Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments

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Parliamentary Control ofCoalition GovernmentsKaare Strøm,1,2 Wolfgang C. Muller,3

and Daniel Markham Smith1

1Department of Political Science, University of California San Diego, La Jolla,California 92093-052, email: [email protected], [email protected]; 2InternationalPeace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Norway; 3University of Vienna, Austria,email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2010. 13:517–35

First published online as a Review in Advance onFebruary 24, 2010

The Annual Review of Political Science is online atpolisci.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071105.104340

Copyright c© 2010 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

1094-2939/10/0615-0517$20.00

Key Words

coalition governance, portfolio allocation, parliamentary committees,coalition committees, coalition agreements

AbstractParliamentary democracy means that the political executive is account-able to the parliamentary majority. However, when both the parliamen-tary majority and the cabinet consist of two or more distinct politicalparties, it is often difficult for the parliamentary majority to monitor andcontrol the executive. In this article, we focus on political delegationfrom parliamentarians to the executive branch under multiparty par-liamentary government. We identify the most important mechanismsparliamentary parties employ to remedy the accountability problemsthat may arise, as well as the arenas in which they are exercised: theexecutive arena, the parliamentary arena, and the extraparliamentaryarena. We discuss the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms arenaby arena, examine their use in 15 Western European countries that fre-quently feature coalition governments, and review our knowledge ofhow parliaments and parliamentary parties control political delegationand accountability in coalition governments.

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INTRODUCTIONParliamentary democracy means first and fore-most that the political executive serves at thepleasure of the parliamentary majority. It isa constitutional design that implies strict andimmediate executive accountability and conse-quently a precarious existence for any primeminister and cabinet. But although the ulti-mate sanctions of the parliamentary majorityare powerful, they are in fact rarely deployed.This is partly a consequence of successful antic-ipation on the part of the executive and partly areflection of the bluntness of the no-confidencevote, but partly also a result of significant in-formational asymmetries between parliamen-tarians and members of the executive branch.Control of the executive is thus complicated bythe means at the parliament’s disposal as wellas by its lack of reliable information. Effectiveaccountability requires not only a formal exec-utive obligation to serve the will of the parlia-mentary majority, but also suitable mechanismsby which the parliamentary majority can deter-mine when this obligation has not been met andmust be enforced.

Making this determination can be a sig-nificant challenge even when all membersof the cabinet belong to the same politicalparty as the members of the parliamentarymajority. The magnitude of the challenge canonly increase when instead both the cabinetand the parliamentary majority are composedof two or more distinct political parties gov-erning together in coalition. And coalitiongovernment is, of course, a common practicein parliamentary democracies, especially inthe multiparty systems of most Europeancountries. Although multiparty parliamentarysystems have borrowed many of the institutionsand practices that first evolved under West-minster government, the latter regime typeoffers few guidelines as to the most effectiveway for multiparty parliamentary majorities tocontrol coalition cabinets. Nevertheless, as wediscuss in this article, a variety of mechanismsfor parliamentary control have evolved and canoften, though far from always, be effective. Inthis article, we thus focus on political delega-

tion from parliamentarians to members of theexecutive branch under multiparty parliamen-tary government, and more specifically on themost important remedies to the accountabilityproblems that may arise under such delegation.

Under parliamentary democracy, the cabi-net must be tolerated by the parliamentary ma-jority (see Strøm et al. 2003; also Strong 1963,Steffani 1979). This accountability of the cab-inet to the parliamentary majority is a spe-cial case of the delegation and accountabil-ity relationships upon which all representativedemocracies are founded. Yet, presidential andparliamentary democracies differ in their re-spective chains of political delegation, as wellas in the foremost consideration that motivatesthem. In a pure presidential system, at least inits Madisonian version, the foremost concernis to minimize the risks of delegation. The vot-ers select a number of different and competingagents and minimize the power of the strongestof these. Thus, each agent is reined in by a com-plex web of checks, balances, and accountabilitymechanisms.

In an ideal-typical parliamentary design, onthe other hand, the dominant goal is to max-imize the efficiency of delegation. The citizensselect a single agent and maximize this agent’spower. In a parliamentary system, the demo-cratic chain of delegation is (a) indirect, in thatvoters (the ultimate principals) directly electonly their parliamentary representatives (andtypically not also a range of executive or judicialoffices); (b) singular, in that each link of the par-liamentary chain of delegation tends to featurea single principal and often a single agent; and(c) hierarchical, in that accountability relationsbetween different government agencies tend tobe vertical (featuring parliamentary supremacy)rather than horizontal (featuring checks andbalances). Parliamentary democracy is thus setup in a way that privileges the national parlia-ment and simplifies delegation, but also reliesheavily on parliament for control of the politicalexecutive.

Delegation is inherently risky. One cannotalways trust politicians, or, for that matter, any-one else to whom one delegates. Hence, the

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danger of any form of delegation is that it mayturn into abdication—the person who delegatesmay lose control rather than get help. Delega-tion in politics is no exception, and problemsof political delegation have hardly gone unno-ticed. Michels (1962), for example, recognizedthat “democracy is inconceivable without orga-nization” (p. 61), yet observed that organization“gives birth to the domination of the electedover the electors, of the mandataries over themandators, of the delegates over the delegators.Who says organization says oligarchy” (p. 365).

When delegation fails, politicians may mis-behave through policy drift (or policy-shirking,in the words of Brehm & Gates 1997) or rent-seeking activities. In the former case, “Politi-cians may want to pursue their own ideas evenif these differ from those of citizens” (Maninet al. 1999, p. 40). In the latter case, they mayuse political power to chase personal advantage.The “grabbing hand” perspective in economicsargues that politicians act not to maximize so-cial welfare but instead to further their ownself-interest (Shleifer & Vishny 1999). Accord-ing to influential theories of bureaucracy, non-elected public officials are also likely to behavein ways that defy the voters’ preferences (Downs1967, Niskanen 1971). Problems of democraticdelegation thus give rise to some of the mostscathing criticisms of modern democracies.

In parliamentary democracy, some potentialproblems of delegation are minimized by thesingular and hierarchical nature of the chain ofpolitical delegation. Thus, parliamentary sys-tems minimize the complexities of multiple-principal design that are typical of presidentialdemocracy. Yet, when parliamentary democracyis combined with proportional-representationelections, as it typically is in continental Europe,it frequently occasions multiple-principal issuesof its own. Proportional representation tends toresult in party-system fragmentation and multi-party coalition governments that compound theproblems of democratic delegation between theparliamentary majority and its agents in the cab-inet. Individual cabinet ministers in coalitiongovernments find themselves acting as agentsof two potentially competing principals: their

respective parties in the legislature and the par-liamentary majority more generally.

