PARTICIPATION BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: AN … · Political Science, public administration...
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This dissertation has beenmicrofilmed exactly as received 69-10,602
KRAUSS, Wilma Rule, 1925-TOWARD A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF ELECTORALAND LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION BYPUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: AN EXPLORATORYSTUDY OF SOME HAWAIl AND PHILIPPINEADMINISTRATORS.
University of Hawaii, Ph.D., 1968Political Science, public administration
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
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TOWARD A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE
PARTICIPATION BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: AN EXPLORATORY
STUDY OF SOME HAWAII AND PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATORS
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
SEPTEMBER 1968
by
Wilma Rule Krauss
Dissertation Committee:
Robert Staurrer, ChairmanRobert CahillFred W. RiggsMichael ShapiroRobert Van Niel
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PREFACE
The author wishes to thank especially Dr. Jose
Abueva~ Graduate School of Public Administration, Uni-
versity of the Philippines and Mrs. Edna Taufa§iau,
Director, Department of Personnel, State of Hawaii, with-
out whose help this dissertation could not have been
undertaken. I also wish to thank Harry Friedman, Director
of Training, State of Hawaii; Robert MacDonald of the
Hawaii Government Employees Association for assistance in
classifying levels of administrators; Dr.·Milton Bloombaum,
Professor of Sociology, for making available the Smallest
Space Analysis tape; Dr. Rudolph Rummel, Professor of
Political Science, and the DON project for use of their
computer programs; Dr. Harry Friedman, former chairman of
the Department of Political Science, for encouragement
and assistance in the early phases of this study; Mrs. Jean
Pararras of the Computing Center for guidance in program-
ming, and my colleague, Amefil Agbayani for help in
obtaining and coding the data and for invaluable criticism.
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TOWARD A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE
PARTICIPATION BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: AN EXPLORATORY
STUDY OF SOME HAWAII AND PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATORS
by
Wilma Rule Krauss
The electoral and legislative participation o~ two
sets of public administrators, one from Hawaii and one
~rom the Philippines, was analyzed in order to develop a
comparative theoretical framework which could serve as a
model for description and verification o~ such participa-
tion. Data were gathered from 52 Philippine bureaucrats
and from 57 Hawaii administrators. The Philippine group
was enrolled in a graduate course in public administration
at the University o~ the Philippines, and most o~ the
Hawaii group were attending a training class under State
auspices.
Rigorous statistical methods were utilized to
ascertain the electoral and legislative participation
patterns o~ the Hawaii and the Philippine public adminis-
trator groups, to rank individuals in terms of influence
behaviors, and to relate their personal backgrounds to
their political activities.
The ~indings showed that in both Hawaii and
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Philippine study groups there was a range of electoral
activities of bureaucrats which corresponds to Lester
Milbrath's gladiatorial, transitional and spectator
behaviors. Also there was a hierarchy of bureaucrats.who
could be categorized as_gladiators, transitionals and
spectators. It was found that legislative and electoral
activity vary together and that as the number and range of
electoral behavior increases, so does legislative partici-
pation.
For the Hawaii bureaucrats, socio-economic status
variables--income, rank, and education--explained 46% of
the variance in political activity, with party membership
and preference adding another 12%. The variables associ-
ated with electoral and legislative behavior of the Philip-
pine bureaucrats were personal qualifications and party
-2reference which together explained 38% of the variance,
while SES variables added another 7%. For both sets of
bureaucrats voluntary associational membership was greater
among the less influential administrators, and family back-
ground contributed about 2% of the variance in electoral
and legislative behavior.
In order to explain the findings in this research
a simple theoretical model of electoral and legislative
participation of public bureaucrats was developed. The
main elements of the P (participation) model are B
(benefits) + M (mobility) + R (resources). Participation
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was related to benerits vs. costs or political activity
in a more merit-oriented bureaucracy (Hawaii) and a less
merit-oriented bureaucracy (Philippines), to legal norms
and to psychological satisraction rrom "doing one's duty."
It was hypothesize~ that when these ractors are held
constant that desire and activity to rise in social status,
i.e. vertical mobility, could explain rurther variance in
electoral and legislative participation. It was proposed
that when benefits and mobility have been taken into
account ~hose bureaucrats with more political resources
(R) are more likely to take part in political activities.
In conclusion, it was suggested that future research
investigate not only the in-puts of electoral and legis-
lative participation by public administrators but policy
outcomes as well.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE .
ABSTRACT
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS • •
CHAPTER
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iv
viii
x
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
INTRODUCTION • . • • . • • • • • • • • .
PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION: 1. THE HAWAIIBUREAUCRATS • . • • . • • . . . • . .
PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION: 2. THE PHILIPPINEBUREAUCRATS ••• • • • . • . . • • .
INFLUENCE AND ELECTORA~ AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION •• . • . • • . • • • •
SOME POSSIBLE PREDICTORS OF ELECTORAL ANDLEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION PATTERNS:1. THE HAWAII PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS •.
SOME POSSIBLE PREDICTORS OF ELECTORAL ANDLEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION PATTERNS:2. THE PHILIPPINE PUBLICADMINISTRATORS • • . • . . . . . • • .
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A COMPAF~TlVE THEORYOF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION BY PUBLICADMINISTRATORS • • • • • . • • • • . •
1
14
49
67
92
123
141
APPENDIX A.CITIZEN ACTIVITIES QUESTIONNAIRE 170
APPENDIX B.SMALLEST SPACE COORDINATES, FIGURES 1-6. 175
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
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LIST OF TABLES
Table
I.
II.
III.
Page
Subset A(l) of' Cluster A, Behavior Patterns,57 Hawaii Bureaucrats · . . · · · · · · · · 23
Subset A(2) of' Cluster A, Behavior Patterns,'"57 Hawaii Bureaucrats · . . · · · · · · · · 25
Subset A(3) of' Cluster A, Behavior Patterns,57 Hawaii Bureaucrats · · · · · · · · · 26
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
Cluster A, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats .•••.•
Cluster B, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats •...••
Cluster C, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats ...•..
Cluster D, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats .•..•.
Cluster E, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats •••.••
40
41
41
41
42
IX. Cluster A, Behavior Patterns, 52 PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats •.• . • • • •• 54
X. Cluster C, Behavior Patterns, 52 PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats ••• . . • . •. 55
XI. Cluster D, Behavior Patterns, 52 PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats •. . . • • • •• 56
XII. Electoral and LegisYative ParticipationScale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
XIII. Hawaii and Philippine Middle LevelBureaucrats Typologized By Responses toGuttman Scale of' Electoral andLegislative Participation • • • . • • • 81
XIV. Stepwise Multiple Regression of' LegislatorsAsk Me to Prepare Bills Upon PersonalBackground Variables of' HawaiiAdministrators . • . . • . . • . • . . •. 103
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Page
xv. Stepwise MUltiple Regression of RegularlyAttend Rallies Upon Personal BackgroundVariables of Hawaii Administrators G • •• 108
XVI. Stepwise MUltiple Regression of Gave Timet. ~ampaign of Candidate Upon PersonalBackground Variables of HawaiiAdministrators • . • • • • . • • • • • III
XVII. Basic Electoral and Legislative PatternIndicators and Grouped Personal BackgroundPredictors of Hawaii Bureaucrats • • • .• 114
XVIII. Stepwise Multiple Regression of Gave Time toCampaign of Candidate Upon PersonalBackground Variables of the PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats • • . • • . • 125
XIX. Stepwise Regression of Will Be a CandidateUpon Personal Background Variables ofPhilippine Middle Level Bureaucrats. • •. 127
XX. Stepwise MUltiple Regression of SolicitedFunds Upon Personal Background" Variablesof Philippine Middle Level Bureaucrats •• 129
XXI. Basic Electoral and Legislative PatternIndicators c~nd Grouped Personal BackgroundPredictors of Philippine Bureaucrats • •• 131
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
x
1. Smallest Space Diagram--Behavior Patterns,57 Hawaii Bureaucrats • . • • • . . . •. 21
2. Smallest Space Diagram--50 HawaiiBureaucrats' Proriles ••••• 29
3. Smallest Space Diagram--Behavior Patterns,36 Hawaii Middle Level Bureaucrats • •• 37
4 . Smallest Space Diagram--38 HawaiiBureaucrats' Proriles •••.•.. 43
5. Smallest Space Diagram--Behavior Patterns,52 Philippine Bureaucrats • . . . • . •. 51
6. Smallest Space Diagram--50 PhilippineBureaucrats f Proriles ..•••.. 58
7. Hypothesized Model: Inrluence as a Functiono~ Participation with Typology orBureaucrats on Inrluence Line • . . . •. 77
8. Hypothesized Relationships or Some Systemsor Inrluence in Hawaii • • . . • •• 87
9. Hypothesized Relationships or Some Systemsor Inrluence in the Philippines • . • •. 89
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The objective or this dissertation is to explore
the electoral and legislative participation of two sets
of public administrators, one from Hawaii and one from the
Philippines, for the purpose of developing a comparative
theoretical framework which may serve as a model for
description and verification of such participation.
