Part 1 Global economic trends and challenges Chapter 1 ... · Figure I-1-1-1-3 Changes in inward...
Transcript of Part 1 Global economic trends and challenges Chapter 1 ... · Figure I-1-1-1-3 Changes in inward...
1
Part 1 Global economic trends and challenges
Chapter 1 Structural change in the economy of emerging countries
【Key points of Part 1. Chapter 1】
*Although the expansion of investments in China and other emerging countries led the global economy
amid the slowdown in advanced countries after the global economic crisis, excess debt has arisen as a
result of capital investment-driven economic growth. In addition, excess capacity is becoming
increasingly prominent.
*The gap between production facility capacity and actual production is prominent in such sectors as
steel, chemicals and liquid crystal displays, with producer and export prices falling. Due to the
combination of the excess capacity and the global economic slowdown, trade restrictive measures,
which have been decreasing internationally, are starting again to increase in these sectors.
*Resource-producing economies recorded accelerated growth due to the expansion of demand for
resources in emerging countries, but they are experiencing economic slowdown because of a steep fall
in resource prices caused by an increase in supply due to such factors as the global economic
slowdown and the shale revolution.
*While the Chinese government is implementing structural reforms to shift from an investment-driven
economy to a consumer-driven economy and is upgrading its industries, resource-producing countries
such as Saudi Arabia are also starting structural reform initiatives.
*In terms of production, China’s presence is growing. Whereas Japan, the United States and Germany
were previously major export sources of value added in final demand for other countries, China’s weight
as an export source of value added is increasing.
Section 1 Emerging countries’ growth led by investment expansion and deepening of economic
relationship
1. Growth of emerging economies through expansion of investments
As a premise of the analysis of the challenges faced by emerging countries today, this white paper
will first look back at the history of the economic growth and industrialization of developing countries
since the 1970s.
Since the 1970s, developed countries have increased technology transfers to and investments in
developing countries in pursuit of labor force and resources against the backdrop of their own abolition
of the fixed exchange rate system and liberalization of the movement of capital and of policy changes
in some developing countries. Consequently, some developing countries, mainly the Republic of Korea
(ROK) and ASEAN countries, have succeeded in industrialization through foreign direct investments
and exports of goods. At first, those countries were mainly engaging in labor-intensive light industries,
but in recent years, they have increased their presence in the high-technology sector, including
semiconductors, in addition to such sectors as electrical and electronics equipment and automobiles.
As a result, emerging and developing countries have achieved sustained growth and have until now
continued to record economic growth at a faster pace than developed countries until the global economic
crisis, although their economies temporarily slowed down due to the Asian currency crisis in 1997,
2
among other factors1 (Figure I-1-1-1-1).
Figure I-1-1-1-1 Growth rate of emerging countries and percentage within the global economy
Note: Difference between growth rates in developed and emerging countries are based on the growth
rate spread of real GDP between those countries.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2016.
For example, the ROK achieved economic growth mainly based on exports in its long period of
growth called the “Miracle on the Han River.” Despite a temporary slowdown due to the Asian currency
crisis, the ROK has achieved such economic growth as to put the country in the 11th place in the world
in terms of economic size and 31st place in terms of per-capita nominal GDP in 2015. Likewise,
Southeast Asian countries have achieved remarkable economic growth accompanied by a rise in the
export ratio against the backdrop of the expansion of Japanese and other foreign companies’ production
networks (Figures I-1-1-1-2 and I-1-1-1-3).
1 Here, the classification of the World Economic Outlook (IMF) is followed.
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Difference between growth rates in developed and emerging countries (right axis)
Percentage of emerging countries within global nominal GDP
(%) (%)
3
Figure I-1-1-1-2 Export ratio of ROK and Southeast Asia and real GDP per capita
Note: GDP per capita is a value obtained by dividing real GDP by population, and export ratio is an
export rate of goods and services in relation to GDP of each year.
Source: United Nations Main Aggregates Database
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50%
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0
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30,000(ROK)
Real GDP per capita
Export ratio (right axis)
(2005, $) (%)
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500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000(Southeast Asia)
Real GDP per capita
Export ratio (right axis)
(2005, $) (%)
4
Figure I-1-1-1-3 Changes in inward direct investment from abroad to ASEAN
Source: UNCTAD
Since the second half of the 1990s, the presence of China—which has grown by taking advantage of
the progress in its reforms and initiatives to open up to the outside world, the end of the Cold War and
its accession to the WTO—has rapidly expanded. In the 2000s, China overtook Japan and developed
countries in Europe to become the global No. 2 in terms of economic size, with its share in the global
GDP rising from 3.6% in 2000 to 13.4% in 2014 (Figures I-1-1-1-4, I-1-1-1-5 and I-1-1-1-6).2 The
size of China’s annual growth is almost equal to the growth of the United States, and its annual growth
is equivalent to the creation of an economic area equal in size to the economy of Thailand or Taiwan
(Table I-1-1-1-7). Furthermore, some Chinese provinces have a country-size scale: for example, the
economic size of the Guangdong province is larger than that of Indonesia.
2 Individual countries’ GDP growth rates are from dollar-based data included in the World Economic
Outlook (April 2016) (IMF).
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(bn. $)
Global economic crisis
Asian currency
(bn. $)
(year)
5
Figure I-1-1-4 Long-term trend of GDP in China
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF (Apr. 2016)
Figure I-1-1-1-5 Changes in real GDP growth rate of China (year-on-year rate)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, CEIC database and World Economic Outlook Database,
IMF (Apr. 2016)
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ap
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Nominal GDP (right axis)
GDP per capita (PPP, left axis)
Southern Tour Lectures (1992)
Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping
WTO membership (2001)
Beijing Olympics (2008)
[Economic situation in 2015*]
Nominal GDP: 10,982.8 bn. $
GDP per capita: 14,107 $ (PPP)
7,990 $ (nominal)
*Nominal GDP in Japan (2015): 4,123.3 bn.$
GDP per capita: 32,486 $ (nominal) 38,054 $ (PPP)
(PPP) (bn. $)
(year)
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Tiananmen Square
Incident (1989)Asian Financial
Crisis (1977)
Global Economic
Crisis (2008)
Economic
reform (1978)
WTO membership
(2001)
Southern Tour
Lectures (1992)Beijing
Olympics (2008)
(IMF outlook)
Average growth
rate 1978-2015:
9.6%
(year)
6
Figure I-1-1-1-6 Changes of GDP scales in major countries
Note: Decline in Japan’s GDP in and after 2013 is due to currency exchange rate. Top 10 countries for
2015 are indicated.
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF (Apr. 2016)
Table I-1-1-1-7 Impacts of Chinese economy
1. Annual increment of Chinese economy (bn. $)
GDP (2014) GDP (2015) Increment
China 10,430.7 → 10982.8 552.1
USA 17,348.1 → 17947 598.9
* Increment of Chinese economy surpasses GDP in Thailand (395.3 bn. $ in 2015) and
Taiwan (523.6 bn. $).
2. One province in China is comparable to one country
GDP in Guangdong province
(2015)
1,170.0 bn. $
* Largest economic scale in
China
GDP in Indonesia (2015) 859.0 bn. $
* Largest economic scale in
ASEAN
Note and source:
GDP of each country is based on World Economic Outlook Database (Apr. 2016), IMF. GDP of
Guangdong province is announced in RMB by National Bureau of Statistics of China and converted into
0
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10
15
20
25
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
USA China Japan Germany UK
France India Italy Brazil Canada
(tn. $)
USA
Japan
China
China’s WTO
membership (2001)
IMF outlook
Global Economic Crisis (2008)
China GDP:
2005 5th in the world surpassing France
2006 4th in the world surpassing UK
2007 3rd in the world surpassing Germany
2009 2nd in the world surpassing Japan
(year)
7
dollars.
In terms of exports, while Japan, the United States and Germany suffered declines in their global
shares, China, serving as the “world’s factory,” increased its global share from 4.1% in 2000 to 13.4%
in 2014, and its export items range widely, from light industry products such as textiles through to
machinery (Figures I-1-1-1-8 and I-1-1-1-9).
