exercised over a populace not

understanding their clever and devious methods used to circumvent the

spirit of the Constitution.

(4. contd). Justice will not develop from tyranny simply because variousindividuals have been changed (and there is no need to rebuild government

from its charter). It is only necessary to learn howthat charter has been largelysubverted and then make one minor clarification to eliminate the improper reignof arbitrary government in America.

5. At the time of publication, the Senate website admits to 11,623 proposedamendments since 1789, out of which only 27 have been ratified by the States.

www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/three_column_table/measures_proposed_to_amend_constitution.htm

Obviously, the ability of Congress to propose Amendments hardly ensuresratification (about two ratifications for every 1,000attempts). Although all 27ratified Amendments have all been proposed by Congress, the States may evenbypass Congress and call for a Convention of the States for proposingamendments directly (without direct discretionary action by Congress).


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9

The States of Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Maine, Hawaii, and

Idaho are each allowed two Representatives under the 2010 census, and

therefore now have four electoral votes each, counting an elector also for

each of their two Senators.

And the States of Nebraska and West Virginia each have three

Representatives under the 2010 census, and therefore are now allowed five

electoral votes each.

Under the 2010 census and under constitutionally-authorized

parameters for determining electors, the single State of California will again

have 55 electoral votes for the 2016 presidential election, which is greaterthan the combined total of the 14 least-populated States which have but 51

electoral votesaltogether.7

6. The 23rd Amendment which empowers Congress to direct theappointment of a number of electors for the District of Columbia (for electing the

President and Vice President) as if it were a State is here ignored, since theDistrict of Columbia is not a State and therefore cannot ratify Amendments.

7. This fact is not in any way meant to endorse the National Popular Votemovement, which would help throw presidential elections to the majormetropolitan population centers and make States functionally less relevant.


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But understanding that the single, most-populated State in the Union

has more political pull in determining the outcome of the Presidential race

than the 14 least-populated States helps us understand true limitations on

federal authority.

However, before getting to that vital point, it is necessary to look

further into Article V of the U.S. Constitution, at the amendment process

which is therein delineated.

Article V clearly dictates that it takes a three-fourths majority of all the

States of the Union to ratify proposed amendments.

With 50 States currently in the Union, it therefore now takes 38 States

to ratify a proposed amendment.8

Therefore, any 13 States may prohibit ratification of any proposed

amendment (given 50 States), even the 13 least-populated States!

Thus certainly the 14 least-populated States which may yet be outvoted

in a Presidential election by only the single most-populated State in the

Union are nevertheless fully-empowered on their own to forever prohibit

ratification of any proposed amendment (given 50 States), even if all the

other 35 remaining States of the Union voted to ratify the proposed

amendment along with the State of California!

The take-home message of absolute importance shown by a simple

comparison of the Electoral College and the amendment process is that it

would be wholly absurd for the Constitutions framers to have requiredsuch a difficult amendment process (remember, only 27 amendments have

been ratified out of some 11,623 proposals) if the President could simply

do whatever he (or she) pleased, thereby defeating the all-important

amendment process!

Does any modern-day American reallybelieve that the framers of our

Constitution were that nave, that simple-minded, that ignorant?

8. 37 out of 50 States amounts only to 74%, which falls short of the required75%.


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A compare and contrast of Article II and Article V of the Constitution,

of the Electoral College and the amendment process, actually provides

strong evidence that it is todays Patriots who have failed to understand

how we have been cleverly deceived, because of our own constitutionalignorance (and not the framers).

While the Electoral College helps show the President is certainly

powerless to change the Constitution, the amendment process is actually

sufficient on its own to prove that only the States are empowered to

collectively change the powers of the federal government.

The federal government is wholly unable to change its own powers;therefore the Constitution has neveractually been changed byany federal

action(even supreme Court rulings)! 9

Since federal action is powerless to actually change the Constitution,

then even 150 years of errant federal action at odds with the spirit of the

Constitution are essentially immaterial and may be swept away with a

proper understanding of how omnipotent government supporters have

been successful to date !

Patriots do not have to attempt to pick at only the outer fringes of

tyranny during the election season to restore liberty in piecemeal fashion

(and yet sadly fall short even of such basic goals).

Excessive government action may be reversedwith the implementation

of one simple restorative amendment to clarify a current power; but

Patriots must first learn howgovernment has been effectively able to do asit pleases (which is the explicit purpose of Patriot Quest).10

9. The 11thAmendment, ratified in 1795, stands as the first clear example thatthe Constitution is what three-fourths of the Statessay it is, not (a majority of) thesupreme Court.

The 11th Amendment, ratified by States, over-turned the supreme Courts1793 ruling in Chisholm v. Georgia(2 U.S. 419) which had set aside sovereignState immunity because of strict construction of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 ofthe Constitution. The 11thAmendment provided updated instruction upon howthe Constitution must thereafter be construed in such matters (see Chapter 7herein for further discussion on this amendment).


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That errant federal actions mustnecessarily rest on powers which have

already been delegated is an important and vital clue to properly-narrow

the field of search to discover howgovernment has long been able to do as

it pleases with impunity.

It should be pointed out if government was actually able to change its

own power, then it would be of great concern who was elected or

appointed to their positions, since these people would be able to determine

the extent of their own power at their pleasure (absolute tyranny).

Yet if government may change its own power, then a written

Constitution is essentially irrelevant, at least over the long-term. But it isthat Constitution alone which creates the Congress and the U.S.

Government and gives them their powers in the first place.

In this absurd form of alternative American government which can be

created but cannot be constrained, it would be of great importance

therefore to elect angels and not the devils we seem to always get or

eventually produce.

But Madisons observations in The Federalist#51 are here pertinent:

If men were angels, no government would benecessary. If angels were to govern men, neither externalnor internal controls on government would be necessary

Knowing men are not angels and knowing that we are neither governed

by them, the framers of our Constitution nevertheless proceeded to chain

and bind government so they would create a nation of laws rather than of

men.

But how did they do it? James Madison provides the answer,

continuing a bit later (italics added):

10. The enactment of a new amendment is not even absolutely necessary, it is

merely a prudent safety mechanism to assure that the misused power is notagain misused (but a wide-spread understanding of governments clever tacticsshould actually assure that on its own).


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In the compound republic of America, the powersurrendered by the people is first divided between twodistinct governments, and then the portion allotted to eachsubdivided among distinct and separate departments.

Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.The different governments will control each other...

Everything that matters in the restoration of political and fiscal sanity

in this lost land naturally flows from this most basic of American governing

principles, of a division of power between federal and State governments,

with the different governments controlling each other.

