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WHICH PA H O PERSIA?O N AS I

K M. PD L. BM I

S MM E. OHB R

A N A LY S I S PA P E R

N u m b e r 2 0 , J u n e 2 0 0 9
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tive opinions about them. Te aim of this exercisewas to highlight the challenges of all the options

and to allow readers to decide for themselveswhich they believe to be best.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis ex-pressed are those of the authors and do not re-ect the official positions or views of the CIA orany other U.S. Government Agency. Nothing inthe contents should be construed as assertingor implying U.S. Government authentication ofinformation or Agency endorsement of the au-thors views. Tis material has been reviewed by

the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classied in-formation.

Which Path to Persia? Options for a New Ameri-can Strategy toward Iran is a product of the Sa-

ban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brook-ings Institution. Te essays were written by SabanCenter scholars Daniel L. Byman, Martin Indyk,Suzanne Maloney, Michael E. OHanlon, KennethM. Pollack, and Bruce Riedel. Kenneth Pollackalso served as the overall editor.

None of the ideas expressed in this volumeshould be construed as representing the viewsof any of the individual authors . Te collectionis a collaborative effort, and the authors attempt-

ed to present each of the options as objectively aspossible, without introducing their own subjec-


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A

Te authors are deeply grate ul or the nancial assistance rom theSmith Richardson Foundation, the Crown Family Foundation, and oth-

ers in the drafing and publication o this study.


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A

K M. PKenneth Pollack is Director o Research at the Sa-ban Center or Middle East Policy at Brookings.He served as Director or Persian Gul Affairsand Near East and South Asian Affairs at the Na-tional Security Council, Senior Research Pro es-sor at National De ense University, and PersianGul military analyst at the CIA. His latest bookis A Path out o the Desert: A Grand Strategy or America in the Middle East (Random House). Heis also the author o Te Persian Puzzle: Te Con- ict between Iran and America (Random House),Te Treatening Storm: Te Case or Invading Iraq (Random House), and Arabs at War: Military E - ectiveness, 1948-1991 (University o NebraskaPress).

D L. BDaniel Byman is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Cen-ter at Brookings. He is Director o the Center orPeace and Security Studies and an Associate Pro-

essor in the School o Foreign Service at George-town University. He has held positions with theNational Commission on errorist Attacks on theUnited States (the 9/11 Commission), the Joint9/11 Inquiry and Senate Intelligence Committees,

the RAND Corporation, and the U.S. govern-ment. He writes widely on issues related to U.S.national security, terrorism, and the Middle East.His latest books are Deadly Connections: StateSponsorship o errorism (Cambridge UniversityPress) and Te Five Front War: Te Better Way toFight Global Jihad (Wiley).

M IMartin Indyk is the Director o the Saban Center

or Middle East Policy at Brookings. He served inseveral senior positions in the U.S. government,most recently as Ambassador to Israel and be orethat as Assistant Secretary o State or Near EastAffairs and as Special Assistant to President Clin-ton and Senior Director or Near East and SouthAsian Affairs in the National Security Council.Be ore entering government service, he served oreight years as ounding Executive Director o theWashington Institute or Near East Policy. He haspublished widely on U.S. policy in the Middle Eastand the Arab-Israeli peace process. His most re-cent book, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account o American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (Si-mon & Schuster), was published in January 2009.

S MSuzanne Maloney is a Senior Fellow at the Sa-ban Center or Middle East Policy at Brookings.She has worked on the State Departments PolicyPlanning Staff where she provided policy analy-sis and recommendations on Iran, Iraq, the GulStates, and broader Middle East issues. Be ore joining the government, she was the Middle East

adviser at ExxonMobil Corporation and served asproject director o the ask Force on U.S.-Iran Re-lations at the Council on Foreign Relations.


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v i i i W H I C H PA H O P E R S I A ? O N A S I

B RBruce Riedel is Senior Fellow or Political ran-sitions in the Middle East and South Asia at theSaban Center or Middle East Policy at Brookings.

He served as Chairman o President Obamas Stra-tegic Review o U.S. Policy toward A ghanistanand Pakistan. In 2006, he retired afer 30 yearsservice at the CIA including postings overseasin the Middle East and Europe. He was a senioradviser on the region to the last our presidentso the United States as a staff member o the Na-tional Security Council at the White House. Hewas also Deputy Assistant Secretary o De ense

or the Near East and South Asia at the Pentagonand a senior adviser at the North Atlantic reaty

Organization in Brussels. Riedel was a member oPresident Clintons peace team at the Camp Da- vid, Wye River, and Shepherdstown summits. Heis the author o Te Search or Al Qaeda: Its Lead-ership, Ideology, and Future (Brookings).

M E. OHMichael OHanlon is a Senior Fellow in ForeignPolicy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He isalso Director o Research or the 21st Century De-

ense Initiative and Senior Author o the Brook-ings Iraq Index and holds the Sydney Stein Chairat Brookings. A ormer de ense budget analystwho advised Members o Congress on militaryspending, he specializes in Iraq, North Korea, A -ghanistan, homeland security, Nuclear Strategy,the use o military orce, and other de ense issues.He is the author o Budgeting or Hard Power(Brookings) and Te Science o War (PrincetonUniversity Press), both orthcoming this summer.


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ITe rouble with ehran: U.S. Policy Options toward Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

P IDissuading ehran: Te Diplomatic Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

C : An Offer Iran Shouldnt Re use: Persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

C : empting ehran: Te Engagement Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

P IIDisarming ehran: Te Military Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

C : Going All the Way: Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

C : Te Osiraq Option: Airstrikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

C : Leave it to Bibi: Allowing or Encouraging anIsraeli Military Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

P IIIoppling ehran: Regime Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

C : Te Velvet Revolution: Supporting a Popular Uprising. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

C : Inspiring an Insurgency: Supporting Iranian MinorityAnd Opposition Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113

C : Te Coup: Supporting a Military Move Against the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

P IV

Deterring ehran: Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129C : Accepting the Unacceptable: Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

CCrafing an Integrated Iran Policy: Connecting the Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145


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I

HE ROUBLE WI H EHRAN

U.S. P O I

either. Iran is an important country in a criticalpart o the world. Although ehrans role in creat-

ing problems in the Middle East is ofen exagger-ated, it has unquestionably taken advantage o thegrowing instability there (itsel partly a result oAmerican missteps) to make important gains, o -ten at Washingtons expense. Meanwhile, the 2007National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, properlyunderstood, warned that ehran was likely to ac-quire the capability to manu acture nuclear weap-ons at some point in the next decade. 1

A U R

Perhaps not surprisingly, the track record o U.S.policies toward Iran is not particularly impres-sive. Since 1979 Washington has tried everything

rom undeclared war are to unilateral conces-sions. Tese policies have done better at limitingIranian mischie making than their critics will ad-mit but have largely ailed to convince ehran todrop its support or terrorist groups, its pursuit oa nuclear weapons capability, or its wider effortsto overturn the regional status quo.

For its part, the Bush 43 Administration had noexplicit policy toward ehran or its rst two to

W hat should the United States do aboutIran? Te question is easily asked, but ornearly 30 years, Washington has had difficultycoming up with a good answer. Te Islamic Re-public presents a particularly con ounding serieso challenges or the United States. Many Iranianleaders regard the United States as their greatestenemy or ideological, nationalistic, and/or secu-rity reasons, while a great many average Iraniansevince the most pro-American eelings o any inthe Muslim world. Unlike other states that mayalso ear or loathe the United States, Irans lead-ers have consistently acted on these belie s, work-

ing assiduously to undermine American interestsand inuence throughout the Middle East, albeitwith greater or lesser degrees o success at di -

erent times. Moreover, Iranian oreign policyis requently driven by internal political consid-erations that are both difficult to discern by theoutside world and even harder to inuence. Morethan once, Iran has ollowed a course that to out-siders appeared sel -de eating but galvanized theIranian people to make ar-reaching sacrices inthe name o seemingly quixotic goals.

