Partition of India and the Princely States
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Transcript of Partition of India and the Princely States
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Partition and the Princely States
S.R. Mehrotra British policy before and after 1857
Governor-General Lord Dalhousie (1848-56) believed that India – as a British dependency – should be ‘one and
indivisible’.1 He wanted the princely states to disappear. So in seven years he annexed seven princely states on one
pretext or the other. This became one of the chief causes of the rebellion of 1857-8.2 As A.O. Hume wrote: ‘The
whole grand apparatus of a highly civilized government shrivelled up in a single month over a vast country … like
some pompous emblazoned scroll cast into a furnace.’3 Dalhousie’s successor, Lord Canning (1856-62), who had to
face the storm, learnt a different lesson. According to him, some of the princes, like Sindhia and Holkar, who had
r efused to join the rebels, had proved themselves ‘breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over
us in one great wave’.4 After the revolt Dalhousie’s policy was given up, and the British decided to preserve and
pamper the princes.
In the later 19th century there were no fewer than 562 states in India and they formed a good one-third of the wholecountry. They differed from each other enormously in size and importance. The sovereignty over the states was
divided between the British government and the ruler of the state in proportions which differed greatly according to
the history and importance of the several states, and which were regulated partly by treaties or less formal
engagements, partly by sanads or charters, and partly by usage. As paramount power, the British government
exercised exclusive control over the foreign relations of the states; assumed a general but limited responsibility for
the internal peace and security of the state; and required subordinate co-operation in the task of resisting foreign
aggression and maintaining internal order. The Indian state did not have any international existence. It could not
make war. It could not enter into any treaty or arrangement with any of its neighbours. Indian princes could not even
directly communicate with each other.
The territories of British India and of the Indian states were inextricably interlaced. The territories of the Indian
states were intersected by British railway lines, postal lines and telegraph lines. For each state there was a British
political officer, representing the civil authority exercised by the paramount power, and in each of the moreimportant states there was a resident political officer with a staff of subordinates. Detachments of British troops
occupied cantonments in all the more important military positions. The states maintained a number of selected
troops in such a condition of efficiency as would make them fit to take the field side by side with British troops. The
officers and men of these troops were largely natives of the state, and they were under the command of the ruler of
the state, but they were inspected and advised by British officers. All these were limitations on the powers of the
state.
The princely states were scattered haphazard over the map of India. Though the geographical layout of the states
was a patchwork, taken together they constituted a great cruciform barrier, broken by gaps of varying width, but
more or less effectively separating the different parts of British India from one another. This fact had obvious
strategic and political importance, which was underlined by Professor Coupland in the early 1940s. ‘An India
deprived of the States’, he wrote in 1943 in his famous report on the constitutional problem in India, ‘would have
lost all coherence. For they form a great cruciform barrier separating all four quarters of the country. If no more thanthe Central Indian States and Hyderabad and Mysore were excluded from the Union, the United Provinces would be
almost completely cut off from Bombay, and Bombay completely from Sind. … India could live if its Moslem limbs
in the North-West and North-East were amputated, but could it live without its heart?’5 It is interesting to recall that
as one travelled by train from Delhi to Bombay in 1947 – a distance of about 600 miles – one crossed only 70 miles
of British Indian territory, the rest was all the territory of the Indian princes.
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Most of the rulers of the states were Hindus, but their religion was not necessarily that of the majority of their
subjects. Whereas Muslims numbered one-fourth of the total Indian population, they numbered only about one-sixth
of the population of the states.
Though the points of contact between British India and princely India were many, the latter were slow in
assimilating the new principles and ideas, methods and practices current in the former. But the growing influence of
modern conditions of life was busy breaking down the isolation of the states from one another and from the rest of India. New forces of constitutional development and national movement were beginning to pose problems which
could not be solved by keeping India divided into two watertight compartments. It was an artificial division,
artificially maintained. But even with the best will in the world, the marriage of Indian India with British India
would not have been an easy task. And the British surely were not eager to act as the priest and bring about a happy
union. In fact, they had a vested interest in perpetuating the division.
States as bastions of conservatism and imperialism
In order to counter the Indian nationalist movement, the British played two trump cards: one was that of the
Muslims; the other that of the states. In the long run, the first proved to be a success; but the second proved to be a
failure. The relative failure of the British in using the states – which they regarded as bastions of conservatism and
imperialism – against the Indian struggle for freedom and unity was due to many factors: (i) the lack of unity among
the Indian states; (ii) the failure of the princes to get the support of their subjects; (iii) the dissatisfaction of the princes with the government of India’s Political Department which dealt with them; and (iv) the patriotism of some
of the Indian princes. But the British did not fail to try.
From Lytton (1876-80) in the 1870s to Hardinge (1910-16) in the second decade of the 20 th century repeated
attempts were made by the British to organize the Indian states as a conservative bloc against the Indian nationalist
movement, but they were not very successful. With the emergence of Gandhiji on the Indian stage and the
introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in the early 1920s, the British became more anxious than ever
before to use the princes as a counterweight to Indian nationalism. Under the smokescreen of bringing together
Indian India and British India and of working towards an ultimate federation of India, the British organized a
Chamber of Princes on 8 February 1921 which did little more than promoting joint action on the part of the Indians
states and bringing them closer to the Political Department of the government of India. But it had another and a far
more important consequence. So far the Indian question had been triangular (involving the British, the Indian
nationalists, and the Muslim communalists). From now onwards another element was introduced into the conflict,that of the Indian states, and it became quadrangular. It is this quadrangular situation which we encounter at the
Round Table Conferences in the early 1930s, and in the making of the Government of India Act of 1935.
The sham federation of 1935
When in the 1930s the British, under pressure from the Indian Liberals, agreed to the idea of an Indian federation,
they saw to it that if at all the federation came into existence, it would be controlled by them and not by the
Congress. The federal provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935 gave the Muslims one-third of the seats in
the central legislature, though they were only a quarter of the British Indian population. The princely states were
even more generously treated. They had 40 per cent representation in the upper house and 33.3 per cent in the lower
house, though the population of the states was less than a quarter of the total population of India. The representatives
of British India were to be elected, but the representatives of the states were to be nominated by their rulers. Therewas also a provision that all powers connected with the exercise of functions of the crown in its relations with the
states were not to be transferred to the federation, i.e. that paramountcy would not be transferred to the federation.
That was not all. The states were free to join or not to join the federation. And it was well known that the bigger
states like Hyderabad and Kashmir would never join it. The federation could come into existence only when a
sufficient number of states had joined it to ensure that half the states’ quota of seats had been filled in the upper
house and half the population of the states had been included. This was a condition almost impossible to be fulfilled.
The states were thus given a veto over the question of federation. The friends of the princes in Britain, Winston
Churchill and others, had got a promise from the British government that the princes would not b coerced, and
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unless the princes were coerced they would not join the federation. The story of the appeasement of the states did
not end there. The federation could enjoy in the several states only those powers and functions which they agreed to
confer upon it by their instruments of accession.6
Could this ‘gigantic quilt of jumbled crotchet work’,7 as Winston Churchill described the federation envisaged by
the Government of India Act, 1935, really function? I personally believe that the federation proposed by the Act of
1935 was not only not meant to work, it was in fact unworkable.
Some persons have blamed Willingdon (1931-6) and Linlithgow (1936-43) for not pressing ahead with the scheme
of federation speedily enough during their viceroyalties. They have regretted that the Second World War intervened
and the federal proposals had to be shelved. They have gone further and asserted that if the federation had
materialized by 1939 the partition of India would have been avoided. As a student of modern Indian history who is
fairly conversant with the facts, I am not inclined to attach much weight to such ‘ifs’ and ‘might -have- beens’. The
Act of 1935 was not intended to give India either freedom or unity.
