Passions' P rforn1ance On th Effects ofAffects1

PIULlPP STOELLGER

lntr duct ry Remark

Wh<lt is to be dis ·u ed on tbe following pages is uot a repetition of my

postdoctoral-thesis on Passi11iflil ar1s H1ssiou (P11ssir,ity by Passiou, or the turn from pas. ivity to pas. ion?). ln tead r make sollle remarks on the relevance ;n1d structure of >pa . ivity< as a phcnOtuenological c::t tcgory and give some e xamples of passivity's per(� nnanc c. In focus are form and Egurcs of pa -sivity in lc111gua,�c: how passivity i. present and effective in la nguage (resp. use of langu age) ;llld how we orient our elves in the activity-passi ity relation

in lifeworld and rcligion.The hypothesis i :passivity is omniprc ent and not

omnipotent , but quite powerful. The range of ph cnontena is stru ctured b

thre aspects: grammar, rhetoric and hermeneutics (and as postscriptum in

aesthetics). The examples are: what does it mean to be in a pas ive position ,

i.e.: t be seen and asked, to be expelled (extremely as >bare life<), and to be

(and be ome) a witness, t be suffering (for something) and finally : v- hat may it me::�n tb::tt God is in a passive position (that he suA:-ers)?

Behind this exploration and explication of >passion ' pcrfi nnance< lies the idea that religiou ymbol are symptom f basic forms of pa sivit) (in creation, in sin, in redemption or alvation etc.). Religion is a culture of passivity and tb re[� re theology needs a special ense [<lf the diverse pas. ive positions of (rel igious) life. [n this regard it may be

. helpful to develop a

hermeneutic of religion by its passions and passivitie .At least od's >pathos< and faith as passion are cru cial tl1ere. They ignify a challenge to theology to understand these >calculated absurdities< as symbols for a way to liv with and by these passivities, in ofu as they are > alviflc<, and to li e against and without: them, insofar JS th y arc >evil<.

As a tenn .in logical remark: I understand passion at first hand in the sense of the Greek >pathe<, and passivity as the Greek >pathos<, in succes i n of Aristotle. The further differences are l lta d e along l11e elaboration by -onlcmporary phenomenol­ogy mainly Lcvinas and Bemhard Waldenfcl . For this rc;,�son I do not care about the terminological ditferences between >passions<, >affect< )feelings< and >emotions< (and >mood.<). The concept of >patho < i used in an i11clusive ensc.

186 Philipp Stoei(Rer

1. ConuTwn Ways to Deal with Passions2

The easiest way to deal with the topic of >passions ' performance< would be to identify basic passions or emotions by means of which we or >the culture< are >driven<. The thesis accordingly would be: Man and culture are drir;en by pcusiot1S. This would ftt in well with quite different theories:

An existentialist view could accept that fear is fundamental for >bccorrril'lg a self< (Kierkegaard). A Heideggerian could accept that the angst of death is fundamental for

hr.tman bfe. With reference to Plato or Aristotle one n tight remember rather the bright or lucky passions to be the primum movens of culture and espe­cially of philosophy. Plato in his Symposium noted the eros as funda­mental passion moving man towards the ideas; or in antiquity the search for >luck< , hence the wish to become lucky, was the basic motivation of hu man agency.

·

Even a Freudian could agree (I assume) that men are driven by passion­ate desires, be it the desire for sex or for death.

However, dark or bright passiOI'JS make man nnoving< and they are the cause of I'I'IOVCIJWnf i11 culture. Not least of all they can be understood as the pn:mrm1 movens of religion (or to religion). Giambattista Vico for example understood fright and horror as origins of myth and religion. The effects of affects or the petformance of passions are, in this reading, ideal cognition , culture and especially rebgion.

But the common rt.se of >passions ' petformance< today rather takes place in business and politics. What for centuries was (and still is?) done by Religion is nowadays done by politics and economy : busir1css witlt fear. Apocalypti­cism is as usual as there are reasons for fear that are indefinite enough to make a11gs t out of it: the global warming (cf. the belated AJ Gore) and the economic crisis are actual versions, the nuclear danger, cold war or the m.illennium bug have been other ones before.3 In Europe it was, once ago, the forest dieback. My intention is not to argue against the serious reasons

2 ln the end of my book about Metaphors and Life-world, there remained an open question of Hans Blumenberg to Nietzsche: his philosophical eschatology is djrected by the expectation of the >super-human< (Ubermensch). May that be the reason why he could not understand >the passion<? And what would it mean >to un­derstand the passion<? It means at least to draw a distinction: the distinction between passion and action, and to ask, how they are to be related to each other. Does this imply that the passion is not an action? That seems doubtful: In the gospel of]ohn for example the passion is narrated as an action. So the question still remains: What is the passive in the passion, what is the difference to any action, if there is a difference?

3 ls terrorism capable of being an apocalyptic danger?

Passious' Pe�{lnmaure Ou the �trerts of A.{jf:cts 187

a t stake h ere. The rhetorical use of these problems is however remarka ble. They fu nction the very same way as once ago pestilence and comets did: as topics for the use of apocalyptic patterns. Fear makes busi ness >go round < , 4 aud sometimes pobtics as well.

The opposi te, or rather the supplement, works perhaps even more effec­tively : Br ight passions n ormally work better (even in election campaigns): del ight, happ i n ess and joy are the m ore effective references for affective tech niqu es (like rhetoric).

The excitements of passions are, tradit iona lly speak ing, suspic i ous . The more or less chaotic arousals have been rega rded as the grou11ds of the Fall, the origin of anarchy or the resource of sophistic argument. Temptation a nd seduction, decept ion and i llusio n are tradi tiona l top ics of the critique of passions (or emotions etc.). The dan,�er or r i sk caused by them is the re­source to argu e a��1inst them:You shalJ not derogate reason by passions!

This certainly is not simp ly wrong: Especially the scientific trea tment of passions should not be too passionate. The same applies in law or in pobtics: to b e elected si mply >by passions< or �1s a result of passio na te ca mpaigns and promises i s risk y. And i n law the judge should be free from passions fo r or against the accused. The cr i tical maxim to act and think not >by< passions i s a rule made to purify and neutralize certain commtmications from pa ssions .

Taking passions o n the other hand to be a danger and accusing them to reaso n for irrat ionality is equally reduction ist . Their driving forces and their energy wou l d be c u t off and too generally restricted as > impure<. This v. ould mean to become t heoretically blind for pass ions and emotions.5

2. To be Driven by Passions (Differences)

Is the thesis > man (or cu l ture) a re dr iven by passions< therefore tr ivial and dangerous or is it as general a s it i s worthless? In ferences and po sible dis­coveries depend on fu rther differences: a) On the one han d they depend o n the difference to the thesis that will or

cogn ition are basic and that passions are merely accidental or marginal; b) On the other h a n d they depend on the further identifica tio n of passions

a nd on the elucidation abou t which passions and hm1' they are effect ive. The val u e of the t hesis depe nds not least on the question whether a n d h ow it opens up the horizon of perception and which possib ili ties of analysis and descr iption it i mplies. In difference to a rationalist (or cognitivist) and an ethic ist (or moral) view of God and fa i th the model of p<tthos might open up other ways of attent ion , analysis a nd description.

4 Not least in Hollywood. 5 One may c::�U it >theoretical alexythyrnia<: being speechless in regard to emo­

tions and passions.

188

a) CognitiiJe and Ethical View (�f God and Faith)

A ca;<niti11e view of c ulture and rel igi on (and God) supposes that cognition and reason a re basic, but not passions . An ethical view supposes that (the more or less) fi:ee will and self-determination are basic (and passions are heteronomous). Thus, in opp osition to these t\vo alternatives, it certainly does not sound trivial to assert that the fo rms and modes ofpathos are basic, that th ey are the driving forces.<'

It is possible to exemplify this in respect to the concept of fa ith as well as in respect to the concept of God: Is God pr imarily determined by his cognition or will? Both p ossibilities have been held in scholastic theology, either by the Thomistic or by the Franciscan tradition. If God, though, ))is love« Qohn,Jungel), he prin1arily is 11ot determined by cognition or w ill , but by this passion ofbeing a >loving father<, i.e. by his passion for 1nen and their salvation . It is >love< then that moves him. It is >love< that determines the con­cept of God. One might obj ect that >love< as metaphorical a ttribute of God is not merely a passion or an emotion, but that it rather is the rational and the purely good. 7 I do not want to contradict, but at a ny rate the model for cognition and speech here is a (conceptual) metaphor taken fi·om the field of passions and emotions- no more, but no less either. Th is entails to t hink and spea k of God in the mode of pathos (in difference to ethos and logos).