This study is the first in which pUblic bureau-
crats in the United States and in an Asian country have
been studied systematically on the basis of responses to
the same questionnaire concerning their electoral and
legislative behaviors and their personal backgrounds. Data
were gathered from 52 middle level bureaucrats employed by
the government of the Republic of the Philippines, civil
servants who were enrolled in a graduate course in public
administration at the University of the Philippines in the
summer of 1966. 1 The Hawaii group consisted of 57 public
administrators most of whom were attending a training class
in supervision under the auspices of the State of Hawaii in
lThe Philippine data were gathered by Dr. JoseAbueva, professor of Public Administration, Universityof the Philippines.
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the rall or 1966. In the Hawaii group, 38 or the public
administrators are middle level personnel, 8 are in the
lowest rank or supervisory personnel, and 11 are top-level
2appointed cabinet members and deputies. Neither group
comprises a random sample and consequently no inrerences
may be made concerning the universes or pUblic adminis-
trators in either Hawaii or the Philippines. In comparing
the two sets or administrators care is taken throughout
this research to contrcl ror rank levels. The question-
naire utilized consists or two parts, one concerning
"citizen activities," electoral and legislative behavior,
the other, personal background. 3
The terms "public administrator," "public bureau-
crat" and "public orricial" are used interchangeably in
this dissertation. These terms are not meant to imply any
analytic or empirical content but are used as nominal
expressions. The nominal derinition4 or these terms is
2Nineteen or the administrators in this study werenot in the training class. These include the 11 cabinetmembers and their deputies, 6 division and 2 branch chiers.
3The questionnaire is contained in Appendix A.4For a clear statement or the analytic distinction
between politics and administration see Fred W. Riggs,Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: HoughtonMirflin Co., 1964), p. 54.
Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals or Concept Formationin Empirical Science (Chicago: The University or ChicagoPress, 1952), distingUishes among the nominal, analyticand empirical definitions. The purpose or the derinitionused in this dissertation is to stipulate in nominal rormthat the terms xl or x 2 or x 3 are equivalent to the terms
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stipulated as follows:
public administratoror public bureaucrator public official
=Df
An individual holding anoffice in a non-militarysector of the executivebranch of government.
By electoral participation is meant taking part in
activities directed toward the election of candidates,
including preparation of party platform or policy state-
ments, party membership, soliciting funds, distributing
handbills, following political developments in the news-
papers, and voting. Legislative participation includes
writ~ng and advocacy of bills, and contacting legislators.
y, and to study the electoral and legislative behaviors ofxn • In the nominal definition, the definiedum, the
expression on the left, need not contain something "new";hence it may be stipulated, for example in the definiens,that a "public official" is one who holds "office."Webster's dictionary definition of office includes,"position of trust, ministration, or authority; esp. aposition of trust or authority conferred by an act ofgovernmental powers, for a certain term, with specifiedduties, and with emoluments ••. 11 If our research focushad been upon distinguishing between administration andpolitics an analytic definition might well be employed.However, our purpose has been the study of patterns ofparticipatory behavior in order to develop a theoreticalmodel which would explain these behaviors.
Another possibility would have been an empiricaldefinition on the order of:
X pUblic = If and only if X implementsadministrator DF policy.
Such an expirical definition requires verification andthis would be beyond the confines of the present researchbut a fruitful subject for another study.
Other definitions of public administration arediscussed in Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: AComparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 2.
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Review o~ Literature
The literature regarding electoral and legislative
participation o~ public administrators shows little empir-
ical and theoretical work in this area. Tingsten5 ~ound
that government employees in Western nations had the
highest rate o~ voting o~ any occupational group. ROkkan's
research6 shows that Norwegian salaried public employees
had the highest levels o~ participation in electoral
activities. Recently the U.S. Commission on Political
Activity o~ Government Personnel concluded a survey o~
the electoral behavior o~ ~ederal civil servants. Data
~rom this study indicate that attendance at rallies,
political contributions, and voting percentages are con-
siderably above the average ~or the public as a whole.
Voting compares ~avorably to the college-educated group
although only 36.4% o~ the U.S. ~ederal civil servants
have some college education or more. 7 U.S. Commission
5Herbert Tingsten, Political Behavior: Studies inElection Statistics (London: P. S. King & Son, 1937).
6Stein Rokkan's study is reported in S. M. Lipset,Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960),p. 186.
7The Commission reported that 22% o~ the ~ederalemployees had attended a political meeting or rally; thiscompares to Milbrath's approximation o~ 10% o~ theelectorate as a whole who engaged in this behavior. Amonetary contribution was made by 17% o~ the U.S. FederalEmployees compared to 10% in the electorate who donatemoney ~or political campaigns. Eighty-~ive percent o~the ~ederal employees stated that they had voted in the1964 presidential election. See U.S. Commission
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rindings indicate that electoral activity varies with
position in the bureaucratic hierarchy: the higher grades
are most active, with the exception or the lower-ranking
postal workers who are also highly participatory.8
Research with regard to candidacy or bureaucrats
ror pUblic orfice is scanty, although observers have re-
ported that government orricia1s in France, Germany and
Japan commonly run for orrice. 9
On a more general level Milbrath has summarized
the literature on electoral participation and rinds that
there is a hierarchy or political involvement: (1) certain
electoral behaviors highly intercorre1ate, e.g., soliciting
runds and attending a political caucus; (2) citizens
comprise a hierarchy rrom more politically involved to
least with those who are highly active engaging in most or
the acts or those at lower levels or participation. 10
Although Milbrath rerers to Tingsten's and other research
regarding political activism or government workers,ll he
on Political Activity of Government Personnel, Research,Vol. II, pp. 6-7. Also Lester W. Milbrath, PoliticalParticipation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 19.Also see Robert E. Lane, Political Lire (N.Y.: The FreePress, 1959), p. 85 ror voting data.
8u.s. Commission, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 28-39.9Heady, op.cit., pp. 44, 51.
10Mi1brath, op.cit., p. 16.
11Ibid ., p. 126.
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does not specifically relate the hierarchy of political
involvement to their behaviors. In Milbrath's summari-
zation of extensive research on electoral behavior and
its relationship to background variables, he states that
participation varies with socio-economic status--income,
education and occupational level--and with activity in
voluntary associations. 12 He also reports on the impor-
tance of other background variables such as party member-
ship and sense of political efficacy.13
Considerable attention has been given to legal
norms--laws, regulations and legal practices--regarding
electoral activity of government personnel. In Australia,
France, Germany, and Sweden legal restrictions regarding
political activity by government personnel have been
removed, and in England all but the higher civil servants
14have full citizenship rights under the law. Although
Japanese law prohibits political activity of civil servants,
observers have noted that it is common practice for the top
three ranks to be actively engaged in electoral activity.15
In the United States the Hatch Act restricts active
12Ibid ., pp. 16-17. 13Ibid ., passim.
14See U.S. Commission on Political Activity ofGovernment Personnel, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 158-160.
l5For legal restrictions~on political activity seeibid., p. 163. For political activity of the higher civilservants in Japan see Robert E. Ward, "Japan," pp. 100-101.in Ward and Roy C. Macridis, eds., Modern PoliticalSystems, Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1963) •
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partisan behavior of federal employees, but systematic
enforcement under the law applies only to the middle and
lower ranks. According to Anchor Nelson, M.C., and member
of the Commission on Political Activity of Government
Personnel, there are 370,000 top-ranking "excepted" em-
ployees or 14.8% of the federal workers who are immune
from Civil Service Commission authority.16 In the Philip-
pines a recent statute allowing the employee the right to
express his views on political problems and candidates
supersedes the prohibition in the Constitution of all
political activity by government workers. The current
Philippine Civil Service rules primarily warn employees
not to participate in political management or political
campaigns, nor to become publicly identified with any
political faction or candidate. 17 In the United States 33
of the 50 states or 66% allow government employees full
citizenship participation; 18% have laws similar to the
Hatch Act and 16% prohibit all political activity.18 The
State of Hawaii allows the civil servant full citizenship
16see U.S. Commission on Political Activity ofGovernment Personnel, Findings and Recommendations, Vol.I, p. 25. Also Library of Congress, Legislative Refer-ence Service, The Hatch Act, p. LRS-194, for Nelson'sstatement.
17Republic of the Philippines, Civil ServiceCommission, Memorandum Circular #25, August 8, 1963,expecially pp. 92-93.
18u. s • Commission on Political Activity ofGovernment Personnel, op.c~t., Vol. II, p. 92.
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rights. 19 There has been very little empirical work
relating actual electoral behavior to the legal norms
outlined above.