Despite these rustrating realities, the UnitedStates is not in a position to simply ignore Iran,

1 National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007, available at , downloaded on February 9, 2009.

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2 W H I C H PA H O P E R S I A ? O N A S I

establishment that the Obama Administrationwill have to adopt a new policy toward Iran, andpossibly a more ambitious one, which can suc-ceed where its predecessors have ailed. Te political, think-tank, and academic com-munities have not been reticent about proposingnew Iran policies, but the overall result has beensomewhat disappointing. No one has been able todevise an approach toward Iran that would have ahigh likelihood o achieving American objectivesat a reasonable price. Moreover, the options thathave been proposed ofen seek to accomplish verydifferent goals depending on what the respectiveadvocate believes the United States should beseeking to accomplish. Te result has been a ca-cophony that has con used ar more than it hasclaried at a time when the American people andtheir new president desperately need a clear-eyedexplication o the various options available sothat they can make an in ormed choice regardingwhich course to ollow. President Barack Obama has already taken upthis gauntlet. Since coming to office, he and Sec-retary o State Hillary Clinton have repeatedly

stated that they would like to begin a process odirect dialogue with ehran. Still, the presidenthas emphasized that such engagement will be parto a wider strategy o carrots and sticks aimed atencouraging ehran to modi y its behavior. Inparticular, the president has made clear that hehopes to build an international consensus to im-pose much harsher sanctions on ehran shouldthe Iranian leadership re use Washingtons newlyextended hand o riendship. Whether this ap-proach can do better than its predecessors remains

very much up in the air. At the very least, it shouldbe thoroughly examined and tested to determinehow best to implement it, and to try to ascertainthe likelihood o its success. Moreover, because itsprospects are uncertain and American policies to-ward Iran have a bad habit o alling short o theirmark, it is also important to consider alternatives,

three years. Te administration simply did notknow what to do about Iran and relegated it tothe too hard box, which led to crosswise tacti-cal decisionslike accepting Iranian cooperationagainst the aliban and al-Qaida early on butmusing indiscreetly about bringing regime changeto ehran afer Kabul and Baghdad. Only in 2003-2004, afer the surprising progress o Irans nucle-ar program was revealed, did Washington adopta deliberate approach to ehran. In part becauseo the inherent difficulties in dealing with Iran,and in part because o the deep divisions withinthe Bush 43 Administration, the resulting policyattempted to straddle at least two very differentapproaches: attempting to mobilize internationalpressure on Iran to give up its nuclear programwhile retaining, at least rhetorically, the threat topursue regime change (i not military action)and being unwilling to take urther actions in thediplomatic sphere that were seen as sof on eh-ran or otherwise inconsistent with regime change.

Te U.S. officials charged with implementing theBush Administrations policy o diplomatic pres-sure on Iran played a weak hand surprisingly well.Despite the constraints placed on themparticu-

larly their inability to offer signicant positiveincentives to Iran or to other key internationalactors to secure their cooperationthey devisednovel nancial sanctions that caused real pain in

ehran and convinced reluctant oreign govern-ments to apply ever greater pressure, including

our UN Security Council resolutions enactedunder Chapter VII o the UN Charter. Despite these accomplishments, the Bush Admin-istrations approach was wearing thin be ore the

president lef office. Although battered, ehranhas so ar withstood the international pressureand has made steady progress toward acquiringa nuclear capability. Troughout the region, Iransstar is seen as waxing while that o the UnitedStates wanes. Consequently, there is an emergingconsensus within the American oreign policy


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president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, is by all ac-counts a devout adherent to Khomeinis concep-tion, including his philosophical suspicion andloathing o the United States.4 Even among thoseIranian leaders who have long since moved be-yond the imams ideology, many still see the Unit-ed States as a more traditional rival in southwestAsia, where a great many Iranians believe thattheir nation should, by nature or divine right,hold some orm o dominion.5 Khomeinis suc-cessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may or may notshare his predecessors hatred o America, but hiswords and deeds indicate that he is deeply suspi-cious, even ear ul, o the United States.6

As a result, the question o Irans relationship withthe United States has been the third rail o Irani-an politics since be ore Khomeinis death in 1989.Pragmatic elements in the Iranian leadershiphave requently argued or improved ties with theUnited States, largely based on the need or Iran toend its political and (especially) economic isola-tion and begin to revive its revolution-, war-, and

contingencies, ollow-ons, and allbacks rom theadministrations chosen approach.

A V H

Te problem o ormulating an effective new U.S.policy toward Iran starts in ehran. Since the1979 Islamic Revolution, much o the Iranianleadership has harbored considerable antipathytoward the United States. Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhol-lah Musavi Khomeini himsel saw the world as aManichean struggle between good and evil, withIran standing as the champion o good (and o Is-lam, synonymous concepts in his mind) and theUnited States as the champion o everything evil.Tis set o belie s lay at the core o his thinking andbecame a oundational element in the philosophyand claims to legitimacy o the regime.2 Whilethere is no question that some Iranian leaders andmost o the Iranian people would like better rela-tions with the United States, this core belie con-tinues to inspire other, ofen more power ul, Ira-nian actors and institutions. 3 In particular, Irans

2 Said Arjomand, Te urban or the Crown: Te Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Ox ord University Press, 1988); William O. Beeman,Images o the Great Satan: Representations o the United States in the Iranian Revolution, in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shiism romQuietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven, C .: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 191-217; Richard Cottam, InsideRevolutionary Iran, in Irans Revolution: Te Search or Consensus , ed. R.K. Ramazani (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp.3-26; Massoumeh Ebtekar, as told to Fred A. Reed, akeover in ehran: Te Inside Story o the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture (Vancouver, Canada:

alon Books, 2000), esp. p. 77; Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Li e o the Ayatollah (London: I.B. auris, 1999), esp. p. 220; Robert Snyder, Explainingthe Iranian Revolutions Hostility toward the United States, Journal o South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 3 (Spring 1994).

3 On Iranian public opinion, see error Free omorrow, Polling Iranian Public Opinion: An Unprecedented Nationwide Survey o Iran, July2007, available at , downloaded on January 7,2007; Karim Sadjadpour, How Relevant Is the Iranian Street? Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006-2007), pp. 151-162.

4 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise o its Neoconservatives: Te Politics o ehrans Silent Revolution (London: I.B.auris, 2007); Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the wisted Path to Con rontation (New York: St. Martins,

2007).5 On Iranian politics and the debates over Iranian policy toward the United States, see or instance Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1921: Te

Pahlavis and Afer (London: Longman, 2003); Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: Te Struggle or Re orm in Iran (Chicago: Universityo Chicago Press, 2001); Daniel Byman et al.,Irans Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); Elton L.Daniel, Te History o Iran (Westport, C : Greenwood Press, 2001); Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Afer Khomeini: Te Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge, 1995); Mark J. Gasiorowski, Te Power Struggle in Iran, Middle East Policy 7, no. 4 (October 2000): 22-40; Jerrold D.Green, Parastatal Economic Organizations and Stability in Iran: Te Role o Bonyads (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997); Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results o Revolution, revised and updated edit ion (New Haven, C : Yale University Press, 2003); Nikki R. Keddieand Rudi Matthee, eds., Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics (Seattle, WA: University o WashingtonPress, 2002); David Menashri, Revolution at a Crossroads: Irans Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions (Washington: Washington Institute

or Near East Policy, 1997); Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002); RobertSnyder, Explaining the Iranian Revolutions Hostility toward the United States, Journal o South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 3(Spring 1994); Ray akeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: imes Books, 2006).

6 On Khameneis thinking regarding the United States, the best work available is Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: Te World View oIrans Most Power ul Leader, Report, Carnegie Endowment or International Peace, March 2008.


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United States sought to accomplish, ofen simplybecause it was the United States making the e -

ort. Ten, ofen with little warning, Washingtonwould note a slight change in rhetoric or an ob-scure overture o unknown, but unquestionablyIranian, provenance. In 1986 and 1998, Washing-ton reacted quickly and took considerable risksto reciprocate and make clear its desire or betterrelations. In 1995 the United States was much tar-dier, in large measure because the Iranian gesturewas especially oblique. In 2003 the United Statessimply ignored the opening rom ehran. Nev-ertheless, in every case, because those Iraniansdesirous o rapprochement were unable to over-come the entrenched psychological and politicalenmity toward the United States o other Iranianleaders, the overtures quickly evaporated regard-less o how rapidly, generously, or enthusiasticallyWashington responded.

O course, America was not exactly an innocentbystander in these cycles o con rontation andcollaboration. Ofentimes, bellicose American ac-tions (meant as such or merely interpreted as suchin ehran) triggered belligerent Iranian responses.In 1987-1988, the Reagan Administration, despite

all its cowboy bravura, was dragged into escort-ing Kuwaiti tankers, but ehran assumed that theUnited States eagerly sought the opportunity toattack Iranian naval and air orces in the PersianGul . On the other hand, some members o theU.S. Congress in the mid-1990s and some mem-bers o the Bush 43 Administration in 2004-2006appeared to be trying to deliberately provoke eh-ran, and the Iranians took the bait. It is almostcertainly the case, there ore, that even the mostwell-disposed observers in ehran view Ameri-

can policy as equally con used and con using.

corruption-ravaged economy. At various times,these gures have even attempted to open covertchannels o communication to the United Statesto lay the groundwork or a rapprochement, mostnotably in 1986 (in what became the Iran-Contrascandal), 1995, and 1998-1999. However, in everycase, the effort was uncovered by more hard-lineelements in the regime and was quickly throttled.