First, freedom. The draftsman of the 1935 Act was being absolutely honest and correct when he described it as an
Act ‘to make further provision for the government of India’ 8 by the British. In order to prove this point I shall
produce only two witnesses. In the early stages of the consultations which led to the framing of the Act, Sir Samuel
Hoare, the then secretary of state for India, drew up, on 12 December 1930, a memorandum for the consideration of
the Conservative Party Business committee, in which he presented all-India federation as an opportunity of avoidingdemocracy and responsibility in the central government of India, of extricating ‘British India from the morass into
which the doctrinaire liberalism of Montagu [secretary of state for India, 1917-22, and the chief architect of reforms
of 1919] had plunged it’. Hoare pointed out that the British would be yielding ‘a semblance of responsible
government and yet retain in our hands the realities and verities of British control. The viceroy would have large
overriding powers. The army would be reserved to British control. Some eighty per cent of the Indian revenues
would be kept out of the hands of an Indian finance minister. The federal executive would not be responsible or
removable in the British sense.’9 In December 1939 Lord Linlithgow, the viceroy, wrote to Lord Zetland, the
secretary of state for India: ‘But there is also our own position in India to be taken into account. After all, we framed
the Constitution as it stands in the Act of 1935, because we thought that way the best way – given the political
position in both countries – of maintaining British influence in India. It is no part of our policy, I take it, to expedite
in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously to hurry the handing over of controls to Indian
hands at any pace faster than we regard as best calculated on a long view, to hold India to the Empire.’10
Second, unity. Could ‘the paper federation’11 of 1935 preserve the unity of India? Could it have prevented the
partition of the country? I have argued at length elsewhere12 that the creation of an Indian federation, such as
postulated by the Government of India Act, 1935, before 1939 would not have prevented the partition of India. The
demand for Pakistan had already emerged.13 Only the Muslim League did not officially adopt it as its goal until
March 1940. If there was any prospect of the federation materializing earlier, the Muslim League would have
adopted the slogan of Pakistan also earlier. But this is not the point which I wish to discuss here.
Believing as I do in the unity of my country and rejoicing in the fact that the Indian states have been integrated with
the rest of India to form the present Indian Union, I do not regret that the federal provisions of the Act of 1935 were
never put into effect. I am glad that the princes were not wise enough in their time and were ultimately swept away.
It would have been a disaster if they had seen their way to join in the making of an Indian federation in the late
1930s. A federation which included some states and excluded other states, which enjoyed different powers and
functions in different states, was unlikely to promote Indian unity. If the integrity, sovereignty and autonomy of theIndian states had been recognized and institutionalized by some federation in the 1930s, it would have been
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reverse the process in 1947.
After their sweeping victory in the elections of 1937 many Congressmen became eager to try even the wretched
federation proposed by the Government of India Act of 1935, because they thought they could dominate it. They
tried both the stick and the carrot with the princes. The stick was an intensification of the agitation by the All-India
States’ People’s Conference and the local Praja Mandals against the princes for constitutional privileges. Even
Gandhiji now came out openly against the princes and fasted at Rajkot in 1938. The carrot was the bait thrown out
to the princes by the Congress that they would be welcome in the proposed federation if only they would take care to
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send representative men to the federal legislature. As soon as this was known, the Muslim League, which had so far
paid lip-service to the idea of federation, became openly inimical to it; and the British, who had hoped that they
would be able to control the federation with the help of the Muslims, the princes, and others, became lukewarm
about it. So the federation failed to materialize, not because the Congress opposed it, but because the Muslim
League, the British and the princes lost interest in it.
Once the Muslim League adopted the demand for Pakistan in March 1940 and the Muslims all over the country began increasingly to rally to its support, Congress leaders prepared themselves for the unpalatable eventuality of
partition. Their strategy was very simple. The Muslim League should have nothing but its pound of flesh. It should
get nothing more than what Jinnah later described as ‘a maimed, mutilated and moth -eaten Pakistan’,14 i.e. a smaller
Pakistan (without Assam, west Bengal and east Punjab). The struggle for Indian freedom must continue unabated,
and if unfortunately the Muslim League succeeded in getting the country partitioned, the unity of the rest of India
should be preserved.
The British were still playing the crescent card; but the more they played the Muslim card now, the more difficult it
became for them to play the state card effectively. The Indian problem now became more and more a Hindu-Muslim
or a Congress-Muslim League problem. The British accepted the principle of Pakistan publicly for the first time in
the famous Cripps proposals of March 1942 which said that any province which did not wish to accede to the future
union of India could stay out of it and enjoy the same status.15 And what applied to the British Indian provinces also
applied – and with greater effect – to the Indian states. Through its resolution of 2 April 1942 the WorkingCommittee of the Congress rejected the long-term proposals of Cripps. The resolution said:
The complete ignoring of ninety millions of people in the Indian States, and their treatment as commodities at the
disposal of their rulers, is a negation both of democracy and self-determination. While the representation of an
Indian State in the constitution-making body is fixed on a population basis, the people of the State have no voice in
choosing those representatives, nor are they to be consulted at any stage while decisions vitally affecting them are
being taken. Such States may in many ways become barriers to the growth of Indian freedom, enclaves where
foreign authority still prevails, and where the possibility of maintaining foreign armed forces has been stated to be a
likely contingency and a perpetual menace to the freedom of the people of the States as well as the rest of India.
The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a Province is also a severe blow to the
conception of Indian unity and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the Provinces, and which
may well lead to further difficulties in the way of the Indian States merging themselves into an Indian Union.Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break of that unity especially in the modern world
when people’s minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federations would be injurious to all concerned and
exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless, the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of
any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will. While recognizing this
principle the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create a common and co-operative national life.
Acceptance of this principle inevitably involves that no changes should be made which would result in fresh
problems being created and compulsion being exercised on other substantial groups within that area.
The proposal now made on the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at
the very inception of the Union and thus create great friction just when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are
most needed. This proposal has been presumably made to meet the communal demand, but will have other
consequences also and lead politically reactionary and obscurantist groups among the different communities to
create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country.16
A careful reading of this resolution would reveal that while the Congress Working Committee rejected the long-term
proposals of the Cripps Mission because it feared that they might lead to the disintegration of India, it had implicitly
conceded (in the italicized portion of the statement) the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan, provided, first that a
common centre was maintained, and, second, that the non-Muslim majority areas in Assam, Bengal and Punjab were
not to be compelled to join Pakistan. If Jinnah wanted the smaller Pakistan which he ultimately got in association
India, he could have got it any time after 1942.
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Towards Partition
By 1946 the British were anxious to withdraw from India as early as possible. There were many reasons for this.
One of them was that they feared that there was going to be ‘a revolution’ in the subcontinent. 17
If the British had tried to fulfil their obligations to everybody in India, they would have still been here. There is no
convenient time for dying or withdrawing. They decided to divide and quit. They fulfilled their obligations to theMuslim League to a large extent, but they had to ditch the princes.
The British had a curious love-hate relationship with the princes. I cannot examine it here. But one point I would
like to make. The British gravely overestimated the power and authority of the Indian princes. Many of them hoped
– even until 1947 – that the bigger states might have an autonomous existence and some of the smaller ones could
do the same by forming unions. The British had clear obligations of honour to the princes. They had nostalgic
notions of the ‘gorgeous east’ and a belief in the stability of autocratic rule. But basically the belief of the British in
the stability of the princes sprang from their long-indulged preoccupation with the tactics of a triangular or
quadrangular situation in India.
On the eve of the transfer of power the British government spelled out its policy towards the Indian States in the
Cabinet Mission memorandum of 12 May 1946 (actually published on 22 May 1946).18 It was reiterated by Lord
Mountbatten on 3 June 1947.19 Briefly stated, the British policy towards the Indian States was as follows: when the
British withdraw from India, paramountcy would lapse and the rulers of the Indian states would become technically
and legally independent: they could enter into any relationship with the successor government or governments; or
they could remain independent; and they were free to decide all this at their convenience.
Lord Mountbatten made two qualifications to this general statement of policy. He advised the rulers to take their
history, geography and the composition of the population into account while deciding their future. And he also
advised them to make up their minds before the date of the transfer of power (which was later announced to be 15
August 1947).20
The Congress denounced this statement of British policy. It argued that paramountcy came into existence as a fact
and not by agreement and that on the British withdrawal from India the successor authority must inherit the fact
along with the rest of the context. It also insisted that no state should be allowed to declare independence, and thatthe princes must make up their minds to accede to India or ‘Pakistan’, taking into account their geographical
situation, before 15 August 1947.21
If Jinnah and the Muslim League wanted partition in a peaceful and friendly way, they should have supported the
Congress on all these points. I would go further and say that had Jinnah made up his mind before 15 August 1947
that the only state – outside the territory of the would-be Dominion of Pakistan – which he wanted, or could get, was
Kashmir, he could have easily got it. There could have been some straightforward horse-trading. He could have
asked the Indian leaders to keep out of Kashmir by promising to himself keep out of Hyderabad.