With regard to legislative activity o~ civil
servants~ very little is known. Heady~ in summarizing the
literature, reports that French 3 German and Japanese
higher civil servants intimately participate in program
planning; however~ the ~orm and degree o~ this participa-
tion is not described. 20 Woll~ who examines the U.S.
~ederal bureaucracy~ states that legislative initiative
is in the hands o~ the public administrators who have
lobbying star~s and who mobilize their clients ~or passage
o~ bills. 2l Riggs has noted that in the post-colonial
developing countries the power position o~ the bureaucracy
has increased whereas parliamentary bodies are weak. He
writes:
A phenomenon o~ the utmost signi~icance intransitional societies is the lack o~ balancebetween political policy-making institutionsand bureaucratic policy-implementing structures.The relative weakness o~ political organs meansthat the polit~~al function tends to be appro- 22priated~ in considerable measure, by bureaucrats.
19State o~ Hawaii~ Personnel Rules and Regulations~January 13, 1964~ Regulation XII--Political Activity.
20Heady~ op.cit.
2lpeter Woll, American Bureaucracy (N.Y.: W. W.Norton & Company~ Inc.~ 1963)~ Chapter 4.
22Fred W. Riggs in "Bureaucrats and PoliticalDevelopment: A Paradoxical View" in Joseph La Palombara,ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton~
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What are the explanations given ror these electoral
and legislative behaviors? Lipset hypothesizes that since
government employees have the greatest involvement in
government affairs, it rollows that they would have the
highest rates or electoral participation. 23 Marsh holds
that the political involvement or government workers is
characteristic or highly-specialized Western society.24
The merit system or the bureaucracy and the high
prestige or administrators in France, Germany, and Japan
account ror the important role or their orricials in
policy-making, according to Heady.25 Riggs associates the
relative power position or bureaucrats in post-colonial
developing countries vis-a-vis other political structures
in part to the inerrectiveness or the "constitutive
system" which he derines as a composite of' political
parties, popular elections and elected assemblies. 26
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 120.
23Lipset, op.cit.
~.4Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology (N. Y.:Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), p. 150.
25Heady, op.cit.26 .Oral communication. For a derinition and expli-
cation or "constitutive system," see Fred W~R-iggs, "TheStructures or Government and Administrative Ref'orm"(Social Science Research Institute, University of' Hawaii,October, 1967), mimeo. ms., pp. 24-27. Cited on ~rmission f'rom the author.
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Questions ~or Study
Research in this dissertation is directed toward a
number o~ questions pertinent to the literature just cited.
The questions are as ~ollows:
1. Is there a hierarchy o~ electoral behaviors among
the bureaucrats under study? Do the bureaucrats
~orm a hierarchy ~rom highly-involved persons to
those least active politically?
By investigating this question data will be
obtained as to whether these bureaucrats have electoral
activity patterns common to the citizenry in general or
whether their behavior varies ~rom this norm, as outlined
by Milbrath.
2. Does legislative activity ~orm a separate cluster
o~ behaviors ~rom the electoral?
In this study an opportunity is provided to inves-
tigate whether or not these pUblic bureaucrats engage in
both types o~ activity or specialize in one or the other.
3. How does the proportion o~ the bureaucrats who
participate in in~luential behavior compare to
the citizenry as a whole?
Following a de~inition o~ in~luence and a ranking
o~ bureaucrats on a participation scale, a comparison with
activities in Milbrath's hierarchy o~ political involve-
ment will be made to ascertain whether or not these public
administrators participate more as a group in in~luential
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behavior than the citizenry as a whole.
4. What personal background variables are associated
with the electoral and legislative participation
of the two groups of public administrators?
The importance of socio-economic status and other
personal background variables such as party membership and
preference, age, marital status, and membership in volun-.
tary associations in explaining electoral and legislative
behavior will be studied.
5. In what ways do the electoral and legislative
behaviors o~ these Hawaii and Philippine adminis-
trator groups compare and contrast? Do background
variables associated with their participation vary
between the two sets of administrators?
Electoral and legislative activities and background
variables o~ the bureaucrats will be compared and con-
trasted in order to determine pattern similarities or
unique aspects o~ the two groups of administrators. 27
6. What inferences, if any, may be made concerning
the relationship of electoral and legislative
participation of the two groups of administrators
to (a) bene~its and costs of political involve-
ment; (b) merit or non-merit systems in the
27See Nimrod Raphaeli, "Comparative Public Ad-ministration: An Overview,ll in Raphaeli, ed., Readings inComparative Public Administr'ation (Boston: Allyn andBacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 4-5, for a brief discussion ofcomparative method.
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bureaucracies; (c) legal norms concerning
political participation; (d) specialization or
their respective societies and (e) parties,
elections and elected parliaments?
Inrerences with regard to (a) through (e) will be
considered rollowing analysis of the patterns of electoral
and legislative behavior of the two study groups.
Methods of Analysis
The five major questions outlined above will be
investigated by the use of rigorous statistical methods.
Propositions suggested by the findings will be stated
seriatim. These will be summarized in the last chapter
of the dissertation and an explanatory model will be
presented. 28 The criteria for the model are broadness of
scope and degree of factual confirmation; that it be
capable or being operationalized and that it be formally
simple. 29 The theoretical framework will take into account
the five items listed above in question 6.
In Chapters II and III patterns of electoral and
legislative behavior of the groups of Hawaii and Philippine
bureaucrats will be ascertained by means or Smallest Space
Analysis, a multivariate clustering technique. In Chapter
28See George C. Homans,"Briilging Men Back In,"American Sociological Review, 29 (December, 1964), pp.809-818, particularly pp. 813-814 for comments on thedevelopment of theory.
29Hempel, op.cit., p. 46.
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IV these bureaucrats will be ranked by participation in
the influence process by means of a Guttman scale con-
structed for this purpose. Chapters V and VI employ
stepwise multiple regression analysis whereby basic
indicators of ele~toral and legislative behavior are
related to the personal background variables of the public
administrators. Chapter VII summarizes the propositions
suggested by this research and offers a simple explanatory-
model which may serve as a basis for future research.
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CHAPTER II
PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE
PARTICIPATION: 1. THE HAWAII
BUREAUCRATS
Milbrath, in summarizing the literature on elec-
toral participation notes that there is a hierarchy of
political involvement: (1) certain electoral behaviors
intercorrelate with one another; (2) individuals form a
hierarchy from more politically involved to least, with
those most active engaged in electoral behaviors at a
higher level as well as those activities at lower levels
in the hierarchy of political involvement. l
Briefly, the behaviors in Milbrath's hierarchy of
political involvement are as follows: gladiatorial
activities--holding public and party offices, being a
candidate for office, soliciting political funds, attending
a caucus or a strategy meeting, becoming an active member
in a political party, contributing time in a political
campaign; transitional activities--attending a political
meeting or rally, making a monetary contribution to a
lLester W. Milbrath, Political Participation(Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 16.
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party or candidate, contacting a public orricial or a
political leader; spectator activities--wearing a button
or putting a sticker on the car, attempting to talk
another into voting a certain way, initiating a political
discussion, voting and exposing oneselrto political
stimuli. Those who engage in gladiatorial activities,
the gladiators according to Milbrath's ter~inology, also
participate in transitional and spectator behaviors;
those who engage in transitional activity also are active
in spectator behaviors.
Is there a hierarchy or electoral behaviors among
the bureaucrats under study here? Are there highly inter-
correlated behaviors and what are these syndromes or
electoral activity, if any, for publi~ bureaucrats? Do
the bureaucrats rorm a hierarchy or highly involved
persons to least active politically? Does legislative
activity rorm a separate cluster or behaviors rrom the
electoral? Do public oureaucrats engage in both types of
activity--electoral and legislative--or do they specialize
in one or the other?
The above questions are guides to this and the
next chapter. In this chapter the electoral and legis-
lative behavior patterns of the Hawaii bureaucrats are
examined, and in Chapter III, the Philippine data are
analyzed. Our focus in both chapters is two-rold, upon
the patterning of the 36 items in the citizen question-
naire and on groups of individual bureaucrats. Since 12
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or the 36 items in the citizen activities questionnaire
correspond to Milbrath's hierarchy or political involve-
ment, their interrelationships are studied as well as the
patterning or other electoral items in the questionnaire--
such as participation in writing a party platrorm or
policy statement and passing out handbills--and certain
legislative activities.
Smallest Space Analysis
To obtain patterns or electoral and legislative
behaviors or the 52 Philippine and 57 Hawaii bureaucrats
in our study population, Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) was
utilized. This technique, developed by Louis Guttman and
James C. Lingoes, is well-adapted to our dichotomous
citizen activities questionnaire data, ror SSA is a
nonmetric method or analysis. Also the data used in the
SSA need not be normally distributed nor is there any
maximal number or variables required. As such this
technique is well suited to exploratory studies such as
this where the purpose is to study interrelationships in
order to develop theory. Variables, whether they be
questionnaire items or individual prorile scores, are
plotted on a diagram in the smallest Euclidian space
pos~ible according to the rule or monotonicity which may
be simply put as rollows: variables A and B are closer
together ir the probability for their association is
greater than the probability ror association or variables
-
17
A anc C. Or, as stated by Guttman and Lauman: distance
(A ,B) <Pr (CIA). 2
distance (A,C) whenever Pr (B/A) :>Variables are calculated as coordinates, based
on their correlation coefficients, and plotted by the
usual Euclidian ~ormula,
distance (A,B)
m
i = 1
Those which are highly intercorrelated are clustered to-
gether and those inversely correlated, for example, are
at opposite ends of the diagram. The correlational rela-
tionship of variables may thus be visually grasped by
study of the space diagram.