Figure I-1-1-1-8 Share of major countries within global export
Note: Top 5 countries of export value (2014) in the world are indicated.
Source: UN Comtrade (downloaded on Nov. 30, 2015).
0
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4
6
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10
12
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16
China USA Germany Japan ROK
(%)
China
Japan
USA
(year)
8
Figure I-1-1-1-9 Share of major export products of China within global export
Source: UN Comtrade.
China’s economic growth is driven mainly by gross fixed capital formation, including capital
investment, which accounted for just over 40% of the whole GDP in 2014. This is higher than the levels
seen in major advanced countries in their periods of high growth. For example, in the case of Japan, the
ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP peaked at 36.4% in 1973 (Figure I-1-1-1-10) (Figure I-1-
1-1-11).
0
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30
40
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Footwear (HS64) Clothing (HS61, 62)Furniture (HS94) Electrical machinery (HS85)Iron and steel (HS73) Machinery (HS84)Precision instruments (HS90) OverallPlastics (HS39) Vehicles (HS87)
(%)
Footwear Electrical machinery
Clothing
Overall
9
Figure I-1-1-10 Trend in China's GDP composition by demand
Note: Among the major developed countries, the ratio of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to GDP
peaked in Japan (1973, 36.4%) and Germany (1971, 30.0%).
Source: UN National Accounts Aggregate Database.
Figure I-1-1-1-11 Years when the percentage of investment to GDP peaked in major countries
Note: Years when the ratio of GFCF to GDP peaked during the period between 1970 and 2014
Source: UN National Accounts Aggregates Database.
A similar expansion of capital investment is observed to some degree in other emerging and
developing countries, including Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, too. However, investments in
China have a huge impact on the entire world because of the size of the country’s economy, accounting
for around a quarter of global investments in 2014. In comparison, final consumption in China, which
37.9%
13.5%
44.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Export Import Household consumption Government expenditure GFCF
44.6%
36.4%
30.0%
24.9% 24.4%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
China 2013 Japan 1973 Germany 1971 UK 1974 USA 1979
10
is comprised of consumption in the household and government sectors, has been relatively slow in
expanding and China’s share in global final consumption is only around 10% (Figures I-1-1-1-12, I-
1-1-1-13, I-1-1-14 and I-1-1-1-15).
Figure I-1-1-1-12 Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and final consumption in China (ratio
to the world total)
Source: UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database
24.4%
9.3%
GFCF Final consumption
Proportion
of China
World
total
11
Figure I-1-1-13 Household consumption and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in
Singapore (ratio to the world total)
Source: UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database
Figure I-1-1-1-14 Household consumption and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in
Malaysia (ratio to the world total)
Source: UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database
0.0
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0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Ratio of the household consumption to
the world total
Ratio of GFCF to the world total
(%)
(year)
Asian currency crisis Global economic crisis
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consumption to the world total
Ratio of GFCF to the world total
(%
(year)
Asian currency crisis Global economic crisis
12
Figure I-1-1-1-15 Household consumption and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in
Thailand (ratio to the world total)
Source: UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database
It is the development of the free and open trade and investment systems that has been institutionally
supporting the economic growth of emerging and developing countries, and the World Trade
Organization (WTO)—which was established in 1995 through the reorganization of the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—is the symbol of that.3 The WTO has expanded since then
by bringing in new members, China in 2001 and Russia and other former East Bloc countries in 20124
(Table 1-1-1-16).
3 Reflecting the recognition that the protectionism that became pervasive in the 1930s was a cause of World
War II, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was based on the underlying principle
of the provision of most favored nation treatment and national treatment, was put into effect in 1948 with the
aim of achieving multilateral trade liberalization. The GATT signatory countries realized substantial tariff
reductions and developed trade-related rules concerning non-tariff matters through eight rounds of
multilateral negotiations including a few of those countries. In 1995, GATT was reorganized into the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
4 For the history of the round negotiations after WTO was established, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2.
0.0
0.2
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1.0
1.2
Ratio of the household consumption
to the world total
Ratio of GFCF to the world total
(%)
(year)
Asian currency crisis Global economic crisis
13
Table I-1-1-1-16 New WTO member countries and regions since 2001
2001 Lithuania, Moldova, China
2002 Taiwan
2003 Armenia, Macedonia
2004 Nepal, Cambodia
2005 Saudi Arabia
2007 Vietnam, Tonga
2008 Ukraine, Cape Verde
2012 Montenegro, Samoa, Russia, Vanuatu
2013 Laos, Tadzhikistan
2014 Yemen
2015 Seychelles, Kazakhstan
Source: UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database
Around the time of the end of the Cold War, regional economic integration initiatives accelerated.
The European Union was established in 1993, following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC,
established in 1989) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, concluded in 1992).
Subsequently, the euro, a common currency, was introduced in Europe in 2002, representing a further
evolution of the economic integration and resulting in a rapid expansion in trade within the region
(Figure I-1-1-1-17).
14
Figure I-1-1-1-17 Trend in export value by destination from EU (tn. $)
Source: Global Trade Atlas
Efficiency improvement in distribution of goods due to the diffusion of Information and
Communication Technologies and containers has also supported economic globalization. The
penetration rate of the Internet has risen rapidly in developed countries since the 1990s and in China
since the 2000s. In Japan, the penetration rate of the Internet5 was 90.6% in 2014 (Figure I-1-1-1-18).
Meanwhile, looking at the usage of containers in exports from Japan, the volume of container cargoes
has roughly doubled, indicating that the diffusion of containers has contributed to the efficiency
improvement in distribution of goods. As a result, the ratio of the distribution cost to sales in the whole
of Japan, which was 6.13% in 1995, improved to 4.90% by 2014 (Figures I-1-1-1-19 and I-1-1-1-20).
5 The figure indicates the penetration rate of Internet for household use. The penetration rate of the Internet
for business use is presumed to be growing at a similar or faster pace compared with the penetration rate of
the Internet for household use.
0%
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50%
60%
70%
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90%
100%
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1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Ratio to the world
Ratio to EU region
Ratio of EU region (right axis)
(tn. $)
15
Figure I-1-1-1-18 Internet usage in major countries
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Figure I-1-1-1-19 Change in volume of container cargoes and volume index related to the
exports from Japan
Note: Magnification from 1972 to 2013
Source: Nationwide Flow Survey of Export-Import Container Cargos, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and Trade Statistics, Ministry of Finance
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China
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0123456789
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Volume of container cargoes (export) Volume index (export)
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Figure I-1-1-1-20 Ratio of the distribution cost to sales in Japan (%)
Source: Survey Report on "Distribution Cost for 2014, Japan Institute of Logistics Systems"
From these results, between 1990 and 2014, the value of global trade increased by a factor of 5.4,
outward foreign direct investment stocks grew by a factor of 10.9 and such investment on a flow basis
expanded by a factor of 5.6 rapidly (Figure I-1-1-1-21). As the global economic structure changed, the
ratio of outward foreign direct investment stocks to GDP and the ratio of the value of exports of goods
to GDP expanded 31.8% and 24.6%, respectively, while international transfer of technologies proceeded,
mainly from developed countries to emerging countries (Figure I-1-1-1-21).
6.58
4.7
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7
(%)
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Figure I-1-1-1-21 Trends in export value, outward direct investment stock and patent royalty
in the world (ratio to nominal GDP)
Exports value of goods in the world
Outward direct investment stock in the world
Patent royalty received by OECD member countries
0
10,000
20,000(bn. $)
x5.4(1990-2014)
0
20,000
40,000
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
x10.9(1990-2014)
(bn. $)
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
(mil. $)
x14.8(1990-2014)
500,000
0
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Ratio of export value of goods, outward direct investment stock and patent royalty in the world
to GDP
Source: WTO Statistics Database
UNCTAD STAT
OECD Stats
IMF World Economic Outlook Database Oct 2015, WTO Statistics Database, OECD Stats, UN National
Accounts Main Aggregates Database, UNCTAD STAT.