The difficulties of controlling governingpartners in coalition governments arise fromthree conditions: preference divergence, un-certainty, and opportunism. “Preference diver-gence” simply means that the members of thedifferent parties, and their cabinet representa-tives, may have different and often conflictingpreferences over the rewards that flow fromcontrol over the executive branch, such as pol-icy influence, office benefits (spoils), and fu-ture electoral advantage (Strøm 1990, Muller &Strøm 1999). All of these goods are likely to bescarce, so not all demands can be satisfied simul-taneously (Muller & Strøm 1999). At least inthe short run, the contest for cabinet portfoliosand other office benefits tends to be constant-sum. Electoral advantage, to the extent thatpoliticians care foremost about vote shares, iseven more strictly constant-sum. Ultimately,one party’s gain has to be another party’s loss. Ofcourse, coalition parties may hope that all suchlosses will come out of the hide of the oppo-sition parties. Much more commonly, however,coalition parties compete among themselves forvotes (Rose & Mackie 1983), and their leadersare acutely aware of the robust cross-nationaltendency for incumbent parties to suffer at thepolls (Narud & Valen 2008). Finally, althoughthe parties that make up a coalition may havemore or less compatible policy preferences, itis hardly ever the case that all of their pol-icy preferences can be realized simultaneously.Moreover, individual parties in coalition do notalways act as disciplined unitary actors with asingle set of policy preferences. Preference di-vergence between party members in the legis-lature and their representatives in the cabinetcan result in further difficulties in executive–legislative relations (Laver 1999).

Cooperation in multiparty coalition gov-ernments often also suffers from the fact thatpoliticians face considerable uncertainty overthe decisions that they will have to make andthe circumstances under which they will do so.Party leaders involved in coalition bargainingface several important kinds of uncertainty.

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One is that they do not fully understand therelationships between the policy instrumentsat their disposal and the political outcomesthey seek (see Krehbiel 1991). A second sourceof uncertainty lies in the exogenous politicalevents that party leaders may confront over thecourse of a parliamentary term. Will there bea recession or an international crisis? A furthersource of uncertainty concerns the skills andpreferences of the various candidates forexecutive office, which are often “hidden infor-mation.” And yet another source of uncertaintyis that even if they were intimately familiar withtheir policy instruments and could perfectlypredict the course of future events beyond theircontrol, politicians cannot know in advancehow voters will respond to their decisions.

Often, uncertainty gives rise to the furtherproblem of opportunism, which arises whencoalition partners use uncertainty to derive pri-vate gain at the expense of others. Opportunis-tic parties may take advantage of unforeseencircumstances to extract policy concessions orother advantages. Non-simultaneous exchangeand noncontemporaneous benefit flows createparticularly tricky problems in coalition bar-gaining (Weingast & Marshall 1988). If the pay-offs to all partners are evenly distributed overthe coalition’s anticipated duration, then mostlikely each partner will have a constant incentiveto maintain the coalition. If, however, the pay-offs are unevenly distributed over time, then aparty that early on receives a large benefit (e.g.,a major piece of legislation or key long-termgovernment appointments) has little incentiveto fulfill its part of the deal later. Thus, the se-quence in which the parties secure their gainsmay (de)stabilize coalitions.

Opportunism also stems from the problemof verification—ascertaining whether all par-ties in fact honor their commitments. The di-vision of government into increasingly special-ized agencies makes this a formidable challenge.To the extent that policy expertise is monopo-lized by the ministry that has prepared the bill,and when one party has exclusive control overthat ministry, there can be considerable scopefor “hidden action” on the part of executive

office holders. This situation makes it difficultfor other parties to oversee the fine grain ofgovernment policy making and to ensure thatcoalitional commitments are implemented. Forall these reasons, coalition partners have reasonto concern themselves with the “downstream”implementation of their policy platform.

When it is combined with preference diver-gence and the risk of opportunism, uncertaintyin coalition-government situations makes co-operation and delegation risky and thereforedrives parties to seek ways to control their coali-tion partners. Coalition parties may fear thattheir political environment could be manip-ulated to their own disadvantage. To preventthis, they put in place various institutional safe-guards. As North (1990, p. 57) puts it: “Noinstitutions are necessary in a world of com-plete information. With incomplete informa-tion, however, cooperative solutions will breakdown unless institutions are created that pro-vide sufficient information for individuals [orcoalition parties] to police deviations.” Insti-tutions assuring cooperation need to provide(a) “a communications mechanism that pro-vides the information necessary to know whenpunishment is required” and (b) “incentives forthose individuals to carry out punishment whencalled on to do so” (North 1990, p. 57).

MECHANISMS AND ARENASOF COALITION CONTROL

Despite the problems inherent in interpartydelegation and control, not every situation ofmultiparty government may require coalitionpartners to rely heavily on monitoring andcontrol, as some early theorists suggested (seeDodd 1976 for a review). In some cases, thepreferences of the parties may be sufficientlywell aligned so that governing together does notpose significant risks. Alternatively, party lead-ers may behave cooperatively without heavyreliance on control mechanisms if they an-ticipate either repeat interactions in the samearena, or other interactions with the same play-ers in different arenas (see, e.g., Shepsle 1996,pp. 229–31; Stiglitz 2000, pp. 1449, 1459–60;


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also Axelrod 1984; Frank 1988; Kreps 1990).Thus, national coalition leaders may anticipatefacing the same partners in subnational coali-tions (cf. Jun 1994; Downs 1998, pp. 193–202),or they may take into consideration positivespillover effects from collaboration elsewhere,for example in a corporatist arena.

Such easy cases are more likely to be the ex-ception rather than the rule. Parties that agreeto enter a coalition government cannot alwayshope that the shadow of future interactions willbe sufficiently long, or their preferences suf-ficiently well aligned, to induce voluntary co-operation. The greater the preference diver-sity between the parties, the more fragile theircoalition is likely to be. And the more fragilethe coalition, the greater the need for coalitionpartners to monitor and control each other’sbehavior.