Kashmir was hardly a bone of contention between the Congress and the League leaders before 1947. Indian leaders
had enough problems of their hands. Of the 562 princely states, all but a dozen were contiguous to Indian territory.
In June 1947 Mountbatten had gone to Kashmir with the promise of Sardar Patel in his pocket that if Kashmir
acceded to Pakistan before 15 August 1947 India would have no objection.22
I am not trying to argue that Kashmir was no problem. It was a problem – and a problem full of complications.
Kashmir was contiguous to both India and Pakistan. Its strategic importance was great. The Maharaja was a Hindu.
He was in a good bargaining position. He had evil counsellors of all races. One part of the state had a Hindu
Majority, the other had a Muslim majority, and the third had a Buddhist majority. And there was Sheikh Abdullah to
make confusion worse confounded. But, despite all these complications, I am inclined to think that if Jinnah would
have satisfied himself with Kashmir alone, he could have easily bargained with the Congress leaders. He could have
supported the Congress stand about paramountcy and about the desirability of all states acceding to one dominion or
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the other before 15 August 1947, taking into account their geographical position and the composition of their
population.
Why did Jinnah not do this? Why did he come out with the astounding statement that the rulers had absolute
freedom of decision: they could join either dominion; and they could make up their minds leisurely. 23 Some say that
Jinnah was a barrister and he was being very legalistic. But this explanation is not satisfactory. Jinnah was not only a
barrister, he was also a politician. Had he such a regard for legal forms he would have quietly accepted Kashmir’saccession to India or at least not countenanced the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani tribals. The second explanation
often given is that Jinnah was annoyed because he got only ‘a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan’. This is a
plausible explanation, but not a sufficient one. The real reason, in my opinion, was very different. Jinnah was
playing for high stakes. He knew that Pakistan had no problem of princely states. Almost all the princely states were
in India or contiguous to Indian territory. And a good many of these states had Muslim rulers. He had an eye on
Hyderabad, Bhopal, Rampur and Junagarh. There was not one scheme of Pakistan drawn up ever since the early
1930s which did not include Indian states with Muslim rulers within the orbit of Pakistan. 24
Jinnah had very little to lose and he had much to gain. Kashmir, after all, was predominantly Muslim. He would
easily get it. Why forego the chance of acquiring other states? So he ran after the birds in the bush, leaving the bird
in hand.
Now, I would not say that Jinnah was just being greedy. No, there was a lot of sentiment attached to states likeHyderabad. But I would insist that Jinnah’s move was based on a very clear and cool calculation. Anybody who
knew anything about the Indian problem in those days realized that India could easily survive the surgical operation
of Pakistan, but it could not survive without the Indian states. I have already quoted what Coupland had said on this
point in 1943. He repeated it with a slight variation in 1945 in his well-known book India: A Restatement: ‘India
could live if its Moslem limbs in the north-west and north-east were amputated, but could it live without its
midriff?25 Sir Hamidullah Khan, the Nawab of Bhopal, who also happened to be the Chancellor of the Chamber of
Princes in the 1940s, was Jinnah’s adviser on this subject. He was an ardent Pakistani. He realized ‘the
undesirability of associating too many Hindu States with large Hindu population or even such Moslem states as have
large Hindu population, too closely with Pakistan’, because ‘if that were done it would disturb the Moslem
preponderance in population’ of Pakistan, so, in a note drawn up for Jinnah’s guidance in early June 1947, he
suggested that the latter should offer to associate Indian states with Pakistan in ‘some form of alliance or treaty
relations rather than entry through [the Pakistan] Constituent Assembly’. This, he added, was ‘likely to upset
completely the apple-cart of Hindustan’.26
The easiest was to destroy India was to encourage Indian states to become independent or to accede to or ally
themselves with Pakistan. Jinnah knew this full well. So did Conrad Corfield, the anti-Indian head of the Political
department of the government of India in 1947. And so Jinnah began to tempt Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer,
Hyderabad, and even far-off Travancore to become independent or to accede to or ally with Pakistan.
No sooner did Congress leaders learn of Jinnah’s moves than they concentrated all their efforts on defeating him in
his own game. Jinnah found more than a match in Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. It was no treachery or duplicity. It was
a simple game of power politics in which the Sardar defeated the Quaid-e-Azam by his firm and tactful handling of
the problem of the Indian states. Before 15 August 1947 he persuaded almost all the rulers to accede to the
Dominion of India. The notable exceptions were Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagarh. How they, too, later on acceded
to India is a story too well-known to be repeated here. What India lost by way of Pakistan, she more than made up
by the accession of the states.
Endnotes
1. The phrase was used by the Anglo-Indian weekly Friend of India, 16 March, 14 September 1854, then edited by Meredith Townsend.Dalhousie, in a famous minute, dated 30 August 1848, wrote: ‘I cannot conceive it possible for anyone to dispute the policy of taking
advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself of consolidating the territories which already belong to us, by tak ing possession of States that may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of those petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength, for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending
the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interest, we sincerely believe, will be promoted ther eby.’ Quoted in
T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of the Revolt. India, 1857-1870 (Princeton, 1965) pp. 31-2.
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2. Metcalf says: ‘Foremost among the causes of the revolt was Lord Dalhousie’s policy of annexing the princely states of India. The fate which
befell so many states during his tenure of office excited widespread apprehension, not least among the remaining princes, and contributedlargely to that spirit of unrest from which the revolt gathered strength.’ Ibid., p.219.
3. Hume to Lord Northbrook, 1 August 1872, Northbrook Papers, India Office Library, London.4. Dispatch no. 43A of 30 April 1860, cited in Metcalf, op. cit., p.224
5. R. Coupland, The Future of India (O.U.P., London, 1943), pp.151-2.6. V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay, 1961), pp;.34-5; U, Phadnis, Towards the Integration of Indian
States 1919-1947 (Bombay, 1968) pp.98-101.
7. Quoted in H.V.Hodson, The Great Divide (London, 1969), p.48.
8. M.Gwyer and A.Appadorai (eds.), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47 (Bombay, 1957), vol. i, p . 323.9. Quoted in R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940 (Delhi, 1974), pp. 155-6.
10. Linlithgow to Zetland, 28 December 1939, quoted in Zetland, ‘ Essayez ’ (London, 1956), p.277. 11. The phrase is R.J Moore’s. See his ‘The making of India’s Paper Federation, 1927-35’ and ‘British Policy and the Indian Problem, 1935-
40’, in C.H.Philips and M.D.Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India (London, 1970), pp.59-94.
12. See my Towards India’s Freedom and Partition (Delhi, 2005), 226-334, passim.13. The idea of Pakistan or a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims had been floating in the imagination of many Muslim intellectuals for
quite a long time. It was born of the feeling entertained and sedulously propagated by certain Muslim intellectuals that their community formed
a distinct cultural and political entity, different from the other Indian communities, especially the Hindus. It was encouraged and fortified bythe sentiment of pan-Islamism, the provision of an exclusive education system, the grant of separate electorates, and the fear that in a united
India the Muslims would inevitably by placed under the domination of the Hindus, who outnumbered them by three to one. But the demand for Pakistan received its real strength and substance from the fact that there were certain regions in India, particularly in the north-west and the
north-east, where the Muslims formed a majority of the population and which they thought they must dominate. But for this accident of geography, the idea of Pakistan – even if it were born – would never have materialized. If the Muslim population of India had been evenly
distributed throughout the subcontinent, it would have been a minority everywhere which could have neither willed nor been in a position to
dominate – as a community – any region. Kingsley Davies rightly observes that ‘had the Muslims been distributed evenly throughout India theidea of Pakistan might have never occurred ’. The Population of India and Pakistan (Princeton, 1951), p.196.
14. Quoted in Hodson, op. cit., p.113.15. Writing on 10 March 1942 to Linlithgow, the viceroy, L.S.Amery, the secretary of state for India, said about the proposals Cripps was
carrying with him to India that ‘the nest contains the Pakistan cuckoo’s egg’. N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby (eds.), The Transfer of Power 1942-7, vol.i (London, 1970), no. 296, p. 396.