The types of goods traded have also changed over the years, with trade growing in capital goods
and parts which are necessary for emerging countries for their exports. For example, the value of
imports of raw materials and parts by China from the rest of the world grew by a factor of 30 between
1990 and 2013. By production process, the value of imports of materials increased by a factor of 106,
whereas the value of imports of processed goods expanded by a factor of only 22. This indicates that
China is not limited to simple assembly in terms of production process but is also expanding into the
processing of imported materials (Figures I-1-1-1-22 and I-1-1-1-23).
0
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1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
Receipts of patent royalty, ratio to GDP (OECD member countries, right axis)
Outward direct investment stocks, ratio to GDP (world)
Exports value of goods ratio to GDP (world)
31.8%
24.6%
19
Figure I-1-1-1-22 Import value in China by production process (bn. $)
Note: Values on the right side of the figure stand for magnifications from 1990 to 2013.
Source: RIETI TID Database.
Figure I-1-1-1-23 Share of import value in China by production process
Source: RIETI TID Database.
The expansion of energy demand in emerging countries since the 2000s brought about an upsurge
in crude oil prices. Between 1990 and 2014, the volume of global consumption of primary energy
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Consumer goods Capital goods Parts Processed goods Materials
Materials
(x106)
Processed goods
(x22)
Parts
(x34)
Capital goods
(x14)
(bn. $)
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increased by a factor of 1.6. While the volume of consumption in the OECD member countries in the
same period grew by a factor of 1.2, the volume of consumption in non-OECD member countries
increased by a factor of 2.1 (Figure I-1-1-1-24).
Figure I-1-1-1-24 World primary energy consumption (100 mil. oil conversion tons)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015.
Oil-producing countries recorded a huge current account surplus, which has been allocated for
overseas investments as “oil money” (Figure I-1-1-1-25). Against the backdrop of the rise in resource
prices, investments in the resource sector grew. For example, production of shale oil has increased
steeply in the United States in recent years. Investments in resource-producing countries such as Brazil,
Saudi Arabia and Russia also became active, leading to rapid economic growth in these countries (Figure
I-1-1-1-26).
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World total OECD non-OECD
(100 mil. oil conversion tons)
Changes 1990-2014:
1.6 times (world total)
1.2 times (OECD)
2.1 times (non-OECD)
21
Figure I-1-1-1-25 Current account of OPEC member countries
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2015.
Figure I-1-1-1-26 Long-term trend of GDP in Brazil
Source: IMF WEO, October 2015.
These economic trends led to changes in the industrial structure around the world. In other words,
as production bases shifted to emerging countries, the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP rose
in emerging and developing countries but declined in developed countries. However, in emerging
countries, final consumption did not grow as fast as gross fixed capital formation, so developed countries
continued to be the main consumer regions even in terms of this trend (Figure I-1-1-1-27).
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Saudi Arabia Qatar UAE Kuwait Iran
Venezuela Nigeria Ecuador Angora Iraq
Algeria Libya Indonesia
(bn. $)
02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,00016,00018,00020,000
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Nominal GDP (US$) [left axis] GDP per capitaperson (PPP) (US$) [right axis]
(Unit: US$)(Unit: bn. US$)
Lula’s first cabinet Lula’s second cabinet Rousseff’s first cabinet
(2003-2006) (2007-2010) (2011-present )
IMF estimation
22
Figure I-1-1-1-27 World share of emerging and developed countries in final consumption and
investment
Investment ratio to GDP
Final consumption ratio to GDP
World share of emerging and other countries in investment
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%1
97
0
197
3
197
6
197
9
198
2
198
5
198
8
199
1
199
4
199
7
200
0
200
3
200
6
200
9
201
2
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
197
0
197
3
197
6
197
9
198
2
198
5
198
8
199
1
199
4
199
7
200
0
200
3
200
6
200
9
201
2
Emerging and devceloping countries
Developed countries
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
197
0
197
3
197
6
197
9
198
2
198
5
198
8
199
1
199
4
199
7
200
0
200
3
200
6
200
9
201
2
World share of emerging and other countries in final consumption
Wold share of emerging and other countries in investment
"Investment" far exceeds "consumption"
23
Source: United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.
2. Global imbalance and global economic crisis
In the 2000s, developed countries, including the United States and southern European countries,
continued to be the main consumer regions, supporting the global economy on the consumption side.
As a result, in the period leading to the global economic crisis, capital inflows into and current account
deficits in these countries expanded, resulting in the global imbalance, which refers to the extreme
polarization between countries recording current account surpluses and those recording current account
deficits (Figure I-1-1-2-1).
Figure I-1-1-2-1 Trends of current account in major countries in the world
Trend of current accounts in major countries in the world
USA
-1500
0
1500
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
Am
ou
nt
of
the
curr
ent
acc
ou
nt
USA Southern EuropeUK ChinaJapan GermanyCentral, Eastern and Northern Africa Other developed countriesOther developing countries
(bn. US$)
-1000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
24
Southern Europe
Note: Southern Europe includes Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2015.
In the United States, consumption expanded due to significant growth in the value of credit provided
in the 2000s, and massive amounts of imports of goods from China and other emerging countries
increased the U.S. current account deficit (Figure I-1-1-2-2). The current account deficit was covered
by financial inflows from countries recording current account surpluses, such as China and Japan
(Figures I-1-1-2-3 and I-1-1-2-4). However, in 2008, subprime loans, which originated against the
backdrop of expectations for higher housing prices, turned into nonperforming loans because of a drop
in housing prices, thereby becoming a factor of the global economic crisis.
Figure I-1-1-2-2 Debts in the non-financial sector in USA (ratio to GDP)
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
197
0
197
1
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
8
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
3
Total Governmental sector Household sector Corporate sector
US household debt expanded rapidly
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy
25
Source: BIS total credit statistics
Figure I-1-1-2-3 Bank sector’s receivables from USA in major countries (tn. $)
Note: Data for 2010 has some missing values partially (France).
Source: BIS Consolidated banking statistics.
Figure I-1-1-2-4 Holdings of U.S. bonds by foreign countries and shares of Japan and China
Source: US Department of Treasury
In Europe, as the policy interest rates in the euro area, which were nominal interest rates, were
unified, real interest rates declined in Spain and other countries where the inflation rate was high because
of strong economic conditions, providing an additional economic boost. While consumption expanded,
accompanied by an increase in borrowings due to credit expansion, products were exported from
Germany and other countries, leading to the expansion of the imbalance between countries recording
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Others GermanyUK FranceSwitzerland NetherlandsJapan
(tn. $)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
200
0
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
4
201
5 Ho
ldin
gs
of
U.S
. b
ond
s b
y f
ore
ign
countr
ies
Holdings of U.S. bonds by foreign countries Japan China
(bn. US$)
26
current account surpluses and those recording current account deficits within Europe as well as outside
the region. In terms of finance, banks in Germany and other countries provided loans in pursuit of high
nominal interest rates in southern European countries, which covered their current account deficits with
such loans. In 2010, confidence in government bonds issued by southern European countries crumbled,
resulting in the euro crisis (Figure I-1-1-2-5).
Figure I-1-1-2-5 Trends of current account in EU 28 (bn. US$)
Trends of current account in EU 28
Germany
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
(bn.US$)
-100
0
100
200
300
400
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
27
Netherlands
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2015.
After the euro crisis, the number of countries recording current account surpluses increased within
the EU because of austerity measures implemented by individual countries. For example, Spain led the
economic growth in the euro area by expanding consumption from the second half of the 1990s onwards
while debts in the household and corporate sectors grew. As a result, from the beginning of the 2000s,
Spain’s current account deficit expanded rapidly. After the euro crisis, Spain experienced economic
slowdown due to the disposal of non-performing loans and swung into a current account surplus (Figures
I-1-1-2-7, I-1-1-2-8 and I-1-1-2-9). In 2008, among the EU28, there were only seven countries recording
current account surpluses: Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Finland and
Luxemburg, but in 2014, the number increased to 21 countries, including Italy, Spain, Greece and
Portugal (Figure I-1-1-2-6).