The same ap plies to the concept of >faith<: If faith is not primarily cognition or agency (or will) , but a >feeling<, as Schleiermacher put it, then faith is rather a pathos than logos or ethos (cognition or will). This c ertain ly is a difference in contrast to any rationalistic or moralistic view of faith. Positively it points towards a >holistic< perspective on faith: it is n ot a no�III'ICIWII of pure reason or of free will, but a phai1w111eno11 of life, body and soul, i.e. of the whole man.

b) vVhich Passions a1'1d How?

In the theory of religion one of the important differences is, whether reli­gion is seen to be a n answer to fear (or angst) or a culture oflove and hap­piness.8 It seems to be standard regarding religions to be provoked by fear (cf. E. Tugendhat). This often is c ombined with the common op inion that religion is a >reduction of contingency< (and not a culture of contingency). Religion then is driven by fear and makes use of it in tea ching and preach­

ing. But even t hough in Lutber's theology the apocalyptic scenario (God against devil e tc.) was essential for the grammar of passions, it nevertheless

6 Remember the resistance to Freudian perspectives, they are s ignificant and symptomatic.

7 I don't ask here for the narrations (and history) of >purifying< the concept of God from revenge or anger.

8 The latter can become ridiculous as well (in religious arousals) , but that does not speak against the difference as such.

Pnssiow' Peiforlllnnre On tl1e E:ff('(/s 4 A fleets 189

is evident that t o him Chr istianity is not a relig ion of fear but of love. The medieval horizon, however, was noneth eless still vivid for him and thereby for some Lutheran theologians succeeding hi111.

ls the fear of death, at least of the eternal death, a basic passion of Chris­tianity? This would result in faith being basically a n xious . [f on the other hand love (or charity) is the answer, what was the question? How to deal with angst and fear? Tin's approach sounds reductive , because the reason for religion would always be the same, may it be death or ang t. There is noth­ing more and all culture of relig ion would become a mere compensation of this existential problem .

Amazingly enough it seems to be convincing for >observers< that religion results out of fear and angst . Religion then would be, like Oescartes put it, >whistling in the dark forest< : a rneans to drive away your fear and anxiety. I do not want to argue against this view (it is evidently reductionist). It is thoroughly m.isguiding and lead to an >understanding< of religion in com­pliance with the prejudices one already had beforehand.

The opposite though seems to be wrong as well: Does religion grow out of joy an d delight? The Epicurean worldv iew seems to be working without any religion. And in (late) moder n times, when the individual's desires and the >pursuit of happi ness < became dominant, there is no grow ing desire for reJigion to be ob served. This is an argument against a straightfmward de­duction of religion from certain 1'1eeds, like e.g. the need to compensate this or that passion . The question is not, whether religion is provoked by certain

passions, but in what sense they are relevant and form a basic dimension of human life, and of Christian religion in particular.

3. Lack of Sense for Passivity?

The question of the //leaning of passion and passivity difters from questions of their reference. The first is a rather existential question , or a hermeneutical and phenomenological one . Take for example t wo basic passivities: to be bom a11d to die. The reference is clear, but what does it mean? A description in a phenomenological sense would be difficult >at the limits of life<. And to ask >how does it feel< is also senseless , because it goes beyond any givenness.

Therefore the meaning of Christ's passion cannot only be the >end of life<. Mere death is not its rne�ming (it is never a >meaning< but the end of any mea ning at all). To give meaning , though, to his passion in retrospect is as usual as it is 1101 self-evident . To make sense out of the senseless might be arbitrary, at least as long as it is not anchored in one's ow n experience and somehow as well in the experience of the one who suffered the passion .

This is why the interpretation of this passion urges at least theology to ask for the meaning of passion and passivity ; >at least theology< , because in this

190 PhilrjJp Stoell(!el'

perspective passion and passivity are basic and irreducible expressions (in re­ligious as in scientific, theologica l language) . I n this regard theology differs from. other perspectives insofar as they may i gnore the question of passion and passivity. I t seems to me that in philosophy for exa mple activity is basic and at the center of in terests : epistemology is directed by the activity of synthesis, ethics is directed by the use of freedom and the rules and maxims of activity, and even aesthetics often seem to be directed by the act ivities named reception of art. Insofar as the active and autonomous subject is the model of perception and rational reconstruction ther rnight appear a lack of passivity or at least a lack of sense for passivity.

4. Passive l'teduction

The contrasting idea is quite simple to express: All action is reaction. Con­cerning human agency this mechanical model, though, is i nsufficient . Hence one bet ter says: All action answers to a question (Gadamer); or is response to a challenge (Collingwood); or i t is response to a precedent affection or pa­thos (B. Waldenfels).9 The antecedent to any action then i s a passion, which provokes the action and shapes it . If one is blamed guiltless, the response will show by i ts >sound< how one feels and thinks about the accusation .

The n1.odel is simple and quite general : Every >interaction< corresponds to a precedent action, which is given as passion and provokes a response char­acterized by the passions.

The <jfect of the m.odel is to open up the hor izon of description and in­terpretation: One has to ask for every action in an in terac tion, in how far and to what extent it is a response to its antecedent. »What was the ques­tion , the challenge or the pathos (even t) beforehand?<< One might call this question and this mode of interpretation a >passive reduction<: asking back to the antecedent passivity and the underlying passions of a response.

By the way: Every i n teraction thus can be seen and interpreted also as il'tfe1passion: as a corresponding play of passions. This underlying dimension of passi on and passivity of every interaction is usually invisible or laten t . To make it visible is to work on the manifestation of these latencies. And to look at our interactio ns in th is regard is a work against the usual dom..inance of activi ty and the active subject. l t is a work aga i nst the >lack of sense for passivity<.

9 The differences are neglected here_

PassioiiS' Performance Or1 the C./f('(/5 cif A_tfc'cts 191

5. Grammar

The passive is a grarmnatical category, indispensable and essential for our speech, rooted in our language. A basic distinction for our orientation, in speech as well as in life, is made visible by it.

Possibly due to this reason Ar istotl.e conceptualized the pas ive as one of his ten categories.You can ask for everything real and possible , in respect to what it is passive. To aU action there corresponds a passion, to every activity a passivity. T hereby it seems to be a distinction of 11j!CI1cy:The agent is active while the patient is passive. The passive clay is formed by the active potter.

Luther made use of this Aristotelian con cept of passivity at the heart of protestant theology: The mere passive iHst[(1cari is made explicit met::lpbori­cally by characterizing the sinner as materia 111ere passi1Ja, formed by the act of God: The sinner >>non vult esse 111ateria 111ere passi11a, sed active ea operari vult quae ipsa patimdo debebat Deum sinere operari et ab eo awjJere«.1u And this soteriological thesis has a theological (i.e. epi temological) implication: >>llotitia IIOSfm de Deo est 111crc passiva«. 1 1 This shows how the grammatical dif­ference becomes relevant for the gram rnar of theology.

But what could this possibly mean: >a passive cognition< or >to be 1nerely passive<? it sounds like rnere nonsense or at least like a category mistake. Accordingly such talk of passivity resembles a certain kind of calculated category rnistake known as metaphor. Paradoxes or hyperbolic expressions are, verbally taken , nonsense, but they articulate a difference in point of view. What is said is what is shown, namely that there is an antecedent act or event in comparison to which we are in a basically passive position, be it in justification or cognition of God.lf that is uot to say that we are just clay, and if that is not regarded as rnere nonsense or mere >rhetoric<, one has to ask for the meaning of passivity in human >interpassions<.

How does it feel to be in a >passive position<, like to be seen or to be asked , to be exposed (to attention, to ridicule or derision), to be accused or hit and hurt (or even killed), or to be in sollletlriuf?, to be in danger of death (of one's own life) or to be in love?

6. Looks and Questions (Rhetoric)

It is a question of perspective: In an interaction every passive corresponds to an active.You may be seen by someone seeing you; you may be asked, by someone asking you. But to be seen and to be asked are not only grammatical markers for the passive position.