16. Gwyer and Appadorai (eds.), op.cit., vol.ii, p.525.
17. According to Sir Francis Wylie, then governor of the United Provinces, Sir Stafford Cripps, a member of the Cabinet Mission, told him inearly 1946: ’There is going to be a revolution here [in India] and we must get out quick.’ Francis Wylie, ‘Federal Negotiations in India 1935 -
1939, and After’, a paper presented in 1966 at the Seminar on the Partition of India, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London.18. Gwyer and Appadorai (eds.), op. cit., vol. ii, pp.767-9.
19. Allan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London 1951), Appendix, p. 367.
20. Ibid., p.141; Gwyer and Appodorai (eds.), op.cit., vol. ii, pp.773-5.21. See, for example, Nehru’s statement in Leader, 16 June 1947.
22. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., p.120.
23. See Leader, 18June 1947.24. See R.J. Moore, Escape from Empire (Oxford, 1983), pp. 51-2.25. R. Coupland, India : A Restatement (London, 1945), p278.
26. See Waheed Ahmad (ed.), The Nation’s voice. Vol. VI : Achieving the Goal (Karachi, 2002), p. 549.
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Accession of Princely states- who started the trouble ??
Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/central-south-asia/261369-accession-princely-states-who-started-
trouble.html#ixzz2gJ9l0yfN
The early history of British expansion in India was characterised by the co-existence of two approaches
towards the existing princely states. The first was a policy of annexation, where the British sought to
forcibly absorb the Indian princely states into the provinces which constituted their Empire in India . The
second was a policy of indirect rule, where the British assumed suzerainty and paramountcy over princely
states, but conceded some degree of sovereignty to them.
Accession of princely states.
After British leave India princely states will become independent.This was the legal statues of Indian
states but like always practice because of political realities were different than theory.
Mountbattens instructions on practice.
Even though princely states are theoretically free to choose independence mountbatten insisted that
princely states should join either India or Pakistan to maintain unity, while doing so geographical
continuity should be considered.This instructions were non binding as a rule but it was suggested,
pressed and practiced by mountbatten for many practical reasons such as geography, peoples
aspirations, lack of resources, administrative ability etc.
Congress's position
congress maintained that princely states should join India or Pakistan according to the geographical
continuity and wishes of the people.when ever a dispute come on this matter a plebiscite should be held.
Jinnaha's position
jinaha did not think people have any say in it and maintained that ruler of the state can decide whether to
remain interdependent or to choose India or Pakistan.He also rejected the role of geographic realities.
kashm ir, junagadh , hydr abad and kalat
kashmir.
kashmir had a Hindu ruler who preferred independence and had a dominant Muslim population(75%). he
made standstill agreement with Pakistan but but couldn't reach one with India.
Nehru was intrusted in accession of Kashmir to India, but when the issue of the accession of junagadhcome up Nehru told liaqat ali khan on Sept 30 1947 that while
India objected to the Nawab’s accession, it would always be willing to abide by the verdict of a plebiscite.
Mountbatten played his role by adding that if need arose Nehru would apply the same principle to other
States too , whereupon, in Mountbattens words “Nehru nodded his head sadly. Mr Laiqat eyes sparkled.
There is no doubt that both of them were thinking of Kashmir”. SP (patel)made it clear that a plebiscite in
Kashmir would be conditional on one in Hyderabad. Not prepared for the latter, Jinnah offered no
plebiscite in Junagagadh.
“Indian Army had already landed in Kashmir. Mountbatten’s proposal was wherever ruler’s religion
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differed from that of the majority of people, plebiscite should be held. But Jinnah urged for excluding
Hyderabad from the plan,” Noorani revealed.
Jinnah s refusal jinxed Kashmir Noorani Lastupdate:- Thu, 16 May 2013 18:30:00 GMT
GreaterKashmir.com
Patel didn't mind Kashmir joining Pakistan if the raja decides so. Visiting Kashmir between 18 and 23/6/47
Mountbatten had told Maharaja Singh “that if Kashmir joined Pakistan this would not be considered an
unfriendly act by the Govt of India”. According to Menon, Mountbatten said, “he had a firm assurance
from Patel himself”. But patel was angered by Pakistan's acceptance of accession junagadh on Sept 16,
1947 and thereafter he started to work for the accession of Kashmir to India.
Pakistan was already pressuring the raja through border raids and by blocking supplies . On Oct 22,
5000-armed tribesmen from Pakistan entered Kashmir. maharajd requested Indian help, on 26 October
1947 maharaja signed instrument of accession.on 27th it was accepted by Mountbatten.
Life Of Sardar Patel ::Great Indian Leaders
The number one argument in the case of Kashmir vs other princely states which was forcefully accessedby Pakistan is that, UN recognised it as a disputed land and it's an international dispute .
1)In domestic law, if A questions B's title to his bungalow and files a lis pendens (pending litigation)
notice, it ceases to have a marketable title. Internationally, however, the
existence of a political dispute does not becloud legal sovereignty. Ireland seeks reunion with Northern
Ireland but meanwhile the U.K.'s sovereignty over it is not affected. Even the U.N.'s plebiscite resolutions
did not contest India's legal sovereignty over the State
Navigation News | Frontline
2.) To people who ask for plebiscite - UN plebiscite is not legally enforceable with out both parties
agreement, when India was ready Pakistan refused act on UN instructions.
Thus Pakistan is responsible for the situation in Kashmir,
1.by not agreeing for plebiscite in Hydrabad as demanded by India for accepting the plebiscite
demand by Pakistan in Kashmir which was in return of Pakistan's demand for agreeing for a
plebiscite in junagadh. India was for plebiscite in all three princely states but Pakistan's non
cooperation in case of Hydrabad has become a stumbling block in reaching an agreement in other
two states too.
2. by initiating an attack on princely state Kashmir without respecting the standstill agreement
and there by starting the whole chain of military actions.
3. By not by withdrawing it's troops as demanded by UN for the requirement of a plebiscite.
junagadh and hydrabad
junagadh & hydrabad
Hydrabad 's ruler choose to remain independent with the support of jinaha. .There was a standstill
agreement on agreement that Hydrabad will not join Pakistan.
The Nizam of Hyderabad initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status
of an independent constitutional monarchy under the British Commonwealth of Nations . This request was
however rejected.
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India didn't like the idea of a independent state inside India, which even threatened to side with Pakistan
in case of any India pak war , nizam rejected even to surrender defence, communication and external
affairs and to conduct a plebiscite to decide the matter of accession with India,
Patel warned Nizam that India would never agree to Hyderabad’s independence. Instead he offered to
hold plebiscite in Hyderabad to determine the will of the people on the issue of accession. Nizam first
rejected the idea but pursuant to hard negotiations later accepted it and issued a firman (Ruler’s order)
on April 23rd 1948 specifically stating that a plebiscite will be taken on the basis of adult franchise. But
this agreement fell apart on issues like disbanding of Razakars, Stationing of Indian army on peripheries
& installation of responsible Govt. with the result that plebiscite could not be held.
Hyderabad and Kashmir some parallels Lastupdate:- Sat, 2 Jul 2011 18:30:00 GMT GreaterKashmir.com
so finally India had to overthrew the nizam by a military action called operation polo on Sept 1948 , and
subsequently conducted a plebiscite to secure Hydrabad.
Ruler of junagadh acceded to Pakistan on sept 15, 1947 (Pakistan accepted it on16th in line with it'sview that rulers has all the freedom to take decision regardless of peoples opinion, completely ignoring it's
earlier claim that Hindus and Muslims could not live together ), against the instructions of mountbatten
that only those princely states which share a boundary should accede to Pakistan, by sighting possibility
of sea link with Pakistan.it was against the wishes of the people who were 80% Hindu. India tried to
negotiate by sending menon on Sept 19 , but both nawab and bhutto were evasive, India
surrounded the state (on Sept 24) and asked Pakistan to take back the acceptance of accession
and invited to conduct a plebiscite, India waited for four weeks however Pakistan refused this
offer(Pakistan was ready for a plebiscite if India agree to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir India in
turn said it would agree if Pakistan willing to accept a plebiscite in Hydrabad ) saying that the
accession was in accordance with the Scheme of Independence announced by the outgoing
British and that Junagadh was now part of Pakistan. Indian cabinet aapproved the take over of
junagadhs three feudatories on Oct 21st and completed by Nov 1. As invited by the diwan of junagadh
who took charge when nawab and bhuto escaped to Pakistan, India conducted plebiscite to secure the
state.