Meanwhile, Irans hard-linerswho have con-sistently advocated a policy o across-the-boardcon rontation with the United States by subvert-ing American allies, supporting militant groupsthat seek violent change to the Middle Easternstatus quo, and even mounting acts o terror-ismhave not ully succeeded in steering IransAmerica policy either. At times, ehrans coursehas leaned hard in their direction, such as in1987-1988 when Iranian orces attacked U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gul , 1992-1997 whenthe Iranians mounted a diplomatic and terroristoffensive against the United States and its alliesin the Middle East, and 2006-2008 when ehranprovided Iraqi insurgents with weapons capableo killing large numbers o American soldiersin hope o driving the United States into a rapid

withdrawal. However, even in these instances,Irans collective leadership typically re rainedrom adopting the hard-liners most extreme po-

sitions and even made important concessions tothe pragmatists. 7

Tus, seen rom Washington, Irans course has o -ten seemed peripatetic and perplexing. For longperiods, Iran has appeared to be Americas Mid-dle Eastern nemesis, supporting every nation,group, or person who wished the United States

harm and trying to block virtually everything the

7 In addition to the sources in note 3, above, see also Anthony Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: Te Treat rom the Northern Gul (Boulder, CO:Westview, 1994); Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington: Washington Institute or Near EastPolicy, 1997); Michael A. Palmer, Guardians o the Gul : A History o Americas Expanding Role in the Persian Gul , 1833-1992 (New York: FreePress, 1992).


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S C B I 5

Iranian economy and to accept varying degreeso international isolation and sanctions, whateverpressure the United States imposed kept ehranweak but did not orce a undamental change inIranian oreign policy. In Washington, Iran policyincreasingly was viewed as a ruitless necessity,one that policymakers sought to ignore to the ex-tent they possibly could. 8 Indeed, this sentimentseemed to be the prevailing view o Bush 43 se-nior officials in the early years o that administra-tion. Even among the academic and think-tankcommunities, or most o the period between1992 and 2003except or the brie period be-tween 1998 and 2000 when Clinton tried, ulti-mately unsuccess ully, to secure a rapprochementwith Muhammad Khatamiwork on Iran policywas largely relegated to a small community o ex-perts, whose proposals were primarily tactical,not strategic, in natureand even then these were

requently ignored by the policy community. 9

Te trans ormation o American and Iranian or-tunes in 2002-2004 sparked both the interest in aproactive policy toward Iran and an agitated newdebate over what such a policy should encompass.Prior to 2002, Iran was seen (by the United States

and many countries throughout the Middle East)as a difficult but largely marginalized troublemaker

Te net effect has been that the U.S.-Iranian rela-tionship has unctioned like the proverbial pen-dulum. At times, the United States and Iran havedeveloped tacit working relationships (such asover A ghanistan and toward al-Qaida in 2001-2003) or even kabuki-like courtships (such as in1998-2000). At other times, the two sides seemedpoised on the brink o war (as in 1987-1988,1995-1997, and 2006-2007).

Because it seemed so hard or U.S. and Iranianovertures to coincide, and because the Iraniangestures appeared inevitably to be throttled bythe regimes more hard-line elements, over time,American policymakers increasingly saw the Iranissue as a loser. Any effort to be proactive withIran, either to try to engage it and entice it intoa better relationship, or to con ront it and try to

orce it to behave better, ended up in the samerustrating nowhere where it had begun. Because

the Iranian leadership was consistently unwillingto jettison its ideological, political, and national-istic antipathies toward the United States, it wasnever willing to accept American offers or betterrelations, most notably during 1989-1991 underthe Bush 41 Administration and in 1998-2000 un-

der the Clinton Administration. Because ehranwas also willing to allow urther erosion o the

8 See or instance, Martin Indyk,Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account o American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2009); Kenneth M. Pollack, Te Persian Puzzle: Te Conict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), esp. pp.244-342. Perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the relative lack o interest in devising a proactive strategy toward Iran during theadministrations o Bush 41, Clinton, and early Bush 43 can be ound in the virtual silence on the topic o Iran in the memoirs o key officialsin those various administrations. See, or example, Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003); James A. BakerIII, Te Politics o Diplomacy (New York: C.R. Putnams Sons, 1995); George Bush and Brent Scowcrof, A World rans ormed(New York:Al red A. Knop , 1998); Warren Christopher, In the Stream o History: Shaping Foreign Policy or a New Era (Stan ord, CA: Stan ord UniversityPress, 1998); Warren Christopher, Chances o a Li etime (New York: Scribner, 2001); Bill Clinton, My Li e (New York: Al red A. Knop , 2004).Also see Condoleezza Rice, Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest, Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January-February 2000 ]. Tis essayby Rice laid out what candidate George W. Bushs oreign policy philosophy would be i elected president. Iran received three shortparagraphs, all o which were descriptive, not prescriptive, in nature, and the subject was amously dismissed with the remark, All in all,changes in U.S. policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian behavior.

9 As one indication o this trend, afer James Bill published Te Eagle and the Lion: Te ragedy o American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, C :Yale University Press) in 1988, another major work on U.S.-Iranian relations was not published until 2004. Again, there were numerous journal articles and opinion pieces written on the subject during the interim, but these largely concerned matters o immediate U.S.-Iranianrelations rather than efforts to reexamine the relationship as a whole and prescribe a new overarching direction. In 2004 a major task orcereport was published by the Council on Foreign Relations, again signaling the willingness o the American policy community to try to beginthinking about a new Iran strategy. See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Iran: ime or a New Approach, Report, Council onForeign Relations, July 2004.


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it did not look to quell the 2006 Israel-Hizballahor the 2008-2009 Israel-Hamas conicts, both owhich produced results that were widely seen as victories or key Iranian allies. Moreover, desta-bilizing spillover effects rom Iraq, Lebanon, thePalestinian territories, and A ghanistan incitedinternal unrest in a number o countries aroundthe region, leaving many o Americas staunchestallies (and Irans worst oes) eeling shaken and vulnerable. By 2005-2006 the United States ap-peared weak and in retreat all across the region,whereas Iran seemed to be leading a new rejec-tionist coalition that threatened to trans orm theMiddle Easts strategic landscape.

Tis threat, or the impression o such a threat,shocked the American leadership and orcedWashingtonboth the Bush Administration andthe wider policy communityto begin thinkingabout Iran in ways it had not in the past. In par-ticular, the sense o a strategic threat rom Iran,even among those who believed that it was beingexaggerated by others, meant that simply tryingto ignore Iran or merely reacting to its latest ac-tions was no longer sufficient. Instead, the UnitedStates had to adopt a new strategy intended to

eliminate, ameliorate, or contain this threat.

B B I P

Since this realization, there has been no shortageo books and articles advocating particular pol-icy positions toward Iran. Un ortunately, thesepieces have ofen added more heat than light tothe debate over how the United States shouldhandle the many problems presented by Iran. Asa result, policy positions are routinely dismissed

with the strength to play the spoiler in Arab-Israelipeace negotiations and Lebanese politics but un-able to mount any more o a threat than that. In-deed, many Iran experts began to see the regimeas increasingly anachronistic and likely to evolveslowly into something more benign over timealthough it could certainly do some damage be-

ore that happened. From this perspective, thereseemed to be little need or a dramatically newAmerican strategic approach to deal with Iran. 10

However, in 2002-2004, Irans position seemed toreverse itsel . Te International Atomic EnergyAgency conrmed the revelations o Iranian op-positionists that ehrans nuclear program was

ar more advanced, and closer to being able toproduce nuclear weapons, than had previouslybeen known. At the same time, the United Statesoverthrew the alibans regime in A ghanistanand Saddam Husayns regime in Iraqtherebyeliminating Irans two greatest regional securitythreats. Washingtons catastrophic mishandlingo the reconstruction o both o those countriesbogged down the United Statesmilitarily, polit-ically, and economicallyand greatly hamperedthe Bush Administrations ability to deal with Iran

or other regional actors looking to challenge thestatus quo. Worse still, because ehran wieldedconsiderable inuence with armed groups in bothcountries, it could threaten vital American inter-ests in Iraq and A ghanistan i it chose to do soand was able to contribute to the military and po-litical problems o the United States in both. Com-pounding these vulnerabilities, the Bush Admin-istration botched political developments in bothLebanon and the Palestinian territories, causingnew civil stri e in each. Perhaps most damaging,

10 See, or instance, Geneive Abdo and Jonathan Lyons, Answering Only to God: Faith and Freedom in wenty-First Century Iran (New York:Henry Holt, 2003); Jahangir Amuzegar, Irans Future: Civil Society or Civil Unrest, Middle East Policy 7, no. 1 (October 1999): 86-101;Daniel Byman et al., Irans Security Policy ; A shin Molavi,Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys across Iran (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); ElaineSciolino, Persian Mirrors: Te Elusive Face o Iran (New York: Free Press, 2000); Suzanne Maloney, Elections in Iran: A New Majlis and aMandate or Re orm, Middle East Policy 7, no. 3 (June 2000): pp. 59-66; Robin Wright, Te Last Great Revolution: urmoil and

rans ormation in Iran (New York: Al red A. Knop , 2000).