Ex Ante Controls

In any principal-agent relationship, the prin-cipal can employ a range of control mecha-nisms to overcome the problems of hidden in-formation and hidden action (see Kiewiet &McCubbins 1991). Some of these mechanismsare employed before the delegation relationshipis established (ex ante). Coalition partners canrely on several such ex ante control mechanismsto reduce uncertainty and the resulting oppor-tunism in coalition governance. Ex ante controlmechanisms are particularly useful for prevent-ing the agency problems driven by hidden in-formation (such as adverse selection) that mayarise when coalition parties delegate authorityto a cabinet minister acting as the “agent” ofanother party. First, principals can design con-tracts that align the agent’s interests with thoseof his principal. In coalition governments, the“contract” can be regarded as the “set of termson which the cabinet is allowed to take office”(Strøm 1995, p. 74). Contracts in coalition gov-ernments allow coalition partners to create asmuch incentive compatibility as possible beforeassuming office, often by constraining the ac-tions and policies that can be pursued after thegovernment is formed.

Yet, the agreements that underlie coalitiongovernments generally cannot be enforced bycourts of law. Generally, coalition deals are pri-vate agreements between political parties thatcannot bind constitutional agents, such as cabi-net ministers or members of Parliament (MPs)(Muller 2000). Hence, coalition deals need to beenforced by political means, and these meansmust be negotiated by the coalition partiesthemselves. This is a major reason that partiesturn to formalized means of cooperation andconflict management in the political arena.

The other important ex ante mechanism ofcontrol is screening and selection of candidatesfor high office. In screening, principals (here,party leaders) review the credentials and pastbehavior of candidates for office. In selection,the onus is on the potential agents to prove theirworth. Checking the background and recordof potential office holders through systematicscreening procedures is often the most effectiveway to select willing and able agents (Kiewiet& McCubbins 1991, pp. 30–32). For mutualpartisan screening to be fully effective in coali-tion governments, however, all coalition partieswould have to be jointly involved in all majorexecutive appointments, especially the namingof cabinet ministers. A more limited version ofmutual screening allows each coalition party topropose its own candidates for high office butgrants all coalition partners veto powers.

Yet, neither of these procedures is the normin real-world coalition politics. Although somecountries and coalitions grant the prime minis-ter veto powers over all cabinet appointments,this power is not easy or costless to exercise, andprime ministers may find it difficult to garnerthe information they would need to make well-informed decisions. Hence, the rule that pre-vails in cabinet appointments is freedom of ap-pointment: Coalition parties generally remainfree to select their own candidates for cabinetoffice without any formal process of screeningor approval by their coalition partners (Muller& Strøm 2000, p. 574). And given that govern-ment office often is the main goal of party lead-ers and their lieutenants (Riker 1962), it is notsurprising that they do not want to jeopardize


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such ambitions by granting veto rights over cab-inet appointments to their coalition partners.

Ex Post Controls

Besides ex ante mechanisms of contract designand screening, political parties can use ex postmechanisms (applied after the fact of delega-tion) to control the behavior of cabinet min-isters in office. Ex post mechanisms of con-trol can help to enforce coalition cooperationby lowering the potential for hidden action(moral hazard) in coalition government situ-ations. Monitoring might be the most obvi-ous way to do this. However, direct monitor-ing, which McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) call“police-patrol oversight,” is costly and error-prone. Principals must exert effort, and theyhave to be able to assess the information thatthey obtain. As Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991,p. 31) put it, “a principal can either be starvingfor information or, more often, drowning in asea of it.” In order to avoid this problem, princi-pals can rely on oversight by third parties (i.e.,organizations or institutions that are not partof the principal–agent relationship). Such play-ers, known as “fire alarms,” must have incen-tives to inform the principal about the agent’sbehavior. For example, interest groups mighthave their own incentives to inform the parlia-ment, or specific political parties, about exec-utive decisions that deviate from the coalitionplatform or that have adverse consequences.Again, relying on third parties for oversighthas its own drawbacks, as information providedby fire alarms can be false or exaggerated. AsLupia & McCubbins (1994) have shown, firealarms are efficient instruments of control whenthe principal and the fire alarm share interests,

when sounding an alarm requires effort, andwhen false alarms get punished.

As an alternative to this form of oversight,principals can install institutional checks to con-trol the agent’s behavior. In that case, power isdelegated to at least one additional agent withthe power to veto or block decisions of the ini-tial agent. In the ministerial arena, such insti-tutional checks come in the form of constraintson the policy discretion of individual cabinetmembers.

Arenas of Control

Mechanisms of parliamentary control can beexercised in a variety of political arenas. Themost important of these are the executive arena,which comprises the cabinet and other execu-tive offices under the control of the governingparties; the parliamentary arena, with its var-ious instruments of legislative oversight; andthe extraparliamentary arena, in which politi-cians act as agents of their respective partiesbut outside of the executive or parliamentarycontext. These arenas are by no means mutu-ally exclusive, as particular governance mech-anisms may well include representatives fromtwo or all three. Nevertheless, these settingsare sufficiently distinct that it makes sense todiscuss them successively. Table 1 displays sev-eral important ex ante and ex post mecha-nisms of control that are available to coalitionpartners, along with the arenas in which theyare exercised. In the remainder of this review,we discuss these mechanisms arena by arena,examine their use in 15 Western Europeancountries that frequently feature coalition gov-ernments, and review our knowledge of howparliaments and parliamentary parties maintain

Table 1 Mechanisms and arenas of coalition control

Executive Arena Parliamentary Arena Extraparliamentary ArenaEx ante mechanisms Portfolio allocation Investiture vote Coalition agreementsEx post mechanisms Mutual control in

cabinet; juniorministers

Parliamentary questions;parliamentary committees

Coalition committees


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control over delegation and accountability inmultiparty governments.

THE EXECUTIVE ARENA

Many of the more stylized models of parliamen-tary governance assume that to the extent thatparliamentary control of coalition governmentscan succeed, the key to success lies at the exec-utive level. In their seminal book, Making andBreaking Governments, Laver & Shepsle (1996)highlight the critical agenda control vested inthe executive branch. Parliament, in contrast,has in their model only the limited tasks that thetitle of their book suggests. In the authors’ ownwords, “the agenda and implementation powerthat the cabinet exercises vis-a-vis the parlia-ment is in turn exercised vis-a-vis the cabinetby individual ministers and their civil servants”(Laver & Shepsle 1996, p. 281). These pow-ers privilege the cabinet vis-a-vis parliament,and they render parliamentary control of cabi-net members very difficult.

According to Laver & Shepsle, parliamen-tary democracies coordinate policy decisionsby granting jurisdictionally specific “propertyrights” (ministerial discretion) through the as-signment of cabinet portfolios. Each portfolio,generally representing a government depart-ment, is allocated to one and only one party, andthere is no mechanism by which any other partycan prevent the portfolio holder from imple-menting its ideal point within that jurisdiction.The set of government portfolios is assumedto be exogenously fixed. This set of assump-tions corresponds to a model of executive poli-tics as “ministerial government” (Strøm 1994).Hallerberg (2004, p. 16) refers to this structureas fiefdom government, where “ministers haverelative autonomy over decisions in their juris-diction; that is, ministers are essentially lords oftheir ministerial fiefdoms.”