-50
0
50
100
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
28
Figure I-1-1-2-6 Changes in current accounts of EU 28 before and after global economic crisis
(bn. $)
Current account of EU 28 as of 2008 (bn. $)
-200-1000100200300
Spain
UK
Italy
Greece
Poland
Portugal
France
Romania
Ireland
Bulgaria
Hungary
Lithuania
Slovakia
Croatia
Belgium
Czech Republic
Latvia
Cyprus
Slovenia
Estonia
Malta
Luxembourg
Finland
Denmark
Austria
Netherlands
Sweden
Germany
Current account surpluses
Current account deficits
(bn. $)
29
Current account of EU 28 as of 2014 (bn. $)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2015.
Figure I-1-1-2-7 Debts in the non-financial sector in Spain (ratio to GDP)
Source: BIS total credit statistics
-200-1000100200300400
UKFrancePoland
FinlandCyprusLatvia
RomaniaEstonia
BulgariaSlovakia
LithuaniaMalta
CroatiaCzech Republic
PortugalGreeceAustria
LuxembourgSloveniaHungaryBelgium
IrelandSpain
DenmarkSweden
ItalyNetherlands
Germany
Current account surpluses
Current account deficits
(bn. $)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
198
0
198
2
198
3
198
4
198
5
198
7
198
8
198
9
199
0
199
2
199
3
199
4
199
5
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
2
201
3
201
4Total(right axis)
Governmental sector
Household sector
Corporate sector
30
Figure I-1-1-2-8 Changes of real GDP growth rate in Spain
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2015
Figure I-1-1-2-9 Trends of current account in Spain (bn. US$)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2015.
3. Expansion of economic relationships between emerging countries
The economic growth of emerging countries and the deepening of the global value chain brought
about the expansion of economic relationships between emerging countries. Particularly notable are
changes in China’s economic relationships with its neighboring countries because of its rapid economic
growth after the global economic crisis. For example, the number of countries whose largest trading
partners are Japan, the United States or Europe has declined, while the number of countries whose largest
trading partner is China has increased (Table I-1-1-3-1). This paragraph analyzes the effects of the
expansion of economic relationships between emerging countries on the production networks that have
been established mainly by developed countries.
-5%
0%
5%
10%
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
198
0
198
2
198
4
198
6
198
8
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
(bn. $)
31
Figure I-1-1-3-1 Geographical distribution of the largest trading partners among Japan, USA,
EU15 and China
Source: Global Trade Atlas
(1) Changes in production networks in East Asia, ASEAN and other regions
(A) Expansion of final demand in China
It has been said that in East Asia and ASEAN, international division of production has developed in
close collaboration with Japanese companies’ overseas business expansion. Specifically, intermediate
goods have been exported from Japan and the ROK to China and ASEAN, while final goods assembled
in China and ASEAN through trade with ASEAN and between China and ASEAN have been exported
from there to the United States and Europe.6
This structure has been gradually changing in line with China’s economic development, and this
change has accelerated particularly since the global economic crisis. Regarding the export of value
added, an indicator of which countries’ demand is finally met by exports of goods and services from
individual countries through cross-border production networks, Japan and the United States were the
world’s two largest final demand regions in the 1990s through the 2000s, but since the global economic
crisis, the situation has changed, with China becoming the largest final demand region for the ROK,
Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Australia (Table I-1-1-3-2).
6 White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2014
Yellow: Japan is the largest trading partner of 4 regions
Red: China is the largest trading partner of 4 regions
Blue: EU15 is the largest trading partner of 4 regions
Green: USA is the largest trading partner of 4 regions
*4 respective regions are marked with their own colors regardless of amount of the trade.
32
Figure I-1-1-3-2 Geographical distribution of the largest final demand providers to exports of
goods and services in respective countries and regions
Source: OECD Tiva.
For the whole of ASEAN, the United States was still the largest final demand region in 2011, but
China has increased its presence as a final demand region. For example, in 2009, China became a larger
final demand region for ASEAN than Japan7 (Figure I-1-1-3-3).
7 The share of direct exports to China from individual ASEAN countries also rose. The rise is prominent in
Myanmar and Laos in particular.
Yellow: Japan is the largest provider of final demand
Red: China is the largest provider of final demand
Blue: Germany is the largest provider of final demand
Orange: France is the largest provider of final demand
Green: USA is the largest provider of final demand
Brown: Russia is the largest provider of final demand
Grey: Other country than above mentioned is the largest provider of final demand
* Each country is excluded to be the largest provider of final demand of itself.
33
Figure I-1-1-3-3 Final demand destinations of value-added exports by ASEAN and
geographical distribution
(Geographical distribution as of 2011)
Source: OECD Trade in Value Added Database
Presumably, one factor behind this is that exports to China, mainly of resources, have grown due to
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011
Japan USA China
(1,000 mil. $)
China surpasses Japan (2009)
Yellow: Japan is the largest final demand provider
Red: China is the largest final demand provider
Blue: Germany is the largest final demand provider
Orange: France is the largest final demand provider
Green: USA is the largest final demand provider
Brown: Russia is the largest final demand provider
Grey: Other country than above mentioned is the largest final demand provider
* Each country is excluded to be the largest final demand provider of itself.
34
the expansion of private consumption associated with a rise in the income level within the country and
the effects of economic stimulus measures taken by the Chinese government and growth in construction
demand since the global economic crisis. In 2009, the share of foreign value added in relation to
construction demand in China in a foreign country’s GDP, which is an indicator of the cross-border
spillover effects of real estate investments in China, was high mainly in resource-producing countries,
including Brunei (1.65%) and Malaysia (1.07%)8 (Figure I-1-1-3-4).
Figure I-1-1-3-4 Share of foreign value added in relation to construction demand in China
(2009)
Source: OECD Trade in Value Added
As a result of a shift of final demand regions from developed countries to China, it can be assessed
that East Asian countries’ economic conditions are becoming increasingly prone to being influenced
by the conditions of the Chinese economy, including construction demand.
(B) A rise in China’s position as a producer and changes in the global value chain
Provided above was an overview of changes in economic relationships between emerging countries
from the viewpoint of final demand. As a result of China’s economic growth, changes have occurred in
the division of production. As described above, the expansion of the global value chain was led by direct
8 In 2009, domestic value added accounted for 89.3% of the overall value added in relation to construction
demand in China, while foreign value added accounted for the remaining 10.7%. The share of value added
in relation to construction demand in China in a foreign country’s GDP is high in resource-producing countries as mentioned in the main text. Meanwhile, in terms of the size of value added, Japan is the largest
provider of value added (1.06%), followed by the United States (0.82%) and ASEAN (0.82%).
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
Rip
ple
eff
ect
by c
ountr
y w
ith t
he
const
ruct
ion
dem
and
in C
hin
a b
eing 1
00
%
Others Services
Construction Metals
Chemicals Mining
35
investments by companies from developed countries, including Japan, so although the nominal value of
exports from emerging countries increased, the largest value was added by developed countries in most
cases. For example, in terms of the value of imports of goods by the United States, China surpassed
Japan in 2002, with the value of U.S. imports from China staying higher than the value of imports from
Japan since then, but the value of U.S. imports of value added from Japan remained higher than the
value of such imports from China until around 20069 (Figure I-1-1-3-5).
Figure I-1-1-3-5 Shares of Japan and China in nominal value of imports and imports of value
added in USA
Note: There is no value added data except for 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, and value
added during the period without data is assumed to change at the same rate.
Source: Global Trade Atlas, OECD TiVA
As indicated above, until recently, for many countries around the world, the largest trading partners
in terms of the value of their imports of value added concerning final demand were developed countries,
particularly, Japan, the United States and Germany. However, since the global economic crisis, the
number of countries with China as their largest trading partner in terms of the value of their imports of
value added has increased around the world. For example, in 2011, China and Thailand were the only
major countries with Japan as their largest trading partner in terms of their imports of value added (Table
I-1-1-3-6).