Two types of SSA analyses were used, the SSA-R
where variables are clustered, and the SSA-Q whereby
2Distances between points in the small spacediagram must meet this criteria: distances between A andB are smaller than -between A and C whenever the proba-bility for an association between A and B is greater thanthe probability of an association of A and C. For eachvariable a numerical calculation for distance is madebetween it and another variable, and so on throughoutthe set. Additional calculations are made until the bestfit is obtained~ the fit being the degree to which therelationships between A and B are most closely set forthin Euclidean space. The coefficient of alienationrepresents statistically the goodness of fit. The smallerthe coefficient of alienation, the better the fit. SeeEdward O. Laumann and Louis Guttman, "The RelativeAssociational Contiguity of Occupations in an UrbanSetting," American Sociological Review, 31 (April, 1966),pp. 169-178, especially p. 172.
-
18
individuals are grouped. 3 These analyses are complemen-
tary, one setting ~orth group behavioral patterns while
the other clusters individuals by similarity o~ patterns.
Boundaries for both types o~ analyses are drawn by the
researcher. In drawing boundaries I have ~ollowed the
criteria set down by Campbell and Fiske, as reported by
Gordon, namely, " • the requirement that di~~erent
measurements of the same construct correlate more highly
with one another than with measurements o~ alternative
3In the Q-SSA individuals are clustered accordingto their correlation of profiles. Each cluster o~individuals intercorrelates more within the group thanwith other groups. Boundaries are drawn in the same wayas in the variable analysis, SSA-R: correlation matricesare checked to assure that lines are accurately drawn.There is a correlation matrix ~or each group in the SSA-Qanalysis. Below is presented, as an example, the cor-relation matrix for group D o~ the 50 Hawaii bureaucrats.Refer to Figure 2. A correlation o~ .273 has a proba-bility o~ .05, an r o~ .354 has a p o~ .01. Subset D(l)is also given below.
Correlation Matrix, Group D and D(l) o~Hawaii Bureaucrats
(Numbers re~er to individuals)Group D
13 16 19 20 21 22 24 27 28 3713 36 59 42 74 68 38 42 28 4216 29 66 74 50 56 47 53 6619 44 49 65 53 57 47 4420 74 53 90 63 56 8021 1. 49 74 1. 7422 47 60 60 5324 57 50 6827 52 4728 5637 Subset D(l)
16 20 24 3716 60 56 6620 90 8024 6837
-
194constructs." As my cutting point for clusters I chose
a correlational limit corresponding to a probability of
.05. Items. which do not intercorrelate at the level of
.05 or lower are excluded. In summary, each cluster
represents a grouping of items which intercorrelate more
with each other than with other clusters and which meet
a probability criteria of .05 or less.
The data are presented in this and the next
chapter in the following order: Chapter II (l) SSA-R and
SSA-Q for all the Hawaii bureaucrats. This group of 57
includes II cabinet members and their deputies, 38 middle
level civil servants, and 8 semi-supervisory personnel.
The findings for this group are presented first for they
give an overall view of the relationship of the electoral
and legislative variables and of individual groups of
bureaucrats, (2) SSA-R and SSA-Q for the 38 middle level
Hawaii bureaucrats. Although these data overlap consider-
ably from the previous set of analyses there are some
patterns which are unique to this group and accordingly
the entire findings will be presented. Chapter III (l)
SSA-R and SSA-Q for the 52 Philippine middle level bureau-
crats, as well as (2) statement of propositions generated
by the SSA analyses of both the Hawaii and Philippine
4 ~Robert Aaron Gordon, "Issues in the EcologicalStudy of Delinquency," American Sociological Review, 32(December, 1967), p. 936.
-
20
groups, and (3) summary and conclusion of Chapters II and
III.
The Electoral and Legislative BehaviorPatterns of the Total Hawaii Group
The SSA-R analysis for the 57 bureaucrats in our
Hawaii study population includes three major clusters and
eight isolated items scattered in the diagram below, Figure
1. Cluster A is a large syndrome of 24 items which covers
all of Milbrath's gladiatorial and transitional activities.
Clusters Band C include items which fall under the
category of spectator activities. The eight isolated
items include three relating to candidacy, one on revealing
and defending political preferences, one on voting and
three concerning party identification or independence.
In Figure 1 cluster A has been divided into three
parts in order to facilitate analysis. A(l) comprises the
core of clustar A and consists of eleven highly inter-
correlated behaviors. The correlations for this subset
are included in Table I.
What are the core behaviors of Cluster A, those in
subset A(l)? The item with the highest correlations is
"I give ideas for the speeches of a political leader."
This item is highly intercorrelated with such electoral
behaviors as soliciting funds and helping draft party
platform, as well as attending a caucus and helping a
candidate plan his campaign. An interesting item is "I
-
FIGURE I. SMALLEST SPACE DIAGRAM
B!HAVIOR PATTliANS, 57 HA"'AII BUREAUtRATS
C.A.""1000 I I I ,
.19
A
.JI
ill.,
All),,~
.a~ .L~~~ 2.,IJI ~ 18,11/
a I I I I I \:: I ILl 1:Jl I I "'""'...,.... I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
.N ."
.ID
I I I-10001 .1
..,I\)
I-'-1500 I I I I
-1000 a 1000 2000
-
KEY TO FIGURE 1
Cluster A
22
A(l)
A(2)
2. Regularly attend rallies4. Ideas ror speeches
12. Contact legislators13. begislators ask me to prepare bills14. Approached legislators for help17. Frequent contacts with politicians18. Considered person with political connections21. Caucus23. Helped candidate plan24. Solicited funds25. Pa~ty platform
3. Handbills6. Fund-raising dinner
11. Helped agency prepare bill15. Chier asks me to seek support19. Encouraged to be a candidate22. Helped candidate in his public relations26. Gave time to campaign of candidate
5. Contributed money9. Regarded as potential politician
20. Politician rriends used house27. Member or party34. Attend meetings, rallies36. Bumper sticker
Cluster B
29. Follow developments in newspaper32. Informal discussions
Cluster C
30. Watch TV33. Initiate discussions
Isolated Items
1. Reveal political prererences7. Lean to party8. Party, not active
10. Won't be a candidate16. Been a candidate28. Will be candidate31. Vote35. Not a party member
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23
TABLE I. SUBSET A(l) OF CLUSTER A~ BEHAVIORPATTERNS~ 57 HAWAII BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)a
2 4 12 13 14 17 18 21 23 24 25
2. Regularlyattendrallies 67 70 62 67 76 83 75 67 80 71
4. Ideas f'orspeeches 60 94 56 68 63 70 76 81 94
12. Contactlegislators 65 74 71 70 61 50 69 63
13. Legislatorsask me topreparebills 61 62 58 65 71 75 88
14. Approachedlegislatorsf'or help 71 60 60 56 58 59
17. Frequentcontacts withpoliticians 75 83 58 75 70
18. Consideredperson withstrongpoliticalconnections 65 53 82 66
21. Caucus 60 78 7323. Helped candi-
date plan 70 6824. Solicited
f'unds 8525. Party platf'orm
aDecimals are omitted in this and subsequenttables.
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24
regularly attend political meetings or rallies in public
places" which is, :for example, correlated .80 with solicit
:funds. Regular rallies is thus part o:f a syndrome o:f
gladiatorial electoral items, those o:f A(l). "I attend
political meetings or rallies in public places," however,
is part o:f A(3), a transitional behavioral cluster, as
in Milbrath's hierarchy o:f political involvement.
With what legislative activities do the electoral
items in A(l) correlate? Cluster A(l) includes three
legislative items--contact legislators :for support,
legislators ask me to prepare bills, and approached
legislators :for help. Thus A(l), the core o:f cluster A,
contains both electoral and legislative activities.
Subset A(2) o:f cluster A di:f:fers :from A(l) in
that the electoral behaviors are "lower order" gladiatorial
transitional activities on Milbrath's scale of political
involvement. Helping distribute handbills, helping a
political candidate in his public relations and giving
time to the campaign o:f a candidate are in the last
category o:f gladiatorUU behaviors prior to such transi-
tional acts as attending a political :fund-raising dinner.
Associated with these electoral behaviors in A(2) are__
encouraged to be a candidate and chie:f asks me to seek
support :for him or agency. Together with these items is
helped agency prepare bill to be introduced in the legis·-
lature.