10 M. LuTHER, In epistolnrn S. Pauli ad Ga/atas Conrmerrtnrius, WA 40/l, 407, 16-17 (my italics).

11 Ibid., 1110,24-25 (my italics).

1 92

a) T!J be 1 1isible means �l t least to be corporeal (the pas iv i ty as qual ity of the pr tra materia reappea rs here in a hu rnan context) . By being corporeal one

i s sensi t ive and vulnerable. 1 2 Thus visuaJ sensi tiv i ty enta i ls that one may be touched by the looks of others, one even might be vulnera ted thereby. This is not necessar ily u n comfortable or i nvidious . I f on e fol lows the > ncoca rte­

s ian < i n tu i t ion >> l am seen and therefore I am<� , l -1 one m ight experience the looks of others as a foundation of one 's own existence. Such an exhibi t ion­ist inc l ination is probab ly not the rule. I assu me the contrary to be more common: To be seen , to be exposed to the looks of o thers, i s a n u ncom fort­able position . 1 4

I n regard to passivity >to be seen< entai ls questi ons l i ke » How does i t feel to be seen« and »What does i t provoke?« By the response to the looks of others one shows how it feels ( intentionally or not) . Mak ing one's passivity visible this way i s wha t I eaU the performance of this passi vi ty. This appl ies to passions l ike showing yourself, making yoursel f vis ible, publ ic :md present (by texts or by pictures) .

I n a theologica l context the visib i l i ty (as passivi ty) is relevant in several dimensions . The main question probably is : How does it feel to be seen by God, a lways and everywhere? To be >in God's eye< tradit ional ly is an expres­sion of securi ty (or rather certa in ty) about being safe as the crea tor takes

care for me. For the sinner, though , i t becomes dangerous, beca use every s in is seen and wil l be judged. For the saved i t can b e an express io n of soterio­logical rel a tion : To be seen by gracefu l eyes means to be saved >over t ime< ,

life long and even longer. I n a hermeneutical perspective these metaphors of >being seen< a re s ignifi­

cant, because they articulate an invisible relat ion expressed in the language of vis ib i l i ty and phenomenality. The qual ification of the passivi ty (/row I am seen , and how it feel s) i s a way of saying and showing how I relate to God

i n God's view. This resul ts i n a twofold view of myself, as s inner and justified , and a

twofold view of God, as the judge and the lov ing fa ther. The performance of the view i s its >eschatological diachronicity< as an effective view of my existence. The > loving look< makes one beloved and i t may provoke a lov­in g look back . But that is ambiguous: The des ire i n the > loving look< can provoke a withdrawa l , because the desire a lso i s a burden and might be u ncomfortable . To be >wanted< (dead or a live; or for mi l i tary service; o r for any other >service<) i s a demand or even a clai m. l t cou ld be experienced as an a ttack.

12 Cf. H . BLUM ENBERG, Beschreibung des Nfenschen (Frankfurt a .M . : Suhrkamp, 2006) .

1 3 I am on TV and that's why I am; I am online etc. 1 4 Facebook and YouTube are counterexamples!

Passiom ' PC'�fomw��ee 011 the E:ffccts of �ljerts 1 93

The v iews of others have a n impact on the >me< (as part of the sel f) . This is wel l known since Mead and l�ca'ur. There i s a performance of the self as i t is viewed by others: These looks make me reflec ting about them; they change my behavior; they are fel t and the reby are directi ng (or partly de­termin i ng?) my way of l ife. llecoming a self means to integrate these views of others i n one's own (self)perception . H ow nught this happen ? How do I i n tegrate >to be seen< i n my own view? The usual answer is : By reflection . By means of reflection I an tic ipate the others in my own consideration (like in an in ternal dia logue) . The passiv i ty created by means of self-reflection , though, can n ever take the place of the others w h o are external and foreign to my self.

I n theology the problem reappears: I s it possible to integrate > to be seen by God< in one's own self-relation ? The usual answer i s given by reference to consc ie nce, because i n my conscience the voice of the other is present to me all the time. But protestant theology i nsists on the irreducible exter­nality ( 11erbrnn extemu111) as well as on a certain strangeness of God (iustitia aliena) . T he passivity i n relation to h i m therefore can n ever be reduced to a n i n ternal relation of the self. Why and what for?

I suppose it to be self-evi dent that >to be seen by others< remains different from self-perception and from a ny i nternal >image< of the others or from the an tic ipation of the ir looks (on me) . There i s or even has to be drawn a distinction between the other and the image of h i m or her created by oneself. I ntegrated in the self there i s an image of the other a s an imaginary presence of h is or her look. To draw a distinction here means to make an > iconic difference< connected with a certa in iconoclastic gesture. Like in regard to God his metaphorical or p ictoria l image is not h i mself, what i s more or less self-evident in the Jewish-Ch ristian tradition. 1 5 To insist on this difference also i n regard to other others (than G od) is to i nsi st on the differ­ence of an internal and an external passivity. l would l ike to i nsist on i t for the sake of saving the >otherness< (iustitia aliena) as well as the openness of the self (as creature, as sinner, as human beings i n need of justiftcation) .

b) To be asked i mpl ies to be p u t in a passive position, exposed to a question with out any choice or possibi l ity for delibera tion beforehand. The person asked lands i n the perspective of an expectation: H e or she is expected to give something, nam ely answers or responses. There is a kind of obliga tion to become active. This position of passivity is fundamental for the person who is asked to answer. One of the worst cases probably is to be asked

1 5 The sacramental or kerygmatic representation as mode of > real presence< i s another question , not to be di cussed here. Also the reverence for Christ-icons in the orthodox tradition, as grounded in the decisions of the 7'h ecumenical Council in N icaea (787) , raises questions on how precisely to describe tlus iconic difference in regard to God, or rather hrist and t h e icons depicting him.

1 94 Philipp 'toell'(er

>Why?< , 1 c' or even worse : >What for?< a nd fina lly : >So what? < . 1 7 The more genera l the qu esti ons are, the more i mposs ibl e the answers . I n due course the posi t ion of be i ng asked can become qu ite inconven ient .

Already the ordi na ry q u estion >> Does God exist?« 1 H anti cipates a n a.nswer (dependi ng on the quest ioner) , bu t befo reha nd appli es the task of a nswer­ing to the quest i oned other. The >p ious< question »Do you believe i n G od?« is no l ess u ncomfortable, because it con fron ts with the task to confess o r not. I t already i s a mode of response , i f o n e withdraws from such a position or ignores or rej ec ts th e question .

The performance of questio ns , espec i a l l y o f th is kind, i s remarkable: Great , too great questions swallow you u p , s o that you m ight wish for t h e earth to swallow you up. Or they challenge you and you accept the battle . However, the question provokes reac t ions or responses. Of course, these responses are active and m ore or le s spontaneous . The situation beforehand, though , i s one of >being as becomi ng<: You are brought into a passive posi ti on by a quest ion . If you are asked or questio ned , if you are s een , you become and you are exposed , no matter if you want it or not. It overwhelms you before any consideration and withou t being asked before . Even i f someone is i n the position to >be asked < (like a teacher) or wish es to be asked (like a poli tician) , hence even if it does not feel >uncomfortable< to b e asked , even then the per-j(mnance of a question remains the same: The qu estion (and the quest ioner?) puts the questioned i n a passive positiot'l . Out of this pos ition the questioned one cannot not respond . The performance i s no t only the passive posi tion in which the question ed i s put, but i t is the >activa tion< of the questi oned person . Whatever he does or does not, his reaction is a way of responding.

To ask a nd to be asked diffe r in respect to the ir ajfecti11e impact or petjor­numce: To be asked can be an uncomfortable situation . The qu estion tou ches the on e who is asked , he is affected by the q uestio n and by the one who i s asking. To be the one who is asked m eans to be affected . A n d to ask someone before one i s asked might be a way to avoid this a ffection. No t a symbol , b u t a symptom of this affecti on can b e the blush ing'9 as Charles Darwin a l ready noted :

BLUS H I NG is the most peculiar and the most h uman of all expressions. Monkeys redden fron< passion, but it would require an overwhelming amount of evidence to make us believe that a ny animal could blush. The reddening of the face from a bl ush is due to the relaxation of the muscular coats of the small arteries, by which the capillaries become fuled with blood; and this depends

1 6 I magine God is asked >why me?< - W hat should he answer? 17 A . R . BoDENHE IM E R , Wmwn ? Von rfer Obsziit1ifdl des Frage11s, 5'" ed. (Stuttgart :

Reclam, 1 999) , 80 . 18 Ibid . , 1 42. 1 9 Cf. ibid . , 70.