The fundamental division of government power in America betweenfederal and State authorities, with the one controlling the other, is

progressive governments worst enemy and the Patriots saving grace.

With the federal government therefore powerless to expand its own

authority, Patriots may thus safely ignore all assertions to the contrary

which simply waste precious timeand divert valuable resources.

Patriots are thus freed to delve deeply into the governments delegated

powers to learn how one of them could ever be cunningly used to otherwise

allow the tyranny which is becoming increasingly evident the chance it

needed to ever gain an improper foothold in the first place.

To regain lost liberty and limited government under strict construction

of the whole Constitution, Patriots must begin to question apparent truths

which are simply nottrue, for false assumptions do not equal truth.

Tragically, Patriots have failed to question long-standing false beliefsand mistaken assumptions, even to the point of believing that words no

longer have any real meaning, simply because they fail to comprehend how

things have digressed so far.


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Like the universal belief in a flat earth was finally overcome ever-so-

slowly only by mounting evidence first believed only by the most-

inquisitive, belief in an omnipotent federal government will also be

overcome (only now with the decentralized Internet, theres no reason

things must proceed slowly).

Since concrete examples are far easier to understand than mere

abstractions, it is proper to look into an actual example to see howproponents of tyranny have long been able to do pretty much as they

pleased despite the Constitutions express mandates otherwise.


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Chapter 2. Legal Tender Paper Currencies

It is of great importance to both the (productive) rich and poor alike to

be able to rely upon sound money which maintains well its store of valueover time and distance.

Since the rich have so much money, it is important that they properly

safeguard it; because the poor have so little money, it is important to them

that every penny really count sound money is thus the safe-haven of

both groups and to every productive person in between.

The greatest beneficiaries of paper currencies are those who control itsissuance who earn compound interest despite negligible cost, even as new

money loaned into existence dilutes the purchasing power of all previously-

issued money (robbing all who have saved money of a portion of their

wealth).

Those who spend first that new money gain additional benefit as they

are able to buy goods and services at prices which dont yet take into

account an influx of new money.

Those with the least political pull suffer the largest losses as prices have

been adjusted to reflect the modified financial realities by the time they are

able to spend any new money which has finally filtered down to them

(typically in the form of higher wages [which usually lag behind]).

Of course, legal tender paper currencies also provide the government

which extensively borrows it a great deal of flexibility; thus aidinggovernment expansion beyond what it could otherwise afford without a

paper currency.

Since government ultimately borrows money only to spend it, a whole

host of private companies are also motivated by ample government

borrowing, providing a strong feedback mechanism in the private industry

supporting the status quo.

Arguably in no other example has it been to (productive) Americas

detriment than the removal of gold and silver coin from our money, to be

substituted instead with paper.


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The American people throughout the country buy-and-sell in the paper

dollar; they earn wages, salaries and profits in that currency; much of their

liquid wealth is directly stored in that form of money or is held in various

accounts denominated in such terms.

With so much of Americas time and energy devoted to earning,

spending and attempting to save this form of money, it is vital to better-

understand the transition of American legal tender money from only gold

and silver coin over to a paper form which continuously robs all those

people who tolerate its use.

Even the most ardent proponents of legal tender paper currency mustreadily admit that all legal tender monetary legislation enacted by Congress

during the first 70 years of government under the U.S. Constitution dealt

only with gold and silver coin.

It was not until a February 25, 1862 legislative Act that Congress issued

the first paper currency ever declared a legal tender, the Civil War

Greenbacks.1 That currency was therein declared a legal tender for all

debts, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt.

Americas legal tender monetary history under the Constitution (of

being at first only gold and silver coin before paper was creatively added

into the mix [and later effectually ending only with paper as gold and then

silver coin were effectively removed from circulation]) provides Patriots

interested in restoring America to greatness with a interesting case study to

examine to see what may be discovered.

1. Vol. 12, Statutes at Large, Page 345.

See also: Monetary Laws of the United States, Vol. II, Appendix J, Page506, Matt Erickson, 2012. www.PatriotCorps.org.


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20 Chapter 2. Legal Tender Paper Currencies

Since Patriot Questis written from a strict-constructionists viewpoint,

the courts answer in the next sentence is of great interest to us:

This is a question foreign to the subject before us. 6

By the courts surprising answer to their own question, monetary

purists must realize that if they ask such questions regarding this particular

court case, then they are wholly on the wrongpage and understand nothing

about what or how the court is actually ruling.

The court thankfully for those of us who are a little dense

continued further, saying:

The legal tender acts do not attempt to make paper astandard of value.

We do not rest their validity upon the assertion that theiremission is coinage, or any regulation of the value of money;nor do we assert that Congress may make anything whichhas no value money.7

By these crucial admissions, The Legal Tender CasesCourt the first

supreme Court case to ever uphold the legal tender nature of papercurrency in the case before them nevertheless expressly admitted that

even the paper currency they were upholding as legal tender:

1. is not coinage;

2. is not money;

3. is not emitted as a regulation of the value of money; and

4. does not even have inherent value.

In case anyone doubts such conclusions, the court next pointedly

declared:

It is, then, a mistake to regard the legal tender acts aseither fixing a standard of value or regulating money values,or making that money which has no intrinsic value. 8

6. Ibid. (Italics added).

7. Ibid. (Italics added).

8. Ibid., Page 553 (Italics added).


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And, of course, the first legal tender government I.O.U.s did promise

to later pay coined money to pay off that debt security.14

Looking further into the last sentence of the first passage of

examination (of what the Court did not do), we again read:

What we do assert is, that Congress haspowerto enactthat the governments promises to pay money shall be, forthe time being, equivalent in value to the representativevalue determined by the coinage acts, or to multiplesthereof. 17

It is now important to examine the word power found within this

sentence. This is because the Constitution is nothing if not for thedelegation of power (from the State governments which ceded specified

powers over to the Congress and U.S. Government).

It is proper for the court to discuss thepowerof Congress and the U.S.

Government in their ruling; after all, one will note that our U.S.

Constitution expressly discusses power repeatedly.