Under ministerial government, parliamen-tary control of individual cabinet ministerstakes place mainly through portfolio allocationin the initial process of coalition bargainingand to a lesser extent in subsequent cabinetreshuffles. Careful screening of potential cabi-

net members can be used to prevent some prob-lems of hidden information. But the extensivediscretion normally given to individual partiesin this process makes it difficult for coalitionparties to check one another. Moreover, the ini-tial screening process is likely to be a less effec-tive way to combat hidden action (moral hazard)on the part of cabinet members. And the abilityof coalition parties to use reshuffles for this pur-pose is often narrowly constrained. As Huber &Martinez-Gallardo (2008) have shown, cabinetreshuffles are actually less common in coalitionsthan in single-party governments.

Portfolio allocation thus offers only limitedopportunities for parliamentary parties to con-trol the downstream policy process. But luckilyparliamentary parties need not settle for thisparticular mechanism of policy control. Laver& Shepsle’s account of coalition governance is aremarkably parsimonious theory of parliamen-tary governance, but it is not a full account ofthe mechanisms of political control availableto coalition parties in multiparty parliamentarysystems.1

Mutual Control in Cabinet

An alternative account of coalition decisionmaking emphasizes the centralization of cab-inet authority as a key to coalition governance.In Tsebelis’ (1995, 2002) account of coalitionpolitics, each coalition party is a veto playerthat can maintain the status quo policy positionagainst the demands of its coalition partner orpartners (see also Tirole 1999). Tsebelis (2002,pp. 106–9) argues that this veto power is ex-ercised through the authority structures of thecabinet or through other binding agreementsbetween the leaders of the coalition parties. Inthe cabinet, any coalition party is a veto playerregardless of the allocation of cabinet port-folios (Tsebelis 2002, p. 96). The doctrine ofcollective cabinet responsibility buttresses and

1For the most comprehensive critique of Laver & Shepsle(1996), see Dunleavy with Bastow (2001). See also Strøm(1998), as well as Warwick (1999a) and the subsequent ex-change with Laver & Shepsle (1999a,b; Warwick 1999b).


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reflects this practice of consensual cabinet de-cision making.

In the real world of coalition politics, how-ever, individual coalition parties often cannotveto policy proposals they do not favor. Theymay have negotiated away such veto powersin coalition bargaining by accepting decision-making rules short of unanimity or by commit-ting to substantive policy agreements.2 Even inthe absence of specific negotiated constraints oncoalition partners, their veto opportunities maybe uneven rather than mutual and balanced. Inshort, parties not pivotal to the coalition andparties that cannot credibly threaten to leavethe cabinet (because they would lose more pol-icy influence or office benefits by leaving thanby submitting to their partners) are unlikely tobe effective veto players.

Tsebelis’ model of “cabinet government”(Strøm 1994) points to an important arena ofcoalition policy enforcement. As the top collec-tive decision-making body, the cabinet providesan opportunity for mutual control by the coali-tion parties. To the extent that cabinet ministersare faithful party agents, they can monitor andcheck one another and help to enforce coali-tion policy. Yet, the empirical literature raisesdoubts about the ability as well as the willing-ness of cabinet ministers to live up to their tasksas party agents. Their lack of ability rests in theiroverload of departmental duties and their lackof information and expertise about portfoliosother than their own. Their lack of willingnessresults from their primary concern for their ownrespective departments, whose cause can easilybe harmed if the minister intervenes elsewhere.Some authors therefore have suggested that inmost cabinets a tacit mutual noninterventionprinciple governs the behavior of “line minis-ters” (Andeweg 2000, Muller 1994). The ex-treme case of such nonintervention is the formof ministerial government envisioned by Laver& Shepsle (1996).

2Indeed, it is difficult to see why political parties would bearthe transaction costs of negotiating a coalition agreementunless this resulted in a decision procedure less restrictivethan mutual veto powers.

Restrictions on mutual intervention are lessrelevant for cabinet members who do not haveto defend their own turf against potential retal-iation, such as ministers without portfolio (e.g.,De Winter et al. 2000). However, given the un-popularity of overly large cabinets, this typeof cabinet member is rare. Particular cabinetministers have responsibilities that deliberatelycross-cut other ministerial jurisdictions. For ex-ample, coalition cabinets sometimes feature de-tailed and strong budgetary oversight by theMinister of Finance (Larsson 1993, Hallerberg& von Hagen 1999). The prime ministership isa portfolio even more obviously entrusted withenforcing policy coherence (Muller et al. 1993).Yet, the key coordination portfolios are few innumber, so some coalition parties may not holdany. Thus, some coalition parties may enjoy theadvantage of being able to control their partnersthrough cabinet-level appointees while otherslack such opportunities.

Junior Ministers

The appointment of junior ministers—executive appointments that do not carryfull voting powers in the cabinet—is anothermechanism of mutual executive control. Notethat such offices do not always exist, eitherbecause the cabinet parties decide to dowithout them or because the constitution doesnot permit them, as is the case in Denmark,Finland, and Iceland (Verzichelli 2008).“Watchdog” junior ministers are frequentlyassigned to senior cabinet members from adifferent coalition party. The job descriptionof such junior ministers includes screening ofdepartmental affairs from a partisan point ofview, raising potentially controversial issueswith the ministers, and reporting to their partysuperiors. Although the official duty of anyjunior minister remains to advise and assistthe senior minister, these control tasks may bemuch more significant when junior ministersare of the watchdog variety. Their presencehelps to reduce information asymmetriesbetween the party holding the portfolio andits coalition partner(s). If controversial issues


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cannot be resolved in-house, i.e., between theminister and the junior minister, the infor-mation provided by the latter can enable theparties not holding the portfolio to act in otherarenas—the cabinet, a coalition committee, orthe corresponding parliamentary committee.

Several studies have examined the use of ju-nior ministers in coalition governments (Muller& Strøm 2000, Thies 2001, Manow & Zorn2004, Verzichelli 2008). The empirical evi-dence from Western Europe shows that the useof watchdog junior ministers is more proba-ble under conditions that are likely to be as-sociated with low trust among the coalitionparties, such as high electoral volatility and acredible parliamentary opposition. The use ofsuch subcabinet appointments also seems tobe an alternative to comprehensive coalitionagreements, as some parliamentary democra-cies (mainly in continental Europe) are morelikely to feature the former and others (princi-pally the Nordic countries) the latter (Muller

& Strøm 2008, p. 183). Table 2 provides a de-scriptive account of the presence of watchdogjunior ministers in Western European coali-tion governments (adapted from Verzichelli2008).

