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7/27/2019 PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE OZAKI.pdf
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PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION O F JUDGE OZAK I
1. I agree with the por tion of the disposition direc ting the Defence to refrain
from usin g M r K eny atta's official title in its filings in this case.
2. I respectfully disagree with the decision of the Majority to grant the
Defence's request for the accused to be conditionally excused from
continuou s presence at trial ('Request').
Preliminary matter - judicial economy
3. Prior to setting out my reasons on the substance of the Request, I will first
briefly address the preliminary matter of judicial economy and the timing
of the present Decision.
4. Unlike the Majority, I do not consider that judicial economy is solely a
matter within the prerogative of the Chamber.^ It is in the interests of all
parties and participants that proceedings are conducted efficiently and
w ith minimal bu rde n on the Court's system and resources. W hereas it is
ultimately a matter for the Chamber to determine whether a particular
course of action will be in the interests of judicial economy, it is well
within the prerogative if not the responsibility of all parties and
participants to make submissions and requests on this point.
5. Furthe rm ore, I find m erit in the argum ent of the Prosecution and the Legal
Representative^ that it w ould be app ropriate to wait for the App eals
Chamber ruling on the appeal against the decision of the majority in the
^Majority decision, para.59.'lCC-01/09-02/11-818, para. 33 ; Transcript of Hearing, 6 September 2013, ICC-01/09-02/1 l-T-22-ENG-ET, page 22 lines 13-18, page 24 lines 7-10.
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Ruto case^ pr io r to determ ining th e prese nt Requ est as the former m ay wel l
be disposi t ive of the la t ter . In my view, in order to avoid unnecessary
fur ther appeals l i t iga t ion, i t would indeed be preferable to have c lar i ty
from the Appeals Chamber as to the correc t interpre ta t ion of the re levant
provisions of the Sta tute pr ior to rendering a decision on the Request .
6 . O n the other han d, I a lso consider th a t it i s of foremost imp ortan ce to
provide di rec t ion to the par t ies on this quest ion pr ior to the impending
commencement o f t r i a l . As no schedul ing orde r has i ssued ind ica t ing
w he n the Ap pea l s C ham ber wi l l i s sue i ts ru ling , I agree tha t the Cha mb er
should determine the Request a t this t ime despi te the pending appeal in
the Ruto case.
Re qu i rem en t to be prese n t a t t r i a l : i n t e rp re ta t io n of Ar t i c l e 63 (1) o f the
S ta tu te
7. I sha re the Majo ri ty's con clusion tha t Article 63(1) of the Statute imp os es a
duty on the accused to be present a t t r ia l and that such presence a t t r ia l i s
the "defa ul t posi t ion" .^ W here I pa r t co m pan y w i th the M ajor ity i s in
respect of the inter-related findings that (i) Article 63(1) imposes no
corol lary obl igat ion on the Chamber to require the accused 's presence and
(ii) that the Chamber retains a discretion, by virtue of Articles 64(2) and
64(6)(f), to set aside this duty and to excuse an accused from attending
substantially all of the trial.^
8. Ac cor din g to Article 21 of the Statute, the applicab le law of the C ou rt is
discerned in the first instance by reference to the Statute, the Elements of
T̂he Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Appeals Chamber, Prosecution appealagainst the 'Decision on Mr R uto's Request for Excusai from Continuous Presence at Tria l', 29 July2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-831 (OA 5).^Majority decision, para . 124. See also Ruto Decision, para. 42 , incorporated by reference into the
Majority decision.^Majority decision, para. 86. See also Ruto Decision, paras 43 -44 ,47 , incorporated by reference intothe Majority decision.
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Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. As the Appeals
Chamber has stated,^ the interpretation of the provisions of the Statute is
in turn govern ed by the V ienna Convention o n the Law of Treaties. Article
31 of the Vienna Conven tion prov ides tha t a treaty shall be interpreted "in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose".
9. Invoking this principal rule of interpretation, in my view the correct
interpretation of Article 63(1) of the Statute is that the accused is required
to be continuously and physically present at trial. This is not a
requirement that can be waived by the Chamber, subject to very limited
exceptions.