Passio11s ' Pciformmrce 011 tire qfjerls �f A_[jecrs 1 95

on the proper vasO-l l lOtor centre being affected . N o doubt if there be at th e same time m u ch menta l agitation , the general circulat ion will be affected; b u t

it i s not du e t o t h e action of the heart that the network of m i nu te vessels covering the face becomes u nder a sense of shame go rged with blood. We can

cause laugh ing by tickling t h e skin , weeping or frown ing by a blow, tremb lin g fi·om the fea r of pa i n , a nd so forth; but we ca n not cause a blush [ . . . ] by a ny phys ical means, - that is by any acti on on the body. It is the m i n d wh ich must

be affected.20

No other an i ma l can blush, on ly h u m a n beings :ue cap�1ble of i t . I t certa inly is not a n >abil ity< : You wn not b lush , but > i t happens<, without wil l ing or wi sh i n g. I t i s not i n tentional . lt i s a sign i fica n tly human syll lpto m o f an a f­fect (or feel ing or emot ion 2 ' ) . J.Vftere the affect is effective i s open to discus­sion . As Darw in puts it, it i s effective in the m i nd , b u t one m ight a l o ay > in the soul < , because i t is not (on ly?) an aWection of the n cms, bu t of all parts of the soul, man i fest i n the v i sible > form of the body < , the face.

The p hysiology and neuro-physiology focus on the bodily aspects, cau­sation and visi ble reaction. But psychology and anthropology can ask for the cultu ra l , mora l and not least rel igious con text a nd pragma-semantics of blushing . The inconven ience or embarrassment evidently depends on the ru les given a nd embedded i n a form of Lfe.

Blushi ng is a typical human sympto m , u sua lly perceived as the manifesta­t ion of shame. It rema i n s quest ionable though, whether o nly shame pro­vokes blushi ng. I t is a response show i ng emba rrassment, shyn ess or modesty

a n d perh a ps awe as well . 22 Even less coul d be enou gh : an i nconven i ence, l ike to be seen or to be a sked.

Remember Adam who is asked by God : »Where art thou?<< : Perhaps t here is a n i nternal voice of conscience correspond i ng to this external voi c e of God.2.l W hen Adam feels his gu ilt , the question of God i s >making it explicit< (a nd conscious) . There i s n o >bl ush ing< of A d a m (an d Eve) men tioned here. A loo k on the h istory of a rts, though , shows that pain ters supplemented this

2o C. DARW I N, »Self-Attention - Shame - Shyness - M odesty: Blushing«, i n The Expressio11 oJ Emotiot r in Man muf Animals, 20tl' eel . (Chicago : U niversity of Chicago

Press, 1 872) , 1 4H . l t fol lows: •> Blushing is no t only involuntary; but the wish to re­strain i t, by leadi ng to sel f-attention actually increases the tendency. «

2 1 The possible d i fferences a re neglected here : >A ffect < is not restricted to cau sal

affect programs, l ike facial reactions of anger or disgust. I t is u sed for the whole

range of the greek pat he a nd patl1en rata, Ia tin a_{j'ectiones. 22 We n 1.ake a diffe reuce between blush and jl.us/1 (like i n >angry flush<) , whereas

the flush is a reaction to an a rtificia l causation (pepper, etc. ) . 23 Or is it his external voice first > raising< the conscience? That dep ends on the

questi on, whether Adam had al ready a moral difference in his mind before being asked by God . l n th e mythical shape the question, whether conscience is already present in doing wrong or if is > waken < by the voice of an other, remains open.

1 96 Philipp Stoel(szer

lac k of symptom . Ge n esis 3 narra tes how i nconven ien t the passive posit ion is and i t shows that the qu estio n alone is not the origin of Adam's i n conve­nien ce . The stru cture of be i ng asked is prec isely the s i tuat ion of be ing asked

as si1 1ner. This bamartiologica] concreten ess is dec isive for the passiv i ty of Ada m 's position : » I heard thy voice in the garde n , and I was a fraid, because I was naked; a nd I hid myself<< (Gen 3 : 1 0) .

Fear (or more existentia l : angst) i s the basic passio n (shaJl one say: e moti on or affective state?) a n d h idin;< the in i tial reac tion in th is passive posi tion . I t is remarkable that this hiding is earl ier than the ma n i fest voice of God's ques­tion . Before t l 1ey even hear h i m ask ing they a l ready become awa re o f his presence, right a fter their awareness of being naked has been raised .

Here the passivities of >bei ng seen< (bei ng v isible) and > be i ng asked< come across each other, as if >being asked< is the expl ici t version of >being seen< . I n trigu ingly the (sham i ng) v i sibi l ity post lapsrm1 i s rnade manifest by the covering (»they sewed fig leaves togeth er, a n d made themselves a p rons« , Gen 3 :7) . The conseque n ce of the awa reness of nudity i s to take cover for the sa ke of h id in g o n eself (par tly) from the loo ks of each other. That they hide t hemselves from the l ooks of Cod c o mes second o nly - not by fig leaves but ( ironical ly?) j ust by >trees < (they >>h id th emse lves from the p res­ence of the Lord G od amongst the trees of the garden« , Gen 3:8) . N o bil l sh­

in,� is men tioned, but i t can be supplemented by i magi nat ion (l ike in art) . One can u n derstand the twofold h iding as reaction to a twofold pas­

siv ity : The first i s to be exposed to each other, the second to be exposed wi th the new situa tion in fron t of God. Both passivit ies are now given as conseque nces of >breaking the rules<, however this happened. In my view i t was not a >wrongdo ing< , a >malefa ctu m< (l i ke Au gustine sa i d) , bu t a drift ing by the dynam ics of a ffection and incl i na t ion , i . e. by a dynamic before and u nderneath the ma n ifest agency. Concep tually spoken: I t was a dyna m ic of pathos before and u nderneath the ethos a nd logos (a gency a n d cogn i ti on) .

TJ1e manife t effect of Adam's (new) passive posi tion is the affective and spontaneous !tiding: first as a visible means for invisibility (partly by the leaves) ; second as a h iding of oneself from >God's eye< (for a wh i le by the trees) .

F rom the fi rst one might deduce the whole ra n ge of cultural means of clothi n g, bu i ldi ngs and even i nstitutions as the arts or media (l ity) . The rela­tions to each other become i ndirect, mediated by signs a nd symbols. This indirectness i s I'I.Of simply the consequ ence o f s in and i ts a wa re ness, bu t it is the ra nge of freedom in cultural formations .

From the second one might deduce the dark sides of c u l tu re : the reason s for sha me and emba rrassment, as they a re shown i n stra tegies of hiding onesel f and rej ecting one's own responsibi l ity. It seems that i n the end (or at fi rst) a lack of rela tion , a loss of a >good conscience< or of > immediacy< to God is grounded here. However, i n this second h id i ng there arises a special passiv i ty : To be exposed to God's eye, to be seen by H i m becomes basi cally

P(lssions ' Peifon11n1 1ce 1 1 the l�fiects of A.fj"ects 1 97

inconvenient , beca use [- -le is (beforehand) seen as judge, a n d thus h is eye becomes the >law's eye < . l n this view on God as pu nish i n g j u dge a · h a n ge of grammar is manifest. This view is as ju st as i t i s w rong because it typecasts

God to the role of keeping the rules . Tins im;:�ge of God misgu i des us to a

narrow horizon of l ife, it drives us out of Ede n . This way the questi o n i ng God a nd the questioned Adam a re put into

the roles of master and slave (remember Hegel) . 24 The master is made by

the slave who ma kes h i mself a slave and thereby the master a master. This new perspective changes the whole view. M.aybe asking n o rmally imp l ies that the questioner puts himself i n the role of the master, a n d the other one i n the role of the slave who has to give an answer. I n Genesis 3 the case i s more complex: A slave of his own (of his desires?) , Adam hears the voice of God as the voice of his master, putti n g him i n the inconve nient position o f biding himself. This i s an indirect >reduplication< of Adam's i nconvenience beforeh and.