Both this actions were in line with the congress view that princely states should join India Pakistan
according to geography and wishes of the people not buy the decision of the ruler alone.technically
incorrect yet ethnically and morally correct actions.This situation could have been avoided if jinaha
agreed to the mountbatten proposal on Nov 1 1947 to conduct plebiscite in al three states
Accession of kalat
British considered kalat to be a India princely state, just like many other princely states whichwere free to stay independent by rule but not allowed to do so in practice for already explained
reasons.how ever only mountbatten and India shared this view,( jinaha being a lawyer have took a
legaly correct but often politically and practically impossible or incorrect decision).jinaha
recognised kalat as an independent state different than other Indian princely states because
1) jinaha calculated that by doing so Pakistan will become successor of British in terms of treaty
relations with kalat.
2) Pakistan would get direct control of leased areas given by khan to British.
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3) Pakistan's official position was that princely states are free to become independent so jinaha
feared if India enters into an agreement with kalat as a counter strategy against Pakistan's
support for Hydrabad and accession of junagadh it will be a difficult situation, so if Pakistan gain
the trust of kalat by accepting it as a sovereign state then Pakistan has a better chance to reach
an agreement with khan of kalat.
khan opted for such a agreement because
1) it will allow him the freedom to stay independent(except for defence, communications and foreign
affairs, Since British were not ready to accept kalath any different than Indian princely state and in
practice none of them were allowed to stay independent . Pakistan's acceptance of kalat's soverginity will
allow them to stay independent. 2) khan considerd jinaha to be a friend so he trusted him to protect
kalath's internal freedom 3) khan was of the impression that leased areas also will return to him, he failed
to see legal complexity.
On 12 th August 1947 the Khan of Kalat proclaimed independence and the flag of Kalat was hoisted.
at a round table conference held in Delhi on August 4, 1947, and attended by Lord Mountbatten, the Khan
of Kalat, chief minister of Kalat and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, in his capacity as the legal advisor of Kalat
State, it was decided that Kalat State would become independent on August 5, 1947. Subsequently, the
rulers of Kharan and Lesbela were informed by the British that control of their regions had beentransferred to Kalat State and the Marri and Bugti tribal regions which were under the British control were
also returned into the Kalat fold, thereby bringing the whole of Balochistanunder the suzerainty of the
Khan of Kalat .
A meeting of the Kalat National Assembly (elections for which had been held a few weeks earlier) held on
August 15, 1947 as well as subsequent meetings of the Assembly, decided not to join Pakistan and
Affirmed the position that Kalat was an independent
state and would only enter into friendly treaty relations with Pakistan.
What was the position of the Muslim League on this issue? The League had, in fact, signed a joint
statement with Kalat and repeated the declaration two or three times
that the League recognized that Kalat was not an Indian state and constituted an independent entity and
the League would recognize and respect this independence. In
fact, as late as August 11, 1947 a joint statement was signed in which the League leaders, now as the
government of Pakistan,again recognize the independence of Kalat. The operative portions of the
communiqué dated August 11, 1947 is worth quoting from:
"As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States
Department, presided over by the Crown Representative, and a series of meetings between the Crown
Representative, HH the Khan of Kalat, and Mr Jinnah, the following
was the situation:
1. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state; in treaty relations
with British government, with a status different from that of Indian
states.
2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases made between the British
government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistangovernment.
3. Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between the Government of
Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat.
4. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to
reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications (currency was not mentioned as it
was understood that the Pakistani Rupee was to be used in Kalat, as a successor to its previouscurrency,
the British Indian Rupee). [3]
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By October 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a change of heart on the recognition of Kalat as an
“Independent and a Sovereign State”, and wanted the Khan to sign the same form of instrument
of accession as the other states, which had joined Pakistan. The Khan was unwilling to abandon
the nominally achieved independent status but ready to concede on Defense, Foreign Affairs and
Communications.
However, he was unwilling to sign either a treaty or an Instrument, until and unless he had got a
satisfactory agreement on the leased areas.
As negotiations were not reaching anywhere, The Khan summoned both the houses of the legislative and
a joint session was held on 14 th December 1947 in Dhadar. The issue of accession to Pakistan was
presented before the lower house (Dar-ul_
Awam) by Mr. Douglas Y. Fell, the foreign minister of Kalat. Mr. Fell told
the house that the Government of Pakistan wanted the state of Kalat to announce accession with
Pakistan and subsequent to this the fate of leased areas, Kharan and Lasbela would be decided. He
further told that the Khan categorically told Jinnah that Kalat was not prepared for accession with
Pakistan.
Bizenjos speech of December 14, 1947, in the Kalat Assembly is noteworthy for the ample warnings thatit conveyed to the Pakistani state:
"Pakistan’s unpleasant and loathsome desire that our national homeland, Balochistan should merge with
it is impossible to consider. We are ready to have friendship with that
country on the basis of sovereign equality but by no means ready to merge with Pakistan. We can survive
without Pakistan. But the question is what Pakistan would be without us? I do not propose to create
hurdles for the newly created Pakistan in the matters of defense and external communication. But we
want an honorable relationship not a humiliating one. "
When the Dar-ul-Awam met on February 21, 1948, it decided not to accede, but to negotiate a treaty to
determine Kalat’s future relations with Pakistan.
The Khan of Kalat also called a meeting of the Dar-ul-Umara to consider Quaid’s request for Kalat to
accede to Pakistan. An intelligence report on the proceedings of the meetings reported that the Kalat
State National Party was “propagating that accession meant restriction on their forces and armament,
undesired freedom for their women and
migration of Muslim refuges into the State which will weaken the voice of the original residents”. The
Khan of Kalat, the report said, made a brief speech before the Dar-ul Awam, in which he emphasized the
need to have friendly relations with Pakistan, and also said that the intentions of the Quaid towards Kalat
were good. The Prime Minister of Kalat spoke next, and said that since this House had voted for Kalat ’s
independence,
he went to see the Quaid in January and had a two-and-a-half hour meeting. He said the Quaid wasprepared to help the State in every way, and while independence of the State would remain intact, the
only way forward for Kalat was to accede to Pakistan in the matters of Defence, Communications and
Foreign Affairs.41 The Prime Minister argued
that with accession in respect of the three subjects, the internal independence of Kalat would not be
affected. But Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizanjo spoke against accession to Pakistan, and he argued that if
Pakistan wanted friendship with Kalat, it should restore its leased territories as well as Kharan and Las
Bela. The House dispersed without any intention of meeting again. Dar- ul-Umara asked for three months
to study the terms of accession in order to understand its implications.
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The Khan then sent the unanimous decision of both the houses to Pakistan’s Foreign Office through
Prime Minister of Kalat that both houses rejected to accede to Pakistan and will only enter with treaty
relations with Pakistan.he also.asked three months time to study the implications of accession.apparently
Pakistan's claims on kharan lasbela and leased territories were the reasons which provoked leaders of
kalat.
On 17 th March 1948 the Government of Pakistan announced accession of Kharan and Lasbela. Similarly
Makran which was part of Kalat for 300 years was declared a separate state and annexed.
The Khan of Kalat objected to their accession, arguing that it was a violation of Kala t’s Standstill
Agreement with Pakistan. He also said that while Kharan and Las Bela were its feudatories, Mekran was
a district of Kalat. The British Government had placed the control of the foreign policy of the two
feudatories under Kalat in July 1947, prior to
partition.
All these actions generated unrest and strong negative sentiments among the people of Balochistan. On
27 March 1948, Lt.Colonel Gulzar of the 7 th Baluch Regiment under GOC Major General Mohammad
Akbar Khan invaded the Khanate of Kalat. General Akbar escorted the Khan of Kalat to Karachi andforced him to sign on the instrument of accession, as reported by Selig Harrison in his book “On the
Shadows of
Afghanistan”, while Pakistan Navy’s destroyers reached Pasni and Jiwani.
The Khan of Kalat signed the accession papers on 28 th March 1948. Mr. Jinnah signed them on 31st
March 1948.The Khan was then detained, his cabinet dissolved, a large number of Baloch “dissidents”
arrested and the army assumed full control of the state.
let's see some counter arguments.