14. The single question which the 1884 legal tender case of Juilliard v.Greenmansought to answer was:

whether notes of the United States, issued in time of war, underacts of Congress declaring them to be a legal tender in payment ofprivate debts, and afterwards in time of peace redeemed and paid ingold coin at the Treasury, and then reissued under the act of 1878,can, under the Constitution of the United States, be a legal tender inpayment of such debts. 15

15. Juilliard v. Greenman,110 U.S. 421 @ 437 - 438, 1884. Italics added.

That the supreme Court acknowledged in this 1884 case that the (1862-era)legal tender notes had actually been redeemed and paid in gold coin at theTreasury provides confirmation that these I.O.U.s were ultimately paid aspromised, in gold coin.16

16. See: the public domain books Dollars and nonCents (beginning at page71) and Monetary Laws of the United States, Volume I (beginning at page 234),

both by Matt Erickson, at www.PatriotCorps.org, www.Archive.org, orwww.Scribd.com/matt_erickson_6 for further discussion of the important legaltender case of Juilliard v. Greenmanwhich will not be herein further discusseddue to brevity concerns.

17. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 @ 553 (1871). Italics added.


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For example, Article III, Section 1 specifically invests The judicial

ow r of the United States:

in one supreme Court and such inferior Courts as the

Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

Article II(Section 1, Clause 1) similarly vests The executive ow r

in a President of the United States of America, who shall hold his office

for a term of four years.

Article I(Section 1), however, is worded somewhat differently (but yet

along the same lines), stating that:

All legislative ow rsherein granted shall be vested ina Congress of the United States

A simple compare and contrast between Articles II and III with Article

I shows the similarity of discussion (discussing the delegation of

government authority to the three branches of government), yet the clear

divergence in Article I must be properly noted and understood.

While the whole of the judicial power and the whole of the executivepower are vested within the respective judicial and executive branches of

the U.S. Government, only the specific legislative powers which were

herein granted were vested with the Congress of the United States.

It is vital to note that the whole of the legislative power power

worded singularly was not ever delegated to Congress, but only the

specific individual legislative powers (powers worded in plural formwith an added s) which were therein enumerated within the written

Constitution were delegated to and vested in the Congress.

Since only the specific legislative powers which were therein

enumerated were actually vested in a Congress of the United States, all

other legislative powers not therein delegated were retained by the States

which ratified the Constitution under terms delineated in Article VII

(except those legislative powers retained by the people, which were notdelegated to any American government [as later specifically expounded

upon in the 10thAmendment {ratified in 1791}]).


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To specifically understand howthe supreme Court was able to remark

that members of Congress have the power (to enact) that the governments

promises to pay money are equivalent in value to value which had

heretofore been determined only by the coinage acts, one must understandthe criminal jurisdiction of the United States as expressly detailed within

the U.S. Constitution, which includes:

1. Treason(via Article III, Section 3, Clauses 1 & 2);

2. Counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United

States (via Article I, Section 8, Clause 6); and

3. Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas and offensesagainst the Law of Nations (via Article I, Section 8, Clause 10).18

Although The Legal Tender Caseshad nothing to do with any alleged

crime (including counterfeiting, treason, or even bribery, etc.), it is proper

for us to examine the federal governments express criminal authority under

the Constitution because that is the specific example The Legal Tender

Cases Court used to actually show how they upheld Congress as having the

power to issue legal tender paper currencies.

The Legal Tender Cases; Passage Number Two

The Patriot Quest will now transition over to an examination of the

second passage in The Legal Tender Cases, to learn what that Court

actually relied upon to rule as they did.

18. Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 also informs us that impeachment is a crime,but Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 advises us that Judgment in Cases ofImpeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, anddisqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under theUnited States.

These and other impeachment clauses listed below allow sufficient federaljurisdiction for a wide variety of State or federal crimes only for federal political

judgment (while not precluding separate judicial Indictment, Trial, Judgmentand Punishment, according to Law, [even if that law and judicial proceedingsotherwise happen to be found under State criminal jurisdiction]).

See also: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5; Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6; andArticle II, Section 4.


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One will again find all of the following quotes within one (even longer)

paragraph (but they will again be looked at individually for easier

examination).

In The Legal Tender Cases, the supreme Court correctly stated that

Treason, Counterfeiting, Piracy, and Impeachments are, in the

Constitution:

the extent of power to punish crime expresslyconferred. 19

Next the court also correctly commented that:

It might be argued that the expression of these limitedpowers implies an exclusion of all other subjects of criminallegislation. 20

Obviously, in a government of delegated powers, all actions in excess of

delegated powers (except those powers necessarily and properly incident to

the implementation of the delegated powers) are necessarily retained by the

original delegating body (bodies).21

By these comments, the court again directly acknowledges the strict

constructionists argument that a government of delegated powers does not

have inherentpowers; that a government of delegated powers may not do

things other than as delegated (except for those things necessarily and

properly incident to the implementation of the enumerated powers).

The court next narrowed that general line of thought down to the

specific case before them, writing:Such is the argument in the present cases.

It is said because Congress is authorized to coin moneyand regulate its value it cannot declare anything other thangold and silver to be money and make it a legal tender. 22

19. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 @ 535 - 536 (1871).

20. Ibid., Page 536.

21. See: Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the U.S. Constitution and the 10 thAmendment.

22. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 @ 536 (1871).


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27

The court thus again directly acknowledges the strict constructionists

argument, here regarding legal tender money of any thing other than

gold and silver coin; that since Congress is authorized to coin money and

especially regulate its value that Congress cannot declare anything otherthan gold and silver to be money and make it a legal tender.23

But look at how the court responded to that wholly-reasonable

assertion in the very next sentence in this passage, easily the most important

sentence within the whole ruling, which response was worded:

Yet Congress, by the act of April 30, 1790, entitled Anact more effectually to provide for the punishment of certaincrimes against the United States, and the supplementaryact of March 3d, 1825, defined and provided for thepunishment of a large class of crimes other than thosementioned in the Constitution, and some of the punishmentsprescribed are manifestly not in aid of any single substantivepower. 24

To better-understand the whole second passage of examination and

thereby the whole ruling and therefore the whole actual basis ofarbitrary omnipotent action by American government it is helpful to

delete out as many of the less-important words of this sentence as possible.

23. A regulated value absolutely necessitates determinable, objectivestandards whileprecludingarbitrary measure.

Of course, the Article I, Section 8, Clause 6 power of Congress To provide

for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the UnitedStates and also the Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 passage that No Stateshallcoin Money, emit Bills of Credit; (or) make any Thing but gold and silverCoins a Tender in Payment of Debts also play significant factors in the strictconstructionists argument against a legal tender of anything other than gold andsilver coin.

See the public domain books Dollars and nonCents and Monetary Laws,both by Matt Erickson, at www.PatriotCorps.org, www.Archive.org or

www.Scribd.com/matt_erickson_6for further support of the argument for a legaltender of only gold and silver coin for the whole U.S. of A.

24. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 @ 536 (1871).