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S C B I 7

We argue that at least nine discrete approachesto Iran have emerged in the public debate, and itis these nine options that we treat in this study.Tese nine differ in a variety o ways: not simplyin that they would employ different policy instru-ments but also because they ofen seek to achievedifferent goals. Tese differences reect divergentassumptions about Iran, about the internationalcommunity, and about how best to prioritize andsecure American interests regarding Iran. For in-stance, the debate between those who avor one othe diplomatic options and those who avor some

orm o regime change is not just about whichwould be the best way to head off the Iranian nu-clear program; it is also about whether the UnitedStates should be willing to accept the Islamic Re-public at all.

We have urther grouped these nine options intoour bundles reecting the similarities among

several o them. Part I o the monograph treatsthe two diplomatic options. It begins by examin-ing the policy option that the Obama Administra-tion has already announced will be its approachto Iran, a policy we have dubbed one o Persua-sion, by which the United States would employ

positive and negative incentives to convince Iranto give up its problematic behavior. Because thispolicy is not guaranteed to succeed, and becausemany Americans may disagree with the admin-istrations approach, we go on to address a muchwider range o alternative strategies, beginningwith another diplomatic option, one o pureEngagement, that would junk all o the sanc-tions and ocus instead on accommodation andreassurance in an attempt to persuade ehran tomend its ways. Part II looks at the various military

optionsa ull-scale invasion, a more limited aircampaign to destroy Irans nuclear program, andallowing Israel to mount its own airstrike againstthe same. Regime change is the ocus o Part III,in all o its different variants: attempting to trig-ger a popular revolution, supporting an insur-gency (ethnic or political) against the regime, and

by partisans o other approaches as being unwor-thy even o consideration. Te right sneers at theidea o engaging with Iran as appeasement, andthe lef clamors or the U.S. government to abjureall resort to orce under any circumstance. Evenin the muddled middle, there is con usion regard-ing the priority that should be given to negotia-tions versus containment, and what mix o incen-tives and disincentives is appropriate to coerceor persuade ehran. Tat con usion has arisen inpart rom proponents unwillingness to take theiranalyses deeper than sloganeering and in part

rom deliberate efforts to ob uscate the real costsand risks involved in virtually every policy to-ward Iran. Moreover, in recent years, the debatehas increasingly ocused on the narrow questiono Irans nuclear weapons program (admittedlya critical concern), requently losing sight o thewider range o American differences with Iran.

Te central purpose o this monograph is to tryto present the most important policy optionsavailable to the United States to craf a new strat-egy toward Iran, and to do so in a dispassionate,objective ashion. We have attempted to portrayeach option in its naked glory, without the gloss

o advocacy. Each o us believes that some o theoptions are better than others, but we all recog-nize that none are per ect and all have more risksand costs than guaranteed benets. We have alsosought to present them in a similar ormat to tryto highlight the differences among them. One othe many ailings o the current Iran debate isthat proponents o different perspectives are o -ten arguing about apples and orangescompar-ing policies meant to achieve very different goalsas i they were meant to achieve the same ends,

or starting rom assumptions as i everyone werein complete agreement about these assumptions.Part o the problem is that there is no nationalconsensus, and one o President Obamas tasks in

orging a new strategy toward Iran will be to buildsuch a consensus or at least achieve a national tol-erance or his pre erred course.


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For these reasons, each option is presented in aairly ormulaic ashion. We start with its goal and

the general time rame in which the policy mightbe expected to achieve that goal, then provide anoverview o how the policy would work, ollowedby a section describing what would be required interms o resources and tasks to give the policy thebest chance o succeeding. We then conclude witha rundown o the various pros and cons associatedwith the policy. In this effort we received invalu-able help rom Henri Barkey, Geoffrey Kemp, El-len Laipson, Abbas Milani, Mohsen Milani, CarlosPascual, George Perkovich, Danielle Pletka, andRobin Wright. All o them provided commentsand criticisms that not only improved this mono-graphs quality but also helped remove bias. Although the nine different approaches we pres-ent represent discrete ways or the United Statesto handle Iran, it is not the case that all o theseoptions are meant to stand alone. Quite to thecontrary. Te best American strategy toward Iranwould doubtless combine several o these ap-proaches into an integrated policy, in which thedifferent approaches would be pursued sequen-tially or simultaneously, and thus in a comple-

mentary ashion. However, or analytic purposes,to most clearly illustrate the differences amongthemand to best reveal which options can bestbe integrated with one anotherwe have chosento present them as separately and discretely aspossible. Te concluding chapter addresses howthe different options could be combined to pro-duce such an integrated strategy.

S ,

For the most part, we present the nine options ina largely bare bones ashion, laying them outin their broad conception without delving intotoo many details. We did not sketch out invasionroutes or list all o the targets or airstrikes, nordid we attempt to spell out how to turn AhvaziArab separatists into a ull-blown insurgency or

aiding a military coup. Finally, Part IV examinesthe idea o moving directly to a policy o Contain-ment o Iran, in which the United States wouldattempt to deter Iran rom trying to wield a uturenuclear arsenal while hindering its ability to causetrouble in the Middle East and Central Asia. N B O

Most readers are likely to conclude that all nineo the options presented in this monograph areriddled with costs, complications, risks, and lowlikelihoods o success. Un ortunately, the avail-able options reect the difficulties acing theUnited States when it comes to Iran, rather than apaucity o thinking on the subject. Perhaps somenew Kennan or Kissinger will emerge to revealthe answer to Americas Persian dilemma, but itseems unlikely. Washington is probably limited to variations o the nine approaches considered inthis study, all o which involve heavy costs, sig-nicant risks, and potentially pain ul trade-offs. Tus, in producing this study o the policy op-tions toward Iran, we have tried to present theoptions in a neutral ashion in one place and in

a uni orm manner that allows easy comparisonsand highlights differences, and in a way that doesnot attempt to sof-pedal potential risks andcosts. We have endeavored to provide readers a

ull explanation o the options without the par-tisan distortions typical in many o the advocacypieces now cluttering the public debate. More-over, by presenting them in a uni orm ormat,we believe the reader will be able to make com-parisons across the different options and see theirdifferencesnot just in approach but in goals,

costs and benets, desired end states, and neces-sary trade-offs. Reasonable people may avor di -erent options, because they seek different objec-

tives, hold different priorities, or are more willingto pay a certain price to deal with the problem oIran, rather than because a given option is morelikely to succeed.


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S C B I 9

relationship. Teir assumption has been that Iranreacts very badly to threats, no matter how condi-tional, and only a patient, long-term effort to convince Iran that the United States is not a threat oany kind will have an impact on ehrans behavior,and then only by gradually taming the Islamic Re-public over many years, i not decades. Tis policyassumes that the United States cannot preventIran rom acquiring a nuclear weapons capability,nor can Washington coerce ehran into ceasingits support or violent extremist groups or tryingto overturn the regional status quo in anythinglike real time. Tere ore, the United States sim-ply must accept these realities in the short term,in the hope that reduced pressure and riendshipwill eventually bring about either a change in theregimes behavior, or even a change in the regimeitsel . Tis is also the policy that we call Engage-ment in this monograph.

However, since the advent o the Obama Admin-istration, other people (including many in themedia) have chosen to call the presidents new ap-proach to Iran a policy o engagement becausethe president has stated that he wants to begin di-rect negotiations with ehran. Un ortunately, this

has the potential to create con usion when consid-ering the various options available to the UnitedStates, the nine options presented in this volume.

Because the Obama Administrations start-ing policy toward Iran eatures more than just aprocess o direct negotiations, and in particular

eatures the threat o urther sanctions i Iran re-uses to meet the United States hal waya criti-

cal difference rom the usual meaning o engage-ment with Iranwe have chosen to describe

this as a policy o Persuasion instead. Indeed,the Obama Administrations policy is an updated version o an older approach that is typically re-

erred to as one o carrots and sticks; however,or reasons explained in Chapter 1, we argue that

this moniker should no longer be used to describethis option.

to detail the myriad steps that might be tried toengage or contain Iran. Tat is not the purpose othis volume. Filling in the details requires a greatdeal o in ormation about the specic circum-stances in which the policy is to be implement-edin ormation that is not necessarily availableas o this writing. Our goal was to help readers(and perhaps members o the new administra-tion) see the principal differences among the op-tions more clearly, their differing objectives andend states, their differing costs and risks, theirdiffering responses to the threat rom Iran, andtheir different acceptability to various constituen-cies oreign and domestic.