-
3 6 11 (13) 15 19 22 26
5'7 37 ( 51) 39 53 79 5950 (53) 37 42 51 47
(57) 41 45 41 37
(76)(67)(53)(50)
62 43 61
57 55
72
25
Table II presents the correlations of subset A(2)
of cluster A. It should be recalled that cluster A is
one syndrome of intercorrelated items. Each outer circle
is more intercorrelated with the core circle A(l) than
within circle items, such as those in A(2). This is
shown in Table II below by item #13 in parenthesis which
is a core legislative item from the gladiatorial subset
A(l).
TABLE II. SUBSET A(2) OF CLUSTER A, BEHAVIORPATTERNS, 57 HAWAII BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
3.· Handbills6. Fund-raising dinner
11. Helped agencyprepare bill
(13. Legislators ask meto prepare bills)
15. Chief asks me toseek support
19. Encouraged to be acandidate
22. Helped candidatein his publicrelations
26. Gave time tocampaign ofcandidate
Subset A(3) items, on the fringe of cluster A,
fall into Milbrath's transitional range of political in-
volvement, except for #27, member of party, which is a
-
5 9 (13) 20 27 34 36
30 (44) 39 46 37 52
(56) 38 17 30 40
(52) (42) (46) (59)
25 29 42
56 49
34
26
gladiatorial behavior. Electoral behaviors in this group
include attending meetings and rallies, contributing money
to a candidate or party, putting a campaign sticker on
the car, and allowing politician friends to use house or
vehicle. Related to these campaign activities is liMy
relatives and folks back home regard me as a potential
politician." Subset A(3) items are presented in Table III
below. The low correlation between regarded as potential
politician and party membership is the only one above the
.05 chance level.
TABLE III. SUBSET A(3) OF CLUSTER A, BEHAVIORPATTERNS, 57 HAWAII BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
5. Contributed money
9. Regarded aspotentialpolitician
(13. Legislators askme to preparebills)
20. Politicianfriends usedhouse
27. Member of party
34. Attend meetings/rallies
36. Bumper sticker
Again item #13 is bracketed to show that corre-
lations with A(l) are higher than within A(3) and to
indicate the relationship of this subset to the core item.
-
27
In summary cluster A consists or a series or elec-
toral items which ranges rrom a core or gladiatorial
behaviors to transitional to one spectator activity--
putting a bumper sticker on the car. Legislative behaviors
range rrom legislators ask me to prepare bills to helped
agency prepare bill.
Clusters Band C raIl into the category of
spectator activities. Cluster C includes initiating con-
versations regarding politics and watching TV programs
reaturing political leaders; these items correlate .38.
Cluster B includes lower order spectator behaviors. These
are rollowing political developments in the newspapers and
taking part in inrormal discussions which correlate .63.
Unrelated to the three major clusters are several
items, three regarding candidacy, three regarding party
membership or independence, one on revealing and defending
political prererences and voting. Being a candidate is an
item which is high on Milbrath's gladiatorial activity
hierarchy, but which is not part or the syndrome or gladi-
atorial behaviors in subset A(l) or cluster A. Voting is
an activity in which 100% or the Hawaii bureaucrats
participate and so it does not correlate with any items.
In summary, the SSA-R analysis of the 57 Hawaii
bureaucrats behaviors indicates three primary patterns of
behavior. The rirst is a gladiatorial-transitional
cluster with three analytic parts. The core or this
-
28
cluster includes "higher order" gladiatorial activities,
such as soliciting runds as well as such items as helping
legislators to prepare bills; the next subset includes
"lower order" gladiatorial behaviors, such as helping a
candidate, and transitional behaviors such as rund-raising
dinner; the third set is a transitional grouping including
putting a campaign sticker on the car. The second pattern
is a "higher order" spectator grouping and the third is a
"lower order" spectator cluster including rollowing devel-
opments in the newspaper and taking part in political
discussions.
We turn now to a consideration or the individual
proriles or the Hawaii bureaucrat group.
The SSA-Q Analysis or Individual Profilesof 50 Hawaii Bureaucrats
In order to execute the SSA-Q analysis on the tape
available, the number of Hawaii bureaucrats was reduced to
50 randomly selected administrators rrom the original group
or 57. Figure 2 presents the 50 Hawaii public orficials,
grouped on the basis or their responses to the 36 citizen
activities questions. To analyze these groups two scores
were obtained: (1) a score or political involvement ror
each respondent and (2) a score or legislative activity
ror each respondent. These scores were tallied and
averages, medians, modes and ranges obtained ror each group.
Groups were determined, as in the previous analysis, on
the basis of the highest intercorrelations. In the Key
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29
,------r------r--------.i
..':
:IE4(a::04( ~i5 =...w L00 • ~~
..en •~ i ~enw :t •....I ~
-
KEY TO FIGURE 2
GROUP A--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS (N=22)
Political involvement X ••. 3.3Legislative activity X ••• 0.0
GROUP B--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS (N=7)
Political involvement X .•. 4.Legislative activity X . 1.3
GROUP C--PARTISAN TRANSITIONALS (N=5)
Political involvement X . 5.4Legislative activity X . .. .2
GROUP D--GLADIATORS (N=lO)
Political involvement X . 10.3Legislative activity X . . • 2.0
D(l) (N=6)
Political involvement X.. 9.9Legislative activity X•.• l.6
D(2) (N=4)
Political involvement X.ll.OLegislative activity X... 2.2
TOTALS
30
Number of individualsby profiles • . •
Number of isolatedindividuals • • • •
grouped.=44
• • • •= 6
Political involvement X,total group. . • • . . • . 5.7
Legislative activity X,total group • • . . . • .9
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31
~or Figure 2 average score ~or political involvement (PI)
and ~or legislative activity (LA) is given ~or each o~
the ~our groups.5 Those groups with a mean PI score o~
eight or more are considered high-level gladiators, those
in the six to eight range low-level gladiators; groups
with PI scores o~ ~our to six are called transitionals,
with three or less, spectators. 6
Political involvement scores were compiled by
tallying responses on twelve items corresponding to
Milbrath's hierarchy, as ~ollows:
Milbrath's Hierarchy o~Political Involvement
Holding public and partyo~~ice
Being a candidate
Soliciting political~unds
Attending a caucus orstrategy meeting
Becoming an active memberin a political party
Political Involvement Items~rom Citizen Activities
Questionnaire
None
I have been a candidate.
I have solicited campaign~unds.
I have attended a politicalor strategy meeting.
I helped in dra~ting a partyplat~orm or policystatement.
5The mean was selected as the statistic for usein the SSA-Q analysis since it has less variability thanthe mode or median. The means, medians and modes wereclose in the clusters. For example, the range of individ-ual political involvement ,scores in group D o~ the Hawaiitotal group was 9 to 11. The median in group D was 10,the mean was 10.3 and the mode was 10. The most deviantcluster was group B where the range in individual scoreswas 3 to 6, the median was 4, the mean was 4, but themode was 3.
6Milbrath, op.cit., p. 156.
-
Contributing time in apolitical campaign
Attending a politicalmeeting or rally
Making a monetary con-tribution to a partyor candidate
Contacting a publicorricial or a politicalleader
Wearing a button or puttinga sticker on the car
Attempting to talk anotherinto voting
Initiating a politicaldiscussion
Voting
Exposing oneselr topolitical stimuli
32
I gave part or my time tothe campaign or acandidate.
I attenci--political meetingsor rallies.
I contributed money to acandidate or politicalparty.
I contact legislators rorsupport or pendinglegislation.
I put a campaign sticker onthe car.
None
I initiate conversation ordiscussions about poli-tics among rriends.
I vote in every election.
I rollow political develop-ments in the newspaper.
For legislative activity the rollowing items were
used:
I have helped my agency in preparing a bill to beintroduced in the legislature.
Some legislators ask me to help them prepare bills.
I am personally close to two or more legislators whomI have approached ror help.
In discussing the various groups or administrators
in the pages which rollow attention will be given not only
to their political involvement and legislative activity
averages but to other items rrom the questionnaire which
-
33
may be uniquely patterned.
Figure 2 has a range o~ political involvement o~
3.3 to 11, and a range o~ legislative activities vary-ing
~rom 0 to 2.2. The average score ~or the respondents
with regard to PI is 5.7 and ~or LA it is .9.
Figure 2, which is a space diagram o~ the relation-
ship o~ behavioral pro~iles o~ individual bureaucrats,
has one group, D, which is primarily gladiatorial in its
political involvement. Group D consists o~ ten individ-
uals who also have a high legislative activity score.
D(2) comprises ~our persons who engage in such activities
as soliciting campaign ~unds, attending a political caucus
or strategy meeting, as well as in lobbying ~or bills,
~elping legislators prepare legislation and contacting
legislators ~or help. None, however, has been a candidate
~or o~~ice. These individuals, as the average PI score o~
11. would indicate, also participate in transitional and
spectator activities. Parenthetically it is o~ interest
that the positions o~ these highly active persons are as
~ollows: one department director and two deputies--who are
political appointees--and one division chie~, a civil
servant.