1) British didn't recognise kalat as independent state but as a Indian princely state by including it
in 1935 govt of India act.
when khan of kalat contested the inclusion of kalat as Indian state , mountbatten in his personal letter
assured him that his excellency recognised the treaty of 1876 and it would henceforth form the basis of
relation between British govt and kalath state.despite of personal assurance it seems mountbatten was
reluctant to recognise kalat as an independent state because, it was obvious that khan if khan is allowed
to stay independent his position will make the position of nizam of Hydrabad adamant and it will create
trouble for unification of India.
As the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, sought to settle the question of accession of all princely states, Kalat
was the subject of a meeting on July 19, 1947. At this meeting Lord Mountbatten, the Crown
Representative, said that those districts which all acknowledged to be administered by Kalat wereMekran, Jhalawan, Sarawan, Kachhi, Dombki and Kaheri. He also said that Las Bela and Kharan were
disputed, as their rulers claimed not to be under the suzerainty of the Khan of.Kalat.
At this meeting, the Prime Minister of Kalat, Nawabzada Aslam Khan, claimed that the relationship of
Kalat with the British Government was defined in the Treaty of 1876 as one of an independent, sovereign
state. While the Viceroy said he would accept this for the purposes of negotiations, Nishtar, the Pakistan
government representative said thathe would not contest this claim.
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so you can see that even though kalat was deserving to be independent mountbatten didn't allow its claim
of independence option, to force the khan to come to an agreement with Pakistan. If mountbatten did not
followed that policy then kalat as an Indian state had full right to stay independent, kalat wouldn't have to
claim to be different than India states, it didn't have to enter into a agreement with Pakistan to be
recognised as a sovereign state in order to retain it's soverginity, the leased ares would have come back
to kalat instead of Pakistan, it was same the mountbatten practice which Pakistan used to oppose
benefited Pakistan. Pakistan initially recognised kalaths independence status, of kalat but later back
tracked and forced the merger .
2 . khan was not forced but he willingly signed accession document.
A) khan of kalat didn't have the authority to sign accession without the agreement of upper and lower
house of parliament, and it's clear that they rejected the proposal of accession.khan himself acknowleged
this fact later.
B). khan himself many times declared his wish to stay independent when he was not under the control of
Pakistan,(he was only ready to surrender defence, communication and foreign affairs, when he get a
satisfactory agreement on leased areas) what he spoke under the control of Pakistan is just like
someone's statements recorded under police custody, can't be trusted to be true because he was under
Pakistani pressure. even under such pressure he and his brother who finished jail term once againagitated against Pakistan govt in 1958, although not successful it will give an idea of what he really
wanted.
3. makren, lasbela and kharan were independent princely states.
lord mountbatten, the crown's representatives only acknowledged(on July meeting ) that kharan and
lasbela are ' disputed ' because the there rulers contested the claim of kalat's control over them.makren
was always under the control of kalath,dipute calls for a stand still and settlement as per legal decision
not one sided action of accepting their accession. British never recognise makren as separate state.After
the meeting on August 4 ,the British themselves informed kharan and lasbela that the control of their
territories is given back to kalat state.
For argument sake let's assume that these states were not part of kalath and they had the right to decide
for themselves,even then kalath's situation becomes same as " Hydrabad " was, or even better because
there was no conflict of interest between ruler and his subjects unlike Hydrabad, where he ruler was a
Muslim and population was Hindu,Pakistan already agreed that kalat is not mearlly a Indian princely state
but it's even above that.
This will now show jinaha's hypocrisy, in Hydrabad he supported independent state even when he knew
that it was completely surrounded by India, but he didn't allow kalath to stay independent, he merged it by
pressure and force so Pakistani who shout about Kashmir plebiscite should think about that first before
giving long passionate speeches about self determination and plebiscite in Kashmir.
4) Kashmir is international dispute kalat is not
Any dispute when two countries are involved is a international dispute, not because the merit or validity of
the claims but simply because two countries are involved .In kalat's case it was recognised as a
independent state, so technically it becomes a international issue , but it's not considered as such onlybecause kalath as a country didn't exist today, it lost it's existence to Pakistan,so Pakistan is ble to
contain it as a domestic issue.Regardless of whether today it's an international issue or not we have the
right to talk about and draw comparisons , to the actions of both countries in accessing the princely states
especially when Pakistan is alleging that India is illegally occupying Kashmir, against the will of the
people.so it's only fair to look at the policys and actions of India and Pakistan regarding the accession of
princely states to know who is what?
The argument of "you shouldn't talk about kalat because we don't talk about khalistan,maoists ,goa, etc is
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just a escapist strategy to prevent Indians from questioning the hypocrisy in Pakistan's arguments and a
strategy to keep Indian arguments always in defensive position so Pakistan can pretend to be the
champions of self determination, once the whole history of ' kalat's accession comes into the picture,
hypocrisy in Pakistani argument will be exposed.
Finally Pakistan in the beginning stood with the ruler's supremacy and freedom of choice
regardless of peoples aspirations, congress and mountbatten stood for peoples choice over
rulers's decision if there is a conflict, but of course byconsidering geographical realities also.
Pakistan accepted junagadh's choice /India opposed it - consistently with their policy
Pakistan accepted Hydrabads choice/India objected - consistently with their policy
Pakistan accepted kalats independence/India rejected it, nor did India wanted to accede it - again
both nations are consistent in their approach
But hypocrisy is started by Pakistan
1)By not respecting the free choice of Kashmir maharaja and standstill agreement when it
attacked Kashmir.
2) Again another hypocrisy by forcing the kan of kalat to sign a instrument of accession on terms
which were against his wishes as well as against both house of parliament of kalat. where is Indian hypocrisy ?? as accused by Pakistan ?? only thing Pakistan can show as a hypocrisy is
India's withdrawal of plebiscite offer. Pakistan is in no position to expect India to continue with the offer of
plebiscite after it rejected the plebiscite offer twice
1)Initial offer by Indian leaders and mountbatten to conduct plebiscite in all three states
2) Rejection of UN plebiscite offer by not agreeing to withdraw it's troops as requested by UN as a pre
condition for conducting a plebiscite.
referencee
Balochistan conflict - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Balochistan in history: BALOCH INSURGENCIES 1948-1977
Balochistan in history: PAKISTAN ABSORBS THE KHANATE
The Accession of Kalat: Myth and Reality - Crisis Balochistan
http://www.bso-na.org/files/The_Ille...ati_478B7B.pdf
Jinnah, Muslim League and Accession of Princely States - wiki
Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/central-south-asia/261369-accession-princely-states-who-started-
trouble.html#ixzz2gJ9dWA4h
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Quaid-i-Azam, Muslim League and the Accession of PrincelyStates
By Arbab Adnan
The study of princely States is a fascinating chapter in Indian history and is mainly consisted of
confused facts and deviating policies. The areas which come under direct British subjugation were
called as British India while the remaining territories entered into the British government through
treaties and agreements were known as Indian states.
It is commonly believed that Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and All India Muslim League had a weak policy
towards princely states and thus they are mainly responsible for the mess created in shape of the
illogical accession and merger of princely States in India and Pakistan. But let's analyze the sequence
of events which created that mess and then decide was Mr. Jinnah only and solely responsible for it:
The question of political future of some 565 Indian states, ruled by native princes, constituted about
one fourth of India's population, had engaged the serious attention of the British rulers, the Congress
and Muslim League leadership. Unfortunately, the widely divergent policy approaches of the three
major actors in respect of states' future created challenging situation for Quaid-i-Azam who was
already pre-occupied with more and severe problems arising out of partition. The manner in which the
British implemented their laconic policies through Crown Representative Mountbatten, who due to his
open conflict with the Quaid and blatant commitment of the proto-Indian Government's policy, made
the Quaid's task difficult indeed.