Only by seeing the options in this stark orm canAmerican policymakers accurately devise a policythat ts with their goals, perception o the Iranianthreat, willingness to bear sacrices, and prioriti-zation o the problem o Iran versus those o theeconomy, health care, A ghanistan, Iraq, Russia,and everything else the United States currentlycon ronts. Once these questions are addressed,the United States can adopt a policy toward Iranthat ts the bill and then adapt the basic prem-ise o the policy to the specic circumstances o

the moment. But without a clear-eyed assessmento how threatening Americans believe Iran to be,what they want to achieve, and what costs they arewilling to pay to achieve that goal, the details willnot add up to a strategy. Indeed, another o theproblems Washington has had in the past is ob-sessing about disputes over niggling details and,in so doing, losing sight o any coherent, over-arching strategy toward Iran.

A N P N

For nearly a decade, some scholars and expertson Iraq have advocated a policy o engagementwith Iran, by which they meant that the UnitedStates should lif all o its sanctions and end itsother efforts to constrain or punish ehran, andinstead try to entice Iran into a purely cooperative


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1 0 W H I C H PA H O P E R S I A ? O N A S I

because many Iranian leaders (probably includingKhamenei) see the United States as their princi-pal oe, they also seek to weaken the United Stateshowever they can. Iran is not the only countrythat has taken such a course, but unlike most,Iran will back groups that use violence to advancethose aims, including violence against Americansor against U.S. allies. Hizballah (in all its variousincarnations) and Hamas all into this categorybecause they are not just terrorists, they are in-surgentsor legitimate resistance, depending onyour point o view. Tere is abundant evidencethat Iran has provided arms to a wide range oIraqi militia and insurgent groups and that thoseweapons have been used to kill Americans; thereis also evidence, albeit weaker, that Iranians aredoing the same or the aliban and other groupsin A ghanistan who are ghting the United Statesand NA O orces there.

Efforts to Subvert U.S. Allies. Tere is strong, butnot incontrovertible, evidence that Iran has aidedgroups seeking to overthrow the governments oSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain (and arguablyLebanon and Israel as well) at various times. Tis,too, appears to be part o Irans efforts to weaken

the American position in the Middle East, but itis also probably a mani estation o the desire omany Iranian leaders to overturn the regionalstatus quo or both ideological and strategic rea-sons. o the extent that the United States sees itin its interest to have allies in the Gul , an Iranianthreat to those governments constitutes a threatto American interests.

Efforts to Block an Arab-Israeli Peace Agree-ment. Many Americansand certainly every

U.S. administration since Nixonbelieve thatconict between Israel and the Arabs threatensAmerican interests because o its potential todraw in other countries (including great powers),escalate to nuclear weapons use, overturn riendlygovernments, cause chaos and civil stri e, and a -

ect Middle Eastern oil exports. Although some

S S

Formulating a new Iran strategy is not or theaint hearted, nor is it or novices. Iran is an enor-

mously complex country, both in terms o itsgovernment and people. Its interaction with theworld is more complicated still. It is there ore use-

ul or the reader to keep certain critical actors inmind when considering the options actors thatwill likely play a role in shaping any o the optionsand Irans responses to them.

I U.S. I

A crucial question that the Obama Administra-

tion must ponder is the threat that Iran poses toU.S. interests. Not surprisingly, there is a verywide range o opinion about the extent o thatthreat. Some Americans argue that Iran does notconstitute a meaning ul threat at all, whereas oth-ers contend that it is one o the most dangerousopponents that the United States aces.

Te threats rom Iran to American interests gen-erally all under our main categories.

Support for Violent Extremist Groups. On atleast one occasion, a court o law has proven thatthe Iranian government was responsible or an acto terrorism (an assassination in a Berlin restau-rant in 1992). Beyond this, there is a great deal ointelligence in ormation indicating that Iran hasengaged in other acts o terrorism and supports arange o groups that engage in terrorist attacksincluding Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,and Hamas. Iran is widely believed to have beenbehind the attacks on the U.S. Marine and French

army barracks in Beirut in 1983, Jewish and Is-raeli acilities in South America in the 1990s, andthe American-occupied Khobar owers housingcomplex in Saudi Arabia in 1996.

Iran generally pursues a oreign policy that seeksto upset the status quo in the Middle East, and


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S C B I 1 1

leaders is hotly debated, but American policy-makers simply do not have the in ormation thatwould allow them to make a denitive judgmentone way or another. Most o Irans oreign policydecisionmaking since the all o the Shah couldprobably be characterized as aggressive but notreckless, but Washington cannot categoricallyrule out the possibility that there are truly insaneor ideologically possessed Iranian leaders whowould attempt ar worse i they were ever in a po-sition to do so.

Most other U.S. ears about Iranian weapons omass destruction stem rom concerns about howpossession o such capabilities, and particularly anuclear arsenal or the ability to build one, couldexacerbate the other threats Iran poses to theUnited States. For instance, some Americans earthat Iran might give nuclear weapons to terrorists.While there are strong arguments as to why eh-ran probably would not do so, this, too, cannotbe ruled out, and the consequences i it did cometo pass could be truly catastrophic. Another pos-sibility is that Iran would develop nuclear weap-ons and then use them against Israel or anotherU.S. ally, like Saudi Arabiawhich stands as the

great champion o Sunni Islam, opposing Iran asthe champion o Shiah Islam. Because the UnitedStates has implicitly extended its nuclear umbrellaover the Saudis, and because Israel could retali-ate almost as massively against Iran as the UnitedStates could, this, too, is only likely in circum-stances where Irans leaders are irrational or acetheir own demise. For many Americans, a more likely (i somewhatless catastrophic) threat in Irans acquisition o

a nuclear weapons capability is that Iran will beemboldened in its support o terrorism, violent

individual Iranian leaders have bravely stated thatthey would accept any peace with Israel that is ac-ceptable to the Palestinians themselves (and pre-sumably the Lebanese and Syrians), ehran hasmostly opposed peace between Arabs and Israe-lis, especially peace efforts brokered by the UnitedStates. Tere is some evidence that Iran may haveeven encouraged (perhaps even ordered) variousgroups to mount attacks that have derailed peace-making efforts. Tus many Americans perceiveIrans efforts to prevent Arab-Israeli peacemakingas an indirect threat to the United States as well.

Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction.When asked about the threat rom Iran, mostAmericans would probably start with its drive toacquire a nuclear enrichment capability, whichis widely believed to be intended to give ehranthe capability to build nuclear weapons. However,the threat itsel actually consists o many parts,only one or two o which derive rom the actualpossession o the weapons themselves. Te otherparts o this threat instead derive rom ears re-garding how Irans development o nuclear weap-ons (or just the capability to make nuclear weap-ons) might heighten the other threats that Iran

potentially poses to the United States.

Te direct threat rom Iranian possession o oneor more nuclear weapons stems rom the possi-bility that Iran would acquire a nuclear weaponand use it against the United States (either rightaway or at a time o crisis). Because the Americannuclear arsenal is vastly more power ul than Iransand there ore American retaliation would be ut-terly devastating, ehran would only do so eitheri its rulers were irrational or they believed that

doing so was the only way to save their own livesor the regime. 11 Te rationality o various Iranian

11 Certainly, there are Americans who believe that some Iranian leaders are irrationalin particular, that they subscribe to a millenarian visiono the world in which they must take apocalyptic actions to ulll Gods plan. However, most experts on Iran are doubt ul o this prospect or,more important, that such zealotry would guide Iranian actions.


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Americans eel, the more they should be willingto give to eliminate it.

Indeed, one reason or the wide divergences amongAmericans on Iran policy is that some nd Iran

ar more threatening to U.S. interests than do oth-ers. I one believes that Irans leaders are irrationalor ideologically blinded to the point where theywould use a nuclear weapon i they possessed one,then such a level o concern would likely cause oneto support the most extreme options. Tis is notto say that one should be unwilling to try one ormore o the diplomatic or regime change optionsrst, or even try airstrikes be ore going all in. Buti these efforts ail, such a perception o threat maywell lead to the conclusion that the costs o an invasion are more palatable than the risk that Iranwill employ a uture nuclear arsenal.

o some extent, the converse is also true: thatones devotion to a particular option typically re- veals (at least it should reveal) ones perceptiono the threat rom Iran. Tose who ervently em-brace the diplomatic options but re use to coun-tenance any o the military or regime change op-tions are implicitly declaring that while they may

not want to see Iran acquire a nuclear capability,they are not so concerned about it that they wouldbe willing to endure the costs and risks associatedwith covert action, airstrikes, or an invasion. Eventhe most optimistic experts recognize that it willbe difficult to convince Iran to give up its nuclearprogram through diplomacy alonewhether byengagement, inducements, sanctions, or somecombinationand so stopping at diplomacymeans leaving considerable probability that Iransnuclear program will not be stopped.