There is >so methi ng< lost, named >the Paradise < : one could call i t a pri­mordial l ifeworl d (Lebenswel t) without any difference between wi h and rea li ty, i . e. a world without desire, because there was no > lack of something< (of tim.e, of God's presence) and no difference o f l i feti me and worldti m e (cf. H . Blu menberg) . 25 Loss and lack determine the days a fter, the life in the sign

of lacking God's presence and shortage of t ime and space. Tlus position i n h istory a fter paradise is i n many respects determined by passivities, not only as givenness of certa in co nditions but also as lack and loss, that ca n not be >compensated< by activities. Even the best work or l ife cannot change the fu nda mental condition >cora m meo< a n d >deo< . A rna i n aspect of >sin< is to b e passive i n a sense tha t one c a n no t overcome this passivi ty onesel f.

7 . M ark of a Limit (Dare Life)

This irreducible passivi ty is always (in w hat sense ever) a result of one's own l ife . I t is n o t a mere >malefactu m<, ra ther it is a resu lt of bei ng misguided by the dyna mics of one's own pass ions (seduction , temptation-meta p hors) . Due to this the passivity of s i n differs from the positi on of being exp el led . An expulsion a lways leave open the possibil ity of hope (to come back

etc.) . The position most extremely i n contrast to the s i tuation of being ex-

pel led is the > bare life< (cf. G. Agamben) . It i s not the position of a s inner (in a mea ningful re l ig ious context) or a sacriftce, which is for some thing l i ke sal­va tion or expiation . Even a victim , not dyi ngfin; but because of some reason ,

24 Abou t Hegel cf. BooEN H EL M E H , J; Vantm ?, 34. 2s Cf. H . BLUMENBEHG, Leber1szeit und Weltzei t (Frankfu rt a . M . : Suhrbmp,

1 986) .

1 98 Philipp Stoel�Qer

is still in the horizon of meaning, possibly at l east . I n the extraordin<1ry case of becoming a victim for and because of noth i ng, l ife l i ke death seems to be senseless . I t i s >out of a ny order< , beyond a ny sense a n d meani ng . Bare life seems to be mere nonsense : no more sense is given and ca n be ascribed to th is posi t ion even more passive than any meaningful passivi ty. The question raised in the beg inn ing (>>What does i t mean to be in a passive posi tion ?«) fl l 1ds i ts end or l i m i t a t this point.

The m ode of cogn ition and agency of a >bare l ife< is (as Agamben puts it) inoperativeness . This could mean a situation beyond any possibility of ac ting and reasoning, beyond spee ch and feel ing. This i s the worst case of >apa thy< as it puts others at a loss for words.

The intriguing questio n is whether the ascn)Jtion of sense or meaning would be an overwhelming of such a meaningless victim? [ f Christ at the cross wou ld be a n example for >bare l ife< , is interpreti ng his death as >death for (sa lvation)< a l ready a >maki ng sense of< and theology going beyond the l imits of death ?

To ascribe sense to a victim or a suffering i s always preca rious . I t is also ambiguous as it can be an overwhel ming of the suffer ing person. But it ca n as well n1.ean to make a demand and to speak to (and of) hi m. To spea k to the >bare l ife< would then mean demanding not to stay i n this extremely passive position . I n the case of G od's de mand on the sinner, theology uses to speak o f >waking him up< . God calls the s inner out of h is old l ife.26 Can this be a model and a mode of speech fitti ng as well for the communication with >bare life <? Speaking to him is an act of communication and thereby a way to overcome extreme passivity, the isola tion of being >l i ke dead man<. The consequence would be that >to s peak to< is a way to overcome the loss of relations (i . e. of death, cf. Ji.i ngel, Tod) . The i mplications for the commu­nication with possible examples of >bare life< in society a nd beyond their l imits are obvious: susp icious inhabitants of camps, i mmigrants or as well homeless and others >out of society's order< are figures of a passivity without

possibilities. To make demands on them might be a way of opening up new possibili ties of life to them .

8 . Witnesses and Prophets (H ermeneutics)

One step bac k : The dangerous situation of a state's evidence shows that o ne is not o nly always witness of one's own life, but becomes witness of certain events. That you >become< a w itness shows that witnesses are > in becom­ing< . One could say the witness is a figure of >con tra-intentionality<: One becomes a wi tness agai nst one's own wiU and re mains it >for l i fe<. To become w itness therefore is not a question of >human agency< , but primar ily of >hu-

26 And of course sin is not to be heard in a moraljstic sense.

Passions ' Pe!fon/I C I I ICe 011 the Efli'cfs of A_{j('rts 1 99

man pass ivity< . I n contrast to al l expectati o ns , what happen s to me makes me become a w itn ess of it . This passive posit ion is eve n more i nconve nient than to be asked and seen .

T h e will'/ess of the J?OIIC, the past , i s consti tu tional Jy b te. T h e w i tn ess ap­pears, when God is gone, when the even t is over, when p resence is past .

This l a teness is qu i te normal in very speec h (or use of signs) : so meth i ng i s deno ted only when i t is a l ready gon e (the use of na mes is differen t though) . B u t the denota tion by a w itne s is late in such a way that i t is u nder sus­p icion of being too la te . H is p reca r ious diachronici ty remains doubtfu l . Without this doubt th ere would be no wi tness but s imply a > hard proof<. The witness g ives room and ti me for doubts.

The witness cif the (0111il'l.J!, the fu tu re, i s constitu tion al ly ea rly, often too early. The prophets as wel l a s Jesus always have been >anachroni tic < . They do not f1t in their time, because they bear wiwe s to another t ime (and space) , >obvi­ousl y< less rea l than the past a n d the presen t world . W hile the witness of the past has got the mell lory as >a u thentificat io n < , the wi tn ess of the coming has only his i mag ina tion , thorou ghly u n stab le . O n e can extermi n a te the past

and even easier the future by kil l ing or ignor i ng the witn esses. Therefore >witn ess-protection< is not only a question i n law b u t especia l ly in rel igion .

There is a need for a re l igion 's >witness-protection-progra m< . Prophets a re exa mp les o f a n extra ordinary passiv ity as they act on the lim­

i ts of their re l igiou s community (bu t of course in the end for i t , by opening up its horizon) . They become p rophets not o n ly by bei ng asked, but by be­ing called, eve n a ga i nst thei r wi ll (cf. already M oses) . It seems to >feel< qui te u n comfortable to be made a prophet . Bad passi o ns or fe elings and resistan ce are of course top i cs of a u then ti fication a nd re l ia bi l i ty (or of tru th) .

T hereby the n1.odel of a prop het 's destiny is a paradigm fo r the w hole o f

I srael . T h e s� ifferillj? o f the Prophet , however, i s extraordinary and someway vouches for I srael's destiny. H ence a soter io logica J difference a ri ses in the suffering by mea ns of the servan t's example (2 I s . ) : >> Suffer i ng a s chastise ­

ment is ma n 's own responsibil i ty ; su ffering as redemption is God's respon­s ibility. [ . . . ] it was He W ho had placed upo n [ srael the task of suffering for others« Y By tllis suffering, concentrated in th e >suffering servant< , thjs extraordinary passivi ty is u n derstood as redemptive, a t least for others (or

even for a l l men ?) . What h appens if such an ascription is made? H esch el see ms to read the

prophets as >tru e his tory< an� takes the texts as >narrated events< . I prefer to concentrate on the marrat1ve eve nt< (the event of narration) : I t i s a n in­terpretation of a (na rra ted! ) suffering as an effective, especially redemptive one. The i n terpre ta tion is of course bela ted (diac h ron ic i ty) and directed by a n ex post tel eological perspective . The question o r challenge lyi ng behind

27 A.]. HESCHEL, The Prophets (Ne\V York : Harper Coll ins, 1 962/200 1 ) , 1 n .

200 Philipp Stoellger

thi s a nswer m ight have been the qu estion of the m.ean i ng of I sra e l 's a n d the prophet's desti ny. Losing the land a nd the tem ple seemed to be nonse nse. Therefore it first was understood as c hastisemen t for disobed ience. But the suffering of the serva n t had to be mea n i ngful beyond that i n terpretation . The preposition >for< i n >sufl:ering for o thers< is obviously decisive: i t makes the suffering effec tive >for< oth ers, i . e. the p assivity i s made redemptive (is asked and is seen as redemp tive) by mea ns of a n ascr ipti on . I do not a r­gue here at the level of h istory a n d exper ience , bu t of rhetoric and narra­tive techn iques : There i s implied a h ermeneu tica l >disclosure< by means of wh ich a fate became tran spare n t for a sense of salvation .