Del) with an average PI score o~ 9.9 a~d a LA score
o~ 1.6 is a somewhat.less active grou~ ~our o~ these
six do not pass out handbills, nor give ideas ~or speeches,
nor help a candidate plan his campaign, and they have not
been asked by legislators to prepare bills. Subset D(2)
-
34
consists of two directors and two deputies, as well as
two civil servants--a section chief and a unit chief.
There are three isolates near group D, two to the right
o~ the cluster and one to the left. They also have a
mean PI of 10 and a LA of 2 and their profiles are closest
to D(2). The main difference between these isolates and
the D cluster is that the individuals in the former group
indicate they will not be candidates for office, whereas
the three isolates state they will. These three individ-
uals consist of two department directors and one civil
servant, a division chief. The behaviors of group D and
the three isolates cover the range of citizen activities
including the core items of A(l) of cluster A in Figure 1.
Group C has a mean political involvement score of
5.4 and a legislative activity average of .2. These
persons may be considered "lower" transitionals in their
electoral behavior. They give money to candidates or
parties and put a bumper sticker on their ~ar. They also
consider themselves party members, hence the name
"partisan transitionals." Except for one person, none
has engaged in any legislative activity. Group CIS
behaviors correspond to A(3) of cluster A in Figure 1.
Group B is labeled "independent transitionals" in
the key to the SSA-Q space diagram. These seven individ-
uals consider themselves political independents. While'
their PI score is 4, somewhat less than C, their legis-
lative activity is markedly higher. All have prepared a
-
35
bill for their agency. Their electoral behavior includes
five of the seven contributing money to a candidate or
party, or attending a fund-raising dinner; four attended
rallies. These latter behaviors and helping agency
prepare bill are included in the behaviors of A(2) in
Figure 1.
Group A has a mean political involvement score of
3.3, but of the 22 persons in this group none engaged in
any of the three legislative activities selected for
analysis. About half contributed money or attended a
fund-raising dinner and a few put bumper stickers on
their cars and attended rallies. These persons answer
affirmatively to item #7 which is " ••. I lean toward or
am sympathetic to one party." This group is labeled
"transitionals-spectators" in the key to Figure 2, for
their behaviors range across categories. All follow
political developments in the newspapers and vote.
The Smallest Space Analysis-Q diagram when viewed
as a whole may be interpreted as a hierarchy of individ-
uals who vary from highly-involved electoral and legis-
lative activists to spectators who read newspapers and
vote. Those persons who are gladiators also participate
in transitional and spectator activities, and those who
are transitionals engage in spectator activities. In
addition, legislative activity is shown to vary with
electoral activity, as was indicated in cluster A of the
-
36
SSA-R analysis. An exception to this generalization is
provided by the five "partisan transitionals" in Group
C, only one of whom engaged in legislative activity.
Another generalization which may be made con-
cerning the total Hawaii group of administrators is that
electoral and legislative behavior varies with party
identification, since gladiators are all party members,
and the group labeled spectators-transitionals state they
do not consider themselves party members but lean toward
a party. The exception to this generalization is Group
B of independent transitionals consisting of seven persons
who state they are not party members and who vote for
candidates regardless of party considerations.
We turn now to an examination of the electoral and
legislative behavior of the 38 middle level bureaucrats
. in Hawaii.
The Electoral and Legislative Behavior Patternsof the 38 Middle Level Bureaucrats
Figure 3 is a smallest space analysis of the
electoral and legislative activities of the middle level
civil servants in the Hawaii study group. The items
analyzed are the 36 citizen activities questions. The
most striking difference between this SSA-R and the previ-
ous one which included the range of civil servants, as
well as political appointees, is that there are five
distinct clusters--A, B, C, D, E--with much of the same
content of Cluster A in Figure 1. Cluster A includes
-
37
-
KEY TO FIGURE 3
Cluster A
2. Regularly attend rallies4. Ideas ror speeches
12. Contact legislators14. Approached legislators ror help17. Frequent contacts with politicians18. Considered person with political connections19. Encouraged to be a candidate24. Solicited runds25. Party platrorm
Cluster B
3. Handbills21. Caucus22. Helped candidate in his pUblic relations23. Helped candidate plan26. Gave time to campaign or candidate28. Will be candidate
Cluster C
9. Regarded as potential politician13. Legislators ask me to prepare bills15. Chier asks me to seek support
Cluster D
27.' Member or party34. Attend meetings, rallies
Cluster E
29. Follow developments in newspaper30. Watch TV32. Inrormal discussions33. Initiate discussions
Isolated Items
38
1. Reveal political prererences5. Contributed money6. Fund-raising dinner7. Lean to party8. Party, not active
10. Won't be a candidate11. Helped agency prepare bill16. Been a candidate20. Politician rriends used house
31. Vote35. Not a
partymember
36. Bumpersticker
-
39
"higher order" gladiatorial activities, such as soliciting
runds and drarting a party platrorm or policy statement,
as well as contacting legislators ror support or pending
legislation and asking legislators ror help. Cluster C
to the right includes legislators ask me to prepare bills
and chier asks me to seek support ror him or the agency.
Clusters A and C include the A(l) and A(2) items in the
SSA-R or the total Hawaii group. B includes the electoral
behaviors in A(2) or the SSA-R or the total Hawaii group,
but no legislative activity. Cluster B is comprised or
"lower order" gladiatorial behaviors such as giving time
to a candidate, and distributing handbills. Attending a
caucus or strategy meeting is also part or cluster B
and is the one "higher order" gladiatorial behavior on
Milbrath's scale or political involvement. Cluster D
includes member or party and attending rallies which are
A(3) items in the Hawaii Total SSA-R analysis. In
addition, rive items which were part or the cluster A
syndrome in the Hawaii Total SSA-R analysis are uncorre-
lated in the SSA-R analysis ror the 38 middle level bureau-
crats. These are rund-raising dinner, bumper sticker,
contributing money and politician rriends used house,
among the electoral items, and helped agency prepare bill.
In summary, clusters A and B are gladiatorial
behaviors; B is entirely electoral in emphasis whereas C
in part concerns legislation. A combines both electoral
-
40
and legislative behaviors, and D is a party cluster. E
combines clusters Band C in the Hawaii Total SSA diagram
and is a spectator cluster, and not a party member is
inversely related to the gladiatorial behavi~s in cluster
A as in the previous SSA-R diagram.
The correlations ror the behavioral clusters or
the 38 Hawaii middle level bureaucrats are presented in
the rollowing Tables IV to VII.
TABLE IV
CLUSTER A, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
2 4 12 14 17 18 19 24 25
2~ Regularlyattend rallies 48 72 50 72 72 69 72 48
4. Ideas rorspeeches 35 35 35 35 70 48 1. 00
12. Contactlegislators 65 65 65 50 50 35
14. Approachedlegislatorsror help 65 47 50 28 35
17. Frequentcontacts withpoliticians 65 50 50 35
18. Consideredperson withpoliticalconnections 50 72 35
19. Encouraged tobe acandidate 69 70
24. Solicited runds 85
25. Party platrorm
-
TABLE V
CLUSTER B, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
3 21 '23 26 28
3. Handbills 58 57 57 5621. Caucus 36 64 61
23. Helped candidate plan 49 4726. Gave time to
campaign or candidate 4728. Will be a candidate
TABLE VI
CLUSTER C, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
9 13 15.9. Regarded as
potential46c9.ndidate 61
13. Legislators ask meto prepare bills 80
15. Chier asks me toseek support
TABLE VII
CLUSTER D, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
27 34
27. Member or a party 44
34. Attend meetings,. r.allies
41
-
42
TABLE VIII
CLUSTER E, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
29 30 32 33
29. Follow developmentsin newspapers 41 85 43
30. Watch TV 32 48
32. Informal discussions 3233. Initiate discussions
We turn now to an analysis of individual profiles
of the middle level Hawaii civil servants.
The SSA-Q Analysis of IndividualProfiles of the 38 Middle Level
Bureaucrats of Hawaii
While there are five major clusters of behaviors
in the middle level group of Hawaii bureaucrats studied,
there are seven groups of individuals whose profiles are
highly intercorrelated. Figure 4, the SSA-Q diagram for
the middle group, may be viewed as a hierarchy of politi-
cally involved individuals. The range in political in-
volvement on the 12 items adapted from Milbrath's hierarchy
is from 10 behaviors to 1; the legislative activity ranges
from 2 (of three items used to obtain the LA score) to .2.
The average political involvement (PI) score for the 38
middle level bureaucrats is 4.5 and the average legislative
activity (LA) score is .5.
-
43
uooN
T
:::!:~a::(!)« CI)
0
0 w0
J
!2
Wu.
U a~
Q.