V

Te Iranian political system is one o the mostcomplex, Byzantine, ragmented, and opaqueon earth. Consequently, summarizing even justthose elements relevant to a consideration o U.S.

militant groups, efforts to subvert American al-lies, and efforts to overturn the Middle Easternstatus quo. In other words, once Iran has a nu-clear capability o some kind, ehran will believethat it is sa e rom retaliation by the United States,Israel, or any other country, and so it will pursuea wide variety o aggressive actions with ar ewerrestraints than in the pastwhich would likelylead to various crises, including con rontationwith the United States. Te acquisition o nucle-ar weapons or a nuclear weapons capability hasmade some countries behave more responsibly(China and eventually Russia), but in other cases,it has either not changed their behavior appre-ciably (North Korea, South A rica, and arguablyIndia) or has made them more aggressive (Russiaunder Khrushchev and Pakistan). Here the con-cern is not so much that Iranian leaders wouldact irrationally, but simply that they would be-come even more aggressive, and would overstepand miscalculate. Over the past 30 years, thereis no question that, whatever their intentions,Iranian leaders have acted aggressively (at least

or periods o time) and have ound themselvesin extremely dangerous positions that they didnot envision when they rst set out. A nuclear

capability would vastly increase the potentialramications o this kind o behavior or Iran, itsneighbors, and potentially the United States. AsAmericans learned during the Cold War, crisesbetween two nuclear armed states are extraordi-narily dangerous events and should be avoided iat all possible.

O

o a very great extent, ashioning a new strategy

toward Iran should be driven by Americans per-ception o the threat that Iran poses. Americanwillingness to tolerate the threat posed by Iranmust be weighed against the price o eliminat-ing the threat. Te less Americans eel threatenedby Iran, the less they should be willing to pay toeliminate the threat; and the more threatened


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S C B I 1 3

Tose Iranians whose sight is set more inward tendto paint a different picture. Te Iranian economyis a mess, with both ination and unemploymentapproaching 30 percent. Iran remains completelydependent on oil exports or its economic liveli-hood, but the low price o oil and projections odramatic declines in Iranian oil production (aproduct o mismanagement and the inability tosecure Western technology because o the sanc-tions) are drastically curtailing ehrans princi-pal revenues. Irans oil woes make the impact oboth rampant corruption and the internationalsanctions ormal and in ormal, multilateral andunilateral ar worse than it already was. Nor domost Iranians see a remedy in their political sys-tem. Te regime tightly circumscribes both whomay rule and what actions they may take. In 1997Iranians elected Mohammed Khatami presidentbecause he espoused the Lefs vision o ar-reach-ing change. However, Khatami ailed to bringabout the change that Iranians sought, so in 2005they went to the polls and elected Ahmadinejadpresident, believing that he would deliver theRights version o ar-reaching change, at least interms o extensive economic re orms and an endto corruption. He, too, has ailed and has actually

made the economic problems ar worse.

Irans economic woes, and the vulnerability to ex-ternal pressure that they create, have gone so aras to push its political leadership to consider en-gaging the United States directly in ways it neverhad in the past. Statements by a variety o Iranianleaders, including even Ahmadinejad, suggestthat Iran would be willing to engage with repre-sentatives o the Obama Administration directly.It should be noted that Iranian officials met with

members o the Bush 43 Administration, both co- vertly during 2001-2003 to coordinate policy onA ghanistan and overtly in 2007-2008 to discussIraq. Tus the willingness to meet is not new, butwhat does seem to be is a willingness to discussthe U.S.-Iranian relationship itsel rather than thenarrow mechanics o a particular mutual interest.

policy options toward Iran is a daunting task, onethat requires a tremendous amount o generaliza-tion and superciality. Nevertheless, it is impor-tant to remember that achieving Americas goalswith Iran will not be a unilateral exercise: the Ira-nians get a vote, too. Ultimately, success will de-pend on how Iran reacts to U.S. policy initiatives,how Washington responds to ehrans moves, andhow each side eels about the others subsequentactions down the road. For this reason, it is use ulto have at least a thumbnail sketch o some key

eatures o the Iranian political scene, and howIranians see the United States.

It is always dangerous to try to generalize aboutIranian opinion because, more than in mostcountries, Irans people and its establishmenttend to have widely divergent views on almostany issue imaginable. But rom the broadest ap-erture, Iran seems to see itsel as simultaneously very strong and success ul, and very weak andtroubled. o some extent, which one an Iraniantends to emphasize ofen reects his or her pri-mary concerns. In the international arena, many Iranians see

themselves as quite strong and are proud o hav-ing made important gains. Tis is certainly thecase or Irans radical hard-line leadership, such asPresident Ahmadinejad and the commanders othe Revolutionary Guards, who see Irans efforts toput together a rejectionist ront against the UnitedStates and its allies as having made great progressin recent years. Irans two most immediate threats,Saddam Husayns regime in Iraq and the alibanregime in A ghanistan, are gone, and the U.S.military is bogged down in both places, limiting

its ability to threaten Iran. Te hard-liners per-ceive the military clashes o Hizballah and Hamasagainst Israel as having redounded to Irans benetand play up the popularity o AhmadinejadandIrans allies, Hassan Nasrallah o Hizballah andKhalid Meshal o Hamasamong the Arab popu-lace as urther signs o Irans strength.


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ractious actions. Khamenei seems to be deeplysuspicious o the United States, and he may sharethe ideological sympathies o the hard-liners, buthe also seems to recognize the economic realitiesemphasized by the pragmatists. Tis has placedhim on the horns o a dilemma, and his tendencyhas been to avoid dramatic decisions in avor oone camp or another so as to preserve the statusquo in the hope that this will prevent a dangerousinternal political schism without doing too muchharm to either Irans economy or security. It is thesum o all o these parts that creates a system thatmost Iranians describe as operating according tothe laws o inertia: a body at rest will remain at restunless acted on by an outside orce, and a body inmotion will remain in motion unless acted on byan outside orce. In other words, the complexityand rivalries o the Iranian system predispose itto try to keep doing what it has been, and thusdramatic change requires enormous effort. Giventhat Americas goal is to change at least Irans be-havior, i not its capabilities or even the very na-ture o its regime, there is a very high threshold

or success.

I S

Although it sometimes eels as i the United Statesand Iran exist in a vacuum, they do not. Becausethe rivalry has played out in the economically vitalPersian Gul region, and because both sides haveattempted to enlist support rom a wide array o

oreign powers, nearly everything about Ameri-can policy toward Iran involves the participationo other countries. Many o the policy optionspresented in this volume are impossible withoutthe ull-throated support o dozens o other coun-

tries. Even those options that attempt to rely sole-ly on the unilateral abilities o the United Stateswould greatly benet rom oreign supportandcould be badly undercut i key countries choseto actively back Iran. Consequently, the perspec-tives o other nations regarding Iran and the U.S.-Iranian con rontation are also important actors

All that said, it appears that Irans leadership hasso ar only made a tactical decision to discussthese issues with the United States, but it has notyet made the strategic decision to compromise onthe issues that matter to the United Statessuchas the Iranian nuclear program and support or violent extremist groups. o some extent, this isprobably because ehran is not sure what Amer-icas goals and intentions are, and they do notknow what Washington is offering (or threaten-ing). Whatever else is going on, it is highly likelythat the Iranians will not cross that bridge untilthey have entered into a process o negotiationsand can see what is on offer. It is worth keeping inmind that bazaar marketis a word o Irani-an origin. And in Iran, the bazaar is always open.

Beyond this, however, ehrans approach almostcertainly reects the nature o politics in Iran to-day. As we have noted, the Iranian polity is rivenwith actions, and alliances coalesce and splinterwith stunning regularity and alacrity, all o whichmakes it extremely difficult to hold togethera broad political coalition capable o effectingmeaning ul change over time. Moreover, manykey political gures align on opposite ends o the

political spectrum on crucial issues. Te hard-liners tend to avor a patronage approach to theeconomy, view improved relations with the Unit-ed States as anathema, and promote Irans nuclearprogram as an economic/diplomatic/securitypanacea. Irans re ormists as well as its more prag-matic gures avor privatization o the economyand view better relations with the United Statesas critical to securing the trade, aid, and invest-ment that the Iranian economy desperately needs;and while they would like to retain at least some

aspects o the nuclear program, they have showna much greater willingness to accept limits on itin return or better international economic anddiplomatic relations. In the midst o all o this sitsAli Khamenei, Irans supreme leader, who is by

ar the most power ul gure in the Iranian systembut has pre erred to rule by balancing all o Irans


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S C B I 1 5

but these have not yet been orthcoming. o someextent, the GCCs reticence so ar may have been

allout rom the ham-sted regional actions o theBush 43 Administration, which so alienated theArab masses that it made it difficult or Arab gov-ernments to publicly associate themselves withanything that the United States was leading. Inprivate, GCC rulers have lef no doubt that theydo not want to see Iran develop a nuclear capa-bility o any kind, earing that it will encourageehran to redouble its efforts to stir up the down-

trodden Shii populations o the GCC, encourage violent extremists in the region, and otherwise tryto subvert or overthrow the conservative mon-archies o the Arabian peninsula. Nevertheless,the GCC states have been equally clear that theywould not support an American (let alone Israeli)military operation against Iran, which they earwould end up creating ar more problems than itwould solve.