10. The ordinary meaning of the provision, looked at on its own terms, clearly
suggests that the presence of the accused is a requirement of the trial.
Reading the provision in its context only strengthens support for this
interpretation. Specifically, I agree with the submissions by the
Prosecution^ and the Legal Representative^ as to the relevance of Articles
61(2)(a), 63(2), 67(l)(d), 58(l)(b)(i) and 58(7) of the Statute in
understanding the meaning of Article 63(1) of the Statute. Additionally,
Article 64(8)(a) clearly envisages the presence of an accused at the opening
of trial for the pu rpos es of being read the charges and taking a plea.
11. This interpretation is also consistent with the object and purpose of the
Statute. According to the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber, the
object ma y be derived "from the chapter of the law in which the particular
^Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, A ppeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor'sApplication for Extraordinary Review of the Pre-Trial Chamber I's 31March 2006 Decision Denying
Leave to Appeal, ICC-01/04-168, para. 33 .^ICC-01/09-02/11-818, paras 1 1 - 1 4 .^ICC-01/09-02/11-819, paras 1 2 - 1 3 .
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section is included" and purpose "from the wider aims of the law as may
be ga thered from its preamb le an d gen eral tenor of the treaty".^ Hav ing
particular regard to the preamble, the general principles section, and the
section governing trial proceedings, in my view the object and purpose
can be summarised as ensuring an end to impunity for the perpetrators of
serious violations of international criminal law, without distinction based
on the capacity or seniority of those perpetrators, in accordance with the
highest s tand ards of justice.
12.1 cannot accept the Majority view that the Statute's aim of ending
impunity compels a contrary interpretation of Article 63(1) of the Statute
whereby the Chamber may in its discretion waive the requirement for an
accused, who is voluntarily cooperating with the Court and not subject to
arrest, to attend substantially all of the trial. °̂ In particular I am not
convinced by what appears to be the underlying rationale of the Majority
in arriving at this view, which is that this level of discretion must be
recognised to prevent a future hypothetical scenario of a trial being
indefinitely stalled if an accused absconds after an initial appearance.^^
13. Additionally, the clear statutory obligation on the Chamber, pursuant to
Articles 21(3) and 27 of the Statute, is to treat all accused equally without
distinction on the basis of official capacity or other status. While I agree
with the Majority this does not compel identical treatment of, or the
granting of identical relief to, all persons regardless of their particular
circumstances^^ it does, in my view, prohibit special legal accommodation
being gra nted to Mr Kenyatta simply by virtue of his position as President
^ICC-01/04-168,para.33.^^ ajo rity decision, para.90. See also Ruto Decision, para. 44, incorporated by reference into theMajority decision.
^^Majority decision, paras 64, 90 and 108. See also Ruto Decision, para. 44 , incorporated by referenceinto the Majority decision.^^Majority decision, paras 112-115.
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of Kenya. Therefore, I must dissent from the opinion of my colleagues to
the extent that a contrary impression m ay be convey ed.
14.1 further note that I find no conflict betw een the pres um ption of innocence
and the obligation on an accused to attend trial. I do not agree with the
Majority that the requirement of an accused's presence at trial is only a
ques tion of judicial control.̂ ^ In m y view , the fairness and integrity of the
proceedings are also im plicated.
15. Finally, I disagree with the Majority's reading of the travaux préparatoires.
In my view these secondary sources, to which it is appropriate to have
recourse for the purposes of confirmation, support an interpretation of
Article 63(1) of the Statute which would prevent the Chamber from
granting the Request on the terms soug ht by the Defence or gran ted by the
Majority. In particu lar, as su bm itted by th e Prosecution,^^ the drafting
history reveals that the drafters intentionally rejected a proposal that
presence at trial be established as a general principle and incorporated
only one specific exception to ongoing physical presence of the accused at
trial, nam ely that codified in Article 63(2).