Reconstru cti ng this releclul'e of the serva nt 's fate as a >making of sense< (i n a constructiv ist or co nstruction i st sense) would be too ea sy. The whole story then would come down to a >mak ing of rel i g ion < or salva tion . I t wou l d j ust be a narra tive co nstru ction of the prophetic rel igio n . The de­cisive di fference rather is made by the gest 1 1res 4 JXlsSilJity: gestu res of the non-intent ionabty of becomi ng a p rop h et ; of the >given< word o f God; of th e invo lu nta ry suffer i ng, etc . To read these gestures on ly a s narra tive

stra tegi es of au thenti fication may be fitti ng a n d plausible, but their i mp l i c it demand, their pragmatic truth-cla im wou ld then be ignore d . These gestures need fur ther hermeneu tic considera tion . I u ndersta nd them as tra its of >ex­ternity<, as pointing to an otherness , different from historical o r n a rrative figures . Putting th ings this way i rnplies adm i tti ng a (pragmatic) claim of these gestures . They a re not only (constru cted) si gni fLe rs . They a re ra ther symp toms of an experience one has not c hosen , i . e. of a mea n i n gfu l pas­sivity. The mean i ng of th i s passivi ty is given only in retrospection , by the na rra tive elabora tion of the prophet 's tHe.

P R_icceu r i n terpreted the p ro phetic subj ect as s1 tjet wn voq11e and soi man­

date.28 The prop hets become what th ey a re by the passivity of an appel; i n the na r rations of course ident ified as > H is Word< , rep resented by the Old Testa rnent i n i ts th ree parts (Tora , Prophets, Scrip tures) . They sign i fy >>l 'u n s u r J'a u tre l e moment d e l ' a ppe l et cel u i de l a reponse<c 29 For Ricceur i t i s

28 P RIC<EU R , >> Phenomenol ogie d e la Religion ( 1 ) « , in : Re1 1ue de l 'lnstitut Catlwlique de Paris 45 ( L 993) , 59-7 5 and I D EM , » Le sujet convoque. A l 'ecole des recits de vocation prophetique<• , in : Re11uc de I 'Jnstitut Catl10lique de Paris 2X ( 1 988) , H3-99, 83.

2 9 R rc<E u R , l> PI H�nomenologi e<c , 73. Here one ca n observe another use of the model of >question - answer< or >challenge - response<, now as >appeal and re­sponse< . Cf. ib id . , 60: l>Une phenomenologie peu t sans aucun doute se proposer de decrire sous ses traits les plus universellernent n§pa ndus cette stru cture de l 'appel et de la reponse qui paralt regir tant les sen timents que les attitudes. A cet egard , cette phenomenologie a u rait pur tache essentielle de clistinguer la structure appel/ reponse du rapport qu estion/reponse, e n raison de l'equivogue attachee a u terme reponse, conunun aux deux couples de corn�lat ifs . Autant le rapport question/

Passions ' Pcifflmwllcc 011 rile �tlerrs of A_ffects 20 1

crucial that the scriptu re signi ftes a n appcl of totale Ctrcm;zcte'0 (can one say: of radica l otherness?) . This reading poin ts i n the same direction , as I sug­gested. The theological question , however, is whether this >strangeness< (or otherness) is given only in the scripture or the narrative >configuration< , or whether i t rather i s a >qual i fier< given in the concept of >God<:1 1

I t wa s Abraham J. HescheJ .I2 w h o developed his own p o i nt of view (aga inst

the Deutsche Ch risten) by writ ing 1 71e 1 71eology of Pathos of the Jew ish proph­

ets . After a first part (un ti l page 28 1 ) on the preexil ic prophets there fol lows

the second (285-632) on their '17tcoloiZ)' cif Pathos and its impl ica tions for the concept of God. There is a twofold focus: on the feel ings and experience of the prophets, a n d o n their theology i n the sign of pathos. To put it her­meneuticaUy: the perfor ma nce of the p rophet i c passivity is Heschel 's >pa­thetic< theology, i .e . his elaboration of a diffe rent concept of God (originally already in the 1 930ies) : God is to be un derstood n ot as an thropomo rph ic ,

but as anthropopathic . He is a passionate God, feel ingfor and suffer i n g with

Israel . .About >The meaning of pathos< Heschel wrote:

[The ] divine pathos is not conceived as an essential a ttribute of God, as some th ing objective, as a finality with which man is confronted, but as an

expression of God's wiJ l ; it i s a fu nct ional rather than a substantia l real ity; not an attribute, not an unchangeable quality, not an absolute content of divine Being , but rather a situation or the persona l im.p lica tion in His acts .

I t is not a passion , an u nreasoned emotion , but an act formed with intention , rooted i n decision a nd detenn i nat ion; not an attitude taken arb itrarily, but charged with ethos ; not a reflexive, but a transitive act. To repeat, its essential meaning is not to be seen in i ts psychological denota ti n, as standing for a state

of the sou l , but in i ts theologic<ll connotation , signifying God as involved in

history, as i nti mately affected by events in history, as liv ing care. ·B

reponse implique, comme le rappel le Gadamer a la sui te de Collingwood, un do­maine pn�alaU/e d ' enten te comrnun, autant le rapport question/reponse a -t-i l pur fonction d 'engendrer ce domaine d 'enten te par l 'obeis ance au plan du sentiment

affecte et par ! 'invocation au plan de L ' attitude de pr iere« . JO Ibid . , 66, following Frye. 3 t Or is i t both? I s the otherness of the text of the Holy Scriptu re itself trace

of the otherness of God as suggested by M . Coons, Scriptum �ffiwx. Die &iblisch­

dogn·zatisclte Gru11dlegu11g des theolo,gische11 Systc1 1 15 bei jolw11 1 1 Andrens Quenstcdt - Ein

dogmatischer Beitrag zu 1 7teorie und Ausfegung des &i&lisrhe11 Ka11o11s als Heiliger Scll r!ft

(Gottinge n: V& R , 2009)? .

.

. .

32 1 1 . 1 . 1 907-23 . 1 2 . 1 97 2 . H e studted smce 1 1J27 m Berlt n and obtai ned his

doctora te i n 1 93 2 (the title ol l ly in 1 935) with the work Das pmphetische Beun!fJt­sein (published 1 936 in K rakau). There he a n��ysed �he >p�ophetic consiousness< as

paradigm of a >pathettc theology<, grounded m passtons (m the sense of pat/re) . I n

hi s later book T he Prophets ( 1 962) he elaborated th is concept. 33 HESCHEL, T he Prophets , 297 .

202 Ph ilipp Stoei�Qer

L t i s remarkable how dominan t the model of ethos rema i n s in th is > theol­ogy of pathos< . Th is may be a consequence of th e Neokan tian contex t of Heschel 's studies. But th i s eth ica l grou nd ing is reconceptual i zed i n his main idea of God's passion as > l ivin g care< . Here one ca n obse rve the idea o f a n

ethos developed out of pathos, out o f the ethica l consequen ces of a certa i n passio n . Passi ons ' p erform a n ce is ac t ion in be i ng the response to the pre­cedent passion . l ts petfor mance i s a lso the nwde of the p rovoked actio n : in w ha t kind of >spirit< (cf. ] . Fischer) t h e activity appe a rs .

l n my view, however, the remarkable poi nt here is the i dea of > God � pa­thos< . Even i n respect to God H eschel 's con cept is do m i na ted by His ethos, activity and hee >will < . The forma tion a nd m ean i ng of His wi l l , however, is dec isive : i t is dete r m i ned not by >the p u rest o f all possibl e reason<, n or by >essent ia l attributes< or other cogn i tive fou ndations. I t is , i n a way, >a nti­fou nd a tional ly< ,Rif;en (as well for God > hi mse l f<?) in the mode of >living care< . This means that this passion is the fundamen ta l given ness and p he­nomenal i ty of God. J t would be thoroughly rnisguiding to see it on ly as the result of cogn itio n , deliberation or other rational reasons in God . The basic phenome non (o ne co u ld probab ly say > revelation<) is nothing else than this >caring for< . It is this pass ion of God, which turns the suffe ring into a suffer­ing > for< others. That is the >reason< for this passion : I t ma kes th e su ffering transpare nt fo r a salviftc meaning.34

I n u ndersta ndi ng this passion of care one can u n dersta n d care as »the se­cret of anger« , 35 bu t a lso »anger as suspended love« . .\6 Finally, it is up to ques­tion, what it means >to be in l ove < for God (and what is happen ing in this theological ascriptio n) ? To take the risk of a thesis: Ascribing this passion to God is a response to his performance (as well to >our< pa ssi o ns ) . I t is a nar­rative gift to God, given i n the narrative configu ration (prophets or gospels for example) , refigu ri ng >Our < form of life . Understanding i t as response and gift (a nd not as a >proj ection< or >self-deception< grounding o ur p ass ion s in an i l lusionary concept) i s again a gesture of passivityY I t is a deictic mode of signification, pointing away from ou rselves back to the >whence and whither< of our experienc e . This gesture i mp li es a demand: to share i t,3R to take part, and to tnake use of tllis ascription by ta king39 it as o rienta tion i n

3 4 Here could follow a discussion o f God being asked: in the requ est for forgive-ness, and the relations of >gift and grace< .

