ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN TANTRIC TRADITIONS

Series Editor: Professor Gavin Flood, University of StirlingThe Routledge Studies in Tantric Traditions series is a major new monograph series which has been established to publish scholarship on South, East and Southeast Asian tantric traditions. The series aims to promote the serious study of both Hindu and Buddhist tantric traditions through the publication of anthropological and textual studies and will not be limited to any one method. Indeed, the series would hope to promote the view that anthropological studies can be informed by texts and textual studies informed by anthropology. The series will therefore publish contemporary ethnographies from different regions, philological studies, philosophical studies, and historical studies of different periods which contribute to the academic endeavour to understand the role of tantric texts and their meaning in particular cultural contexts. In this way, the series will hope to establish what the continuities and divergencies are between Buddhist and Hindu tantric traditions and between different regions. The series will be a major contribution to the fields of Indology, Sinology, History of Religions, and Anthropology.

IDENTITY, RITUAL AND STATE IN TIBETAN BUDDHISMMartin A. Mills

THE KHECARĪVIDYĀ OF ĀDINĀTHAA critical edition and annotated translation of an early text of haţhayoga

James MallinsonAN INTRODUCTION TO TANTRIC PHILOSOPHY

The Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of YogarājaLyne Bansat-Boudon and Kamaleshadatta Tripathi

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AN INTRODUCTION TO TANTRIC PHILOSOPHYThe Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Yogarāja

Translated by Lyne Bansat-Boudon and Kamaleshadatta Tripathi

Introduction, notes, critically revised Sanskrit text, appendix, indices byLyne Bansat-Boudon

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

© 2011 Lyne Bansat-Boudon and Kamaleshadatta Tripathi

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or

retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.British Library Cataloging in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested.

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Contents

Preface ixAcknowledgments xiIntroduction 1

1.The two Paramārthasāra 11.1. The Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa 21.2. Rewriting 7

2.The Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta 192.1. The text and its commentator 192.2. Structure of the text 232.3. Sketch of the doctrine 32

Translation 59Kārikā 1 61Kārikās 2-3 72Kārikā 4 76Kārikā 5 82Kārikā 6 88Kārikā 7 92Kārikā 8 96Kārikā 9 99Kārikās 10-11 104Kārikās 12-13 111Kārikā 14 117Kārikā 15 126Kārikā 16 129Kārikā 17 131Kārikā 18 136Kārikā 19 138Kārikā 20 141Kārikā 21 142Kārikā 22 144K ā rik ā 23 145K ā rik ā 24 147K ā rik ā 25 149K ā rik ā 26 150K ā rik ā 27 152K ā rik ā 28 161K ā rik ā 29 163K ā rik ā 30 164K ā rik ā 31 166K ā rik ā 32 169K ā rik ā 33 173K ā rik ā 34 175

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K ā rik ā 35 177K ā rik ā 36 184K ā rik ā 37 187K ā rik ā 38 190K ā rik ā 39 191K ā rik ā 40 193K ā rik ā 41 195K ā rik ā 42 199K ā rik ā 43 200K ā rik ā 44 206K ā rik ā 45 207K ā rik ā 46 209K ā rik ā s 47-50 210K ā rik ā 51 215K ā rik ā 52 217K ā rik ā 53 217K ā rik ā 54 219K ā rik ā 55 219K ā rik ā 56 220K ā rik ā 57 222K ā rik ā 58 223K ā rik ā 59 225K ā rik ā 60 227K ā rik ā 61 231K ā rik ā 62 232K ā rik ā 63 234K ā rik ā s 64-66 237K ā rik ā 67 240Kārikā 68 243Kārikā 69 245Kārikā 70 247K ā rik ā 71 248K ā rik ā 72 250K ā rik ā 73 251K ā rik ā 74 252K ā rik ā 75 255K ā rik ā 76 258K ā rik ā 77 260K ā rik ā 78 261K ā rik ā s 79-80 265K ā rik ā 81 270K ā rik ā 82 271K ā rik ā 83 272K ā rik ā 84 278K ā rik ā s 85-86 279K ā rik ā s 87-88 282K ā rik ā 89 285

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K ā rik ā s 90-91 287K ā rik ā s 92-93 290K ā rik ā s 94-95 292K ā rik ā 96 299K ā rik ā 97 301K ā rik ā s 98-99 304K ā rik ā s 100-101 306K ā rik ā 102 308K ā rik ā 103 311K ā rik ā 104 313K ā rik ā 105 315

Appendix 317

Sanskrit text 347On the Sanskrit text 347

List of typographical errors corrected 348List of variants in some collated passages 348Description of the manuscripts consulted 352

Text 356

Bibliography 407Abbreviations 407Sources (editions and translations) 410Studies 428

Index 437Index locorum 453Anthology of spiritual experience 461

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Preface

In the text, kārikās and pratīkas are set in boldface.In general, an effort has been made to limit citation of Sanskrit terms in

parentheses. However, it has been judged desirable to make the basic vocabulary of the doctrine visible to the reader. Thus, the Sanskrit term is instanced—when it designates a key notion of the Trika, or one of its favorite metaphors, and

at its first occurrence,—when it is required in order to grasp the sense of a gloss (e.g., ad 33, where krīḍā is

glossed by khela),—in order to take note of the more or less uniform translation of diverse, but

essentially synonymous, Sanskrit terms, e.g., X Y Z, all of which have been translated by ‘consciousness’ (note, especially, the variety of terms for ‘liberation’),

—mutatis mutandis, in order to take note of the polysemy of certain crucial Sanskrit terms, parāmarśa, paramārtha, smŗti, etc.Certain Sanskrit terms of wider, but often technical usage, whose meaning is not

easily grasped, or which are expanded upon, have been treated in the notes. Literal translations are likewise to be found there.

Sanskrit terms that have become, or are used as, English words are left in Roman, and may accept a plural suffix: kārikā, śloka, mantra, avataraņikā, guru, karman, etc.

Likewise, marks of suppletions have been limited as much as possible to those necessary to make sense of an often laconic Sanskrit, especially as concerns the many technical explanations of concepts and terms. The frequently occurring āha, referring always to Abhinavagupta, has been rendered by ‘the master says’.

Glosses or terms to be understood as such are enclosed in single quotation marks. Double quotation marks indicate that the author ‘wishes to single out a word or phrase, not quoting it from a specific document... but referring it to a general background that will be recognized by the reader’ (Chicago Manual of Style, 13th ed.).

Certain elaborations of notions treated in the notes have been grouped together in an ‘Appendix’.

In addition to the key terms of the doctrine, certain recurring segments of its phraseology have been indexed, each with a translation, forming a glossary of the essential points of the system.

To this has been added an Index locorum and an ‘Anthology of spiritual experience’ (see Intr., n. 99).

The Sanskrit text reproduced here is based on the KSTS edition. It has been revised and corrected at places after collation of nine manuscripts; see ‘On the Sanskrit Text’.

For the history of the work here presented, it may be useful to note that Prof. K. D. Tripathi is a disciple of Rāmeśvara Jhā, the author of the Pūrņatāpratyabhijñā, cited frequently in the notes (see, especially, n. 314).

A work by D. B. SenSharma has appeared in 2007, to which I have had access only tardily, but have nevertheless consulted: Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta. The Essence of the Supreme Truth, with the commentary of Yogarāja. Translation &

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introduction. New Delhi, Muktabodha, and Emeryville, Calif. The work is however more a free gloss than a translation.

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Acknowledgments

The work on the annotated translation of the Paramārthasāra and its gloss began in June 2000 in collaboration with Prof. Kamaleshadatta Tripathi, thus following the rigorous tradition of Indian scholarship. Since then, a number of versions have seen the light and have resulted in the present text, which has benefited from comments and advice offered by several learned scholars.

Special thanks go to Charles Malamoud, Andre Padoux, Raffaele Torel-la, Alexis Sanderson, Dominic Goodall, Marion Rastelli, David Seyfort Ruegg, Eli Franco, Karin Preisendanz, Ernst Steinkellner, Nalini Delvoye, Michel Hulin, Victoria Lissenko, Birgit Kellner, Seishi Karashima, who were generous enough to provide their expertise in response to my queries.

One of the pleasures attendant upon scholarly research is certainly this: the constant attestation of that simple and discreet fraternity to which the scientific community pays tacit homage.

I am particularly indebted towards three colleagues and friends. Not only did Yves Codet contribute to elucidating several difficulties raised by the text, but he also immensly helped by formatting my manuscript using the XeTeX software. This was a long and somewhat laborious task, during which his patience never abided.

With Judit Torzsok, I had long discussions concerning passages that required her grasp and knowledge of tantric Śivaism, particularly its rituals. Her unfailing support was central to the establishment of the Sanskrit text.

Finally, the bibliography is the result of a dedicated collaboration with Silvia D’Intino who generously shared her cataloguing skills and her sharp understanding of the "bibliographic object".

I also wish to express my deep gratitude to my friend and highly esteemed colleague Edwin Gerow, whose careful reading of my text ensured proper English wording. During our discussions, with talent and just the necessary touch of mischievousness, he fulfilled the role of an objector, commenting and challenging many terms and passages of earlier drafts of this work. The present version has been materially improved by responding to, and indeed incorporating some of, his comments. Needless to say, any remaining infelicities should be attributed to me.

LBB

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Śiva (?), with the khaţvańga. Sirpur, Chattisgarh. 7th century. Photo by Nicole Menant-Di Dio

Introduction

As soon as the expanse of ignorance affecting the mind is dispelled by correct insight, then ‘liberation while living’ is present on the palm of the hand.

— Abhinavagupta, Tantrāloka

1. The two ParamārthasāraThe Paramārthasāra, or ‘Essence of Ultimate Reality’, is a work of the Kashmirian polymath Abhinavagupta (end of the tenth, beginning of the eleventh century). It is a brief treatise,1 a compendium2 in which the author outlines the doctrine of which he is a notable exponent (indeed, the most fecund), namely nondualistic Śaivism, which he designates in his works as the ‘Trika’, or ‘Triad’ of three principles: Śiva, Śakti and the embodied soul (nara).3

According to Yogarāja (second half of the eleventh century), the author of its commentary, Vivŗti, the Paramārthasāra is of the nature of a prakaraņa,4 a ‘manual’ or ‘precis’ serving as introduction to the established doctrine of a tradition.5 The work, appropriately, begins by featuring a mumukşu, one who ‘aspires to liberation’, a student desirous of learning from a master the means whereby he may put an end to his dolorous wanderings through the cycles of rebirth.6

1 The commentary ad 104 uses the term śāstra.2 saṃkşepa or saṃgraha. See 2nd mańgalācaraņa of the commentary (paramārthasārasaṃkşepa), Paramārthasāra [PS] 104 (idam... saṃkşepam), 105 (tad idaṃ saṃkşiptaṃ śāstrasāram) and the colophon of the commentary (paramārthasārasaṃgrahavivŗti).3 See, for instance, Tantrāloka [TĀ] X 1, XIII 348 and (as the periphrastic expression ‘şaḍardha’, ‘half of six’) TĀ XIII 301 (where is established the supremacy of the Trika over all Śaiva currents), XVI158, XXXVII 26, 68, etc. I use the term ‘Trika’ here in this sense. On the historical development of the Trika and other symbolic meanings of the term itself, see Sanderson 1995: 672; 2007. The preeminent concern of this essay, ‘nondualistic’ or ‘non-dual’ (advaita) Śaivism of Kashmir, will be, when the context does not tend to confusion, referred to simply as Kashmir Śaivism or even as Śaivism. On this ‘Triad’, see avataraņikā [avat.] ad PS 41 (n. 875) and 46.4 See avat. ad PS 2-3 and 105, and n. 276 on prakaraņa.5 As YR puts it in his commentary ad 104, the theme underlying the entire text is ‘[that brahman], in reference to which a concise summary (saṃkşepa) containing the essential purport (tātparya) [of our doctrine] has been stated, and explained, by Abhinavagupta, whose name is to be mentioned with reverence [i.e., celebrated]’. In his gloss of PS 105, YR underlines as well the esoteric dimension of such a tradition, thus "revealed", at least in part, to the sincere adept: ‘This core of the teaching (śāstrasāra), that is, that essence (satattva) spread throughout numerous texts, has been condensed by me; that is, has been stated [by Abhinavagupta] after having mastered it himself, within the small span of hundred verses, though it can hardly be explained in a thousand texts. By this is stated [as well] the resourcefulness [of the author’s] luminous consciousness (pratibhā)’.6 See YR ad 101, where the gods say, apropos the ‘failed’ aspirant (yogabhraşţa): [...] yasya svātmani jijñāsārthaṃ prāgjanmani udyamo ‘bhūt, ‘It is he [after all] whose striving in a previous life was motivated by a desire to know regarding his own Self.

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The Paramārthasāra shares with the vast majority of Indian philosophical texts this propaedeutic purpose that is encoded as well in the title of the work, which may equally be understood as signifying ‘The Core of the Teachings on Ultimate Reality’, as Yogarāja explains in his gloss of the second and third verses.7

1.1. The Paramārthasāra of ĀdiśeşaWhat makes the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta unique is the nature of its exposition of the doctrine. It does not in all respects correspond to the ordinary model of a prakaraņa.8

In its second and third verses, which recount its "myth of origin", this Paramārthasāra is presented as a śaivite reworking of another Paramārthasāra, attributed to Ādiśeşa, also called Ādhāra9 (sixth or seventh century),10 of which the commentator, Yogarāja, has retained only the Sāṃkhya features.11 This is perhaps in 7 The polysemy of the term artha makes other interpretations possible: ‘The Essence of Ultimate Meaning’ (see PS 59 and YR ad loc), or, more pregnantly, ‘Principles essential in attaining the Supreme Goal of life’, namely mokşa — see PS 103 and YR ad 104, quoted p. 33. The term ‘sāra’ (lit., ‘sap’, ‘vivifying juice’) itself participates in the pun, expressing on the one hand the ‘kernel’ or ‘core’ of the Real, from which the inessential has been stripped away, and on the other, the ‘heart’ of the teaching, from which superfluous or ancillary discussion has been abstracted.8 See p. 19.9 Also Ananta — all these being synonymous with Śeşa, Vişņu’s serpent. Hence the alternative titles of the work: Ādhārakārikā, or Anantakārikā, to which is sometimes added a descriptive title: Āryāpañcāśīti, ‘The [work composed of] eighty-five āryās’. The tradition also makes this identification, conferring on the author a quasi-divine status (cf. the epithet jagadādhāra, ‘support of the world’, v. 87). And so, Rāghavānanda [R], a late Advaitin (probably 16th cent.), author of the Paramārthasāravivaraņa [ĀPSV], the only commentary on the first PS to have come down to us, observes, in his gloss on v. 87: śeşaḥ anantas tu na yaḥ ko ‘pi vipaścit, ‘Śeşa, namely Ananta, not some sage or other’. But, in his gloss on v. 3, he qualifies this same Ananta as jīvanmuktaṃ guruvaraṃ (papraccha), ‘[he asks] the most excellent teacher, liberated while alive ...’ The same ambiguity is seen in YR’s commentary, which sometimes presents Ādhāra as a sage (muni), a mortal, but also associates Ādhāra or Śeşa directly with a divine figure, Anantanātha — ‘Lord Ananta’ — sometimes termed also the ‘presiding deity of Māyā’ (TĀ VIII 323a, with the commentary of Jayaratha [JR] (fl. ca. 1250; see Sanderson 2007: 418-419), the Tantrālokaviveka [TĀV]; references to TĀV will be made to Dwivedi and Rastogi’s ed. 1987). Abhinavagupta [AG] seems generally to opt for a supra-mundane status; he cites, in his commentary to Bhagavadgītā [BhG] VIII 6, v. 81 of Ādiśeşa’s work, which he there terms a śruti; in his TĀ (XXVIII 309b), he attributes this same verse, without naming the text, to the ‘Lord of the serpents, who bears the burden of the universe by supporting it’ (ahīśāno viśvādhāradhurāndharaḥ). Another thread of the tradition (in fact, the edition of the text, published in the Pandit, 1871) identifies Śeşa with Patañjali: śrīmadbhagavaccheşakŗtāryāpañcāśītiḥ samāptā (colophon) vs. śrīmadbhagavatpatañjaliviracitāryāḥ (incipit). The Western mentality will of course attempt to resolve the ambiguity: the author is one Ādiśeşa, so named, who is a devotee of Vişņu. The line between divinity and honored predecessor being always difficult to draw in India, such identifications serve as well as ways of claiming greater authority for the text in question. In these notes, the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa will be designated by the abbreviation ĀPS [= Ādiśeşaparamārthasāra], the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta, by PS.10 The Yuktidīpikā ad Sāṃkhyakārikā [SK] 2 cites v. 83 of ĀPS. This anonymous commentary is situated ca. 550 AD by Frauwallner (1973, vol. I: 226), ca. 680-720, or even later, by Wezler and Motegi, Yuktidīpikā: 50.11 SeeYR ad 2-3.

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function of that text’s verse seven, in which the mumukşu, who now knows his catechism, presses the master to reveal the secrets implied in the distinction between puruşa and prakŗti and just why knowledge of that distinction is salvific.12 To this extent, Yogarāja only takes partial account of the doctrine of the older Paramārthasāra, which conflates Sāṃkhya dualism and the nondualism of the Vedānta — a kind of pre-Śańkara Vedānta13 halfway between the dvaitādvaitavāda of Bhartŗprapañca14 and the advaitavāda of Gauḍapāda,15 but one which, imprinted with devotion to Vişņu, remains profoundly theist, in the manner of epic Sāṃkhya.16

The doctrine that emerges from the earlier Paramārthasāra reflects at least a part of the conceptual apparatus of Sāṃkhya evolutionism, placing it within the general framework of a vedāntic metaphysics that posits from the start the unreality of the phenomenal world,17 itself the result of the all-powerful māyā of Vişņu — a deity who, however, seems little but the personification of a principle that the text terms equally brahman, ātman, or paramātman. This doctrine, evidently eclectic, is none the less sufficiently coherent to be qualified as "synthetic". The text attempts, in effect, to integrate both the perspectives (darśana) of Sāṃkhya and of Vedānta, rather than considering them as alternatives, unifying them within the rubric of a Vaişņavism whose "divinity", whatever his name, serves as unique principle — thus,

12 ĀPS 7: guņapuruşavibhāgajñe dharmādharmau na bandhakau bhavataḥ / iti gaditapūr-vavākyaiḥ prakŗtiṃ puruşaṃ ca me brūhi //, ‘Merit and Demerit do not bind him who knows the distinction between the Qualities and the Soul. In accordance with [these] sentences, as pronounced in the foregoing, explain to me Primordial Nature and Soul!’ (tr. Danielson — as are all translations from ĀPS cited here, unless otherwise specified).13 See, notably, Bouy Āgamaśāstra [ĀŚ]: 23-28; Mahadevan 1975: 16-22; Bhattacharya ĀŚ: LXXIX ff.14 See ĀPS 27. Ādiśeşa shares notably with Bhartŗprapañca the conception of a saprapañcabrahman, in virtue of which brahman, in the course of evolution, passes through different states (avasthā), eight in number, according to Bhartŗprapañca (see Hiriyanna 1924), five, according to Ādiśeşa (v. 27).15 See ĀPS 31.16 Thus, by some authors, the PS of Ādiśeşa has been identified as essentially vedāntic, in reference, particularly, to v. 31, whose terminology is indubitably vedāntic, and to the last verse (which may nevertheless be a late interpolation): vedāntaśāstram akhilaṃ vilokya śeşas tu [...] (Gaņapati Śāstrī ĀPS: preface; Suryanarayana Sastri ĀPS: VII; Bhatttacharya ĀŚ: LXXX; Bouy ĀŚ: 18, 27; note that the Śabdakalpadruma identifies the text of the Paramārthasāra as the ‘work of Śeşanāga’, in 79 āryās, s.v. vedānta); note also that the later vedāntic tradition, represented notably by the Jīvanmuktiviveka (14th cent.) appropriates the first Paramārthasāra for its demonstration of jīvanmukti, presuming to ignore Śaiva arguments entirely on that notion. Others consider it as more akin to Sāṃkhya (Pandey 1963: 63; Silburn PS: 19: ‘un Sāṃkhya teinte de Vişnouisme (sic), par consequent theiste’), or vaişņavite (Barnett PS: 708). P. Hacker (1965: 154) treats the ĀPS as one of the texts ‘that profess Vaişņavism and teach radical advaitism at the same time’. For Danielson (ĀPS: 4, 6, 10), despite numerous Sāṃkhya traits, ‘the work as a whole belongs to a tradition of Vedānta, and one we may call Bhedābhedādvaita’.17 ĀPS 2: ātmāmburāśau nikhilo ‘pi loko magno ‘pi nācāmati nekşate ca/ āścaryam etan mŗgatŗşņikābhe bhavāmburāśau ramate mŗşaiva//, ‘The whole world, though submerged in the ocean of the Self (ātman), neither drinks from nor looks at it. It is a mystery that [the world] just blindly lusts for the ocean of existences, which is like a mirage’; also ĀPS 9, cited infra.

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in effect, privileging the nondual aspect of the doctrine and placing it squarely within the currents of early devotionalism. 18

A programmatic verse at the beginning of Ādhāra’s response to the disciple sketches the basic outlines of such a doctrine: ‘I shall propound this "Essence of Supreme Truth" (paramārthasāra) after making obeisance to that Upendra [= Vişņu], by whom this unreal world was made from Primordial Matter as something seemingly real’.19

Moreover, one has the feeling that the questions put by the disciple are principally framed in terms of Sāṃkhya,20 whereas the responses of the teacher are usually couched in advaitic terms, even though the latter continues to utilize (in order to make himself better understood?) several Sāṃkhya concepts — always careful, however, to establish equivalences, where possible, with key notions of the other system — for instance prakŗti, persistently identified with the māyā of Vişņu.21 As a matter of fact, the disciple poses two questions: how liberation is achieved (vv. 4 and 6),22 and how he is to grasp what is at issue in distinguishing puruşa and prakŗti (v. 7). It is the master who, in the course of his response, unifies the two requests by introducing a third term, brahman (or ātman),23 an upanişadic notion, hence vedāntic, qualified as advaita in verse 57.24

Thus, doubtless, the liminary caution of the master, who warns the student that the response will be difficult, and who exhorts him to make the necessary effort to understand it: ‘Although that which is to be said [about this] in the following is very hard to penetrate into even for those who have knowledge, do you hear it nevertheless!’25

One may wonder whether Ādiśeşa’s preamble offers the occasion for apprehending the manner in which the transition between the two systems may have taken place. The transition is conceptual, if not chronological, which may have been the work of a thinker or group of thinkers — though we must not infer from this any anteriority of one system vis-a-vis the other, be it Sāṃkhya dualism or the nondualism of the Vedānta.26 Thus the analogy of the chrysalis, which the student

18 It might be said that the same tactic is employed in all the manifestos of devotionalism, including the Gītā, which may well have served as model for those that followed.19 ĀPS 9: satyam iva jagad asatyaṃ mūlaprakŗter idaṃ kŗtaṃ yena/ taṃ praņipatyopendraṃ vakşye paramārthasāram idam//.20 Even if he addresses (ĀPS 4) a master whom he celebrates as ‘one who has mastered Veda and Vedānga’, as him ‘who speaks the truth’ (ŗtavaktŗ) — that is, comments R, who knows ‘the complete meaning of Vedānta [viz., of the upanişads], formed by the words of the Lord, Brahma, etc.’.21 ĀPS 10b: māyāmayī pravŗttiḥ saṃhriyata iyaṃ punaḥ kramaśaḥ//, ‘[Then] this Manifestation, which consists of Magic (māyā), is absorbed again in [reverse] order’.22 ĀPS 4: saṃsārārņavataraņapraśnaṃ pŗcchāmy ahaṃ bhagavan.23 In particular, ĀPS 13 (ātman), 16-18, 19 (brahman), etc.24 An advaitabrahman further described as sakalanişkala, an oxymoron that R interprets as referring both to the saprapañcabrahman of pre-Śańkara Vedānta and to brahman as sat, cit, ānanda.25 ĀPS 8: ity ādhāro bhagavān pŗşţaḥ śişyeņa taṃ sa hovāca/ viduşām apy atigahanaṃ vaktavyam idaṃ śŗņu tathāpi tvam//.26 See Shastri PS: IX. Bhartŗprapañca (5th or 6th cent.), cited by Śańkara in his commentary to Bŗhadāraņyakopanişad [BĀU], is there presented as an aupanişada whose doctrine is influenced by Vaiśeşika and Sāṃkhya (see Bouy ĀŚ: 27).

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employs to illustrate the problematic of liberation from bondage,27 may also apply to the manner in which one doctrine emerges from the other — the same doctrine, to be sure, yet different, indeed perfected.

Nevertheless, as he arrives at the end of the exposition, the reader notices that the doctrine — despite its apparently composite character — takes great care to designate and to present itself as a sarvātmavāda, a ‘doctrine of the Universal Self or a ‘doctrine holding that all is the Self28 — a term that proclaims the doctrine’s coherence by allying it with a long-established tradition that sees the Ultimate as both immanent and transcendent, but which in effect amounts to asserting another type of nondualism. The sarvātmavāda of Ādiśeşa, in effect, finds its place within the lineages of Advaita and the traditions of Kashmir Śaivism — monisms that proclaim, in consonance with many upanişads, that ‘the Self is All’: ‘[There is] not a single doubt as to this, [viz., the fact that] this all is only the Self. Only when one realizes [this Self] as both having and not having parts, does one become free from the impenetrable darkness of Delusion, and become Supreme Lord at the same time’.29

Another aspect of the strategy of identification elaborated by the first Paramārthasāra is its claim of doctrinal uniqueness, which takes the usual form of asserting its universality with respect to rival doctrines, but such that they find a place within it as subsidiary moments: ‘We consent to whatever [others], who are blind with greed, proclaim in their Siddhāhtas, Āgamas, and Tarkas, since all that [testifies to the orientation of] their thought toward [our] doctrine, according to which everything is the Self.30

Moreover, it is evident that vedāntic notions and the monistic argumentation that supports them take precedence over the expose of Sāṃkhya categories: the theory of the tattvas appears only occasionally,31 and there remains of Sāṃkhya ontology only the notion of the three ‘qualities’ (guņa), and of Sāṃkhya eschatology only the insistence on discriminating puruşa from prakŗti,32 with a view thereby to gaining liberation — a teaching, for that matter, found already in the upanişads, as recognized already by Vācaspati in his Tattvakaumudī [TK] (citing specifically BĀU II 4, 5 and Chāndogyopanişad [ChU] VIII 15): ‘Says the Śruti: "The Spirit should be known and

27 ĀPS 6: karmaguņajālabaddho jīvaḥ saṃsarati kośakāra iva/ mohāndhakāragahanāt tasya kathaṃ bandhanān mokşaḥ//, ‘The soul, bound by the net of Acts and Qualities, is in Transmigration like a chrysalis [in its cocoon]. How is it to be delivered (mokşa) from bondage, which is hard to penetrate because of the darkness [consisting] of Delusion?’28 Verse 29c-d sketches already the outlines of the doctrine: na vidanti vāsudevaṃ sarvātmānaṃ narā mūdhāḥ//, ‘Deluded by this error, people do not recognize Vāsudeva as the Self of everything’.29 ĀPS 63d-64: na kaścid apy atra saṃdehaḥ// ātmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ nişkalasakalaṃ yadaiva bhāvayati/ mohagahanād viyuktas tadaiva parameśvarībhūtaḥ//. Here, the most evident divergence with respect to Śaiva monism or that of Śańkara is the maintenance of a brahman/atman conceived as both provided with and devoid of parts. The final phrase, however, reads as Śaiva:’… and become the Supreme Lord at the same time’ (tadaiva parameśvarībhūtaḥ).30 ĀPS 65: yad yat siddhāntāgamatarkeşu prabruvanti rāgāndhāḥ/ anumodāmas tat teşāṃ sarvātmavādadhiyā//. Similar strategy in PS 50 (see p. 9).31 See ĀPS 20.32 See ĀPS 7, 35, 44-45, 70, 75, 83.

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discriminated from Primordial Matter"; (by so doing) "the agent does not return, he does not return (into this world)."’33

In effect, more even than an exposition of doctrine — a doctrine moreover that did not give rise to a discrete tradition — the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa presents itself as a treatise on liberation, to the extent that it constitutes the response of a master to his acolyte desirous of liberation.

Such is indeed the point of articulation between Sāṃkhya-type and Advaita-type reasonings in the first Paramārthasāra — the soteriological perspective.34 And this is also, without a doubt — I will return to this point below — one of the justifications that might have prompted the second Paramārthasāra to undertake a rereading of the first.

1.2. Rewriting1.2.1. Appropriation

However that may be, the claim made by the Śaiva Paramārthasāra to have rewritten the older Paramārthasāra is quite unheard of in the history of Indian literature — where neither borrowing nor unattributed copying are much frowned upon35 — for in this case it is not merely a matter of reproducing a text of well-known reputation,36

making here and there a few adjustments or innovations, but rather of appropriating, transforming, even investing another text, to make it better able to express an improved doctrine. This appropriation is justified on the assumption that the improved doctrine (in effect, Trika Śaivism) is already present in seed form in the older doctrine (of Ādiśeşa), and that it is nothing but the accomplishment of that older doctrine, from which it has erased all trace of dualism.

The second Paramārthasāra is thus a work that sees itself as the quintessential distillation of another — though, to be fair, in formal terms, it is also an expansion, having added twenty or so verses — which process Yogarāja illustrates by the analogy of butter extracted from clotted milk,37 an analogy that cuts two ways. For, in effect, while the clotting of milk represents a transformation that is spontaneous, given the right circumstances, the production of butter requires will and effort. On the other hand, according to the Sāṃkhya doctrine of causality, satkāryavāda, the effect is pre-existent in the cause, and so may the Trika itself, which adopts the same

33 TK 2: ātmā vā ‘rejñātavyaḥ prakŗtito vivektavyaḥ (BĀU II 4, 5); na sa punar āvartate na sa punar āvartate (ChU VIII15); tr. G. Jha.34 It has been suggested (Danielson ĀPS: 4) that the famous preamble to the second section of the received text of the Upadeśasāhasrī may have been based on the model furnished by the first PS: a mumukşu asking a master to instruct him regarding means of acceding to liberation.35 See Kāvyamīmāṃsā, chapters XI-XII — or Dhvanyāloka, chapter IV.36 See, for instance, the different versions of the Madanaparājaya, The Defeat of Love (Balbir, Osier 2004: 21ff.).37 ‘That very Anantanātha, wise in teaching all the doctrines without exception, imparted instruction to the disciple, saying: "[Knowledge of] brahman, the ultimate, may be attained through the text entitled Paramārthasāra, also called the Verses of Ādhāra, via the discrimination of puruşa from prakŗti, according to the principles of the Sāṃkhya system". The teacher (guru, viz., Abhinavagupta), motivated by the need to show favor to others, [now] expounds the essence of it, just as one extracts butter from curds; that is, he expounds the essence of teachings on ultimate reality (paramārthopadeśa) in keeping with the Śaiva principle of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality, in order to show favor to all creatures’ (translations of AG’s PS and its commentary are the author’s).

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satkāryavāda, be understood by its advocates as already present in the ‘clotted milk’ of Ādiśeşa’s "Sāṃkhya". What remains is that the transformation implies a supplementary effort, as well as a perfectioning — a threefold effort composed of reasoning (yukti), acquisition of experience (anubhava), and scriptural exegesis (āgama), as Yogarāja is fond of repeating.38

Thus the process of rewriting at work in the second Paramārthasāra makes it appear that the debate with Sāṃkhya has really never taken place, which justifies nondual Śaivism of Kashmir in borrowing the theory of the tattvas, all the while adapting it to the needs of a monistic system.39 Even though it is true that the doctrine set forth in the Śaiva Paramārthasāra is framed polemically, as the commentary frequently attempts to demonstrate,40 it is essentially directed against the Buddhists, particularly Dharmakīrti, and against Vedānta, referred to by Yogarāja as Brahmavāda at large, or as Śāntabrahmavāda.41 I will return to this point later.

In support of this interpretation of the exercise of rewriting — in addition to the clotted milk analogy — I might point to the passage of the commentary where the term guruḥ of the third verse is understood to refer both to Ādhāra and to Abhinavagupta. Yogarāja’s exegesis is supported by several liminary considerations: — the attribution of the first Paramārthasāra to an author designated not only as Śeşa but as Patañjali; — the traditional identification of Patañjali (whether he be the

38 With, sometimes, a fourth term: meditative practice (pariśīlana); see YR ad 8, 10-11, 79-80.39 See p. 54. On the Saiddhāntika treatment of the tattvas, see Tāntrikābhidhānakośa [TAK], s.v. tattva.40 See, esp., PS 32 and the commentary ad loc, which, in the course of discussing rival conceptions of the Self, refers explicitly to the Mīmāṃsā (see n. 738, 740).41 See, for example, YR ad 10-11, 15, 27, 32 (where the ‘Brahmavāda’ is referred to for its version of the śūnyavāda: neti neti), and 35. YR’s gloss permits us to complete Sanderson’s observation: ‘When Vedānta is expounded by its opponents in Kashmirian sources of our period it is the doctrine of Maņḍanamiśra which is generally in mind [...]. To my knowledge no source betrays familiarity with the doctrines of Śańkara’ (1985: 210, n. 41 — Sanderson refers here, notably, to the commentary of Rāmakaņţha on the Paramokşanirāsakārikā of Sadyojyotis). It is in fact quite difficult to decide whether Śaiva authors discuss or are aware of the niceties involved in distinguishing Maņḍana’s from Śańkara’s doctrines. They nowhere deal with the issues dividing later vedāntic schools; how then is it possible to know definitely which particular version of Vedānta they have in mind? All one can reasonably say, at least as regards the PS and its commentary, is that YR assigns to the ‘Brahmavāda’ category both the Vedānta stricto sensu — which he also refers to as the Śāntabrahmavāda (ad 10-11) — and the Śabdabrahmavāda of Bhartŗhari and his followers. Accordingly, YR ad 27 refutes the conception of Self of the ‘Brahmavādins’ and that of the ‘Prāņabrahmavādins’, viz., of Bhartŗhari. And YR ad 35 applies the word ‘Brahmavādin’ to Bhartŗhari. Bhartŗhari (ca. 650 AD), of course, is substantially prior both to Maņḍana and Śańkara, who are more or less contemporaneous with each other. The distinction between these two sorts of ‘Brahmavāda’ seems much clearer in YR’s text than any putative distinction between the doctrines of Maņḍana and Śańkara. One may wonder whether the Śaivas of the 10th-11th cent, were aware of or interested in doctrinal differences among later vedāntic "schools", which may not have come into vogue in any case much before the time of Vācaspati and his great commentary, the Bhāmatī. It may be added that one of the main points of contention between Śaivas and Advaitins, according to YR, concerns their respective interpretations of the epithet śānta as applied to brahman: śānta, for YR, does not mean ‘inert’, in the manner of a stone, but’ "serene", reposing [ever] in its absolute nature, in unison with its Śakti, for there is no disturbance arising from the dichotomy between the knower and the known’ (YR ad 10-11). On the above discussion, see also n. 791; on Maņḍana, see Biardeau 1969.

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author of the Mahābhāşya, or of the Yogasūtra [YS], or of both) with Śeşa, in virtue of the epithetical designation bhujańgavibhu, implying that Patañjali is a devotee of the Serpent,42 and thus, in some degree, its incarnation; — the evidence of a south Indian tradition, which holds Abhinavagupta also to be an incarnation of Śeşa,43 on the basis of a pun on his name when suffixed with the honorific -pāda: ābhinavaguptapāda, ‘he, utterly novel, whose feet are hidden’. Though the attribution may appear fanciful, this line of argument does suggest, if ‘guru’ is to be understood as referring to more than one teacher in this passage, that Abhinavagupta and Ādhāra were also sometimes understood as the same teacher. The passage in question might then be translated: ‘The Teacher [Ādhāra] replied to him by [reciting] the Ādhārakārikā of which [as] Abhinavagupta, [he now] expounds the essence from the point of view of the Śaiva teachings’.

It should be noted also that verse 50 of Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra: ‘Though not an agent, it is I who compose the wonderfully varied Siddhāntas, Āgamas and Tarkas’, besides echoing ĀPS 65, amounts to an implicit proclamation of the superiority of the Trika doctrine. Thus is disclosed one of the main purposes served, from the Trika point of view, by rewriting the Ādiśeşa’s text: to put an end once and for all to the disputes of precedence among the schools, by affirming the uncontested supremacy of the Trika. At the same time, PS 50 provides another, as it were "metaphysical", clue as to that rewriting: the true author of the Paramārthasāra, whether he be called Ādiśeşa or Abhinavagupta, is none other than Śiva himself, the sole Agent, who is one’s own Self in the form of the absolute ‘I’. ‘Thus, says Śiva, in Yogarāja’s commentary, though not myself their creator, it is I who cause the multitudinous wonders that are the Siddhāntas, etc., [to come into being], having entered into the intentions of gods, sages and men, being [already] in essence their inner intuition (antaḥpratibha) and desirous of expounding [these doctrines] either in abridgement or in more elaborate form’.44

1.2.2. Reasons for a choice1.2.2.1. DESTINY OF THE FIRST PARAMĀRTHASĀRA Why has the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa been chosen as a text to be recomposed? It was, evidently, a text that enjoyed some celebrity in the Indian tradition — and may already have acquired by Abhinavagupta’s time the status of a śruti. Might one suppose that Abhinavagupta, in "rewriting" it, expected some transfer of its authority in his favor?45

The text’s authority was not limited in time or by tendency. Abhinavagupta himself refers to Ādiśeşa’s work elsewhere, citing twice its verse 81 in his Gītārthasaṃgraha [GAS] ad VIII 6 (where it is termed a śruti) and ad VIII 14, as well as in TĀ XXVIII 312.46 The same verse will be repeated verbatim by Abhinavagupta in his Paramārthasāra, as its verse 83. And when Vāmadeva,

42 Note that TĀ XXVIII 285b, in quoting the pratīka of YS IV 27, refers to the author of the YS as ‘Bhujagādhīśa’, ‘Lord of the serpents’. Similarly, TĀ XXVIII 309b refers to Ādiśeşa, author of the first PS, as Ahīśāna, v. 81 of whose work TĀ XXVIII 312 quotes.43 See Pandey 1963: 10-11.44 See n. 946. On the question of Trika’s supremacy, see also PS 27 and n. 661.45 See Chatterji 1914: 14.46 The entire passage (vv. 309-320ab) constitutes a meticulous exegesis of the cited verse, whose source, according to JR, is the Anantakārikā.

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probably a disciple of Yogarāja,47 quotes it (p. 21), he attributes it to ‘bhagavān bhogipatiḥ’,48 the ‘Lord of the serpents’, that is, presumably, Ādiśeşa.

Similarly, the older Paramārthasāra was well known in circles that practiced a syncretistic version of Śaivism and Vaişņavism. Thus, the Spandapradīpikā [SpP], a commentary on the Spandakārikā [SpK], the founda-tional text of the Spanda school, cites verse 66 (which has no direct correspondent in the Śaiva Paramārthasāra).49

The Spandapradīpikā, a work of Utpalavaişņava (also known as Utpalācārya, Bhāgavata Utpala,50 ninth -tenth century), testifies to the same spirit of syncretism as does the Cicchaktisaṃstuti of Yoginātha (probably same period),51 a Śākta who was familiar with the Spanda, and who as well cites Ādiśeşa’s verse 33 for its evocation of the māyā of Vişņu.52

Before this, the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa was authoritative for Sāṃkhya, as evidenced by the citation of its verse 83 in the Yuktidīpikā, a work composed sometime between the sixth and ninth centuries, of unknown authorship, but probably of Sāṃkhya affiliation. This verse, which the Yuktidīpikā attributes to the ‘tradition’ (āmnāyā), is cited in support of its interpretation of SK 2, according to which interpretation ‘liberation is obtained by knowledge’ (jñānān mokşaḥ) — the knowledge, that is, whereby puruşa is discriminated from prakŗti: ‘Just as a man falls to the ground from the top of a tree involuntarily, once he has lost his foothold, similarly, someone who knows the Qualities and the Soul (puruşā) becomes "separate" (kevala), even involuntarily’.53

Even Advaitins make use of the first Paramārthasāra. The fourteenth century Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāraņya cites verses 77 and 81, which present two types of jīvanmukta.54 In the sixteenth, Rāghavānanda comments upon the entire text. And numerous are the Indianists who take the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa to be a possible source for the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, the chef-d’oeuvre of pre-Śańkara Advaita.55

47 See p. 22.48 With emendation: bhogipatināpi for bhegipatināpi.49 Cited n. 80.50 See Sanderson 2001: 35.51 By the testimony of the SpP which, in its long avat. (Dyczkowski SpP: 5-6), cites at length the Cicchaktisaṃstuti, one may infer that Yoginātha is prior to Utpalavaişņava, or his contemporary. On Yoginātha, see Dyczkowski SpK: 290.52 ĀPS 33: jvalanād dhūmodgatibhir vividhākŗtir ambare yathā bhāti/ tadvad vişņau sŗşţiḥ svamāyayā dvaitavistarā bhāti//, ‘As a variety of forms appear in the sky because of smoke rising from fire, so creation, expanded into multiplicity, appears in Vişņu by his own Magic’. By this citation, Yoginātha explains the fact that phenomenal diversity itself presupposes a unique divinity in which it must inhere, thus justifying an idealistic monism.53 ĀPS 83: vŗkşāgrāc cyutapādo yadvad anicchan naraḥ kşitau patati/ tadvad guņapuruşajño ‘nichann api kevalībhavati//.54 Respectively, pp. 74 and 49, ascribing them to Śeşa (qualified as bhagavat, in citing v. 81; as the author of the Āryāpañcāśīti, in citing v. 77). ĀPS 77: hayamedhasahasrāņy apy atha kurute brahmaghātalakşāņi/ paramārthavin na puņyair na ca pāpaiḥ spŗśyate vimalaḥ//; v. 77 repeated almost verbatim by v. 70 of the second PS, as ĀPS 81 is repeated as such by PS 83.55 In particular, ĀPS 78 (jaḍavad vicared agādhamatiḥ) is paralleled by ĀŚ II 36d: jaḍaval lokam ācaret. See, esp., Sastri ĀPS: VIII; Bhattacharya ĀŚ: LXXIXff.

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In addition, the Candrikā (sixteenth century) on the Prābodhacandrodaya (ad V, v. 33) cites ĀPS 18, ascribing the verse to Śeşa (yathoktaṃ bhagavatā śeşeņā).56

Finally, in the eighteenth, the famous grammarian Nāgeśabhaţţa cites it several times in his Vaiyākaraņasiddhāntalaghumañjūşā, while discussing the status of error.57

The first Paramārthasāra has thus enjoyed a long and significant destiny, of which the most striking indication is no doubt its having been rewritten by a philosopher of another persuasion.

1.2.2.2. DIVERGENCES/CONVERGENCES The identification of Abhinavagupta, the ‘new Śeşa’, with the author of the first Paramārthasāra is just the emblem, the mythical clothing, of a more profound affinity.

After all, nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, which Abhinavagupta has brought to its finished state, aims, just as did the work of Ādiśeşa, at the integration of two points of view seemingly incompatible: realistic dualism — that of the Sāṃkhya, from which it borrows the hierarchy of ‘principles’ (tattva) — and idealistic nondualism, of which it retains the core notion of the ‘world as appearance’. Even if the modalities of realization are different, the principle of integration is the same in both projects.

But, just as evidently, the fact that the two doctrines are analogous does not make them strictly commensurable. For the version of Kashmir Śaivism that eventuates in the Trika is a system of thought of considerable scope and coherence, lacking common measure with the relatively impoverished system of the older Paramārthasāra — which, as we said before, has not given rise to a discrete tradition.

Above all, the Trika, to which the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta is intended to serve as introduction, is a Śaiva doctrine, whose greater purpose is that of synthesizing the older currents of Śaivism itself. From them it borrows not only the notion of śakti, but many elements of ritual and yogic practice (mantras, mudrās, kuņḍalinī, etc.) that serve to place it in a tantric context, deploying both a metaphysics and a praxis of considerable complexity within a system of thought situated under the aegis of esoterism.58

Still, the points of convergence of the two Paramārthasāra are not infrequent. Let me mention only a few most worthy of note. For the text of Ādiśeşa has already forged a number of concepts that will become integral to the Trika.

sarvātmanIn the first place, the notion of sarvātman, the universal Self, inherited from the

upanişads, is fundamental to the doctrine of Ādiśeşa. And though the Trika describes itself using terms other than sarvātmavāda, the idea of sarvātman is nevertheless at the heart of its doctrine — as the principle explaining the double status of the Self, serving also as divinity: both immanent and transcendent. And so Kşemarāja teaches, in his auto-commentary to Pratyabhijñāhŗdaya [PH] (v. 8), that the notion of the

56 Noted by Sovani 1912: 259-260. PS 8 reproduces ĀPS 18 in large part.57 Nāgeśabhaţţa cites ĀPS 49-50 (p. 232), 33 (p. 236), 9 and 30 (p. 246), 25 (p. 247), 28 (p. 268, 287), 29 (p. 268), 56-57 (p. 269), 47 (p. 283), 23 (p. 284), 27 (p. 287), 46 (p. 291), 65 (p. 295). He shows that Adiśeşa conceives error as sadasatkhyāti, not as anirvacanīyakhyāti; see Sastri ĀPS: XX.58 Note the recurrent reference in these texts to the notion of rahasya, ‘secret’.