Exception: scope of Chamber's discretion
16. As indicated above, I consider that Article 64(2) and (6)(f) of the Statute
nonetheless does reserve a limited discretionary power for the Chamberwhich would permit granting an accused, irrespective of his or her official
status, a conditional excusai from presence at trial in certain exceptional
circumstances. Given that this discretion arises from an inheren t pow er of
the Chamber it should be restrictively interpreted. Moreover, any such
excusai would represent an exception to the requirement for presence
^^Majority decision, para. 124.^'^ICC-01/09-02/11-818, paras 8-9, 12.
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under Article 63(1) of the Statute and therefore should be exercised in a
manner which does no t render tha t p rov i s ion meaning less .
17 . Determinat ions regarding excusai should only be considered on a case by
case basis , consider ing presence of the accused a t t r ia l as a whole and
taking into account fac tors inc luding the fa i rness and expedi t iousness of
the proceedings, the s tage of proceedings, the r ights of the accused under
Art ic le 67 of the Sta tute , the impact on vic t ims and wi tnesses and the
reason submitted to justify such an excusai . I t is a question of fact and
degree in each c i rcumstance . Consequent ly , t empora ry absences due to
tru ly exce ptiona l circu ms tance s - suc h as occu rred in the Bemba case^^ - or
indeed to a l low for the handl ing of nat ional t ragedy such as the recent
a t tack a t W estgate in Nairobi^^ - could be app rop ria te .
18 . Addi t ional ly , in each instance , the Chamber should sa t i sfy i t se l f tha t the
accus ed 's decision not to be presen t a t t r ia l i s m ad e voluntar i ly , kno win gly
and unequivoca l ly .
V i d e o - L i n k
19 . Turning to the port ion of the Request seeking permission for Mr Kenyat ta
to par t ic ipate in the t r ia l by means of video-l ink, and notwi thstanding the
l imi ted manner in which the request for this re l ief was pleaded, I consider
i t useful to se t out my views on the i ssues ra ised. In my opinion. Art ic le
63(1) of the Statute requires the physical presence of the accused in the
cou rt room . Al tho ug h the Defence submissions^^ ha ve so ug ht to dr aw a
para l le l wi th the s i tua t ion of vic t ims and wi tnesses who may, in cer ta in
circumstances, be permitted to test ify via video-link, i t is noted that
^^See e.g. ICC-0l/05-01/08-T-183-Red-ENG CT WT, pages 1-2; ICC-01/05-01/08-T-306-Red-ENG
W T, page 62; ICC-01/05-01/08-T-324-ENG ET WT, pages 16-17.
^^ICC-01/09-01/ll-T-35-ENG ET WT and ICC-01/09-01/ll-T-3 7-Red-EN G W T.
'^ICC-01/09-02/ll-T-26-ENG ET WT, page 24, l ine 22- pag e 25, l ines 4, 21-23.
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specific provision is made for the presentation of victim and witness
evidence by "electronic or other special means" in Article 68(2) of the
Statute.
20. Notwithstanding this finding of a requirement of physical presence, and
on similar reasoning to that applied at paragraphs 16 and 17 above, I
consider that the Chamber retains a limited discretionary power to permit
an accused to participate by means of video-link where this is specifically
justified by the circumstances. However, where such discretion is
exercised it represents an exception to the general requirement of physical
presence and any such determination should again be made on a case-by-
case basis.
Conclusion
21. Finally, it is necessary to note that I find portions of the Majority decision
reasoning to be repetitive, irrelevant to the question before the Chamber
(including the use of selective quotations from various authorities) and/or,
in some cases, incorrect. In my opinion, the Chamber should confine itself
to consideration of the specific legal and/or factual matters before it.
Additionally, while there may be a place for proper policy considerations
in the context of legal decision making, it is important to make a
distinction between such proper policy considerations and the realpolitik of
the day. Therefore, although I hav e not individually identified ab ove all
elements of the Majority decision with which I disagree, such silence
should not be interpreted as representing agreement.
22 . For the foregoing reasons, without prejudice to subsequent specific
requests for excusai being raised for consideration on a case by case basis,
I would not have granted either the primary or alternative relief sought in
the Request.
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Done in both Engl ish and French, the Engl ish version being authori ta t ive .
Ju d g e K u n i k o O z a k i , P r e s i d i n g Ju d g e
Da ted 18 Octob er 2013
At The Hague , the Ne the r l ands
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