Te government o Iraq is still too ragile to bemaking waves internationally or picking riendsand enemies among its neighbors. Moreover, be-cause o Irans lingering inuence in Iraq and theties o many Iraqi politicians (Shii and Kurdish) to

Iran, Baghdad has been wary o involving itsel inthe international dispute over Irans nuclear pro-gram. Yet it should be noted that as evinced by theoverwhelming popular support or Prime Min-ister Malikis offensives against Iranian-backedmilitias in al-Basrah, Sadr City, al-Amarah, andelsewhere, most Iraqis retain their traditional dis-like or their Persian neighbors. Few Iraqisandprobably ew o the current Iraqi leaderswouldwant to live next to a power ul, aggressive Iran ithey could do anything about it. But they cant.

While Iraq has made tremendous strides orwardrom the civil war o 2005-2006, its domesticsituation remains precarious. Most Iraqi leaders

ear that the U.S.-Iranian riction might escalateto actual conict (overt or covert) and would be

ought out in Iraq, where Iranian agents and prox-ies would likely try to mount a major campaign

or Washington to consider when devising a newstrategy toward Iran.

Once again, because the problems between Iranand the United States touch on numerous differ-ent aspects o the oreign, economic, and secu-rity policies o many nations, simply describingall o the potentially relevant points about everyother country and how it might react to variousAmerican strategies toward Iran would ll many volumes. Nevertheless, it is use ul or the readerto bear the basic points in mind when weighingthe various options addressed in this monograph.

Irans Neighbors. None o the countries o theMiddle East or South Asia are enthusiastic aboutthe prospect o ehran acquiring the ability tobuild nuclear weapons, let alone an actual arse-nal. Nevertheless, their reactions have tended torange rom studied indifference (Pakistan, India)to deliberate silence (Iraq, A ghanistan, Armenia)to private panic ( urkey, Saudi Arabia, and theother Gul states). Yet their willingness to coop-erate with the United States does not always cor-relate with either their public or private positions.

Te states o the Gul Cooperation Council (GCC)are both the most concerned and potentially themost inuential American allies in the region. Inpublic, they have tended to say little, althoughthey have announced plans to match Irans drive

or a nuclear energy program as a lightly veiledwarning to ehran that its continued pursuit onuclear enrichment could touch off a regionalarms race. Te Gul states have done relatively lit-tle to promote diplomatic efforts to sanction eh-ran, to counterbalance Iranian inuence in Iraq

and A ghanistan (although the Saudis have been very active in Lebanon), or to buy the supporto other countries or tougher measures againstIran. For example, a ew large GCC weapons ortransportation purchases rom Russian compa-nies might go along way toward changing Mos-cows perspective on the Iranian nuclear program,


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more important to prevent Iran rom completingits nuclear program or to avoid urther sanctionson Iran.

One group o European countries, led by Franceand Britain, has pushed hard to impose morestringent sanctions on Iran to convince it to haltits nuclear activities. Tis groups motivation hasbeen primarily the preservation o the globalnon-proli eration norm and only secondarilythe preservation o stability in the Middle East.Its argument typically has been that Iranian ac-quisition o nuclear weapons (and again, thesecountries are convinced that this is the aim o theIranian nuclear program) would be the straw thatbroke the camels back o the Non-Proli eration

reaty and would spur numerous other countriesto acquire nuclear weaponseither to deter Iranspresumed arsenal or merely because there was nolonger any reason or them not to do so. Tese na-tions have pushed not only or stronger action bythe UN Security Council but even or multilateralaction by the European Union outside o the UNprocess.

Another group o European countries, represent-

ed principally by Germany and a number o Med-iterranean states, has tended to emphasize theirdistaste or sanctioning Iran. On some occasions,this group has argued that continuing trade withIran is the best way to ameliorate Iranian behaviorover time (an idea embodied in the Engagementoption; see Chapter 2). At other times, it has ac-cepted the principle o sanctioning Iran but, whenit came to putting words into deeds, opposed allbut the mildest actual restrictions. And on stillother occasions, officials rom this group have

simply acknowledged that their publics have aphilosophical aversion to sanctions and their gov-ernments are not strong enough to go against thepopular will. Whether their position is principledor simply politically expedient, these countrieshave stead astly resisted placing urther pressureon Iran and are likely to do so in the uture.

against the American soldiers who will remainthere until at least 2012. Tus Iraqs greatest pri-ority has been avoiding any dispute between Iranand America that could escalate to ghting andturn Iraq into their battleground. A very similarsentiment has guided A ghan silence on the issue.Farther aeld, Israel may be the only country inthe region unhappier than the GCC about Iransprogress toward a nuclear weapon and what thiscould mean or Iranian support o terrorists andother violent extremist groups. Israel has beenlocked in almost daily combat with Iranian allies(Hamas, Hizballah, and the Palestinian IslamicJihad) or over 25 years, and Jerusalem ears thatan Iranian nuclear capability will motivate eh-ran to encourage its allies to increase their at-tacks on Israel. Some Israelis even ear that Iranwould use nuclear weapons against them as soonas it acquired a small arsenalor would give theweapons to terrorists to do soposing an exis-tential threat to the tiny Jewish state in the literalsense, since a ew well-placed nuclear weaponscould obliterate nearly all li e in Israel. In pub-lic, many Israeli leaders have threatened to attackIran to prevent it rom acquiring such a capability.In private, however, they unanimously state that a

diplomatic resolution would be pre erable, that amilitary strike would probably only buy them twoto three years, and that they hope they will neverhave to decide whether to conduct such an opera-tion, both because o the difficulties involved andthe potential or Iranian retaliation.

Europe. At some level, European leaders seemto agree that Iran should not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapons capability (and there isremarkably widespread agreement among them

that Irans nuclear program is meant solely to ac-quire weapons), but they also agree that it wouldbe pre erable not to impose harsher sanctionson Iran and that the use o orce would be di-sastrous. European unity dissolves beyond suchbland platitudes. In particular, different Europeanstates take very different positions on whether it is


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S C B I 1 7

important sources o weapons or Iran, includingnuclear sales rom Russia. Russia and China areimportant trading partners with Iran, and Chi-nese businesses especially have moved into Iranto scavenge all o the business deals that Westernrms were orced to abandon because o the sanc-tions. Tus, i Russia and China were to ollow theWest in sanctioning Iran, ehrans already pre-carious economic situation might turn downrightperilous.

In particular, the Persuasion approach wouldgreatly benet rom Russian and Chinese will-ingness to impose harsher sanctions on Iran, andbecause the Obama Administration has alreadyannounced that it will pursue this option, Mos-cow and Beijing hold potential trump cards overAmericas course. I Russia and China cooper-ate with the United States, Iran will come undermuch heavier pressure; this may or may not beenough to convince Iran to change course, butit certainly will give Washington reason to stickwith this policy or some time. However, i Rus-sia and China oppose the United States (which, ineffect, would be siding with Iran), not only wouldit be ar more difficult or the strategy to work,

but also the United States will likely drop it muchaster and turn instead to different options thatrequire less international cooperation.

Both Moscow and Beijing have publicly statedthat Iran should not be allowed to develop the ca-pability to make highly enriched uranium, whichis the key ingredient or a nuclear weapon. (TeIranians probably already have that capability, atleast at the theoretical level.) In addition, despitethe insistence o many experts and most Iranian

officials that they would not do so, both Russiaand China agreed to re er Irans nuclear programout o the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) and over to the UN Security Council.Tey then proceeded to vote in avor o our Se-curity Council resolutions against Iran enactedunder Chapter VII o the UN Charter (which

I Irans nuclear program is a topic o great im-portance or Europe, ehrans involvement withterrorists and violent militant groups, let aloneits efforts to overturn conservative Middle East-ern governments and block an Arab-Israeli peaceprocess, stir little European passion. Many Euro-peans believe that Irans activities in these variousareas are unhelp ul, even dangerous, but they donot seem to have the same power to galvanizeEuropean opinion (let alone action) as much as

ehrans nuclear program does. Tis is an impor-tant area where Europe tends both to be internallyunited and o a different mind than the MiddleEastern states. Consequently, con rontational po-lices toward ehran can ofen elicit at least somesupport when they are tied to Irans pursuit o anuclear weapons capability but nd little back-ing when meant to respond to Iranian activitiesin other areas that the United States considersalarming. While Europe is united in its opposition to Iransnuclear program (i not in the method to stop it)and in its indifference toward Irans support omilitant groups, it is divided over the nature othe Iranian regime itsel . Te Islamic Republic is

brutal, oppressive, repressive, intolerant, paranoid,and prone to widespread human rights abuses. Al-though it ollows some democratic practices (suchas relatively competitive elections), its adherenceto otherssuch as transparency, accountability,the rule o law, the protection o minorities, ree-dom o the press, reedom o religion, reedom ospeechranges rom questionable to nonexistent.Tis morally odious behavior is irrelevant to someEuropean regimes and o paramount importanceto others. Te Scandinavian states in particular are

staunch advocates o human rights, and or them,the Iranian regimes treatment o its own citizenryis a matter o great concern.