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double status of the Self is the criterion of excellence that places the Trika above all the other systems, even those of the Tāntrikas and Kaulas.59

Numerous are the occurrences of the notion of sarvātman in the Śaiva Paramārthasāra. Here are just two examples: verse 73, which serves to define the jīvanmukta, and whose first hemistich implies the notion of sarvātman: ‘There is nothing at all separate from the [knower of the Self] to be honored with an oblation or to be praised; would then he, who is liberated, who has no use for homages or ritual formulae, be satisfied with hymns of praise, etc.?’;60 and verse 82, which repeats almost verbatim verse 80 of the first Paramārthasāra: ‘He who knows the Self of all, thus described — [source of] supreme and incomparable bliss, omnipresent, utterly devoid of diversity — becomes one with that Self’.61

krīḍāAnother point of convergence is supplied by the notion of ‘play’ (krīḍā), which

serves to explain, in the first Paramārthasāra, the double movement of phenomenal manifestation — away from, and return to, the One that is both immanent and transcendent, both extroverted and introverted: ‘Having displayed himself, like a mirage, employing the infinite varieties of breath [and the other principles], Vāsudeva withdraws again [all into himself] through his own power, as if playing’.62 Here the idea of ‘play’ is associated with the notion of svavibhūti, which anticipates the śaivite notion of svātantrya, ‘freedom’ or ‘independence’. Note also that Rāghavānanda glosses svavibhūtyā, ‘by one’s own sovereignty’, as svātantryaśaktyā māyayā, ‘by virtue of māyā, the energy of freedom’ — śaivite terminology indeed, and which does take the reader aback coming from an Advaitin! Nevertheless, though the theme of ‘divine play’ is common to Śaivism and to Advaita (even pre-Śańkaran), it should be noted that Advaitins privilege the term līlā, whereas Śaivas prefer krīḍā, as does Ādiśeşa.63

59 Kşemarāja cites from an Āgama: viśvottīrņam ātmatattvam iti tāntrikāḥ/ viśvamayam iti kulādyāmnāyanivişţāḥ/ viśvottīrņaṃ viśvamayaṃ ca iti trikādidarśanavidaḥ/, ‘The Tāntrikas maintain that the ātman principle transcends the universe. Those who are followers of the Kula tradition, etc., consider the ātman principle as immanent in [or ‘constitutive of’] the universe. The Knowers of the Trika system, etc., consider it as both transcendent and immanent’ (Pratyabhijñāhŗdayavŗtti [PHvŗ] 8). Similarly, YR ad 82 explains: ‘He is the "Self of all" (sarvātman), the Self of all that cognizes and is cognized; or [taking the compound as a bahuvrīhi] he is that whose Self is [composed of] the entirety of knowers and things known; in other words, he is both the transcendent and the immanent’.60 PS 73: stutyaṃ vā hotavyaṃ nāsti vyatiriktam asya kirņcana ca/ stotrādinā sa tuşyen muktas tannirnamaskŗtivaşaţkaḥ//.61 PS 82: vyāpinaṃ abhihitam itthaṃ sarvātmānāṃ vidhūtanānātvam/ nirupamaparamānandaṃ yo vetti sa tanmayo bhavati//; cf. ĀPS 80: vyāpinam abhinnam itthaṃ sarvātmānāṃ vidhūtanānātvam/ nirupamaparamānandaṃ yo veda sa tanmayo bhavati//. See also YR ad 69, which discusses the double meaning of sarvabhūtātman.62 ĀPS 30: prāņādyanantabhedair ātmānaṃ saṃvitatya jālam iva/ saṃharati vāsudevaḥ svavibhūtyā krīḍamāna iva// (translation is mine; cf. Danielson: ‘After having extended himself through infinite varieties, viz., breath, etc., like [a feat of] magic, Vāsudeva [= Vişņu], by his own sovereignty, reabsorbs [everything] as if playing’). R reads ākrīdamāna iva.63 In the Brahmasūtra [BS] (II 1, 33), creation itself is free play (līlā): lokavat tu līlākaivaiyam, ‘But [Brahman’s creative activity] is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life’ (tr. Thibaut). One should distinguish this theory from the teleological theory according to which the Lord creates in order to play; Śańkara in his Bhāşya [BSBh] II 1, 33 observes: ‘Analogously, the

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sakŗdvibhāta ātmāEqually remarkable is the presence of a phrase in Ādiśeşa’s text destined to find its

place in the treasury of śaivite maxims: sakŗd vibhātaḥ, ‘having appeared once [and for all]’: ‘The Self is devoid of all concepts, pure, [always and forever] waked, unageing, immortal, calm, spotless, having appeared once [and forever], spiritual, [and] pervasive, like space’.64

This very verse finds a parallel in the second Paramārthasāra, in reference to its verses 10 and 11, which attempt as well a definition of the Self. Yogarāja, after explaining that the compound ‘devoid of dissolution and creation’ (layodayavihīnam) means ‘eternal’ (sanātanam), goes on to cite the formula sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā, ‘The Self appears once and for all’. Śaivite texts that take up this formula in more or less developed versions are numerous. Its origin is perhaps to be found also in the upanişads, as for instance, in ChU VIII 4, 1-2, where the ‘world of brahman’ is qualified as sakŗdvibhātaḥ. As far as the ontological implication of the formula is concerned, namely that this Self ‘once and for all appearing’ is the source of the appearance of all other things, is the ‘unique Real’, Rāghavānanda, while commenting on Ādiśeşa’s verse 25, recalls that the formula is already alluded to in Muņḍakopanişad [MuU] II 2, 11: ‘Every thing shines only after that shining light. His shining illumines all this world’.65 Such an idea is also present in one of the leitmotifs of the Trika, the formula nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate, ‘That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself’,66 with its complex network of implications.

In a śaivite perspective, the epithet sakŗdvibhātaḥ in effect establishes not only the eternality of the Self, but the contemporaneity of the Self’s revelation and the advent of liberation — and as well that the experience itself is perennial. This is the truth, when apprehended, that "astounds" like a flash of lightning (the root sphur) — the sudden and simultaneous realization both of the Self and of one’s liberation; on it is grounded the otherwise paradoxical idea of liberation in this life (jīvanmukti). For if the experience of the Self takes place in this life, the same must be said of liberation, whose realization is thereupon dependent. Such is the Traika usage of the old epithet applying to the Self, sakŗdvibhātaḥ — a usage that the second Paramārthasāra illustrates: ‘Similarly, the [knower’s] own essential Self remains in the condition it

activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature, without reference to any purpose’ (tr. Thibaut, who adds in note: ‘The nature (svabhāvā) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Māyā joined with time and karman’). This is equally the view of ĀS I 9. R ad ĀPS 30, while commenting on the word he reads as ākrīdamāna, cites as well BS II 1, 33. And he adds: svārājyasamŗddhimanto narendrā yathā svavibhūtyā krīḍanti tadvad ātmanātmany eva vihartukāma iva, ‘Just as princes whose dominion is complete [continue to] play [at being kings] by exercising their majesty, so also [does Vişņu], for he loves to sport, in and by himself’.64 ĀPS 25: sarvavikalpanahinaḥ śuddho buddho ‘jarāmaraḥ śāntaḥ/ amalaḥ sakŗd vibhātaś cetana ātmā khavad vyāpī// (tr. Danielson, modified).65 ChU VIII 4, 1-2 is quoted n. 455. MuU II 2, 11: tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ tasya bhāsā sarvam idaṃ vibhāti (tr. Radhakrishnan — as are all translations from upanişads cited here, unless otherwise specified).66 See YR ad 30.

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was in when it became manifest once and for all at the moment knowledge was acquired; it does not become otherwise when the body falls away’.67

Liberation through gnosisThe principle of ‘liberation through gnosis’ appears as the first correlative of the

doctrine of sarvātmavāda: to know that all is the Self is to be instantaneously liberated. Several verses of the two Paramārthasāra propound this principle.68 Two are particularly worthy of attention — if only for the way in which the second Paramārthasāra borrows from the first. Ādiśeşa’s verse 73 reads: ‘There is neither any place for Release, nor [does Release consist in] going elsewhere. Breaking the fetter which consists of ignorance: that is what one knows as Release’.69 It is taken up by verse 60 of Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra, whose first hemistich is identical, but which shows śaivite modifications in the second: ‘Neither has liberation any abode, nor does it involve a going elsewhere. Liberation is the manifestation of one’s own energies realized by cutting the knot of ignorance’.70

Similarly, Ādiśeşa’s verse 8171 is repeated verbatim as verse 83 of Abhinavagupta’s work — constituting one of the rare cases of word-for-word citation in the second Paramārthasāra: ‘Whether he gives up his body in a place of pilgrimage or in the hut of an outcaste, be he conscious or not, he goes [thence] to a condition of transcendent Isolation, his grieving at an end, for he was liberated at the very moment he acquired knowledge’.72

There is no better example of the affinity of the two texts, inasmuch as, prompted, almost fortuitously, by the epithet naşţasmŗtiḥ, the later Paramārthasāra introduces another point of convergence: once acquired in this life, the fact of liberation cannot be abolished, even by the mindlessness and disorder of the final agony. Verse 81 of the initial Paramārthasāra just alludes to that question, which, as is well known, is much debated in Indian speculation. But the Śaiva Paramārthasāra, in the person of Abhinavagupta, develops the issue at length, over several verses, followed by Yogarāja who proceeds even to reinterpret in a śaivite sense several parallel passages of the Bhagavadgītā.73

Meditative realization (bhāvanā)The means whereby one accedes to that final knowledge of the Self (or of

brahman), according to the first Paramārthasāra, is ‘meditation’ (bhāvanā), or rather, as we have translated the term as it occurs in the second Paramārthasāra, ‘meditative realization’. This is also the means privileged by the Śaiva Paramārthasāra, to the extent that it is this means that prevails in the śāktopāya, the

67 PS 93: evaṃ jñānāvasare svātmā sakŗd asya yādŗg avabhātaḥ/ tādŗśa eva tadāsau na dehapāte ‘nyathā bhavati//.68 Notably, ĀPS 39-40, 67-68, 72, 73, 81; PS 60 [= ĀPS 73], 83 [= ĀPS 81].69 ĀPS 73: mokşasya naiva kiṃcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/ ajñānamayagranther bhedo yas taṃ vidur mokşaḥ// (the words common to the two PS are in roman).70 PS 60: mokşasya naiva kiṃcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/ ajñānagranthibhidā svaśaktabhivyaktatā mokşaḥ//.71 Arguably the verse most frequently cited in later literature, particularly by AG; see p. 9.72 PS 83: ārthe śvapacagŗhe vā naşţasmŗtir api parityajyan deham/ jñānasamakāīamuktaḥ kaivalyaṃ yāti hataśokaḥ//.73 See PS 90-91, 94-95, with notes.

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‘way of energy’ — of the four ‘ways’ the one whose perspective is chiefly adopted by Abhinavagupta in his Paramārthasāra.74 Indeed, the notion is found as well in other doctrines (though sometimes in another context, or with different implication or significance),75 but its understanding is here directly inherited from the older text.

The first Paramārthasāra devotes, in effect, three verses to bhāvanā: ‘After one has discarded Illusion, which, being delusive, has the nature of fallacy [in that it produces] the idea of plurality, let him realize Brahman, which is without plurality, being both with and without parts. As water becomes one with water, milk with milk, wind with wind, so, by meditation (bhāvanā) on the spotless Brahman, [man] becomes one with it. If in that way, the sum total of plurality has receded into the state of Brahman by meditation (bhāvanā), no delusion, no sorrow [remains] for him, as he looks on everything as Brahman’.76

After an encomium of bhāvanā (v. 41), the second Paramārthasāra condenses in a single verse (v. 51) the teaching of its predecessor’s verses 57-58: ‘Thus, once the postulation of duality has ceased, [the adept] after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion, should merge in brahman as milk merges in milk, and water in water’,77

and in concatenation reproduces verse 59 of the first Paramārthasāra, verbally modified to suit śaivite metaphysics: ‘Thus, once the host of principles has been reintegrated into Śiva through meditative realization, what sorrow is there, what delusion for him who views everything as brahman?’78

For its part, the first Paramārthasāra returns (v. 64) to the notion of bhāvanā, in the guise of the causative verb bhāvayati, which it associates with the idea of liberation (parameśvarībhūtaḥ), ‘he becomes the Supreme Lord’).79 And, in verse 66, the term itself, though not mentioned as such, is ably etymologized as follows: ‘By whichever appearance the Lord, who has all forms, is meditated upon that appearance he adopts, as he is like a jewel [fulfilling all] wishes’.80

Similarly, at verse 68, the second Paramārthasāra associates again this notion with that of liberation: ‘Thus awakened by the winds of his meditative realization, as

74 See p. 49, and n. 858; also n. 1227.75 See n. 1054, the usage the Mīmāṃsā makes of it.76 ĀPS 57-59: evaṃ dvaitavikalpaṃ brahmasvarūpāṃ vimohanīṃ māyām/ utsŗjya sa-kalanişkalam advaitaṃ bhāvayed brahma// yadvat salile salilaṃ kşīre kşīraṃ samīraņe vāyuḥ/ tadvad brahmaņi vimale bhāvanayā tanmayatvam upāyati// itthaṃ dvaitasamūhe bhāvanayā brahmabhūyam upayāte/ ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayataḥ//.77 PS 51: itthaṃ dvaitavikalpe galite pravilańghya mohanīṃ māyām/ salile salilaṃ kşīre kşīram iva brahmaņi layī syāt//.78 PS 52: itthaṃ tattvasamūhe bhāvanayā śivamayatvam abhiyāte/ kaḥ śokaḥ ko mohaḥ sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayataḥ//. Note especially the substitutions śiva for brahman, tattva for dvaita. The second hemistich, in both texts, recalls Īśopanişad 6-7, the first PS being somewhat closer to its source, since it respects the upanişadic order of the words (ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ): yas tu sarvāņi bhūtāny ātmany evānupaśyati// sarvabhūteşu cātmānaṃ tato na vijugupsate// yasmin sarvāņi bhūtāny ātmaivābhūd vijānataḥ// tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ//, ‘And he who sees all beings in his own self and his own self in all beings, he does not feel any revulsion by reason of such a view. When, to one who knows, all beings have, verily, become one with his own self, then what delusion and what sorrow can be to him who has seen oneness?’79 See ĀPS 64, quoted n. 29.80 ĀPS 66: sarvākāro bhagavān upāsyate yena yena bhāvena/ taṃ taṃ bhāvaṃ bhūtvā cintā-maņivat samabhyeti//. This verse lacks a correspondent in the later PS.

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he pours an oblation of all his thought constructs into the blazing Fire of the Self, he becomes Fire itself.81 And we note that the metaphor ‘winds of meditative realization’, which serves as matrix to the extended metaphor of the verse, may well be a reemployment of a segment of Ādiśeşa’s verse 58, not otherwise utilized, [...] samīraņe vāyuḥ, ‘As [...] wind becomes one with wind’ — verse 51 of the Śaiva Paramārthasāra having retained, in its exercise of transposition, only the two initial images: water and milk.

The Śaiva Paramārthasāra thus puts equal emphasis on the idea of bhāvanā, but with the difference that the notion is there placed among practices of an āgamic yoga, in which the Trika sets great store. Associated with mantric practice, with kuņḍalinī yoga and with the practice of the mudrās, bhāvanā is the spiritual exercise par excellence, thanks to which the mumukşu accedes simultaneously to knowledge and to liberation, while he yet lives.82

jīvanmukti‘Liberation in this life’ is indeed the common project of the two Paramārthasāra,

even though the second reserves to it a more explicit treatment. It provides also, doubtless, the first among the motives for rewriting the text itself. The Śaiva Paramārthasāra transposes the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa precisely because it has apprehended there the foundation for the doctrine of jīvanmukti. It is a jīvanmukti that does not speak its name clearly in the first Paramārthasāra, but which is there recognized by many indications, when viewed in the light of later developments, once the debate provoked by the oxymoron of the term itself (‘jīvan’ while living / ‘mukti’ liberation [from this life]) finally subsided, conferring on the notion its general legitimacy. Rāghavānanda, the Advaitin exegete mentioned earlier, makes no mistake when, in his commentary on verse 3, he presents Ādiśeşa as a jīvanmukta.83

The entire labor of Abhinavagupta and Yogarāja is aimed at bringing to light that very truth: the ‘liberation’ that is at issue in the older Paramārthasāra is already the ‘liberation in this life’ that Abhinavagupta makes into the issue of the second. In this sense, the śaivite transposition is also an exegetical project. Underscoring the soteriological vocation of the first Paramārthasāra, the transposition reveals in addition that the soteriology, based doubly on Sāṃkhya and Advaita, establishes the notion of jīvanmukti.

Thus the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta makes the text of Ādiśeşa into a treatise on liberation in this life. The best proof that may be given of this is that the stanzas of Ādiśeşa’s work cited in later literature — with the possible exception of Nāgeśa’s grammatical reference — concern more or less the idea of jīvanmukti. Two among them (especially 81, the most famously cited in any case) are part of the demonstration of jīvanmukti propounded by the Jīvanmuktiviveka; moreover, the quasi-totality of the second Paramārthasāra’s borrowings from the first concern 81 PS 68: itthaṃ sakalavikalpān pratibuddho bhāvanāsamīraņataḥ/ ātmajyotişi dīpte juhvajjyo-tirmayo bhavati//.82 See YR ad 9, 61, 62, 64-66, 83, 86, 96.83 APSV 3: [...] ātmatattvasākşād bodhavantaṃ jīvanmuktaṃ guruvaraṃ yathāvidhy upagam-ya baddhāñjaliḥ papraccheti, ‘[...] having approached in a proper way and with a gesture of salutation the most excellent teacher [Ādiśeşa], who is liberated while still living and who possesses an intuitive grasp of the reality of the Self [or ‘and who possesses an evident mastery of the reality of the Self’], he asks…’

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liberation — and that means, as the commentary incessantly attempts to show, ‘liberation in this life’.

Even if the term ‘jīvanmukti’ appears no more often in the second Paramārthasāra than it does in the first, it is possible to read it there in outline, twice, by the bias of periphrases where the concessive ‘api’ points to and resolves in one gesture the oxymoron that the notion represents. Thus, at verse 61: ‘He who has cut the knot of ignorance, whose doubts have vanished, who has put aside error, whose merits and demerits have been destroyed, is liberated, though still joined with his body’,84 and at verse 86: ‘In the same manner, consciousness, once it has been separated from the complex of sheaths [that is the body, etc.], is [forever] completely alien to their touch, even though, as a liberated Self, it remains there [for a time] due to root impressions [previously accumulated]’.85

Moreover, in comparing the strategies of composition of the two Paramārthasāra, one notes that, beginning with verse 76 of the first (= verse 69 of the second), the textual parallelism grows more obvious, the correspondences are more patent, and succeed one another in a rhythm that cannot be ignored. Whole sequences of verses are repeated verbatim or almost so, in many cases.86 One observes also that verse 75 of the first Paramārthasāra, strongly colored with Sāṃkhya and not as such taken up by Abhinavagupta, itself clearly postulates the notion of jīvanmukti, via a periphrasis, and as such introduces the long concatenation of symmetrical verses in the two texts: ‘As soon as the Soul has understood Matter as different [from itself], it becomes, [even though it still] exists in the midst of Transmigration, free from all acts, as a lotus leaf [is free] from the water [in which grows the lotus plant]’.87

The first Paramārthasāra even takes up the matter of obstacles to liberation as represented by the notion of the yogabhraşţa, the acolyte ‘fallen from discipline’ (vv. 84-85). Thus going out of its way, the text promises even to such as he access to the liberation that had been to him for so long a time denied (v. 86).

This is, in its way, also a manner of establishing the legitimacy of the notion — that of envisaging equally all the obstacles that might be alleged to interfere between the mumukşu and his liberation. And so a "rhetoric of solicitude" is put in place that Abhinavagupta also makes use of — his verses 100-101 repeating almost verbatim Ādiśeşa’s verses 84-85, while his verse 102 transposes Ādiśeşa’s 86, the principal difference being es-chewal of any reference to Vişņu. And finally, this last point of convergence: the theistic dimension of the two doctrines, so evident that it often suffices, in the exercise of transposition, to replace references to Vişņu with those corresponding to Śiva.88

1.2.2.3. DESTINY OF THE SECOND PARAMĀRTHASĀRA In the same way most modern accounts take little note of the contribution of Śaivism to the

84 PS 61: bhinnājñānagranthir gatasaṃdehaḥ parākŗtabhrāntiḥ/ prakşīņapuņyapāpo vigrahayoge ‘py asau muktaḥ// (the words at issue are in roman).85 PS 86: tadvat kañcukapaţalīpŗthakkŗtā saṃvid atra saṃskārāt/ tişţhaty api muktātmā tatsparśavivarjitā bhavati//.86 Compare ĀPS 76-78 and PS 69-71; ĀPS 79-82 and PS 81-84.87 ĀPS 75: buddhvā vibhaktāṃ prakŗtiṃ puruşaḥ saṃsāramadhyago bhavati/ nirmuktaḥ sarvakarmabhir ambujapattraṃ yathā salilaiḥ//.88 This is not the place to pursue the discussion of the elder Pāramārthasāra and its relationship to the younger. A separate monograph will be devoted to the subject, to be published in due course.

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issue of liberation — liberation in this life or not — likewise later Indian tradition, notably inspired by Vedānta, is careful to avoid Śaiva reasonings. Perhaps, for the orthodox, it is due to the reticence aroused by suspicion of tantric leanings.89

When the Jīvanmuktiviveka invokes, in the fourteenth century, the authority of the Paramārthasāra, it is the first Paramārthasāra that its author has in mind, though the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta contains the same verse, hardly modified: later tradition, it is true — Abhinavagupta included — accords to the first Paramārthasāra the status of śruti.

I have found references to the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta only in works of śaivite tendency: the TĀV ad I 37, I 39-40, and IX 50, as well as the Parimala [PM] ad Mahārthamañjarī [MM] 25 (probably thirteenth century),90 which cite, respectively, vv. 15-16a, vv. 16b-17, v. 14 and v. 26. Note as well that, when Abhinavagupta cites ĀPS 81 in his TĀ XXVIII 312, and explains it in the following verses, it is as though he were using his treatment of Ādiśeşa’s work in order to comment, though allusively, on his own PS 83.

And so the destiny of Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra has been limited to Śaiva circles.

2. The Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta2.1. The text and its commentator

Yogarāja describes as a prakaraņa the text he is commenting on. Though the text of Abhinavagupta does conform to the strictures of the genre in that it is indeed an epitome, a concise treatment of doctrine (see vv. 104 and 105), it does nevertheless diverge from the type in two principal ways: one is inherent in the need to reconcile the imperative of doctrinal coherence with the project of rewriting an older text of somewhat different persuasion; the other is that the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta does not confine itself to an exposition of the doctrine as such but at times hints at a second sense lying beneath the evident sense, namely esoteric techniques and practices that are at the heart of the philosophical discourse, as strikingly exemplified by verses 41-46.

Moreover it can be said that the doctrine itself is esoteric by nature, which does not prevent it however from being formulated in precise philosophical terms. At least, it is how the system perceives itself: ‘Thus, the supremely recondite core of the teaching (śāstrasāram atigūḍham) has now been condensed in one hundred āryā-verses by me, Abhinavagupta, illumined [viz., inspired] by remembrance of Śiva’s feet’ (v. 105). Yogarāja never fails to expand upon that ‘supremely recondite core of the teaching’, the spiritual realization of nondualism — which is the ultimate truth of the system — and the means or ways to attain it. He refers frequently to the ‘secret’ (rahasya) that consists in the ‘knowledge of one’s own Self’ (svātmajñānarahasya, vv. 87-88), in other words, in recognizing that one’s own Self is not different from Maheśvara (v. 81).91

89 See p. 35.90 On the date of the MM, see Cox 2006; Sanderson 2007: 379, n. 479.91 See YR ad 14 (rahasyanaya), 75 (rahasyavid), 81 (rahasyaṃ paramārthamaheśvarākhyam ... upalabhya), 87-88 (svātmajñānarahasya), 96 (svāmasaṃbodhamukhāmnāyarahasya) and 104 (parabrahmarahasyātiśaya).

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Even though he has not the breadth of Abhinavagupta, who commented on many of the key texts of the tradition, or of Jayaratha, who felt able to confront the monumental Tantrāloka, Yogarāja is nevertheless a profound exegete, sometimes even audacious — despite what Lilian Silburn says.92 Not only is he sensitive to the subtle and ever reciprocal transitions in the text between the cosmic Self and the individual self, between Śiva and the ‘knower’ (jñānin), both of which appear in our text under the guise of the pronoun ‘I’ that verses 47-50 are at pains to represent, but he shows himself capable of decoding the double entendres. Thus he deciphers references to the articulation of the mantra throughout verses 41-46, and to the symbolic signification of its elements. As well, in his commentary on verse 104: idam abhinavaguptoditasaṃkşepaṃ dhyāyataḥ paraṃ brahma / acirād eva śivatvaṃ nijahŗdayāveśam abhyeti, ‘To him who meditates on this transcendental brahman, as concisely expounded by Abhinavagupta, Śivahood comes without delay, once it has pervaded his own heart’ — the apparently straightforward authorial signature is reinterpreted metonymically,93 as a copulative compound (dvandvā) of adjectives that qualify the term ‘brahman’: ‘To him who meditates on this transcendental brahman in reference to which a concise summary has now been stated, [such that brahman is now understood as both] quite novel (abhinava), and [heretofore] hidden (gupta), Śivahood comes without delay [...]’. Moreover, Yogarāja proves himself very accurate when he finds in the discussion of liberation of verse 60 a reference to the Trika denunciation of the practice of yogic suicide (utkrānti), which is also condemned at greater length in the Tantrāloka — though with some misgivings, as the practice was taught in the Mālinīvijayottaratantra [MVT], the text that is otherwise considered authoritative in the Trika.94

It is equally obvious that Yogarāja is familiar with the immense literature of nondualist Śaiva tradition, which he cites abundantly, and without much regard to tendency — which in effect establishes his authority to comment on the Paramārthasāra. Nevertheless, a predilection for a Krama-oriented exegesis is felt in his commentary, in the manner of his guru, Kşemarāja (1000-1050), who repeatedly concerns himself with the Krama doctrine, celebrated as the highest of all systems.95

Yogarāja himself was probably initiated into Krama, as may be inferred from another text ascribed to him, the recently discovered Śivāşţaka.96 This hymn to Caitanyaśiva, ‘Śiva as consciousness’, is of Krama affiliation and justifies our recognizing, at various places in the Paramārthasāra, Yogarāja’s references as having a Krama coloration. For example, after referring to the Kālikākrama in his gloss on PS 41,

92 ‘Contrairement aux grands commentateurs de cette ecole philosophique, Yogarāja n’est qu’un simple exegete qui ne possede aucune originalite; c’est la raison pour laquelle nous ne donnons qu’un resume de sa glose’ (Silburn PS: 20).93 Trika literature abounds in such reinterpretations of the name ‘Abhinavagupta’.94 See n. 1031. Note that AG also finds a veiled reference to that practice while commenting on BhG VIII 13-14.95 See his Spandanirņaya [SpN] ad I 1 (Kaul Shāstrī SpK: 6, 1. 5); his quotations of the Kālikākrama in the Śivasūtravimarśinī [ŚSV]; his auto-commentary ad PH 15, where he reverently cites ‘the Kramasūtras composed by ancient teachers in their own characteristic language’ (tad uktaṃ pūrvagurubhiḥ svabhāşāmayeşu kramasūtreşu), and ad 19, in which he refers again to the Kramasūtras, which he not only quotes, but explains at length, in dealing with the notion of kramamudrā, or mudrākrama; see also Sanderson 2007: 398ff.96 See Sanderson 2007: 380, n. 483.

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Yogarāja, ad 42, quotes the text of Kallaţa that Kşemarāja himself quotes in his vŗtti ad PH 18 — a verse that is instrumental in defining śaktivikāsa, the ‘blossoming of energy’, also called bhairavīmudrā, which, as the context shows, implies a reference to Krama practice.97 It is one example among many of Yogarāja’s hinting at esoteric aspects of the doctrine (‘esoteric’ being understood in its narrow, technical sense), expanding on the diversity of yogic practices where the base text merely alludes to them.

Thus, within the apparent linearity of the Paramārthasāra’s philosophical discourse, Yogarāja finds many occasions to bring out more or less cryptic references to the notion of supreme Speech, to the doctrine of phonemic emanation and the role of the mātŗkās (vv. 10-11), to mudrās (v. 42), to mantric practice (vv. 41-46), to the placing of the thirty-six tattvas on the body of the guru and of the initiand (v. 74), and to the kuņḍalinī,98 understood notably in its association with the articulation of the mantra HAṂSAḤ (v. 78).

However, the major contribution of Yogarāja to the understanding of the text is his emphasis, beginning with the commentary on verse 9, on what he considers its core issue, jīvanmukti. He does adopt a style that is his own — conscious doubtless of the reticences and the disagreements surrounding the notion, he makes constant reference to the interior experience of the yogin, of the jīvanmukta so incomprehensible to ordinary men. Of course, the framework is well known, both in the literature of Kashmir Śaivism (and in the Paramārthasāra itself; see v. 59), and in pan-Indian tradition, beginning with the upanişads — but Yogarāja gives its exposition a particular twist. For instance, he accents his account with a series of phrases in the first-person singular, presumably to be attributed to the yogin himself, wherein the yogin formulates the content of his "incommunicable" realization.99

Such are the originality and the lucidity of this commentary that it truly merits its appellation as a vivŗti, an ‘elaborate explanation’.100

It might be noted also that Yogarāja could have figured in roles other than that of Kşemarāja’s disciple, exegete of the Paramārthasāra, and author of the Śivāşţaka, if he is the Yogeśvara or Yogeśvarācārya that Vāmadeva, the author of the Janmamaraņavicāra, salutes as his master — thus furthering a preceptorial lineage or paraṃparā.101

Thus read in the light of its commentary, the text of Abhinavagupta presents a remarkably exhaustive exposition of Trika doctrine, which Yogarāja attempts to

97 See also, inter alia, the reference to the notion of ‘great Void beyond the Void’ (mahāśūnyātiśūnya), in YR ad 14 (n. 495).98 Covertly ad PS 78, more explicitly ad PS 97, again ad PS 98-99, through one allusion.99 Phrases that I have thought interesting enough to collect in an ‘Anthology of spiritual experience’ (see p. 461), to which should be added the "ahaṃstuti" that constitute verses 47-50 of the PS itself; see p. 25, and p. 55.100 Thanks to this commentary, we have been able to make sense out of such puzzling passages as kārikās 27, 63, 78 or 84-85, to cite only a few; see, for instance, the way YR discloses the ‘implication’ (tātparyā) of kā 63 (n. 1065).101 Such is the hypothesis of Shāstri, in the preface to his edition of the Janmamaraņavicāra — an hypothesis that might be corroborated by a few additional indices: 1) the occurrence of the image of the water-wheel (araghaţţaghaţiyantra), in a similar context in both YR’s commentary ad 47 and in the Janmamaraņavicāra: 18-19; 2) Vāmadeva’s citation (pp. 20-21) of the same two verses that YR had quoted in his commentary ad 83.

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position, as much within the vast śaivite tradition as in the perspective of other Indian systems — sometimes in order to appropriate the others, as in the case of the Bhagavadgītā and the Mahābhārata, sometimes in order to achieve distance from them, as in the case of idealistic monisms of the Advaita or the Buddhist Vijñānavāda sort, and sometimes to "complete" their argumentation, particularly in reference to the Sāṃkhya.102 Note especially the way in which Abhinavagupta103 condenses the polemical demonstration of the Trika’s supremacy into one verse, v. 27 — a verse that summarizes, sometimes idiosyncratically, several rival doctrines, and which is based, with significant alterations, on verse 27 of the first Paramārthasāra. It becomes, in the second, a doxography in miniature.

Thus the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta achieves a double goal: it rewrites an older text without compromising its own point of view, and it makes of itself both a doctrinal synthesis and a defense of jīvanmukti. And it does this within the confines of a tight argument, the articulations of which Yogarāja is at pains to emphasize, taking particular note of the various implicit objections to which such or such a verse may be said to be a response.

2.2. Structure of the textThe structure of the text is governed by a dialectic between bondage and liberation — a dialectic that is articulated in terms of instruction as to the means of abolishing bondage.

V. 1: programmatic verse, in which Yogarāja, following a well-known procedure, alludes not only to the essential principles of the system, but also, if covertly, to what constitutes its major theme, and that of the Paramārthasāra itself: the notion of jīvanmukti.

Vv. 2-3: the myth of origin of the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta, structured in terms of the myth of origin of the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa.

Vv. 4-13: condensed expose of the system’s nondualism: phenomenal diversity understood as the manifestation of the Lord’s energies; successive and concentric manifestation of the four envelopes, or cosmic spheres (aņḍa, v. 4), which comprehend the multiplicity of worlds and finite creatures; reaffirmation of nondualism: the paśu is none other than Śiva incarnate, who assumes as actor the infinity of roles in terms of which the theater of the world is characterized (5); series of examples (6-9, 12-13); doctrine of ‘reflection’ (pratibimba; 12-13) and the related doctrine of ‘difference-and-non-difference’ (bhedābheda). Yogarāja introduces (ad 9) for the first time the figure of the jīvanmukta, which he reads allusively in the notion of grace there set forth. Vv. 10-11, proposing to define the Self (or supreme principle), anticipate the later definitions of the jīvanmukta.

Vv. 14-22: expose of the thirty-six ‘principles’ (tattva), ontological categories or principles constitutive of the ‘pure path’ and the ‘impure path’, that are graduated manifestation of the Self, itself designated in what follows as brahman, or as ‘supreme principle’ (paratattva), or as ‘Śiva beyond [the principles]’ (paramaśiva — Śiva seen as the thirty-seventh principle). These principles, arranged progressively, explain the genesis of finitude — as they do in the prototypical Sāṃkhya, which serves as basis for this and other Indian theories of "objectivity". Allusions to the

102 See p. 52.103 In supposing that the interpretation of YR reflects the views of AG.

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theme of error appear from v. 15 onward, where is introduced the notion of ‘fallacious creative power’ (māyā vimohinī).

Vv. 23-27: characterization of finitude as a ‘sheath’, ‘constriction’, or ‘impurity’ — all realizations of error, and consequences of māyā; allusive reference to three of the four ‘envelopes/spheres’ (aņḍa, 23), the three ‘impurities’ (mala, 24); the fundamental misapprehension of taking the Self for the non-Self, expression of ‘nescience’ (avidyā), termed as well ‘ignorance’ (ajñāna) — in other words, Self-forgetfulness and the advent of subject-object dualism in the form of ‘dualizing thought’ (vikalpa, 25); nondualism reaffirmed (26); refutation of competing theories of the Self, all of which partake of error, though in different degrees (27, reprised in 32).

Vv. 28-32: introduction of the theme of ‘all-powerful error’, described as the obfuscation of the truth (‘the darkness of error’, 30), the constriction of the immemorial and eternal freedom of the Self (32); a theme that is omnipresent, inasmuch as on the dissolution of that error depends liberation in this life — the major issue here treated. Traika innovation: notion of the sequentiality of the two errors, that of taking the Self for the non-Self being prior to and more fundamental than that of taking the non-Self for the Self (31).104 The two errors constitute the mithyājñāna of PS 53, ‘false/apparent knowledge’. Similarly, ‘dualizing thought’ (vikalpa), which includes all the false constructions of the relation of Self and non-Self espoused by rival systems, is condemned as ‘false’ (mithyā, 32).

Vv. 33-38: reversibility of finitude and liberation, of which the freedom of the Lord is the explicative principle: Abhinavagupta’s introduction of the theme of ‘divine play’ (kriḍā), expression of the Lord’s sovereign freedom; beginning of the treatment of liberation, which is obtained by reversing the process that is instrumental in generating bondage; liberation prescribed in v. 33: ‘One should unveil his proper Self ...’, to which one accedes, symmetrically, by unveiling, by purification, by reconquest or recognition of ‘Self-knowledge’ (svajñāna); correspondence established between macrocosmic (creation, etc.) and microcosmic (the four states, waking, etc.) modes of the Self (34); justification of the apparent paradox of a Self (or a brahman) both one and many (35); refutation of the objection that the Self is polluted by its particular realizations (36) and that the Self is compromised by the variety of its states of consciousness; refutation of the objection that the Self is subject to affectations: the "psychologization" of the Self being a mere matter of metaphor (38). Verse 38, which describes the Self ‘as it is in reality’ (paramārthataḥ), anticipates the descriptions of jīvanmukti that follow.

Vv. 39-40: eradication of the twofold error (bhrāntidvaya, avat. ad 40) and the simultaneous advent of knowledge and liberation. The same freedom of the Supreme Lord — that is, one’s own Self (svātmamaheśvara) — which has the power to subjugate has also the power to liberate (ad 39). The liberation that was prescribed in v. 33 is acquired in v. 40, with the necessary implication that it is a liberation acquired in this life: ‘In this way, when these twin delusions have been cut off, along with their roots, there is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else’. Here we find, in Abhinavagupta’s text, the first reference, even though veiled, to the jīvanmukta, described as the ‘supreme adept’ (parayogin). Yogarāja interprets v. 40 as implying a denunciation of external

104 See n. 848, ad PS 39.[30]

rites, preparing thus the way for an esoteric account of mantric practice (vv. 41-46) exemplifying the ‘interiorized rite’ (antaryāga).

Vv. 41-46: change of tone in the commentary that focuses on an esoteric and mystical interpretation of the philosophical concepts treated above (bhedābheda, etc.).105 The stress is put upon the means of simultaneous access to both knowledge and liberation, by presenting, in terms that are ambiguous, a ‘discipline’ (yoga) based on scriptural sources (āgama) that is proper to the ‘way of energy’ (śāktopāya), this latter also called the ‘way of knowledge’ (jñānopāya) — the way of interiorizing ritual that is characterized by ‘meditative realization’ (bhāvanā) and mantric practice, notably that based on the mantra ; description of the jīvanmukta as a yogin embarked on the way of energy. Vv. 41-46 constitute thus an esoteric parenthesis (or the beginning of such a parenthesis) in a discourse that is primarily philosophical — whose esoterism is recognized by its partial presentation and by the dissemination of occult teachings (YR ad 43, notably); symbolic correspondence between this section of the treatise — which describes the heart (hŗdaya), that is, ‘energy’, as well as the ‘seed of the heart’ (hŗdayābīja), that is, the mantra — and its place in the center of the treatise.

Vv. 47-50: self-proclamation of the ‘I’ as ultimate principle, on the model of the vedic ‘self-praise’ (ātmastuti).106 The realization of the absolute ‘I’ (aham), equally that of the yogin and that of the Lord, is characteristic of the ‘way of Śaṃbhu’ (śāṃbhavopāyā), defined, as well, as the ‘direct way’ (sākşādupāyā).107 In consequence, the first-person pronoun expresses the ‘undeniable’ (anapahavanīya, YR ad 47, 50) faculty of experience (or consciousness) present in all beings. This ‘I’, the mode of affirmation of the ‘Great Lord that is the Self of each person’ (svātmamaheśvara), reduces all the other modes of valid knowing (including revealed texts, Āgamas), to a position of externality and relativity (YR ad 50). 108 This self-praise of the ‘I’ ‘stamps the yogin in the way of Śaṃbhu’, as is said in Tantrāloka.109

On another level of interpretation, it is not the metaphysical principle of the ‘I’ that is solely at issue here, but the mantra as well, which represents that principle symbolically. Vv. 47-50 would in that case constitute a follow-up to the esoteric

105 See n. 865.106 I call it ahaṃstuti, ‘[self-]praise of the "I"’. Note that the first appearances of the key notion of the absolute "I" are to be found in YR’s commentary ad 6 (see n. 369), with the concept of ahantācamatkāra, and ad 8, with the concept of ahaṃpratīti, the cognitive experience of the ‘first person’ (see n. 397).107 See TĀ I 142.108 Cf. TĀ III 125b-127a, IV 212-218.109 See TĀ III 269: [...] sa evāsau śāṃbhavopāyamudritaḥ. The three principal traits of the śāṃbhavopāya are found in this PS’s ahaṃstuti, as they are set forth in Tantrāloka, along with the same stylistic usage of the first person; see TĀ III 280-281: matta evoditam idaṃ mayyeva pratibimbitam/ madabhinnam idaṃ ceti tridhopāyaḥ sa śāṃbhavaḥ// [...] sŗşţeḥ sthiteḥ saṃhŗteś ca tad etat sūtraņaṃ kŗtam/, ‘ "All this proceeds from me, is reflected in me, is inseparable from me". The way of Śaṃbhu is a triple one [...]. In this way follow one another emanation, maintenance, and reabsorption’. Cf. PS 48a: mayyeva bhāti viśvaṃ darpaņa iva nirmale [...]; 48b: mattaḥ prasarati sarvam [...]; 49b: sarvasmin aham eva sphurāmi [...], and YR ad 47-50: ‘[... the master] explains, using terms expressive of the pronoun "I", that Śiva is the very self of everything [that exists], that, being in evidence everywhere in virtue of being established first [as condition for everything else], he enjoins the creation and all that follows from it’.

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parenthesis of vv. 41-46, devoted to mantric practice and articulated in terms of the mantra. The mantra defined elsewhere as the ‘supreme great mantra’ (paramahāmantra), source of all the other mantras’ efficiency (vīryā), is thus in effect the counterpart, in the way of Śaṃbhu, of the mantra that pertains to the way of energy.

Vv. 51-59: the esoteric parenthesis is brief. From v. 51 onwards, we return to a properly philosophical account. At the very moment that knowledge is acquired (v. 51, ‘after overcoming the bewildering māyā ...’), the yogin is liberated. He is henceforth a ‘knower’ (jñānin, YR ad 51 [first occurrence]). After this sketch of the yogin in majesty as the ‘master of the Wheel of energies’ (v. 47), that is, of the yogin following the śāṃbhavopāya, we return to the depiction of the yogin in majesty according to the śāktopāya: the avataraņikā ad 51 places in the mouth of the yogin, at the moment of his awakening, the proclamation of ĪPK IV 12: ‘This might is all mine’. The portrait of the jīvanmukta presented in vv. 51-59 answers the implicit objection that the notion of ‘liberation while living’ is incompatible with the karmic destiny that must be attributed to the yogin in virtue of his incarnate state. The response is that subjection to the law of karman is the product of ‘faulty knowledge’. In consequence, the advent of ‘true knowledge’ suffices to free one from that law (53), without it being necessary to distinguish between acts dating from before the awakening and those posterior to it: in both cases, it is a question of detaching the consequence from the act, seen not as a momentary event, but as the setting in motion of a long process eventuating in its proper fruit (in Mīmāṃsaka terms, it is thus the apūrva, generated by the act and linking it with its fruit, that "disappears"). For him who has been consecrated ‘liberated while living’ by his awakening, those fruits in process of maturation (prārabdhakarman) are consumed by the fire of awakening itself (v. 55), while those set in motion after the awakening eventuate in no consequence, inasmuch as ‘awakening’ signifies the abolition of the desire for fruition (v. 56). The jñānin frees himself thus from all the modes of karmic realization (v. 58), the principal indicator and effect of which is his emancipation from all sorrow.

V. 60: this initial portrait of the ‘knower’ culminates in the Traika definition of liberation as ‘the manifestation of one’s own energies realized by cutting the knot of nescience’, in other words, as liberation while living — against a backdrop of "dualistic" definitions of liberation, rejected because they account only for liberation at death.

Vv. 61-67: less allusive mention, in the kārikās, of jīvanmukti — albeit via a periphrasis: ‘[...] he is liberated though still joined with his body’ (v. 61); sketch, in the commentary to 61, of a distinction between liberation in this life, jīvanmukti, and liberation at death, which later traditions, among them post-Śańkara Vedānta, will term videhamukti; reiteration of the principle underlying the notion of jīvanmukti: it is access to knowledge, that is, the recognition of one’s own self as the universal Self (or the Lord, or Pure Consciousness), that sets aside the negative effects of the law of karman, together with the fatality of transmigration (61-62). Vv. 63-66 respond to this apparent paradox by contesting the necessity of any convergence between a mechanistic application of the law of karman and the so-called fatality of reincarnation. Such "fatality" applies only to the embodied soul laboring under the control of nescience, which obliges him to act in view of a fruit or result. As soon as

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his nescience dissipates and his identity with the universal Self is recognized, the ‘knower’ — incarnate, as he is (at least in the eyes of others) — accedes to a state of ‘disincarnation’ (aśarīratva), synonym of liberation110 — responses that are hardly more than common places used by the commentator to further his demonstration. As proof that the benefit of an act may not pertain to the agent, v. 67, borrowing from ordinary experience, proposes the grammatical example of the verb yaj- ‘to sacrifice’, which, when inflected in the middle voice (yajate), implies that the yajamāna, the patron of the sacrifice, is its beneficiary, but, when inflected in the active voice (yajati), implies that the yājaka, the officiating priest, acts without acquiring that particular benefit which belongs to his patron. The yājaka thus becomes a metaphor for the man ‘liberated while living’.

Vv. 68-73: exonerated henceforth from the corruption of his acts, the jīvanmukta can now be described in the light of the very acts that compose his daily life — indifferent to the injunctions and prohibitions that are the meat of the ordinary man, appearing to others not unlike a madman, wandering hither and yon, so deviant is he from the usual standard (71). His rituals of consecration are interior, metaphorical (68): the ‘knower’ makes oblation of his dualizing thoughts in the fire of his consciousness, fanned by the wind of meditative realization (bhāvanā) — the mention here of bhāvanā signals that the path taken by the ‘knower’, in this section of the Paramārthasāra, is that of ‘energy’. Regardless of the accidents that may affect his life and acts henceforth, the characteristic of the ‘knower’ is his purity (70), unalterable because innate.

Vv. 74-80: description of the mystic practice of the ‘knower’ devoted to the way of energy; metaphorical extensions of the inner-outer parallelism noted above: construction of the body as temple (devagŗha, 74); one’s own self as the divinity (devatā, 75); thought as oblation (havana, 76); unshakable awareness of the Ultimate as his own meditation (dhyāna, 77); contemplation of supreme ipseity as his silent (or whispered) recitation (japa, 78); surpassing of all duality as his vow (vrata, 79-80). The description of practice culminates with a characterization of the jīvanmukta as a Kāpālika (79-80) — although his vow, qualified as ‘otherworldly’ (alaukika) by Yogarāja, goes well beyond that of the ordinary kāpālika, whose practices are soiled by duality despite their terrifying rigor; pursuit of these images: the transmigratory world where abides the jīvanmukta is quite as terrifying as the burning-ground of the kāpālika; the symbolic khaţvāńga of the latter, a staff surmounted by a skull, becomes, literally, the body of the former; the kāpālika’s begging-bowl, in the form of a shard of skull, becomes the ‘shred’ of the knowable that sustains equally the jīvanmukta; the kāpālika’s liquor is the other’s ‘essence of the universe’. In sum, the jīvanmukta is ‘liberated’ because he is exempt from duality. Yogarāja concludes: ‘Such is the vow of him who has cultivated the lotus feet of a true teacher. Beyond that is nothing but the desiccation of the body’ — a comment that serves also to introduce a new motif (extensively developed in vv. 89-102), that death does not interrupt or modify the fact of liberation.

Vv. 81-88: new portrait of the jīvanmukta, again in quasi-philosophical terms (81): the commentary borrowing from the Sāṃkhyakārikā the famous image of the potter’s wheel (without however acknowledging the source [SK 67], which it cites

110 Cf. BSBh I 1, 4: aśarīratvaṃ mokşākhyam; See YR ad 63, 70, 72 (and n. 1062), 79-80 (and n. 1212).

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almost verbatim), the living body of the ‘knower’ is said there, like the potter’s wheel, to "spin" for some time after the last impulsion given to it by the potter. Here, the impulsion is the inertia provided by acts previously undertaken (prārabdhakarman), whose motion continues unrestrained: it explains why and how liberation occurs within this world;111 introduction of two new elements defining jīvanmukti (82): that the experience is blissful (that is, positively felicitous, not merely absent of sorrow), and that it is open to all, without ritual prerequisites — and therefore does not require the social ‘perfectioning’ (saṃskāra) implied in the caste system. In his commentary to v. 83, Yogarāja sketches the distinction between liberation in this life and liberation at death,112 and alludes to a theme that will be later developed (vv. 90-95): the significance of the yogin’s final moments for his already acquired liberation. The vanity of injunctions and prohibitions is again noted (83-84). A new objection is raised (avat. ad 85-86), which, while admitting the simultaneity of ‘knowledge’ and liberation, denies the possibility of continuing to ‘live in a body’, for this is necessarily polluting — liberation being possible, in other words, only at the moment of death. In response, it is pointed out (85-86) that ‘enlightenment’ implies the disappearance of the three impurities that are responsible for the soul’s finitude and transmigration. The persistence of a body does not compromise in any way the liberated status of the jīvanmukta — and his liberation is irreversible, established once and for all, according to the Śaiva maxim: sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam. A concession is made nevertheless to the adversary (YR ad 85-86): a gradation, or perhaps a sequencing, of two orders of liberation: liberation in this life, corresponding to the ‘Fourth state’ (turya), and liberation at death, corresponding to the ‘state beyond the Fourth’ (turyātīta).113

Vv. 89-95: theme of the irreversibility of liberation developed in detail. A paradoxical argument justifies this irreversibility by appealing to the law of karman — the same law that, for the ordinary man, condemns him to the fatality of transmigration. One becomes, in effect, that which one has always been — whether he be a bound soul (paśu) or a ‘knower’ (jñānin). No intervening accident, no unexpected shock is sufficient to deflect one from the destiny he has sought.114 Such

111 The notion of jīvanmukti itself represents in all likelihood an effort to resolve the dilemma thus posed: how can "fruits" of action be abolished at the moment of awakening, and yet the motion imposed on the body during the period before awakening continue until the death of the body? To affirm both is in a sense to claim that certain acts or manners of acting have no result, nor do they propose any goal (see PS 67). The figure of the potter and his wheel seems to exclude another possible resolution of this dilemma — that seemingly adopted by the Gītā and by Mahāyāna Buddhism — that the fruits of such acts can be conveyed to others, more worthy or capable of receiving them, Kŗşņa, in the former case, a bodhisattva in the latter. A ‘god’ is indeed a convenient adjunction to any such system of thought.112 ‘... in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (kevalata) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness [...]’.113 ‘This being the case, the [mind of the] knower of the Self (jñānī), while living (jīvann evā), is formed by the Fourth; and he transcends even that Fourth, once his body no longer exists’.114 ‘On the other hand, comments YR ad 89, when his body falls away, nothing at all befalls the man [viz., the jñānin] who has rehearsed no [acts engendering] latent dispositions; indeed, with whatever intention the cognizer rehearses (abhyasyati) [his actions], he becomes one with that [intention], and at the moment of death the object that he desires with clarity comes into evidence for the cognizer. In this way, there can be no reversal [or setting at naught]

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is the teaching of v. 89, which on its face seems to concern only the bound soul; it is the commentary that supplies the missing link with this śaivite interpretation of the law of karman. In virtue of this principle, the final agony of the ‘knower’, whatever disorder of mind or body may accompany it, does not bring into question his status as ‘liberated’ (90-95). One reading of v. 91 suggests the possibility of comparing the opacity of the ‘knower’s’ final moments to the condition of certain animals as they confront death (cf. the episode of gajendramokşa, for example, taken up by YR): the animal condition itself does not obstruct the state of liberation to which the animal may have been entitled.