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Although the title of the 1790 Act is important to be able to find the

correct legislative Act for further examination, once one finds it, one may

thereafter safely ignore the title temporarily (and the 1825 supplement).

Thus, deleting out less-important words, the following words remain:

Yet Congress, by the act of April 30, 1790defined andprovided for the punishment of a large class of crimes otherthan those mentioned in the Constitution, and some of thepunishments prescribed are manifestly not in aid of anysingle substantive power. 25

To best understand the courts deft reference to the actual power the

Congress could actually use which would allow the supreme Court touphold the issuance of legal tender paper currencies given the Constitution

of delegated powers which didnt reach to bills of credit, it helps to restate

this passage from the courts ruling in an easier-to-understand form:

1. First, the court began their admission by correctly acknowledging

that Treason, Counterfeiting, Piracy, and Impeachments are the

extent of power to punish crime expressly conferred (within the

Constitution).

2. The court next admitted the normal principle of a government of

expressly-delegated powers, that It might be argued that the

expression of these limited powers implies an exclusion of all other

subjects of criminal legislation.

3. The court then brought the general discussion of a government of

delegated powers to the specific case before the court, repeating thestrict-constructionists argument that Congress cannot declare

anything other than gold and silver to be money and make it a legal

tender.

4. But (never-mind otherwise valid arguments normally associated

with a government of expressly-delegated powers [both general and

specific to this case]) that Congress by the act of April 30, 1790nevertheless defined and provided for the punishment of a large

class of crimes other than those mentioned in the Constitution

even though some of the punishments prescribed therein were

manifestly not in aid of any single substantive or named power.


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29

The Legal Tender CasesCourt thus points out the actual historical fact

that even considering the general rule for a government of expressly-

delegated powers, Congress had earlier defined and provided for the

punishment of a large class of crimes other than those mentioned in theConstitution and no one at that time had cried foul.

But notice how the court phrased the most important words found of

this paragraph; that the 1790 and 1825 crime Acts defined and provided

for the punishment of a large class of crimes other than those (crimes)

mentionedin the Constitution. 26

This precisely-worded phrase is our first clue that this 1871 courtwasnt perhaps being completely forthright in their ruling.27

Neither is this first instance of strict attention to detail the only one;

this same court elsewhere also stated that those 1790 and 1825 crime Acts

defined and provided for the punishment of a large class of crimes other

thanthose crimes which had direct reference in the Constitution.28

The Legal Tender Cases reiterated for a third time that the 1790 and

1825 crime Acts defined and provided for the punishment of a large class

of crimes other than the criminal jurisdiction which was expressly

conferred in the Constitution.29

With three separate examples of precisely-worded phrases dealing with

the same (otherwise irrelevant) subject in this case, it becomes increasingly

evident that The Legal Tender CasesCourt was being very careful when it

chose its words (to imply something without actually stating it).

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. (italics added).

27. While strict attention to the proper delegation of authority is whollyappropriate and common in those who strive toward and practice limitedgovernment, beware of what comes next when those who constantly yearn for

more government power start paying such particular care to their actualdelegated authority (for they will surely next be pushing those limits).

28. Ibid., Page545 (italics added).

29. Ibid.,Page536 (italics added).


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That the court uses the phrases mentioned in the Constitution,

reference(d) in the Constitution and which discussed the criminal

jurisdiction which was expressly conferred in the Constitution, one

begins to see clever legal maneuverings being implemented to make itappear and perhaps even imply that at least some of the crimes covered in

the 1790 and 1825 crime Acts couldnt find direct constitutional support

(without actually ever legally stating such a false assertion).

But it should be readily apparent that if the Constitution otherwise

provided for alternate criminal jurisdiction within its clauses even without

specific mention, explicit reference or the express conferring of such power,

that these other criminal punishments could stillfind direct constitutionalsupport (without making the court wrong [and without ever resorting to

any type of creative interpretation of the Constitution]).30

By such precisely-worded phrases, one begins to understand the

authors assertion in Chapter 1 that proponents of a progressive, all-

powerful government necessarily hold the Constitution up to its strictest

terms (all while they brilliantly appear to otherwise ignore its mandates [forone is thus witnessing truly evil masters of the profession at work]). But

careful examination of their tactics under the bright light of full disclosure

shows that they necessarily take great and even monumental pains to ensure

that one clause of the Constitution held to it strictest terms supports

their actions.31

It is now necessary to examine the April 30, 1790 crime Act to see if all

of its sections can nevertheless find proper constitutional support, even ifthere happens to be a large class of crimes therein listed which wasnt

expressly mentioned, referenced or where the criminal jurisdiction therefore

wasnt directly conferred in the Constitution.

30. Again, when the roles of the proponents and opponents of omnipotentgovernment action seem to be reversed (one using words and phrases more

commonly attributed to the other), pay special attention to whatever comes next,for it surely will be important.

31. Without such ultra-precision, proponents of omnipotent government powercould not actually ever hope to get away with what they have.


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31

Upon examining Sections 1, 2, 23, 24, 29, 30, and 32 of the 1790

crime Act, one will find the discussion regarding Treason, which of course

finds direct support in Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution.32

Section 14 also deals with Counterfeiting (the securities of the United

States), which also finds express constitutional support.33

Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16 and 28 deal with Piracy, which again

finds explicit support within the Constitution.34

The many sections of the 1790 crime Act which cover treason,

counterfeiting and piracy all find direct mention and direct reference

within the Constitution, and the criminal jurisdiction for those crimes areall directly conferred within the Constitution (thus those particular sections

of the 1790 Act may be ignored).

But then one comes across sections such as Section 3of the 1790 crime

Act, which declares:

Section 3: That if any person or persons shall, withinany fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other placeor district of the country, under the sole and exclusive

jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilfulmurder, such person or persons on being thereof convictedshall suffer death. 35

32. 1790, April 30; Chapter 9 (1 Stat. 112@113-119)

See also: Monetary Laws, Volume II, Appendix K, Pages 590 - 595. 2012.www.PatriotCorps.org

33. Ibid. SeeArticle I, Section 8, Clause 6.

The first coinage act wasnt until 1792; thus there wasnt any mention ofcounterfeiting the current coin of the United States within the 1790 Act.

34. Ibid.SeeArticle I, Section 8, Clause 10.

35. 1790, April 30; Chapter 9, Section 3. (1 Stat. 112@113).