(J) ~t-
o
-
KEY TO FIGURE 4
GROUP A--LOW LEVEL SPECTATORS (N=2)
Political involvement X ... 1.0Legislative activity X . .. .5
GROUP B--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS (N=16)
Political involvement X 3.3Legislative activity X .2
GROUP C--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS (N=3)
Political involvement X ••• 3.8Legislative activity X . .. .6
GROUP D--PARTISAN TRANSITIONALS (N=8)
Political involvement X .•• 4.6Legislative activity X . .. .8
GROUP E--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS (N=3)
Political involvement X •.. 5.3Legislative activity X .•. .3
GROUP F--LOW LEVEL GLADIATORS (N=3)
Political involvement X ... 6.3Legislative activity X • .. .3
GROUP G--HIGH LEVEL GLADIATORS (N=3)
Political involvement X .10.0Legislative activity X ... 2.0
TOTALS
Number of individuals groupedby profiles . • . = 38
Number of isolatedindividuals • • • • • • • = 0
Political involvement X,total group. • . . • 4.5
Legislative activity X,total group • • • • • •• .5
44
-
45
Group G is a cluster of three persons whose PI mean
is 10 and whose LA average is 2. They are labeled "high
level gladiators" to indicate that the behaviors engaged
in are among the top items in Milbrath's hierarchy. They
are active in all PI electoral activities except candidacy
and writing party platfroms. They have been asked by
legislators to prepare bills and they also prepare bills
for their agency. In addition, bureaucrats in this cluster
are party members and engage in transitional and spectator
behaviors.
Group F "low level gladiators" are also party
members and they help candidates in their pUblic relations,
distribute handbills, contribute money, and attend rallies.
However, their legislative activity is negligible. Group
E is a cluster of three persons who consider themselves
politically independent and who help candidates in their
campaigns; their legislative activity is also minimal.
Group D are "partisan transitionals" and their legislative
activity mean is .8; four of the eight have prepared
legislation or engaged in other legislative activities.
Groups Band C are both labeled "spectator-transitionals"
for these persons mainly follow political developments,
discuss politics and vote. Six of the sixteen in Group B
have contributed money or attended a fund-raising dinner
and four have attended rallies; none is a party member.
C profiles differ from B in that the former answer that
tbey are considered persons with strong political
-
46--connections. Group CIS mean political involvement score
is also slightly higher than B's, as is their legislative
activity average. A is a set or two persons who vote and
engage in no other electoral activities; or these one
person has helped his agency prepare a bill.
When we compare the Q analysis and the R for the
middle group we note that the SSA-R shows one large syn-
drome which includes such gladiatorial activities as
solicited runds, contact legislators ror support or pending
legislation, and approached legislators ror help. These
behaviors are engaged in by the high level gladiators in
the Q analysis, and on a lesser scale by the partisan
transitionals. The low level gladiator cluster in the Q
analysis corresponds to the behaviors in B in the SSA-R.
The transitional-spectator behaviors in the R analysis--
contributed money and bumper sticker, as well as the
spectator cluster E have their counterparts in the Band
C group proriles in the Q analysis.
Do middle level bureaucrats' electoral behaviors
correlate in patterns corresponding to the Milbrath
hierarchy? The R analysis does show a patterning or elec-
toral behaviors rrom A, a gladiatorial cluster or higher
order behaviors to B, lower order gladiatorial activities,
to D transitional and E spectator activities.
Among the middle level bureaucrats is there a
hierarchy or individuals dirrerentially engaged in
-
47
electoral behaviors? Except ~or group E, independent
transitionals, consisting o~ 3 persons, this is the case.
In the E group, bureaucrats do give time to a candidate
but they do not engage in such transitional behaviors as
attending a meeting or rally, although they do take part
in spectator activities. The independent transitionals,
E Group, also are not party members. As was noted earlier
electoral activity varies with identi~ication with party,
except ~or the E group which has its counterpart in Group
B in the SSA-Q analysis o~ the total group o~ Hawaii
bureaucrats. The remainder o~ middle level civil servants
follow the scale pattern: high level gladiators partici-
pate in low level gladiatorial behaviors as well as
transitional and spectator activities; transitionals
engage in spectator activity and spectators only discuss,
expose themselves to the mass media, and vote.
In addition, those persons who are active in
electoral behaviors also participate in legislative
a~~airs. The exceptions to this generalization are
greater among the middle group studied than among the
total Hawaii administrator group investigated in this
research. Eleven persons in the Hawaii middle level
groups A, C, E and F in the SSA-Q do not conform to the
patterns; the remaining 27 persons' pro~iles in groups B,-~-
D and G are consistent with the generalization that those
persons who engage in electoral a~~airs are dif~erentially
engaged in legislative activities as well.
-
48
We turn now to an examination of the legislative
and electoral behaviors of the ?2 Philippine middle level
civil servants.
-
CHAPTER III
PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE
PARTICIPATION: 2. THE PHILIPPINE
BUREAUCRATS
In this chapter the objectives are the same as in
Chapter II--to investigate whether or not there is a
hierarchy o~ electoral behaviors among the bureaucrats
studied and to explore whether these pUblic administrators
~orm a hierarchy o~ persons di~~erentially involved in- -electoral activities. Also does legislative activity
~orm a separate cluster o~ behaviors ~rom the electoral?
And do the Philippine bureaucrats studied here engage in
both types o~ activity--electoral and legislative--or do
they specialize in one or the other?
The same methods are employed in this chapter as
in the previous one. First, an SSA-R analysis is pre-
sented whereby the electoral and legislative activities
o~ the Philippine public administrators are clustered.
Then the bureaucrats are grouped according to similarity
o~ their pro~iles, using the SSA-Q technique.\
Since this chapter is a continuation o~ Chapter
II, it concludes with a brie~ statement comparing the
~indings ~or the Hawaii and Philippine bureaucrat groups,
a listing o~ the propositions generated by the SSA
-
50
analyses, and a summary of Chapters II and III.
The Electoral and Legislative BehaviorPatterns of' the 52 Philippine
Middle Level Bureaucrats
Figure 5 is the smallest space analysis diagram
of the electoral and legislative behavior patterns of the
middle level Philippine bureaucrat groups. There are two
large clusters, A and C, and five smaller groupings of
behaviors in the diagram. While both A and Care gladia-
torial in behaviors, A does not include a legislative
item, whereas C includes two. D mainly concerns fund-
raising and fund-giving. E includes drafting a party
platform and legislators ask me to prepare bills which
correlate .48. F is a spectator cluster of initiate
discussions and take part in informal discussions which
correlate .28. G, vote and not a party member, also has
a lower statistical relationship as may be seen from the
.30 correlation.
The correlations f'or the electoral and legis-
lative activity patterns in cluster A are presented below.
Correlations below .273 would fall above the .05
chance level; correlations at .354 or above have a prob-
ability of' .01. With the above in mind inspection of
Table IX shows some correlations which are quite low
indicating, f'or example, little statistical relationship
between party membership and attendance at rallies. The
item with the highest correlations is 19, encouraged to
-
FIGURE 5. SMALLEST SPACE DIAGRAM
BEHAVIOR P"TTERN8, 1& PHIL.IPPINIl BUR.EAUCRAT.5
G.A. ".~'I500, I I
.1.,
.10.(1o
~21 .11 I I I,I ,O~ t:'\ _ , .\;I ,
ol9
looe500o-500 I I I I
-500
IJ1I-'
-
KEY TO FIGURE 5
Cluster A
2. Regularly attend rallies9. Regarded as potential politician
15. Chief asks me to seek support17. Frequent contacts with politicians19. Encouraged to be a candidate23. Helped candidate plan27. Member of party28. Will be candidate34. Attend meetings, rallies
Cluster B
16. Been a candidate36. Bumper sticker
Cluster C
3. Handbills4. Ideas for speeches
12. Contact legislators14. Approached legislators for help18. Considered person with political
connections20. Politician friends used house21. Caucus22. Helped candidate in his public
relations26. Gave time to campaign
Cluster D
5. Contributed money6. Fund-raising dinner
24. Solicited funds
Cluster E
13. Legislators ask me to prepare bills25. Party platform
Cluster F
32. Informal discussions33. Initiate discussions
52
-
KEY TO FIGURE 5 (Continued)
Cluster G
31. Vote35. Not a party member
Isolated Items
1. Reveal political pre~erences7. Lean to party8. Party, not active
10. Won't be candidate11. Helped agency prepare bill29. Follow developments in newspaper30. Watch TV
-'-~ ---
53
-
54
be a candidate which has an r of 52 with will be a candi-
date. These items have intercorrelation with helping a
political candidate plan his campaign, as well as attend-
ance at meetings and rallies.