Vv. 96-97: jīvanmukti is now philosophically established. One question remains: why are some aspirants, though genuinely desirous of liberation, not accorded their release in this life? In other words, how does one account for "gradations" or "degrees" of liberation — and sometimes even failures? The response, even though it may appear not entirely satisfactory, makes appeal to ‘divine grace’ in the form of a ‘descent of energy’ (śaktipāta): it is that ‘descent of energy’ of the Supreme Lord, unconditioned, unrestricted,115 and yet varied, that liberates. This apparent gradation of "descents" is of course correlated with the abilities of the aspirant, which notion would be difficult to see as anything but a restating of the question, rather than an "answer". In fact, a shift in point of view is in course: at the end of the treatise, it is solely Śiva’s perspective that is at issue — paramārthataḥ — in terms of which the perspective provided by the law of karman is merely instrumental, and ultimately to be cast aside, as mere vyavahāra, inasmuch as it is valid for the embodied agent, who acts only by proxy; the sole real agent is Śiva. The ‘descent of energy’ thus amounts to the acquisition (or ‘recognition’) of a ‘freedom’ that is one’s already — inasmuch as Śiva is here conceived as ‘freedom’ itself. Given the degrees of grace, one cannot escape the idea that different degrees of effort are also called for — on the part of different aspirants — and so the text, in these final sections, shifts from an emphasis on the jñānin to one on the yogin, he who is engaged in a ‘discipline’ (yoga) leading to emancipation. If the echo of the Gītā is clear, the term ‘yogin’ implies as well a reference to the Śaiva system of upāyas. A reading of vv. 96-97 — without any reference to the commentary — finds there easily a description of jīvanmukti and the three ‘ways’ capable of leading to it. In 96 is described an aspirant who, benefiting from a grace that is ‘very intense’ (atitīvra), follows the ‘way of Śaṃbhu’, the immediate or direct path to liberation, characterized through the analogy of copper changed alchemi-cally into gold by contact with mercury; such an aspirant accedes to final enlightenment, as it were, ‘effortlessly’ and in this life — the only mediation required being that of the teacher. V. 97 envisages an aspirant who has devoted himself to the sequential practices of the ‘way of energy’ (śāktopāya) — and probably, to the ‘way of the finite soul’ (āņavopāya). The element that is common to vv. 96-97 is their reference to a yogin who has or will have succeeded in his quest, who has acquired liberation in this life or will in the next.

(viparyaya) of the matters that have been rehearsed [throughout life], nor can anything not of the nature of previously rehearsed activity come into play in some unprecedented fashion (apūrvatvena). Thus, previous rehearsal (pūrvābhyāsa) is alone the cause [of] whatever [effect ensues]. This is the purport’.115 viśŗńkhala, as it is said in the avat. ad 9.

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Vv. 98-102 are devoted to a lengthy exposition of the unsuccessful aspirant, the aspirant who has ‘fallen from discipline’ (yogabhraşţa), typically, by an unexpected death that has interrupted his practice — and who thus sees his liberation deferred. Vv. 98-99 promise to such a one a residence in ‘divine worlds’ and a rebirth that is guaranteed to produce a salutary result. Not only is no effort wasted, but his practice is taken up at just the point it was interrupted. Vv. 100-102 describe an aspirant even more imperfect, whose practice has utterly failed, who has, for instance, failed to grasp what has been clearly explained to him. After a sojourn lasting even longer in the divine worlds, he too is promised an ultimate liberation, but only after a subsequent death. The source of the notion of the yogabhraşţa is doubtless the Gītā (VI 37-49), as Yogarāja notes ad 102. The notion, strangely enough, is largely absent in other texts of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir — with the single exception of TĀ XXXVII 65 (which uses the synonym yogacyuta while referring to Kŗşņa’s teaching apropos the yogabhraşţa) and Tantrālokaviveka ad loc, where the term yogabhraşţa figures in a citation of those very verses (viz., BhG VI 41b-43, in vol. VIII: 3713). Why this Paramārthasāra’s remarkable and quite detailed exception? In part, the answer must lie in the fact that Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra is the rewriting of an extra-Śaiva text, the Ādiśeşa’s Paramārthasāra, of which the last verses (vv. 84-86) have been reproduced quasi verbatim in Abhinavagupta’s verses 100-102 — preceding which, however, comes a preamble that refers, even though covertly, to the Traika notion of the three ‘ways’ (vv. 96-97) and supplies a philosophical foundation for the notion of the yogabhraşţa (vv. 98-99). This brings into focus, perhaps, the strategy of rewriting at issue here, where sometimes fidelity and coherence must be reconciled somewhat loosely. This borrowing from the older text does serve Abhinavagupta, however, in facilitating his claim that liberation is universally accessible — witness the vibrant plea of Yogarāja in favor of the effort to obtain liberation (103).

V. 103: This verse contains the "moral" to be derived from vv. 96-102, which is that of the entire treatise: every effort bears fruit, provided that it be sincere; liberation is certain, be it now or later. Neither must the aspirant fear presumption: not only is his effort promised success, but it is legitimate.

Vv. 104-105: As expected at the end of a treatise like the Paramārthasāra, v. 104 returns to the text itself and its author, and finds an additional reason to believe in the inevitability of liberation: it is even more certain now that it has been explained in the best of all possible treatises, namely, the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta. V. 105 goes even further, celebrating the work for its concision, and the author for his authority, conferred by the unequalled splendor of his mystical realization, in which he is likened to none other than Maheśvara himself.

2.3. Sketch of the doctrineOn the model of a doctrine that places in tandem servitude and emancipation, the text of the Paramārthasāra is constructed dialectically: to verse 24, which describes the installation of impurities, corresponds verse 57, which contemplates their abolition;116

to verses 4-5, which introduce the motif of the ‘sheaths’ or ‘envelopes’ (aņḍa), whose unfurling causes finitude, correspond verses 41-46, which describe the manner in which mantric practice proceeds to their being stowed away; to verses 30-31, which

116 Theme taken up again at vv. 85-88.[36]

set forth the notion of twofold error, correspond verses 39-40, which consecrate its eradication; verse 15, which defines māyā, is reflected in verse 51, which makes māyā’s dissipation the precondition of liberation.

In effect, finitude and liberation are nothing but appearances, have no "reality" apart from worldly convention and linguistic usage.117 To the extent that Śiva’s game brings them into play, they assume alternating roles, endlessly, in a world that has no other destiny than transmigration, subject only to Śiva’s will: ‘Thus does the Supreme Śiva extend [within our sphere] his play [made] wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation’.118

On the level of ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ), in contrast, there exist neither servitude nor emancipation — just sovereign freedom, which is manifest in the play of the god, who is pleased sometimes to conceal himself, sometimes to reveal himself, rhythmically, in accordance with his two ‘energies’ (śakti), that of obscuration (tirodhānaśakti) and that of his grace or favor (anugrahaśakti).119

Everything, in this system of thought, extending even to notions and entities of little value, is a product of an ‘energy’ of the god. The doctrine is well suited then to the needs of the mumukşu, the acolyte aspiring to emancipation, for it accords him assurance that he will reach his goal: even in the sphere of finite interests, there is nothing set in stone, nothing irremediable — even finitude itself is finite.

In this sense, emancipation is defined not so much as a motivated effort to undo bondage, as it is a positive recognition (pratyabhijñā) that one is already free — if anything, the paradoxical acquisition of a freedom that one has never lost. Although this paradox is, in some way, common to most Indian radical monisms, this school affirms in particular that the recognition at issue takes the form of the ‘full deployment of one’s own energies’ (svātmaśaktivikasvaratā, YR ad v. 60). With the introduction of the notion of śakti, the Trika affirms both its doctrinal coherence (the other systems do not have recourse to such a notion in order to describe liberation) and its taste for paradox — a way to shore up a counterfactual view of the human condition. Liberation is freedom: in other words, there exists no liberation, but a freedom that plays at hiding itself.

At the heart of the doctrine, as we have seen, is the notion of jīvanmukti, ‘liberation [from life] while one yet lives’, the oxymoron par excellence — and scandalous as well for ordinary reasonable men, concerned, as all men should be, with executing their religious and ethical duties. The numerous objections to the notion point to that scandal, objections for the most part implicit in the texts themselves, but which the commentators delight in bringing out.

117 See YR ad 60: ‘In just this way, consciousness, [when] constricted by the limitations deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., is said to be "as if bound" (baddham iva); and similarly, once the bondage that consists of the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize has come to an end through the manifestation of the knowledge of one’s own nature, that same [consciousness] is said to be "as if liberated" (muktam iva), [since now it is] fully deployed through the discrimination of its own energies [of independence, etc.] [...]. Hence bondage as well as liberation are both essentially [functions of] conceit of self affecting the limited cognizer; it is not that any events of this sort [really] take place in the reality that is consciousness — the ultimate truth [of this system]’; see n. 1039.118 PS 33.119 See YR ad 60 and 69.

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The challenge that jīvanmukti represents as well for the Paramārthasāra itself can be ascertained subliminally in the polysemy of the work’s title, where paramārtha signifies not only ‘ultimate (parama) reality (or truth, artha)’, but (as the commentary to v. 104 at the end of the treatise somewhat belatedly reveals) ‘the highest (parama) of the four goals (artha, scil., puruşārtha) of human life’, namely emancipation (mokşa): ‘Now the author [Abhinavagupta] proceeds to sum up the purpose of the text, saying that "it alone is the teaching that serves as a means for realizing the highest among the goals of human life." ’

Likewise, in his commentary on the first verse, Yogarāja appears to descry a reference, albeit concealed, to jīvanmukti in the name ‘Śaṃbhu’, which he interprets etymologically as signifying ‘whose nature is unsurpassed felicity’120 — a not uncommon ploy, witness the similar readings of the name ‘Śańkara’ (cf. SpP 1 , quoted below). He continues: ‘With this summary sentence, which teaches that the supreme state to be attained is absorption in [what is already] one’s own essence, the teacher has stated in abbreviated form the purport of the text in its entirety’.

In this system, the only freedom to which one should aspire, is emancipation in this life121 — a notion that appears to follow from nondualism itself, if one understands by ‘emancipation’ going beyond the contraries and reintegration within the One: there is no reason why a person, in this world, should not be as free as is Śiva, for he is not-different from him, provided that he undertakes the real labor of recognizing that truth.122 The existential difficulty of becoming Śiva may be read, in effect, between the lines of the doctrine of the four upāyas — which doctrine includes, nevertheless, at least for a handful of individuals, either the possibility of the ‘non-means’ (anupāya), that is, the absence of all existential difficulty in realizing one’s own identity with Śiva; or that of the quasi-instantaneous ‘way of Śaṃbhu’.

Indeed, one has the sense that Kashmir Śaivism is one of the first systems to seek to justify doctrinally the notion of jīvanmukti. As such, the treatment of the notion and its representation as a philosophical issue constitute in their own way major contributions to the development of Indian thought.

The theme of abandoning karmic life is nearly as old as Indian civilization itself, and has given rise to a debate that is a persistent leitmotif of Indian intellectual history. The asperity of that debate might be due as much to a lingering suspicion that Brahmanism had already surrendered too much to Buddhist influence, as to the newly popular devotionalism and its reinvigorated sense of ritual, menaced by any abandoning of worldly life.

The menace represented by the abandonment of karmic life had been first manifest in the late-vedic critique of the efficacity of the sacrifice itself (see, for instance, MuU I 2, 10-11). That critique was at least partially disarmed by the notion of the four stages of life (āśramadharma), relegating saṃnyāsa to the end of life, well after the householder had fulfilled his ritual destiny (including the procreation of sons). In

120 anuttaraśreyaḥsvabhāva — or ‘[appropriation of] whose nature becomes [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal’.121 See SpP 1 [= ad 11, in the textual organization of SpN]: iha hi jīvanmuktataiva mokşaḥ.122 Concerning the conception of jīvanmukti in the Siddhānta, which is dualist at the time of the Kashmirian exegetes, see, especially, Brunner, Somaśaṃbhupaddhati [SŚP], vol. III: XIII, and TAK, s.v. jīvanmukta (vol. II: 275ff.).

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the same way, the ideal of liberation (mokşa) was superadded to the three "normal" goals of human life, corresponding to this new "extra-human" condition.

From a strictly philosophical point of view, the debates that are echoed in the Śaiva texts on the degrees of liberation relate to a narrower issue, rather more technical in nature: can liberation — accepted by nearly everyone at the time — be reconciled with karmic life, or must one wait for the end of life in order to accede thereto? That is, is the notion of jīvanmukti defensible?

Many scholars, Renou among them, have remarked on the Indian genius for synthesis, reconciliation — a spirit that refuses to regard any contradiction as final. In this sense, the tension between the life of the hermit and worldly life is not a recent phenomenon, nor a fatality — and the notion of jīvanmukti offers once again the opportunity to palliate it. The dynamism of Indian intellectual history depends in large part on that dialectic, where compromises have been numerous (and not all congenial to Western fashions of thought), such as the interiorization of complex external rites, the Brahmanico-Buddhist amalgam, the notion of the ‘guru’, both "free" and socially engaged.

The quarrel reflected in these Śaiva texts is thus far from original, but is nevertheless felt as irremediably crucial.

As far as the terms jīvanmukti/ºmukta are concerned, most modern interpreters consider them as relatively recent. To date, they have been noticed in several Advaita or Advaita-like texts of the epoch, such as the Yogavāsişţha (also it seems from Kashmir, and presenting several Śaiva traits), that some (including Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 231) would attribute to the ninth century; and the Ātmabodha, traditionally assigned to Śańkara himself — though erroneously, according to the same authorities.123

The terms figure as well in Śaiva texts of the same period, as I will attempt to show, but their more certain dating should not hide the fact that the idea of jīvanmukti had long ago found its way into the conceptual apparatus of monists (of whatever stripe) — it is there in the Gītā,124 as well as in some older upanişads,125 and recognized as such by Śańkara.126 Even its technical interpretation is there: are ‘free while alive’ those that "act" no more, but are obliged to live out their prārabdhakarman, because (as indicated by Śańkara and others) a karman once set in motion is not easily annulled.123 On the notion of jīvanmukti in the dvaitavedānta of Madhva (13th or 14th cent.), see R. Mesquita 2007.124 See notably Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 247.125 See n. 1405.126 See Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 246; Oberhammer 1994: 15. Prof. Raffaele Torella has kindly referred me to the epic usage of jīvanmukta, or rather jīvan... muktaḥ, to which Prof. Minoru Hara has devoted an article (1996). It is to be noted, however, that in the Epic the term does not occur as such, but rather as variations on a stock phrase, usually (in the MBh) in the negative: na me jīvan vimokşyase, ‘You will not escape from me alive’, a phrase which expresses only the hero’s determination not (na) to let his foe escape (muktaḥ) alive (jīvan) from the battle. The locution is found in the affirmative in the Harivaṃśa: jitaḥ ... jīvan muktaś ca vişņunā, ‘vanquished, he was released alive by Vişņu’. The context here is clearly not "mukti" (as it is later understood) but the very worldly issue of a kşatriya’s humiliation. M. Hara is of course justified in raising the question of the relationship between the philosophical and epic variants of the locution "jīvan muktaḥ"; it seems more appropriate, however, to see the two as distinct developments, different not only in context but in syntactic usage.

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Yet, the contribution of the vast śivaite literature to the debate on jīvanmukti cannot be ignored, as has been mainly the case, not only by modern scholarship (at least beyond the field of Śaiva studies),127 but also by later Indian tradition. In effect, one can say without exaggeration that the Śaiva authors give us one of the first more or less complete accounts of an idea that had taken root for some time in Indian absolutist thought — although they do not deviate from the commonly received opinion as concerns the general character and importance of liberation itself, as shown by their constant references to prior discussions of this issue, and most notably to the Gītā.

There is no doubt as to the soteriological orientation of the quasi-totality of developed Indian philosophical systems — be they monist or dualist, as the Sāṃkhya — but the novelty of the Trika’s approach lies in its viewing, indeed reevaluating, mukti in the light of its metaphysics, showing that, for instance, on the level of the absolute, there is no liberation, inasmuch as bondage exists only on the empirical level. A view with Mādhyamika overtones, it is true, but freed from the eristic and negative character of the latter — bondage itself being resolved in the absolute freedom of the Self, a state of dynamic plenitude (among other names, Trika confers upon itself that of pūrņatāvāda) that suffices to define liberation as freedom itself. Thus, the Trika organizes under the heading of a ‘doctrine of freedom’ (svātantryavāda) the elements of the immemorial dialog on the liberated man.

Another important emphasis of the Trika, perhaps even an innovation, is, as I have already indicated, its privileging the acquisition of jīvanmukti, even to the point of denigrating the older notion of ‘liberation at death’.128

Jayaratha, in his commentary on TĀ I 21— the concluding verse of the text’s introit — observes, in effect, that ‘the objective [of this treatise] is to confer emancipation in this life by recognizing the Self as such, by employing progressively such means as will be described in what follows’, and that this goal ‘although developed through the long sequence of verses that follow, is directly declared by the present verse (21), which begins with "Śriśaṃbhunātha" ‘.129

At the other extreme of the treatise, verses 32-33a of chapter XXXVII confirm: ‘This treatise [concerning the] Real, [wherein is declared] the essence of the Trika itself, is evidently to be taken up [and studied], providing as it does without great effort the supreme benefit that is emancipation in this life, and arranged in such a way as to convey the highest satisfactions just as desired’.130

Jayaratha (ad TĀ XXXVII 32-33a) does not fail to stress the coherence of the treatise on which he comments, by relating these verses to those of the first chapter: ‘Thus, [with the articulation of vv. 32-33a of ch. XXXVII] the main purpose of the work is accomplished, which had been set forth in [vv. 284b-286a of ch. I]: "The sage who continually occupies himself with [this work] of thirty-seven chapters will become an incarnate Bhairava; since he whose knowledge has been completed in 127 See Oberhammer 1994: 15, with reference to BhGBh VI 27: ‘Selon toute apparence, ce texte est la plus ancienne reference a la jīvanmuktiḥ et peut-etre le seul passage ou Śańkara emploie le terme technique de jīvanmukta’.128 See Utpalavaişņava’s exegesis, p. 41.129 TĀV I 21: vakşyamāņopāyakrameņa svātmatayā pratyabhijñānāj jīvanmuktipradatvaṃ prayojanaṃ ślokāntarāsūtritam api śrīśaṃbhunātha ityādiślokena sākşād uktam.130 TĀ XXXVII 32-33a: itthaṃ dadad anāyāsāj jīvanmuktimahāphalam/ yathepsitamahābhoga-dātŗtvena vyavasthitam// şaḍardhasāraṃ sacchāstram upādeyam idaṃ sphuţam//.

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[study of] these thirty-seven will become Bhairava, why should one be surprised when even finite creatures, by contemplation of him, attain to the state of Bhairava?" ’131 Recalling thus, in his commentary on verses 32-33 of the final chapter, the passage in the initial chapter where the jīvanmukta is described, along with his vocation of helping others on the same path, Jayaratha reaffirms that the theme of emancipation in this life is the thread of Ariadne stringing together the entire text — and I might add, the entire doctrine.

In effect, the key notions of the system — ‘grace’ (śaktipāta), the ‘means’ or ‘ways’ of liberation (upāya), the triad of ‘impurities’ (mala), to cite only a few — enter into its soteriological project. We learn, for instance, from the Tantrāloka’s treatment, and to a lesser extent, that of the Paramārthasāra, that jīvanmukti is accessible in the three inferior ‘ways’. Supporting this notion is the alchemical metaphor, which is one of the Trika’s favorite topoi.132 According to Yogarāja (ad 96) the process at work in attaining jīvanmukti by the quasi-instantaneous ‘way of Śaṃbhu’ is similar to that involved in transmuting copper into gold by means of mercury — viz., the paśu into Śiva by the ‘verbal transmission’ (āmnāya) of Śaiva doctrine. By āmnāya is here meant, somewhat atypically, the direct audition of the doctrine, arguably once only, from the mouth of the teacher. In TĀ V 151, that same analogy applies to jīvanmukti obtained by the ‘way of the finite soul’.

Still, the imperative of emancipation in this life is not limited to the Tantrāloka, nor to the phase of development of nondual Kashmiri Śaivism of which Abhinavagupta’s treatise is the summation. At the very beginning of his treatment, Abhinavagupta relies on the authority of various Āgamas on the question of emancipation, and particularly on that of emancipation in this life — notably, the Raurava, Svāyaṃbhuva, Matańga, etc. (I 46).133 The Niśāţana is cited in TĀ I 50-51 as positing in unambiguous terms the distinction between liberation at death and liberation in this life.134 In these same verses one can also detect a sketch of the notions of pauruşajñāna and bauddhajñāna, to which TĀ I 36ff. has just devoted a novel treatment: ‘He whose mind remains subject to dualizing thoughts becomes Śiva after the dissolution of the body; but the other [who is not so subject] becomes [Śiva] in this very life — such is the main teaching of the śāstra [viz., the Niśāţana]’.135 In

131 TAV XXXVII 32-33a: anena ca asya granthasya — iti saptādhikām enāṃ triṃśataṃ yaḥ sadā budhaḥ/ āhnikānāṃ samabhyasyet sa sākşād bhairavo bhavet// saptatriṃśatsu saṃpūrņabodho yad bhairavo bhavet/ kiṃ citram aņavo ‘py asya dŗśā bhairavatām iyuḥ — ityādinā upakrāntam eva mahāprayojanatvaṃ nirvāhitam//.132 ... which serves also to describe the two final ‘states’ (avastha), turya and turyātīta (see YR ad 96 and n. 1365).133 In the context of treating pauruşqjñāna and bauddhajñāna. On the dating of those texts, see below.134 Even though the terms jīvanmukti or jīvanmukta are not there found, JR ad I 50-51 is explicit: evaṃ vikalpo ‘tra sambhavan muktau vyavadhāyakaḥ iti na tadaiva muktiḥ, tasya punar asaṃbhave satyapi dehe muktiḥ, ‘Since dualizing thoughts, still possible, interpose themselves at the point of liberation, there is then no liberation; when they are no longer possible, there is liberation, even though the body exist’.135 TĀ I 50-51: vikalpayuktacittas tu piņḍapātāc chivaṃ vrajet/ itaras tu tadaiveti śāstrasyātra pradhānataḥ//. See also TĀV ad loc, which completes the citation: [...] vikalpahīnacittas tu hy ātmānaṃ śivam avyayam/ paśyate bhāvaśuddhyā yo jīvanmukto na saṃśayaḥ, ‘He who sees himself as the unchanging Śiva, his mind free of dualities, because his being is cleansed, is "freed while living"; of this there is no doubt’.

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TĀ XIV 44b-45, Abhinavagupta alludes again to this passage of the Niśāţana, which Jayaratha cites more elaborately, concluding: ‘Thus it has been demonstrated that liberation is only for the living whose mode of being lacks dualizing thought constructs; but, as for the rest, it will be when the body falls away’.136 Similarly, the passages TĀ IV 213-221a and 259-270 rely on the Mālinīvijayottaratantra, a supreme authority for the Trika, in order to develop their notion of jīvanmukti as obtained via the ‘way of energy’ — a ‘way’ that implies the interiorization of ritual (MVT XVIII 74-82, TĀ IV 212).

Again, reference is made, in the texts of this school, to other Tantras or Āgamas, notably the Svacchandatantra [SvT], the Mŗtyuñjit (or Netratantrā) [NT], the Kularatnamālā and the Kālikākrama, profusely cited by the Śivasūtravimarśinī (see n. 881) and the Spandanirņaya [SpN], works of Kşemarāja, who as well commented on the Svacchandatantra and the Netratantra. In some of these citations, the notion of jīvanmukti is explicitly formulated, notably: SvT VII 259a (in SpN II 6-7): [...] jīvann eva vimukto ‘sauyasyeyaṃ bhāvanā sadā// (see also Appendix 20, p. 345); SvT IV 398b (in ŚSV III 28): [...] dehaprāņasthito ‘py ātmā tadvallīyeta tatpade//; SvT X 372b (in ŚSV III 45): tatrastho ‘pi na badhyeta yato ‘tīva sunirmalaḥ//; and Kālikākrama (in ŚSV III 31): sarvaṃ śuddhaṃ nirālambhaṃ jñānaṃ svapratyayātmakam/ yaḥ paśyati sa muktātmā jīvann eva na saṃśayaḥ//, ‘He who sees all knowledge as pure, free of [external] support [viz., object], and having the nature of his own understanding, [is now such that] his self is liberated [or "has a liberated self”] while yet he lives. Of this there is no doubt’.

Here, a few remarks as to the dating of scriptural sources referred to by Abhinavagupta and his commentators in the context of jīvanmukti might be of some use.137 Sadyojyotis, who was active between 675 and 725 according to Sanderson 2006: 76, certainly knew the Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha, the Svāyaṃbhuvasūtrasaṃgraha and the Matańgapārameśvara, belonging to the Siddhānta canon. The last work is later than the fifth century AD, as Sanderson 2006: 78 also shows. We can also affirm with a fair amount of certainty that all these texts, as well as all other known scriptural sources, postdate the early layers of the Niśvāsa, which is probably the earliest of all known Tantras. Goodall and Isaacson (2007) have established 450-550 for the early Niśvāsa, thus 550 is a very likely terminus post quem for most of our sources (675 being the terminus ante quem).

The case of the Mālinīvijayottara is less straightforward, for Sadyojyotis’s references or allusions to it are not established beyond doubt.138 However, it is more likely than not that he indeed knew the Mālinīvijayottara, whose date can be tentatively established before 675 (and after 550). The Svacchanda, which is often considered relatively late,139 may also come from this period (sixth-seventh century). For the Mālinīvijayottara knows and claims to be based on the Siddhayogeśvarīmata, whose short recension declares itself to be an abridged Svacchanda.140 Since the

136 TĀV XIV 44b-45: evaṃ nirvikalpavŗttīnāṃ jīvatām eva muktir itareşāṃ tu dehapātānan-taram iti siddham (vol. V: 2438).137 I am grateful to Dr Judit Torzsok for detailed discussions on the subject.138 See Torzsok Siddhayogeśvarīmata [SYM]: 14 citing Sanderson.139 See Goodall: ‘Tentative sketch of a possible relative chronology of some early Tantric works and authors, principally of the Śaivasiddhānta’, 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, September 1-5, 2009.140 Torzsok SYM: 16 and 262.

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dating of the Mālinīvijayottara is itself problematic and the Siddhayogeśvarīmata survives only in its short recension, we are not on firm ground here. Nevertheless, both the Siddhayogeśvarīmata and its near contemporary, the Brahmayāmala, of the Vidyāpīţha canon, are likely to have been composed in or around the seventh century for various other reasons.141 The Brahmayāmala also includes transformations of the cult of Svacchandabhairava,142 which suggests again that the Svacchandatantra, the scripture of that cult, predates the Vidyāpīţha. As to the Netratantra, also referred to in the context of jīvanmukti by Kashmirian exegetes, Sanderson has concluded from iconographical evidence that it was composed between AD 700 and 850, probably toward the end of that period.143

Concerning the Niśāţana, the Kularatnamālā and the Kālikākrama,144 the dating of these texts has been discussed much less extensively than the above mentioned titles. Given their Kaula and Krama affiliations, they are likely to be later than the above listed works of the Siddhānta and the Vidyāpīţha,145 possibly going back only to the eighth century or later. In any case, they must predate the Kashmirian exegetes of the tenth.

This tentative dating of the relevant scriptural sources indicates that not only the idea, but also the very terms jīvanmukti, jīvanmukta, etc., were present at an early date in the Śaiva tradition.

The figure of the jīvanmukta is also present in the more easily datable texts of the Spanda and the Pratyabhijñā, all of which were composed within the span of one century, between 875 and 975.146

It is only hinted at in the Śivasūtra, particularly in the third section devoted (according to Kşemarāja’s exegesis) to the āņavopāya (III 9ff., III 18-45), and it is the text’s Vimarśinī that develops the idea, either through citations (notably Kālikākrama, in ŚSV III 31; see supra), or directly, as in III 42, which describes the state of the jīvanmukta.147

141 See especially Hatley 2007: 200ff., establishing the period of composition of the Brahmayāmala from the 6th to the 8th cent.142 Hatley 2007: 223.143 Sanderson 2004: 273-293.144 On the Kālikākrama, see Sanderson 2007: 369-370.145 On the Siddhānta and the Vidyāpīţha canons, see, esp., Sanderson 2007: 233-234.146 See Sanderson 2007: 411, 418.147 SSV III 42: śarīravŗttir vratam ityuktasūtrārthanītyā dalakalpe dehādau sthito ‘pi na tatpra-mātŗtāsaṃskāreņāpi spŗşţaḥ/ tad uktaṃ śrīkularatnamālāyāṃ yadā guruvaraḥ samyak kathayet tan na saṃśayaḥ/ muktas tenaiva kālena yantras [perhaps an aiśa form for yantram, which appears in other citations of the same verse: TĀ XIII 231b, XXXVI 29] tişţhati kevalam//, ‘In accordance with the sūtra "śarīravŗttir vratam" (Śivasūtra [ŚS] III 26) though he still exists in the body which is to him like a mere sheath, he is not touched even by a trace of [the conceit that this body is] the subject. It has been said in the Kularatnamālā: "When the excellent teacher teaches him correctly, he is undoubtedly liberated at that very moment; the ‘machine’ [viz., the body — the implicit image being that of the potter’s wheel] alone persists [viz., thereafter he inhabits a body merely moving like the revolving wheel of the potter]." ’ Cf. the readings of the second hemistich in YR ad 83: muktas tatraiva kāle ‘sau yantravat kevalaṃ vaset, and PM ad MM 66: tadaiva kila mukto ‘sauyatra tişţhati kevalam, and n. 1239.

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But the term itself is employed in the Spandakārikā (II 5).148 Even better, jīvanmukti is the real subject of the treatise, as both the SpP and the SpN emphasize, and the jīvanmukta is described in the manner of the śakticakreśvara, ‘Lord of the Wheel of energies’. The term, in its Kaula acceptation,149 figures both at the beginning and at the end of the treatise and is taken up also in v. 47 of the Paramārthasāra — as a way of reaffirming one of the fundamental traits of the doctrine: the inseparability of ‘energy’ and the ‘possessor of energy’ — śakti and śaktimat.

Utpalavaişņava observes that, in the first verse, jīvanmukti is betokened in the very name of the divinity ‘Śaṃkara’, ‘maker’ (kara-) of ‘felicity’ (śam-), this last understood as the equivalent of śreyas, ‘[ultimate] goal’, itself defined as enjoyment (bhoga) and release (apavarga).150 Utpalavaişņava continues by pointing out the major components of the expose of jīvanmukti: SpK 30 [= II 5, in the textual organization of SpN], 10 [= I 10] et 51 [= III 19]. To be precise, SpP 30 attacks dualistic conceptions of emancipation, which recognize only emancipation at death, as well as practices such as utkrānti that aim at achieving such a death.151

As well, Kşemarāja, in his explanation of the first and last verses, states that jīvanmukti is the goal of the Spandakārikā: ‘What is to be taught in this treatise is that absorption in the [Lord] has for its fruit liberation while living’ (ad I 1);152 and commenting on the cakreśvara of III 19, he observes: ‘Thus he becomes the Lord, that is, the Master, of the Wheel of energies described in the first sūtra. In other words, he attains the supreme sovereignty in this very body’.153

Finally, the notion of jīvanmukti is at play in ĪPK IV 12-16, and particularly in IV 12: ‘All this might is mine’,154 and in the treatise’s conclusion (IV 16), which Utpaladeva’s vŗtti glosses: ‘He who by applying himself intensely to this enters into the nature of Śiva, becomes in this very life a liberated soul’.155

148 SpK II 5: iti vā yasya saṃvittiḥ krīdātyenākhilaṃ jagat/ sa paśyan satataṃ yukto jīvanmukto na saṃśayaḥ //, 'Or he, who has this awareness, viewing the entire world as the play [of the Self], and constantly united [with it], is liberated while living; there is no doubt about it'.149 According to the Kaula, the śaktis are not yoginīs, as is the case in the Vidyāpīţha and in the Bhairava-tantras, but internal energies. See Sanderson 2007: 402-403; 1988: 679ff.150 SpP 1 [ad I 1, in the textual organization of SpN]: bhogāpavargākhyaṃ śaṃ śreyaḥ sukhaṃ vā karotiti śańkaraḥ / amalaḥ svasvabhāvo yaḥ prāgabhidheyatayopāttaḥ / iha hi jīvanmuktataiva mokşaḥ.151 SpP 30 [ = ad II 5]: ye tv āhuḥ vinotkrāntiṃ kuto mokşaḥ/ tannirāsāyāha — vinā svabhāvā-nubhavena puṃsaḥ kaivalyam utkrāntibalād yadi syāt/ atra ‘pi pakşe nanu mokşabhāg udbandhanaṃ yaḥ kurute pramūḍhaḥ//, ‘In order to refute those who maintain that liberation cannot be achieved without commiting ritual suicide, it is said "If one could achieve liberation by virtue of ritual suicide without experiencing one’s own true nature, then, from this point of view, would not the deluded one who hangs himself achieve liberation?" ’ On the notion, see YR ad 60 and n. 1031.152 SpN I 1: tatsamāveśa eva hi jīvanmuktiphala iha prakaraņa upadeśyaḥ.153 SpN III 19: tataś ca prathamasūtranirņītasya śakticakrasya [...] īśvaro ‘dhipatir bhavet/ anena ca dehena maheśvaratvam avapnoty eveti yāvat.154 sarvo mamāyaṃ vibhava iti, quoted by YR ad 33 and 51 (avat.).155 Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvŗtti [ĪPvŗ] IV 16: etatpariśīlanena śivatāveśāt jīvann eva mukto bhavati (tr. Torella ĪPK).

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Utpalavaişņava’s sarcastic dismissal of the yogic notion of utkrānti (relayed by YR ad 60) testifies also to the sharp debates that must have taken place on the question of jīvanmukti, not only in Śaiva precincts, but also among the Advaitins, as, for example, Śańkara ad BĀU IV 4, 6 makes clear. These debates proceed, in the first place, from the incredulity and skepticism that the notion arouses: given the iron law of karman, jīvanmukti offends common sense. The jīvanmukta is a walking paradox. And thus does the Paramārthasāra describe him as mad, a vagabond living a life of randomness — at least as the ordinary man sees him (vv. 69, 71). Both text and commentary are keen to stress that essential misunderstanding.156

Perhaps, as I have already indicated, resistance to the idea of jīvanmukti is related as well to its implied evicting of dharma from the system of values, or at least to paying it only an optional respect: ‘Whether he performs a hundred thousand horse sacrifices, or kills a hundred thousand brahmins, he who knows ultimate reality is not affected by merits or demerits. He is stainless’ (PS 70).157 The scandal would be greater had the Śaivas not found a way to defuse it by relativizing their rejection of conduct universally admitted. Such could be one of the implications of the famous maxim describing the Śaiva brahmin: ‘Kaula within, Śaiva without, Vedic for worldly affairs — like the coconut, the essential is kept within’,158 which is also a way of recalling the esoteric dimension of the doctrine. In the same spirit of reconciliation, Yogarāja (ad PS 40) refers to the pan-brahmanical authority of the Yājñavalkyasmŗti in order to distinguish between ordinary and supreme dharma. Whereas ordinary dharma consists of sacrifice, good conduct, and the like, ‘the supreme dharma is to see the Self through discipline’ (Yājñavalkyasmŗti I 8). Thus is the jīvanmukta justified in neglecting the lower dharma in pursuit of the higher one, that of his inner realization.

Alone among the texts of the system, it seems, the Tantrāloka develops, in the context of emancipation, the original doctrine of double-ignorance (I 36 ff.): ‘spiritual’ (pauruşājñānā) and ‘intellectual’ (bauddhājñānā) — and along with it its positive counterpart, the doctrine of double-awakening: ‘spiritual’ (pauruşajñānā) and ‘intellectual’ (bauddhajñānā). If the rationale for these concepts is present in the Śaiva Āgamas, the terminology, which presents overtones of the Sāṃkhya, seems to be a creation of the Tantrāloka. It is in this doctrinal context that appears the definition of jīvanmukti that figures as an epigraph to this introduction.159

The Paramārthasāra refers not to these symmetric pairings. One may infer, however, from the citations that Jayaratha makes of vv. 16b-17 of the Paramārthasāra, in his commentary on the passages of the Tantrāloka (ad I 39-40) that concern pauruşājñāna and bauddhājñāna, that these pairs correspond in the

156 See YR ad 83: ‘Moreover, by whom [else] can the last moment of the knower of the Self be directly experienced, apart from the witness (sākşin) that is his own experience? — On the strength of which [witness] one might posit the existence in him of consciousness or its opposite, inasmuch as "those who see horizontally" [viz., fettered subjects] are not privy to any such realm of experience? Therefore, in this matter, let the omniscient ones be asked [their opinion]’, as well as TĀ XXVII 319-320a and TĀV ad loc.157 See also TĀ IV 248-253.158 Quoted without attribution in TĀV IV 250: antaḥ kaulo bahiḥ śaivo lokācāre tu vaidikaḥ/ sāram ādāya tişţheta nārikelaphalaṃ yathā//; see also Sanderson 2007: 232.159 Tantrāloka I 44: bauddhajñānena tu yadā bauddham ajñānajŗmbhitam/ vilīyate tadājīvanmuktiḥ karatale sthitā//.

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Paramārthasāra to the conjoined placement of finitude and double error. The pauruşājñāna corresponds to the āņavamala, the impurity of deeming oneself finite, that is, the wholly deceitful ‘atomization’ of universal consciousness — itself the product of māyā (PS 15) — and to the constitution of the puruşa, finite (or mundane) man (PS 16a); the bauddhājñāna to the quintuple constriction of the kañcukas (PS 16b-17).

Still, the articulation of these notions in the Tantrāloka, and the rigor with which they are argued, constitute a singular contribution to their understanding. When spiritual ignorance, the metaphysical ignorance proper to incarnate man consisting in mistaking the Self for the non-Self, is dissolved by initation (dīkşā), that is, by ritual, there subsists still an intellectual ignorance, marked by the unleashing of ‘dichotomous thinking’ (vikalpa). In consequence, spiritual ignorance by itself can be an instrument of liberation only at death, when the body (and so the buddhi, locus of vikalpa) is no more. On the other hand, when intellectual ignorance, consisting in mistaking the non-Self for the Self, is abolished by the study of the treatises and practices that they teach, this does not suffice for attaining emancipation in this life, nor in the following. It is spiritual knowledge, accompanied by (or preceded by) intellectual knowledge, that is the instrument of liberation in this life. In any case, it is intellectual knowledge that is decisive for determining whether or not one reaches enlightenment in this life.160 By pauruşajñāna, in effect, the paśu-puruşa is delivered in essence, but, existentially, continues under the domination of his ‘dualizing thoughts’.

Apart from the fact that these arguments seal the alliance of ritual and gnosis, they confirm that jīvanmukti is nothing else than the reconciliation of the plans of essence and existence.

For its part, the Paramārthasāra — at least as YR ad 85-86 reads it — introduces a correspondence unknown to the Tantrāloka, which is established between the two kinds of liberation — seemingly "consecutive": that obtained while living and that secured at death — and the two final ‘states of consciousness’ (avasthā), the ‘Fourth’ (turya) and ‘Trans-Fourth’ (turyātīta)161— the latter appearing as a Śaiva innovation.162 From the moment the ‘state of liberation’ (mokşa) found a home in life existential (jīvanmukti), the insertion of the latter in the pan-Indian schema of the four states, and its designation there as the ‘fourth’ obliged the promotion of the old ‘fourth’ — ‘liberation’ universally understood as ‘liberation at death’ — to a ‘fifth’,

160 See TĀ I 45: dīkşāpi bauddhavijñānapūrvā saţyaṃ vimocikā/ tena tatrāpi bauddhasya jñā-nasyāsti pradhānatā// and TĀV, avat. ad I 44: nanu yady evaṃ dīkşayā dehānta eva muktir bhavet, tat kathaṃ "jīvann eva vimukto ‘sau" ityādy uktam ity āśańkyāha/.161 A correspondence already sketched in ŚSV III 25 and ŚS III 41. See also YR ad 61: ‘And he whose [ignorance] is destroyed, even while remains a rapport with the body, is at that very moment liberated (muktaḥ), though he still lives (jīvann eva). It is not that bondage involves necessarily a connection with a body. The removal of that ignorance is liberation. However [it may be added that], with the perishing of the body, complete (pūrņa) liberation is attained’, and ad 83: ‘ "He goes to a condition of transcendent Isolation" (kaivalya) [viz., reaches ‘separation’ from the limited world of bondage] through knowledge of the Self alone; that is, in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness] (turyātītarūpāṃ kevalatāṃ yāti), composed solely of blissful consciousness’.162 The term appears in some late upanişads of tantric coloration.

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or rather to a ‘Trans-Fourth’, position in the hierarchy of states having no name of its own, yet retaining something of its previous status.163

As mentioned above, the term itself (jīvanmukti, or jīvanmukta) makes some of its first appearances in tantric texts, whose aim was, among other things, to supersede the orthodox ritual system. As Sanderson (1995: 25ff. and 1988: 660ff.) shows, tantric doctrine and ritual attempted to demonstrate their superiority compared to orthopraxy in several ways, which included that tantrism presented itself as a more efficient means to the same end: on the whole, it proposed to liberate one through tantric initiation (even if liberation was not immediately fully effective). This meant that the average initiate could be considered liberated already in this life and did not need to make any particular effort for the attainment of mokşa subsequently. Therefore it is not surprising that the term and the concept of jīvanmukti were not unknown to the early tantric tradition.

However, when nondualist Kashmirian exegetes make use of this notion, they tend to do so from the Kaula point of view, which is anti-ritualist.164 Consequently, one is liberated in this world through internal realization, and ultimately through knowledge, rather than through ritual action. The jīvanmukta is a jñānin. This kind of liberation in life was in turn seen by proponents of the orthodox brahmanical religion as a paradox, and it is on their behalf that avat. ad PS 85-86 asks the following question: ‘How can one continue to act after enlightenment, without accumulating further consequences of those acts? In effect, liberation is possible only at the moment of death’.

The fact that tantrism proposed more efficient means of liberation did not imply that arguments of the brahmanical orthodoxy were refused by Kashmirian exegetes. The Trika, as set forth by the Paramārthasāra and its commentary, employs a rather virtuoso strategy that uses the law of karman in order to subvert that same law. And so the last portion of our text, from v. 89 onwards, multiplies references to the properly Mīmāṃsaka notion of apūrva165 in arguments intended to establish not only the possibility of jīvanmukti, but its very legitimacy.

In parallel, the Trika is not loath to invoke authorities (pramāņa) outside its own tradition,166 though, to be fair, its readings are usually favorable to its own theses. In the first place, the Bhagavadgītā, whose omnipresence in Yogarāja’s commentary and in other texts of the system is perhaps intended chiefly to affirm how the this-worldly ascesis167 recommended by the Gītā is, in fact, this-worldly liberation.

Similarly, several indices furnished by the Paramārthasāra and its commentary permit apprehension of the relation of inheritance that Trika sustains with Sāṃkhya on the question of liberation: the commentary to PS 81 (which paraphrases without attribution SK 67) and 83, where we find mention of the potter’s wheel; the reutilization of Sāṃkhya notions of kaivalya (at v. 83, itself the reprise of ĀPS 81)

163 See also YR ad 35.164 See p. 51. On the Kaula developments in general and their importance in the exegetical tradition, see Sanderson 1988: 692ff.165 See p. 29. Compare the transformation of the Mīmāṃsaka notion of bhāvanā, ‘efficient force’ (PS 63) into the Traika notion of bhāvanā, ‘meditative realization’ (PS 41, 52, 68).166 For instance, the Śaiva Āgamas, such as the Triśirobhairava (cited TĀ XXVIII 320b-324a), and the Gītā (cited TĀ XXVIII 324b, and 325-326a) are put on the same level.167 This is an attempt to translate into English the formula: ‘ascese intra-mondaine’, coined by Hulin (2001: 268) apropos the BhG.

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and of apavarga (YR ad 33); the important role assigned to the antaḥkaraņa in the process of liberation (YR ad 90-91, 92-93); the citation of SK 44 by YR ad 92-93.

It is true that Sāṃkhya and Trika start from the same postulate: liberation is not accessible by ritual (SK 1), but rather by discriminating knowledge (vijñāna, SK 2). There comes to the surface, in the usage that the Paramārthasāra makes of these Sāṃkhya notions, a Traika rereading of Sāṃkhya doctrine according to which the notion of jīvanmukti, or at least a type of this-worldly release that has not yet received that name, is already germinating in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, in re vv. 67-68.168 As such, the Trika proposes an interpretation of SK 67 that is not all that distant from that of Gauḍapāda.169 The Gauḍapādīyabhāşya [GBh] on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, in effect, brings out the dynamic organization of the ensemble constituted by vv. 67-68: contrasting the ‘incarnate’ state of v. 67 with the ‘disincarnate’ state of v. 68 (prāpte śarīrabhede) — life and death in effect. Moreover, the liberation that occurs ‘when the body falls away’ (GBh 67: śarīrapāte) is the liberation that v. 68 terms kaivalya, described as ‘total’ (aikāntika), that is, according to the Gauḍapādīyabhāşya, ‘necessary’ (avaśya), and ‘definitive’ (ātyantika), or ‘which encounters no obstacle’ (anantarhita) — the principal obstacle being the body, which no longer, in any way shape or form, afflicts the spirit, now liberated, of the departed. In sum, v. 67 refers to jīvanmukti, v. 68 to kaivalya, ‘absolute’ liberation, in the etymological sense of ‘ab-solvo’, ‘loosen from’.