The 3rd June Plan was, on purpose, kept ambiguous about the future of the States. It merely affirmed
that the British Government's policy towards Indian states remained as enunciated in the Cabinet
Mission's Memorandum of 12 May 1946, which stipulated that paramountcy would lapse with the
withdrawal of the British from India and would in no circumstances be transferred to an Indian
government. The void crated by the lapse of paramountcy and the cessation of political and other
arrangement s between the states and the British Crown was "to be filled either by the States entering
into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in British India, or failing
this , entering into particular political arrangements with it or them". 1 In their statement of 16 May
1946, the Cabinet Mission pronounced that paramountcy would neither be retained by the British
Crown nor transferred to any new government in India. The states, released from the obligations of paramountcy, would work out their own relationship with the succession states, and it by no means
followed that such relationship would be identical for all the states. 2
These policy parameters did not define the precise status of the states after the British colonial rule in
India had come to an end rather it had confused the whole situation. However, during discussions with
the States Negotiating Committee, which comprised the Rulers or their representatives, the Crown
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Representative observed that, in order that no administrative vacuum might result from the lapse of
paramountcy, standstill arrangement would have to be made for the interim period until fresh
agreements had been made. He also confirmed that the accession of a State to one or the other
Constituent Assembly was a matter of free choice". 3 But the same Mountbatten only some three
months later, in a volte-face urged that the rulers take into account the geographical factor in decidingwhich dominion to join, so that the balkanization of India be avoided. Moreover, although the right of
the states to determine their own future had been conceded by the British Government, Mountbatten
chose to go along with the Congress plan to pressure the princes into accession before 15 August
1947.
The policy of Mountbatten was scarcely compatible with the states policy of the British Government.
Referring to the deadline of 14 August 1947 that Mountbatten had given the States for accession,
Secretary of State Listowel reminded him that his "statement was inconsistent with the thrust of the
debate in Parliament on the Indian Independence Bill." 4
Whereas the States had accepted the British plan for the transfer of power in so far as it concerned
them, this was far from true of both the Congress and the Muslim League leadership. At a meeting
between Mountbatten and the Indian leaders on 13 June 1947, Nehru reiterated the oft-repeated
Congress policy that paramountcy would devolve on the succession states upon the transfer of power.
He claimed that the states had no right to declare independence and that the Cabinet Mission's
Memorandum of 12 May 1946 did not permit of this. Jinnah had a legalistic approach towards the
states. The British Government policy of not merging the Indian states and retaining their status quo
was far beyond any logical justification. The only justification we find is their policy of indirect rule.
Now Jinnah had to cope with the legacy, so special care was needed. Jinnah took the view that the
States would regain sovereignty with the lapse of paramountcy and their treaties and agreements with
the British would cease to be valid until fresh agreements were concluded on a voluntary basis with
the Succession states. Nehru had to concede that "he was not intending to lay down that every state
must join one or other Constituent Assembly; but if they did not come in, they would have to come to
some other arrangement could not and should not be preceded by declaration of independence." 5
Jinnah reaffirmed that, constitutionally and legally, the states could not be mandated by the British
Government to join one Constituent Assembly or the other. If a state wished to come in, he said, it
could do so by agreement.
Jinnah's stand was in conformity with that of the Nawab Hameedullah Khan of Bhopal, Chancellor of
the Chamber of Princes, who held that the states should be free to decide which constituent Assembly
to join and suggested that the All India Muslim, League (AIML) offer liberal terms for future
relationship with Pakistan to those States that might wish to associate with it. The states should be
assured that "their sovereignty, integrity and autonomy are in no manner to be jeopardized". 6 He
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even resigned as Chancellor and declined to attend the meeting of the States Negotiating Committee
called for 25 July 1947 protesting that the Rulers have been invited like the oysters to attend the tea
party with the walrus and the carpenter.
A firm believer in constitutional process and political fair play, Jinnah's statement of 17 June 1947
exhibited his legalistic and constitutional approach. He said that "constitutionally and legally the Indian
States will be independent sovereign states on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to
decide for themselves to adopt any course they like. It is open to them to join the Hindustan
Constituent Assembly, or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent". 7
The policy of the All Indian Muslim League, as clarified by Quaid-i-Azam was that "we do no wish to
interfere with the internal affairs of any state… Such States as wish to enter the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly of their free will and desire to negotiate with us, shall find us ready and willing to do so. If
they wish to remain independent and … to negotiate... any political or any other relationship… with
Pakistan, we shall be glad to come to settlement which will be in the interest of both". 8
The Muslim League leadership from the very beginning stood for faithful adherence to the doctrine of
non-interference in the affairs of the states which in turn overlook the insidious political developments
taking place in states of vital interest to Pakistan like Jammu and Kashmir. Even among the 12 states
located within the geographic limits of Pakistan, at least two rulers initially attempted to keep away
from Pakistan. Mountbatten quoted in an aid-memoir that "a large state-Kalat-approached the
Government of India for political relationship, but was refused; and unofficial overtures from
Bahawalpur [for acceding to India] were similarly discouraged". 9 The Muslim League was not looking
into the merits of each of these cases and their political hold over the prospective areas of Pakistanappeared to be loose.
The Muslim, League had admittedly no political ambition as far as Hyderabad was concerned except
for maintaining centuries' old culture and religious bonds existing between the States' Muslims and
Pakistan.
On the contrary the Congress had taken a lead in extending its political influence in the princely
states. It actively helped to establish the All-India States Peoples' Conference in 1927. During 1928-
46, the Congress leadership worked for establishment of representative institutions in the states and
lent active support for their legitimate and peaceful struggle for responsible government.
By 1946, the Congress was successful in establishing a strong political hold and propagated for
majority rule for the states' people. Its resolution of 15 June 1947 stood for a comprehensive political
framework in respect of the states which did not concede the right of any state in India to
independence and to live in isolation from the rest of India. All states had to accede to one or the
other Dominion in respect of only three subjects like Defence, External Affairs and Communications.
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Nehru had apprehension about the "balkanisation of India" if the States were allowed to opt for
independence following the lapse of paramountcy. He urged that administrative and other
arrangements concerning matters of common interest, especially in the economic and fiscal spheres,
be made in time. 10
In the course of negotiations between the British Government and the Rulers of the States, the
Congress leaders, Nehru and Patel, adopted a stance based on intimidation and coercion of the Rulers
as well as resorting to clandestine and crafty dealings. On 9 April 1947, speaking at Gwalior as
President of the States' People's Conference, Nehru threatened the Rulers to join the Indian
Constituent Assembly or be treated as hostile. 11 On 5 July Patel invited the Rulers and the people to
the Constituent Assembly in a spirit of friendly cooperation. The states, he warned, should "bear in
mind that the alternative of cooperation in the general interest is anarchy and chaos which will
overwhelm great and small in common ruin if we are unable to act together in the minimum common
tasks." 12 Patel told Mountbatten, in discussing on the future of the States that "he need not bother
about the States because after the transfer of power the States' peoples would rise, depose their
Rulers and throw in their lot with the Congress." 13 Such was the attitude of the Congress; they
wanted to grab as many states as they can no matter with fraud, violence or intimidation. The Indian
Government had criticized the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan but were not ready to handover
Kashmir to its people even Nehru once wrote, before partition, in a letter to the Maharaja that "the
idea of accession of Kashmir to Pakistan is hateful to me. I want to do anything that is reasonably
possible to prevent its accession to Pakistan." 14
Conrad Corfield, Political Adviser to Mountbatten, a man with a strong sense of duty and moral
obligation, believed that the States would act in concert in asserting their "theoretical" right to
independence. He held the view that the states should not sign anything before the transfer of power
and lapse of paramountcy. At that point, he thought, they would be free as independent entities to act
in unison and even dictate the terms of any merger with India. Mountbatten, however, was opposed to
this approach because of the Congress pressure. Corfield had flown to London with Ismay in May 1947
to seek direct support from the India Office. His trip, without Mountbatten's consent, provoked the
Viceroy to dub his Political Adviser as a "son of a bitch". 15
H. V. Hodson, a Constitutional Advisor to Viceroy Linlithgow, in his book the Great Divide mentions of
a deal between Mountbatten and Sardar Patel on States' accession to India at all costs. Patel is quoted
to have told Mountbatten; "I will buy a basket of 565 apples", the computed number of states-but if
there are even two or three apples missing, the deal is off". Mountbatten responded: "if I give you a
basket with, say, 560 apples, will you buy it?" Patel replied "I might". 16 The bargain was struck and
the ostensible reward was the assurance of Governor Generalship of independent India.