See also: Monetary Laws, Volume II, Appendix K, Page 590. 2012.www.PatriotCorps.org


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Since the crime of wilful murderwhich is found in Section 3 of the

1790 Act wasnt expressly mentioned or directly referenced in the

Constitution, nor was the jurisdiction for punishment of that specific crime

otherwise directly conferredin the Constitution, the courts comments areobviously not wrong i.e., they are not false. There is at least one crime

listed in the 1790 Act which fits the courts stated parameters.

The same goes for Section 7, which is worded:

That if any person or persons shall within any fort,arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or other place or district of thecountry, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United

States, commit the crime of manslaughter, and shall be thereofconvicted, such person or persons shall be imprisoned notexceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousanddollars. 36

It is also true that nowhere in the Constitution is there any express

mention of the power of Congress to punish the crime of manslaughter;

thus there are at least two crimes listed in the 1790 Act which fit the courts

stated parameters.Numerous other sections of the 1790 Act follow the same rules of

Sections 3 and 7, but add nothing further to our point; this author

therefore readily admits there is a large class of crimes listed within the

1790 Act (and also the 1825 Act) which fit the courts stated parameters

and thus the court is clearly correct on their literal legal point.

But just because the courts actual comments are not literally false

doesnt necessarily mean that they were actually wholly and completely

true, that they contained the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

While the court was correct with what they legally stated, their

inference however is utterly false(that a large class of crimes found in the

1790 [and 1835] crime Act[s] couldnt find actual constitutional support

but that Congress could nevertheless enact those laws).

36. 1790, April 30; Chapter 9, Section 7. (1 Stat. 112@113).

See also: Monetary Laws, Volume II, Appendix K, Page 591. 2012.www.PatriotCorps.org.


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33

To properly understand the (1790 and 1825) crime Acts and The Legal

Tender CasesCourt, it is absolutely mandatory to begin by pointing out

that this large class of crimes which were not mentioned in the

Constitution, which were not directly referenced in the Constitution, orwhere the jurisdiction for this class of crimes was not expresslyconferredin

the Constitution actually all dealt with crimes occurring:

within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or otherplace or district of the country, under the sole and exclusive

jurisdiction of the United States. 37

It is therefore vital to learn more about this phrase, to find if it is

supported constitutionally.

Consistent advocates of strict construction of the U.S. Constitution

should be well-versed with its words. If they are, then the phrase fort,

arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or other place or district of the country,

under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States should

already be readily familiar, because such words and concepts are expressly

discussed withinArticle I, Section 8, Clause 17of the Constitution which

reads:

Congress shall have PowerTo exercise exclusiveLegislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (notexceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession ofparticular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, becomethe Seat of the Government of the United States, and toexercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the

Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Sameshall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.

This clause, of course, authorizes a unique federal district the

government seat the District of Columbia.

37. Ibid.


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The seventeenth clause of the eighth section of the first article of the

U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to exercise exclusive legislation in

all Cases whatsoever in the district which shall become the seat of

government of the United States and to exercise like Authority over allplaces purchased with the consent of the legislature of the State in which

the same shall be, for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-

Yards, and other needful Buildings.

Importantly for our explicit purposes here, it is vital to realize that the

express wording (that Congress may exercise exclusive legislation) in all

Cases whatsoever readily acknowledges the power of Congress to enact

both civil and criminal legislation in the government seat and in forts,magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful buildings; such that the

wording in all Caseswhatsoever therefore necessarily include cases both

civil and criminal in nature.


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35

Thus the Constitution fully delegates to Congress the power to provide

for the punishment of crimes committed within the District of Columbia,

and also in forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful

buildings (which were ceded to the federal government with the consent ofthe respective State legislatures).

That crimes committed within exclusive legislative lands arent

specifically named within the Constitution isnt relevant to the actual grant

of criminal jurisdiction therein.

Even after only a brief discussion, it should be becoming patently

obvious that The Legal Tender Cases Court nevertheless sought to takegreat advantage of the inherent differences between the named crimes

which are federal crimes wherever they happen to occur in the United

States and exclusive legislation jurisdiction crimes which are federal crimes

only when committed within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or

other place or district of the country, under the sole and exclusive

jurisdiction of the United States.38

The Legal Tender Cases Court in effect ruled that since Congress in1790 and 1825 could provide for the punishment of crimes which werent

mentioned in the Constitution, thus Congress could exercise that same

level of discretion (on a different topic) again in 1862 and 1871.

But the ruling necessarily has an important caveat which absolutely

cannot be separated without actually nullifying the courts ruling, which is

that Congress could only act with such degree of discretion again in 1862

as they actually did in 1790(which was onlyunder and within the exclusivelegislative jurisdiction of Congress).

38. Even if one counterfeited government securities in some city in one of theStates of the Union, it would nevertheless be a federal crime because the U.S.Constitution explicitly makes such activity a federal crime(wherever it occurs).

However, whether any other matter be federal (beyond treason,

counterfeiting, and piracy [impeachment-related crimes which may only befederally-punished in a political manner may otherwise have their own set ofhere-not-relevant parameters]) depends on where that activity occurs (in thegovernment seat or within forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, or otherneedful buildings ceded for exclusive legislative jurisdiction purposes).


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Just as Congress could not act in 1790 or 1825 without proper

constitutional authority, neither could they act apart from that authority in

1862 or 1871. And the authority ultimately resorted to in 1862 and 1871

(despite clever implications otherwise) rested solelyupon Article I, Section8, Clause 17 (just like a large class of crimes in the 1790 and 1825 Acts as

explicitly cited by The Legal Tender CasesCourt).

Since the States which ceded exclusive legislative lands cannot any

longer enact State legislation for these areas which are now under the

exclusive legislation control of Congress, it is of course important that

someone enact (civil and criminal) legislation in those lands.39

While the Constitution does not ever expressly mention or directly

referencecrimes such as willful murder ormanslaughter, the Constitution

nevertheless explicitly does provide for punishment of these crimes when

they occur within exclusive legislation areas of Congress, as part of the all

Cases whatsoever wording of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17.

Neither does the Constitution ever directly confer named criminal

jurisdiction for crimes committed within exclusive legislative jurisdictionlands, but the Constitution nevertheless does explicitly provide for criminal

jurisdiction in the exclusive legislation areas of Congress, as part of the all

Cases whatsoever wording of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17.

The justices of the supreme Court in 1871 certainly understood all of

the relevant facts and knew precisely what they were doing (including those

justices who nominally ruled against the majority, but who didnt scream

and shout at the top of their lungs what was actually going on).

Yes, these scoundrels all took an oath or affirmation to support the

Constitution and in theory they were doing so, but only under the strictest

of terms (supporting but one clause of the Constitution [which allows for

government tyranny] against the remainder of clauses [which prohibit it]).40

39. It is not like willful murder or manslaughter could ever go unpunished in thegovernment seat or within a federal fort, after all.