9 At around this time, the largest importer of value added from the United States was presumably Canada.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
5Japan (nominal value) China (nominal value)Japan (value added) China (value added)
China surpasses Japan
in nominal value of
imports (2002)
China surpasses Japan in imports
of value added (about 2006)
36
Figure I-1-1-3-6 Geographical distribution of value added creators to final demand of
respective countries
Source: OECD TiVA
In line with an improvement in Chinese companies’ production capabilities, changes can be observed
in the composition of importers and exporters in China. From the second half of the 1990s onwards, the
share of foreign companies in exports from China continued to rise consistently until it peaked in 2005,
since when it has declined. In 2015, the share was down to 44.1%, similar to the level around 1998
(Figure I-1-1-3-7).
Yellow: Japan is the largest creator of value added
Red: China is the largest creator of value added
Blue: Germany is the largest creator of value added
Green: USA is the largest creator of value added
Brown: Russia is the largest creator of value added
Grey: Other country than above mentioned is the largest creator of value added
*Each country is excluded to be the largest creator of value added of itself.
37
Figure I-1-1-3-7 Share of foreign companies in imports and exports in China
Source: General Administration of Customs, CEIC database.
One aspect of this trend is a change in ASEAN’s position in the global value chain. First, regarding
the source of value added to the nominal value of exports of goods and services from ASEAN, the share
of value added by Japan is declining while the share of value added by China is rising. In the second
half of the 1990s through around 2000, the share of value added by Japan in the value of exports from
ASEAN was around 10%. However, as China caught up with Japan, the shares of value added by the
two countries were almost equal in 2011. Moreover, the composition of traded goods has also changed.
Although ASEAN’s exports to China are still composed mainly of intermediate goods (processed goods
and parts), the share of parts has declined since the global economic crisis while there has been an
uptrend in the shares of processed goods that are close in nature to raw materials10 and of raw materials
(Figures I-1-1-3-8 and I-1-1-3-9).
10 The share of raw materials has recently been declining.
44.1
49.4
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Exports Imports
(%)
(year)
38
Figure I-1-1-3-8 Share of value added in exports in manufacturing industries from ASEAN
(Japan and China)
Source: OECD Trade in Value Added Database
Figure I-1-1-3-9 Change in composition of export items from ASEAN to China
Source: RIETI TID
These trends indicate that Japanese companies’ role in the division of production in ASEAN is
changing and also that apart from existing production networks established mainly by companies from
developed countries, the economic integration of China and ASEAN is developing independently.
Presumably, the reasons for this include not only the growth of Chinese companies, including state-
9.7%
10.6%
7.4%
6.3%5.7%
6.0%5.5%
0.6% 1.3%
3.4%
4.9% 4.8% 4.7%5.1%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011
Japan
China
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
199
0
199
1
199
2
199
3
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
Materials Processed goods
Parts Consumer goods
Capital goods
39
owned enterprises and private companies, but also institutional factors, such as the Chinese
government’s support for Chinese companies’ overseas business expansion and the conclusion of the
China-ASEAN free trade agreement.
In line with improvements in China’s technological capability and production capacity, there are also
signs of change in trade between China and the ROK. After the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the two countries in 1992, their trade relationship was initially vertical, with the ROK mainly
exporting light industry products to China while importing primary goods such as resources and
agricultural products from there. Regarding foreign direct investment, small and medium-size
enterprises from the ROK mainly invested in small-scale, labor-intensive light industries in China, such
as textiles and clothing, in order to take advantage of low-cost labor there. From 2002 onwards,
following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign direct investments from
the ROK in China11,12 increased rapidly. However, at that time, ROK companies operating in China
imported a large proportion of parts and materials necessary for their production from the ROK, leading
to exports of raw materials, intermediate goods and capital goods to China for ROK companies operating
there13 (Figures I-1-1-3-10 and I-1-1-3-11).
11 The manufacturing industry is the largest recipient of outward foreign direct investments from the ROK,
and the investments in the industry are mainly made in such sectors as electronics, automobiles and steel.
Investments are also actively made in the mining sector in order to secure resources. By region, Asia is the
largest recipient of foreign direct investments from the ROK, followed by North America and Europe.
12 The ROK has been steadily attracting inward foreign direct investments from abroad, with the ratio of
such investments to GDP staying above 10% since 2000. The amount of inward foreign direct investments
in the ROK in 2015 (on a declared basis) was a new record high of approximately 21 billion dollars, up 10.0%
compared with the previous year. By sector, investments in services, particularly financial services and
insurance, increased significantly, while investments in the manufacturing sector declined. By country/region,
investments from the United States, China and the Middle East grew markedly, whereas investments from
Japan and Europe decreased.
13 Mukoyama, H.,“Tsuyomaru Kankoku no Chugoku tono keizai kankei” (March 2014).
40
Figure I-1-1-3-10 Change in value of outward direct investment in ROK (by industry, flow)
Source: Korea Eximbank and CEIC database.
Figure I-1-1-3-11 Changes in value of outward direct investment in ROK (by country and
region, flow)
Source: Korea Eximbank and CEIC database.
After peaking in 2007, foreign direct investments from the ROK in China slowed down. In addition,
as ROK companies operating in China proceeded with local procurement of intermediate goods, the
ratio of procurement of intermediate goods from the ROK declined. In 2005, the ROK accounted for
4.0% of value added to the value of exports of goods and services from China, but in 2011, the share
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
Others
Real estate and rental
Finance and insurance
Wholesale and retail
Mining
Manufacturing
(mil. $)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
USA China Hong Kong Japan
Vietnam Singapore Indonesia Thailand
Central America Europe Middle East Pacific
(year)
(mil. $)
41
fell to 2.7%14 (Figure I-1-1-3-12). As for the composition of exports from the ROK to China by type of
goods, the share of intermediate goods (parts and processed goods) was 76.8% in 2013, down around
10% compared with 2000. According to one estimate, a rise of 1% in China’s self-sufficiency rate of
input of intermediate goods would result in a decrease of 8.4% in exports from the ROK to China, which
in turn would lead to a decline of 0.5% in the ROK’s GDP.15
Figure I-1-1-3-12 Share of foreign value added creation in exports of goods and services in
China
Source: OECD Trade in Value Added Database
It is said that a sense of crisis is growing in the ROK about China’s catching up. 16 China’s
technological capability is improving and production capacity is expanding in the area of intermediate
goods, such as semiconductors, panel displays, petrochemicals, and steel, which are the ROK’s main
industries. In China, it has become possible to produce many types of parts and materials, leading to a
14 However, as a result of increases in production and sales by Chinese companies in China and abroad in
the electronics sector, exports of intermediate goods to China remained robust afterwards. In 2015, integrated
circuits, liquid crystal devices, auto parts and semiconductors were among the main intermediate goods items
exported to China.
15 Hyundai Economic Research Institute, “Effects of the Rise in the Chinese Economy’s Self-Sufficiency
Rate on the ROK Economy” (July 2015).
16 Regarding the nine major ROK industries’ competitiveness relative to China, the Korea Institute for
Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), a government-affiliated think tank, provided the following
assessments: the ROK is inferior to China regarding steel, textiles and clothing; competition with China is
intensifying regarding shipbuilding, petrochemicals, communication equipment, home electronics and liquid
crystal displays; the ROK maintains a slight advantage concerning general machinery and semiconductors;
ROK companies maintain an advantage regarding automobiles (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Trade, “Current Status of China’s Catching Up and the ROK Industries’ Competitiveness” (October 2014).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011
Within China (right axis) Japan ROK
42
rise in the self-sufficiency rate, and as a result, China’s dependence on imports from the ROK has been
declining.17
Concerning China-ROK trade, there is also a high degree of similarity between the two countries’
import and export product items. In 2015, integrated circuits, liquid crystal devices, wireless
communication equipment and semiconductors were among the major export and import items for both
countries (Table I-1-1-3-13). Concerning the two countries’ trade with the rest of the world, too, there is
much overlap between their import and export items.18 The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient19
was calculated to look at the similarity between China and the ROK in the composition of export items,
and in 2014 the correlation coefficient concerning China and the ROK was 0.803, higher than the
correlation coefficients for Japan and China (0.768) and Japan and Germany (0.664), meaning that there
is a higher degree of similarity in the composition of export items of China and the ROK (Tables I-1-1-
3-14 and I-1-1-3-15).