The Trika pretends however to ignore the appropriation of this gradation by the Advaita inspired by Śańkara. At the very most, one notices, especially in Yogarāja’s commentary, the vedāntic idea of aśarīratva, the ‘disincarnation’ that characterizes the jīvanmukta in that he ceases to confuse his body with the Self.170

Another element of the definition of ‘liberation’ that Trika shares with Advaita, and which dissociates it from Sāṃkhya, is the notion of ‘felicity’ (ānanda) that accompanies the experience of liberation. That Sāṃkhya has ignored this ‘felicity’ is a reproach made by Śańkara ad BĀU III 9, 28, 7: ‘Some, like the partisans of Sāṃkhya or Vaiśeşika, opine that in liberation, one tastes no kind of joy’. The Trika does not confront Sāṃkhya directly on this point, but never ceases to stress the aspect of ‘felicity’, associating with it an aspect of experience that is absent from advaitic

168 A rereading implicit in YR’s borrowing from SK 67, while commenting on the paradoxical condition of the jīvanmukta, as described by PS 81. This Traika rereading of liberation according to Sāṃkhya appears equally in the TĀ, notably in IV 212, which associates explicitly the notion of kaivalya with that of jīvanmukti, and in XXVIII 307-320 and TĀV ad loc. (in particular, ad 317, which cites also SK 67). Hiriyanna (1995: 116, and 1993: 297) finds as well allusion to the notion of jīvanmukti in SK 67-68.169 Probably not the Gauḍapāda, author of the Āgamaśāstra; see Frauwallner 1973: 226; Larson 1998: 148-149.170 See p. 27, as well as YR ad 63, 70, 79-80 (and n. 1212), and 85-86: ‘The corporeal sheath is effective only so long as a relation with the sheaths of the [three] impurities [...] that arise from ignorance exists. But since the sheath created by ignorance has already been destroyed by [the guru’s] instruction regarding knowledge of one’s own [true] Self, how can any such corporeal sheath, [even] moribund, effect any control over the knower of the true Self at the end?’ The idea of aśarīratva culminates in the idea (which is as well an experience) that the universe becomes, as it were, the permanent body (svāńgakalpa) of the yogin now freed from his transitory body; see, esp., YR ad 87-88.

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arguments: the ‘marvelous’ (camatkāra), a notion that Śaiva metaphysics shares with Śaiva aesthetics.171

Whatever may be the case with these similarities and differences, the Trika develops an original doctrine regarding liberation, of which a singular trait is the postulate that liberation in this life is inconceivable in the absence of the Lord’s grace, described here as a ‘descent of energy’ (śaktipāta). It is this subordination of liberation to ‘grace’ that, according to TĀ XIII 276b-279a, constitutes the superiority of the Śaiva path in relation to other systems. As Andre Padoux observes, ‘[... la grace] determine la voie parcourue, le maitre rencontre, l’initiation recue et jusqu’au systeme religieux auquel on accorde sa foi’.172

From this point of view, Trika may be considered as a "mystique of grace". In this vein, the Paramārthasāra proposes at the very beginning (v. 9) that the key to the system is Śiva’s grace (śivaśaktipātā).173 Even if that mystique resonates perfectly with the emotional effusion proper to bhakti — an experience that is omnipresent in Trika literature174 — it is still subject to reasoning and to argumentation. We observe in effect an attempt to theorize that mystique of grace, which not only adduces a complex hierarchization of its "degrees", set forth in ch. XIII of Tantrāloka,175 but also establishes correspondences with the doctrine of the ‘means’ or ‘ways’ (upāyā) of liberation. The progressive extenuation of grace is reflected, in effect, in the descending hierarchy of the ‘means’ — distinctions, of course, as we have seen, that apply only at the mundane level.176 As the first five chapters of the Tantrāloka affirm, the ‘ways’ of liberation are themselves subordinated to the degree of grace accorded to the adept — in other words, to his relative capacity of receiving that grace.177

Such a conception of grace implies for the Trika the abandonment of social and ritual requisites, measured in terms of the acquisition of merit and demerit. No

171 See p. 55.172 Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 47. Others have seen, in other contexts, systems setting forth the dispensation of grace on the part of a merciful god; for instance, Hiriyanna (1995: 412-413), apropos the doctrine of Rāmānuja: ‘The word (viz., prapatti) points to a belief that salvation is obtained through free grace. It is described as śaraņāgati, flinging oneself on God’s compassion [...]. In one of its forms described as ‘resignation in extreme distress’ (ārta-prapatti), it is believed to bring liberation immediately. A single moment of seriousness and sincerity is considered enough [...]’.173 Which motif is taken up again by YR, notably ad 18: ‘When the bound soul becomes of purified heart, due to the Supreme Lord’s grace, then the veil of sheaths that afflict us with finitude spontaneously disappears, on account of the coming into being of the knowledge of one’s own Self (svātmajñāna) [consisting in the insight:] "I am myself the Great Lord." ’174 See, for instance, YR ad 94-95, 100-101, as well as the rich stotra literature.175 See Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 44-47.176 On the doctrine of the upāyas, see n. 858. For the manner in which a practice engenders a practice associated wifh the immediately inferior path, or another practice of the same path, see TĀ V 155b-157. The process is comparable to the unfolding of the tattvas, and like it, is reversible. The yogin who is not accorded a ‘very intense’ grace (alone associated with the anupāya), may raise himself from one path to the next, seen as levels — from meditation to bhāvanā, for instance, and, as TĀ III 174 says, from bhāvanā to the experience of the ‘I’, characteristic of the śāṃbhavopāya. See also the general avat. ad PS 41-46.177 See YR ad 96; also TĀ V 158a.

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particular ‘qualification’ (adhikāra) is postulated: access to jīvanmukti is thus open to everyone, if only he make a sustained effort in that direction.178

It is thus clear that the Paramārthasāra articulates the quasi-totality of the doctrine it seeks to abridge around its defense and characterization of liberation. But this project is not without its costs, as certain accents are displaced that are required in order to establish the coherence of the work. On the one hand, an emphasis is put on the notion of the aņḍas (vv. 4-5, 23, 41, 46); on the other, reference to the theory of the ‘word’ remains mostly implicit (vv. 10-11),179 as is the treatment of the upāyas — a notion that became so important in Abhinavagupta’s syncretistic exegesis,180 that Kşemarāja divides the text of the Śivasūtra into three parts organized in terms of the three inferior upāyas.

As I have attempted to show in examining the arrangement of the Paramārthasāra text, these three ‘ways’ are there alluded to, though not explicitly designated, with the exception of the avat. ad 41-46, which mentions the ‘way of Śaṃbhu’ (or the ‘condition of Śaṃbhu’, śāṃbhavapada) and that ‘of energy’ (śāktabhūmikā).181 This confusion of boundaries between the ‘ways’ perhaps signifies by indirection their porosity — a porosity of practices proper to each of the ways, and especially, their porosity of essence. For, as the Tantrāloka insists, in the last analysis, little matters the way; it is the end that counts182 — namely, absorption in Śiva (or in the Self),183

that is, liberation itself. Indeed, it is to liberation in this life that lead the three inferior ways, for, in the ‘non-way’ (anupāya), there is neither servitude nor liberation (TĀ III 273).

For this reason, all the ways have a degree of legitimacy. Whether one enters without delay into one of the two superior ways (anupāya, śāṃbhavopāya), thanks to a spectacular ‘descent’ of grace that makes any further mediation unnecessary or useless,184 or whether one raises himself progressively from one way to the next (excluding, of course, the ‘non-way’), each way is instrumental either as such or as transitional, in virtue of a functional hierarchy that is, however, not a hierarchy of value. In effect, even the lowest way, that of the finite soul (āņavopāya) is not without value. Apart from the fact that Abhinavagupta says that he was himself

178 YR ad 103: ‘Therefore, it is shown by the words "whosoever engages in this very beautiful path" — that is, in the path leading to the most excellent [form of] liberation — that there is no restriction of qualification [on such practice]’.179 It is YR who makes it explicit.180 As A. Sanderson (1983: 160) observes: ‘The upāyas [...] out of their humble origin in the Malīnīvijayottaratantra (2.21-23) [...] had become in his [AG’s] exegesis the defining core of his entire system, more than a thousand verses being devoted to their definition in his Tantrāloka’; see n. 858.181 See n. 865. Note that, according to YR’s commentary, PS 96 alludes to the śāṃbhavopāya: ‘The acquisition of the knowledge of one’s own Self has for its unique means (upāyā) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as silent recitation, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord’s] power of causal constraint, are ineffectual as means’, whereas PS 97 implies a reference to the two other ways: the śāktopāya and the āņavopāya (see n. 1376).182 TĀ III 293, IV 273-275a, V 153b-155a.183 See TĀ V 151: [...] tādātmyaṃ yāty ananyadhīḥ/ śivena hematāṃ yadvat tāmraṃ sūtena vedhitam//.184 See TĀ I 58a as well as PS 96 and YR ad loc.

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initiated into that way by his master Śaṃbhunātha,185 it emerges from the organization of the Tantrāloka itself that the treatment of the āņavopāya is not confined to the fifth chapter, but is prolonged well beyond that, even to the final chapter.186 In the last analysis, the differentiation of the various ways is not very significant, in the sense that ‘everything is Śiva’.187 That is why the motif of jīvanmukti is associated with the three inferior ways in the chapters of the Tantrāloka devoted to them, whereas it is absent from the chapter devoted to the anupāya.

Another indication of the porosity of the ways and their partial overlapping is the reciprocity of yogic and mystic practices. In effect, the same practices postulate different modes of realization according to the way in which they are put into effect. Thus are present in the three ways mantric practice,188 kuņḍalinī (also utilized considerably in the āņavopāyā),189 and meditation on the Wheel of energies,190

whereas mudrās are shared by the śāktopāya (TĀ IV 194-211) and the āņavopāya (TĀ V 79-85). In this sense, the ‘ways’ are so many ‘approaches’ to or specific points of view on the same content of experience. Texts like the Vijñānabhairava [VBh] show how, within the confines of the same practice, the yogin raises himself from one means to another. So does the commentary on PS 41-46 (avat.).191

Still, though perhaps covertly, the Paramārthasāra privileges, it would seem, the point of view of the śāktopāya (or jñānopāya, ‘way of knowledge’), which allows in principle a certain plurality of practice, though one practice suffices.192 This is one of the matters in which the śāktopāya is distinguished from the āņavopāya, in which a plurality of practices is of the essence, associated with an intense sensory activity. Among the indications corroborating that interpretation: the emphasis placed on

185 At least into two practices typical of that path, namely, reflection on the Wheel of energies, and raising the energy of breath (TĀ V 41, 50b-52).186 See TĀ I 231 and Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 31.187 TĀ IV 273-375a.188 See, respectively, TĀ III 200b-208a, 223b-225 (which cites Siddhayogeśvarīmata), on the mantra ________; IV 181b-193 (________ and ________); V 54-100 (________); V 131b-155a (________ and others).189 In the context of a complex practice associated with raising the energy of breath (V 43-53), with the uccāra of ________ (V 54-70 and 141-145), with the fusion proper to sexual union (V 70-74), and with mudrās (V 79-85); vv. 86-95, a citation from Triśirobhairava, again evoke it, as well as V 100b-128a, where it is again associated with sexual practice. For the kuņḍalinī in the śāṃbhavopāya, see TĀ III 137b-141a (which cites Triśirobhairava), and III 220-223a (which cites Siddhayogeśvarīmata), where it is described as phonemic energy, and identical with the totality of word (vāc). In the śāktopāya, the kuņḍalinī is merely alluded to, in a citation from Yogasaṃcāratantra (TĀ IV 136-144) which evokes the kuţilā, the ‘coiled [serpent]’ (IV142), in its association with sexual practice (see Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 230), and with the practice of haṃsoccāra (IV 135-136). Similarly JR apprehends, sub IV 153-157, a reference to the saṃhārakuņḍalinī, and, sub IV 200, a reference to the moment where the kuņḍalinī arrives at the form of mystic drunkenness which is its culmination.190 See TĀ III 248a-267, IV122b-147, TĀ V 26b-42.191 See VBh 28-31, for instance, and TĀ XXXIV 2, quoted n. 868.192 Similarly, according to ŚSV III 4, the śāktopāya is the principal focus of the SpK: iti śrīpūrvaśāstre dhyānādi eva āņavatvena uktam/ etac ca sthūlatvāt śāktopāyaprakaśātmani spandaśāstre na saṃgŗhītam, ‘In the Śrīpūrvaśāstra [viz., the MVT] meditation, etc., are spoken of only in relation to the finite soul [viz., to the way of the finite soul]; they, because of their gross character, are not referenced in this Spandaśāstra, which is devoted to the exposition of the way of energy’.

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‘knowledge’ (jñāna) and on the ‘knower’ (jñānin), as well as the importance attributed to the notion of bhāvanā (not present in the two superior ways).193

On the other hand, the mantric practice that Yogarāja discerns in vv. 41-46 is that prescribed by the śāktopāya:194 not only does he apprehend, in the adjectives śāntam and amŗtam of v. 43, an occult reference to the mantra,195 which evokes Parā, the divinity proper to the śāktopāya, but he emphasizes the effectiveness (vīrya) of mantras in general (avat. ad 41) — one of the main themes of the śāktopāya. An effectiveness that is not merely a function of correct enunciation, but presupposes the in-teriorization of a mystic realization. The yogin engaged on the ‘way of energy’ identifies, not with the divinity that the mantra expresses, as is the case with the Siddhānta, but with ‘the universal sense of the mantra’ (mantrārthasārvātmya, TĀ IV 258b-259a). In other words, for this yogin, the mantra is not a simple formula for ritual usage, but represents ultimate reality itself.196

Mantric practice and bhāvanā have as their consequence conversion of a discursive mode of thought into an intuitive and non-discursive awareness focused (if that is the word) on ultimate reality, an awareness of ‘difference-and-non-difference’ (bhedābheda).197 Mantric practice and bhāvanā concern the interiorized sacrifice (antaryāga), drawn from the Kaula tradition, which itself involves the promise of liberation in this life.198 This ‘interiorized sacrifice’ — touted by the śāktopāya199 — defies description and is never better portrayed than by analogy. Thus, as I have already shown, vv. 74-80 of the Paramārthasāra transform the procedures of the "mundane" ritual metaphorically into their interiorized counterparts — in other words, transform practices proper to the āņavopāya into those suitable to the śāktopāya.200 Vv. 79-80 are particularly exemplary of this, to the extent that Yogarāja evokes the figure of the Kāpālika ascetic in order to oppose to him the figure of the jīvanmukta Traika. This also shows how the Trika of the exegetes has been able to integrate, while domesticating and purifying, the older tradition of the Kāpālikas, which reserved the most extreme practices to its virtuosi (vīra). The gloss of Yogarāja illustrates this clearly: the ascetic who follows the Trika path is as worthy, or perhaps even more worthy, of the title of vīra, for he observes an other-wordly vow, whereas the Kāpālika’s is merely mundane.

The privileged place accorded to the śāktopāya in the Paramārthasāra derives as well from the fact that it is presented there as ‘easier’. Such is the teaching of TĀ IV 257b-258a: ‘[The Siddhānta recommends], in order to identify [with Śiva], giving oneself up to restrictive practices such as wearing the topknot. The Kula prescribes their abandonment, for it teaches an easy way’, or of PS 76: ‘For him who is engaged in offering into the blazing fire of consciousness all the great seeds of difference [that blossom forth] on the presupposition of inner versus outer, the oblation is made

193 See PS 41 and n. 858. On bhāvanā, see also Appendix 20, p. 345.194 In fact, mantric practice is the principal characteristic of the śāktopāya.195 _______ is, in effect, that mantra whose initial is SA- (or S-), and it is designated as the amŗtabīja; see YR ad loc.196 As taught also in ŚS II 1 (cittaṃ mantraḥ) and SpK II 1-2 (quoted in ŚSV II 1 and II 3).197 On this notion, see PS 12-13 (and its commentary), as well as avat. ad PS 41 and 46.198 See TĀ IV 211 (antaryāga) and 212 (description of the jīvanmukta).199 See TĀ IV 211 and PS 41-46, 74-80.200 Same rhetoric in TĀ IV 194-203.

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without effort’.201 Similarly, when PS 80 describes the vow of the yogin engaged on the ‘way of energy’ as ‘both easy and very difficult’, it signifies that the śāktopāya is both easier and more difficult than the āņavopāya: easier in that the practitioner need no longer concern himself with the panoply of rites prescribed in the āņava nor acquire their requisite ingredients and votive objects; more difficult in that all rites must be interiorized successfully. The śāktopāya is thus the way that occupies the middle ground between the śāṃbhavopāya and the āņavopāya, just as the bhedābheda, the experience to which it gives access, occupies the middle ground between the abheda of the śāṃbhavopāya and the bheda of the āņavopāya.

The two other ways are not for all that absent in the presentation of the Paramārthasāra, and the exhortation in the commentary to verse 103 to ‘use all means’ in order to accede to the supreme human goal is perhaps to be understood in that sense.202

The manner in which the Paramārthasāra positions itself in relation to other systems deserves also to be noted in brief. With the signal exception of verse 27, which is a doxography in miniature, the only evident criticism of other systems is aimed at the rival idealisms of Advaita and Vijñānavāda — as though the dualism of the Sāṃkhya were nothing but a venial sin, destined to dissolve itself in the "complete" soteriology of the Trika. Once Sāṃkhya dualism is refuted in the commentary to verses 2-3, Yogarāja makes no further reference to that system, apart from some veiled borrowings of elements in its theory of liberation, such as the analogy of the potter and his wheel,203 and the very terms of SK 47, of which he offers (ad PS 83) a Traika interpretation.204

201 See also PS 77: ‘And unceasing is his meditation [...]’ and YR ad loc: ‘Therefore, the meditation of such a yogin arises naturally (svarasodita)’, as well as PS 78 and YR ad loc: ‘emerging naturally, [the energy of the middle breath] is said to be an innate [kind of] rosary, as it comprehends all the senses’.202 References to Bhairava (TĀ III 1, and passim), to Bhairava as śabdarāśi, ‘mass of sounds’ (TĀ III 198-200a), and to the ‘condition/nature of Bhairava’ (bhairavībhāva, III 271, 277) — a term for jīvanmukti realized in the manner of the śāṃbhavopāya (see JR ad 271) — are characteristic of the śāṃbhavopāya. As well, are the analogy of the mirror (TĀ III 1-66; 268-293), the mantra _______(TĀ III 20b-206), the celebration of the absolute ‘I’ (TĀ III 207-208a, 280-281), and the motif of the Wheel of energies (TĀ III 248a-267). The same themes may be read sub PS 9-13, 43, 47-50, 96. The avat. ad 41 refers to the manner in which the yogin raises himself from the śāktopāya to the śāṃbhavopāya. The point of view of the āņavopāya, with its profusion of practices, is relatively rarely adopted in the PS. This point of view appears only by implication in the description of the śāktopāya (vv. 74-80) — the practices of concern to the āņava are those that the śāktopāya transforms — and in that of the śāṃbhavopāya — the enlightenment that v. 96 describes has as its ‘means’ (upāyā) the grace of Śiva alone, not the collection of means that characterizes the āņavopāya: ‘Now the purport of this is as follows: the acquisition of the knowledge of one’s own Self has for its unique means (upāyā) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as reciting the rosary, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord’s] power of [causal] constraint, are ineffectual as means (upāya)’ (YR ad 96). The only positive reference to the ‘way of the finite soul’ is perhaps found in the following verse. YR ad 97 describes, in effect, the stages of the elevation of the kuņḍalinī, a practice present in the three ways, but whose discursivity seems to attach, here, to the ‘way of the finite soul’.203 SK 67 seems to be the origin of this image, which soon becomes a topos; see BSBh IV 1, 15.204 In the same way, TĀV XXVIII 312 cites SK 67.

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It is interesting that the Paramārthasāra prefers to efface such differences in order better to bring out the relationship of one tradition to the other. The Sāṃkhya is not only a system that the Trika considers to have stopped short in working out the aspiration toward enlightenment and liberation; it is also a system with which the Trika sustains an affinity, indicated by its having adopted the doctrine of the tattvas, together with the notion of their evolution.205

For the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the tattvas implies two corollaries: on the one hand, that the empirical world is given a value206 — by the ‘enumeration’ (saṃkhyā) that is made of its forms; on the other hand, that the world thus evaluated is also instrumentalized in the quest for liberation.

According to the Sāṃkhyakārikā (and the commentary of Gauḍapāda particularly) the same attractions of the world that subject the puruşa to incarnate existence — understood as both intellectual and sensible experience — and to the cycle of rebirths have also the vocation of conducting the puruşa to its liberation — which amounts to establishing the final cause as a fundamental principle of the system. That is even their raison d’etre: prakŗti deploys the creation (understood as the twenty-three remaining tattvas) only for the sake of the puruşa’s separation from herself. She works indefatigably (vv. 56-58) to that end, or better, she displays the creation before the puruşa, as an actress before an audience (v. 59). Such would be the meaning of the arresting and sustained analogy of the prakŗti-actress playing before the puruşa-spectator (vv. 59, 61, 65-66). The same "theater of the world" in which the puruşa is imbricated so long as he is deprived of discernment is also the locale of his liberation, for that liberation is subordinated to the acquisition of ‘discriminating knowledge’ (vijñāna): once Creation is grasped as a complex of organized constituents, which must therefore be ‘for another’, the puruşa is ipso facto ‘differentiated’ from it and from the complex; it is ‘free’, it recognizes itself as the independent term, ‘that for which’.207

The puruşa, in its essence freed of any taint of objectivity — objectivity as summed up in the twenty-four remaining tattvas — is that difference. And that discriminating principle is made the fundamental index of the Sāṃkhyakārikā’s soteriology, from its second kārikā onwards, which enjoins the fundamental distinction between the ‘manifest’ (vyakta), the ‘unmanifest’ (avyakta) and ‘the knower’ (jña — lit., ‘knowing’) — that is, between the twenty-three ‘produced’ tattvas, beginning with the buddhi, and the two ‘unproduced’ or original tattvas —

205 The Trika’s affinity with Sāṃkhya is again manifested by its adoption of the satkāryavāda.206 In contrast with its devaluation, presented by the Advaita as necessary, to the extent that on that devaluation depends the status of brahman itself (see Hulin 2001: 83). The advaitic devaluation of the phenomenal world extends even to acosmism — the ajātivāda, ‘view that [the world] never came into existence’ — which serves the view that brahman only "truly" exists (Hulin 2001: 56; 102-103; Bouy ĀŚ: 48-49, 249-254, 266-272). Dasgupta (1975, vol. I: 423), however, finds an ajātivāda in Gaudapāda’s Kārikās, and considers this an indication of Gaudapāda’s putative Buddhism — a point of view much debated (on this debate, see Bouy ĀŚ: 42-43).207 GBh 55: [...] pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ syāt sattapuruşānyathākhyātilakşaņam idaṃ pradhānam iyaṃ buddhir ayam ahańkāra imāni pañca mahābhūtāni yebhyo ‘nyaḥ puruşo visadŗśa iti /, ‘The knowledge of the twenty-five principles is marked by the otherness of spirit and existence: "this is matter", "this is mind", "this is ego", "these are the great elements" — from all of which alien spirit is dissimilar’; see also GBh 60 and 64.

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primal "matter" (prakŗti), designated as the unmanifest (avyakta), and primal "spirit" (puruşa), the former also frequently referred to as pradhāna, the ‘base’, ‘placed-before’.

This is taken up by Gauḍapāda in his Bhāşya, who cites the following verse: ‘He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever his style of life, whether his hair be plaited or in a topknot, or his head shaven, is liberated — no doubt about it!’208

Thus, in the Sāṃkhyakārikā’s manner of setting forth the tattvas can be seen in ovo the principle of reversibility of servitude and liberation. One has the feeling that Śaivism (nondualist and dualist) takes up this principle and puts it into practice sequentially, introducing two symmetrical movements of installation and ‘dis’installation of the tattvas, now thirty-six in number. The Śaiva innovation consists in the reversal of these tattvas, from gross to subtle, in the ascending movement of the self s recognition of its Self.209 Of course, the idea is similar to the strategy of the combined Sāṃkhya-Yoga, according to which the process of awakening, for the yogin, is in some manner the reverse (pratisarga, or pratiprasava, YS IV 34) of the process described in Sāṃkhya, resulting in the world of our experience. Still, Yoga has not developed the notion of a "reversion" of the tattvas, one after another, as a means of access, or rather, of ascent to liberation. Therefore one can speak of a Śaiva "innovation",210 at least in a technical sense. Besides, such a reversal of the tattvas is implied in the doctrine’s logic of the system to the extent that it can be considered as conditioned on the introduction of the notion of śakti, which is itself dependent on the introduction of eleven supplementary tattvas whereby a dualism is converted into a monism. In effect, the idea of a "reversion" of the tattvas can only be conceived of dynamically, at the cost of a considerable effort capable of establishing the notion the Śaivas call adhvaśuddhi, ‘purification of the paths’. It is a reversal that is implicit in the term adhvan, ‘path’, given to the differentiated manifestation of the Supreme Lord.211 Apart from the fact that the ‘world as path’ lends itself to directionality, it seems destined to point to a "return path". In effect, in virtue of a folk etymology that derives adhvan from the root ad, ‘eat’, the path is not just a process, a moving toward something, it is also that which ‘should be consumed’, that is, the expected result of that movement: the ‘path’ (analogy of the empirical manifestation), which the act of returning itself abolishes.212

With the insertion of māyā and the ‘sheaths’ (kañcuka) associated with it, not only is the dualism of Sāṃkhya made to mesh with Śaiva nondualism, but, inversely, Śaiva nondualism attempts to fortify itself against logical defect to the extent that it is careful, in its philosophical discourse, to present māyā as one of the modes of realization of the Śakti. With the addition of the eleven superior tattvas, of which the

208 GBh 1: pañcaviṃśatitattvajño yatra tatrāśrame vaset / jaţī muņḍī vāpi mucyate nātra saṃśayaḥ //, repeated ad 2.209 See SpN III 19: [...] dharādiśivāntasamagrabhogyakavalanena paramapramātŗtāṃ satīm eva pratyabhijñānakrameņāvalambate/, ‘By gulping down the entire range of things to enjoy, from earth to Śiva, he reaches gradually through the process of recognition the state of supreme subject, which exists unconditionally’; see also PTLvŗ 21-24, quoted n. 621.210 One that could be old; see, for instance, the notion of tattvajaya, ‘conquest of the tattvas’, in MVT (Vasudeva MVT: 149).211 Not only the śuddhādhvan and the aśuddhādhvan, but the notion of şadadhvan, the ‘six paths’.212 See TĀ VI 30 and TĀV ad loc. cited n. 1387.

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first five represent the ‘pure path’ (śuddhādhvan), Śaivism reconciles the level of essence (śuddhādhvan) with that of existence (aśuddhādhvan).

Moreover, the Śaiva setting forth of the eleven superior tattvas permits the resolution of another problem that is raised by the borrowing from Sāṃkhya of the notion of the tattvas: the idea of evolution itself, in effect, is in principle incompatible with most Indian idealistic systems, which, establishing an equivalence between "change" and the "unreal", consider the very idea of evolution in and of itself faulty, erroneous.

The Trika’s reconciliation of idealism with the "realistic" approach implied by the idea of evolution goes even to the extent of revising the notion of bhedābheda, ‘difference-and-non-difference’. Evolutionism in effect cannot be maintained apart from the notion of bhedābheda, for such an idea is implied in any theory of causation linking a cause with its effect, different from that cause, but in some sense also the same, for it is not the case that any cause can produce any effect. Thus the quadripartite distinction of the tattvas proposed by classical Sāṃkhya reposes implicitly on the notion of bhedābheda: that which, not produced, produces (prakŗti); those which are produced but produce nothing (the mahābhūtas); those that both produce and are produced (from mahat to the tanmātras); and that which neither produces nor is produced (puruşa).

In the last analysis, the Śaiva treatment of bhedābheda, illustrated, somewhat atypically,213 by the metaphor of the mirror and its reflection (PS 12-13), would derive as much from a doctrinal constraint — that of an idealistic system — as it does from the external constraint imposed by integrating a "realistic" evolutionism within an "idealistic" evolutionism. For that, the notion of evolution itself had to be reconsidered. While Sāṃkhya makes it dependent on prakŗti alone, active but unconscious, presented to a puruşa conscious but inactive, Śaivism subordinates evolution (where the puruşa is relegated to the ‘impure path’) to the agent par excellence, the unique ultimate principle, Śiva animated by his Śakti — in other terms, consciousness indissociable from self-consciousness. This agency expresses itself as the absolute ‘I’ (aham), which is given a central place in the Paramārthasāra itself, via the "ahaṃstuti" of verses 47-50, the self-proclamation of the ‘I’ as the ultimate Real.214 Thus the idea of the ultimate principle as itself agent seals the difference, on the ontological plane, between Sāṃkhya and Trika, or rather consecrates the integration of the first in the second.215

The Trika distinguishes itself also from Sāṃkhya in that the revaluation of the sensible world culminates in a sense of marvel (camatkāra), a ‘marveling’ that borders always on joy (ānanda), and which characterizes both the regard the yogin casts upon this marvelously variegated world and the open-eyed delight with which he contemplates his identity with that world and with the Lord.216

We find here perhaps the source of one of the characteristic features of the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, which has developed, alongside a religious philosophy and a 213 In Advaita, the same analogy illustrates the notion of ‘appearance’, bhedābheda being rejected by Śańkara as a logical contradiction; see p. 57.214 See, esp., Tantrasāra [TS] VIII (p. 86) quoted n. 594, and TS VIII (p. 87), quoted n. 605, which speaks of the ‘agentive part’ (kartraṃśa) of the ahańkāra, itself nothing else than the devaluated form of the absolute ‘aham’.215 See also PS 10-11, PS 14, PS 45, and YR ad loc; also ĪPvŗ III 2, 5, quoted n. 515.216 See YR ad 75 and 79-80.

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mysticism, an aesthetics that has become one of the leitmotifs of Indian speculation, and compelling enough as an aesthetics to overshadow all its rivals. A series of writers, preeminently śaivite, among whom Abhinavagupta was probably the most influential,217 developed a "theory of beauty", or rather, of "aesthetic experience", that remains one of the jewels of Kashmir to this day.

Not only is aesthetic emotion described in the very terms that Kashmirian Śaivas apply to spiritual experience — rasa, ‘savor’, ānanda, ‘bliss’, camatkāra, ‘wonder’, ātmaviśrānti, ‘repose in the Self’— but the ‘amazement’ (vismaya) of ordinary experience is transmuted into the ‘sentiment’ (rasa), as aesthetical as it is spiritual, of the ‘Marvelous’ (adbhuta). The yogin and the spectator of drama have in common the ‘recognition’ of the Self, or, what amounts to the same thing, their identification with the universe — a transitory experience for the spectator but established once and for all for the yogin,218 who is thus nothing but an ‘emancipated spectator’.219

What about the relation of Trika with Advaita? It is obvious that the former shares with the latter the notion of māyā (already present in the first Paramārthasāra) and its faculty of ‘veiling’ (āvaraņa), inherited from the tradition; after all, even in its vedic occurrences, and in conformity with its etymology, māyā is a ‘power of fabrication’, and as such can be seen as to represent the advaitic version of the Śaiva śakti. Yet, whatever may be their fundamental affinity in this regard, it is still the case that the two systems differ considerably in their manner of treating māyā.

In the Paramārthasāra, we find, in effect, a polemical attack on Vedān-ta’s views regarding śakti and māyā. Yogarāja (ad 15) reproaches the ‘Brahmavādins’ for having considered māyā distinct from brahman, whereas, from the Śaiva point of view, māyā is nothing but a realization of Śiva’s śakti, understood initially as ‘energy of freedom’ (svātantryaśakti). It is because of this failure to recognize the essential freedom of the supreme principle that Yogarāja (ad 27) finds fault with these Brahmavādins, even though such an account of the vedāntic system (especially that of Śańkara) must be taken as a serious abridgement, which fails to take note of the

217 See Bansat-Boudon 2004: 273ff.218 See Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī [ĪPV] I 1, 1, vol. I: 38, in the context of a debate on the function of memory in accounting for the experience of the yogin: nūnaṃ sa eva īśvaro ‘ham iti, ‘Yes, I am the Lord’; in the same context, see also ĪPV I 4, 3, vol. I:165: eşa sa iti ācchāditasyeva pramātŗtattvasya sphuţāvabhāsanaṃ kŗtam, idam iti, vismayagarbhayānayā uktyā pratyabhijñā eva sūcitā, ‘When one says "this is he" there is clear revelation of a cognizer, hidden as it were; [even in cases when one says only] "Aha!" (idam), a recognition is indicated by this utterance, whose central meaning is amazement’. As for the experience of the spectator, see Abhinavabhāratī [ABh] ad Nāţyaśāstra [NŚ] I 107, vol. I: 36: pāţhyakārņanapātrāntarapraveśavaśāt samutpanne deśakālaviśeşāveśānālińgite ... rāmarāvaņādivişayādhyavasāye ... bhavat pañcaşair divasaiḥ sacamatkāratadīyacaritamadhyapravişţasvāmarūpamatiḥ svātmadvāreņa viśvaṃ tathā paśyan pratyekaṃ sāmājikaḥ ... ‘Once the conviction has developed that Rāma and Rāvaņa, and so on, are before him, ... thanks to the entrances of other characters and the hearing of lines spoken — [a conviction] unmarked by the irruptions of particular times and places — ... the spectator thus view[s] every particular through the lens of his own self, [though the spectacle] continue (bhavat) for five or six days, for his attention is now one with his own self, which has entered into the midst of that action with a sense of wonder’. N.b.: This characterization is excerpted from a much longer passage describing the spectator’s experience in response to the play. See Bansat-Boudon 1992: 151-152.219 Phrase borrowed from the title of J. Ranciere’s book (2008).

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important cosmological role played therein by Īśvara, or of the complex interplay of māyā and the jīva in its account of the "perceptible" world.

As a consequence, one observes that the Traika view of the "real world" differs somewhat from that of Śańkara’s Advaita, where notions of the "real" are based exclusively on the single unchanging Real, brahman (sat, τò ὄν), which can never be other than it is (in later Advaita usage, termed pāramārthikaṃ sat). By contrast, the "absolutely unreal" (prātibhāsika) can appear only verbally, is always other than it is (asat) — the ‘son of a barren woman’ (a contradiction in terms) or the ‘horn of a hare’ (an imaginary association). Between these two extremes is the "real world" (vyāvahārika) — or what we like to call the "real world" — which is ‘inexplicable’ (anirvacanīya) in the sense that it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal (sadasadvilakşaņa) — the world, in other words, of change, where rules of cause and effect apply. Śańkara prefers the formula sadasadvilakşaņa to the older bhedābheda (different-and-not-different) for he considers this last a contradiction in terms.

While the Śaivas and the Advaitins agree in not denying a provisional reality to the world of normal experience, they seem to part company in their view of the "absolutely unreal", which notion has disappeared from the Śaiva lexicon, leaving us with a "bi-polar" universe consisting of the God on one side and his "creation" on the other. Such "entities" as sky-flowers and square circles are accorded no special status, for as ideas they "exist" in the same created universe.220 In a sense, we have returned to a more Sāṃkhya-oriented view of the Real, where the created world is legitimated as a function of the absolute, no doubt motivated by the Śaivas’ view that action is part and parcel of that absolute, conceived as inseparable from its Śakti.

Thus, in the schema of the Trika, Śakti appears twice, as the consort of Śiva, that is, as self-consciousness still indistinct from pure consciousness, and as the subtly "degraded" form of māyā — which, it will be remembered, figures as the sixth in the procession of the tattvas. In this sense, one can say that the Trika substitutes for the pair brahman/māyā of Advaita the couple Śiva/Śakti, once māyā, or more precisely, the goddess Māyā, is taken as a hypostasis of Śakti. It being understood that, in a Traika perspective, the dissociation Śakti/māyā is valid only in a worldly perspective, vertically; it has no reality from the ultimate point of view, when envisaged horizontally. In some ways, it could be said that the Trika conception of māyā is closer to that of the Gītā — or in any case, to the version of the Gītā as commented upon by Abhinavagupta. Besides, it should be noted that the philosophical discourse of Advaita, though founded on the pair brahman-māyā, does not assign to the tattvas the soteriological role which is their due in Sāṃkhya and in Trika — although in varying ways.

As regards the integration of Sāṃkhya into the Trika, certain displacements are in evidence: the māyā of the Trika represents functionally the prakŗti of Sāṃkhya with the major difference that the former now embodies a goddess and is not an ‘unconscious’ principle; in contrast, the prakŗti of the Trika is a devalued form of the

220 See PS 44 and n. 915. Trika theory holds that consciousness contains everything within its fold. Only that which is known exists; whatever is not an object of knowledge does not exist. It is curious that the same formulation of the relation of the idea and its object may be found also in the most extreme realistic doctrines — notably Prābhākaramīmāṃsā — where it cannot be admitted that an idea (even an erroneous one) has "nothing" for its object; see also n. 265.

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Sāṃkhya prakŗti, reduced to its triguņātmaka function. Likewise, the puruşa of the Sāṃkhya becomes, in the Trika hierarchy, little more than the archetype of the finite, bound soul.

It is true that Indian soteriologies have as their principle the abrogation of a condition deemed unhappy, and one can argue that they are all organized around a dialectic of servitude and liberation. Still, the way proposed by Śaivism is distinguished from other systems by the dynamism and discursivity of that dialectic. A quality that relates evidently to its notion of the Absolute (called Śiva), which the throbbing essence of its energy predisposes to a series (limited in number) of manifestations. The geneses of finitude and of liberation operate, dynamically, by a progressive installation and disinstallation of the tattvas, by the emanation of diversity and its reabsorption. Thus does Śaivism interpret both Sāṃkhya and Advaita.

The thought-universe of the Trika is indeed that of an idealism based on the notion of universal consciousness, of which many variants exist, in the West as well. Still, the wide range and the complexity of the system make it unique, inasmuch as it develops, as a coherent tradition, over several centuries, and is graced by the works of some of the most acute thinkers of the Indian past.

Lyne Bansat-Boudon Saint-Aubin-sur-mer, June 3, 2009

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Translation

Salutation to the one having the form of ultimate reality, which is the Self, which is consciousness.

Now begins the Paramārthasāra, the ‘Essence of Ultimate Reality’,221 composed by the revered

master, Abhinavagupta, most eminent among the great Śaiva teachers222 together with the commentary of the revered master Yogarāja

221 The compound paramārtha is equivocal as is the final term artha, which may be understood according to anyone of its various meanings, such as ‘goal’, ‘object’, ‘truth’, ‘reality’; see Intr., n. 7.222 māheśvarācārya — lit., ‘preceptor in the lineage of [teachers] devoted to Maheśvara’.

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1. To the One who, although nothing but a mass of consciousness,223 is yet solidified in the form of the world,224 to the unborn One who is proficient in the play225 of concealing226 his own Self, glory to this Supreme Lord!2. On the compendium227 Paramārthasāra, artfully228 composed by the master, I, Yogarāja, make this brief commentary, at the request of the learned.

Kārikā 1

223 cidghana: the image, much exploited in the Śaivism of Kashmir, of consciousness as ‘solid’ or ‘compact’ (ghana) is translated here more or less literally, though it probably seems quite paradoxical to the Western reader, as ‘solidity’ is normally associated with physical objects, especially weighty ones, not with events of the mind. But it also appears to be the case that Śaiva authors were quite aware of the paradox as well, and had good reason to stress it. Even in modern Sanskrit, the term ghana continues to be associated with the gross, rather than the subtle, as for instance ‘ice’ is commonly referred to as ‘ghanībhūtaṃ jalam’. Several rationales can be adduced for this strange metaphorical usage, among them the fact of paradox itself, which may serve (as it often does in Advaita and Mādhyamika explanations) to shock the mind out of its usual habits and to prepare it for supra-mundane insights. It may also be the case, especially for Kashmirian Śaivas — who do not dismiss the ‘solid’ world as a purely illusory phenomenon (as is usually done by Advaitins), but see it as an activity of the Lord himself — that, by this paradox, attributes normally associated with the effect are transferred to the cause, emphasizing thus the cause’s truly substantial reality. Which suggests a third rationale for the usage, which is simply that it is the overtones suggested by the literal ‘solidity’ that are at issue — thus consciousness is ‘compact’, ‘uniform’, ‘pervasive’, etc. And finally, in stressing what amounts to the materiality of consciousness, our authors may be making a point that is often associated with the ‘material cause’ (in Aristotelian terms), namely, that, quâ matter, all form is superadded and ipso facto extrinsic. As Chāndogya says, what is ‘real’ is the clay, not the pot or the dish or the toy formed of it. Mutatis mutandis, the clay (as matter) is ‘inexpressible’ except as or through form — one cannot encounter clay as such, and yet all clay objects are nothing but clay. Taken together, these interpretive possibilities present a strong justification for this apparently anomalous metaphor. However that may be, the formula has upanişadic antecedents: cf. BĀU IV 5, 13: evaṃ vā are ‘yam ātmā [...] kŗtsnaḥ prajñānaghana eva, and BĀU II 4,12: idaṃ mahad bhūtam [...] vijñānaghana eva; also MāU 5, referred to n. 792; see also n. 234 on cidānandaikaghana.224 jaganmūrti: in spite of the solidity implied by the term ghana, the same cit is seen as rasa, fluidity (cf. the expression ‘cidrasa’ in PH 4, quoted below), which, when oriented toward objectivity in the process of bhedavyakti, ‘manifestation as difference’, is again described in terms of gradual solidification, or crystallization, which process ends in pŗthivītattva. Solidification is also emphasized through terms such as śyāna (or āśyāna, or prāśyānā) and mūrti. In the sense of ‘image’, mūrti (derived from the root mūrch, ‘to solidify’, ‘to coagulate’) signifies the coagulation of the essential fluidity of the divinity. In this mańgala, YR seems to echo the words of his direct guru Kşemarāja’s auto-commentary on PH 4, pp. 55-56: śrīparamaśivaḥ [...] cidrasāsyānatārūpāśeşatattvabhuvanabhāvatattatpramātrādyātmatayāpi prathate/, ‘Paramaśiva [...] manifests [lit., ‘displays’] himself both as the totality of principles, worlds and entities and as their respective experiencers, that are only a solidified form of the essential fluidity of consciousness’. See also Kşemarāja’s SpN I 2 quoted n. 226; also YR ad 46. Quoted in Utpalavaişņava’s SpP (Śāstrī Islāmpurkar: 6), the Cicchaktisaṃstuti, which develops the image, uses the same terminology: prāśyānaś cidrasasyoghaḥ sākāratvam upāgataḥ/ avaśyāyaḥ prabodhārke tūdite svasvabhāvabhāk//, ‘The stream of the essential fluidity of consciousness solidifies, assuming [concrete] forms. However, it recovers its own essential

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[The master] being of the opinion that the completion of this treatise — in keeping with the system of nondualistic Śaivism (śivādvayaśāsana) — requires first the removal of the unceasing flow of obstacles, such as apprehension,229 fear, idleness and doubt,230 which arise when one imagines oneself as primarily determined by that condition wherein the body and the like is taken to be the cognizer (dehādipramātŗtā),231 now first considers his reverence232 to the Supreme Lord (parameśvara).