THE PARLIAMENTARY ARENA

Much of the literature on coalition bargain-ing has focused on the activities of politicalparties within the executive branch, in cabinetand subcabinet settings. However, the execu-tive arena is not the only venue through whichcoalition parties can monitor one another andtheir respective representatives in executive of-fice. Other opportunities for monitoring andcontrol exist in the parliament itself.

Investiture Procedures

Many parliamentary democracies, and espe-cially those with recent constitutions, feature

Table 2 Use of coalition control mechanisms by countrya

Executive Arena Parliamentary Arena Extraparliamentary Arena

Country (totalnumber of cabinetobservations)

Junior ministersfrom different

partyb

Investiturevote

requiredb

Parliamentarycommittees can

redraft govt. billsb

Writtencoalition

agreementsb

Coalition committees usedto manage most serious

coalition conflictb

Austria (17) 88 No Yes 82 47Belgium (28) 79 Yes Yes 71 68Denmark (17) – No No 47 –Finland (33) – No Yes 100 42France (17) 88 No No 47 18Germany (22) 45 Yes Yes 45 100c

Greece (2) – Yes No 50 100Iceland (22) – No Yes 82 –Ireland (10) 90 Yes No 80 100Italy (34) 100 Yes Yes 3 100Luxembourg (16) – Yes No 100 50The Netherlands (23) 91 No No 48 100Norway (8) 38 No Yes 100 14Portugal (6) – Yes No 100 100Sweden (7) 43 Yesd Yes 100 –

aNumerical entries represent the percentage of coalition cabinets that have used each mechanism of control.bJunior-minister data are from Verzichelli (2008); investiture-rules data are from Bergman et al. (2003); parliamentary-committees data are from Mattson& Strøm (1995); coalition-agreements data are from Muller & Strøm (2008); coalition-committees data are from Andeweg & Timmermans (2008).cBased on 18 cabinets.dSince 1975.


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some constitutional investiture requirementbefore a new government can assume its tasks.An investiture vote represents an initial con-trol by the parties in parliament with regard towhich government is permitted to form. Coali-tion governments that require parliamentaryconsent before they are allowed to take of-fice may find themselves compelled to committo specific policy positions before presentingthemselves to parliament.

Investiture requirements come in a vari-ety of guises. Bergman et al. (2003) note thatin countries that require a formal investiturevote, it can be formulated as a vote on theprime minister alone, or on the entire cabi-net (in the cases of Belgium, Italy, and Lux-embourg). In all the Western European casesexcept Ireland and Sweden, the head of statenominates or appoints the prime minister tobe confirmed by parliament. In four countries(Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal),it is mandatory for the designated prime min-ister to lay out the proposed government’s pol-icy program and cabinet nominations, and thensubject both to plenary debate and an investi-ture vote (Bergman et al. 2003).

While such institutional constraints may notdetermine the final outcome of coalition bar-gaining, they almost certainly help reduce un-certainty among coalition partners. They alsoaffect the type of cabinet formed. Bergman(1993) finds that in parliaments with nega-tive formation rules (where no investiture voteis required for a government to assume of-fice), minority governments are more likelyto emerge. In countries with positive forma-tion rules (such as Belgium, Germany, Ireland,Italy, and Luxembourg), coalition governmentsare more likely, and their formation may re-quire potential coalition partners to negoti-ate and commit to certain policy positions upfront. Paradoxically, Saalfeld (2008) finds thatsuch investiture rules depress cabinet stability.Table 2 states, for each of our selected coun-tries, whether or not a formal investiture voteis required before the government may assumeoffice.

Parliamentary Questionsand InterpellationsMost parliaments feature regular occasions onwhich cabinet members or civil servants have toappear and respond to questions and/or inter-pellations from parliamentary members. Theseoccasions may sometimes provide valuable in-formation (or questionable amusement), andthey constitute a classic means of parliamentarycontrol once a government has been formed.Parliamentary questions are frequently usedby opposition parties in single-party govern-ment situations to extract information from orembarrass the governing party. In coalition-government situations, such questioning canserve the additional purpose of keeping coali-tion partners in check. Notwithstanding themany differences in the details of the parliamen-tary questioning regimes (see Wiberg 1995),questions are a common means to extract infor-mation from the government. Especially withrespect to interpellations, the answers to thesequestions may constitute the basis for furtherparliamentary initiatives (such as further ques-tions or commissions of inquiry, or even mo-tions of no confidence).

The bulk of the empirical literature onparliamentary questions has focused on systemswith single-party governments of either themajority or the minority variety (e.g., Franklin& Norton 1993, Wiberg 1994). Consequently,it has shed less light on the relevance of suchquestions for coalition governance. This isreflected in Wiberg’s (1995, p. 218) conclusionthat in the case of majority governments, “thereis really no political space left for parliamen-tary control.” Building on Crossman (1993),Wiberg (1995, p. 219) goes on to state that “therole of controlling the executive has been re-moved from the House as a whole and investedin the Opposition, whose capacity to controleven a government with a moderate majorityis strictly limited.” Wiberg does not discussthe use of parliamentary questions for mutualcontrol in coalition governments, perhaps be-cause he assumes that it is in the joint interestof the governing parties “to keep certain things


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away from the public’s concern” (Wiberg 1995,p. 218). This may be true for many issues incoalition governments, but not necessarily forall. To the extent that ministers do not willinglyinform their coalition partners, the latter mayresort to parliamentary questions to extract theknowledge they seek. Parliamentary questionsare particularly suitable for matters not associ-ated with current legislation, since informationon the latter may more readily be extractedfrom the minister or from civil servants duringcommittee deliberations (see below).

Studies of the Austrian grand coalitions ofthe 1960s (Gerlich 1973) and 1990s (Mulleret al. 2001, pp. 306–16) reveal that coalitionparties do indeed use parliamentary questionsto monitor one another. This is clear from(a) the number of questions directed by gov-ernment MPs toward ministers of their respec-tive coalition partners and (b) their tone, whichspans from neutral information gathering toquite critical interrogations. In the absence ofany substantial body of equivalent research onother countries and coalition types, it remainsto be seen how widespread such behavior is.