17 China is said to be raising the self-sufficiency of its major industries while reducing processing trade as
part of its policy of upgrading the industrial structure (Hyundai Economic Research Institute, “Diagnosis and
Outlook of Risks of Domestic and Overseas Economies” (November 2015). The share of processing trade in
overall Chinese trade fell from 55% in 2000 to 35% in 2015 (calculated from the China Customs Statistics).
18 On a four-digit HS code basis, integrated circuits, liquid crystal devices, wireless communication
equipment and auto parts are among major export items for both China and the ROK. 19 The rankings of product items in terms of export value in 2014 were compiled from data concerning the
value of individual countries’ exports by product item (on a four-digit HS code basis), and the rank
correlation coefficient was calculated based thereon. Spearman’s ρ (rho) takes a value between minus 1 and
plus 1. The closer the value of Spearman’s ρ is to plus 1, the stronger is the positive correlation between the
two countries’ rankings of export product items—which means the presence of a higher degree of similarity
and a higher level of competition between their export product items.
43
Table I-1-1-3-13 Comparison of top 10 items of ROK imports from and exports to China
Major export items from ROK to
China (mil. $)
Major import items from China to
ROK (mil. $)
2000 2000
Mineral fuel 1,625 Coal 698
Thermionic tube, imaging tube for
television 1,231 Corn 660
Cyclic hydrocarbon 670 Office equipment parts 412
Polycarboxylic acid 578 Computer 404
Ethylene polymer 518 Semiconductor 352
Office equipment parts 463 Mineral fuel 309
Cattle leather 436 Integrated circuit 269
Woven fabric of textile fiber 435 Transformer, rectifier 261
Integrated circuit 430 Frozen fish 248
Stainless steel flat rolled
products 420 Pig iron and spiegeleisen 242
Overall 18,455 Overall 12,348
Major export items from ROK to
China (mil. $)
Major import items from China to
ROK (mil. $)
2015 2015
Integrated circuit 24,270 Integrated circuit 8,649
LC device 15,308 Wireless communication device 8,472
Cyclic hydrocarbon 6,355 Computer 3,101
Wireless communication device 6,231 LC device 2,179
Automobile parts 5,410 Insulated electrical wire, cable 2,140
Alarm, siren 4,336 Semiconductor 1,897
Mineral fuel 3,311 Flat hot-rolled products 1,604
Semiconductor manufacturing
equipment 2,756 Steel structures 1,482
Electric circuit components 2,735 Office equipment parts 1,111
Semiconductor 2,225 Printed board 1,103
Overall 137,124 Overall 90,250
Note: Items are classified according to HS 4-digit classification
Source: Global Trade Atlas
44
Table I-1-1-3-14 Comparison of top 10 major export items in China and ROK (to the world)
Major export items in China (mil. $, %)
2014 2015
year on year
Wireless communication device 195,317 213,412 9.3
Computer 163,421 137,303 -16.0
Integrated circuit 61,213 70,125 14.6
Lighting device 31,109 35,792 15.1
LC device 34,701 33,961 -2.1
Semiconductor 30,641 33,585 9.6
Furniture and components 28,442 29,172 2.6
Office equipment 31,233 28,918 -7.4
Automobile parts 28,477 28,285 -0.7
Travel goods, bag 27,130 28,270 4.2
Overall 2,343,222 2,280,541 -2.7
Major export items in ROK (mil. $, %)
2014 2015
year on year
Integrated circuit 51,544 52,173 1.2
Automobile 44,821 41,721 -6.9
Petroleum product 48,818 30,622 -37.3
Wireless communication device 27,667 29,855 7.9
Automobile parts 24,265 23,053 -5.0
Vessel 21,836 21,570 -1.2
LC device 24,884 21,487 -13.7
Other than vessel for navigation 16,330 16,487 1.0
Cyclic hydrocarbon 10,601 8,317 -21.5
TV/radio parts 7,240 6,013 -16.9
Overall 572,665 526,757 -8.0
Note: Items are classified according to HS 4-digit classification
Source: Global Trade Atlas
45
Figure I-1-1-3-15 Comparison of similarity of composition of export items between China and
ROK (2014)
Source: Global Trade Atlas.
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 𝜌 is calculated for composition of export items in
respective countries for 2014 based on HS 4-digit classification.
China’s presence as a final consumption region and a creator of added value is growing not only for
East Asian and Southeast Asian countries but also for other countries around the world, mainly resource-
producing ones. The Chinese government is aiming to strengthen economic relationships with Asia,
Europe and the eastern coast of Africa.20 Exports to these regions account for slightly higher than 50%
of overall exports from China, while imports from there make up slightly lower than 60% of overall
imports by China (Table I-1-1-3-16 and Figures I-1-1-3-17 and I-1-1-3-18).
20 Regarding these regions, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the New Silk Road Economic Belt
(land-based portion of the New Silk Road) initiative during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 and
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (ocean-based portion of the New Silk Road) initiative in his speech in
the Indonesian parliament in October of the same year. China refers to these two Silk Road initiatives
collectively as the New Silk Road (One Belt, One Road) initiative. It is expected that improving
connectivity with this region by developing infrastructure there—including roads, railways, ports, and
communication and energy facilities—will contribute to exports from China by expanding flows of people,
goods, funds and information and by promoting the region’s economies and industries. Although there is no
clear definition of countries covered by the initiative, around 30 countries, including Turkey and Poland,
signed a memorandum of understanding on the One Belt, One Road initiative in 2015, according to an
announcement by the National Development and Planning Commission (February 2016). Meanwhile,
according to a survey report commissioned by a Japanese private-sector think tank to the survey division of
the Ministry of Commerce of China (Mizuho Research Institute, called “Full Picture of the New Silk Road
Initiative as Revealed by a Chinese Think Tank—FY2014 Survey Commissioned to the Chinese Academy
of International Trade and Economic Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce,” the initiative, as
broadly defined, covers a vast region that includes Central Asia, South Asia, Russia/CIS and Europe in the
land-based portion and East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf coast and the Red Sea and
East Africa coast, with the total number of countries reaching as many as around 90. Described here are trade and investment relationships between China and the New Silk Road region as defined by the report
commissioned by the Japanese think tank.
ROK
Japan
Germany
*Numbers stand for
similarity of
composition of export
items (Max. value: 1)
China
46
Table I-1-1-3-16 Major countries that have foreign economic relations with China (Asia,
Europe and Africa)
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kirghiz, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia
South Asia India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives
South-East Asia Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei, East Timor
Middle East Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar
Central and
Eastern Europe
Russia, Poland, Belarus, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia,
Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Armenia, Ukraine
Western Europe EU member countries
Africa Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Africa
Note and source:
1. Compiled focusing on the countries along the New Silk Road based on websites of The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and
other survey reports commissioned to the private sector.
2. Regions are classified for expedient.
Figure I-1-1-3-17 Trends of China’s exports to Asia, Europe and Coastal East Africa
Note. Land and sea routes are aggregated from the countries that are considered to be included in the
New Silk Road area. Overall does not meet total of land and sea routes as some countries are
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
200
9
201
1
201
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
200
9
201
1
201
3
New Silk Road (land route) New Silk Road (sea route)
Overall New Silk Road Overall exports
(bn. $)
(Exports) (Imports)
47
overlapped both in land and sea routes.
Source: Global Trade Atlas
Figure I-1-1-3-18 Changes of share of Asia, Europe and Coastal East Africa in China’s exports
Note: Land and sea routes are aggregated from the countries that are considered to be included in the
New Silk Road area. Overall does not meet total of land and sea routes as certain countries are
overlapped both in land and sea routes.