The essential meaning of the entire treatise is inherently present in this reverence, and it is through this reverence that is enabled absorption (samāveśa) in the divinity

nature [i.e., its fluidity], as does the morning dew, when the Sun of consciousness rises’.225 krīḍā — a key term of the doctrine.226 pracchādana points here to a central concept of the Śaivism of Kashmir: the tirodhānaśakti, power (or energy) of concealment of the Lord, itself a realization of his svātantryaśakti, his energy of absolute freedom. Cf. Kşemarāja in SpN I 2: tato ‘yaṃ cidātmā bhagavān nijarasāśyānatārūpaṃ jagad unmajjayatīti yujyate, ‘Therefore, it is perfectly valid to say that the Lord who is consciousness brings about the emergence of the world by solidifying his own essence’, and Śivasūtravimarśinī [ŚSV] I 2: yaḥ parameśvareņa svasvātantryaśaktyā bhāsitasvarūpagopanārūpayā mahāmāyāśaktyā svātmany ākāśakalpe ‘nāśritāt prabhŗti māyāpramātrantaṃ saṃkoco ‘vabhāsitaḥ sa eva [...] bandhaḥ, ‘A limitation is made to appear by Paramaśiva in his own being which is pure like the sky. Taking the form of [experiences, beginning with those of] Anāśritaśiva and ending with [those of] the māyāpramātŗ, this limitation is the effect of [Paramaśiva’s] energy of mahāmāyā, which itself consists [for the Lord] in the veiling of his own nature brought about by his energy of freedom. That limitation alone [...] is bondage’.227 saṃkşepa — cf. YR’s symmetric statement in the colophon and n. 1445.228 yuktyā could be understood more literally as ‘by means of, by having recourse to, reasoning’, inasmuch as the exponents of the Śaivism of Kashmir claim a rational justification for the doctrine; see n. 427. However, taking into consideration the context, we have opted for the translation: ‘artfully’, ‘skillfully’, as pertaining more directly to the composition of a text; this is all the more justified, inasmuch as YR can thus be seen as alluding to AG’s Paramārthasāra as a (skillful) rewriting of the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeşa.229 In this context, where the dehādipramātŗ is referred to, śańkā is probably to be taken in the sense of vicikitsā, ‘uncertainty’ (‘incertezza’, in Gnoli’s translation [TĀ: 309]), ‘apprehension’; see YR ad 58 (avat.) and YR ad 83, which gives this definition: ‘[...] doubts occasioned by [the presence of] choice (vikalpa)’; cf. Tantrāloka [TĀ] XIII 198b, for a general description of śańkā: śańkā vikalpamūlā hi śāmyet svapratyayād iti, ‘Doubt originates from mental constructs. It may be pacified by one’s own [firm] conviction [viz., ‘when possessed of intense or average grace’ (tīvramadhyaśaktipātavataḥ)]’. In his commentary, JR quotes from the Niśāţana (referred to in TĀ XIII 197-198) a definition of doubt as bondage par excellence: vikalpaj jayate śańkā sā śańkā bandharūpiņī / bandho ‘nyo na hi vidyate ŗte śańkāṃ vikalpajām // vikalpāyāsayuktasya na hi syāc chreyasī gatiḥ /, ‘The doubt that arises from mental constructs takes the form of bondage. There is no other bondage than the doubt arising from mental constructs. The one who is concerned with exertions resulting from mental constructs cannot attain to the highest goal’; also TĀ XII 24: śańkyājāyate glāniḥ śańkyā vighnabhājanam, and 25, which quotes Utpaladeva’s Śivastotrāvalī [ŚSĀ] II 28: sarvāśańkāśaniṃ mārgaṃ numo māheśvaraṃ tv iti. Note Sanderson’s usual translation of śańkā as ‘inhibition’ (1985: 199, and n. 69; 1986: 181). See also Parātrīśikālaghuvŗtti [PTLvŗ] ad 18: kevalaṃ parikşīņaśańkātańkatvam atropayogi śańkāyāḥ [...] ekarasatadvimarśātmakasamāveśavighnabhūtatvād, ‘The destruction of the doubt that is perplexity is alone useful, for this doubt is an obstacle to the absorption that consists in constant awareness of him only’. Sanderson (2007: 379) casts doubt on the attribution to AG

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who is but one’s own Self (svātmadevatā),233 a uniform mass of blissful consciousness (cidānandaikaghanā),234 once the condition of finite cognizer (parimitapramātŗ) has been overcome:235

1. To You, the transcendent, situated beyond the abyss, beginningless, unique, yet who dwell in manifold ways in the caverns of the heart, the foundation of all this universe,236 and who abide in all that moves and all that moves not, to You alone, O Śaṃbhu, I come for refuge.237

To You, whose form is the god that is my own Self, who are the essence of what is present (sphurattā)238 in every cognizer,239

of the PTLvŗ, but observes that this attribution is attested at an early date in the PM, probably 12th or 13th cent.230 Sanderson 2005: 91, n. 7, translates: ‘the multitude of hinderers, namely, such [states of mind] as hesitation, uneasiness, laziness, and uncertainty’.231 pramātŗ — lit., ‘agent of [presumably valid] cognition (pramā)’. The two families of terms based on the roots jñā (jñāna, etc.) and mā (māna, esp. pramāna, etc.) present particular difficulties to the translator. We have tended to prefer ‘know’ and its derivatives for the former, and ‘cognize’, etc., for the latter — although both translations are etymologically closer to Skt. jñā than either is to the original sense of mā, ‘to measure, determine’. Rather than become embroiled in the Germanic / Latinate constrast, some have preferred the Greek-based ‘gnosis’ for jñāna, for obvious reasons (Skt. jñāti would be an exact transpositon of this term), but of course this too is, etymologically, just another variant of the IE root *gnō. To the extent, however, that the terms based on the root mā retain an associative nuance with their origins in the Naiyāyika-Bauddha debates on ‘valid means of cognition’, it was thought at least permissible to employ here the rather more ‘academic’ associations of ‘cognize’, reserving the solid Germanic ‘know’ for jñā and its derivatives — whose applications are both mundane and esoteric, but less often "technical" — in the sense of serving to disambiguate the concrete problems of the "knower" enmeshed in the trammels of mundane awareness. Along with pramātŗ ‘cognizer’ must be accounted an entire family of terms that serve to characterize the problematic of the concrete knower — prameya, ‘object of cognition’ (for the Nyāya, there is no ‘knowledge’ without a corresponding object — a position common to most "realisms"); pramāņa, ‘means’ of establishing a correct relation between the prior two; and pramā, the ‘valid’ cognition thus derived. If these associations are to be thus retained, the distinction in translation may to that extent be justified. In some contexts, however, stylistic and other constraints may operate to suggest a less rigid adherence to this strict distinction. See PS 30-31, 39-40, 60-61 concerning the two levels of error, as sources of bondage.232 pravaņatā — lit., ‘his [constant] submission’. Cf. ĪPV I 1 (vol. I: 18ff.), in which prahvatā is synonymous with the pravaņatā found here. Commenting upon Utpaladeva’s first words: kiṃcid āsādya maheśvarasya dāsyām [...], ‘Having somehow realised my condition as being Maheśvara’s servant [...]’, ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 18) elaborates the meaning and the connotations of this salutation: iha parameśvaraṃ prati yeyaṃ kāyavāńmanasāṃ tadekavişayatāniyo-janālakşaņā prahvatā sā namaskārasyārthaḥ, ‘In this system, salutation means the reverence consisting in the dedication of body, speech and mind exclusively to Him’ (tr. Pandey); see Sanderson 2005: 89ff.233 ĪPV I 1,1 (vol. I: 21) explains that the salutation and the vow, or celebration, of divine victory it implies, whether expressed or not, are interrelated: śuddhaprakāśaṃ [...] prakhyopākhyākrameņa svātmaparāvabhāsavişayabhāvajigamişayā niḥśeşotkarşābhidhīyijayatyādiśabdānuvedhena parāmarśanīyam, ‘Pure Light [i.e., consciousness, or the Lord] [...] should however be clearly apprehended by calling to mind some words like "jayati", "he is victorious", which stands for all-surpassing greatness, with the intention of bringing it before one’s own as well as others’ consciousness by means of inner visualisation and its external expression [through the utterance of the salutation itself]

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Śaṃbhu, [appropriation of] whose nature becomes [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal (śreyas),240 who are as well [absolute] Being (satta),

I come for refuge to You as my protector in order to attain absorption in You;By the word ‘eva’ the author means: ‘I take [refuge] in Śambhu, not in some other

god operating within the realm of Illusion (māyā), who is [therefore] different from me — Śambhu, the divinity who has taken the form of my own Self.241 Thus the master excludes any connection with another divinity.242

Moreover, what sort of Śaṃbhu?243

respectively’ (tr. Pandey, vol. III: 2, modified).234 cidānandaikaghana — lit., ‘mass consisting solely of consciousness and bliss’ (if the compound cidānanda be understood as a dvandva, as is generally the case); or ‘mass consisting solely of the bliss that is consciousness’ or ‘mass consisting solely of the bliss of consciousness’ (if the compound be understood as a karmadhāraya or tatpuruşa). For an inventory of more-or-less equivalent expressions gleaned from the commentary (cidekaghana, cidekavapus, cidekamūrti, cinmūrti, cinmūrtatva, cinrūpa, citsvarūpa, cidghana, abhinnacidghana) suggests, beneath the diversity of style, an insistence on (1) the sole reality of cit — by appropriating qualifications normally associated with its "objects", viz., vapus, mūrti, rūpa, etc.; (2) the materiality of cit, as the sole basis of the visible world. The mention ānanda in the longer versions of the compound seems destined to add a "sensible" dimension to that uniqueness. All of which might be alleged to favor the interpretation of the compound itself, not as a dvandva, but as a karmadhāraya or tatpuruşa — for, precisely, cit and ānanda are not two; therefore our translation: ‘a uniform mass of blissful consciousness’.235 The avataraņikā — lit., ‘descent’, is the preamble to the commentary proper, serving to introduce the verse, and clarifying the sequence of the text from one kārikā to the next.236 Silburn translates: ‘qui reposes en toute chose’.237 The verse (a trişţubh) is nearly identical to ĀPS 1 (on the title and authorship of the first Paramārthasāra, see Intr., p. 2), substituting parasthaṃ gahanāt for parasyāḥ prakŗter, and śaṃbhum for vişņum. The editions of the ĀPS add to this mańgala a verse (ĀPS 2: ātmāmburāśau nikhilo ‘pi loko magno ‘pi nācamati nekşate ca / āścaryam etan mŗgatŗşņikābhe bhavāmburāśau ramate mŗşaiva), to which nothing in AG’s PS corresponds. The Pandit edition of the ĀPS omits those first two stanzas, beginning directly with the long narrative frame (garbhagŗha°...) that precedes the exposition proper. Thus is the title Āryāpañcāśīti justified: if the concluding verse is excepted, the text does consist of 85 āryās; see Intr., n. 16.238 The term sphurattā is one of the key words of the Trika. Mayrhofer, Monier-Williams (Sanskrit-English dictionary [MW]), and other authorities consider the roots sphur, sphar, and sphāy more or less related; the various senses that may attach individually to each root are often confounded in the usage of all, extending from ‘be enormous’ to ‘explode’. By reason of the frequency of their occurrences alone, and given the preponderance of the notion of light in this doctrine, the roots [pra-]kāś, [pra-, vi-, ava-]bhā, bhās, sphur, etc., appear to be employed without major differentiation of meaning. Thus, we have preferred to translate them in a more or less anodyne fashion and indifferently with terms such as ‘appear’, ‘become evident’, ‘become patent’, ‘manifest’, etc. A passage from TĀV V 123 supports this interpretation: commenting on bhāsate durghaţā śaktir of the verse, JR says: bhāsate svātmaikātmyena prathate, ‘ [and so, that energy] "manifests itself, [that is] it extends itself [as everything visible] inasmuch as it is [ever] identical with itself [viz., incapable of abolishing its own nature]’ (see the entire passage, n. 872); also TĀV IV 14, where sphuţayet is glossed as sākşātkuryāt. However, to fully understand the connotations of these usages will require a complete exposition of the Śaiva doctrine, which is rather the business of PS itself. The term sphurattā appears in ĪPK I 5, 13-14, in the context of defining citi — ‘consciousness’, or, as translated by Pandey, ‘sentiency’, or ‘principle of consciousness’ (ĪPK, vol. III: 73), a term that

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Transcendent (para)244 means ‘full’ (pūrņa), namely, ‘replete with all five energies’: Consciousness (cit), Bliss (ānanda), Will (icchā), Knowledge (jñāna), and Action (kriyā),245 and who has thus the nature of the Unsurpassed.

Thus is he ‘situated beyond the abyss’.Now, beyond the abyss246 means ‘beyond the principle of māyā’ (māyātattva)

[viz., beyond the category of apparently objective existence],247 ever remaining in his transcendent (para), or all-encompassing (pūrņa) nature, that is, remaining on the pure path (śuddhādhvan)248 [composed of the five principles] beginning with Śiva and ending with vidyā.

is glossed by the Vimarśinī as yā citiḥ citikriyā tasyāḥ pratyavamarśaḥ, ‘the act of consciousness which has self-reference’ (tr. Pandey, vol. III: 73). Being essentially reflective awareness (pratyavamarśa), consciousness (citi) is represented also as ‘supreme Speech’ (parāvāc), ‘freedom’ (svātantrya) and ‘sovereignty’ (aiśvarya) of the supreme Self (paramātman) (ĪPK I 5 13); as the ‘manifestation’ (sphurattā), ‘absolute being’ (mahāsattā), and ‘heart’ (hŗdaya) of the Supreme Lord (ĪPK I 5 14). ĪPV I 5, 14 glosses again mahāsattā as mahādevī, through the citation (vol. I: 261): mahāsattā mahādevī viśvajīvanam ucyate. On the Vaiśeşika and Vaiyākaraņa concept of mahāsattā, see Appendix 15, p. 339. Here, the use of the root sphur in the sense of ‘to manifest’ is significant, for the Trika phenomenal world is neither an illusory appearance (vivarta), as Advaitins hold, nor a real transform (pariņāma), as stated by followers of Sāṃkhya and Pāñcarātra, but the luminous manifestation of the Lord (or spanda principle) that is implicit in every act of consciousness and which "surges forth" periodically as the insight determining even the possibility of awareness. See SpN I 3.239 See PS 49 and YR ad loc.240 Or ‘whose nature is unsurpassed (anuttara) felicity’. One might suspect here a play on the word śreyas — a term commonly used by the Mīmāṃsakas in the sense ‘the goal par excellence’; that is to say, the reward, in the largest sense, deriving from strict performance of the sacrifice: the maintenance of the good order of things (dharma) and, ultimately, the personal reward thereto pertinent, long life and, at its conclusion, residence among the gods. Where the text declares no explicit purpose deriving from the ritual, the Mīmāṃsakas posit this "general" end, for every act should be undertaken in view of some result, whatever it may be. So, in later loose usage, śreyas becomes a term for the ‘purpose of purposes’, something akin to the Platonic ‘Good’, human felicity in its most abstract form, or (even better) ‘heaven’ — but generally to be distinguished from the ‘other-worldly’ purpose (which is not an "end"), mukti, liberation. In our text, however, some occurrences of śreyas appear to refer to mukti; see also n. 150 and 1421.241 śaṃbhuṃ svātmadevatākāram evaprapadye na ca punar māyāntaścārinaṃ kiṃcid bhinnaṃ devam. See ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 29): saṃbhavanti hi māyāgarbhādhikāriņo vişņuviriñcādyāḥ, ‘There do exist [deities] powerful within the pale of māyā, such as Vişņu, Viriñca (= Brahma), etc.’; and ĪPV I 5, 13 (vol. I: 254-255): "Those operating within the pale of māyā are Brahma, Vişņu, Indra, etc.’; cf. BĀU I 4, 10 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 80), characterizing the paśu: atha yo ‘nyāṃ devatām upāste anyo ‘sau anyo ‘ham asmīti, na sa veda/ yathā paśur evaṃ sa devānām, ‘So whoever worships another divinity (than his self) thinking that he is one and (brahman) another, he knows not. He is like an animal to the gods’.242 anyayogaṃ vyavacchinati: the indeclinable eva is used in two different senses: avadhāraņa, ‘determination’, ‘ascertainment’ (viz., ‘that very X’); and that of anyayogavyavaccheda, ‘exclusion’ (viz., ‘X only’), as is the case here. Cf. ĪPV I 1, 1 quoted n. 241.243 The syntax of commentaries on versified texts is relatively free; two exegetical procedures are followed: the daņdānvaya, ‘rod-like syntactic construction’, and the khaņdānvaya, ‘syntactic construction [made clear] by [having recourse to its] elements (khaņḍa)’. Beginning with the subject (if expressed), ending with the verbal form, the daņdānvaya method places the intermediary words in their respective cases in keeping with the normal prose order. Such

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And although he manifests himself (sphurat) as marvelously differentiated, when manifesting various states of consciousness,249 he does not deviate from his transcendent nature, which is all-encompassing. As it has been said in the Spandaśāstra:

Even though different [states of consciousness, such as] waking, etc.,250 that are not [truly] different from him,251 proceed from him,252 he never departs from his own nature, which is that of pure agent of experience (upalabdhŗ).253

Beginningless means ‘ancient’,254 due to the presumption of priority (ādisiddhatva)255 [that necessarily devolves] from his status as the cognizer present in all possible perceptions as the principle of experience itself (anubhavitŗtā);

is the style of Mallinātha’s commentaries on Kālidāsa’s works. Here, and throughout his commentary, YR follows the khaņḍānvaya style: the long sentence constituting the entire kārikā is first reduced to its core sentence: tvām eva śaṃbhuṃ śaraņaṃ [prapadye =] saṃśraye, which is then explained in the order of its words. Then, the exegete explains the other words of the sentence — all here adjectives qualifying ‘śaṃbhum’ — by asking questions that elicit the qualifications as responses: ‘what sort [of Śaṃbhu]?’ One will find excellent illustrative examples of this style in YR’s commentary ad 98-99. Note that the question: ‘what sort [of Śaṃbhu]?’ (kiṃ bhūtam) will be again answered in kārikās 10-11, 43, and, even more elaborately, in kārikās 64-66. At the same time, YR’s commentary adheres to the general principles of Indian hermeneutics in stressing the inner coherence (saṃgati) of the text, and in raising possible objections and offering solutions (ākşepasya samādhānam); cf. Grimal 2000: 765-785.244 Same gloss in YR ad 43. In this acceptation, ‘para’ appears to have been derived from the guņa degree of the verbal root pṝ, ‘fill’ (present: piparti), with suffix -a.245 On the Lord’s śaktis, especially his five fundamental śaktis, see PS 4, YR ad loc, PS 10-11, YR ad loc, and PS 14.246 On the meaning of gahana, see APS 6b: mohāndhakāragahanāt tasya kathaṃ bandhanān mokşaḥ, and R ad loc. According to R, the adjective gahana (lit., ‘dense’, ‘impenetrable’), as qualifying the noun bandhana, means ‘difficult to destroy’ (duruccheda). In this understanding, ĀPS 6b means: ‘How is the limited soul to be delivered from bondage, [which is] difficult to eradicate because of the darkness that is delusion?’ (We differ from Danielson’s understanding of the verse.) See also TĀ VIII 322a, which associates māyātattva with gahana: māyātattvaṃ vibhu kila gahanam arūpaṃ samastavilayapadam/, ‘māyātattva is indeed pervasive, impenetrable, formless. It is the abode of dissolution of the entire universe’. This rather cryptic statement is further explained by JR: vibhu vyāpakam ata eva gahanam/ arūpam iti sūkşmatvāt/ samastavilayapadam iti sūkşmeņa krameņātra viśvasyāvasthānāt, ‘vibhu means "pervasive", therefore "impenetrable" (gahana). It [viz., māyātattva] is "formless", due to its subtlety. It is the "abode of dissolution of the entire universe", for the entire universe remains there in a subtle sequence’. In other words, since phenomenal diversity in its entirety (meya) arises from the tattva named māyā, it is considered to abide there in a subtle form. As such, māyāguhā is also defined, in TĀ VIII 308a, as jagadyoni, the ‘womb of universe’. We will devote a separate study on the Trika notion of a threefold māyā, namely, māyāgranthi, the ‘knot’ (or māyābila, the ‘cavity’), māyātattva, the ‘principle’ (or māyāguhā, the ‘cavern’) and māyāśakti, described in PS 15. Cf. BĀU IV 4, 13: yasyānuvittaḥ pratibuddha ātmā / asmin saṃdehye gahane pravişţaḥ / sa viśvakŗt sa hi sarvasya kartā / tasya lokaḥ sa u loka eva, ‘Whoever has found and has awakened to the self that has entered into this perilous inaccessible place (the body) (saṃdehye gahane) [note that Senart translates: ‘engage dans les tenebreuses complexites du corps’], he is the maker of the universe, for he is the maker of all. His is the world. Indeed, he is the world itself’, and Śańkara [ = Ś] ad loc: gahane vişame anekaśatasahasravivekavijñānapratipakşe vişame, ‘a place inaccessible, that is a place with hundreds and thousands of obstacles to attaining enlightenment through discrimination’.

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unique means ‘unaccompanied’, for the attribution to him of difference makes no sense, inasmuch as he is universally present (sphuraņāt) as the unity of consciousness (cidaikyā).

The master goes on: ‘who dwell, etc.’.Even if he is of this sort, yet, out of his own freedom (svātantrya), he has

penetrated in manifold ways, that is, in many different ways, into the caverns (guhā), that is, into the caverns that are the hearts (hŗd)256 [of all limited cognizers], whether they be Rudras or ordinary souls (kşetrajña).257

247 In the nondualist Śaivism of Kashmir, creation is nothing but the Lord’s manifestation; the tattvas are thus the categories, or ‘principles’, constitutive of this manifestation; in some cases they are better rendered as ‘reality-levels’ (see Sanderson 2005: 104, n. 45); on this concept and its etymology, see PS 10-11 and YR ad loc. The first five tattvas are grouped together as the śuddhādhvan, the pure path; the aśuddhādhvan includes the other 31. On māyātattva, see also n. 246.248 This notion accounts for that ideal, or internal, level of manifestation, which has not yet materialized into actual creation. As Michel Hulin (1978: 305) states, at the level of the suddhādhvan, ‘Śiva [fait], si l’on ose dire, le tour de sa nature’ (‘Śiva, so to speak, takes an overall view of his own nature’).249 Reflecting on the states of consciousness (avasthā) — waking (jāgrat), dream (svapna), deep sleep (suşupti) — has, from the time of the earliest upanişads, the BĀU and ChU, been a way of discovering the inner ātman, for suşupti is taken to be the stage (avasthā or sthāna) where objectivity resolves into its source, as it were. See BĀU II 1,15-19 (svapna and suşupti), IV 3, 9-34 (jāgrat, svapna and suşupti), with the famous image (IV 3,18) of the ātman/puruşa continuously wandering through the two states of waking and sleep, as a great fish swims from one bank of the river to the other; see also BĀU (II 1, 15-19, IV 3, 9-20); ChU IV 3, 3; VIII 6, 1-3; VIII 10-11; KauBU III 13; ŚB X 3 3, 6 and 5 2, 11-15; BSBh I 1, 4 and I 1, 23. In accordance with a recurring pattern where + 1 completes a series of three in an enumeration (see Malamoud 1989: 140ff.), some texts, like MuU III 2 8 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 70), postulate a state (not yet designated as the ‘Fourth’, turīya or turya) transcending all three: vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parāt paraṃ puruşaṃ upaiti divyam, ‘He who knows, delivered from name and form, attains the divine Being, higher than the highest’; see also ChU VII 24, 1: yatra nānyatpaśyati [...] sa bhūmā. It is MāU 7 and 12 that, for the first time, explicitly adduces a caturtha, ‘fourth’ state (on the MāU and its exposition by Gauḍapāda, who lived before Śańkara, see PS 35 and YR’s gloss). The Śaivism of Kashmir adds a fifth, turyātīta, ‘beyond the Fourth’, the ‘trans-fourth’ state. Thus is developed the logic of transcendence, in consequence of which the Śaivism of Kashmir postulates above Śiva himself, Paramaśiva; see YR ad 14 (and n. 513), which establishes the correspondence of turya with the ‘pure path’ (śuddhādhvan), i.e., the totality of the first five tattvas; also YR ad 15 and 85-86.250 According to the SpN (Singh: 34), ‘etc’ includes not only dream (svapna) and deep sleep (suşupti), states of consciousness common to all (lokaprasiddha), but also concentration (dhāraņā), meditation (dhyāna) and intense absorption (samādhi) that are proper to yogins. SpN I 3 seems to establish a term-by-term correspondence between waking / dhāraņā, dream / dhyāna, and deep sleep / samādhi. On this point, see ŚSV I 8-10 (Singh: 43).251 According to SpN I 3, tadabhinne may be understood as a hetugarbhaviśeşaņa, an ‘adjective containing an implicit reason’. Thus one could understand: ‘Even though different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., proceed [from him], he never departs from his own nature, which is that of a [pure] agent of experience (upalabdhŗ), for those [states of consciousness] are not [truly] different from him’.252 Or else (according to the gloss prasarpati = pravahati sati): ‘flow on’, i.e., ‘go on appearing’. However, our translation of prasarpati as ‘proceed from’ is also supported by the SpN which

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In other words, even though his nature is [unitary] consciousness, he situates himself as the variety of cognizers, manifesting (ābhāsya) himself freely (svayam) as insentient or sentient, just as an actor [assumes various roles].258

Therefore he is ‘the foundation of all this universe’.259

The foundation, the place of repose (viśrāntisthānā) of all this universe (sarvā) [viz., ‘the place whereon reposes’, that is, ‘on which depends’, all this universe] — namely, this [manifest] world (jagat), consisting of all cognizers, whether they be Rudras or ordinary souls, and, as well, of all objects of cognition (prameyā).260

emphasizes the process of manifestation, expression of the Lord’s absolute freedom: anena cātidurghaţakāritvam eva bhagavato dhvanitam/ yasmāj jāgarādivibhedaṃ ca prakāśayati tatraiva ca svābhedam iti bhedātmanā tadabhedātmanobhayātmanā ca rūpeņāparāparāparāparāśaktitrayasvarūpeņa sphurati, "This [adjective ‘tadabhinne’] suggests that the Lord accomplishes [what is otherwise] difficult to construe. Inasmuch as he [is the one who] manifests (prakāśayati) the different states, waking, etc., [he manifests] his own lack of difference vis-a-vis that [manifestation of difference]. Thus, he manifests himself as differentiated, as non-differentiated and as both differentiated and non-differentiated when he assumes the form of the triad of his energies, viz., non-supreme, supreme, supreme-non-supreme".253 SpK I 3. Ancient commentators, as well as modern scholars, have variously interpreted this verse (see Silburn, Singh, Dyczkowski ad SpK), largely for the reason that the syntactic construction of the first hemistich may be analyzed in two ways, as shown by Kşemarāja in his Spandanirņaya. In the first interpretation, the first hemistich is to be taken as a locative absolute in which the tatpuruşa compound tadabhinne is an adjective qualifying jāgradādivibhede ‘pi, and prasarpati is the locative of the present participle. We have preferred to retain this interpretation in our translation inasmuch as Kşemarāja also seems to prefer it (see the beginning of the gloss: lokaprasiddhe [..,] bhede yogaprasiddhe ‘pi vā [...] prasarpaty anyān-yarūpepravahati sati arthāt tat tattvaṃ [...] naiva nivartate). In the second interpretation, tad becomes an autonomous pronoun, and the subject of the present indicative prasarpati. tat would then refer to the spanda principle, and the meaning would be: ‘Although that [spanda principle] flows on (prasarpati = prasarati) [i.e., ‘assumes diversity’ (vaicitryaṃ gŗhņāti)] in different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., which are not [truly] different from it it never departs from its own nature which is that of a [pure] agent of experience’ (see Silburn SpK: 71); or else, if one retains the alternative understanding of jāgradādivibhede ‘pi as jāgradādivibhede ‘pi sati, offered by SpN: ‘Although that [spanda principle] flows on [i.e., ‘assumes diversity’], when different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., take place [...]’. The two interpretations — equally supported by SpN — are not fundamentally different, except for the emphasis that the first puts on the absolute freedom of the Lord. The kārikā means that Śiva, or the spanda principle, is the condition permitting such states of consciousness; the essential nature of Śiva is that of pure agent of experience (upalabdhŗ), and this persists even when one dreams, or is in deep sleep. In other words, states of experience such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Śiva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3: nivartate nijān naiva svabhāvād upalabdhŗtaḥ: tat tattvaṃ nijād anapāyinaḥ sarvasyātmabhūtāc cānubhavitŗrūpāt svabhāvān naiva nivartate, ‘This [spanda] principle never departs from its immutable nature, which consists in being the universal Self and the [pure] agent of experience’ (on the meaning of upalabdhŗ, glossed as anubhavitŗ, see n. 337). As observed by SpN, this metaphysical truth has its practical counterpart in spiritual practice and experience: ataś ca jāgarādidaśāvasthito ‘py evam imam svasvabhāvaṃ pariśīlayan yaś cinute sa śańkara evety upadişţaṃ bhavati, ‘Thus, this verse teaches that, although himself the basis of differentiated states, such as waking, etc., he who persists essentially (cinute) while contemplating his own undifferentiated nature is

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For is it not well known261 that this universe, which indeed is grounded in the universal knower (pūrņapramātŗ) [viz., the Lord, or consciousness],262 is nevertheless referred to in various ways, manifesting (prakāśamānā) itself through difference, as though emerging263 [from the placid sea of unity], urged on by a pressing need264 to articulate everything into pairs of knowers and knowns (grāhyagrāhaka)?

If this were not the case, this universe would not exist at all — for it would be on such hypothesis other than Light (prakāśā).265

Reflection266 on the pronoun [‘all’ (sarvā)]267 gives rise to the question: ‘whence emerges this all (viśva)?’268

that very Śańkara’. PM ad MM 19 [PM 19] quotes SpK I 3.254 Cf. BĀU IV 4, 18: te nicikyur brahma purāņam agryam, ‘They have realised the ancient primordial Brahman.255 See Utpaladeva’s ĪPvŗ I 1, 2, where the term ādisiddha of the kārikā, lit., ‘established from the beginning’, or ‘logically prior’, is glossed both by pūrvasiddha ‘formerly established’ and purāņa ‘ancient’. It means that the cognizer is prior to the cognition, that he is its condition sine qua non. The subject precedes the object, which is but the object of his cognition, and as such is established (siddha) first. This question of the Lord’s ādisiddhatva is discussed at length in SpN I 2, while answering the Buddhist objection that there is no Self, no ultimately real Knower; that which we consider real is, for want of a better word (cf. SpN I 4) a continuum, a series, of cognitions (jñānasantāna). Kşemarāja demonstrates that a denying subject is needed for denying the Self; in other words, that without a denying Self, there cannot be denial of the Self, for this denial would be then a painting without a canvas (abhittikam etac citram). The proof of the reality of the Lord is precisely his manifestation as denying subject. Therefore the text can conclude: bhagavān ādisiddhasvaprakāśamūrtir astīti, ‘The Lord, being logically prior (ādisiddha), and in the form of self-luminosity, does exist’. Such arguments as to the logical priority of the Self or consciousness are found in all the Indian idealisms: cf. Śańkara’s Upadeśasāhasrī 97: siddhā tarhy ātmanaḥ pramātuḥ svataḥsiddhiḥ pramāņanirapekṣatayaiva. In ĪPVV I 1,2 (vol. I:51), AG, while answering the objection that in the case of fire inferred from smoke, it is smoke that is established first, contrasts that sort of priority with the priority of the Self, which is qualified as purāņa, since there cannot be any objectification of the Self, the pure subject. See also SpP avat., p. 6, which deals with the concept of ādisiddhatva while demonstrating the irrefutability of the Spanda doctrine. Thus ĪPK (I 1, 2) affirms the logical priority of the Self, i.e., the spanda: ata eveśvarapratyabhijñāyām ādisiddhir ity uktam (correcting a misprint [ādisiddhar] in Dyczkowski’s edition). In ĪPV I 1, 2 (vol. I: 55), AG glosses the term ādisiddha with avicchinnaprakāśa, ‘of uninterrupted light’, and relates it to the next word of the kārikā, maheśvara, the ‘sovereign Lord’ — who is such on account of his being uninterrupted light, manifesting himself thereby as omniscient (jñatŗ) and omnipotent (kartŗ). AG attributes the meaning ‘eternal’ (see Pandey’s transl., p. 10), or ‘eternally present’, to ādisiddha — a meaning that can be retained in YR’s commentary, where ādisiddha glosses anādi, ‘beginningless’. On purāņa, see YR ad 7; also the avat. ad 47-50, which refers to the concept of ādisiddhatā.256 The expression addresses the problem common to all monisms: how can one reconcile the oneness of the Lord, the only Real, with phenomenal diversity? The Lord’s immanence consists in his being the consciousness of each and every finite being, from the Rudras to the kşetrajñas. guhā, ‘cavern’, is a designation of māyā, ‘power of differentiation’, or ‘delusion’. It is not to be taken as a mere metaphor; rather, it is a technical term that designates one aspect or level of māyā, seen as threefold; see n. 246.257 The phrase associating rudras and kşetrajñas recurs as a motif in Trika texts; cf. YR ad 5, 6, 14, 23 and ŚSV, mańgalācaraņa: rudrakşetrajñavargaḥ samudayad yato yatra viśrāntim ŗcched [...] caitanyaṃ śāñkaraṃ taj jayati, ‘Victory to this consciousness of Śańkara from which proceeds the host of Rudras and kşetrajñas, and in which they come to rest’. It is a way of

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Yet, for all that, the nature of the Lord is not merely transcendent (samuttīrņa); therefore the master says: ‘[You] who abide in all that moves and all that moves not’, for he is ever present also in the form of this sentient and insentient universe, as has been said:

Since You are indeed the creator of All, O You, who permeate all, therefore, You alone are this All.269

In accordance with this rule, it makes no sense to posit as an effect some other unmanifest (aprakāśamāna) entity that is not part of that [manifesting cause].270

According to the Spandakārikā:

classifying the multitude of cognizers (pramātŗ) — or, as stated by PS 5, of ‘enjoyers’ (bhoktŗ) — endowed with bodies (or, more generally, ‘forms’), faculties (karaņā) and the corresponding attributes (guņa), into a hierarchy of categories, according to the degrees of excellence of their faculties: gods (Rudra, etc., viz., Brahma and Vişņu), men (among which the yogins enjoy extraordinary faculties and powers), and ‘animals’, this latter category including stationary beings (sthāvarā) such as plants; see Appendix 1, p. 317.258 The analogy of the actor is recurrent in Indian speculation, one of the better-known examples being the danseuse (or actress) of the Sāṃkhyakārikā. The theory of the seven subjects (saptapramātŗ) is implicitly referred to here. See YR ad 14, and SpN I 1 quoted in Appendix 10, p. 330. For the same analogy of Śiva as an actor, see YR ad 5 and 26.259 The juxtaposition of the two epithets sarvālaya and sarvacarācarastha points once again to the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the Lord. The epithet sarvālaya is another formulation of SpK I 2: yatra sthitam idaṃ sarvaṃ kāryam [...], ‘[The One, i.e., Consciousness] in whom is situated all this product, i.e., all this world [produced by that Agent who is the Lord, or Consciousness ...]’.260 On jagat, see, esp., n. 465.261 kila — see Emeneau 1969: 241ff. The commentator wishes, as it were, to distance himself from such a report, without denying it.262 Cf. ĪPK I 4, 8: tan mayā dŗśyate dŗşţo ‘yaṃ sa ity āmŗśaty api/ grāhyagrāhakatābhinnāv arthau bhātaḥ pramātari, ‘Therefore, when there is the reflective awareness "that is seen by me, that was seen by me", "this", "that", the two elements though divided into perceiving subject and perceived object are manifested within the [true] cognizer (pramātari)’ (tr. Torella ĪPK: 110).263 In SpK I 2, the term corresponding to unmagna is nirgata: yatra sthitaṃ idaṃ sarvaṃ kāryaṃ yasmāc ca nirgatam.264 Cf. the apekşā of the grammarians — the ‘expectation’ or ‘need’ aroused by one word for another in a tight syntactical relationship, as the apekşā of an active transitive verb for an accusative direct object.265 This is the first statement, in YR’s commentary, of a major thesis of the Śaivism of Kashmir: only that exists which shines, i.e., that alone exists which is known. This fundamental principle will come up again in the discussion of kā. 5, 7 and 8, as well as in kā. 30 and its commentary, where it will be given as a formula, unfortunately truncated, quoted by YR: [...] nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate, ‘[...] That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself [lit., ‘illumine’]’. — or ‘the absence of appearance does not appear’. Cf. SpN I 2: iha yat kiñcit [...] tad yadi na prakāśate na kiñcit, ‘Whatever is here, in this world, [...] if it does not shine forth [viz., appear], it is nothing [i.e., it does not exist]’; again in PS 49; also ĪPK I 5, 3b (quoted in SpN I 5): prakāśātmā prakāśyo ‘rtho nāprakāśaś ca siddhyati //, ‘The object that is made manifest [lit., ‘that is illumined’] has Light/consciousness for its essence. That which is not Light does not exist [lit., ‘cannot be established’]’; also Ajaḍapramātŗsiddhi [APS] 13, quoted in SpN I 5 and ĪPV I 1, 5 (part of the second hemistich) and I 5, 3 (entire verse): evam ātmany asatkalpāḥ prakāśasyaiva’santy amī / jaḍāḥ prakāśa evāsti svātmanaḥ svaparātmabhiḥ //, ‘Those objects, insentient, are treated as (or "seem to be") inexistent vis-a-vis the Self; nevertheless, they do

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It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment,271

it is the Lord himself who appears (cakāsti), now one way, now another.In other words, to You, who are such, that is, who are unsurpassed, who take the

form of that god who is the Self of everything, and who, though in essence the marvel of supreme ipseity (parāhantācamatkāra),272 have yet assumed diversity; and, even more, to You who are supreme Light, free from duality (advaya); to You who are, as well, extreme, infrangible freedom; to You, O Lord Śaṃbhu, I come [for refuge]. I absorb myself (samāviśāmi) in You alone who are such, that is, who are my own Self

exist as belonging to Light; the Light of one’s own Self alone exists, [whether it comes] from the selves of others or one’s own’. The context in which ĪPV I 1, 5 quotes this verse (second hemistich) may aid in its understanding: paratvaṃ kevalam upādher dehādeḥ sa cāpi vicārito yāvan nānya iti viśvaḥ pramāttvargaḥ paramārthata ekaḥ pramātā sa eva cāsti/ tad uktaṃ prakāśa evāsti svātmanaḥ svaparātmabhir iti/ tataś ca bhagavān sadāśivo jānātīty atahprabhŗti krimir api jānātītyantam eka eva pramātā, ‘Otherness only derives from limiting conditions such as the body, and these [limiting conditions themselves], as soon as they are investigated, [turn out] not [to be] different [from the universal Self]; therefore the entire crowd of knowers is, in truth, one knower, and this [knower] alone exists. This has been said [by Utpaladeva]: "The Light of one’s own Self alone exists, [whether it comes] from the selves of others or one’s own". So there is just one knower, whether expressed as "Lord Sadāśiva knows" or even as "the worm knows." ’ An echo of that verse may be found in YR’s gloss ad 58. The Trika notion according to which there is no other reality than Light/consciousness, and the correlated concept of ‘reflection’ (pratibimba) are anticipated in Kāţhakopanişad [KāU] II 2,14-15: tad etad iti manyante ‘nirdeśyaṃ paramaṃ sukham/ kathaṃ nu tad vijānīyāṃ kim u bhāti vibhāti vā// na tatra sūryo bhāti na candratārakaṃ nemā vidyuto bhānti kuto ‘yam agniḥ/ tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ tasya bhāsā sarvam idaṃ vibhāti//, ‘This is that and thus they recognise the ineffable, Supreme Bliss. How then may I come to know this? Does it shine (of itself) or does it shine (in reflection)? The sun shines not there, nor the moon and the stars, these lightnings shine not, where then could this fire be? Everything shines only after that shining light. His shining illumines all this world’; note that KāU II 2, 15 = MuU II 2, 10, Śvetāśvataropanişad [ŚvU] VI 14.266 pratyavamarśa.267 Such reflections are ancient; see Appendix 2, p. 318. Cf. YR ad 17.268 The question is likely inspired by the grammatical notion of the pronoun (sarvanāma) — a (single) noun capable of representing a multiplicity of other nouns: ‘whence comes this multiplicity to which we refer by a single word, the Lord?’ In a sense, the Lord is the prototype of the pronoun.269 The source of the quotation has not been discovered. For the reasoning, see SpN I 2, quoted n. 265. See also the lost commentary of Somānanda on the Parātrīśikā [PT], quoted in Parātrīśikāvivaraņa [PTV] 4 (Singh PTV: 32, Skt. text): kiṃ bahunā sarvam evānuttaram anuttaratvāt, ‘Why say more? All [this universe] is unsurpassed, because he [the Lord] is unsurpassed’.270 For if it were an effect, it would ipso facto be manifest. YR presumes here a "world" that would not be part of the Lord, which would be nothing but an "effect" separated from him and therefore devoid of "luminosity". But such a supposition contradicts itself, for how would such a "world" make itself known? Similar phraseology and reasoning in YR ad 27: anyasyaitadvyatiriktasya aprakāśarūpasya prakāśamānatābhāvāt; also in YR ad 5 and 10-11.271 SpK II 4b. ŚSV I 14 observes that this verse hints at the bhedābheda state of experience. YR quotes again SpK II 4b in his gloss ad 74.272 First occurrence in this text of a key concept of this school: camatkāra is one of the notions common to Kashmiri aesthetics and speculation. The term characterizes both an aesthetics

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in the marvelous form of supreme ipseity to be experienced by making use of the adventitious ego (kŗtimāhańkārā)273 [that limits the Self] to the body, etc.

With this summary sentence,274 which teaches that the supreme state to be attained is absorption in [what is already] one’s own essence (sva-svābhāvā), the teacher has stated in abbreviated form the purport of the text in its entirety, via notions of what must be done and what must not be done that will be explained in detail later.275

Kārikās 2-3Thus, through the intermediary of this verse of praise, the author has stated the essential purport of the manual,276 namely, nonduality. Now, making explicit [as is

(rasāsvāda) and a mystical experience (brahmāsvāda) — which are ‘analogically related, but differentiable’ (Gerow 1994: 188) — via a shared aspect: that of ‘wonder’, ‘wonderment’. In the attempt to understand or describe and name this experience, other concepts have been forged that emphasize its other dimensions, involving two main semantic fields: nirvŗti, ‘serenity’, ānanda, ‘bliss’, ātmaviśrānti, ‘repose in the Self’, on the one hand, and rasa, ‘flavor’, carvaņā, ‘delectation’ (lit., ‘mastication’), on the other. All these terms are common to both fields of experience, even if they appear to have greater scope in aesthetics; see ABh ad NŚ VI 31, vol. I: 279, which justifies such technical terms on the basis of their common use: tathā hi loke sakalavighnavinirmuktā saṃvittir eva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdair abhidhīyate, ‘For, in ordinary life, by the various words "wonderment" (camatkāra), "immersion" (nirveśa), "relishing" (rasanā), "tasting" (āsvādana), "perfect realization of enjoyment" (bhogasamāpatti), "absorption" (laya) [lit., ‘dissolution’], "resting" (viśrānti), etc., is expressed that [form of] consciousness which is free from any obstacle’; see Appendix 3, p. 320.273 That is, by instrumentalizing the adventitious, ‘manifest’, ego in the quest for transcendence. The concrete ego is, as Śańkara observes, the existential form of the transcendent absolute.274 grahaņakavākya.275 What is to be attained is identification with the anuttara, that is, with one’s own Self; what is to be abandoned is the kŗtrimāhańkāra, the ‘adventitious ego’, that considers the Self limited to the body, and identifies with wordly experience. Similar statement in Rāmakaņţha’s commentary on SpK, commonly known as the Vivŗti, "Extensive Explanation" [SpV], although entitled Spandasūtrārthāvalī, the Necklace of Meanings [Strung Upon] the Thread of the Spanda [a pun on ‘sūtra’]; see SpV I 1: vyākhyātaś ca ayam ādiślokaḥ samastaprakaraņārthopakşepagarbhaḥ, ‘Thus we have shown that this first verse contains, in a nutshell, the meaning of the entire work (or manual)’.276 prakaraņa — AG’s verses are also referred to as a prakaraņa in the avat. ad PS 105. See Vācaspatya s.v.: śāstrasiddhāntapratipādake granthabhede, ‘[prakaraņa] means a category of text expounding the established doctrine of a system’, and, quoting Vedāntasāra 3, refers to it as an example of the textual genre: asya vedāntaprakaraņatvāt [...],’ [It is thus called] because it has for its topic the Vedānta [...]’. In fact, the primary sense of prakaraņa is ‘topic’ (asmin prakaraņe, etc.), but the term is employed, by synecdoche, to designate a text that introduces a topic, which therefore constitutes an ‘introduction’ to it that is considered elementary; the term also designates one of the ten types of rūpaka, which has for its subject "topical" matters, that is, does not deal with otherworldly gods or heroes. See also the Vidvanmanorañjanī ad Vedāntasāra 3, which quotes Parāśaropapurāņa XVIII 21-22: śāstraikadeśasaṃbandhaṃ śāstrakāryāntare sthitam/ āhuḥ prakaraņaṃ nāma granthabhedo vipaścitaḥ//, ‘The learned call prakaraņa that particular category of texts which deals with one part of a system or is established in [service of some] other purpose of the system [e.g., as a manual]’. Note that the Spandakārikā is defined by Rāmakaņţha (see n. 275) as belonging to the same class of texts, that of prakaraņa.

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required at the beginning of a treatise of this sort] the ‘descent of the śāstra’,277 he explains, in the following two āryās, its subject matter, its relation [to that subject matter, that is, the relevance thereto of this work and of the entire Śaiva doctrine there expounded], etc.:278

2. Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts with our residence in the womb and ends with dying, a disciple inquired of the revered Ādhāra concerning ultimate reality.

3.The Teacher replied to him by [reciting] the Ādhārakārikā.279 [Now] Abhinavagupta expounds the essence of that [instruction], from the point of view of the Śaiva teachings.280

277 śāstrāvatāra — a śāstra involves transmission through a tradition, which transmission may be of five sorts, which SpP, avat, p. 2 expounds in detail: tatrāmīşāṃ śāstrāņāṃ saṃbandhas tāvat pañcavidhaḥ/ paro mahān divyo divyetara itaretaraś ceti, ‘The relationship [between those who reveal] these śāstras [and their disciples] can be of five kinds, namely, "supreme", "great", "divine", "human", or "mutual" ‘. For further details on this classification, see Dyczkowski SpK: 360.278 The ‘etc’ covers the two remaining aspects of the ‘descent’, namely, the aptitude of the pupil (‘is he qualified?’) and the goal presupposed by the teaching (‘is it possible of realization?’). Here is an example of the methodology of Indian hermeneutics, whose objective is to establish, at the threshold of the text to be commented upon, the anubandhas, that is the ‘preliminary considerations’ or ‘requisites’ as Hiriyanna translates the term in his edition of the Vedāntasāra (pp. 20 and 45), without which no study of śāstra should be undertaken. The main anubandhas are four: the determination of the disciple’s aptitude (adhikāra) to study the matter at issue (it concerns as well his ritual and social qualifications), the subject (vişaya), the mutual relation (saṃbandha), the end to be attained (prayojana). As the Vedāntasāra explains, saṃbandha means ‘the relation of what has to be made known — that is, in the vedāntic system, the identity between brahman and the individual self — to the means of making it known, namely, in this case, the upanişads, which are the [right] propounder’ (saṃbandhas tu tadaikyaprameyasya tatpratipādakopanişatpramāņasya ca). Here, PS 2-3 present the same four anubandhas, namely, the description of the adhikārin (‘Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts with our residence in the womb and ends with dying, a disciple inquired of the revered Ādhāra concerning ultimate reality’); the subject-matter (vişaya, or abhidheya), namely, ‘ultimate reality’; the relationship (saṃbandha) the treatise bears to its subject, namely, that of expounder (pratipādaka) to expounded (pratipādya), in keeping with the Śaiva nondualistic doctrine; the objective (prayojana) of the treatise, namely, attaining the realization of the identity of Śiva and paśu, culminating in liberation from the ‘cycle of sufferings’. As observed by YR, PS 2-3 has recourse to a fifth anubandha: the abhidhāna or title, namely, Paramārthasāra — hinted at in the two āryās by paramārtham (kā. 2) and tatsāram (kā. 3). Rāmakaņţha’s commentary on SpK I 1 is a remarkable example of the application of these hermeneutical rules; such is the case with the SpP, avat., p. 2-3, respectively: vācyo ‘rthaḥ/ vācakaṃ śāstram/ spandābhidho ‘rtho ‘tra vācyaḥ/ tadvācakatvād upacārāc chāstrasyāpy etatsamjñā/, ‘The denoted [subject] is [supreme] reality; the denotator is the śāstra. The reality denoted here is called spanda, and, by extension (upacārāt), insofar as it denotes it, spanda is also the name of the śāstra’; and (p. 6): upāyopeyapratipādanam eva śāstrasya prayojanam/ yā tadavabodhād upeyasvarūpāpataḥ sthirā tad eva prayojanaprayojanam iti, ‘The purpose (prayojanā) of the treatise is to explain the means and goal [of spiritual realization]. The purpose of the purpose is to achieve a permanent realization of one’s own nature, which is the [supreme] goal attained by an enlightened insight [into the means and goal]’ (tr. Dyczkowski 1994: 142).279 On the authorship of the first Paramārthasāra and its different titles, as well as on the relationship between the two Paramārthasāra, see Intr., p. 2ff.

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A certain [student], having cultivated dispassion281 through the grace (prasādā) of the Lord, and having withdrawn his mind from the world of transmigration,282 came to realize that he needed to be instructed by a teacher. Having propitiated properly283

the revered Ādhāra, who was for him the true teacher (sadguru), namely, the sage called also Śeşa, he inquired of him concerning the nature of ultimate reality [and whether it was attainable] through instruction.