40. Again, such actions follow the strictest letter of the law and as such do notviolate oaths, laws, or even the Constitution; although such actions necessarilyviolate the spirit of each of them.


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39

Our initial examination into the extreme levels of discretion necessary

to justify a legal tender paper currency shows that paper currency can only

be made a legal tender within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of

Congress for the District constituted as the Seat of Government of the

United States (and federal forts, etc.).42

In coming to such conclusion, it is important to recall that neither

members of Congress nor U.S. Government officers of the executive orjudicial branches may themselves ever changetheir delegated governmental

powers; therefore alldiscretion they exercise mustultimately come from at

least oneof their delegated powers.

The greatest ability to exercise discretion necessarily comes from and

by the words in all Cases whatsoever found in Article I, Section 8, Clause

17 of our U.S. Constitution.

While this conclusion perhaps remains less-than-readily-apparent, a

deeper study into Americas founding documents provides further evidence

that this phrase in all Cases whatsoever actually has a much deeper, far

more sinister meaning than would first be evident from our brief

examination into The Legal Tender Cases.

42. See: the public domain books Dollars and nonCentsand Monetary Laws,both by Matt Erickson, at www.PatriotCorps.org, www.Archive.org, orwww.Scribd.com/matt_erickson_6for more extensive theoretical support to theconclusion that only gold and silver coins remain legal tender for the whole ofthe United States of America.


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41

Chapter 3. In all Cases whatsoever

The previous chapter shed important light on the four-word phrase

found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution, in allCases whatsoever.

To discover more information about this all-important phrase, it is

necessary to examine our nations founding document our Declaration

of Independence our Unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united

States of America.

At the beginning of the Declaration, one finds various declarations ofuniversal truth being uttered, such as that we Americans are endowed by

our Creator with certain unalienable rights, including life, liberty and the

pursuit of happiness.

Importantly, the principle that American governments are instituted

among man to protect such God-given rights is expressly stated as the

fundamental purpose of government.

There is also acknowledgment that governments of man occasionally go

bad; and when they do, that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish

these forms of governments to which they are accustomed, as necessary.

One soon finds within the Declaration of Independence a long listing

of various facts of repeated injuries and usurpations which were being

submitted to a candid world to prove that the then-present King of Great

Britain was a tyrant who sought to establish an absolute Tyranny overthese States.

Thereafter follow thirteen short paragraphs which begin with the

phrase He has which begin to enumerate the specific injuries.

The thirteenth of these paragraphs (which discusses Acts of pretended

Legislation) is next broken into nine sub-paragraphs which further

elucidate these Acts of pretended Legislation, which all begin with thepreposition For including the last, which is worded (italics added):

For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaringthemselves invested with Power to legislate for us in allcases whatsoever.


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42 Chapter 3. In all Cases whatsoever

Remarkably, the last four words of this sub-paragraph repeat the same

exact phrase found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of our U.S.

Constitution, in all Cases whatsoever.

This is remarkable because this phrase is found within the Declaration

where it was listing the many grievances against a tyrant who sought to

establish an absolute tyranny over these States!

Thus, it should come somewhat as a surprise to find this particular

phrase within our U.S. Constitution which otherwise guaranteed a

Republican Form of Government in Article IV, Section 4 to every State of

the Union (representative government of our elected peers who areempowered to act only within delegated powers).

An even more dramatic use of this same four-word phrase is found in

one of the founding documents of one of the original 13 States.

South Carolinas 1776 State Constitutionbegins with the following

words (italics added at the end):

Whereasthe British Parliament, claiming of late years aright to bind the North American colonies by law in all caseswhatsoever

South Carolinas first Constitution actually shows just how far the

claimed ability leads, stating more fully (italics added at the end):

Whereasthe British Parliament, claiming of late years aright to bind the North American colonies by law in all caseswhatsoeverwithout the consent and against the will of thecolonists...

South Carolinas 1776 State Constitution clearly shows that the

claimed ability of the British government was that they could actually

bind the North American colonies in all cases whatsoever extending even

to the point of nullifying American consent, and implementing

governmental actions even against the colonists will.

Both references in the Declaration of Independence and SouthCarolinas first Constitution to the claimed right and power of the British

King and Parliament to be able to bind the North American colonies in all

cases whatsoever actually point to the infamous Declaratory Act by British


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Parliament which was signed into law by King George III on March 18,

1766, which stated in pertinent words:

That the said colonies and plantations in America have

been, are, and of right ought to be, subordinate unto, anddependent upon the imperial crown and parliament of GreatBritain; and that the King's majesty, by and with the advice andconsent ofparliamenthad, hath, and of right ought to have,full power and authority to make lawsof sufficient force andvalidity to bind the colonies and people of America, subjects ofthe crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever. 1

And there in the final four words of this passage one again sees the

ominous phrase in all cases whatsoever.

Here the British King and Parliament asserted their claimed right and

absolute power to make lawsof sufficient force and validity to bind the

colonies and people of Americain all cases whatsoever.

This 1766 Declaratory Act was enacted on the same day the notorious

1765 Stamp Act was finally repealed by British Parliament under pressure

exerted by powerful British merchants because of the successfulimplementation of American non-importation agreements (under which

the colonists agreed with one another not to buy specified goods imported

from Great Britain).

Thus, due to the extended perseverance of the colonists despite the

corresponding hardship of doing without, the British merchants suffering

lowered profits (or actual losses) eventually pressured their own

representatives in British Parliament (for the American colonists had no

representation in Parliament) to eventually drop the dreaded Stamp Act.

But the disgruntled Parliament would not drop the Stamp Act without

directly stating their case in the Declaratory Act of their ultimate power

and might over the colonies.

1. A.K.A.; The American Colonies Act. 6 George III, c. 12, The Statutes atLarge, ed. Danby Pickering (London, 1767), XXVII, 19 - 20. Italics added.

Note the Declaratory Acts claim of (inherent) government rights (under theconcept of the Divine Right of Kings), versus American governments which aredelegatedonly power (and [unalienable] rights belong only to people).


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This 1766 Declaratory Act was thus actually the true, root cause of the

Revolutionary War; the stated position of a stubborn mindset of the British

government to absolutely refuse to acknowledge any rights of the colonists

and a firm insistence on absolute British power over the American colonies.