Source: Global Trade Atlas
Looking at the composition of China’s trade with these regions by type of goods, China imports raw
materials (unprocessed resources such as crude oil and iron ore) and mainly exports processed goods
(steel/metals chemicals, etc.) and consumer goods. Figure I-1-13-19 shows the type of goods that has
the largest share in China’s imports from and exports to each trading partner. Regarding imports, the
share of raw materials is the largest in imports from West Asia, the Middle East and the western coast
of Africa. As for exports, the share of consumer goods is the largest in exports to Russia and many
countries in Central Asia and Europe. Regarding trade with Southeast Asia and South Asia, the share of
processed goods (steel/metals, chemicals, etc.) is the largest in both imports from and exports to many
countries in these regions.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Land route Sea route Overall
(%)
Land route
Sea route
Overall
(Exports) (Imports)
48
Figure I-1-1-3-19 Composition of China’s trade with Asia, Europe and Coastal East Africa by
type of goods (goods with the largest share)
Imports of China (2014)
Exports of China (2014)
Note: Map is an approximate map.
Source: UN Comtrade data obtained from World Bank WITS Database.
There is the view that these changes in the global value chain are not limited to East Asia but it may
China
Primary goods
Processed goods
Parts and components
Consumer goods
Capital goods
China
Primary goods
Processed goods
Parts and components
Consumer goods
Capital goods
49
be seen as a global phenomenon from the perspective of a slowdown in the growth of the volume of
trade in goods across the world.21 For example, at the G20 trade ministers’ meeting held in 2015, this
matter was discussed.22 Elasticity calculated by dividing the growth rate of the global volume of imports
with the growth rate of real GDP has been declining as a long-term trend since the 1990s although going
up and down steeply during the IT bubble period and the global economic crisis, for example. Since
2012, the growth rate of the volume of imports has tended to be lower than the growth rate of real GDP,
so the ratio of the global trade volume to GDP has been declining.23 A change in vertical industrial
integration worldwide has been cited as a background factor of such trends24 (Figure I-1-1-3-20).
Figure I-1-1-3-20 Relationship between global real GDP growth rate and volume of imports
(elasticity)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and CPB World Trade Monitor.
21 Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta (2015), The Global Trade Slowdown: Cyclical or Structural?, IMF
Working Paper, WP/15/6, January 2015, (IMF).
22 Chairman’s Summary Meeting of G20 Trade Ministers, Istanbul, October 6, 2015. 23 However, the ratio of services trade to GDP has continued to rise. For further details, see Chapter 3, Section 1.
24 Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta (2015).
2.1 2.2
3.5 3.5
2.4 2.5 2.32.0
3.1
0.0
1.62.0
2.6
1.9 2.0
1.4
0.6
6.4
3.2
1.7
0.71.0 1.2
0.8
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
199
2
199
3
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
5
50
(2) Overseas business expansion by Chinese companies, etc.
(A) Overseas expansion by Chinese companies and foreign direct investment
Since around the early 2000s, the Chinese government has called for active overseas expansion by
Chinese companies. As a result, the value of outward foreign direct investments (FDIs) from China grew
rapidly in the 2000s, and in 2014, it was very close to the value of inward FDIs in China (Figure I-1-1-
3-21). In 2014, China was the global No. 3 in terms of outward FDIs on a flow basis, after the United
States and Hong Kong, and the global No. 7 in terms of outward FDIs on a stock basis (Figures I-1-1-
3-22 and I-1-1-3-23).
Figure I-1-1-3-21 Changes in direct investment in China
Note: Statistics by Ministry of Commerce have reported overall including finance since 2006. Statistics
excluding finance since 2002.
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China and CEIC database.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Inward direct investment Outward direct investment
(bn. $)
(Overall) (Finance excluded)
Inward direct investment
Outward
direct
investment
51
Figure I-1-1-3-22 Outward direct investments in major countries (flow base)
(Trends)
Note: Top 5 countries and regions for 2014 are indicated.
Source: UNCTAD website.
(2014)
Note: Top 10 countries and regions as of the end of 2014 are indicated.
Source: UNCTAD website.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
USA Hong Kong China Japan Germany
(bn. $)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
US
A
Ho
ng K
on
g
Chin
a
Jap
an
Ger
man
y
Russ
ia
Can
ada
Fra
nce
Net
her
lan
ds
Sin
gap
ore
(bn. $)
52
Figure I-1-1-3-23 Outward direct investments in major countries (stock base)
(Trends)
Note: Top 5 countries and regions for 2014 are indicated with Japan and China.
Source: UNCTAD website.
(End of 2014)
Note: Top 10 countries and regions as of the end of 2014 are indicated.
Source: UNCTAD website.
By region, Hong Kong was the largest recipient of FDIs from China, accounting for two-thirds of
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
USA UK Germany Hong Kong
France Japan China
(tn. $)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
US
A
UK
Ger
man
y
Ho
ng K
on
g
Fra
nce
Jap
an
Sw
itze
rlan
d
Net
her
lan
ds
Chin
a
Can
ada
(tn. $)
53
China’s outward FDIs, followed by financial centers such as Luxemburg and the Cayman Islands (Figure
I-1-1-3-24). Among other major recipients are the United States and Australia. By sector, leasing,
business services, retailing, mining and financial services are the largest recipients of FDIs from China,
followed by manufacturing (Figure I-1-1-3-25). The recipient sector of FDIs from China differed
according to the recipient country/region. For example, business services, wholesaling, retailing, and
financial services have large shares as recipients of Chinese FDIs in Hong Kong, while in Australia, the
share of mining is large.
Figure I-1-1-3-24 Outward direct investment in China (by region)
Note: Top 10 countries and regions for 2014 are indicated. Japan is not shown as it was ranked 29th.
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China and CEIC database.
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Hong Kong USA Luxembourg Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands Australia Singapore UK
Germany Indonesia Others Overall
(bn. $)
54
Figure I-1-1-3-25 Outward direct investment in China (by industry)
Note: Top 10 industries for 2014 are indicated. Finance intermediation is not included before 2006.
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China and CEIC database.
In many cases, Chinese companies procure foreign currency funds for overseas expansion in the
Hong Kong stock market. In 2015, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing attracted the largest number
of initial public offerings in the world, outpacing the New York Stock Exchange.
In the 2000s, the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) carried out by Chinese
companies steadily rose. While M&A activities by companies from major Western countries, such as
the United States and the United Kingdom, have remained sluggish since the slump after the global
economic crisis, the number of Chinese M&As has increased, bringing China up to the global No. 7 in
terms of the number of M&As in 2014 (Figure I-1-1-3-26).
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Lease and office services Wholesale and retail Mining
Finance intermediation Manufacturing Real estate
Transport and post Construction IC and IT services
Agriculture and fishery Others Overall
(bn. $)
55
Figure I-1-1-3-26 Cross-border M&A (acquisition) in the world
(Trends)
(2014)
Note: Top 7 countries for 2014 are indicated.
Source: UNCTAD website.
Since 2011, the annual number of Chinese cross-border M&As has been increasing slightly at around
250. By nationality of M&A targets, companies in developed countries are the main targets. By country,
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
USA UK Canada France Japan Germany China
(case)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
US
A
UK
Can
ada
Fra
nce
Jap
an
Ger
man
y
Chin
a
Sw
itze
rlan
d
Au
stra
lia
Net
her
lan
ds
(case)
56
Chinese M&As have been mainly carried out in developed countries, and by sector, the share of
resources and energy as M&A targets declined from the previous high level while the share of industrials,
finance and consumer goods increased (Figure I-1-1-3-27).
Figure I-1-1-3-27 Cross-border M&A of China (by partner country and industry)
Cross-border M&A by Chinese companies
(completed)
Targets by country (total of respective years)
Targets by industry
255 251 245
303
264
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
230
186158
9678 78
6044 34 33 28
293
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
90
74
7
23
61
89
71
8
34
49
75
61
10
24
75
56
88
4
44
111
31
89
7
40
97
0
50
100
150
Resource and energy Industries Infrastructure Finance Consumer goods
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
57
Note: Total from 2011 to 2015.
Source: Thomson Reuters.
Regarding infrastructure investment, Chinese companies are acquiring port and airport service
companies and shipping and aviation service companies through M&As around the world (Figure I-1-
1-3-28).