Thereupon, considering, in order, [the disciple’s] entitlement, his maturity, and his determination,284 and having thus judged him, the disciple, to be endowed with a receptive heart,285 that very Anantanātha, wise in teaching all the doctrines without exception,286 imparted instruction, saying: ‘[Knowledge of] the transcendental brahman (parabrahman),287 may be attained through the text entitled Paramārthasāra, also called the "Verses of Ādhāra" (Ādhārakārikā), via the discrimination of puruşa from prakŗti, according to the principles of the Sāṃkhya system’.288 The teacher [viz., Abhinavagupta], motivated by the need to show favor

280 Kārikās 2 and 3 are in the āryā meter, as is the rest of the text, with the exception of the first verse, which is a trişţubh. AG’s PS 2-3 correspond to a longer narrative in ĀPS 3-9 (omitted in the edition of the Śabdakalpadruma, probably because it does not directly rely on the canonical exposition of the Vedānta that is expected). Besides, it should be noted that PS 2a (garbhādhivāsapūrvakamaraņāntakaduhkhacakravibhrāntaḥ) echoes both ĀPS 3a (garbhagŗhavāsasaṃbhavajanmajarāmaraņaviprayogābdhau) and 54b (janmajarāmaraņamaye cakra iva bhrāmyate jantuḥ).281 vairāgya. Cf. TĀ XIII 98: vairāgyaṃ bhogavairasyaṃ, ‘vairāgya is disgust with [respect to] objects of enjoyment’ and TĀV XIII 100: vairāgyaṃ nāma bhogebhyo vaimukhyam ucyate iti, ‘repugnance [felt] toward objects of enjoyment is called vairāgya’.282 Cf. ĀPS 4b: saṃsārārņavataraņapraśnaṃ pŗcchāmy ahaṃ bhagavan, ‘Thee, O Lord, I ask the question of how to cross the ocean of transmigration’.283 APS 3 shows the pupil ‘making obeisance with his hands’ (prāñjali) and eulogizing the guru (kā. 4).284 pariśīlana.285 vigalitāntaḥkaraņa. Or ‘whose heart has been emptied [of its cares]’. A probable explanation of this expression is given further in YR ad 2-3: ‘whose heart is pierced with (viddhahŗdaya) the energy of the Supreme Lord’s favor (anugrahaśakti)’, see also YR ad 103: vivekārdrahŗdayaiḥ, ‘by those whose hearts are softened by discrimination [that is, whose minds have been rendered susceptible to this doctrine by their powers of insight]’.286 Note the pun: the one who is Śeşa (‘remainder’) knows all (niḥśeşa, ‘without any remnant’) the doctrines.287 This ‘qualification’, in constant usage, should be taken more or less hyperbolically: it is not thereby suggested that ‘other’ brahman(s) of lower quality are to be noticed. Rather the compound is understood more or less as an appositional karmadhāraya — the brahman that is the ultimate, or the transcendental brahman. It is for this reason that we have generally avoided the translation ‘supreme’ — suggesting quasi-political dominance — in preference to ‘ultimate’, or ‘transcendental’, which looks only to the limit beyond which there is nothing. The same principle has been applied to the translation of parapramātŗ.288 YR offers here a summary of what is at stake in the disciple’s query, after the manner of AG, who gives in two kārikās (2-3) the essential meaning of the introductory passage of Ādiśeşa’s PS: (kā. 3-7: ‘[...] explain to me prakŗti and puruşa’), to which the guru responds (kā. 8-9): ‘I shall propound this "Essence of Ultimate Reality", after making obeisance to that Upendra [Vişņu], by whom this unreal world was made from prakŗti as something seemingly real (satyam iva)’. Cf. also ĀPS 70a: evaṃ prakrtiṃ puruşaṃ vijñāya [...], ‘Thus having recognized prakŗti and puruşa as distinct [...]’; and ĀPS 75: buddhvā vibhaktāṃ prakŗtiṃ puruşaḥ [...], ‘When the puruşa has understood prakŗti as different [from himself ...]’.

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(anugraha) to others, [now] expounds the essence of it, just as one extracts butter from curds;289 that is, he expounds the essence of teachings on ultimate reality in keeping with the Śaiva principle of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality (paramādvaya), in order to show favor to all creatures. It is he who realized that the teachings concerning brahman are supplied with irrefutable arguments when expounded from the point of view of [the notion of] one’s own freedom, in the form of ultimate nonduality. [By his very name,] which, even as a sequence of syllables, is auspicious, that teacher may be said to be hidden (guptā); and is himself a secret (guhya), that is, he is possessed of secret [wisdom] (sarahasya), due to [his experiencing] the ever new (abhinava), supramundane,290 sudden burst (sphāra) of the state of wonder (camatkāra) that is consciousness.291

Thus have been expounded the objective of the text, its title, subject matter, and the mutual relation [of the subject matter to the means of making it known], etc.,292 but they are not elaborated here for fear of making the text overly prolix.

Now how is the disciple described?The master replies: ‘[Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts

with our] residence in the womb’.Wandering, that is, at a loss, in the cycle (cakra) that consists of suffering and

ends with dying — a ‘cycle’ so-called because it is like a wheel (cakram iva),293

whose [revolutions are the] existences294 shaped by successive appearances and disappearances [of the disciple, viz., his births and deaths].

289 The analogy is a variant of the topos according to which the goose (haṃsa) is said to be capable of separating the milk from a mixture of milk and water; cf. TĀ IV 134-136, especially TĀ IV 136b: tatpunaḥ pibati prītyā haṃso ‘haṃ sa iti sphuran//, ‘The resplendent goose drinks all that again [viz., he reabsorbs the universe] with pleasure [JR: prītiḥ ānandaḥ svātantriyaṃ], saying to himself: " ‘haṃ saḥ, viz., I am that."’ The subject, once aware of his identity with the universe, becomes the supreme subject — the haṃsa serving as an image of the jīvanmukta. TĀV ad loc. glosses ahaṃ saḥ as: ahaṃ parapramātŗrūpo ‘pi saviśvasphāraḥ saviśvasphāro ‘pi vā aham eva/ iti akŗtrimeņa sŗştisamhārakāriņā svabhāvabhūtena vimarśena sātatyena pravŗttatvād avicchinnatayā prasphuran, ‘The "I", though the transcendental cognizer, bursts forth in the form of the universe, or, though bursting forth in the form of the universe, is the "I" alone; resplendent, undivided [lit., ‘in its lack of internal differentiation’], due to its constant activization through [viz., realized in the form of] reflective awareness, its very essence — reflective awareness [that is, the corresponding activization] that is the non-adventitious cause of creation and reabsorption’; also TĀV ad loc: haṃsaḥ [...] parapramātā; punaḥ sŗşţyādyuttarakālam.290 alaukika.291 Numerous are the esoteric etymologies of the name Abhinavagupta, some given in his own works, some in their commentaries. See PS 104 and its gloss.292 See n. 278.293 Cf. ĀPS 54b: janmajarāmaraņamaye cakra iva bhrāmyate jantuḥ.294 saṃsaraņa.

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One may see as its felly the six ‘modifications of becoming’295 [which any limited soul undergoes when passing] through the variety of states consequent upon residence in the womb, namely, birth, existence, growth, change, decay and death.296

By this description is suggested that the disciple’s awakening is becoming evident, which implies remembrance of his previous births.297 Otherwise, how can the curiosity that prompts him to pursue acquisition of the supreme benefit be explained?298

And [it is also here suggested that] he is a worthy receptacle for the teacher’s instruction in whom dispassion has developed, whose heart is pierced by the energy of the Supreme Lord’s favor (anugrahaśakti), and by whom correct knowledge (samyagjñānā) has been acquired; thus, it is such a one alone who desires knowledge of ultimate nonduality, having approached a suitable teacher, an incarnation of the Supreme Lord. And this has already been said elsewhere:

O Goddess, he is led toward the true teacher by the Lord’s grace.299

This will be stated later in this treatise.

Kārikā 4The master has thus established a basis [for the text] by [expounding] the process of its origin. Now, he starts the text [proper] by stating, as regards this world, marvelous with the diversity of everything in it, that it is the supreme freedom of the Supreme Lord alone that constitutes the source of agency (kartŗtvā),300 [made manifest in] conjoining or disjoining [the host of his energies, bringing about, on the one hand, the

295 bhāvavikāra — Renou (BSBh: 12) translates bhāvavikāra as ‘modifications du devenir’ (‘modifications of becoming’, Sarup Nirukta), whereas Thibaut (Vedāntasūtra: 16) renders it as ‘forms of existence’ or ‘stages of existence’. Renou (BSBh: 12, n. 7) adds that, according to Vārşyāyaņi (on Nirukta I 2), the theory of the six bhāvavikāras is given in order to defend the thesis that the verb has as its fundamental idea ‘to become’, whereas the noun has for its fundamental idea ‘to be (such and such)’ [‘Le verbe a pour notion fondamentale le devenir (le nom ayant pour notion fondamentale l’etre)’]. Moreover, as does YR here, the Nirukta expresses those ‘modifications’ as verbal forms, with a slight alteration in the order of enumeration. See also Vākyapadīya [VP] I 3 and III 33ff.; Ś ad BhG [BhGBh] II 20 (verse quoted in YR ad 7); see Ruegg 1959: 24-25, on the difficulty raised by the inclusion of asti, ‘to be’, in the list of modifications of action.296 ĀPS 3a enumerates four of these bhāvavikāras as consequent upon dwelling in the womb (garbhagŗhavāsa): saṃbhava, janman, jarā, maraņa; ĀPS 54, three: janman, jarā, maraņa.297 Had he not remembered his previous births, he would not have been aware of this unending cycle, which he can no longer bear. It is this awareness that serves as his awakening, and prompts the enquiry addressed to his guru.298 Lit., ‘how can the curiosity [that prompts him] to pose questions as to acquisition of the supreme benefit [...]’.299 The exact source of this quotation has not been found. Compare, however, TĀ XIII 249b: rudraśaktisamāvişţo nīyate sadguruṃ prati//, and TĀV XIII 248b-249a, which quotes: rudraśaktisamāvişţaḥ sa śivecchayā/ bhuktimuktiprasiddhyarthaṃ nīyate sadguruṃ prati//, a text very similar to TĀ IV 35: śrīpūrvaśāstre tenoktaṃ sa yiyāsuḥ śivecchayā/ bhuktimuktiprasiddhyarthaṃ nīyate sadguruṃ prati, ‘It is said in the Ancient Treatise [viz., the Mālinīvijayottaratantra]: "He who, thanks to Siva’s will, wishes to go to the true teacher, is led to him so that he may obtain enjoyment and liberation."’ The question of the intensity of śaktipāta will be taken up in kā. 9 (and YR ad loc), YR ad 18, kā. 96-97 (and YR ad loc). The KSTS includes a second line of quotation which we have chosen to omit: see our ‘List of variants’ in ‘On the Sanskrit text’.

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dissolution, on the other, the creation of the universe]301 — thus making known that this universe is nothing but the blossoming of his energies (śaktivikāsa) through the intermediary of the four [concentric] spheres (aņḍa):302

4. Displaying the glorious superabundance303 of his own energies, the Lord has brought forth this tetrad of spheres.304 As divided one from another, they are named Energy, Illusion, Nature and Earth.305

By the Lord — Lord Maheśvara, who is free [from any constraint], a uniform mass of blissful consciousness —

300 Note the difference between kartŗ and hetu — doubtless based on the usage of the grammarians (cf. P. I 4, 54-55), who, among other things, thus distinguish the ‘agent’ of the causative verb from the ‘agent’ of its embedded base verb.301 We have interpreted saṃyojana and viyojana as the conjunction and the disjunction of the Lord’s śaktis, taking into consideration the lines of the avat. as well as the kārikā itself. Moreover, this interpretation is supported by Kşemarāja’s commentary on SpK I 1 (p. 6): yasyonmeşanimeşābhyāṃ jagataḥ pralayodayau/ taṃ śakticakravibhavaprabhavaṃ śańkaraṃ stumaḥ//, ‘We laud that Śańkara by the opening and shutting of whose eye-lids the world appears and dissolves, and who is the source of the glorious display of the Wheel of energies (śakticakravibhava)’. As does here the avat., SpN I 1 explains śakticakravibhava in terms of the saṃyojana and viyojana of the Lord’s śaktis: tasya śakticakrasyābhāsaparamārthasya viśvasya yo vibhavaḥ parasparasaṃyojanāviyojanāvaicitryam anantaprakāraṃ tasya prabhavaṃ kāraņam/ sa eva hi bhagavān vijñānadehātmakān svātmaikātmyena sthitān viśvān ābhāsān anyonyaṃ nānāvaicitryeņa saṃyojayan viyojayaṃś ca viśvodayapralayahetuḥ/, ‘ "Glorious display" (vibhava) means the infinite variety of the conjunction and disjunction of the Lord’s energies vis-a-vis each other, which thus appear as a wheel [lit., ‘the conjunction and disjunction with each other of the Wheel of energies’]; a Wheel of energies whose ultimate meaning is the manifestation, viz., the universe. [The Lord] is the source (prabhavā) [of this glorious display], its cause. Thus, the Lord mutually joins and disjoins, in an infinity of ways, all objective phenomena (ābhāsa) [lit., ‘appearances’, ‘manifestations’], which are [in reality] of the nature of consciousness and exist within him as identical with him [for they are nothing but his śaktis]. He is [in that way] the cause of the manifestation and dissolution of the universe’. According to this interpretation, the conjunction, or fusion, of the Lord’s energies — of phenomena — amounts to the dissolution of the world, whereas their disjunction, or diffusion, amounts to the creation of the world in all its wonderful diversity. Such is also the explanation of Rāmakaņţha: according to the SpV (p. 3) on the same SpK I 1, the manifestation (udaya) and the reabsorption (pralaya) of the world take place, respectively, through the extension (prasara) and the reabsorption (pralaya) of the Lord’s energies. In keeping with one of the traditional exegeses of SpK I 1, Rāmakaņţha demonstrates that the members of the two compounds unmeşanimeşābhyām and pralayodayau are organized as a chiasmus, with unmeşa related to udaya and nimeşa to pralaya: yasyonmeşanimeşābhyāṃ śaktiprasarapralayābhyāṃ jagato viśvasya pralayodayau vināśaprādur bhāvau/ atra yathāsamkhyaṃ na vivakşitam iti vakşyāmaḥ, ‘The reabsorption and the manifestation, that is, the end and the generation, of the world take place through the opening and shutting of his eye-lids, i.e., by the expansion and reabsorption (°prasarapralaya) of his energies. The meaning intended here involves a reversal in the order of words’. Note that the term yathāsaṃkhyam designates a principle of ordering two parallel lists in such a way that the terms of the second list mimic in order those in the first: ABCD abcd (see P. I 3, 10). Rāmakaņţha, here, observes that this principle is not observed in the present case. Moreover, YR commenting upon nijaśaktivaibhavabharāt uses the same terminology, vaibhava explained as vicitraḥ prasaraḥ. On the Wheel of energies whose circumference is the universe and the hub the divine Heart, see Kşemarāja

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this tetrad of spheres, consisting of the aggregate of [all] entities (vastupiņḍa), is so called inasmuch as it covers306 the universe as does a sheath (kośa). As has been said:

[...] the aggregate of entities is called an ‘egg’ (aņḍā).307

[This tetrad] has been brought forth, that is, has been made manifest, or rather made effective, by [his own free] agency of becoming (bhavanakartŗta).308

How? The master says: ‘By display of the glorious superabundance of his own energies’.

(Spandasaṃdoha [SpS] ad SpK I 1), and AG’s Dehasthadevatācakrastotra, along with its extensive commentary by Silburn (pp. 89-97). See also PS 65 and YR ad loc.302 The multiplicity of spheres poses the problem of their relashionship. Śaiva doctrine assumes them to be concentric, that is to say, the inner contained within the outer.303 Lit., ‘By the superabundance of the glorious display [...]’. Our translation of °vaibhava is borrowed from Silburn’s ‘glorieux deploiement’ in her translation of SpK I 1 (Silburn SpK: 61).304 Cf. ŚS III 30 [in the textual organisation of the ŚS]: svaśaktipracayo ‘sya viśvam.305 As regards AG’s rewriting or adaptation of ĀPS, it may be observed that the term aņḍa is found in ĀPS 10, although in its usual sense of cosmic ‘egg’, and not as a notion specific to the Śaivism of Kashmir. Creation, viewed as a tetrad of spheres, is a novel idea proper to Āgamas such as MVT. Although this concept of aņḍacatuşţaya may be seen as implicit in Sāṃkhya, insofar as it is related to the doctrine of the tattvas that Sāṃkhya does develop, it occurs here in an altogether different context, with an altogether different import: the tetrad of spheres is an ontological requirement of the system (see Appendix 5, p. 323).306 ācchādaka.307 Segment of TĀ VIII 169b, which is a quote from the Rauravāgama. TĀV ad loc. (vol. IV: 1474, in Dwivedi, Rastogi TĀ; all references to TĀ and TĀV will be made to this ed.) explains vastupiņḍa as a samudāya, ‘aggregate’, of ‘entities’, namely, ‘bodies, faculties, etc’ (aņḍo hi nāma vastūnāṃ tanvakşādīnāṃ piņḍaḥ samudāya ucyate, tad asya lakşaņam ity arthaḥ). The term vastu is further explained in TĀ itself (VIII 176b-177a): [...] vastuśabdena tanvakşabhuvanātmakam// rūpam uktaṃ yatas tena tatsamūho ‘ņḍa ucyate/, ‘The word "entity" (vastu) refers to a form (rūpa) of bodies, faculties, or worlds. Thus, by this term, their assemblage is referred to, called aņḍa, "envelope" [lit., "egg"]’. Thus, here, YR quotes a part of the much longer definition that TĀ VIII 169-170 borrows from the Raurava[āgama]. This cryptic quote is further glossed by TĀ XI 171-172, which provides the key for understanding the concept: vastupiņḍa iti proktaṃ śivaśaktisamūhabhāk/ aņḍaḥ syād iti tadvyaktau saṃmukhībhāva ucyate// tathāpi śivamagnānāṃ śaktīnām aņḍatā bhavet/ tadarthaṃ vākyam aparaṃ tā hi na cyutaśaktitaḥ//, ‘Since this aņḍa, which is [essentially] an assemblage of Śiva’s energies, has been described as "aggregate of entities", it is spoken of as their [energies’] objectification, in the process of manifestation. Even so [one may object], the condition of being aņḍa could be predicated of the energies that are immersed in [i.e., that are one with] Śiva. For that reason [i.e., in order to avoid the fault of a too wide definition], another syntagm [qualifying aņḍa, has been given, namely, pracyutaḥ śaktirūpataḥ, from which it may be inferred that] those [energies] have not deviated from their nature as energies [viz., being one with Śiva]’. It results from such a definition that the aņḍa, assuming the form of an ‘aggregate of entities’, namely, bodies, faculties, and worlds, is the first externalization, or objectification, of the host of Siva’s śaktis. Furthermore, as the concretization of the Lord’s śaktis, the aņḍa is seen as a form given to the formless, hence as a cover, veiling the pure Light of the Self/consciousness, and further covering the world that it encompasses. Thus, the other aspect of the definition of aņḍa consists in its being a cover (ācchādaka), a sheath (kośa), as explained here by YR. Therefore, the definition given by YR synthesizes the two main features of aņḍa: it represents a constriction permitting

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[That is, the Lord has brought forth this all] by and through the abundance,309 the profusion, of the glorious displays, the wonderfully variegated outflows,310 of his innate, inherent, unique host of energies, such as Will, etc.

Thus the confection of the world is indeed but the sudden bursting into bloom of the Lord’s own energies.311

As it has been said in the Sarvamańgalāśāstra:Energy (śakti) and the Possessor of energy[ies] (śaktimat) are said to be the [only] two entities. His energies constitute the entire world, but the Possessor of energies is the Great Lord.312

Of what does this tetrad of spheres313 consist?

concretization of the Lord’s śaktis; see Appendix 5, p. 323.308 bhavanakartŗtā, ‘[the Lord’s free] agency of becoming’ [lit., ‘faculty of exerting his power of becoming’], is the key word here, expressing the paradox of an Absolute (Paramaśiva, pure Being, perfect plenitude) who coexists with his own creation, necessarily external to him. The concept of an active being is thus adumbrated, suitable for an Absolute that is both consciousness (prakāśā) and self-consciousness (vimarśa), self-consciousness seen as spanda, ‘vibration, pulsation’. The term occurs in ĪPvŗ I 5, 14 defining citi, ‘consciousness’, or ‘principle of consciousness’: sattā bhavattā bhavanakartŗtā [...], ‘It [viz., consciousness, citi] is being, becoming, and agency of becoming’ (compare Torella ĪPK: 122: ‘It is existing, being, the subject of the action of being’). We prefer to translate bhavanakartŗtā as ‘[the Lord’s free] agency of becoming’, in the light of ĪPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 258-259): sattā ca bhavanakartŗtā sarvakriyāsu svātantryam, ‘sattā, "Being" [or rather, "state of being"], means bhavanakartŗtā, "agency of becoming", [which is but] freedom in all actions’; on citi, see n. 238 and n. 1049. bhavanakartŗtā designates the Lord’s faculty of exerting his power of becoming — that is, of manifesting himself as the universe, eternally and permanently present in him. Being free, Parameśvara decides to embody reality, in other words, to become "real". See again ĪPV IV 1, 6 (vol. II: 289): sattā bhavanakartŗtā sphurattārūpā, ‘His state of being, i.e., his [own free] agency of becoming (bhavanakartŗtā), is but [lit. ‘takes the form of’] his manifestation [lit., ‘flashing forth’]’. From both passages (ĪPvŗ I 5, 14 and ĪPV IV 1, 6), it appears that bhavanakartŗtā stands as a synonym for sattā and sphurattā, the latter very closely related to spanda. As such it designates the highest śakti of the Lord, for sphurattā and spanda consist of nearly imperceptible, or extremely subtle, movement: kiṃciccalana. The ‘kiṃcit’ tells us rather that the ‘movement’ at issue is not otherwise distinguished, which implies that it would be ascertainable only with difficulty, for to perceive it would be to impute to it some characteristics, a direction, an intensity, etc. — thus justifying the translation generally adopted, ‘imperceptible’ or ‘subtle’ (movement). On the notion of spanda, see Appendix 6, p. 327.309 bhara — lit., ‘burden’.310 prasara.311 bhagavataḥ kila svaśaktivikāsasphāra eva jagannirmāņam. Nearly the same formulation in ĪPvŗ IV 5: vastutaḥ śaktivikāso viśvam, ‘In reality, the universe is the blossoming of the [Lord’s] energies’, a statement which, according to ĪPVV (vol. III: 363), finds its source in ‘an Āgama such as the Śrīmańgalāśāstra’ (thus certainly referring to the famous verse: śaktayo ‘sya jagat sarvam which YR quotes here). Nevertheless, as emphasized by Śivadŗşţivŗtti [SDvŗ] III 20b, such statements are valid only from a vyāvahārika point of view. Note YR’s usage of śaktivikasvaratā (and its synonyms) in the context of liberation (ad PS 56, 60 and 61).312 śaktiś ca śaktimāṃś caiva padārthadvayam ucyate/ śaktayo ‘sya jagat sarvaṃ śaktimāṃs tu maheśvaraḥ//. See Appendix 4, p. 322.313 As underlined by Pūrņatāpratyabhijñā [PP] (prakriyāvimarśa [= II], 169, p. 21), which reformulates TĀ XI 12b-13a, the concept of aņḍa is meant to emphasize diversity: aņḍaś ca bhuvanānāṃ hi vibhāgasthitisādhakam/ tad evāvaraņaṃ prāhuḥ śaktyantaṃ tac ca saṃbhavet//, ‘It is said that aņḍa is responsible for the differentiation of the bhuvanas, that it

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The master replies: ‘Energy, Illusion, Nature, Earth’.This energy, which pertains to the Supreme Lord, belongs to the universe formed

of cognizers and objects of cognition (pramātŗprameyā), even though it is in essence nothing but the marvel of supreme ipseity. It takes the form of an activity of negation (nişedhavyāpārā) based on the failure to discern the Self (ātmākhyāti), and is effected by denying (apohanā) one’s own nature.314

This energy is called śaktyaņḍa, the ‘sphere of Energy’, in virtue of its veiling function, and its role in effecting bondage (bandha).315

[This sphere] consisting of that part [of the thirty-six principles] beginning with Sadāśiva and Īśvara and ending with śuddhavidyā, fully holds in itself the triad of the [remaining] spheres, which have yet to be explained.

Thus it is that the [supreme] energy [of the Lord] has been so designated [i.e., śaktyaņḍa], inasmuch as it takes the form of a cover. In this sphere,316 Sadāśiva and Īśvara are the presiding deities.

is an envelope [sequestering all the principles (tattva)] up to [but not including] śakti’. From śaktyaņda to pŗthvyaņḍa, the four aņḍas may be seen as concentric spheres encompassing the entire creation, itself understood as the triad of experiencer, experience and object of experience. When, at the outset, the text has recourse to the concept of the four aņḍas, diversity is not yet apprehended dynamically, in the course of its progressive manifestation via the thirty-six tattvas, which will be expounded at length in kā. 14-22, but statically, as a fixed object or entity composed of those thirty-six principles, grouped into four spheres according to increasing constrictions put upon the Lord’s absolute freedom. For a detailed exposition of the notion of aņḍa and an attempt at their interpretation, see Appendix 5, p. 323.314 By denying, negating the plenitude of the Self, apohanaśakti gives rise to difference, but this difference exists only on the level of pure subjectivity. This is why śaktyaņḍa is related to the three tattvas — Sadāśiva, Īśvara and śuddhavidyā — ordered below Śiva/Śakti, and above māyā.’śaktyaņḍa represents the state of consciousness in which difference appears as a very dim presence, a first outline of what will actually take place in māyā. On apohanaśakti, see the exposition of PP II 155b-157, which sounds like a gloss on this very passage of YR’s commentary: mātŗmeyātmaviśvasya svātmarūpasya sarvadā// parāhantācamatkārasārabhūtatayā sataḥ/ svarūpāpohanātmeyam akhyātir yāsti tanmayī// nañarthābhāvarūpātmanişedhavyāpŗtiś ca yā/ sā śaktiḥ parameśasya śaktyaņḍam iti procyate//, "The Supreme Lord is that absolute reality, eternally remaining as the essence of the marvel of supreme ipseity, whose form as the universe of cognizers and objects of cognition is [ultimately] that of the [unitary] Self. This energy (śakti) called "śaktyaņḍa" — assuming a form of non-existence [lit., ‘absence’] as denoted by the particle "na" — operates to negate the Self, for it consists in the failure to discriminate, the setting aside (apohana), of the nature of that Self [now seen as "I" and "this"]’. While explaining this notion to K. D. Tripathi orally, Rāmeśvara Jhā used to add that this negation (nişedha) was a ‘pure negation’ (śuddhanañartha), for, at this stage, negation does not require any opposing reference (pratiyogin): there is nothing else than the Self to be negated. See also YR ad 10-11.315 The form of experience that takes place at the junction of the śaktitattva and the sadāśivatattva is named Anāśritaśiva, ‘Śiva unrelated [to the universe]’; see Appendix 7, p. 327.316 aņḍa is not merely the ‘envelope’, which, limiting the ultimate reality, determines different levels of experience; it is also seen as a fullyfledged loka, a ‘sphere’, as it is often translated (Silburn PS), inhabited by a multitude of beings and things, under the control of presiding deities, and related to the hierarchy of the tattvas. This will be even more obvious with the three other aņḍas.

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And another sphere is called māyā[aņḍa], the ‘[sphere of] Illusion’, whose essence is the triad of impurities (malatraya).317 It is composed of delusion (moha); its form is the bondage that affects all varieties of cognizers in virtue solely of its propensity to occasion difference. It consists of that part [of the thirty-six principles beginning with māyā and] ending with puruşa.

That [sphere] incorporates within itself the two spheres yet to be explained.Here the presiding deity is the Rudra named Gahana — the ‘Abyss’.318

Similarly, Nature (prakŗti), whose constituents are sattva, rajas and tamas [originally in equilibrium], once it is transformed [viz., once this equilibrium is lost] into [internal and external] faculties, and as well into effects [namely, the objects of those faculties] — which become objects of enjoyment (bhogyā) for fettered subjects, binding those subjects in their guises of pleasure, pain and delusion — is called prakŗtyaņḍa — the ‘sphere of Nature’.319

In this [sphere] also, there is a presiding deity, Lord Vişņu, who is endowed with great glory320 and who emphasizes difference [or, who presumes difference (in order to function)].

Similarly, earth (pŗthvī) is termed pŗthvyaņḍa, the ‘Terrestrial sphere’ — the Terrestrial sphere, consisting of the gross [corporeal] sheath (kañcukā), for it provides an outer enclosure321 to all the subjects, from man to stationary beings, and is [hence also a] binding factor.

This sphere also has its presiding deity, Lord Brahma, who occupies the preeminent place in the fourteenfold creation of beings.322

317 The first occurrence, in our commentary, of this key concept. The three impurities (malatraya) are the āņavamala, the impurity of [deeming oneself] finite, the māyīyamala, the impurity of [regarding the world as] objective, and the kārmamala, the impurity of [supposing oneself the agent of] actions; on those notions, see YR ad 17-18, 24, 37, 57. Once māyāśakti, the power of differentiation, begins to operate, engendering the saṃsāric world, the five kañcukas constitute the subjectivity of an individual soul (aņu) and affect it with the three impurities. Might it be possible to see in these three terms, displaced to a more concrete level, references to the three forms of being noticed above (viz., sattā, bhavattā, bhavanakartŗtā; see n. 308)? The āņava "defect" relates, in effect, to the individual subject; the māyīya to the objective universe; and the kārma to the cycle of existences, which, by the intermediary of the notion of the act, explains the fashion in which the two other modes of being enter into contact, entwine.318 Or ‘the Impenetrable’. On gahana and the threefold māyā, see n. 246. On Gahana, as the adhipati, the intendant deity, of the māyāņḍa, see Appendix 8, p. 328319 Cf. ĪPK IV 4-6, which states that the Lord’s energies — jñāna, kriyā and māyā — correspond, in the fettered subject (paśu), to sattva, rajas and tamas, respectively, and explains how those guņas, transformed into karaņas and kāryas, can no longer be termed ‘energies’ or ‘powers’ (śakti).320 mahāvibhūti.321 pratiprākāra — the term is attested, according to Bohtlingk, Roth Sanskrit Worterbuch [B&R] (confirmed by Edgerton’s BHSD), only in the Tibetan canon, viz., in the Mahāvyutpatti, in the sense of ‘outer wall’. Same term in YR ad 12-13 (prākāra) and ad 23 (pratiprākāra).322 See MVT V 7-9, where the fourteen categories of beings inhabiting the fourteen worlds (loka or bhuvana) in brahmāņḍa are given in the context of the ‘purification of the paths’ (adhvaśuddhi), itself a part of the dīkşā: caturdaśavidho yatra bhūtagrāmaḥ pravartate/ sthāvaraḥ sarpajātiś ca pakşijātis tathāparā// mŗgasamjñaś ca paśvākhyaḥ pañcamo ‘nyaś ca manuşaḥ/ paiśāco rākşaso yākşo gāndharvaś caindra eva ca// saumyaś ca prājāpatyaś ca brāh-maś cātra caturdaśa/ sarvasyaivasya saṃśuddhir brāhme saṃśodhite sati//, ‘[Such are the

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Thus does this tetrad of spheres, which is but the expansion323 [i.e., the emanation] of the Supreme Lord, become apparent [to us] (parisphurati) — made manifest (prakāśitā) in this way by the Sovereign [who remains immanent in it].324

Karikā 5Having thus explained the tetrad of spheres, the master utters the [following] verse in order to portray the nature of the universe, with a view to explaining it in terms of the relation of enjoyer to object of enjoyment:

5. There, within those spheres lies this universe, as an uninterrupted continuum of wonderfully varied bodies, faculties, and worlds. And, therein, the enjoyer, endowed with a body, is Śiva himself, who assumes the condition of a fettered soul.325

There, in those four spheres well known to the Āgamas326

fourteen lokas] where dwells the fourteenfold host of beings: stationary beings and reptiles, birds being another variety, and those termed wild animals; those termed domestic constituting a fifth variety, another being man. And Piśācas, Rakşas, Yakşas, Gandharvas, Indra, Soma, Prajāpati, Brahmā. Thus they are fourteen. Once this brahma[aņḍa] has been purified, the purification of all this [fourteenfold host of beings] is achieved’. First seen as triple (see SK 53: ayaṃ tridhā sargaḥ) — viz., man, ‘animals’, gods — creation is further seen as fourteenfold, distributed into one variety of man, eight varieties of gods and five varieties of ‘animals’, including ‘stationary’ beings: aşţavikalpo daivas tairyagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati mānuşaś caikavidhaḥ. Yuktidīpikā ad loc. gives a list of the eight kinds of divine beings that is slightly different from that of MVT: Brahmā, Prajāpati, Indra, Pitŗs, Gandharvas, Nāgas, Rakşas, Piśācas. The five kinds of ‘animals’ are the domestic (paśu), the wild (mŗgā), birds, or winged animals in general (pakşin), reptiles (sarīsarpa) and stationary beings (sthāvarā), such as plants, etc., that are considered to be living beings, but at the lowest level, the tairyagyona (see PS 6, where ‘pādapa’ of the kārikā is glossed by sthāvara); R ad ĀPS 27a names jāti ‘genus’, those categories of beings. As for man, it is stated that ‘human creation is of one sort, for no other category (jāti) [lit., ‘birth’, or ‘class’] can be suitably alleged’ (manuşyaś caikavidhaḥ jātyantarānupapatteḥ). Note that the acceptation of the term bhuvana as a metonym for the number ‘fourteen’ testifies to the regular association of that notion with that number — compare, for instance, the terms akşiņī or nayane, ‘eyes’ [dual], which sometimes are taken to mean ‘two’, by a similar metonymy.323 vijŗṃbhita.324 Parameśvara is the transcendent form of the Lord as creator, on the cosmic level, whereas Bhagavat is the form he assumes on the level of immanence; when no longer the creator, he is seen as the knower of creation. In the Āgamaprāmāņya of Yāmunācārya, bhagavat is defined as follows (1976: 26): jñānam apratighaṃ tasya vairāgyaṃ ca jagatpateḥ/ aiśvaryaṃ caiva dharmaś ca sahasiddhaṃ catuşţayam//, ‘There is a tetrad [of] innate [attributes] belonging to the Lord of the world [that is, the tetrad ‘appears along (with him)’ (sahasiddha), as soon as he manifests himself] [or, less probably, the members of the tetrad ‘appear together’ (sahasiddha), not in sequence]: invincible knowledge, dispassion, sovereignty, and righteousness’ This is further commented upon: jagatkartur bhagavato niratiśayaśaktimatvādinirūpaņam, ‘It is described how the Lord, creator of the world, is endowed with unsurpassed energy, etc’325 Cf. SpK II 3-4, quoted n. 452.326 The doctrine of the aņḍa is expounded in MVT II 49 (quoted in TĀV XI 8) and MVT IV 24-25 and in the Rawavāgama, as clearly stated by TA (VIII 168b) itself: aņḍasvarūpaṃ gurubhiś coktaṃ śrīrauravādişu, ‘The nature of the aņḍa has been said by the gurus in the Raurava[āgama]’. The two following ślokas (TĀ VIII 169-170), defining aņḍa, are a quotation from the Rauravāgama (or from its commentary by Sadyojyotis, as proposed by Gnoli TĀ: 183, n. 4), as is made clear by the commentary. Then comes AG’s own explanation, in TĀ VIII

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within those spheres lies this universe; that is, it dwells in the midst of them.What sort of universe? The master answers: ‘[a continuum of] wonderfully

varied [bodies, faculties, and worlds]’.By bodies, he means shapes characterized by various arrangements of face, hands,

feet, etc., and differing [from each other] according to the [infinite] varieties of [beings, from] Rudras to ordinary souls,327 all of which are made wonderful by the manner of their differentiated conditions.328

Similarly, faculties, such as eyes, have [degrees of] excellence due to the difference from one to another [being].

For instance, endowed as they are with a host of attributes,329 such as omniscience, the faculties of cognizers on the order of Rudras (rudrapramātŗ) are unsurpassed. This universe is indeed instantly and simultaneously known and created by such faculties.

On the contrary, this universe is neither known nor made by the [corresponding] faculties of ordinary souls which are capable only of knowing and making objects such as jars, for they are restricted [in their function] by the power of [causal] constraint [that is, the constraint imposed by causal consecution, the sequence of cause and effect] (niyatiśakti)330 belonging to the Supreme Lord.

And even there [viz., among ordinary souls], ascetics (yogin) are seen to possess faculties above the norm: even that which is distant [yet still visible], or is screened from view, or is entirely out of sight331 may be discerned by them, and even the

171-174.327 See Appendix 1, p. 317. Both categories are ‘embodied’ (dehin) subjects, yet the difference between them is established on the basis of the hierarchy of the faculties and knowledge. Being omniscient (sarvajña), Rudras will not be reborn after dissolution, unlike kşetrajñas, whose limited Knowledge (they take the body to be the Self) destines them to be reborn. Rudra [or the Rudras], as a type of being, signifies those who have reached, after the model of Rudra, a level of experience where one is able to reabsorb within himself all cognizable reality. Hence they will be described in the following lines of the commentary as possessed of unsurpassed knowledge and powers (see, n. 324, the definition of bhagavat), whereas the knowledge and the faculties of the kşetrajña are limited. Nevertheless, the yogin possesses relatively more powers. The same may be said, to some extent, of beasts, for they may be more powerful physically than men, even if their knowledge is not superior. PS 49 develops the theme of the variety of bodies.328 saṃsthāna.329 guņa.330 The Self, within the realm of māyā, is enclosed by five kañcukas, among which is niyati, the restriction of the freedom of the Lord: the One beyond causal relationship is now limited by the law of causality, which is ‘at the root of the law of karman’ (niyatir yataḥ karmaņo mūlabhūmiḥ) (ĪPVV III 2, 3, vol. III: 312). Cf. ĪPvŗ III 2, 2: māyīyaḥ [...] pramātā niyatyā karmādhīnaḥ saṃsārī, ‘The māyic cognizer [...] depending on the karma because of the law of necessity is in the power of the saṃsāra [...]’ (tr. Torella ĪPK: 197). Hence the translations of niyati as ‘determinism’ (Miśra 1993: 175), ‘causal restriction’ (Silburn PS: index), ‘necessity’ (Torella ĪPK: 197). Yet, one can see, even so, a difference between niyati and niyatiśakti: inasmuch as everything arises from the Lord, niyati as a category is called ‘tattva’, whereas niyatiśakti is a potentiality of the Lord. See also YR ad 9 and 17.331 Cf. SK 7, which enumerates eight causes making perception impossible, among which are atidūratva, ‘excessive distance’, and vyavadhāna, ‘interposition [of an object between an organ and the object to be perceived]’. This question will be taken up again by YR ad 17, in the course of explaining vidyātattva. viprakŗşţa is opposed to saṃnikŗşţa, whose philosophical

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pleasure and pain experienced by other cognizers, for such ascetics have transcended the power of causal constraint.

And likewise, there are animals who have faculties excelling even those of men, 332

although [in general] they are restricted (saṃkucita) by niyatiśakti.For instance, cows are able to see their homes even if they are screened from view;

horses discern their way even at night; vultures descry meat even if it lies hundreds of yojanas away; [winged creatures, from] birds to flies and mosquitoes, are capable of flying in the sky; reptiles move on paths on their chest and hear sounds by the power of sight, and camels pull a serpent out of its hole, even at distance, merely by breathing. Thus one may infer that there is everywhere a wonderful variety of faculties.

Similarly, there are worlds (bhuvana), well known to the Āgamas, that are distinguished [from the norm] by their circular, triangular, quadrangular, semilunar and parasol-like shapes.333

Thus the universe is such that within it is contained an uninterrupted continuum, an unobstructed flowing stream,334 of bodies, faculties and worlds — [bodies, faculties and worlds that are] wonderfully varied, or of a marvelous nature, due to their varied extraordinary qualities.

Here, in such a universe, whose nature it is to be enjoyed, an enjoyer must be presumed. Therefore, the master says: ‘And, therein, the enjoyer, endowed with a body [is Śiva himself]’.

Being the abode wherein are enjoyed [the results of past actions], the body belonging to the finite soul (aņu)335 is affected by the three impurities. That [finite soul is thus said to be] embodied (dehin), that is, is endowed with a body (śarīrin),336

whose nature consists in the experience of pleasure and pain, etc.

implication is the proximity of an organ of sense to its object.332 For an elaborate discussion of this point, see SpP 39 [ = ad III 7, in the textual organization of SpN].333 See SvT X 99a: chatrākārāņi sarvāņi teşāṃ vai bhuvanāni ta. On the various descriptions of and ways of counting bhuvanas in the Āgamas, see Appendix 5, p. 323, and YR ad 78.334 However, the four spheres themselves, within which the entirety of the various worlds, along with their specific bodies and organs, is created and dissolved, remain immovable.335 First occurrence of this concept in the commentary. The use of ‘aņu’ here recalls the term’s usage in Vaiśeşika, where it designates the ultimate and individible constituents of all "things" — ipso facto therefrom composed. By extension, it designates also the ‘atomic’ soul (or rather "souls"), indivisible and reproducible infinitely, the constituents of the psychic universe. If our present authors are using the term in cognizance of its Vaiśeşika origins, it would indicate then consciousness that is not omniscient, which functions in the inadequacy of always partial awareness — not only limited but also incompetent. According to Gonda (1960-1964, vol. II: 235ff.), the notion of the 'aņu' — which is common to all the versions of Śaivism — is not so much understood as a concrete existent, as it may well have been in the Vaiśeşika, as a designation of a principle in terms of which is explained an aspect — in any case illegitimate — of the soul’s existence: the soul, which is in reality unlimited, identical with brahman, sees itself as detached therefrom, enclosed in a body. It is that very soul, seen in this way as ‘aņu’, ‘atomic’, that constitutes the āņavamala.336 A traditional etymology derives śarīra, ‘body’, from śṝ: śīryata iti śarīraḥ, ‘That which decays, is the body’.

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In this universe consisting of pleasure and pain, etc., that [embodied soul] is also called the ‘enjoyer’ (bhoktŗ), that is, who experiences (anubhavitŗ)337 pleasure and pain, etc. — the fettered subject (paśupramātŗ).

Now, one may object: — inasmuch as there is [according to you] no difference attaching even to that which appears infinitesimal — as far as the transcendental cognizer (parapramātŗ) is concerned) — 338 how indeed can this worthless thing we call ‘embodied’ be different from him? For, as has been said:

Even a part represents the universality of brahman [viz., its capacity to assume all forms]. Neither has it been exceeded, nor can it be diminished.339

Likewise, according to [your own] maxim:

337 Derived from bhuj, ‘to enjoy, possess, eat, consume’, the term bhoktŗ designates the ‘enjoyer’ of an object, its possessor, whether it be internal (as pleasure and pain) or external (as the color blue). Thus he is the subject of sense experiences, bound to experience those objects, whether agreeable or not. In general usage, anubhava is also conceived of as an empirical experience, even though, when contrasted with bhoga, it signifies an experience more receptive than acquisitive, in which the ego does not assume the dominant role, or, at least, in which personal interest is not primary. Nevertheless, such an experience is considered "mine", that is, does not exceed the ambit of the finite subject. The Trika system appears to invest the notion with a meaning different from ordinary usage, to the extent that it associates anubhava with the ultimate principle, which has the result of dissociating this type of experience from corporeal enjoyments, in principle at least. Hence the recurring contrast between bhoga and anubhava, between bhoktŗ and anubhavitŗ: the anubhavitŗ is also an experiencer, but of ideal objects only — his "use" of them is ideational, rather than corporeal. This is confirmed by SpN I 3 (quoted n. 253), where anubhavitŗ glosses upalabdhŗ, whose meaning, in the context of SpK I 3, is that of ‘pure agent of experience’; cf. SpV I 5, p. 30: grāhako ‘pi māyīyaḥ pramātā atra vivakşito na tāttvika upalabdhŗmātrasvarūpaḥ, ‘By "subject" (grāhaka), what is meant here is the empirical subject (māyīyaḥ pramātā), not the real one, who is the pure agent of experience’.338 That is, given that the Lord is [according to you] absolutely undifferentiated, how would [in that case] one be able to conceive even the atom as differing from him? By the same token as applying to "Paramaśiva" or "parabrahman", the term parapramātŗ is also hyperbolic, for, at this ultimate level, there is no other "pramātŗ" possible. However, given the origins of the term and its cognates in discussions elsewhere of concrete and therefore limited experience, the term parapramātŗ does have the flavor here of an oxymoron, plainly accepted in the Kashmiri schools in order to distinguish Śiva’s unlimited cognition from that of ordinary knowers — in reference to whom the term "pramātŗ" may be understood literally — albeit that the limitations on their "knowledge", being self-imposed, are on no wise inherent.339 avikalpya — lit., ‘dichotomized, subject to alternativity’. This is a topos: if brahman is really the all, it cannot be surpassed or diminished. In our interpretation of the verse, we differ from Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 148: ‘Le propre du brahman, c’est de prendre toutes les formes, d’etre insurpassable et sans qualites’ [— ‘What is proper to brahman is to assume all the forms, to be unsurpassable and devoid of qualities’]. Formulated in the manner of a sūtra, this verse (of uncertain provenance) has been variously cited and interpreted. The logic that seems to underlie it is that the ‘part’ in truth does not exist, for all ‘parts’ are already the Lord; each ‘part’ then, being incipiently the ‘all’ may accept qualifications normally reserved to the ‘all’, such as avikalpya ‘not subject to mental constructs, or to alternativity’. Some citations of the verse (AG’s, in his commentary ad BhG XV 7, in particular) do not include avikalpya, but end with anatikrāntaḥ, which suggests that the participle may have been understood in active voice (with sārvarūpyam as its direct object); cited however in conjunction with avikalpya (so YR), the passive construction appears more likely. YR cites again the same verse in his gloss ad 43. This verse occurs, shortened and slightly altered, in PTV 5-8, where it is followed by the same maxim as is here quoted by the fancied objector: pradeśamātram api brahmaņaḥ

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Even each and every principle has got the form of the thirty-six principles,340

the same supreme sovereign cognizer, who, endowed with his own energies and formed of great Light (mahāprakāśavapus) is one only, radiates [within everything] (avabhāsate), utterly undifferentiated in every respect.

Now, even if one postulates the existence of an embodied soul [viz., an individual consciousness] lacking illumination (aprakāśamāna) and who is different from him [viz., the supreme cognizer], that existence cannot even be ascertained, since it [viz., the embodied soul] has been denied [or, has been postulated as lacking] the quality of ‘illumination’ (prakāśamānatva) [— and asserting this would involve you in a contradiction, for you have elsewhere maintained that nothing exists that is bereft of illumination — or, that is not manifest]. If, on the other hand, [you assert the existence of an embodied soul that] is possessed of illumination (prakāśate), then in that entity, which [according to you] has for its essence the transcendental brahman, there is just one cognizer, [for such a cognizer can] not be distinguished from ‘illumination’ (prakāśa) itself, [or from brahman, for that matter, which has been defined as prakāśa ‘illumination’ — and this is plainly contradicted by the plethora of subjects attested in sense-experience itself].341

Then, on what basis342 do you affirm the existence of difference [viz., this universe] characterized as it is by [the opposition between] object of enjoyment and enjoyer?

In answer to all this the master says: ‘Śiva himself assumes the condition of a fettered soul’.