35 Cf. H ESCHEL, The Prophets, 37 4 . 3 6 Ibid. , 378. 3 7 May one call 1t a supplementation of the prophetic or apostolic gestures? 38 That is, what shall be done with a gift . 39 This shari ng and taking part shall be u n derstood not as a n >act< out of >delib­

eration<, but rather as an >infect ion< or >ge tting involved< . One may be >animated< by i t , or not.

Possions ' Pe�fc)J'I Iraurc Q, tire f l[Tects u.f Afji•cts 203

cogn ition and agency. This would be the final perfor mance of this passion .

Heschel h i mself nny be seen as a n example for th is orienta t ion . This way the mea n ing of >re pon e to the pathos< gets i ts spec i fic accent:

I t i s the response, that w e a re and th a t we J!.ir ;e. We give a respo nse to G od i n this gesticulating mode o f n a rrations (of his pa ssio n) ; a n d we are a respon se

in o u r way of l ife.

9. C ontemplation, or: Passions in S low Motio1 1 (Aesthet ics)

1 wan t to clo e these phenomenological exercises by focu si n g o n a fu rther example of >passion 's performance<, taken from the field o f art . I n 2003 there was an exposi t ion at the Getty museum in L os A ngeles, a series of video i n stal lations by Bill Viola , 40 n amed The passions . 4 1 I n th e years be­fore, Viola had s tudied theor ies of affects from baroque times (Cha rles Le

Brun42) . This doe n ot only h int towards an iconoloxiraf ba ckground, but a lso

to the impact: t heses v ideos are p erformed affects . B u t what you see there

(at first glance) is less than you get (i nvol ved) .

In using theories of a ffects Viola desi gne d his v ideos in a u i((mogmphic tra di tion of devotional p ic tu res, especially of Masol i n o 's Pied from 1424

40 ))Born in N ew York in 1 95 1 , Bill Viola i s one of the vvorld's leading video

artists . He has been making video art since 1 970, when the first portable came ras

and recorders became avai lable. His work has ranged from single videotapes to irrunersive a rch itectural video i nstallat ions including video projections, sound and sometimes physical objects. Deeply involved in Buddhism, Viola 's preoccupations have always been the inner or spiri tual-self and the boundaries o f consciousness. Since the death of his parents and birth of his ch ildre n i n the 1 990s his work has

often drawn on his own l i fe to explore recurring thernes of birth , death, self-dis­

covery and personal transformation . Viola lives and works in Long Beach, Califor­

nia with h is wife, collaborator and manager Kira Perov and their two children . <•

(http : 11 w ww. nationalgallery.org. uk/ exhibitions/bill_ viola/ theartist .htm, accessed

A r.il 30'" 2009) . P4 , Cf. h ttp : //www. nationalgallery.org. uk/ exhibitions/bill_ viol a/ theexhibition .

httn (accessed April 30'" 2009) . 42 cf. Ch . LE B RUN, Mcthodc pour apprendre a dessiner les passio11s. proposee da11s une

confere11ce sur / 'expressio11 generale et particuliere �H i ldesheim/ Amsterdam: Ohm, 1 982 [1702] ) . Cf. Haudwiirterbuch der Seele11 1 1 1ahlem. . . z�,, ge11 1einniitzig�n Cebrauch , beson­

ders fi:ir Zeiclwcr, .Mahler Ul' ld Lr�blzaber charakterrsft.scher und allegonscher Darstellrmge1 1 .

Nebst zwei und Jutifzig i n Kupjer 1estochwen K<iJfen, die 1 1orzilglichsten Celll l:i tltsbewe­

gul1gen. uttd Leide11schajtet1 belr�tJ(md (Leipzig: Kleefeld, 1 802) .

204 PhiiljJp Stoel({!er

(pie . 1 ) "3 a nd Giovanni Bellini 's 1 77e Dead Christ supported by Ti110 Ar1gels, 1 465-70. 44

[ PjctLJ re 1 : Masol ino, Pi e ta, 1 424; M use a della Collegiata di Sant' Andrea , Ernpoli , I ta ly]

43 »Viola says that >Emergence< beg.:m with a passing idea for a p iece called >Woman Supporti ng Slumping Man<. Later, leafing through a book on the early Renaissance I talian a rtists Masaccio and M<lsolino, he came upon a cal or pbte of Masojjno's fresco showing the corpse of the dead Christ in his tomb, supported by his mother Mary and John the Evangelist. > I sketched it and put it away<, he says. > I 'm not interested in restaging historical paintings.< Still later, an image occurred to him of two w men pulling a dead man out of a well , a nd he looked back to Masoli no's composition . Dut since he wanted to embody the idea of birth, he began to imagine that as the body came out of the well, an unexplained surge of water would accompany it . << (http: / /www.nationalgallery.org. uk/ exhibitions/bill_ viola/ace_ emergence 7 .htm , accessed April 30'11 200Y) .

44 Cf h ttp:/ /www.wga.hu /art/b/bellini/giovann.i/ 1 45Y/02 l pietajpg (accessedApril 30111 2009) .

Passions ' Peifomulllce On rite Efff('rrs ufA.Lfects 205

Both hints , the iconologiGll J nd the iconogre1phic one, may make i t plau ­sible that V iola 's passiuns are rel van t i n regard to >passions' performance< : They are exempl i fications, >expressing< what they perform by showing (Greek: deixis) themselves. I n the context of contemporary video-installa­tions the point spec ial about them i s their tempora li ty. They are passions i n slow motion. Tbe video-loop is s o s low that one recogn izes the >stills< a re moving only a fter several m inutes . As ti m e goes by the figures of the devo­tional scene are moving very slowly The p icture becomes a moving p ic ture: between movie and video-sti l l .

Giorgio Agambe n n oted: >> I n front of the eyes of the unbelieving spec­tators the 1 1n1see irnaginaire becomes a ntusee cinenwtogmpltique<< . 4 5 I n Emer­j!.e11ce the time a nd the top ic a re intensified by means of slow cliachronicity. S lowing down the t ime is to perform i ntensi ficat ion. As Viola himself said: »When you watch t ime slow down l i ke that, you know, you feel the ac­tions open u p, l i ke a Aower . . .

I reali zed tha t human emotions have i n fin i te resolu tion - the more you magnify them the more they keep u n folding, in fin i tely. I bega n to sense that th se feel ings, or at least thei r residue, seem to exist outsi de of time, in some other e terna l dimension . «46 I t sou n ds as i f V ioloa >magn i fies< emotions, a s i f t h y a re bown in a m ;1 gn i fying glas . I t also sou 1 1ds a bit sublime, as i f the s low motion wou ld be a staging o f eter­n i ty. Cri t ical ears a re remi nded o f the preach ing >of rea l p resence< . Agamben aga i n sa i d (with an a ffi r l l lative acce n t) , that he saw a >ka i rologi c satu ration<47 (re membe r the >S<J turated phenomena <) .

To show wlut i s sa id , I p ick out o n e o f these videos, Elllergence (2002) . W hat you see ranges somewhere between lamenta tio n , p ieta and entomb­ment of Chri st : a scene taken from the classic repertoire of devotional im­ages. From there Eutel��er lce draws i ts performative impact : to arouse (or annoy?) the passions of grief and sublime mourning for Christ (I assume) . One could perhap ay t hat the i 1 1 1 r 1Ro { �!!,ens (the image of memory) becomes an imago patie11s, ;m > icon< of passion , i n which Christ 's pa ss ion a n d the passions of the two women are crossi ng (coinc id ing) . But what about the recep t ion of the specta tor? Are the spectators moved by an effective icon ? That, of course, i s open to discussion . I f this , though, i s the case, it raises the question , what aesthetic difference there i s i n regard to classic devotional p i ctures or to con temporary movies (cf. e.g. Mel Gibson 's T /1 C' P11ssion 4

Cltrist, 2004)?