Parliamentary Committees

An alternative vehicle for mutual monitoringby coalition partners exists in the form of per-manent or ad hoc parliamentary committees.In most parliamentary democracies, govern-ment bills that require legislative approvalare assigned to a parliamentary committee,in which the most intensive and detailedpart of the legislative scrutiny takes place.Mattson & Strøm (1995) find that amongthe functions that parliamentary committeesserve, information collection is of particularimportance. Parliamentary committees serveas crucial providers of information and moni-toring under coalition government, especiallywhen committee jurisdictions match the policyresponsibilities of specific ministries and whenthe committee chairperson does not come fromthe same party as the corresponding minister(Hallerberg 2000). Indeed, Kim & Loewenberg(2005) find that in Germany, coalition parties

tend to distribute committee chairs in sucha fashion. In parliaments that rely on parlia-mentary scrutiny of coalition government billsto keep tabs on coalition partners, committeechair positions thus serve as a legislativeequivalent of watchdog junior ministers.

Hallerberg (2004) finds that in budgetarymatters, parliamentary committees are mostactive in collecting information where coali-tion ministers have extensive policy autonomywithin their respective portfolios. Martin &Vanberg (2004, 2005) provide evidence fromthe Netherlands and Germany that the greaterthe ideological divergence between coalitionpartners in a specific policy area, the more par-liamentary scrutiny the relevant bills receive (asmeasured in the length of time a governmentbill is under deliberation in committee beforeit reaches the plenary stage, as well as in thenumber of changes introduced in committee).Hence, parliamentary committees under coali-tion government not only allow for the scrutinyof executive bills by the legislature, or of gov-ernment bills by the opposition, but also pro-vide opportunities for one coalition party toscrutinize another. Thus, when individual min-isters have substantial policy discretion, par-liamentary committees can enable “ministerialcorrection” by their respective coalition part-ners (Martin & Vanberg 2005, p. 105).

However, considerable variation exists inthe extent of monitoring and decision-makingpowers that reside with parliamentary com-mittees (Mattson & Strøm 1995, Saalfeld2000). Although parliamentary committees inmost countries have the authority to scruti-nize government-initiated legislation by hold-ing hearings, calling witnesses, and requestingrelevant information from the executive, notall countries allow parliamentary committeesto rewrite government bills. Table 2 identifiesthe countries in which parliamentary commit-tees have the authority to freely rewrite govern-ment bills before they are reported for plenarydeliberations (adapted from Mattson & Strøm1995). This authority is commonly circum-scribed. In France and the Netherlands, com-mittees may offer amendments to government


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bills, but these must be approved by parliamentat the plenary stage. In Greece, any changesto government-sponsored legislation text mustbe approved by the relevant cabinet minis-ter. Committees in Luxembourg and Portugalmay present substitute language that can thenbe considered in competition with governmentlegislation, but they may not amend the text ofthe government bill itself.

Even where committees can amend legis-lation proposed by the government, there isalways the risk that overly specialized parlia-mentary committees may become accomplicesto their ministerial counterparts rather than re-main faithful agents of the parties in parliament(see Krehbiel 1991). Moreover, although theuse of parliamentary committees for oversightis common in Germany and the Netherlands,other European parliaments rely more on coali-tion committees and other extraparliamentarymethods to resolve problems of preference di-vergence in policy making. We now turn ourattention to this arena.

THE EXTRAPARLIAMENTARYARENA

In addition to using the official executive andparliamentary institutions for the purpose ofmutual control of their partners, coalitions fre-quently create their own, extraconstitutionalmechanisms and venues for control. Being ex-traconstitutional, these mechanisms must relyon the political clout of their members for theireffectiveness. Often, coalition parties rely onseveral such extraparliamentary vehicles, somestaffed by policy experts and others by partyleaders themselves. While the more technicalcommittees typically take on screening func-tions, those composed of high-ranking partyleaders commonly engage in top-level log-rolling and conflict resolution.

Coalition Agreements

One of the first opportunities to promotecoalition discipline through extraparliamen-tary means lies in the design of the coalition

agreement between the governing parties. Allcabinet coalitions are based on some tacit orexplicit agreement between their members. Ata minimum, these parties have to agree on thedivision of cabinet portfolios. In most cases,however, the coalition partners will make an ex-plicit agreement that goes beyond the divisionof high-office spoils. Such agreements may de-fine the government’s policy agenda, from at aminimum identifying its top priorities to, in themost ambitious cases, cataloging all major leg-islative initiatives to be introduced during theparliamentary term. The coalition parties mayalso decide to spell out the rules under whichthey will cooperate in government. They mayeven decide how they will interact in other insti-tutions or at other levels of government. Thus,coalition agreements vary greatly in their con-tent, comprehensiveness, and formality.

Coalition agreements are primarily de-signed to govern the relationship between gov-erning parties, but they may also serve to pro-mote cohesion within each party. Thus, partyleaders have a mechanism by which they canresist internal pressure to renege on their com-mitments to their partners in difficult times (cf.Elster 1984, pp. 36–47). The external functionsof coalition agreements are to bond the lead-ers of the different coalition parties, ease com-munication between them, and contain inter-party conflict (or facilitate its resolution). Theseexternal functions of coalition agreements aretypically the more critical ones (Muller &Strøm 2008).

Coalition agreements indicate that neitherministerial government nor cabinet govern-ment adequately describes the process of coali-tion policy making. If coalition parties couldsimply exercise their veto powers without them,there would be no need for coalition agree-ments. Alternatively, if coalition agreementswere of no use in constraining cabinet mem-bers and their subordinates, there would simi-larly be no reason to have them. One of the mainfunctions of coalition agreements is indeed forthe coalition parties mutually to relinquish anyveto power over the policies to which the coali-tion specifically commits itself. As long as the


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coalition parties faithfully observe the agree-ment, their mutual veto power has then ceasedto exist. The coalition accord may in additioncontain procedural clauses that effectively re-move any implicit veto power the individualparties might otherwise have.

How much attention and work parties de-vote to negotiating such agreements will de-pend on the expected value of the coalition andthe costs of forging an agreement. A majoritycoalition will in most circumstances be morevaluable than a minority coalition, and a coali-tion formed at the beginning of a parliamentaryterm more valuable than one formed close to itsend. Coalition agreements also have to be cost-effective, so that the expected benefits from hav-ing them outweigh the transaction costs of writ-ing and policing them (as well as the audiencecosts resulting from the compromises that suchagreements necessarily contain).