In reality, the remainder of the Declaration of Independence merely

lists a multitude of different symptoms of the same viewpoint (of the ability

of Parliament to act in all cases whatsoever, being able to bind the North

American colonies and colonists however Britain saw fit).2

2. Tragically, Americans in 2015 are suffering from the same exact fate assuffered by Americans in 1775, from a government which strictly implements itspower to act in all Cases whatsoever, even against the will and consent of WeThe People (only we now have a new king [King Fed]).

Thankfully, however, we 2015 Patriots neednt again fight this absolute formof tyranny with bullets and cannon balls (because we won that war and wealready implemented limited government as the solution to safeguard thatsecured freedom [sadly, weve simply misunderstood our rulebook]).

Thus our 21st-century Freedom Fight is only a war of knowledge andunderstanding (of how to disarm misplaced tyranny).

The American Civil War has also showed the ultimate imprudence ofresorting to physical violence (of storming Article I, Section 8, Clause 17properties [Fort Sumter]).

Even though the South was unwilling in 1861 to overtly initiate violenceagainst the North and the North was unwilling to overtly initiate violence in the

South, neither was opposed to aggressively defending their own interests againstany initiation of force by the other.

When the South saw Northern troops occupying Fort Sumter in theCharleston Harbor (otherwise within South Carolina) even after succession fromthe Union, they were incensed.

The South mistakenly figured that by assuming control of Fort Sumter, theywould be properly defending the Souths interests, rather than actually beginning

armed aggression against Northern interests.But South Carolina had willingly ceded the land which ultimately became

Fort Sumter to Congress and the U.S. Government decades earlier.

Any disputes over ownership and governmental control over this land hadalready been long settled.3


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45

3. American State Papers, Military Affairs, Volume 5, Pages 463 472, 23rdCongress, 2nd Session, Document #591, The Construction of Fort Sumter,Charleston Harbor, South Carolina.

http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html.If South Carolina had desired to resume State jurisdiction over Fort Sumter

while she was yet a part of the Union, it would have taken a formal retrocessionof the property by Congress (just like when Virginia in 1846 received back thecounty and town of Alexandria which she had originally [in 1791] ceded aspart of the 10-miles-square area for the District of Columbia [IX Stat. 35]).

Of course, after succession, it would have taken a formal treaty of cessionbetween the two now-separate governments (the U.S.A. and the ConfederateStates of America), just like when His Britannic MajestyKing George III in 1783signed the Definitive Treaty of Peace ending the Revolutionary War (whereinGreat Britain relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety and territorialrights of the same, and every part of the United States [VIII Stat. 80, Article I]).

Since Congress and the U.S. Government never relinquished exclusivelegislation over Fort Sumter, when South Carolina succeeded from the Union in1861, only the lands which were yet under the jurisdiction of that State could

possibly have been removed from U.S. jurisdiction.Thus, when the South fired on Northern soldiers occupying Fort Sumter in

1861, the fort was legally yet a U.S. federal fort under Article I, Section 8,Clause 17 of the Constitution, and the South actually initiated physicalaggression against Northern interests.

Even if one were to argue that the U.S. didnt actually purchase the landas Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 specifies as a condition for proper cession (atleast for private lands), such legal argument is a matter to be argued and settled

through judicial means. The resort to physical violence by the South abandonedany measure of diplomacy and chose to settle the issue by direct confrontation inarmed conflict (and she ultimately lost that battle of force).

We 21st-century Patriots must become far-better-armed in knowledge than the19th-century South, for surely we citizens cannot over-power U.S. military forceswho are there to defend us, not for us to war against!

There is solid reasoning that the First Amendment is listed before the

SecondWe must never give up the moral high ground and resort to armed conflict

through insurrection; we must simply learn how to expose to the purifying light ofday power-hungry frauds who exercise arbitrary government power (for truth iswholly on our side) after all, we wish to enforcethe Constitution, not subvert it.


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From the actual history of the phrase in all Cases whatsoever, one

should begin to understand the extensive power it references. Yet it is still

undoubtedly difficult to fathom its true extent without further examination.

With the express ability of Congress to act in all Cases whatsoever

over the district constituted as the seat of government of the United States

(and like authority over exclusive legislative jurisdiction forts, magazines,

arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings), one must realize that the

U.S. Constitution has thus always actually authorized two opposing, wholly

separate and utterly distinct forms of government!

Under every other clause of the Constitution beyond Article I, Section8, Clause 17, Congress may only exercise their delegated powers for a

limited form of representative government throughout all the States of the

Union a Republican Form of Government as acknowledged under

Article IV, Section 4.

Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, however, members of Congress

have the omnipotent power to act in all cases whatsoever, to do most

everything within the government seat (and federal forts, etc.) except what

is specifically prohibited tyranny.


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47

Readers may understandably object to or at least question the strongly-worded form of government for the District constituted as the Seat of

Government of the United States being described as that of tyranny, of

omnipotent government which may act except as prohibited.

But lets ask a few questions to see if the description is apt:

Question 1. Who is empowered to exercise exclusive Legislationin allCases whatsoever, over such District which shall become the Seat ofthe Government of the United States?

Answer:

Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution

acknowledges that:

Congress shall have PowerTo exercise exclusive

Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such Districtasmaybecome the Seat of the Government of the UnitedStates...

Question 2. And Congress consists of what two entities?

Answer:

Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution informs us that:Congressshall consist of a Senate and House of

Representatives.


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And finally:

Question 5. So, what did the Declaration of Independence call the formof government whereby one people (suspended the legislatures of

another people and then) acted with full power and authority to bindthese other, non-represented people in all cases whatsoever?

Answer:

The Declaration of Independence called the form of government

whereby one people acted with full power and authority to bind

another people in all cases whatsoever as absolute Tyranny and

absolute Despotism.

So, this authors statement that our U.S. Constitution allows (for a

federal) tyranny in the District constituted as the Seat of Government of

the United States (and exclusive legislation jurisdiction forts, etc.) was, if

anything, too mild (it should have been correctly labeled absolutetyranny

and absolutedespotism).

U.S. Senators and U.S. Representatives elected by States are theultimate purveyors of law within the District of Columbia. No resident of

the District of Columbia has any voice in electing these people. No

resident of the District has any legislative representation in Congress.5

4. In its pertinent words, the Declaration declares that the right ofRepresentation in the Legislature is a right inestimable to the people and calls

for its relinquishment are formidable to tyrants only.

5. Motor vehicle license plates within Washington, D.C. today properlycomplain of Taxation Without Representation, acknowledging residents lackof representation.


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Looking again at the electoral process for choosing a President and Vice

President is helpful to clearly understand that the District constituted as the

Seat of Government of the United States is not a State (and that Congress

is not a State government).