Figure I-1-1-3-28 Acquisition of foreign logistic infrastructure by China transport-related
cross-border M&A by Chinese companies
Source: Thomson Reuters
Acquired company Country
Hanjin New Port Co Ltd South Korea
PT Kutai Nyala Resources Indonesia
Kuantan Port Consortium Sdn Bhd Malaysia
APM Terminals Zeebrugge NV Belgium
Kumport SA Turkey
Brazilian Dock Brazil
Luka Rijeka dd Croatia
Swissport International AG Switzerland
Source: Thomson Reuters
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Air freight Airlines Marine freight Land freight
Acquisition completed
In process
58
(B) China’s economic cooperation provided mainly to resource-producing countries25
China’s share as a destination of exports from resource-producing countries, mainly in the Middle
East and Central Asia, is increasing, and at the same time, the value of Chinese economic cooperation
provided to such countries is growing (Figure I-1-1-3-29). Presumably, infrastructure built through
Chinese economic cooperation projects, including roads and railways, invigorates flows of goods
between resource-producing countries and China, while oil and natural gas pipelines thus constructed
contribute to China’s acquisition of resources from abroad.26
Figure I-1-1-3-29 Share of China in exports in major resource-rich countries and Chinese
economic cooperation
(Share of China in exports in respective countries)
25 China’s economic cooperation with foreign countries or regions (as defined by China Statistical Year Book
(National Bureau of Statistics of China)) may be different from cooperation provided to developing countries
through ODA and other means as defined in Japan. China’s economic cooperation with foreign countries or
regions is presumed to be a concept that includes foreign construction contracts and foreign labor service
cooperation.
26 China also led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a new financial
institution intended to promote infrastructure investments in Asia. The AIIB was established in December
2015 with 57 countries as its founding members and formally started operation after holding a general
meeting and a Board of Governors meeting in January, but Japan and the United States are not members of
the institution. In addition, at the end of 2014, China established the Silk Road Fund (40 billion dollars),
which is intended to promote co-development and co-prosperity with countries in the region covered by the
One Belt, One Road initiative that it is advocating by investing in and providing loans for connectivity-related
projects, including infrastructure and resource development and industrial and financial cooperation. This
fund can make decisions on projects at China’s own discretion. According to a media report, in April 2015,
a decision was made on the first project, which is an investment in the construction of a hydroelectric power
station in Pakistan.
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
5
10
15
20
25
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Kazakhstan
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Turkmenistan
(%) (%)
59
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics/Yearbook 2014, IMF.
(Value of Chinese economic cooperation offered to respective countries)
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, CEIC database.
After the global economic crisis, the growth in Chinese economic cooperation slowed down,
particularly in 2014, the most recent year for which relevant data is available, but in the 2000s, such
cooperation was growing rapidly (Figure I-1-1-3-30). Between 2000 and 2014, the value of Chinese
economic cooperation grew by a factor of 17, translating into the average annual growth of 22.4%
over the 14-year period, and immediately before the global economic crisis, the annual growth was
nearly 40%. By region, Asia and Africa are by far the largest recipients of Chinese cooperation in
terms of value. In particular, Africa’s share in overall Chinese economic cooperation rose remarkably,
from 13.1% in 2000 to 37.2% in 2014 (Figure I-1-1-3-31).
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
(mil. $)
60
Figure I-1-1-3-30 Chinese economic cooperation (value of completed projects)
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, CEIC database.
Figure I-1-1-3-31 Share of Chinese economic cooperation (value of completed projects) by
region
(Changes)
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Asia AfricaCentral and South America EuropeNorth America OceaniaWorld total Growth rate (right axis)
(bn. $)
Asia
Africa
(%)
Growth rate (right axis)
World total
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Asia Africa
Central and South America Europe
North America Oceania
Asia
Africa
(%)
61
(2014)
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, CEIC database.
In 2014, the most recent year for which relevant data is available, Asia was the largest recipient
region of Chinese economic cooperation, but by country, African countries (Ethiopia, Angola and
Algeria) were the three largest recipients, followed by Saudi Arabia and Venezuela (Figure I-1-1-3-
32). Figure I-1-1-3-33 is a map indicating major recipients of Chinese economic cooperation in terms
of value (the deeper the color is, the larger the value of economic cooperation is). While recipients of
Chinese economic cooperation are scattered across the world, there are many recipients in Africa,
Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East in particular.
Asia
46%
Africa
37%
Europe
5%
Central and
South
America
9%
North
America
1%
Oceania
2%
62
Figure I-1-1-3-32 Value of Chinese economic cooperation by major country (value of
completed projects, 2014)
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, CEIC database.
Figure I-1-1-3-33 Partner countries and regions for Chinese economic cooperation
Note: The deeper the color, the larger value of economic cooperation.
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, CEIC database.
0
2
4
6
8
Sau
di
Ara
bia
Iraq
Ind
on
esia
Pak
ista
nV
ietn
amH
ong
Kon
gS
ing
apo
reM
alay
sia
Ind
iaK
azak
hst
an
Eth
iopia
An
go
raA
lger
iaN
iger
iaR
epub
lic
of
the…
Equ
atori
al
Gu
inea
Tan
zan
ia
Fra
nce
Bel
aru
sR
uss
iaU
KG
erm
any
Ven
ezuel
aE
cuad
or
Bra
zil
Bah
amas
Mex
ico
US
AC
anad
a
Au
stra
lia
Pap
ua
New
Guin
eaN
ew Z
eal
and
(bn. $)
Asia Africa Europa OceaniaCentral and
South
America
North
America
63
Recently, economic cooperation in terms of the value of completed projects has been increasing
in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Ethiopia, and it has also been on an uptrend in Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq and ASEAN countries such as Indonesia (Figure I-1-1-3-34).
Figure I-1-1-3-34 Trends in Chinese economic cooperation by major country (value of
completed projects)
(Central Asia)
(Africa)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Kirghiz
Uzbekistan
Tadzhikistan
(mil. $)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Ethiopia Tanzania
Sudan Kenia
Egypt Mozambique
(mil. $)
64
(South Asia)
(Middle East)
(ASEAN)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
(mil. $)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Saudi
Arabia
(mil. $)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Indonesia Laos
Malaysia Brunei
Philippines Singapore
Thailand Vietnam
(mil. $)
65
(Russia/CIS)
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, CEIC database.
Regarding Chinese economic cooperation projects, large-scale infrastructure and plant
construction projects are increasing. Among recent specific examples27 of the progress made in
Chinese infrastructure cooperation provided to other countries is a contract obtained by China for a
high-speed railway project in Indonesia, which was reported by the media in September 2015. Among
examples of cooperation for large-scale infrastructure projects in developed countries is an agreement
reached at the U.K.-China summit in October 2015 on promoting the introduction of Chinese-made
nuclear power stations in the United Kingdom. In 2016, there have been media reports about
agreements signed with Saudi Arabia and Iran during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the
Middle East on economic cooperation, including the construction of nuclear power stations and high-
speed railways (Figure I-1-1-3-35).
27 There are no statistics concerning the breakdown of specific economic cooperation, so projects mentioned
in recent media reports are cited here.
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belarus
Russia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
(mil. $)
66
Figure I-1-1-3-35 Chinese foreign infrastructure cooperation projects reported recently
Note: Map is an approximate map.
Source: The sources such as newspaper reports.
Regarding the composition of exports of goods to recipients of Chinese economic cooperation, the
share of capital goods has generally stayed large in line with infrastructure investments, although the
share varies from recipient country to country (Figure I-1-1-3-36).
UK
Nuclear power plant
(Oct. 2015)
Saudi Arabia
Nuclear power plant
(Jan. 2016)
Iran
Nuclear power plant
(2015)
High-speed railway
(Jan. 2016)
Indonesia
High-speed railway
(Sep. 2015)
Laos
High-speed railway
(started Dec. 2015)
67
Figure I-1-1-3-36 Trends in composition ratio of imports from China by type of goods
Kazakhstan
Pakistan
Source: UN Comtrade.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Primary goods Parts and Components
Processed goods Capital goods
Consumer goods
(%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Primary goods Parts and ComponentsProcessed goods Capital goodsConsumer goods
(%)