TABLE IX
CLUSTER A, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 52 PHILIPPINE- MIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
2 9 15 17 19 23 27 28 34
2. Regularly attendrallies 44 43 31 46 46 38 41 27
9. Regarded aspotentialpolitician 27 53 66 33 22 50 47
15. Chief asks me toseek support 25 43 43 41 16 48
17. Frequent contactswith politicians 41 31 41 20 34
19. Encouraged to bea candidate 46 33 52 37
23. Helped candidateplan 46 41 37
27. Member of party 44 1628. Will be a candi-
date 2834. Attend meetings,
rallies
The correlations ror cluster C are presented in
Table X. The most highly intercorrelated item in Cluster
C is 26, gave time to campaign or candidate, followed by
politician rriends used house. This cluster contains
gladiatorial behaviors, and legislative items as well,
-
55
including contacting legislators for support of pending
legislation and approaching legislators for help.
TABLE X
CLUSTER C, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 52 PHILIPPINEMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
3 4
3. Handbills 424. Ideas for speeches
12. Contactlegislators
14. Approached legis-lators for help
18. Considered personwith politicalconnections
20. Politician friendsused house
21. Caucus22. I helped a
political candi-date in his publicrelations
26. Gave time to campaignof candidate
12 14 18 20 21 22 26
39 33 48 42 38 33 4.840 31 43 49 40 34 31
46 25 52 36 37 27
54 30 30 32 22
29 45 29 53
47 54 4730 55
48
The correlations for Cluster D are presented in
Table XI. Cluster D behaviors include the gladiatorial
item solicit funds as well as the transitional activities
of attending a fund-raising dinner and contributing money.
The positive relationship of D cluster to the C gladia-
torial cluster nearby is indicated in the SSA-R diagram
on page 51.
-
56
TABLE XI
CLUSTER D, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 52 PHILIPPINEMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)
5. Contributed money6. Fund-raising dinner
24. Solicited funds
5 6
29
24
43
39
In summary, the SSA-R analysis for the Philippine
middle level bureaucrat group shows a hierarchy of elec-
toral and legislative behaviors. Two large clusters of
behavior, A and C, are both gladiatorial in electoral
activities, but A includes no legislative items whereas C
includes both electoral and legislative behaviors. Nearby
cluster D is a syndrome concerning soliciting or giving
funds to party or candidate. This pattern differs from
Milbrath's scale which includes soliciting funds as a
gladiatorial item and contributing money as a transitional
behavior. Party platform and legislators ask me to
prepare bills in E also form a separate cluster, the
former being a gladiatorial item. Among the spectator
items are cluster F, initiate conversation and informal
discussions, and G, not a party member and vote. Seven
of the 36 items in the citizen activities questionnaire
do not cluster. Of particular interest is helped agency
prepare bill which is not related in the SSA-R to any of
the other electoral and legislative behaviors of the
-
57
Philippine middle level group studied.
Now our attention will be directed to the individ-
ual profiles of the Philippine bureaucrats.
The SSA-Q Analysis of Individual Profilesof the Middle Level Bureaucrats of
the Philippines
Figure 5 presents the Philippine middle level
bureaucrats grouped by correlation of profiles of answers
to the citizen activities questionnaire. The range in
political involvement mean scores is 3.2 to 7. There are
four isolates in the diagram and their PI SCQres are 5, 6,
7 and 10. Legislative activity scores for the isolates
range from .2 to 2.5. The average score for political
involveme~t of the group as a whole is 4.9 for PI and .8
for LA--both somewhat higher than the Hawaii middle level
bureaucrats' averages.
In Figure 6 there are three small groups labeled
gladiators on the basis of the behaviors engaged in. Their
varying scores would indicate some differences as would
the placement on the diagram. Independent gladiators, C
group, of two persons state that they are not party
members. Their behaviors conform to A in the SSA-R
diagram in Figure 5. They will be candidates if circum-
stances are favorable, they give time to a candidate,~
attend caucus or strategy meetings, and attend rallies;
in addition, they prepare bills for their agency. Their
average score of political involvement is 6 because they
-
58
o
oo.,
go .,~I
-
59
KEY TO FIGURE 6
GROUP A--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS.(N;:36)
Political involvement X ... 3.9Legislative activity X . .. .7
A(l) (N-15)--SPECTATORS
Political involvement X ••• 3.2Legislative activity X . .. .3
A(2) (N=lO)--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS
Political involvement X ... 4.3Legislative activity X . .. .7
A(3)--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS (N=ll)
Political involvement X ... 4.9Legislative activity X . 1.
GROUP B--PARTISAN-TRANSITIONALS (N=3)
Political involvement X ... ~.7Legislative activity X . 1.
GROUP C--INDEPENDENT GLADIATORS (N=2)
Political involvement X ••• 6.Legislative activity X ..• 1.
GROUP D--GLADIATORS (N=3)
Political involvement X ... 6.3Legislative activity X . .. .7
GROUP E--GLADIATORS (N=2)
Political involvement X • 7.Legislative activity X ... 2.5
TOTALS
Number o~ individuals grouped by pro~iles = 46Number o~ isolated individuals = 4
Political involvement X, total group ••• 4.9Legislative activity X, total group ••• ,8
-
60
do not make monetary contributions to the party or
candidates or put a bumper sticker on their car, although
they do initiate conversations and discuss politics and
vote. Nearby is gladiatorial group D consisting o£ three
persons who identi£y with a party and who put bumper
stickers on their cars; only one has approached a legis-
lator £or help or engaged in any legislative activity.
Group E o£ gladiators are also partisans who state they
will be candidates under £avorable circumstances; they
also attend strategy meetings, help candidates in public
relations, and engage in transitional and spectator
behaviors. Their PI score is but 7, £or they do not con-
tribute money nor solicit £unds. Both have helped their
agency in preparing bills, one was asked by legislators
to write bills and both approached them £or help. Con-
sequently their legislative activity average is 2.5.
Gladiatorial group D's behaviors correspond to
clusters A and B in the SSA-R diagram in Figure 5; and
group E's to the C cluster o£ behavior patterns.
The three "partisan transitionals" in B group
have contributed money or attended a £und-raising dinner,
given time to the campaign o£ a candidate, and they also
engage in spectator activities, with the exception o£
putting a bumper sticker on their cars. One has prepared
a bill £or the agency and two have approached legislators
£or help.
-
61
Group A, spectator-transitionals, includes 36
persons whose profiles intercorrelate. For purposes of
analysis this large grouping was divided into .three sub-
sets, whose scores increase as one procedes from the
inner core of 15 spectators to the outer circle of 11
transitionals. These persons state that they lean to one
party but that they are not party members. They engage in
such behaviors as discussing politics, following political
affairs in the newspapers and in some transitional
behaviors such as contacting a public official, but not in
contributing money or attending a fund-raising dinner.
Clusters F and G in the SSA-R analysis presented in Figure
5 correspond to the dominant behaviors in Group A.
In summary, the SSA-Q analysis for the Philippine
middle level bureaucrat group shows a hierarchy of persons
differentially engaged in electoral and, to some extent,
legislative activity. Three gladiator groups show
political involvement scores ranging from 7 to 6 compared
to the transitional and spectator means from 4.9 to 3.5.
Among the gladiatorial groups there are two partisan
ones, and one where individuals state they do not belong
to a party, and among the transitional groups there is..-"-
one partisan group and two independents. Although
gladiator group members assist candidates in campaigns,
few state that they solicit funds or contribute money to
candidates. These latter two behaviors are also not
--_.-
-
62
related to the central gladiatorial syndromes in the
SSA-R analysis but form a separate cluster, D, shown in
Figure 5. While the range in legislative activity varies
.3 from the spectator group A(l) to 2.5 for the group E
gladiators, there is little variation in mean scores among
the various transitional and the other gladiatorial groups.
Thus electoral behavior shows a greater range among the
Philippine middle level bureaucrats than does legislative
activity, the mean scores being comparable among five of
the seven groups.
We turn now to a brief comparison of the SSA
analyses of the two middle groups of pUblic administrators
studied.
Comparison of the SSA Analyses for theMiddle Level Bureaucrat Groups
In comparing the Philippine middle group with the
Hawaii middle in terms of their electoral behaviors, in
both SSA-R analyses gladiatorial activities form into two
separate clusters and each has syndromes of transitional
and spectator behaviors. l In both SSA analyses the two
lA minor but interesting difference between thegroups studied is the SSA-R context of the item, "Myrelatives and folks back home regard me as a potentialpolitician. It In the Hawaii middle level bureaucratgroup this item clusters with legislators ask me toprepare bills and with chief asks me to seek support forhim or for agency. In the Philippine middle levelbureaucrat group regarded as potential politicianclusters with encouraged to be a candidate and otherelectoral items, but not with legislative behavior.
To our knowledge only one study has been under-taken which systematically compares conceptualization of
-
63
clusters or gladiatorial behaviors dirrer.in that one
does not contain any legislative items whereas the other
does. In the Hawaii group contacting legislators regard-
ing pending legislation and approaching them ror help is
associated with "higher order" gladiatorial behavior such
as solicit ~unds. In the Philippine group the same two
legisla