4 5 G. AGAMBEN, Nymplwe (Berl in : Merve, 2005) , 8 . 4 6 h ttp : / / w w w. nat iona lga l l e r y. org. uk/ exhibit ions / b i l l _ v io la/ acc_si x h 4 . htm

(accessed April 30th 2009) . 47 AGAM BEN, Nymplwe, 9 .

206 PhiltjJp Stoel��?er

To me i t see ms that the slow Aow o f ti me , the i n tensification of the performan ce by slow i ng down the move me n ts, is ra ther special a bo u t this insta l l ation . The scene thereby beco mes a certa i n new >c onciseness< or >suc­

c inct ness< (in the se nse of Cassi rer's symbolise/le Pragnanz; I wou l d s� ty: > icon­ic concisen ess<) . Perhaps i t i s not a >ka i rological satu rat ion< , but ra ther an esch atological slow motion of t ime; not an aesthetic eve nt of > real presence<, but of sl ightly movi ng and of withdrawal of >the Rea l < .

l f Viola d iscovered the > infi nite resol ution< o f pa ss ions , e.g. in Leib n iz ' th eo ry of infm i te reso l u tion i n the analysi s of contingen c ies ( uerite rfejait) , then he ca n not h old the opi n ion of a g iven n ess of > rea l p rese nce< as (pe r­h aps) inten ded in the cont emplation of devotional p i c tures ( in the model of v i s io Dei) . Wha tever he might want to say, w h a t Erner'}!e11ce s hows (in my view) is the w it hd rawa l of imr nedi acy.The (infi n i te) video-loop is perform­in g the infinite mediat ion and, even more, a > real absence< . At least it is �l

paradoxatio n of p rese nce: What you see is not what yo u get , but it is m ovi ng and withdrawing i tsel f.

V iola recorded the foUowing Sufi poem i n h is notebook i n 1 976: Wi th every moment

a world is born and dies,

And know that for you ,

with every moment

com.e death and renewal .

Oahl uddin Rumi, from T he Mathnawt) . I t i s a resu lt of his stu dies of Eastern religion and p h il osop hy, especia lly Zen Buddhism and Sufi mysticism.48 Th is points to the background of the fol­lowi ng self-i nterpre tat ion:

lfl hadn't been studying texts and poems of the mystics and spiri tual masters a t

the time I started with video, I don't think I could have made as much progress . These individu als gave m e the language to understand what I was really seeing. One of the conm1on threads in all these traditions, cutting across diverse cultures, is the idea that eve rything in front of us righ t now is merely a world of appearances . I t 's only a su rface . The task is to u nderstand and master sensory experience because you need the language of the senses to help decipher this surface and pe netrate to the deeper connections u nderneath.49

48 Cf. h ttp : I I w w w. nati o nalgallery. org. u k/ exhibiti ons/bill_ viola/acc_em e r­gence4 .htm (accessed April 3011')

49 H ttp : / / w w w. nat ional gal l e r y. org . u k / exhibi tions/bill_ v iola /ac c_erner­gence4.htm (accessed April 30t") .

Passions ' Pe�fom/(lnre Ou tire E :ffects 4 Ajj"er!s 207

The probl e m of this an ti-p henomenological tu r n is the r isk to rea ffi r r n >the rea l beh i n d the surface< , l i ke in the Platonic searc h for th eternal behind th e fl ow of time . Following V iola 's self-i n terpre ta tion i t would be possi ble >to get w h a t you see< : a devotional p i ctu re i n the audiovisual media l i ty.

Craig Detweiler5 1 1 did so, followin g his obv io us des ire for a ffirma tive c on -templa tion :

Yet , his work took a decidedly Ch ristian turn w i t h The Passions, h i s 2003 show at the Getty M use u m . The emotional em phasis in Viola 's recent v,ork flowed out of the death of his father. For the first ti me, a pa int ing made him cry. Vio1a fou n d h imself d rawn to the emotio11al aspects of the Ch ristia n story, the grieving of M ary, the loss of a son . He fou n d i nspira tion in R enaissance art. Work ing with professional actors in his Long Deach studio, Viola slowed the ir a ngu ished emoti ons down to a microscopic level . Their si lent screa.rns cal l audiences to gen uine empathy.

Emergence (2003) takes us back to the anxious days j u st after]esus' cru cifixio n . Two fai thful women wai t by a tomb, united i n their grief. A ghostly vision rises fi-om the sepulchre - a bodily resu rrecti o n . V iola captu red th e wonder, maj esty a nd strange ness of Jesus' resu rrection l ike no o ther contemporary artist . H e b rou ght t h e entire scene t o life i n dramatic slow motio n .

H is impressive body of work is a t ribute to a l i fe of careful observation . H e considers art, >Doing something as a disci p l ine i n a l i fe path - walking where no one walked. < He left an appreciative audi ence with the quest ion, >Are you on the path o r j ust watch i ng i t?< When I watch a Viola video, I ' m suddenly snapped back on the path. A rt can't get much more rel igious than that. 5 1

To be visible, l ike a video, a nd to be exp osed, both i mply t o be exposed to quite clifl:erent desires . A wishful seein g tends to saturation a n d satisfaction , if not to fulfillmen t . Detwei ler 's reading is of cou rse based o n biographical evidence, but i t i s based as well in h is obvious desire . Was this al l he wanted: to >get much more rel igious<?

I wou l d h esitate, j ust to not sa tisfY my own expecta tions too fast. The ex­treme slowing down of the video's movement is not a path to eter ni ty, but a loss of im_mediacy, a n d thereby the possibil i ty to ga in someth ing different than one expected.

5° C raig Detweiler, PhD is a filmmaker, author and professor. He directs the Reel Spirituality I nsti tute fo r the Brebm Center at Fuller Theological Semin ary.

5 1 H ttp : / /www.conversantlife .com/bill-viola-video-master (accessed April 30'h 2009) . Cf. the reference to >slow dancing< : http : / /www. apple. com/pro/profues/ nuchalek ( accessed April 30'h 2009) .

Qfijnint

Passion and Passivity

Clare1nont S tudi es

in th e Philosophy of Religion ,

Conference 2009

dited by

I n golf U. Dalferth

and Michael Rodgers

I

ARTIBUS

IJ

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1 • 8 · 0 · 1

Mohr Siebeck 20 1 1

T lr is (�[fjJriiH rm mot be purchased jro11 1 a bookstore.

Con te n ts

Pref3cc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .

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, Q Lf U. DA L l "E HTl l

l ntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .

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H . ..OBERT C. ROBERTS Emotion in t h e Episte m o l ogy of Pau l t h e Apostle

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C o R N E LI A R I CHTE R M ela n ch th o n on A ff<.:ct ivi cy - Pnform3tivc Passio n . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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AMY M . SCHM ITTER Natural Pass i o ns, R easo n a n d R.c l ig ious Emoti o n i n H obbes and S p i n oza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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M I CHA E L MoxTE R Fee l i n g :md Symbolic Expre ion Schle iermacher's Fee l i n g of U l ti mate Dependen cy Recon idered . . . . . .

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THA DEKA Neuropa ·s ion Plays :

Sc hleiermacher and Affective N euro cience . . . . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . · 87

C.J. O[CKSON chlciermac h e r Through W ittgen tc in .

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Con I m rs

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M . jAMI E F ER R E l RA Passi o n , Passi ity, and I magination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 :?. 1

ARNE G R0N b . . . I) . d I) . . 1 I 3 S u � e c t1 v 1 ty, r a ss 10 n an a s 1 vny. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;-

IV

M r c L IAEL RooGERS Anxiety and the F e a r o f G o d . . . . . . . . . . .

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TER I MERRICK Won der as a haracteri t ical ly R e l igious Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . 1 69

P H I LI PP STOELLGER Passions Performance On th e Effect of Affects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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I n formation about Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . _ . . .. . . . . . . . . . :?. 1 1

I ndex of Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

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