Thus, that Lord who has been described above as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and whose nature is freedom, Śiva himself, whose essence343 is now

sarvarūpam/ekaikatrāpi ca tattve şaţtriṃśattattvamayatvaṃ śāstreşu nirūpitam/, ‘Even a part of brahman is endowed with all forms [here we differ from Singh who translates: ‘Even a limited space contains the entire form of the Brahman’]. The śāstras have stated that each tattva has the characteristics of all thirty-six tattvas’. AG quotes it again (pradeśo ‘pi brahmaņaḥ sārvarūpyam anatikrāntaḥ) in his gloss ad BhG XV 7, explaining that references to a ‘part’ (aṃśa, in v. 7) of the partless brahman are intended for heuristic purposes only. In the form in which it appears in YR’s commentary, the statement is more than once referred to by TĀV I 165, III 45-46, IV 98, XII 5, XXVIII 375 (in the context of aesthetic experience). In TĀV III 45-46, in the course of expounding the pratibimbavāda, it is referred to in the way it is found here, in YR’s commentary, that is, immediately followed by the second maxim (with variant: ekaikasyāpi tattvasya [...]). We surmise that the statement might derive from the Kashmirian nondualist Śaiva tradition, since TĀV IV 98, while explaining the PTV’s reference to ‘śāstras’, introduces it as follows: yad vā parādvayadarśane, ‘Or, as is said in the doctrine of transcendent nonduality [...]’. However, AG, in his gloss ad BhG XV 7, introduces it as belonging to śruti.340 For other citations of the text, see previous note, and PM 25 which attributes it to TĀ. According to one etymology, each and every tattva is the ‘extension’ (tanana < tan) of Śiva (see YR ad 10-11 and n. 433). Therefore, from Śiva to earth, every tattva has the form of the thirty-six tattvas. The theory of causality espoused here is the satkāryavāda, developed at length in PTV 5-8 (Singh: 45-48 [Skt. text], 113-118 [transl.]), according to which the effect preexists potentially in the cause. Therefore, every tattva is present in the others, either as potency (pŗthivī, the final tattva, is latent in Śiva, the first one) or as manifestation (when manifested, pŗthivī is nothing but Śiva). Cf. TĀ IX 49b-52a, quoted n. 485.341 Example of reductio ad absurdum.342 kiṃparatvena.343 satattva. The Bālabodhinī of Vamanacharya Ramabhatta Jhalakikar, a modern commentary on Kāvyaprakāśa, states (sub IV 23 [1965: 91]) that the satattva of Mammaţa’s text may be

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the veiling of his own true nature, takes on the role (bhūmikā) of a cognizer endowed with a body (dehapramātŗ), according to his own will, as though he were an actor (naţa), and, since he is [henceforth] to be maintained and treated as a domestic animal [that is, as a tethered beast], he is now distinguished by his existence as a fettered subject (paśu).344 In reference to the objects of his enjoyment which he has himself created, pleasure and pain, etc., he, now the embodied soul, is called their enjoyer. There is, in consequence, nothing to which language can refer345 that is other than Śiva.346

Moreover, it is the Lord himself, it is Śiva, who makes manifest the pair of cognizer and object of cognition [again] characterized as enjoyer and object of enjoyment, in his freedom, as if they were toys for playing (krīḍanaka).

It is in relation to this pair that all these worldly pursuits based on difference take place.

Therefore, the very freedom of the Supreme Lord is unsurpassed: even though he abandons his own nature of plenitude (pūrņasvarūpā) and assumes the condition of a fettered soul which consists of the dichotomy of enjoyer and object of enjoyment, he remains Śiva himself, a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, who ever manifests himself (prasphuran) as the pure agent of experience present in the Self of all cognizers.

Kārikā 6[Let us admit that] the cognizer, whose nature is consciousness, is one. Even so, if he is designated as ‘many’ because of the diversity implied by the marvelous variegation of knowers and things known, created by māyā, etc., how can he be referred to any longer in terms of a oneness already contradicted [by diversity]? If he is one, how can he be many?347 Inasmuch as this is a case of contradiction (virodhā), like that of sunlight and shadow, it entails the attribution (adhyāsa) of contradictory properties (viruddhadharma) [to one and the same thing];348 and it is not the case that a thing can be at the same time one and many,349 as has been stated:

understood as synonymous with tattva in the sense of svarūpa, ‘nature’, as is the case with the terms gotra and sagotra: satattvena tatsvarūpeņa/ tattvasatattvaśabdau paryāyau/ go-trasagotraśabdavat. Note that Mammaţa is a Kashmirian author of the late 11th cent., contemporaneous, more or less, with YR. Cf. MW s.v. (sa-tattva): ‘natural property, nature (-tas, ind. "really, in reality")’, attested in BhP, Vedāntasāra); also YR ad 105, who glosses °sāra, in śāstrasāra, ‘the core of the teaching’, with satattva. Same analogy of Śiva compared with an actor in YR ad 1 and 26. See also SpN 11, quoted in Appendix 10, p. 330.344 According to Mayrhofer EWA, s.v., paśu is related to Lat. pecus, ‘(domesticated) animal’; the word has nothing to do, historically, with pāśa ‘snare’ (cf. Gk. πησσω ‘assemble’) — contrary to etymologies in vogue in India (as here), paśu in the sense of ‘bound soul’, ‘fettered subject’, is, in any case, a metaphoric usage. Similar explanation of paśu in YR ad 16.345 padārtha.346 Cf. SpK II 4, quoted n. 452.347 Cf. ĪPV II 1, 1: yata iyati pūrvapakşe iyad eva jīvitam ekam anekasvabhāvaṃ kathaṃ syād iti.348 Cf. ĪPK II 2, 1 (Torella ĪPK: 157, n. 3), ĪPK II 4,19, and ĪPV ad loc: na tu sa eva svabhāvo bhinnaś cābhinnaś ca bhavitum arhati vidhinişedhayor ekatraikadā virodhāt.349 The usual response of the Bhedābhedavādins to such an objection is situated in the realm of experience — whatever pure logic may tell us, ordinary experience offers us countless examples of the essential coexistence of the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ (in Plato’s terms) — for example, any set of "parts" that make a "whole", an "organic" whole — as opposed to an

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The attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same thing], [or] difference in the causes, this [pair] only constitutes difference, or the cause of difference between things [respectively].350

[Alleging this,] the author resolves the objection by proposing an example taken from ordinary life, in regard to the matter to be illustrated [viz., his own position]:

6. As the clear crystal assumes the shades351 of varied colors, so the Lord himself352 contains the kaleidoscope353 of forms of gods, men, animals354 and plants.[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]355 Although uniform, the [clear] crystal356 sustains within itself a marvelous diversity by virtue of [its association with] innumerable and varied contingent attributes (upādhi)357 such as red or blue, and thus itself becomes wonderfully diverse. Yet, for all that, it [the crystal] is never

unrelated assemblage of disparate entities. The Trika’s answer involves the doctrine of the two truths — for, on the cosmic level, the "one" and the "many" indeed coexist, but on different levels of being: samvŗtisatya, variously translated as ‘verite d’enveloppement’, ‘surface-level truth’, ‘relative truth’, or ‘truth of empirical order’, and paramārthasatya, ‘deep-level truth’ (see kā. 27) — or, in Plato’s terms, the ‘merely apparent’ and the ‘truly real’.350 Pramāņavārttikasvavŗtti [PV svavŗtti] ad Svārthānumāņapariccheda 33a. We are indebted to Prof. E. Steinkellner for the identification of the quote. In the view of the MSS evidence and the citation in TĀ, the KSTS’s reading has been kept; see our ‘List of variants’ in ‘On the Sanskrit text’. The sentence is to be construed yathāsaṃkhyam. Also quoted in TĀV XI, avat. to 98, also in the context of a controversy as to the ability of an undivided consciousness to assume entirely the form of diversity, i.e., to manifest itself as many.351 Lit., ‘aspect’. Silburn (p. 64) translates rūpa by ‘apparence’ (‘appearance’). Barnett translates rūpa and rūpatva by ‘semblance’.352 [...] although being fundamentally one.353 Lit., ‘the fact of being forms’, ‘formness’. The idiom ‘the kaleidoscope of forms’ is an attempt to render the abstract noun rūpatva, in the sense that a kaleidoscope represents a capacity holding within it an infinity of discrete forms.354 paśu, ‘domestic animal’, stands in the kārikā, by synecdoche, for four of the five varieties of ‘animals’ enumerated in MVT V 7-9 and SK 53, namely, paśu, pakşin, sarpa, mŗga, whereas pādapa, ‘plant’, usually termed sthāvara, ‘stationary’, is given a fifth and separate entry. See n. 322.355 In fact the commentary starts with yathā, ‘just as’, citing the yathā of the kārikā. The correlative adverb, tathaiva, ‘likewise’, equivalent to the tadvat of the kārikā, comes later in the commentary. In order to make the translation lighter, we have separated the two clauses.356 sphaţikamaņi — lit., ‘crystal-jewel’.357 upādhi is generally translated as ‘contingent condition’ or ‘contingent attribute’, according to context. The bird is an upādhi of the branch — that is, a ‘contingent attribute’ of the branch — insofar as it serves to distinguish that branch from others, just as "wet fuel" is an upādhi of the fire — that is, a ‘contingent condition’ of the fire — insofar as it serves to correct the overextension of the proposition ‘where there’s fire there’s smoke’ ("fuel" may be a necessary condition of fire, but its "wetness" is an upādhi). YR’s usage seems consistent with this general principle inasmuch as, here, the very multiplicity of the attested world (including all substances, attributes, and actions) is viewed as freely (but not necessarily) ‘conditioned’ on the Lord’s will. In the case of the color ‘red’, which at first sight appears to belong to the crystal, but of which it is nothing but an upādhi — discovered at that moment when one realizes that the color belongs in fact to the flower — the term ‘upādhi’ finally acquires the valence of ‘false attribute’. From this standpoint it is but a short step to the cosmic usages we see in texts of monistic persuasion, like the Paramārthasāra; on upādhi, see also n. 1278.

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devoid of crystal-ness.358 What alone [determines] the crystal-ness359 of the crystal is this: although the [crystal] is permeated360 by various characteristics, the understanding [viz., ‘this is a crystal’] remains ever unobstructed to all [who perceive it].

In ordinary parlance [or, in everyday practice],361 we say only that these colors, red, etc., appear (sphuranti) here [viz., in the crystal], not that the contingent attribute ‘red[ness]’, etc., qualifies the crystal, as it does a cloth, such that an alteration362 of its true nature ensues [if the color is modified].363

Therefore the purity of the gem consists precisely in assuming various hues,364

which have the form of contingent attributes, while at the same time persevering (prathate) in its very essence [viz., as crystal].

Likewise, as the crystal-gem may contain a variety of colors, so the Lord, free, solely formed of consciousness (cidekaghana),365 contains, though uniform, in the clear mirror of his Self,366 the kaleidoscope of forms of those particular [entities] he has himself created, which are not different from him — though they now have the form of entities such as Rudras or ordinary souls, who [may be classified as] gods, men, and others, from domestic animals and winged creatures to stationary beings [viz., plants].367

Nevertheless, transcending all of them, he is ever aware of his non-dual Self — although it has assumed innumerable forms — invigorated368 by the state of unfragmented wonder that is [pure] ‘I’[-ness] (aham).369 Although [the Lord] is as he has been described [i.e., one, yet assuming innumerable forms], neither ‘space’ nor

358 sphatikatā.359 maņitva — lit., ‘jewel-ness’.360 ācchurita — same term in ĪPvŗ I 7, 1; Torella (ĪPK: 136) translates ācchuńta by ‘variegated by’. Cf. also avat. ad 85-86, p. 167, and ŚSV III 1, defining citta, ‘empirical experience, or consciousness’, as vişayavāsanācchurita, ‘colored by [or saturated by] the dispositions deposited by the objects of senses’.361 vyavahŗyate.362 vipralopa — lit., ‘loss’.363 If the red color were really present in the crystal, it would no longer be crystal, for its nature, which is to be transparent to any color, would have changed.364 ākāra — lit., ‘forms’, ‘aspects’, ‘shapes’.365 Lit, ‘a mass solely consisting of consciousness’, which we have translated somewhat more freely to avoid burdening the reader with too many "massive" constructions.366 First occurrence of the mirror metaphor.367 Creation taking place in pŗthvyaņḍa is referred to here.368 upabŗṃhita.369 First occurrence of the ‘I’ notion, in reference to the specific concept of ahantācamatkāra. YR will take it up again, with the notion of ahampratīti, while commenting on PS 8. ‘aham’ as a full-fledged notion is to be found in YR ad 30 and in kā. 47-50. Cf. ĪPK 15, 11, according to which the difference between consciousness and the crystal is that the latter, unlike the former, being lifeless (jaḍa), cannot be aware of the reflections of which it is the substratum. Same reasoning in the Saṃvitprakāśa quoted in SpP 4 [ = ad I 4] (Dyczkowski SpP: 18): [...] naitāvatā ‘sau sphatikaḥ pŗthań nasty eva rañjakāt/ bhāvarūpaparityaktā tava vā nirmalā tanuḥ//, ‘[...] the crystal can never be free of the color [imparted to it by other objects] whereas Your pure form [0 Lord] is always free of phenomena’ (tr. Dyczkowski Samvitprakāśa: 149). As observed by Dyczkowski (SpK: 369, n. 95), the verse is not found in the available MSS of the Saṃvitprakāśa, but is also quoted in the Lakşmītantra [LT] (XIV 8a) in the same form, and as a paraphrase in TĀ V 154b-155a.

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‘time’ may be [posited as] different from him, in such manner as to negate370 his oneness, and in reference to which one might raise the objection that [in asserting that he is both one and many] contradictory properties, etc., have been attributed to [one and] the [same] Great Lord that is one’s own Self (svātmamaheśvara).

And even others [viz., Buddhists] acknowledge that a cognition [whose content is] variable, although it is [thus] modified by a variety of distinct [factors], is, qua immediacy [of perception — sākşāt], one only.371

For instance, as in the Pramāņavārttika:The color blue, etc., is a contingent attribute of cognition as regards the cognition (vijñāna) [whose content is always] variable (citra); [as such,] it does not partake of anything else [viz., it is itself, and not the color yellow, for instance]; it cannot be perceived [differently, viz., as the color yellow]. For [even] when [conceptually] separating this [blue from yellow], [the cognizer] refers [only] to the thing [i.e., to the concrete unit that underlies what he sees in his perception, namely, the color blue].372

370 Time and space are deemed upādhis. Note the pun on khaņḍanā, ‘dividing’ and ‘refuting’.371 Buddhist logical theory is invoked here, once again represented by Dharmakīrti (Pramāņavārttika [PV], Praţyakşapariccheda 220), this time explicitly. Similar reasoning is at work in TĀ I 197 and TĀV ad loc. (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 115): ‘De meme que pour un ob-jet donne, une cruche ou autre chose, la perception globale de l’objet lui-meme, avec toutes ses caracteristiques, resulte de l’ensemble, de la reunion de toutes les perceptions separees de chacune de ses qualites — une couleur rouge, par exemple, etc. — de meme, ici, c’est ā partir de la manifestation partielle des elements grossiers, etc., [formant la manifestation] qu’apparait dans sa totalite l’energie de Rudra’ [— ‘In the same way as, for a given object, a jar, etc., the global perception of the object itself along with all its characteristics, results from the whole, from the combination of all the perceptions parted from each of their qualities — the red color for instance — similarly, here, it is from the partial perception of the gross elements, etc., [constitutive of the manifestation] that appears the energy of Rudra in its totality’].372 Pramāņavārttika, Pratyakşapariccheda 220. Again, we are indebted to Prof. E. Steinkellner for the identification of the quote. The verse here cited is to be taken with the following verse (PV III 221): yad yathā bhāsate jñānaṃ tat tathaivānubhūyate/ iti nāmaikabhāvaḥ syāc citrākārasya cetasaḥ//. This pair of verses has been variously interpreted by Buddhist commentators themselves: among them, Manorathanandin (whom we have followed in our translation) and Prajñākaragupta, followed by Masahiro Inami, in an article entitled ‘Non-dual Cognition’ to appear in Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference (Vienna, forthcoming), which has been brought to our attention by Prof. Eli Franco, one of the editors. Inami translates the verses as follows (cited with the author’s permission): ‘In a variegated cognition, a color such as blue, which is a qualifier of the cognition, cannot be known to be unaccompanied by other [colors]. One who distinguishes it [from other colors] is focusing on the [external] objects [not on the cognition] [III 220]. The cognition is experienced exactly in the manner in which it appears. Therefore, the variegated image in cognition should be singular [or, as suggested by Eli Franco: ‘the cognition which has a variegated form is singular (viz., it is the cognition which is said to be singular, not the form)’] [III 221]’. The major difference of interpretation relates to the term ananyabhāk, which Inami subordinates in idea to the following compound, aśakyadarśanaḥ, understanding it (as it were) as expressing the content of that ‘cognition’ that is impossible — ‘cannot be known [dŗś- here understood as jñā-] to be unaccompanied by other [colors]’ — whereas we have related it to the verse’s subject, jñānopādhiḥ, as, apparently, does Manoratha also. However that may be, the understandings of verse 220 are not that different as to the point that YR wants to make: even the most notorious partisans of multiplicity — the Buddhists — accept that what

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Moreover, space and time are [here] postulated [by the objector] as diversifying the free, all-encompassing Knower (jñātŗ), whose nature is only consciousness (cidekavapus). How could they serve to delimit [viz., serve as a qualification of]373

such a Lord, persisting as they do [within him] only as aspects of his playful effulgence (samullāsaka) that results in the variety of his forms and actions?374

Here it should be kept in mind that, had space and time ever existed as different from [i.e., independent of] consciousness, only then, would [your objection] have been valid: [viz., that our assertion, namely, that the Lord is one and many, entails] the attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same object] — an attribution which is itself a creation of that consciousness.

[Rather,] since their own existence [viz., the existence of space and time] is established only by the Light of consciousness (saṃvitprakāśa), it is thereby established that the [Lord], although having a multiple nature, is the same unique Great Lord, whose form is consciousness (cinmūrti).375

Had difference [viz., manifoldness] been a [real] property,376 it would have been difficult to refute [the objection of] the attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same object].

Kārikā 7But, [objects the pūrvapakşin,] the notion has been admitted [by you] that there is but one cognizer, whose essence is consciousness, and also that [such a subject], having now assumed [the shape of] bodies, faculties and worlds, becomes multiple. If that is indeed the case, then, that one cognizer should perish once his body, etc., is destroyed, and he should originate once his body, etc., comes into being.

Similarly, that [universal subject] is variously delimited with respect to each and every cognizer in accordance with the six ‘modifications of becoming’ — birth, existence, etc. And it is that [universal subject, in the form of the] Lord who enjoys heaven and hell, according to the variety of his actions, whether meritorious or unmeritorious. All this being so, how can it be said that Śiva has an absolute nature (svasvarūpa)? The master responds to these objections by means of an example:

7. As when the water moves, the moon [reflected there] seems to move, and when the water is still, seems to be still, so it is with this Self, the Great Lord, [when reflected] in the host of bodies, faculties and worlds.377

appears to the mind, inevitably, as multiple must be cognized, insofar as it is cognized, in a cognition that is in some sense one, momentary though it may be. Whether that ‘unity’ be predicated of the cognition itself (as per Prajñākaragupta), or of the ‘object’ of cognition — viz., the color blue, that cannot be anything but itself, insofar as it is understood as a component of that object — (as per Manorathanandin), the principle is established that the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ may, or do, coexist. On the context of such a statement in this work of Buddhist logic, see also Vetter 1964: 66-71.373 vyavacchedaka.374 Cf. again ĪPK II 1, 4-5.375 Silburn translates cinmūrti as ‘pure spiritualite’ (‘pure spirituality’).376 bhedadharme, scil. sati.377 Cf. ĀPS 17, evidently followed here by our author — although its first hemistich is slightly different, as the sun is there mentioned rather than the moon. As the moon does not depend for its existence upon the water in which it is reflected, so the Lord does not depend upon the play of differentiation. It is diversity that fluctuates, not the Lord. Silburn translates bimbo, by ‘reflet’ (‘reflection’), and omits iva. Our translation is based on the commentary, which

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Just as, where a course of water is moving, the ‘cool-rayed orb’, that is, the physical moon, which, in reality, is situated in the sky and of itself does not move, but has even so descended [in appearance] onto the flowing water, moves, goes forth, as it were, so too, at the same moment, elsewhere, where the pond of water is motionless, that very ‘cool-rayed orb’ becomes still, as it were [i.e., there reflected, appears to be still].

Thus the moon is imagined in both ways [as both moving and still] by all cognizers, though it cannot in fact be so [that is, the moon neither moves nor is still: such predicates belong to the water only].

Nor is it the case that time and space, which pertain properly to the water, affect (parāmŗś) the nature of the moon, that is, its remaining in the sky, as differentiating factors; only water as such is so [affected by the differentiation brought about by time and space].

Moreover, since difference — as exemplified by the mobility or immobility that affect the orb of the moon but properly belong to the water in which the moon is reflected (pratibimbita) — is merely phenomenal,378 to that extent, the moon suffers no harm at all in its essential nature, whether it be reflected in the water of the Ganges or whether it descends onto [viz., is reflected on the surface of] slime.

So it is with this Self that has the nature of consciousness, [though it appears] to be born or to perish when are born or perish the host of bodies, faculties and worlds it has itself created. But this is only the practice [i.e., the understanding] of those who are deluded (vyāmohita) by māyā in this phenomenal world,379 just as happens when the moon [is reflected] in water. For it is not possible that the Self be born or that it die.

As it has been said in the revered Gītā:

develops the meaning of iva, and clearly distinguishes bimba from pratibimba ‘reflection’. In fact, the logic of the complete simile requires to understand himakarabimbam as the ‘orb of the moon’, instead of the ‘reflection of the moon’, as does Silburn, for what has to be demonstrated is the absolute, eternal, nature of the Lord, or Self. Thus the complete simile is to be understood as follows: the moon stands for the Lord, or the Absolute, its reflection for the limited Self, water for the phenomenal world. Cf. SpP 3 (p. 13), in the context of the discussion on avasthās: vellatsu pratibimbeşu jalaspandānuvartişu/ yathendor na kriyāveśas tathā ‘tra paramātmanaḥ//, ‘Although its moving reflections dance in consonance with the vibrations of water, the moon does not indulge in any action. Likewise, here, the supreme Self [remains constant in the midst of change]’.378 vyavahŗyate — or ‘is merely a convention of language’ — i.e., we say ‘the moon shimmers [on the water]’, but this is just a way of talking.379 vyavahāra — see n. 659. Note that BhGBh II 20 (BhG II 20 being quoted subsequently in YR’s commentary) refers to this conventional but erroneous understanding of things: ity ucyate loke (see note below).

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He is not born, nor does he ever die;/ Nor, having come to be, will he ever more come not to be./380 Unborn, eternal, everlasting, this ancient one/ Is not slain when the body is slain.381

Therefore this Self, the Great Lord, free [ever autonomous], whose nature is the awareness (pratyavamarśa) that all the universe is his own Self, ever persistent382 as the principle of experience itself [at the heart] of all cognizers is in fact nothing but his own absolute nature, whatever [limiting] condition383 may appear or disappear.

It is precisely the universal mastery (maheśānatvā) of the conscious principle (saṃvittattva) that enables accomplishment of [what is otherwise] difficult to construe (durghaţakārin); for, although [, in conformity with this principle, the Lord]

380 The phrase nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ has been variously interpreted. See, among others, Levi, Stickney BhG (borrowed by Silburn PS: 65): ‘n’ayant jamais ete et n’allant etre encore’ [— ‘neither having ever been, nor being about to be again’], and Edgerton BhG: ‘Nor, having come to be, will he ever more come not to be’, who translate the sentence as it is, in a linear way. Ś’s commentary reads (with the ambiguity on bhavitā/abhavitā allowed by sandhi): nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā [and ‘bhavitā] vā na bhūyaḥ, glossed as follows, in terms of a complex analysis of the syntax: na ayaṃ bhūtvā abhavitā bhūyaḥ, na vā na bhūtvā bhavitā bhūyaḥ, ‘It is not that, having been, [the Self] will cease to be thereafter [viz., the ordinary definition of death], nor that, not having been, will it be thereafter [viz., the ordinary definition of birth]’. Thus nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhuyaḥ is a way of emphasizing and unpacking the first statement — na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit — by making it clear that this Self is beyond temporality, i.e., beyond the sequentiality hinted at here by the double use of the absolutive and of the periphrastic future — although one has to be suspicious of this interpretation, for abhavitā cannot be a periphrastic future, according to Pāņinean grammar. The negative form of such a future would be na bhavitā (see Renou 1968: §134, for some exceptions). For this reason, Edgerton finds Ś’s explanation implausible. Ś’s commentary is the following: yasmād ayam ātmā bhūtvā bhavakriyām anubhūya paścād abhavitā ‘bhāvam gantā na bhūyahpunas tasmān na mriyate/ yo hi bhūtvā na bhavitā sa mriyate ity ucyate loke, ‘Since it is not that this Self, after having come into being, i.e., after having experienced the process of existence, will thereafter cease to be, i.e., will thereafter (bhūyaḥ = punaḥ) become nonexistent, therefore it does not die. [For] in common parlance, the one who ceases to be after coming into being is said to die’, vāśabdān naśabdāc cāyam ātmābhūtvā vā bhavitā dehavan na bhūyaḥ punas tasmān na jāyate/ yo hy abhūtvā bhavitā sajāyata ity ucyate/ naivam ātmā/ ato na jāyate, ‘Or, from the use of the words vā and na, [it is to be understood that] unlike the body, this Self does not again come into existence after having been non-existent [thus, on this second level of the meaning, the second na negates bhūtvā with the sense of abhūtvā]. Therefore it is not born. [For] the one who comes into existence, after having been non-existent, is said to be born. The Self is not like this; therefore it is not born’. Cf. AG’s commentary on the same passage, where the exegete proves to be a more scrupulous grammarian than Ś, although he offers essentially the same explanation: na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit/ etad eva sphuţayad — nāyaṃ bhūtveti/ ayam ātmā na na bhūtvā bhavitāpi tu bhūtvaiva/ ato na jāyate na ca mriyate / yato bhūtvā na na bhavitāpi tu bhavitaiva/, ‘ "Neither is this [Self] ever born nor does it ever die". He explains this by the words "nāyaṃ bhūtvā [etc.]". This Self, not having not become, will exist — in other words, it has ever been; thus it neither is born nor does it die; (mutatis mutandis) since it has become, it will not not be — in other words, it will ever be’. 381 BhG II 20 (tr. Edgerton — as are all translations from BhG cited here, unless otherwise specified). Ś comments upon these attributes: since birth is denied, the Self is unborn (aja); since perishability, i.e., death, is denied, it is eternal (nitya); since change in the form of decay is denied, it is everlasting (śāśvata); since change in the form of growth (opposed to decay) is denied, it is said to be ‘ancient’ (purāņā), and as such evernew, everfresh, free from any accretion. Let us recall the traditional etymology of purāņa: purā navaṃ bhavati id purāņam, ‘what formerly was new, is ancient’ and: purā adhunā ca navam eva, ‘purāņa is that which

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enjoys in innumerable ways all the goods of heaven and all the evils of hell, having accepted [freely] the condition of fettered subject, at the same time, he remains identical with his essence384 which is consciousness, because he is the principle of experience itself in each and every [percipient subject] (sarvānubhavitŗtā) [that is, that makes possible the experience of anything at all].

Or rather, if the state of being fettered — determined by its condition of bondage, and exemplified when we experience merit and demerit, heaven and hell, hunger and thirst, etc. — is illumined (prakāśita) by the self-illuminating (svātmaprakāśā) Lord and recognized (parāmŗşţa) [by him], only then does it attain its being [viz., exist] in [the Lord’s] own Self, as stated above.385 Otherwise this state of being fettered simply doesn’t exist.386

How then can it be said that the Great Lord that is one’s own Self suffers loss of his true nature?387

In every wise, only the thing, such as the body, that has been created [by the Lord] can be subject to destruction or generation; never can creation or destruction be attributed to the eternal Lord who is consciousness.

Thus, the unitary Self, being at the heart of the multiplicity of forms thanks to the distinction [freely projected by the Self] between what is to be known and him who knows, is at the same time what there persists, as the principle of unity [that obligatorily subtends that very multiplicity], inasmuch as it is the principle of experience itself that is at the heart of every percipient subject [that is, that makes possible the experience of anything at all].

Therefore, the nondualistic doctrine (advayavāda) remains intact.388

Kārikā 8

formerly was new and is new to-day’ (see YR ad 1, who comments upon anādi by purāņa). Finally, in the last statement: ‘this Self is not destroyed [or ‘killed’ (hanyate), ‘slained’, as Edgerton translates], when the body is destroyed’, hanyate is to be understood as ‘transformed’, in order to avoid a tautology with mriyate in the first line. Thus this last statement works as a conclusion: in this verse, all six kinds of transformation seen in the world are denied with respect to the Self.382 prathamāna — lit., ‘expanding’.383 avasthā — those states and processes which differentiate him as a limited soul: birth, existence, etc., and being gods, men, animals, etc.384 Lit., ‘is not other than his essence’.385 Cf. YR ad 1, 5 and 6.386 niḥsvabhāva eva — lit., ‘is simply devoid of any proper nature’. The rationale here is that of the ābhāsavāda, and is characteristic of the Śaiva system: only that exists which shines, i-e., only that exists which is known to us (see n. 265). Likewise, the condition of fettered subject does not exist independently of consciousness: it exists only when apprehended as such.387 svarūpavipralopa — same term in YR ad 6. The same rationale again is developed as in YR ad 6: how can that which is itself dependent alter the nature of that on which it depends? Hence bondage itself does not provide a valid argument for the pūrvapakşin whose position is that Śiva, as paśu in bondage, cannot be of an absolute nature. Whatever is bondage is known to be bondage, its existence depends upon the Self as knower. Therefore, whatever depends upon the Self, that cannot delimit the Lord as supreme Knower, or foundational consciousness, which is essentially one.388 The absoluteness of the universal Self cannot be denied. The infinite variety of limited selves is but its reflection in the water — flowing or still — of the phenomenal world.

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Even so, [the following objection has been raised:] — if indeed, as you have proclaimed — in keeping with both reasoning and traditional scripture — this Self of all things, on whose nature depends the phenomenal display of the universe, is ultimately nothing but universal consciousness (saṃvit) and if it manifests (avābhāsā) all things in consequence of the fact that consciousness is everywhere,389

why then is [that universal consciousness] not observed even in the lump of clay, for [, according to you, the lump] is not therefrom to be differentiated, as far as its essence is concerned?

And if you accept [even the nonsensical view that it is present even in a lump of clay], then the [conventional] repartition [of entities]390 according to sentiency and insentience, which is so evident, cannot be explained, inasmuch as worldly practice is based on the distinction between sentient and insentient. How can that [difficulty] be [overcome]?

Answering that objection, the master says:8. Just as Rāhu, although invisible, becomes manifest when interposed upon

the orb of the moon,391 so too this Self, although [invisibly] present in all things, becomes manifest in the mirror of the intellect,392 by securing [similarly] a basis in external objects.393

Although wandering everywhere in the sky,394 [the demon of the eclipse] Rāhu is not perceived. Nevertheless, at the time of a [lunar] eclipse, he is clearly visible,

389 See PS 44 and 49, and YR ad 58.390 vyavasthā.391 According to the tenets of Indian astronomy, Rāhu, the so-called planet (graha) causing lunar eclipses, is visible only when he crosses the moon; otherwise, he is invisible. To become visible, Rāhu, like consciousness, requires then a concrete substratum. Since eclipses are harmful, Rāhu is considered a demon, thus completing the image.392 dhīmukura is glossed as buddhidarpaņa, which itself is glossed as pratibhāmukura; same term in YR ad 77. The visible ‘reflection’ of the universal consciousness in the ‘mirror of the intellect’ is commonly considered by all the Vedāntas to be the ‘I-notion’ or personified ‘ego’ (ahańkāra); on pratibhā, see n. 557.393 vişayāśrayaņena is glossed by śabdādivişayasvīkāreņa, ‘by apprehending objects of sense such as sound’. The Self is apprehended only in course of the cognitive process, that is, when it is reflected in the mirror of the intellect, for, in statements such as ‘I’ hear a sound’, ‘I’ stands for the Self/consciousness, even though this ‘I’ represents but the limited self. This amounts to saying that universal consciousness, although all-pervasive, becomes manifest in the puryaşţakapramātŗ only, i.e., in the finite being endowed with subtle body, as will be further explained by YR. This puryaşţaka is the aggregate of the five tanmātras, here termed vişayas, and the three constituents of the antaḥkaraņa (buddhi, manas, ahańkāra) — thus meriting its name, ‘octad in the fortress’, viz., the eightfold, or eight-factored, subtle body within the gross body, itself seen as the ‘fortress’ of the puruşa. The list of eight constituents of the puryaşţaka differs from text to text, cf. B&R, s.v. (which quotes a medical text): bhūtendriya/mano/buddhi/vāsanā/karma/vāyu, and, as the eighth, avidyā; see also Torella ĪPK: 204-205. The puryaşţaka is responsible for the paśu’s experience, or cognition, formed of the complex of objects (vişaya) and their corresponding faculties of cognition (jñānendriya), through which the limited cognizer comes to know himself as ‘I’ in virtue of the experience: ‘I’ hear a sound’. On tanmātras and jñānendriyas, see n. 399; on puryaşţaka, see PS 92-93 and n. 1316; also SpK III 17-18, and Kşemarāja ad loc, who explains the process of transmigration whose main impetus are the saṃskāras deposited in the puryaşţaka.394 ākāśadeśa.

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appearing to us as if situated upon the form [viz., the orb] of the moon, [such that people say:] ‘This is Rāhu’.

Otherwise, although present [in the sky], it is as if [Rāhu] were not present among the host of planets.

Likewise [i.e., as in the example], here also [i.e., in the thesis to be exemplified], this Self, although intrinsically persisting as the inmost core of all beings, is not observed as such by anyone, for what is apprehended is apprehended only in immediate perception, where it takes a form indistinguishable from one’s own experience.395

Moreover, when [this Self] becomes a matter of awareness396 in the [cognitive] experience of the ‘first person’ (ahaṃpratīti), namely, [in the ‘I’ that subtends the predicate in expressions] such as ‘I’ hear [sounds]’397 — an experience that occurs to every cognizer endowed with a subtle body (puryaşţakapramātŗ)398 whenever objects of sense such as sound,399 viewed as400 objects to be known401 are apprehended in the mirror of intellect (buddhidarpaņa), or, in the mirror of intuition (pratibhāmukura) — then, that same Self, its form now fully manifest,402 is apprehended also in [the object before us] the lump of clay, etc., as that whose nature it is to apprehend [that lump]: there also the inherent Self becomes manifest (prakāśate), that is, is perceived by all as one and the same as their own particular experience.

[Nevertheless,] even though [consciousness] is there in the lump of clay, etc., it is widely taken (prathate) as not being there, in virtue of [the clay’s] abounding in tamas, just like Rāhu in the sky.403

395 YR perhaps wishes us to understand here that the Self is not apprehended (though present) because it has clothed itself in the multiple forms of common experience; it is indeed the Self that one apprehends (what else could one apprehend!), but one is unaware that this is the case inasmuch as mundane consciousness has rendered the Self "invisible" behind the multiplicity that characterizes every act of ordinary awareness.396 vişayo bhavati.397 Second occurrence of the I-notion in YR’s commentary.398 This is a definition of the paśupramātŗ, since it is the puryaşţaka, or ‘subtle body’, that carries the Self or the Soul from one birth to another, that is, from one body to another. As such it is also called ātivāhika; see n. 738.399 In Sāṃkhya as well as in the Śaivism of Kashmir, the five tanmātras (defined in PS 21) — sound, etc. — are the subtle objects (vişaya) of the jñānendriyas respectively — hearing, etc. — (PS 20). Both the jñānendriyas and the tanmātras proceed from the antaḥkaraņa, and especially from the ahańkāra, for the jñānendriyas, realized in the form ‘I hear’, necessarily refer to an ‘I’ (YR ad 20). The tanmātras do the same ‘due to the inevitable interrelation of the object with the subject’ (YR ad 21).400 vyavasthā — see n. 406.401 Starting with the conjunction of objects and sense-organs, this process of cognition aims at establishing a determinate cognition (niścaya) — which is the function of buddhi (PS 19) — which leads one to become aware of one’s self as the subject of the experience: objectivity becomes the pretext for an awareness of one’s own subjectivity, although it is yet but limited, deserving to be termed egotistical ‘conceit’ (abhimāna), an adulteration of essential I-ness, or ipseity (ahantā). On speculations about this process, and the functions which it implies, see PS 19; also YR ad 94-95, which, through a striking description of the dysfunction of antaḥkaraņa and bāhyakaraņas at the moment of death, is very useful for understanding their role in the cognitive process.402 sthitaḥ san sphuţarūpaḥ.

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Thus, among the host of entities that are nothing but semblances of himself404 [viz., aspects of universal consciousness], the Lord, by his power of differentiation (māyāśakti),405 turns some into cognizers, who, anointed with the unction of conditional [or temporary] ipseity (ahantā),406 take on the form of subtle bodies though they are [to him] but elements to be known.

And [mutatis mutandis] he turns some into objects fit to be cognized — in reference to which, the well-established practice of differentiation407 whereby, on the one hand, sentient entities are stipulated and, on the other, insentient, is quite well founded.

Thus, because it is a mere object of cognition, the lump of clay, etc., is insentient, whereas the cognizer endowed with a subtle body, because he is a cognizer, is sentient.

But, ultimately, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, no usage distinguishes the sentient from the insentient.408

Kārikā 9Now, one may object: — if in the intellect (buddhi) of all cognizers there exists this vibration (prasphuraņa) of their proper Self without any distinction, then why may not all of them become knowers of their proper Selves (svātmavid)? Or let us suppose them not endowed with such knowledge [viz., that of the Self], there being no basis for any distinction [among knowers].409

403 tamas is darkness, lethargy, as well as metaphorical darkness, ignorance. Clay is not a cognizer, in the absence of a subtle body. Consciousness may be there, but is not experienced, and therefore not experienced by others, except by a jñānin, one enlightened.404 svātmakalpa.405 First occurrence of this notion, as such (and not as tattva, or as aņḍa), that is, as the power of the Lord to manifest himself as the entirety of diversity.406 ahantāvyavasthārasābhişikta. For vyavasthā as a technical term in traditional usage, see Renou 1942, s.v. The term is used in relation to certain rules whose "optionality" is not general, but is rather determined by accompanying circumstance (cf. P. I 1, 34). For instance, the difference between ‘one may substitute saccharine for sugar at any time’ and ‘when taking coffee, you may use sugar; otherwise, saccharine’. In our present usage, the term perhaps signifies that what is at issue is conditioned — by "facts", by ordinary usage — and is in no wise predetermined; as such, it is subject to the complex of spatio-temporal conditions. The same image of royal consecration — lit., an ‘aspersion’, a ‘sprinkling’ (abhişeka) of water mixed with a few ingredients — occurs in YR ad 31. Consecration (abhişeka), thus used analogically, is a topos; cf. SpN I 8, in the context of a discussion on the sense-organs: ahantārasavipruńabhişekād acetano ‘pi cetanatām āsādayatyeva, ‘The insentient [group of the senses] itself may acquire sentiency provided it is consecrated by the drops of the unction of ipseity’. And ŚSV II 8: sarvair yat pramātŗtvenābhişiktaṃ sthūlasūkşmādisvarūpaṃ śarīraṃ tat [...] haviḥ, ‘The body, whether gross or subtle, etc., that all beings consecrate (abhişikta) "Subject", is the oblation [...]’.407 bhedavyavahāra.408 The passage concerns two issues: it justifies ordinary usage (vyavahāra), which goes against that of the doctrine, and sets it aside, for, as it is the case with the other Advaitas, ordinary usage cannot apply to the Absolute.409 The two branches of the dilemma are: since the Self/consciousness is all-pervasive, either every pramātŗ must immediately know that Self, or no pramātŗ can possibly exist, for no distinction can be imagined that would distinguish that pramātŗ from any other. All are jñānins, or none are. How then can one justify a hierarchy of pramātŗs?

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Yet, even at the level of phenomenal existence, there are some who, having attained the knowledge of their proper Self (svātmajñānā) are liberated while still living [in a physical body] (jīvanmukta), and are endowed with omniscience and omnipotence;410 and there are some who are worthy of attaining the knowledge of their proper Self and are desirous of making the ascent,411 whereas others, lacking the knowledge of their own Self, are tightly fettered by the chains412 of actions good and evil that occasion merit and demerit, and are bound to transmigrate. How can this be consistent?

So, keeping all these objections in mind, the master explains in response that the grace (śaktipāta)413 of the Supreme Lord is without restriction414 [that is, is not bestowed in virtue of any qualification, moral or immoral, on the part of the donee]:

9. As a face is reflected clearly in a mirror free of dirt, so does this [Self] become manifest, being nothing but radiance, in the ‘intellect-principle’, made pure by Śiva’s grace.

[The comparison may be developed through the following example:]In a mirror free of dirt, a face appears415 [clearly], is endowed with its various

qualities of form, etc., that are not different [from those of the face itself], for there is no area [of the face] that the mirror free of dirt doesn’t capture.416 On the contrary, in a dirty mirror, the face, even though it may have an extraordinary excellence, appears (prakāśate) altered due to the tarnishing force [of the mirror].410 See PS 96.411 ārurukşu — see PS 97-102.412 The term nigaḍa refers to the heel chains of an elephant or to a noose that snares the feet of an animal, throwing him down. The paśu, or fettered soul, is, analogically, such an animal.413 Lit., ‘the "fall", that is, the conveyance [from above] of energy, its descent’; first occurrence of the notion in the kārikās; see YR ad 18, PS 64-66, and 96. Śiva is seen as pañcakŗtyavidhāyin (cf. PH mańgalācaraņa), endowed with five cosmic functions (kŗtya): creation (sŗşţi), sustenance (sthiti), dissolution (saṃhŗti, or dhvaṃsa) — three functions accepted by all Indian philosophical systems that postulate the world as created — as well as obscuration (tirodhāna, or nigraha), and grace (anugraha, or śaktipāta) — two additional functions that are postulated by Advaita systems in general. These two functions, or energies/powers (spoken of as tirodhānaśakti and anugrahaśakti) respectively explain bondage — the manifestation of Śiva as the host of the sentient limited souls and the insentient objects of the world — and liberation. Cf. TĀ XIV 24, where the pañcakŗtyas are enumerated.414 viśŗńkhala — see YR ad 96. Note the play on the words: nigada/viśŗńkhala. viśŗńkhala, whose literal meaning is ‘lacking a chain’, viz., ‘unfettered’, ‘unbound’, ‘unrestrained’, has here the derived meaning of ‘unconditioned’ (see, infra, the second quotation in YR ad loc). The question will be taken up again in kā. 82, where the notion of ritual adhikāra is questioned, as well as in kārikās 96-102. Analogous formulation in TĀ I 185: nairmalyaṃ saṃvidaś cedaṃ pūrvābhyāsavaśād atho/ aniyantreśvarecchāta ity etac carcayişyate//, ‘Consciousness’ absence of defect is due either to prior practice [in former lives, adds JR], or to the unrestrained will of the Lord; this will be examined [in the thirteenth chapter, adds JR]’. Whereas the jīvanmukta is described in kā. 96, kā. 97 evokes the videhamukta who is liberated immediately after the existence in which he has striven for liberation. The different types of the yogabhraşţa, those ‘fallen from the path of yoga’ (or ‘from discipline’) are also described: one who will strive for liberation within the span of two births, separated by a stay in ‘worlds of enjoyment’ (kā. 98-99); and one whose liberation will take place also after two births, but after a much longer stay in divine worlds (kā. 100-102).415 cakāsti glosses vibhāti in the kārikā; cf. KāU II 2, 14-15, quoted n. 265, which contrasts vibhāti and bhāti, vibhāti meaning ‘to shine in reflection’.416 svīkŗ— lit., ‘make its own’, ‘appropriate’.

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Moreover, the dirty mirror is not able to capture those qualities, such as they are. Rather, the man whose face is reflected there feels ashamed of himself while contemplating his altered face, affected as it is by the tarnishing force [of the mirror], etc., and he thinks: ‘my face is deformed’.

In the same way, the Self of some few cognizers whose present birth is the last is reflected (avābhāsate, lit., ‘is resplendent’) in the mirror of intuition, in proportion to the sum of attributes, such as omniscience, with which it is endowed — for that mirror has been cleansed by Śiva’s grace — [Śiva being none other than] one’s own Self, for that [Self] is radiance (bhārūpaḥ) — whose very form is radiance, namely, Light itself.

[‘Cleansed’ means] made clear by the complete removal of the latent dispositions (vāsanā) left by the impurities of deeming oneself finite (āņavamala), of regarding the world as objective (māyīyamala), of supposing oneself the agent of actions (kārmamala).417

By the term descent (°pāta) is here evoked the effulgence of the rays of the energy (śakti°), [also] termed ‘favor’ (anugrahā), that emanate from Śiva himself.418

These few alone, though descended into the world of transmigration, are, for all intents and purposes, liberated (muktakalpa), for their own nature has become co-extensive with their proper [or ‘universal’] Self.419 They are thus possessed of excellence.

The Self of some others, though endowed with radiance, that is, though [in reality] illumined (bhāta), remains, for all intents and purposes, as if unillumined (abhātā), due to its impurity, inasmuch as the intellect-principle (buddhitattva) has been veiled by the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions deriving from the Supreme Lord’s energy of obscuration (tirodhānaśakti). On this account, these [others] are called ‘tethered’ [animals, paśu] and ‘bound to transmigrate’ (sāṃsārika).

And still others are cognizers desirous of ascending, because of the conjunction of both energies [that of obscuration and that of grace, bestowed on them by the Lord].

Thus, in all such cases, the variation in [the Lord’s] grace may be presumed as one of the following types: sometimes intense (tīvra), sometimes feeble (manda), sometimes even more feeble (mandamandatarā), etc.420

417 The translation reflects, for these three notions, the same point of view, which is that of the fettered subject; the three ‘stains’ are certainly erroneous but at the same time are voluntary, imposed on ourselves by ourselves, and by no other, of whatever sort; see n. 317, an hypothesis on the correspondence of the three malas with three forms of being: sattā, bhavattā, bhavanakartŗtā. See PS 24 for a complete exposition of the mate.418 Cf. another definition of śaktipāta in YR ad 96.419 Lit., ‘due to the extension of their own nature into their proper Self (svātmasvarūpa-prathanāt). These are the jīvanmuktas further described in PS 96 and YR ad loc. Same statement, but in negative form, at the end of the passage, which deals with the opposite figure of the paśu: ‘on account of this [power], they wander (saṃsaranti) through this [cycle] again and again, engaged in good and bad actions, enjoying pleasure and pain, etc., for their own nature has not become co-extensive with their [universal] Self (svasvarūpāprathanāt)’.420 ‘Variation in [the Lord’s] grace’ here refers, not to to differing intensities of the Lord’s grace, but to the levels of receptivity of the adept. Similarly, the same fire will have quite different effects on dry and wet paper. We have here, admittedly, an explanation of the inexplicable: on one hand, divine grace is the same for all, unconditioned (viśŗńkhala); on the other, nevertheless, is observed in the "real" world a hierarchy of subjects, which is a function of

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Accordingly, there is no action — whether it be meditation (dhyānā), silent (or whispered) recitation (japa), etc., or sacrifices such as horse sacrifice, or anything else, all of which arise from the power of causal constraint [of the Lord] that is included in his power of differentiation — which may cause the liberation (mocana) of the Self. For nothing that is based on difference is suited to serve as means to that [liberation, viz., identity with the Self], since the Self has passed beyond māyā.421

As it has been sung:Not by the Vedas, nor by austerity,/ Nor by gifts or acts of worship,/ Can I [be seen in such a guise,/ As thou hast seen Me].422

Therefore, accordingly, the favor of the Supreme Lord is the only genuine (akŗtrimā) cause [of liberation for] those whose intellects are worthy of it.