Again,Article II, Section 1, Clause 2of the U.S. Constitution directs

that (italics added):

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as theLegislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors

The 12thAmendment (ratified June 15, 1804) also details that (italics

added):The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and

vote by ballot for President and Vice President

Of course, since the District constituted as the Seat of Government of

the United States is not a State, residents therein were long wholly unable

to have any voice in selecting our President and Vice President, at least

before ratification (on March 29, 1961) of the 23rd Amendment which

now reads, in part (italics added):

Section 1. The District constituting the Seat ofGovernment of the United States shall appoint in suchmanner as the Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice Presidentequal to the whole number of Senators and Representativesin Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a

State, but in no event more than the least populous State

(5 contd). A non-voting delegate to Congress has no actual say no actualvoting rights (which is the only voice which ultimately counts).

Any delegation of local governing authority to a mayor and city council orother form of local government within the District of Columbia is also immaterial,as the Constitution specifically vests exclusive legislative power in all Cases

whatsoever with the Congress of the United States and thus by expressconstitutional mandate, all government power in the government seat ultimatelyand conclusively always rests with those members of Congress elected by States(until or unless unchanged by the States through a ratified amendment).


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The 23rd Amendment clearly shows that the District of Columbia is

decidedly not a State when it declares that residents therein are now

entitled to the number of electors (not more than the least-populous State)

for which the district would be entitled ifit were a State.

But the District of Columbia is not a State which is able to select

Senators or Representatives or to ratify Amendments.

The District of Columbia was formed by cessions of States and was

created out of States, but decidedly is not a State.

Neither is the District of Columbia a State for Article I, Section 10

purposes, including the prohibition to States from emitting bills of credit ormaking any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.

Within their delegated powers for the whole country, Congress may

not emit bills of credit nor declare anything besides gold and silver coin a

tender in payment of debts because such powers were never delegated (nor

would such purposes fit within the necessary and proper means for

implementing a delegated power [as earlier acknowledged by the court]).6

However,that same Congress may nevertheless, under Article I, Section

8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution, emit bills of credit and declare them

a tender within the District constituted as the Seat of Government of the

United States and for forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other

needful buildings because Congress may there exercise exclusive

legislation in all cases whatsoever, and no express prohibition is anywhere

listed within the Constitution which expressly keeps Congress from doingso here in the Government Seat (as now correctly acknowledged by The

Legal Tender CasesCourt).

6. We are obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to paydollars a legal tender in payment of debts previously contracted, is not a meansappropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any expresspower vested in Congress; that such an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the

Constitution; and that it is prohibited by the Constitution.

Hepburn v. Griswold,75 U.S. 603 @ Page 625(1870).

See also: Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. 229 (1869) and Lane County v.Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868).


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The U.S. Constitution authorizes two opposing, wholly separate and

utterly distinct Forms of Government:

Stated another way, throughout all the States of the Union, Congress

may exercise their delegated powers as detailed throughout the

Constitution.

But in the district constituted as the seat of government of the United

States, Congress may here exercise sovereign government powers (i.e.,without the limits imposed upon States by the U.S. Constitution).7

Looking at this issue from a slightly different angle, one must realize

that with the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, governmental authority

became divided into State and federal authority, by the express terms of the

Constitution.

7. Seethe public domain books Dollars and nonCentsand Monetary Laws, bothby Matt Erickson, at www.PatriotCorps.org, www.Archive.org, orwww.Scribd.com/matt_erickson_6 for further discussion on sovereigngovernment powers within The Legal Tender CasesandJuilliard v. Greenman.

1. A limited government of delegated

powers (a Republican Form of

Government for the whole country

under the whole of the Constitution

except rticle I, Section 8, Clause 17);

2. Omnipotent government

of all powers except those

prohibited (tyranny, under

Article I, Section 8, Clause

17) for the government seat.

versus


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Although everywhere else in America governmental power has been

divided into State and federal jurisdictions, in the government seat, all

legislative poweris unified within Congress.9

While such authority does not perhaps at first appear ominous, upon

deeper contemplation one must absolutely realize the serious implications.

For example, answering a few questions should bring awareness of a few

ramifications:

Question 6. What is the source of authority for the federal powersfound within the first pie chart, the chart of dividedgovernment powers?

Answer:

The U.S. Constitution, of course.

Question 7. What is the source of authority for the Statepowers withinthat same pie chart?

Answer:

The respective State Constitutions and the U.S. Constitution,where pertinent (such as the prohibitions to States in Article I, Section

10).

Question 8a. And with regards to the second pie chart (the pie chartshowing unified government powers for the District constituted as theSeat of Government of the United States), what again is its source ofauthority of the federalpowers?

Answer:

For the small sliver of federal authority (even in the government

seat), the answer again is the U.S. Constitution.

9. Any delegation of local governing authority to a mayor and city council orother form of local government within the District of Columbia is again

immaterial, as the Constitution specifically vests exclusive legislative power inall Cases whatsoever with the Congress of the United States and thus by strictconstruction of the U.S. Constitution, all legislative power in the government seatultimately and conclusively always rests with those members of Congress electedby States (until or unless unchanged by the States through a ratified amendment).


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The authority for the District constituted as the Seat of Government of

the United States is, of course, shaped over the centuries by hundreds and

thousands of laws enacted by Congress, by a like number of court cases,

and by similar numbers of executive department rules and regulations.10

The U.S. Governments apparent Multiple Personality Disorderis fully

explained by understanding that the U.S. Constitution has always

authorized two opposing, wholly separate and utterly distinct Forms of

Government, even if few members of the general public have ever

understood this (and those who do are typically motivated by private gain

to keep such facts quiet).

10. Remember, there is no Republican Form of Government guaranteed to theDistrict constituted as the Seat of Government of the United States or enclaves,and thus there is no direct (or even indirect) constitutional conflict when executiveagencies here create their own administrative law or when court justiceseffectively here legislate from the bench.11

11. In Marbury v. Madison, (5 U.S. 137 [1803]), Chief Justice John Marshalllaid down his infamous principle of judicial review being a court function. But itis not by mere coincidence that this ruling dealt with the commissioning of aJustice of the Peace for the District of Columbia, the Seat of Government of theUnited States!

The real point in understanding Marburyis to realize that in and throughoutall the States of the Union, the United States as that term is understood by the

Constitution, it is the States collectively which have the ultimate authority todetermine the Constitution and its meaning (but in Art. I:8:17, the Stateswithdrew all their say for the government seat [so someone else

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