No matter how good the parties’ intentions,there is no guarantee that their coalition agree-ments will be effective. Coalition agreementsare the script, not the performance. Studies ofactual coalition agreements nevertheless showthem to be highly relevant guides to coalitiongovernance and policy. De Winter et al. (2000,p. 322), for example, refer to the agreement asthe coalition Bible. According to the best avail-able evidence, the rules that have been adoptedare generally observed, and the agreed-uponpolicies are implemented (see the country chap-ters in Muller & Strøm 2000). Timmermans(2003) provides the most systematic accountof the effects of coalition agreements in theNetherlands and Belgium, covering 98 contro-versial issues from five cabinets. He finds thatthe compromises hammered out in coalitionnegotiations and embodied in coalition agree-ments were implemented in slightly more thanhalf of the cases. In turn, half of these were im-plemented without contention.

Muller & Strøm (2008) have made themost extensive cross-national study of coalitionagreements. In Western Europe, most cabinetcoalitions are based on a single, public, writ-ten agreement, although some coalition partiesmay have a private agreement that they do not

release to the public. Occasionally, parties de-vise more than one coalition document, for ex-ample a joint pre-electoral declaration to signaltheir intent followed by a more detailed post-electoral agreement. Muller & Strøm focus onthe most comprehensive and authoritative doc-ument to which the parties of a coalition com-mit themselves. Yet, coalition agreements maybe kept wholly or partially private for severalreasons. First, they may violate the constitu-tion or contain potentially embarrassing clauses(for example, on the division of rents such aspublic-sector jobs). Second, detailed procedu-ral clauses signal distrust that may make thegovernment look weak and divided. Third, acoalition agreement that is rich in policy de-tail may provide a dangerous yardstick againstwhich government performance could subse-quently be measured. Finally, if the agreementcontains a lot of “fine print,” the coalition par-ties may fear that they will have trouble keepingpublic debate focused on their main message tothe voters.

Muller & Strøm’s data include 262 coalitioncabinets in 15 Western European parliamentarysystems over the period 1945–1999. Almost twothirds of these cabinets were based on a coali-tion agreement. Two thirds of these coalitionagreements (67%) were concluded immediatelyafter elections, whereas a fifth (21%) were ne-gotiated during a parliamentary term, mainly inconjunction with a change of the government’sparty composition, and 13 coalition agreements(7.6%) were purely pre-electoral. Nine cabinetshad both pre- and postelectoral agreements.Of the 169 written coalition agreements, 141(83.4%) were originally intended for the publicdomain.

There has been a clear trend over timetoward greater use of coalition agreements.Whereas in the 1940s only a third of all coali-tion cabinets were based on written agreements,by the 1990s this was true of 81%. Table 2lists the percentage of cabinets in each countrythat were based on a formal, written coalitionagreement.

There is substantial variation, between andwithin countries, in the length of coalition


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agreements. The shortest coalition agreementwas just over 200 words long (Finland), whilethe longest one contained more than 43,000words (Belgium). The number of words servesas a rough indicator of the agreements’ compre-hensiveness (see Huber et al. 2001, pp. 336–38).All else equal, the longer the agreement, themore policies it covers and the more detailedthe coverage.

The three general issue areas contained inmost coalition agreements are (a) policy, (b) pro-cedural rules, and (c) the allocation of govern-ment offices and other benefits. Most coalitionagreements have substantial and explicit policycontent. Indeed, in the majority of Western Eu-ropean countries, 90% or more of the contentsof coalition agreements have on average beenpolicy related. The second most frequent con-tent has been procedural rules designed to im-pose coalition discipline in parliamentary votesor other parliamentary activities. In contrast,only a minority of coalition agreements dealwith interparty distributions of offices and com-petencies, most likely because the coalition par-ties see such agreements as unnecessary andpotentially embarrassing. Informal agreementsabout such matters are probably much morecommon.

Muller & Strøm (2008) find that much ofcoalition “contracting” is driven by path de-pendency: Once a certain set of governance in-stitutions has evolved in a particular country,these institutions tend to get replicated in sub-sequent coalitions. Yet, the coalition parties doso only when the transaction costs are not over-whelming. Thus, parties may deviate from anestablished pattern of writing a formal agree-ment when they expect that the coalition mightnot last long (e.g., when the end of the parlia-mentary term is approaching or when the coali-tion has minority status). Coalition partnersare more likely to negotiate formal agreementsthe more balanced their bargaining power isand the fewer parties make up the coalition.Thus, the use of coalition agreements dependsin part on their costs and in part on theirvalue in inducing politicians to abide by theircommitments.

A few studies have addressed the effectsof coalition agreements on coalition gover-nance. Timmermans & Moury’s (2006) study ofBelgium and the Netherlands analyzes the com-pleteness and precision of coalition agreements.The authors show that the presence of a writtencoalition agreement does not prevent conflictover the issues covered in the agreement dur-ing the coalition’s lifetime. Yet, coalitions rarelyterminate over these issues and hardly any ofthe relevant issues the authors analyze ended ina nondecision. Coalition agreements also seemto foster cabinet stability. Saalfeld (2008) showsthat cross-nationally coalitions based on a writ-ten agreement are more durable than thosewithout such a mechanism.

Coalition Committees

Coalition parties typically also establish vari-ous types of ex post coalition committees thatare inserted at strategic points in the policyprocess. Such committees are designed to co-ordinate policy and manage potential conflictswithin the coalition. They often include non-cabinet members selected on the basis of eithertheir policy expertise or their capacity to harmthe coalition (by issuing public criticism, start-ing intraparty revolts, or persuading significantgroups of MPs to vote against government pol-icy). Tying them into the government’s policy-making apparatus is designed to increase thegovernment’s legitimacy and avoid defeat andelectoral fallout. This is all the more importantin fragile coalition-government situations, as itis easier to shelter such committees from pub-lic scrutiny compared to official bodies such asparliamentary committees or the cabinet.

Unfortunately, the literature on coalitioncommittees has remained scarce even with re-gard to single-country studies (for particularlyinsightful analyses see Criscitiello 1993, Rudzio2005, Miller 2009). Andeweg & Timmermans(2008) and Miller (2009) have provided theonly cross-national studies, mixing quantita-tive analysis and case studies. Andeweg &Timmermans (2008) distinguish coalition com-mittees according to their composition, and


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thus identify internal, mixed, and external com-mittees, with the first type consisting entirelyof cabinet members and the last type entirelyof noncabinet members. Examples of mixedand external committees include coalition com-mittees composed of both cabinet and parlia-mentary leaders, those composed exclusivelyof parliamentary leaders, and party summitscontaining party leaders but no cabinet minis-ters. The authors show that although cabinet-internal arenas are the most frequently used fo-rums for resolving conflict between coalitionparties, the weight shifts toward mixed and ex-ternal solutions when conflicts become moreserious (2008, p. 278). Andeweg & Timmer-mans also report that external arenas are morelikely to be used when the coalition is fragileor the bargaining environment complex; whenthe cabinet parties have failed to write a com-prehensive coalition agreement; and when theinstitutional rules have vested one party, typi-cally via its control of the prime ministership,with extensive powers. Table 2 lists by coun-try the percentage of cabinets that relied onmixed or external coalition committees for re-solving the most serious conflicts that aroseduring coalition governance (adapted fromAndeweg & Timmermans 2008).