In open opposition to Jinnah, Mountbatten actively prevented the accession of 5 Kathiawar Statesnamely Dasuda, Vanod, Jainabad, Bajuna and Radha to Pakistan. Each of these states had a Muslim
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ruler who requested for union with Pakistan. In the case of Junagadh, Manavadar and Mangrol, whichhad acceded to Pakistan, India ordered military action in September 1947, which culminated in theirforceful annexation on 9 November 1947. Four months later, Mountbatten justified the illegal militaryaction against Junagadh, in an aide-memoire to the King of England. He maligned Jinnah in acceptingaccession of the State, aimed at "deliberately teasing the Government of India into taking precipitousand aggressive action." 17 He accused Jinnah of launching a wider campaign in which Pakistanappeared as the innocent small nation, the victim of aggressive designs of its large, bullying neighbor.
Mountbatten boasted that the accession exercise was a convenient bargaining counter for Pakistanvis-à-vis Kashmir. "When I saw Mr. Jinnah at Lahore on 1 November," Mountbatten informed his King,"he gave me his view that there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan, andthat he had been most averse to accepting this accession. He had in fact demurred for long but hadfinally given way to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan". 18Both the views are anapparent contradiction in the first instance and an insult to the sagacity and wisdom of the greatMuslim statesman that Jinnah was, on the other. Jinnah has long been criticized for his acceptance of accession of Junagadh State to Pakistan. Actually it was in conformity with League policy of givingright to states to decide their political future. Not only the Muslim League but the British Governmenthad assured them of this option but with certain ambiguities and contradiction and later the sameadvocate of free will i.e. Mountbatten, broke his previous promises.
The case of the Rajasthan Hindu States of Jodhapur, Jaisalmer and Bikancer, contiguous to Pakistan,
who favoured independence and accession to Pakistan in accordance with the ground rules provided
by the British Government, is proof how Mountbatten cajoled and threatened them into submission by
joining India. According to Hodson, Jinnah had offered Jodhpur the use of Karachi as a free port, free
import of arms, jurisdiction over Jodhpur-Hyderabad Sindh railway and a large supply of food grains
for famine-struck state population.
Bhopal, Indore and Travancore, influenced by Jinnah's political stance on States' future stood for
independence, as against acceding to India or Pakistan. Mountbatten talked them with deceit
intimidation and got them into the Indian fold. According to the Viceroy's personal Report No. 15 of
1st August, the "adherence of Travancore after all C.P [Ramaswamy Aiyar] declarations of independence has had a profound effect on all the other states and is sure to shake the Nizam". 19
Accession of Kashmir is the best example of Congress deviation and contradiction of their stance of
representative and responsible government. Following partition, Jinnah had to confront the Indo-
British conspiracy with the Maharaja of Kashmir as a pawn, and the anti-Pakistan National Conference
of Sheikh Abdullah as perpetrators. According to reports filed by Charles W., Charge d'Affaires at U.S
Embassy in Delhi with his State Department in October-November 1947, "that Maharaja had been
intending to bring his state into the Indian Union…but at all costs to prevent it from adhering to
Pakistan." 20 The ruler demonstrated open partially towards National Conference and other pro-India
elements with a view to "faking popular support for an anti-democratic decision amounting to the
political murder of the state's majority community." 21 Nehru's anxiety over Kashmir is evident from
a letter he wrote to the Maharaja on 12 December 1947: "I have an intimate and personal interest in
it and the mere thought that Kashmir joins Pakistan and become a part of foreign territory for us is
hateful to me. I want to do everything that is reasonably possible to prevent it". 22 He had been
directing Sardar Patel for arranging accession of Kashmir "as rapidly as possible."
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The final act of the conspiracy was therefore initiated by the Maharaja by letting loose a reign of terror
against the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference and their Muslim supporters and by hurling baseless
charges of infiltration of Pakistani nationals in his state. Pakistan made repeated attempts to defuse
the alarming political situation by mutual discussions. In return Maharaja sent an ultimatum to
Pakistan to invite external help to solve the problem. Jinnah wrote back: "the real aim of yourGovernment policy is to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Union as a coup d'etat." 23 He advised
the Maharaja to depute his Prime Minister to discuss all contentious issues. Earlier, a Pakistan
representative sent to Srinagar with peace proposals had been turned away by Kashmir Prime
Minister.
Eventually, on 27 October 1947, Indian troops marched into Kashmir after getting the Maharaja to
sign the instrument of accession in a dubious manner. Pakistan declared that the accession was
predicated on fraud and violence. On 1 November 1947, Jinnah told Mountbatten at a Lahore meeting
that he felt from beginning to end this was a deliberate, long worked out, deep laid plot to secure
Kashmir's permanent accession. 24
Mountbatten sharply reacted to these statements as did the Indian leadership at Delhi. He somewhat
scolded Jinnah by terming these as "unstateman-like, inept and bad mannered". It was like a
conspirator reprimanding the victim of the conspiracy. In contrast, one finds him arguing before his
Kings, in February 1948, with no scruple of conspiracy that "from the strategic and economic point of
view… while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh, India has considerable interest in Kashmir." 25 It
was scarcely surprising that Mountbatten persuaded the King to believe that India had put no pressure
to bear on the Maharaja to cause him to accede, even though there is overwhelming evidence that
India had done all the dirty work to force the Maharaja into accession.
Another problem which the nascent country faced was the accession of Kalat to Pakistan. The British
Government had given more autonomy and independence to Kalat through their treaties of 1841,
1854 and 1876. The khanate were power drunken. They were literally Kings of Kalat through
Sandeman System of administration and the privileges granted to them by the British Government
due to the geo-strategic location of the state. Now Quaid-i-Azam had to cope with that mindset of
Kalat and it was not easy for him to topple down the state and merge it with Pakistan with just a
stroke of pen. So tact was required and that was what Quaid-i-Azam did.
Jinnah had problems in dealing with his friend, the Khan of Kalat, who claimed independent sovereign
status for his State. In the negotiations held on 19 July 1947, with Crown Representative Mountbatten
in chair, who stated that on the lapse of paramountcy "states would de jure become independent; but
de facto, very few were likely to benefit… that although Kalat would have gained freedom, no practical
course other than some from of association with Pakistan was open to it." 26 On 11 August 1947,
Jinnah recognized Kalat as independent sovereign state in treaty relationship with British Government,
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with a status different from that of Indian states, although the British Government had earlier
disallowed the Kalat's position other than an Indian state.
It is surprising that even though the Indian Independence Act 1947 did not give the option of
independence to any Indian state, Pakistan conceded such a status to Kalat. This position was
incompatible with the policy adopted towards all the states and resulted subsequently in strained
relationship and conflict between Pakistan and Kalat. Britain also objected to this policy and advised
against recognition to the State as a separate international entity. Jinnah was anxious to complete the
formalities of accession which the Khan of Kalat promised to complete shortly. Not favorably disposed
towards accession to Pakistan; the Khan stood for establishment of relations on a treaty basis and
took several unwelcome steps to press his demand through his state assembly. Jinnah took a dim
view of his "most disappointing and unsatisfactory" attitude. The six-month delay in the completion of
legal formalities taxed his patience, and on 27 March 1948, he instructed Foreign Secretary Ikramullah
that "there should be no negotiations of any kind or any further discussion to create slightest
impression that anything but accession is possible". 27A.S.B. Shah, a Joint Secretary in the Foreign
Office, and Ambrose Dundas, Agent to the Governor-General of Balochistan, were also asked to make
it clear to Kalat to give us his answer whether he is prepared to accede as promised by him more than
once or not". While these developments were going on, the All India Radio broadcasted accession of
Kalat to India. Khan of Kalat retaliated and somewhat dramatically decided to accede to Pakistan since
Las Bela, Kharan and Mekran had already acceded to Pakistan on 17 March 1948.
We can conclude that Jinnah was not solely and only responsible for what had happened in respect of
its accession. Policy of Jinnah and AIML from the very beginning was of non-intervention and favoring
maximum autonomy and sovereignty for the states. Though the policy of Muslim League and Jinnah,
regarding princely states, had certain discrepancies and weakness but whatever it was; they stood
firm on it. On the contrary British Government and Indian National Congress changed their stances
from time to time. Let the readers decide for themselves who was right and who was wrong. Let this
issue be discussed and debated so that the truth may come to surface.
Arbab Adnan is a Research Officer at the Quaid-i-Azam Papers Wing, Ministry of Culture, Islamabad