Russia and China. It is widely believed thatRussia and China could play critical roles in anew American strategy toward Iran. Both are


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come down on will be determined by who iswilling to offer them the more enticing deal. Bothcountries see Irans acquisition o nuclear weap-ons as potentially dangerous, but both see the op-portunity or economic benets rom trade withIran. For its part, Russia is largely unconcerned byinstability in the Middle Eastin act, problemsthere actually can help Russia by driving up theprice o its own oil exports. Moreover, or reasonso pique and pride, Moscow relishes tweaking its

ormer superpower rival as a way o orcing Wash-ington to pay it the respect that Russians eel theydeserve. In private, Chinese officials will bluntlysay that their strategic concern with Iran is energyresources. Te Chinese simplistically believe thatbecause oil is a nite resource, they must secureaccess to as much o it or themselves as they can(and so prevent others rom consuming it) to en-sure their continued uture growth. Because Iranis a pariah to so many countries, ehran is will-ing to cut the kind o deals with Beijing that makeChinese planners happy, in return or Chinesediplomatic support. Te Chinese have repeated-ly told Americans that a precondition o greaterChinese support or harsher sanctions againstIran is American cooperation on energy supplies.

C

Te passage o time lends urgency to the need oran effective new Iran policy. Te Obama Admin-istration may well have the last opportunity to trymany o the policy options detailed in this study.Te November 2007 National Intelligence Esti-mate on Irans nuclear program warned that it waspossible (albeit very unlikely) that Iran mightbe able to produce enough highly enriched ura-

nium or a nuclear weapon by 2009, although theperiod 2010-2015 was a more likely time rame.12

In March 2009, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chair-man o the Joint Chie s o Staff, stated that based

makes the resolution binding on all memberstates and is the chapter under which uses o orceare authorized). Moreover, two o these resolu-tions included sanctions against various Iranianindividuals and entities, again something thatmost experts and most Iranians never expectedRussia or China to support. Tus, over the pastve years, Russia and China have taken some veryimportant steps to counter Irans ambitions to be-come a nuclear power.

Yet, Russia and China have continued to do busi-ness with Iran and have not prevented or evencautioned their own companies against doingso. In act, Chinese rms have aggressively at-tempted to expand their business in Iran. Like-wise, Russia completed work on Irans Bushehrresearch reactor, which many believe to be a rontthat ehran uses to conduct research into morene arious nuclear activities. Russia has also dis-cussed selling Iran advanced S-300 sur ace-to-airmissile systems, which would make it more diffi-cult or Israel and the United States to strike Iransnuclear acilities. Te Russians and Chinese havestead astly re used to approve the kind o sanc-tions against ehran that could put real pressure

on its teetering economy. In other words, theRussians and Chinese have done ar less to hin-der Iran than they mightor that their rhetoricwould have suggestedand a great deal to helpIran, while also helping their own nances. Nei-ther has shown any willingness to take ehran totask or its support o terrorism, opposition to anArab-Israeli peace, and other efforts to upset theMiddle Eastern status quo, let alone or its humanrights abuses.

Many Western experts on both countries haveexplained this behavior by suggesting that Rus-sia and China have conicting interests whenit comes to Iran, and there ore, which side they

12 National Intelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.


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S C B I 1 9

throughout the Cold War suggests that Wash-ington might still be able to pursue this strategytoward ehran in some orm, the same examplealso suggests that this would have to be ar morerestrained than many o its current partisans hope

or today. Tus it may well be the case that theObama Administration represents the last chance

or the United States to adopt an effective newstrategy toward Iran that could eliminate the needto conduct the grand experiment o trying to seei Americans can indeed live with a nuclear Iran.With that in mind, we believe it absolutely criticalthat Washington and the American people havea clear sense o what each o the different optionsentails, what it would require, and what it mightachieve be ore deciding which path to take.

on the ndings o the IAEA, he believed that Iranalready had sufficient low-enriched uranium tomake enough ssile material or a single nuclearwarhead. 13 Others have disputed that assertion,but there is no question that Iran will soon have atleast the theoretical know-how to make a weaponand most, possibly all, o the physical componentsto do so as well.

Once Iran has acquired that capability, it may betoo dangerous or the United States to attemptthe military options and too late to employ eitherthe Persuasion or Engagement options to try toconvince ehran to give up its nuclear program.Although Americas consistent support or some

orm o regime change behind the Iron Curtain

13 Steven R. Hurst, Mullen: Iran Has Fissile Materials or a Bomb, Associated Press, March 2, 2009.


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threats simply cause the Islamic Republic to digin its heels, even i doing so means cutting off itsnose to spite its ace. Indeed, in its purest orm, apolicy o Engagement would take a long-term ap-proach based on the belie that by reassuring theIranians that their ears were baseless, integratingthem into the global economy, and helping theirpeople see the possibility o a better li e or them-selves through a cooperative relationship with theUnited States and the rest o the world, ehranwould slowly change its ways, much as China did.Tese two diplomatic options are presented in thenext two chapters.

Eastern status quo. Te rst is a revamped versiono the diplomatic approach that the Bush Admin-istration mostly mishandled. It would attempt toemploy both positive and negative inducementsto persuade the Iranian leadership that changingits behavior would be both its most rewardingand least harm ul course o action. Tis approach,which we have called a strategy o Persuasion, isthe policy that the Obama Administration haschosen or its initial oray into Iran strategy. Te second is a policy o Engagement that wouldabandon sticks altogether in the belie that any


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C 1

AN OFFER IRAN SHOULDN REFUSEP

S C B I 2 3

o convince Iran to give up its nuclear pro-gram, the George W. Bush Administration

in 2005 adopted a diplomatic approach that em-ployed a combination o positive inducementsand the threat o economic and diplomatic sanc-tions i ehran re used to comply. By the timeBush lef office, the policy had not yet succeeded,although it had accomplished more than manyo its critics had predicted. Many Americansbelieve that this approach could be revived, revised, and made to succeed under a new admin-istration.

Immediately afer his election, President Obamahimsel indicated that this would be the startingpoint o his administrations approach to Iran. 14Since then, the administration has nished itspolicy review and has adopted a multi aceted ver-sion o this option.

Like all Iran policy options, this approach acesconsiderable hurdles. For this option, the rsthurdle is the legacy o the Bush Administrationsefforts and demonstrating that it ailed not be-

cause o inherent aws in the strategy, but be-cause o poor implementation. Tose who avor

Persuasion (sometimes in elicitously re erred toas a policy o carrots and sticks) believe that the

Bush Administration hamstrung the process bycombining it with elements o other policy op-tionsparticularly regime changethat ran atcross-purposes. It also eschewed key diplomaticbargains that might have secured greater interna-tional support and re used to put up meaning ulpositive incentives that could have had a greaterimpact on the actions o both ehran and the resto the international community. Persuasion also requires building a broad interna-

tional commitment to a set o power ul sanctionson Iran to punish it or noncompliance at a timewhen many countries do not see the threat romIran as a priority, and some have reason to opposesuch treatment. Moreover, in the nal analysis,this option (and the Engagement option as well)rests on the willingness and ability o the leaderso Iran to sort out their politics in such a way thatthey agree to comply with the international com-munity. Irans habitual pugnacity toward externalpressure and the Byzantine internal politics o the

clerical regime mean that any such effort inevita-bly begins with a hard row to hoe.

14 Interview with President-elect Barack Obama, Meet the Press, NBC, December 7, 2008, available at , downloaded on January 19, 2009.


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all intended to undermine the American position,topple or Finlandize un riendly governments,and otherwise reorder the region more to its ownliking. Even with a nuclear capability, ehran maystill not achieve these aims, but a greater willing-ness to try will nevertheless result in more vio-lence, mayhem, radicalism, and crises in a regionthat does not need any more. In other words, a critical threat behind Irans pur-suit o a nuclear weapons capability is that it willintensi y Irans anti-status-quo activities, whichmany Americans would argue should necessitatean effort not merely to convince ehran to halt itsnuclear program but also its support or violentextremist groups and other anti-status-quo activi-ties. Indeed, American sanctions on Iran (at leastprior to 2001) were always explicitly intended toconvince the Iranians to give up all o these prob-lematic behaviors, not merely their nuclear pro-gram. As such, this policy would mirror the goalso the success ul American policy toward Qad-has Libya, which is ofen seen as a model or howa similar approach should be applied to Iran.

A D

Tere is a critical complication in expanding thepolicy goals to encompass Iranian behavior be-yond its nuclear program: it could undermine theinternational support th

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