Miller (2009) focuses exclusively on mixedarenas. Perhaps not surprisingly, he shows thatwhether parliamentarians or representatives ofthe extraparliamentary party constitute the bulkof the external representatives in such com-mittees depends on the resources commandedby these respective actors. Miller also reportsthat the presence of mixed coalition commit-tees has a marginal life-prolonging effect oncoalitions.

Clearly, coalition committees constitute oneof the most difficult research topics of coali-tion governance. To begin with, often neitherthe composition nor the jurisdiction of suchcommittees is entirely clear, so considerable re-search effort is required to acquire informationabout their use in controlling coalition part-ners. Nor can researchers draw on (publiclyavailable) records of coalition committee meet-ings. Although cabinet governance in general is

a matter of discretion and “state secrecy,” thesecrecy surrounding coalition-committee de-cisions is probably even greater. Despite theshortage of reliable information, however, thereis ample indication in the existing literature thatsuch arenas of coalition control do matter. Thisshould identify coalition committees as one ofthe key topics of further research into coalitiongovernance.

CONCLUSION

Coalition parties in parliamentary democraciesface formidable problems of mutual oversightand control of the political executive. Theirchallenges are magnified by the fact that coali-tion government adds a component to the chainof delegation in parliamentary democracy bycreating cabinet ministers who are agents notonly of their respective parties, but also ofthe parliamentary coalition as a whole. Pref-erence divergence between coalition parties in-creases uncertainty on the part of parliamen-tarians about the actual policies that will beadopted and implemented by the executive, andit leads parties to fear opportunism on the partof their coalition partners.

Our analysis in this article has explored howpolitical parties in parliamentary democraciesenforce agreements concerning their jointcontrol of the executive branch. Coalitions canattempt to combat these problems at variousstages of the policy process and in variousarenas. Ex ante, that is, before the governmentis inaugurated, the member parties can attemptto resolve their differences through portfolioallocation and/or a coalition agreement. Inmany parliamentary democracies, constitu-tional investiture requirements may also inducecoordination among the parties that are aboutto enter government together. A broader arrayof enforcement mechanisms is available ex post,after the fact of government formation. Theseinclude forums such as cabinet committeesand watchdog junior ministers in the executivearena; scrutiny through questions and commit-tee deliberation in the parliamentary arena; andeven extraparliamentary vehicles of conflict


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resolution, such as coalition committees, whichseem to be of particular importance for themost pressing and consequential conflicts thatcoalition governments confront.

The dilemma for politicians in multipartygovernments is how to balance the risks thatface them in coalition situations against thecosts of devising mechanisms by which they cancontain or reduce these risks. Ex ante mecha-nisms of control such as coalition agreementscan lower uncertainty, yet it is often difficult toensure that they will be enforced. Such agree-ments are beset with transaction costs, and be-cause of the problems of enforcement, theyare also vulnerable to opportunistic behavior.Ex post mechanisms of control reduce the op-portunities for coalition partners to serve theirparty principal while shirking their obligations

to their coalitional principal. Coalition partnerscan avoid such problems by employing formsof ministerial scrutiny such as junior minis-ters and strong parliamentary committees—butno single instrument is likely to be universallyeffective.

Recent research has begun to identify andmeasure the effects of various mechanisms ofparliamentary control. We know, for exam-ple, that having an official and public coalitionagreement significantly enhances cabinet sta-bility. Yet, we have far less systematic knowledgeof the costs and unintended consequences ofvarious instruments of parliamentary control.Much research remains to be done, but thereis every reason to expect that such endeavorswill yield rich rewards for our understanding ofparliamentary politics.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings thatmight be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank our collaborators, and especially Torbjorn Bergman, Rudy Andeweg, Arco Timmer-mans, and Luca Verzichelli, for their contributions to the research on which this article builds,and Gerhard Loewenberg for his helpful comments.

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Annual Review ofPolitical Science

Volume 13, 2010Contents

A Long Polycentric JourneyElinor Ostrom � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1

What Political Science Can Learn from the New Political HistoryJulian E. Zelizer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �25

Bridging the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide: Best Practices in theDevelopment of Historically Oriented Replication DatabasesEvan S. Lieberman � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �37

The Politics of Effective Foreign AidJoseph Wright and Matthew Winters � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �61

Accountability in Coalition GovernmentsJose Marıa Maravall � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �81

Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and ResolutionAndrew H. Kydd � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 101

Political Order and One-Party RuleBeatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 123

RegionalismEdward D. Mansfield and Etel Solingen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 145

The Prosecution of Human Rights ViolationsMelissa Nobles � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 165

Christian DemocracyStathis N. Kalyvas and Kees van Kersbergen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 183

Political Theory of Empire and ImperialismJennifer Pitts � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 211

The U.S. Decennial Census: Politics and Political ScienceKenneth Prewitt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 237

Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political ScienceLisa Wedeen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 255

Treaty Compliance and ViolationBeth Simmons � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 273

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Legislative ObstructionismGregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 297

The Geographic Distribution of Political PreferencesJonathan Rodden � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 321

The Politics of Inequality in America: A Political Economy FrameworkLawrence R. Jacobs and Joe Soss � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 341

The Immutability of Categories and the Reshaping of Southern PoliticsJ. Morgan Kousser � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 365

Indigenous Peoples’ Politics in Latin AmericaDonna Lee Van Cott � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 385

Representation and Accountability in CitiesJessica Trounstine � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 407

Public Opinion on Gender Issues: The Politics of Equity and RolesNancy Burns and Katherine Gallagher � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 425

Immigration and Social Policy in the United StatesRodney E. Hero � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 445

The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1988–2008Michael Woolcock � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 469

Origins and Persistence of Economic InequalityCarles Boix � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 489

Parliamentary Control of Coalition GovernmentsKaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Muller, and Daniel Markham Smith � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 517

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 9–13 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 537

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 9–13 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 539

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Political Science articles may be foundat http://polisci.annualreviews.org/

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Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments

Documents

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