As has been said:As far as the Lord’s grace is concerned, his intention requires nothing [as a precondition], for it proclaims his independence; it is not affected by a trace of cause423 [associated with it — that is, it cannot be construed as the effect of any cause, such as the behavior of the worshiper].424

On the other hand, the Supreme Lord’s energy of obscuration is the very cause of fettered subjects’ wandering from birth to birth: on account of this energy, they wander through this [cycle] again and again, engaged in good and bad actions,

each subject’s degree of aptitude in receiving that grace. Thus YR distinguishes three large categories: on one extreme, the jīvanmukta, on the other, the paśu or saṃsārin, whose submission to worldly concerns makes him insensible to the actions of grace, and between these two extremes, the ārurukşu (or mumukşu), whose efforts toward delivrance open him up to the Lord’s grace, but whom diverse factors — his native intelligence, or chance interruptions in his practice (see kā. 98-102) — deter from an efficacious and immediate reception of grace. We have here another version of the "two truths": the paramārthasatya and the saṃvŗtisatya, transcendent truth, and empirical truth. The distinction between the subject destined to liberation and the subject condemned to be reborn is not a function of the intention of the god — so says the text cited below by YR himself: ‘As far as the Lord’s grace is concerned, his intention (dhī) requires nothing [as a precondition], for it proclaims his independence (svatantratā) [...]’. There remains the question of the distinction between anugrahaśakti and tirodhānaśakti. The former is manifested in the form of the ‘descent of energy’ (śaktipāta). The second is instrumental in effectuating māyā, which is responsible for the finitude of the saṃsārin. But the principle underlying the exercise of either śakti is the sovereign liberty of the Lord. Similarly, the term viśŗńkhala, applied to śaktipāta in the avat., may also be understood in this sense: the grace dispensed by the Lord is ‘free’, not merely in that it is unconditioned, but also in that it has no other cause than the sovereign liberty of the divinity. An explanation that may well be opened to the objection that it explains nothing, but to which one might respond that the dogma of the Lord’s liberty is at the very heart of Trika doctrine. The same debate, expressed in almost the same terms, occurs in the commentary on kā. 96-102; see, esp., the avat. to 96 and 97.421 Cf. YR ad 18 and 96: ‘the acquisition of the knowledge of one’s own Self has for its unique means the favor of the Supreme Lord’.422 BhG XI 53. Devotion (bhakti) is the unique means, as taught in the following verse: bhaktyā tv ananyayā śakya aham evaṃvidho ‘rjuna/ jñātuṃ draşţuṃ ca tattvena praveşţuṃ ca paraṃtapa//, ‘But by unswerving devotion can/ I in such a guise, Arjuna,/ Be known and seen in very truth,/ And entered into, scorcher of the foe’ (BhG XI 54). There is no direct commentary of AG on this verse of the Gītā.423 Read kāranakalā-aghrātā.424 The source of the quotation has not been found. The doctrine of the Lord’s ‘unconditioned’ will suits very well other ideas concerning the dispensing of grace in the Śaivism of Kashmir.

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enjoying pleasure and pain, etc., for their own nature has not become co-extensive with their [universal] Self.

Therefore, although the [absolute] Self is common to all cognizers, there are nevertheless two energies, that of favor and that of obscuration, of the nature of Light and of non-Light (aprakāśā) [respectively], that are causes of the dichotomy between liberation (mokşa) and bondage.

As has been said [by Avadhūtasiddha]:The unobstructed energy [of obscuration] of the one endowed with infinite energies binds the ordinary being with the net of fetters that is this empirical world. And his other [energy, that of grace], after it has severed all [three] strands with the sword of knowledge,425 leads man face to face [with Śiva] so that he reaches the state of liberation (vimukti).426

Kārikās 10-11Having thus accounted for this entirety (idaṃ sarvam) [viz., the universe in general], in accordance with scripture, experience and reasoning,427 the master next takes up the world (jagat) that is internal to the tetrad of the spheres of Energy, etc., earlier propounded, which has as its basis the thirty-six principles [that will be explained] in the order of their arising.428 But, in anticipation of that, in two kārikās, he propounds

425 The ‘sword of knowledge’ is a common image. Cf. MBh X 47, 12-15, quoted in BhGBh XV 1: etac chittvā ca bhittvā ca jñānena paramāsinā/ tataś cātmaratiṃ prāpya tasmān nāvartate punaḥ//, ‘Having felled and split this [Tree of material existence] with the great sword of knowledge, and thus attaining the bliss of the Self, one does not return from that [bliss]’. ‘Axe of knowledge’ (jñānakuţhāra) is a variant; cf. YR ad 87-88.426 Bhagavadbhaktistotra 17. The verse is also quoted in Śrīkumāra’s commentary on the Tattvaprakāśa (115) of Bhoja. As observed by Gnoli (ibid.: 215), ‘this stotra, as is shown by the relatively numerous quotations, must have enjoyed at other times a certain reputation’, especially in Kashmirian Śaiva circles. In effect Abhinavagupta quotes it (v. 29) in the Bṛhadvimarśinī and the Laghuvimarśinī, and YR, once more, cites it (v. 21) when commenting on PS 27 (see Gnoli, ibid.). According to Gnoli, Avadhūtasiddha might have been a native of Kashmir, and, having become an authority among Śaivas as early as AG’s time, might have lived there in the 10th or even in the 9th cent.427 That the doctrine can be justified logically is a claim made by all the exponents of non-dual Saivism of Kashmir; see, for instance, the first and last kārikās of the ĪPK, viz., ĪPK I 1, 1: tat pratyabhijñām upapādayāmi, ‘I will make suitable [to my audience by my exposition] [viz., make a suitable exposition of] the [doctrine of] recognition’, and ĪPK IV 18: īśvarapratyabhijñeyam utpalenopapāditā, "This [doctrine of] the Lord’s recognition has been made suitable [to the student] [viz., explained suitably] by Utpala’, as well as ĪPvŗ IV 16: mayā yuktinibandhanena hŗdayaṃgamikŗtaḥ, ‘[This new path taught by Somānanda] I have made it attractive [lit., ‘I have caused it to enter the hearts’] by affixing it with arguments (yukti)’. Also third mańgala verse of the SpN: samyaksūtrasamanvayaṃ [...] tīkşņāṃ yuktikathām [..,] jñātum vāñchatha cet [...], ‘If you want to know the exact inter-connexion of the sūtras [...], accurate exposition of the reasoning [at work, there], etc.’. Recurrently, in all the texts of the Trika, argument by reasoning is contrasted with justification by Āgamas or appeal to personal experience (anubhava), often in the form of the triad: yuktyanubhavāgamasiddhena, yuktyanubhavāgamayuktam, or other variant; see, for instance, YR ad 8 (which omits anubhava); avat. ad 104; YR ad 79-80, which adds a fourth term (pariśīlana, ‘sustained concentration’), as required by context: yuktyāgamānubhavapariśīlanena. Even more explicitly, Kşemarāja’s general avat. ad SpK presents the work as ‘showing the agreement of Āgamas, experience and reasoning’: āgamānubhavopapattaikīkāraṃ pradarśayan.

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the cause of the cause, namely, the Supreme Śiva (Paramaśiva), suspended from whom that world appears:429

10-11. This world of thirty-six principles is reflected within the ultimate principle,430 which, formed of light, is complete, and is supremely blissful on account of reposing in itself; it is suffused with the energies of Will, Knowledge and Action,431 and replete with an infinity of [other] energies; it is devoid of all mental constructs, devoid of dissolution and creation, is pure and is at peace.432

The universe, which will be described as starting from Śiva [the first among the thirty-six principles] and ending with earth [the last], appears (prakaśate) as reposing in him — that is, in him whose nature is such as has been described — the ultimate, all-encompassing, Śiva-principle (śivatattva). That is to say, though manifesting itself (cakāsat), it is shown by reasoning not to be different from that [principle]. Now, as to this view, [the following objection may be raised:]

— [The word tattva is thus derived:] ‘that where the whole (sarvā) consisting of bodies, etc. [scil., faculties and worlds], is spread out (tanyate) [is called "tattva"]’;433

alternatively, because of its ‘extension’ (tananāt), it is what ‘extends’ (tat) up until [the world’s] dissolution; "tat-tva" is then ‘the state or condition of that [extended thing, viz., the ultimate principie]’.434

428 Cf. YR ad 1, 14 (avat.), 22, 46 (avat.). Note that the word ‘jagat’ (by most accounts, derived from the intensive form of gam) suggests the ‘world’ unceasingly moving, finite, and full of contrast, as apprehended by our sense-organs; therefore, the "real" world, contrasting with the "virtual" world previously described; see n. 465.429 Same phraseology and same context in ĪPV I 7, 1: apitu saṃvedanam eva tat tathā cakāsti māṃ prati bhāti iti pramātŗlagnatvāt, ‘Moreover, that [object] is consciousness itself, for that [object] is inseparable from (lagna, lit., ‘attached to’, ‘hung upon’, ‘suspended from’) the experiencing subject [whose experience has always the form]: "thus it appears before me."’ Here, pramātŗ represents the subject par excellence, as does Paramaśiva in YR’s commentary.430 A similar attempt is made in kā. 43 and 64-66 to understand Paramaśiva (or, what amounts to the same thing, brahman), through the enumeration of his qualifications. Note that the image of the city in the mirror developed in 12-13 is already present here: yat paratattvaṃ tasmin vibhāti [...] jagat, ‘This world appears in the ultimate principle’.431 Silburn translates literally: ‘abondamment pourvu de volonte (icchā), de Conscience (saṃvit) et d’instrument (karaņa)’.432 Compare PS 11 with ĀPS 25: sarvavikalpanahīnaḥ śuddho buddho ‘jarāmaraḥ śāntaḥ/ amalaḥ sakŗd vibhātaś cetana ātmā khavad vyāpī//.433 Both derivations of the word tattva referred to here by the pūrvapakşin are from the root tan, ‘to spread, extend, expand’. The first, in passive voice, makes tattva an object, an effect of the Lord’s activity. However, the word does not designate concrete diversity per se, but rather ‘where the entire manifestation is extended’ — the categories whereby the infinite varieties of phenomena are ordered; tattva is thus a factor of classification (vargīkaraņanimitta), an element unifying a collection of distinct entities, as stated in ĪPV III 1, 2, vol. II: 219: yathā girivŗkşapuraprabhŗtīnāṃ nadīsaraḥsāgarādīnāṃ ca pŗthivīrūpatvam abrūpatvaṃ ceti, ‘For instance, mountain, tree, city, etc., are earth by essence, whereas river, lake, ocean, etc., are water by essence’.434 Kşemarāja’s definition of tattva in his Svacchandatantroddyota [SvTU] ad SvT IV 241-242 (vol. II: 74) — the terminology is almost the same — makes YR’s commentary more intelligible by adopting the exegetic method associated with nirukti: tasya bhāvas tananāt tattvam iti vyutpattyā niruktyā ca, ‘tattva is so called for it is "extension" (tanana), according to etymology (niruktyā); and from the point of view of morphological derivation (vyutpattyā), it means the state or condition of that [which "extends" (tat)]’ — that is, tattva is derived from the root tan. It is (barely) possible that this tat could have been understood as the root noun

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In either case, the word tattva conveys something insentient.435 How, therefore, can it be applied to the Lord, to the Supreme Śiva, whose form is consciousness (cidrūpa)?

To this objection it may be said in response: — The word tattva, ‘principle’, is employed [by us] only to the extent that a verbal exposition is required, for those who need instruction,436 but truly this word does not apply to [the Supreme Śiva].

Of what sort is this ultimate principle (paratattva) then? It is that whose form, whose proper nature, is radiance, is Light: of it the form is that of great Light: that is the meaning.

And, it is complete [or all-encompassing] (paripūrņa), that is, it wants nothing [to complete itself, is free of dependency] (nirākāńkşa).437 [In this respect, it might be alleged:] — but also are free of dependency such things as crystal-gems, mirrors, etc., which are insentient.

Therefore, the master says: ‘supremely blissful (mahānanda) on account of reposing in itself, that is, it is endowed with great bliss, with supreme felicity,438 due to the fact that it reposes in its own true nature [informed by] the delight (rasa) that arises from the state of unfragmented wonder that is [supreme] ipseity (akhaņḍāhantācamatkāra).439

of the root tan (tanoti), in weak grade (and so shorn of its nasal, cf. ga-ta), with tugāgama (that is — the stem-extension t[uk]), as would be normal after a short vowel (cf. viśva-kŗ-t). See also TĀV IX 1, vol. IV: 1637: tanoti sarvam iti tat paraṃ rūpaṃ tasya bhāvas tattvam ity arthaḥ, ‘[The term] tattva is thus explained: [the element] tat means ‘that which extends to everything’, [namely] the ultimate form [of the universe]; [by affixing thereto the abstract suffix -tva, one obtains the sense:] ‘the state (or condition) of that [extended entity (or supreme form) — that is, the principle of expansion itself]’. Thus, tattva refers either to classified objectivity, or to transcendental subjectivity, although, ultimately, all tattvas are absorbed into that wherefrom they proceed, the Supreme Lord, or ultimate principle (paratattva), defined as ‘that which expands’. See also n. 506. Historical linguistics of the modern sort of course does not approve such etymologies, preferring the straightforward derivation tat-tva ‘this-ness’.435 Whether phenomenal category or ultimate principle, tattva is always understood as existing in space and time (as paratattva, it ‘expands till dissolution’). As demonstrated elsewhere (YR ad 6 and 10-11), spatiality and temporality are insentient, unless taken as the very powers of the Lord. So grounded is the objection of the pūrvapakşin. This ‘extending’ manifestation, being nothing but phenomenal plurality, implies that the Lord has abandoned his own essential nature, pure consciousness. In this way, plurality implies insentience.436 Same term and discussion in YR ad 14. 437 Barnett and Silburn translate paripūrņa as ‘perfect’. But ‘complete’ appears more appropriate here, in the light of the commentary which explains it as nirākāńkşa, ‘desireless, wanting nothing [to fill it up, viz., complete]’. The term ākāńkşā, ‘expectation’, borrowed from grammar, designates that which — like a transitive verb — "expects" a complement — its "direct object" — and is therefore in itself incomplete. Commenting upon both icchāsaṃvitkaraņair nirbharitam and anantaśaktiparipūrņam, YR again understands the term to mean ‘completely filled with innumerable energies’. Same sequence in YR ad 65.438 His freedom from dependency is not just a negative condition. He is also characterized as supreme bliss itself; see Intr., p. 29, and p. 46.439 Similarly ĪPK I 5, 11 makes reflective awareness (vimarśa/pratyavamarśa), experienced as wonder (camatkāra), the factor distinguishing the Lord or universal consciousness from insentient objects such as crystal. Although the latter are colored by objects just as consciousness is, they are not aware of it.

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Thus, because its essence is supreme, beatific splendor (sphurattā), [which needs no other source of light], its difference is [sufficiently] stated in respect of inanimate entities such as crystal, which must be illumined [from without].

Therefore the master says further: ‘suffused with the [energies of] Will, Knowledge and Action’.

The energies of Will, Knowledge, and Action440 constitute its nature; it is not the case that it is devoid of energy, and is, as it were, insentient, as is maintained by the Śāntabrahmavādins.

Moreover, it is replete with an infinity of [other] energies (anantaśakti);441

replete with (paripurņā) — entirely, completely, filled with (pūrņa), or permeated by (vyāpta) — infinite, uncountable, energies, as manifested in [the infinity of] forms that have names, such as ‘jar’, ‘cloth’, etc. And these energies take the form of Brāhmī, etc.,442 as offshoots of the energies of Will, Knowledge and

440 Paramaśiva is inseparable from his supreme energy (parāśakti), which is also named svātantryaśakti, energy of absolute freedom. Since this svātantryaśakti transforms itself into icchāśakti, jñānaśakti and kriyāśakti, in succession, Paramaśiva may be said to be ‘of the nature of the energies of Will (icchā), Knowledge (jñāna), and Action (kriyā)’. SpN III 13 and ŚSV III 19, both quoting MVT III 5-13, describe in detail the entire process (see Appendix 9, p. 329).441 Note that anantaśakti was the term used by Avadhūtasiddha in the passage quoted at the end of the commentary on PS 9. Cf. also SpK I 1, quoted n. 301, in which Śiva is celebrated as the master of the Wheel of energies. These ‘innumerable (ananta or aśeşa) energies’ are also termed the ‘Wheel of energies’ (śakticakra), which SpN III 13, while defining parāvāc, describes as ‘composed of enlargements of the "six paths" — [enlarged] by means of innumerable words and objects to which they refer [appearing and disappearing to the rhythm] of uninterrupted series of manifestation and dissolution [...]’ ([...] svīkŗtānantavācyavācakarūpaşaḍadhvasphāramayāśeşaśakticakrakroḍīkārāntaḥkŗtaniḥśeşasargapralayādiparaṃparā[...]). See also PS 47 (and YR ad loc.) and the image of the water-wheel.442 MVT III 14 mentions eight goddesses, or divinized energies (śakti), presiding over the eight groups of phonemes (varga): Māheśī (= Māheśvarī), Brāhmaņī (= Brāhmī), Kaumārī, Vaişņavī, Aindrī, Yāmyā, Cāmuņḍā and Yogīśī; on the mātŗkās, see also SpP 1 (pp. 11-12). But the lists differ according to different texts (see Padoux 1992: 155). SpK III 13 emphasizes, as explained by the Nirņaya, the deluding power of those verbal śaktis, responsible for the servitude of the paśu, ‘deprived of his might by limited words and ideas’ (saṃkucitaiḥ śabdair jñānaiś ca viluptavibhavaḥ). Cf. ŚSV III 19: [...] prāptatattvo ‘pi pramādyan māheśyādibhiḥ paśujanādhişţhātŗbhūtābhir api śabdānuvedhadvāreņa mohyate, ‘Even he who has attained [supreme] reality, if inattentive, is confounded (mohyate) by Māheśī and all the other presiding deities of fettered subjects, through the medium of words that confound [lit., ‘pierce’ (scil. ‘destroy’), anuvyadh]’.

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Action,443 and [as denotation] arise from the mass [or totality] of sounds (śabdarāśi).444 These energies beam forth (ullasat) from it [the ultimate principle], and also achieve rest in it.445

And, thus, it might also be said that, in the Lord, [his energy of absolute] freedom takes the form of supreme Speech (parāvāc).446

Here, someone may object: — If the ultimate principle [or entity] is of the nature of Speech (vāc), then, it is constructed mentally inasmuch as it is differentiated by means of sounds [or phonemes] [which are voluntary]. How can a mental construct (kalpanā) be attributed to him who is pure Light?

With the intention of answering this objection, the master says: ‘devoid of all mental constructs’.

[That is,] although of the nature of Speech, the wondrous experience, in the supreme cognizer, of supreme ipseity is free from mental constructs (nirvikalpa).

For a mental construct (vikalpā) is characterized by the differentiation (apoha) [of a ‘this’] from an ‘other’ [viz., a ‘non-this’] — that is, by the postulation of a duality — the jar and the non-jar — which determines the jar as distinguished from all that is non-jar.447

443 YR’s exposition refers here to the doctrine of phonemic emanation, as developed by ŚSV III 19. The Lord’s svātantryaśakti, seen as parāvāc, supreme Speech, having divided itself into the three energies of Will, Knowledge and Action, assumes the forms of vowels and consonants. Thus it becomes Mātŗkā, the ‘Mother’ of phonemes, whether uttered or not, and presides over the deities, such as Māheśvarī, etc., who reign over the eight groups of phonemes, also called mātŗkās. The name mātŗkā, whether applied to a single entity or to many, connotes not only the ‘mother’ of the words, but also of the worlds, inasmuch as the multitude of words entails the multitude of objects by them denoted. As shown by MVT III 5-13 (see Appendix 9, p. 329), Brāhmī, etc., seen as energies, spring forth from the triad of icchā, jñāna and kriyā. Similar development in YR ad 64-66; also ŚSV III 19, TĀ III 198-200a.444 ŚSV II 13 defines the Lord as ‘śabdarāśi, mass [lit., ‘heap’, implying an undifferentiated totality] of sounds, whose essence consists of a pulsating radiance, the nature of which is the reflective awareness of the fullness of the [absolute] "I", inseparable from the totality of the universe’ (bhagavān śabdarāśiḥ tasya yā sattā aśeşaviśvābhedamayapūrņāhamvimarśanātmā sphurattā); tr. Padoux 1992: 307. See also YR ad 64-66, using a similar phraseology. SpV IV 21 [= ad III 19, in the textual organization of SpN] (p. 160) makes explicit the relationship between the Wheel of energies and śabdarāśi: satyātmasvarūpapratyabhijñālakşaņād hetoḥ cakreśvaro bhavet cakrasya prākpratipāditasthityā carācarabhāvaparyantena prapañcena prasŗtasya śabdarāśisamutthasya svaśaktisamūhasya īśvaro ‘dhişţhātā, ‘By recognising his true essential nature, "He becomes the Lord of the Wheel", that is, the Lord Who presides over the Wheel or group of His own powers born of the "Mass of sounds" (śabdarāśi) and which, in the manner previously described, unfolds through the extending sequence of manifestation (prapañca) all the way down to the level of animate and inanimate beings’ (tr. Dyczkowski ĪPK: 134); also SpK III 13, which again establishes the śabdarāśi as the source of the group (or Wheel) of energies: śabdarāśisamutthasya śaktivargasya bhogyatām/ [...] gataḥ san [...], but from the viewpoint of the paśu and not that of the pati, as does SpV IV 21 [= III 19] quoted above.445 Cf. SpN III 13 quoted n. 441.446 parāvāc, supreme Speech, is the first flutter of consciousness: I am, and I know that I am. On the levels of Speech, or of the Word (vāc), see Padoux 1992: 166-222.447 Cf. ĪPK I 6, 3, which defines vikalpa in almost the same terms: [...] atadvyapohanāt/ tanniścayanam ukto hi vikalpo ghaţa ity ayam, ‘For we call vikalpa the ascertainment of a certain thing (tanniścayanam) [e.g.] "jar" arrived at through the exclusion of its opposite (atadvyapohanāt) [...]’ (tr. Torella ĪPK: 131).

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But nothing other than Light, which would [necessarily] have the form of non-Light, is attested that could serve as a counter-reality448 to that Light — whose very essence is the marvel of supreme ipseity — such that, by distinguishing [Light] from that [other entity], its status as a mental construct [— as having an alternative449 —] would be established.450

If [you, the pūrvapakşin, further allege that] there is an object to be distinguished [from Light] that is of the essence of non-Light, and which does appear before him whose form is Light itself [— namely, the content or object of that Light/consciousness —], then, we reply: how could that object serve to delimit451 that Light, which is [also] that object’s own essential nature, inasmuch as that object must have [by your hypothesis] the nature of Light [in order that it may be ‘seen’]? Only in terms of such [alternativity] could the status [of Light] as a ‘mental construct’ be brought out!

For there is the maxim:

448 pratipakşatayā.449 vikalpa, here, is used almost punningly: not only ‘mental construct’, but also ‘alternative’ (as employed by grammarians and some others).450 Had there been something like non-Light (aprakāśa), Light (prakāśa) would have been a mental construct. But aprakāśa becomes prakāśa as soon as one supposes it to be aprakāśa. All is Light, and this Light is ultimately pure ipseity, as such free of all mental constructs. This discussion echoes, in nearly the same terms, that of ĪPK I 6 and its vŗtti concerning vikalpa, while examining ahaṃpratyavamarśa, the reflective awareness ‘I’. See particularly ĪPK I 6, 2: bhinnayor avabhāso hi syād ghaţāghaţayor dvayoḥ/ prakāśasyeva nānyasya bhedinas tv avabhāsanam//, ‘In fact, the manifestation of two things as different would [be limited to, for example,] the case of the "jar" (ghaţa) and the "non-jar" (aghaţa). There is, however, no manifestation, as if it were light, of something other [than light]’; and its vŗtti: prakāśād dvitīyasya bhinnasya pratiyogino ‘prakāśasaṃjñasya anavabhāsane prakāśetaratvaṃ na syāt/ tasya anavābhāse vyapohanāyogād vikalpatāhāniḥ//, ‘Otherness with respect to light (prakāśetaratva) is not possible, since an opposite reality (pratiyogin), second to and distinct from light, called non-light, is not manifested. There being no possibility of exclusion (vyapohanāyogāt), since such an opposite reality does not exist, one cannot, therefore, speak of mental construct (vikalpatā) [with reference to ahaṃpratyavamarśa]’ (tr. Torella ĪPK: 129-131). Note that the notion of pratiyogin is based on a technical usage of the Nyāya — where it signifies the term to be presumed as the other pole in defining a given relation. For instance, ‘father’ is the pratiyogin of ‘son’, in the relation pitŗputrabhāva, as the meaning of this latter term (already implicitly relational) presumes reference to a parent, in this case, his ‘father’.451 vyavacchedaka — lit., ‘serve as a qualification of’. The meaning of the term vyavacchedaka is best grasped in the context of the notion of the pratiyogin — for it too is a relational term, whose pratiyogin is the vyavacchedya. The relation is that of ‘qualification to thing qualified’, understood in a way such that the existence of the one is somehow determined or limited by the existence of the other — for example, the ‘Indian cow’ and the ‘dewlap’ (whose relationship appears to be without exception, and therefore may serve in a definition), or the ‘bird’ and the ‘branch’ (on which it perches, which relationship is merely occasional, and therefore serves only to distinguish the bird from other birds). The relation is thus (as are all relations) shared by the two relata, and belongs to neither one exclusively, whatever be the manner of their coexistence. In the present context, this language is used to emphasize that "light" (prakāśa) can have no pratiyogin, and is therefore "unqualified" absolute. Cf. Vāmana, quoted in SpN II 3-4 (see n. 902).

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[...] since [the embodied soul] perceives his identity [with all entities] through his awareness (saṃveda) of them, [there is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, which is not Śiva].452

And, since nothing appears as contrary [to Light], how then might it be possible even to ascertain453 that there is an object here which, not subject to illumination (aprakāśamāna), has the form of its opposite [that is, which is different from Light] — whatever that object might be?

Therefore, the ultimate principle is of an undelimited nature (aparicchinnasvabhāva), inasmuch as it is free of all mental constructs, which are themselves delimiting factors.

Therefore, the master says: ‘it is pure’, free of stain, due to the absence of the soot-like impurity found in thought-construct.

Similarly, [the master says: that the ultimate principle is] serene (śānta), reposing [ever] in its absolute nature, in unison (sāmarasya)454 with its Śakti, for there is no

452 SpK II 3b. The entire text is as follows: yasmāt sarvamayo jīvaḥ sarvabhāvasamudbhavāt/ tatsaṃvedanarūpeņa tādātmyapratipattitaḥ// (II 3) tasmāc chabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ/ bhoktaiva bhogyabhāvena sadā sarvatra saṃsthitaḥ// (II 4), ‘The limited individual Self/embodied soul (jīva) is identical with the whole universe, inasmuch as all entities arise from him, and he perceives his identity (tādātmya) [with all entities] insofar as he is aware (saṃveda) of them. Therefore, there is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, that is not Śiva. It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer (bhoktŗ) who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment (bhogya)’. Thus the experienced object has an identity of essence with the experiencer. From the PM 60, it may be inferred that the famous hemistich (SpK II 4a): tasmāc chabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā nayā śivaḥ, is borrowed from some older texts (anekāmnāya); see n. 1028. Cf. TĀ IV 275a: sarvaṃ śivamayam, and avat. ad PS 46.453 Cf. ĪPV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 143): yata eşa evaparitaś chedanāt pariccheda ucyate, tad avabhāsanasāmarthyam apohanaśaktiḥ, ‘Differentiation (pariccheda) is so called because it cuts [the differentiated] off on all sides [from the rest]. Hence, what is responsible for the manifestation [of one object as distinct from the rest] is apohanaśakti [the power of differentiating "I" from "this", i.e., the power of negating the Lord’s essential plenitude]’ (our translation borrows from Pandey ĪPK: 38). On apohanaśakti, see n. 314; also GAS XV 15: ayaṃ ghaţa eva iti sarvātmakabhāvakhaņḍanāsāraṃ vikalpajñānātmakam apohanaṃ pāśavasŗşţirūpamāyā-mayapramātrucitam, ‘Distinctive apprehension (apohana), such as "this is nothing but a jar" (or "this is a jar [and nothing else]") is essentially that knowledge consisting of mental constructs, the source of [sāra — "from which flows" ...] the disintegration of the notion that all things have the same essence, which is suitable to the [limited] knower who is himself a consequence of those illusory powers (māyā) that have shaped themselves into a creation affected to souls in bondage’.454 sāmarasya — lit., ‘the condition of [those things] that have one and the same savor or essence’, ‘sameness of savor’; first occurrence of this key notion. Same term in ŚDvŗ I 48, glossing sarvapadārthānāṃ samaiva śivatā sthitā: paramaśivātprabhŗti ghaţādyantānām api padārthānāṃ samaiva [...] śivatā... niyatā sarveşāṃ tathā sāmarasyāsādanāt kāpi sthitiḥ syād ity arthaḥ/ evaṃ ca sarvasya śivarūpasāmarasyāt tadakhyātimayaśuddhyaśuddhirūpaparāparādi-bhedo bhāvānām uktaḥ, ‘["Śivahood is the same for all entities" — This means:] from Paramaśiva [on high, down] to jars, and so forth, Śivahood [...] is established ... as the same for all entities. So, since they have acquired such unity of essence, their status would be a matter of indifference. Since everything has identity of essence (sāmarasya) with Śiva, the difference between pure and impure, between the transcendent and the immanent (parāpara), and so forth, can be attributed to entities only insofar as that [identity] is misconstrued/not recognized (akhyāti), for this is the source [of

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disturbance (kşobha) arising from the dichotomy between the knower and the known. Yet, it does not at all resemble a piece of stone [as does the śāntabrahman of the Advaitins].

Moreover, it [the ultimate principle] is devoid of dissolution and creation. According to the maxim:

Once this Self has appeared [, its possibility of not appearing is nowhere (— is not possible —), for it is complete],455 [the Self] is eternal. Therefore time, past, future, and present, makes no alteration456 in it, for from it time itself emerges (samullāsā).

Thus, once it is admitted that the ultimate principle is free of generation and decay, the entirety of the whole may be logically established. And this is what has been propounded here.

such difference] (°maya°)’. In the Kashmirian tradition, the word rasa lies at the heart of another unity, that of poetics and metaphysics. In an aesthetic context, the rasa expresses also a unity of sentiment in which private distinctions and emotional involvements are cast off. It is the cornerstone of the doctrine. On the notion, see Rastogi 1987: 35-36; Bansat-Boudon 1992; Pollock 2006.455 The complete text of the quotation is given by AG in ĪPVV II 1, 6-7 (vol. III: 23), while commenting on na kvāpy aprakāśaḥ of the vivŗtti ad II 1, 7, attributing it to the Śaiva Sārasvatasamgraha: sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā pūrņasyāsya na kvāpy aprakāśanasambhavaḥ; it is found also in the SpS [p. 25], where it is attributed to the Śivasūtra (probably a part of the ŚS which is lost; see Silburn ŚS: 2); note that the SpS reading differs slightly: pūrņo ‘sya, aprakāśasaṃbhavaḥ. The statement can also be reminiscent of ChU VIII 4, 1-2: athaya ātmā sa setur [..,] tasmād vā etaṃ setuṃ tīrtvāpi naktam ahar evābhinişpadyate/ sakŗdvibhāto hy evaişa brahmalokaḥ. It may be worth noting that ĀPS 25 also defines the ātman as sakŗd vibhātah, a point of convergence with AG’s PS 93; R ad loc. quotes MuU II 2, 11 (see p. 14). The compound sakŗdvibhāta appears twice in Gaudapāda’s ĀŚ III 36 and IV 81, in the context of defining brahman as ātman (or citta). The term is glossed by Ś ad loc: sadaiva vibhāta ity etat, and, as he notes, is further explained in ĀŚ IV 81b itself: sakŗdvibhāto hy evaişa dharmo dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ (as Bouy reads); the same term qualifies brahman in Upadeśasāhasrī X 1: dŗśisvarūpaṃ gaganopamaṃ paraṃ sakŗdvibhātaṃ [...]. In its abridged form (viz., sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā, or even sakŗd vibhātaḥ), this passage is quoted in a number of Śaiva texts, among which we are able to cite, besides ĪPVV and SpS, ĪPV II 1, 6-7 (vol II: 22), TĀV I 125-126, IV 179, VIII 169a, 174 and XXIX 80, and, here, YR ad 10-11. It is also found, in the context of aesthetics, in ABh ad NŚ VI, śāntarasaprakaraņa, after kā. 82 (vol. I: 335). In all probability, this list is not exhaustive and many other occurrences might be discovered. In any case, it should be emphasized that its frequent occurrence makes sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā a key formula of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir. Note that YR quotes it here in the same context as does ĪPK II 1, 6-7, that of the eternity of the supreme Subject, or consciousness, whose background is the debate on Light and its contrary. In fact, YR seems here to refer, indirectly, to the literal form of ĪPK II 1, 6, whose final sakŗt is given a special treatment: sarvatrābhāsabhedo ‘pi bhavet kālakramākaraḥ/ vicchinnabhāsaḥ śūnyāder mātur bhātasya no sakŗt//, ‘In all things the diversity of the manifestations is the source of temporal succession for the knowing subjects, such as [those who are conscious of] the void (śūnya) [viz., the śūnyapramātŗ], etc., whose light is discontinuous, but not for the knowing subject who shines once and for ever’ (tr. Torella ĪPK: 155, modified). See also PS 93 and notes thereon. It is noteworthy that SpS quotes sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā, etc., immediately after referring to SpK II 4a: śabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ/, ‘There is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, that is not Śiva’. The same textual organization is observed, here, in YR’s commentary, where the previous quotation is from SpK II 3b. Such echoes from text to text show the persistent interreferentiality of the Trika system.456 na kramate — see YR ad 6.

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Kārikās 12-13But, interrupts an objector, if the ultimate principle is such as you say [and you also] affirm that the world appears [within it], then how can this be — inasmuch as nothing, in respect of that ultimate principle, would dare to ‘appear’ therefrom different?

[You are caught in the following dilemma:] If you say that the universe is different from it [viz., the ultimate principle] and so appears [within it], this would be tantamount to denying the nondualistic doctrine. But if you say that it is not different, what sense then can be attributed to this verbal construction of yours,457 [which appears to say] that the universe appears [within it] [as something else again]?

[In response to this], illustrating through an example the principle at issue, viz., [the relation termed] ‘difference-and-non-difference’ (bhedābhedā), the master says, in order to substantiate [the aforesaid principle]:

12-13. As, in the orb of a mirror, objects such as cities or villages, themselves various though not different [from the mirror],458 appear both as different from each other and from the mirror itself, so appears this world [in the mirror of the Lord’s consciousness], differentiated both internally459 and vis-a-vis that consciousness, although it is not different from consciousness most pure, the supreme Bhairava.460

457 vācoyukti.458 That is, as reflections, having no substratum apart from the mirror itself.459 Lit. ‘mutually’.460 The translation differs somewhat from that of Silburn: ‘Tout comme des villes et des villages varies qui se refletent dans le disque d’un miroir sont depourvus de distinctions, bien qu’ils semblent doues de distinctions mutuelles et separes du miroir egalement, de meme, procedant de l‘Intelligence absolument immaculee du supreme Bhairava, cet univers tout en etant lui aussi denue de toute distinction, apparait comme fait de parties mutuellement distinctes et distinct egalement de cette (Intelligence)’ [— ‘In the same way as varied cities and villages reflecting in the orb of a mirror are devoid of distinctions, although they appear as endowed with mutual distinctions and separated also from the mirror, so, originating from the altogether immaculate Intelligence of the supreme Bhairava, this universe, although also devoid of any distinction, appears as made of parts mutually distinct as well as distinct from that [Intelligence]’]. Here, vimalatamaparamabhairavabodhāt is not taken as a complement of vibhāgaśūnyam, as does the commentary, but rather as a causal complement of the principal verb ābhāti (which creates a difficulty, for, then, vibhāgaśūnyam is left without complement), and bhairavabodha is understood as ‘the Intelligence of Bhairava’. Note that these kārikās seem to echo TĀ III 1-4 and TĀV ad loc: ata eva cānena viśvasya citpratibimbatvam/ [...] yathā hi darpaņādau parasparavyāvŗttātmānaḥ pratibimbitā ākāraviśeşāḥ tato ‘natiriktatve ‘pi atiriktā iva bhāsante tadvad ihāpīti, ‘Le monde, ainsi, est un reflet dans la conscience [...] II en est du cosmos comme des formes refletees dans un miroir ou autre [surface reflechissante], formes distinctes les unes des autres et qui, quoique nullement separees [du miroir qui les reflete], apparaissent cependant comme differentes de lui’ (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 141); the pratibimbavāda is developped at length in TĀ III 1-65, whose commentary ends with the same verse as that which is quoted at the end of YR’s commentary ad 12-13. Since the exposition of the pratibimbavāda is dealt with in the TĀ in the context of the exposition of the śāṃbhāvopāya, and is placed there under the aegis of Bhairava, it may be inferred that PS 12-13 amounts to a cryptic exposition of the śāṃbhāvopāya — in order to be liberated in the ‘way of Śaṃbhu’, one must realize mystically that the universe has no nature apart from being a reflection in the divine consciousness. He who acquires in this way an experience, in his own consciousness, of the appearance and disappearance of the universe, and can affirm: ‘I am

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[The comparison may be developed through the following example:]In the depths of a clear mirror, the world461 appears (bhāsate) as reflection

(pratibimba) variously — whether a city, village, fortress, enclosure, market-place, river, stream, fire, a tree, mountain, animal, bird, a man or a woman — that is, as having various forms, each differentiated by means of its own characteristics (svālakşaņyena), but also that [differentiated world] appears (bhāti) as undifferentiated, that is, as not different from the mirror itself, assuming a form within the mirror that is in no way different from that mirror.

And although it appears there [in the mirror] as undifferentiated from the mirror itself, [that world] appears (bhāti), or presents itself [to the senses] (sphurati) in relations of mutual disjunction,462 that is, appears as differentiable463 [internally], in the sense that the cloth is different from the jar and the jar from the cloth inasmuch as each presents characteristics of its own.

Only as reflected in that mirror are objects perceived (parāmŗśyante) as distinct from each other; and once they quit the mirror, nothing of them [remains behind to be] apprehended separately [that is, only the mirror remains]. Rather, though remaining consubstantial with the mirror464 [i.e., although being one with it, as reflection], the world465 is perceived as different in every respect.466

Now, if it be objected that, in that case, the mirror would itself be hidden by the reflection of the jar, etc., the master replies, saying: ‘no, [the reflections are different] from the mirror itself as well’.

Śiva’ [śivo ‘ham], is liberated (TĀ III 268-293). See also, AG’s stotra, Paramārthacarcā, vv. 4-5.461 sarva — in order to appreciate the force of the analogy, it seems important to understand sarvam ‘the whole’ (= the world) in its distributive aspect, rather than in its comprehensive aspect: sarvam here implies ‘everything that exists, or can exist, whatever it may be’; "differentiation" is thus implied by the notion of "totality" itself.462 vibhāgenaiva ca parasparam.463 vibhaktatayā — cf. PS 48 and YR ad loc.464 darpaņasāmarasyena sthitam api — the term sāmarasya, ‘unison’, is intended to evoke the nature of the relation between the image and the mirror: fundamental identity, superficial (or apparent) difference.465 jagat — although there are still differences of opinion, the word jagat is commonly derived from the root gā (jigāti), understood as a present participle with "corrected" reduplication. The Indian tradition more or less agrees, beginning from the root gam- (‘kvip, dvitvam, tuk ca’ — Vācaspatyā), which explanation Renou also favors (1952a: §248). On the other hand, one of the glosses of the word given the same dictionaries is jańgama, which suggests that a sentiment of intensification has also been associated with jagat. Thus the word suggests, even more strongly than sarva, that the "world" is here to be understood distributively, as the ‘incessant going and coming’ of differentiated being; see its frequent occurrence in the phrase: şaţtriṃśatattvātmakaṃ jagat, for instance in avat. ad 14, YR ad 1 and 46 (avat.).466 It is only in the mirror that the appearance of multiplicity is possible; without the mirror, there would be no presentation of multiplicity. In order for the comparison to support the thesis here propounded, and in order to understand the verse above, one must forget that a "real" mirror implies objects beyond or outside it. In this mirror reflections alone are at issue, and, qua reflections, their sole support is the mirror itself; see TĀ III 21b: [...] vastu bhavati tato ‘py anyatra nāpy alam//, ‘[the reflected image] is a [real] thing, which does not exist apart from that [mirror]’.

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It is not merely in and of themselves467 that the objects, even though reflected in the mirror, appear as different [from each other], inasmuch as they are also different from the mirror.468

For, although the mirror is composed of those various reflections, it appears (cakāsti) as [different] from those reflections, for its own nature transcends them. And it is not understood as composed of them in such a way as to convey the idea that no mirror exists.

Everyone has an unsublated perception that ‘this is a mirror’, even as he apprehends the various objects therein reflected. Nor is it the case that the [image of the] jar, etc., qualifies the mirror in such fashion that the essential nature [of the mirror] would be abrogated [— as it would if one were to say]: ‘this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a jar’ [scil., ‘... and not a cloth’], and ‘this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a cloth’ [‘... and not a jar’]. The difference consequent upon time and space [‘causes’ of the variability of the reflections] does not thus eventuate in the loss of the [mirror’s] essential nature.469 Therefore, being tolerant of those reflections, the mirror remains nothing but a mirror, as regards itself.470 There is thus no defect attaching to the doctrine of reflection [viz., of the reflected image] (pratibimbavāda).

Now, it might be said that this reflection is nothing but an error (bhrānti). Indeed, when an elephant is perceived in the mirror, it is not that an elephant is found in the mirror [rather, there is something like an elephant, in the form of its reflection], for, since no consequence which is fruitful471 [can be attributed to the elephant in the mirror] such as would in fact [pertain to an actual elephant], the conclusion (niścaya) [that ‘this is an elephant’] would be simply an error.

[Let it be said here only that] the example is valid to the extent that the doctrine of reflection is valid. As far as error is concerned, its nature will be propounded later in the text.472

Likewise, in exactly the same way, namely, in complete accordance with the example of the reflection of a city, etc., in a mirror,473

[we assert that] the world (jagat), this universe (viśvā), although not different from consciousness most pure, the supreme Bhairava, that is, although not separated from Light itself, which abounds in unfragmented bliss and is utterly free of impurity,

[... that the world] is displayed as differentiated [internally], like the image in the mirror — that is, as having various forms, each [determined as different] from the other, in virtue of the dichotomy of knower and known...

467 svayam.468 The differences between objects do not suffice to explain all difference. The issue is important for Abhinavagupta for it entails that the world be understood also in its relation to the Absolute, rather than merely in and of itself, independently. Thus the illustration is complete — the reflections of objects, however numerous they are, also need the mirror.469 Were it necessary to employ a special mirror to reflect each different object, then, of course, it would have been legitimate to say that its ‘nature’ had indeed been affected by the nature of the object.470 svātmani — or ‘... its nature’.471 arthakriyā.472 It will be explained later what is an error, and how reflection is not an error.473 The example (dŗşţānta) has been explained. The author now takes up to the dārşţāntika, the term to be explained through the example.

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... and [differentiated] from that as well, that is, from that consciousness as well, appears (ābhāu) [the world] as if emerging from it, whereby consciousness, though displaying itself in the form of that [world], displays itself also as transcending it, in the way the mirror transcends the reflections.

And so, Light/consciousness, tolerant of the reflections of all the objects of the universe and yet transcending all those objects, displays itself according to its own inherent nature as the principle of experience itself in each and every [percipient subject].

And even the difference of time, of place, or of kind, which pertains to the [external] object, just appears there [but not really], as if in a mirror. Yet, it is not the case that they serve to differentiate the very nature [of consciousness]. Therefore, consciousness, although appearing both one and multiple, is one only, just as variegated cognitions are grasped by [one] consciousness.474

Nevertheless, between the Light of consciousness (citprakāśā) — endowed as it is with the state of wonder [that is supreme ipseity]475 — and the light of the mirror, there is the following difference — viz., the city, etc., that is judged to be different [from the mirror] as a reflection, appears in the perfectly pure mirror only as external to it, but is in no way created by the mirror. Thus the conclusion that ‘this is an elephant’ [as applying to what is seen] in the mirror would be erroneous.476

On the other hand, Light [viz., consciousness], whose essence is the marvelous experience of itself, makes manifest (ābhāsayati) on its own surface (svātmabhita), and out of its own free will, the universe, whose material cause is that same consciousness, by considering (parāmŗśat) that [the universe] is not different [from that consciousness].477 The Lord’s creativity (nirmātŗtvā) is nothing but that

474 All variety — the city itself — is comprehended in and by consciousness, single and unique, which serves as the basis of that variety. Compare the elegant argument on this issue developed by Śańkara in his Upadeśasāhasrī.475 I.e., endowed with vimarśa, or spanda. Consciousness, or Light, vibrates, realizing itself as consciousness, whereas the insentient mirror is neither aware of itself nor of the reflections it receives from outside.476 This remark follows from the discussion of arthakriyā, above. The "image" (usually designated by the term ākāra) of the elephant, whether that of the mirror or a picture, represents only its exterior form (and to that extent is shared with the "real" elephant), but lacks all other qualities (which we may call "real") of the animal: one cannot travel on the back of a picture (for example). Here, this difference is exploited in order to emphasize that the "reality" of the elephant is elsewhere, and does not derive from the mirror, which is not true of "objects" created by Śiva. The metaphor can, in other words, only be carried so far.477 In the example (dŗşţānta), the substratum is the mirror. In the dārşţāntika, the substratum is consciousness. There is a unique difference between the dŗşţānta and the dārşţāntika. In the dŗşţānta, there is something present as an archetype that is reflected in the substratum, whereas, in the dārşţāntika, it is consciousness that appears both as substratum and archetype (as the manifold world), for the archetype is but the creation of the substratum. The world thus created is consciousness, he who manifests it is consciousness, and the surface, or screen (bhitti), on which it is manifested, or projected, is also consciousness. This is the source of wonder. For a similar formulation, see TĀV III 1-4 (vol. II: 354): svabhittāv eva svecchayā sarvaṃ prakāśayati, and vol. II: 355-56: parameśvaro hy anargalatvalakşaņasva-svātantryamāhātmyāt svātmabhittāv eva anatiriktam apy atiriktāyamānam iyad viśvavaicitryaṃ pradarśayati iti, ‘The Supreme Lord, by the power of his own freedom which cannot be hindered, makes manifest on his own surface the wonderful diversity of the universe as different from him, although it is non-different from him’.

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manifestation (ābhāsana) of the universe. Therefore, self-awareness (parāmarśā) is the main aspect of that Light, making it possible to distinguish it from the light of the insentient mirror, etc.478 This is what the author has stated in his Vivŗtivimarśinī:

As the variegated construction [of the universe] appears within the mirror, so does the entire universe, here, within the Self [consciousness]. Nevertheless, consciousness knows the universe by means of its own essential power of awareness (vimarśa), whereas the mirror doesn’t know it in that way.479

Thus, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, since the host of objects480 has been created within his own body, there is no illusion of difference (bhedabhrānti) at all [that is, we cannot logically consider the Lord as different from the universe].

However, from the point of view of the cognizer under the dominion of māyā (māyāpramātŗ), the appearance of difference [or, difference which itself is but an appearance] (bhedāvabhāsā) is nothing but a confusion on his part that consists in his failing to recognize his plenitude (pūrņatvākhyāti).481

Failure to discern (akhyāna) means here ‘absence of display’ [or ‘non-persistence’ (in our consciousness)] (aprathā) of the all-encompassing, that is, the nondual nature [of the Lord].

To say it in another way: plenitude does not appear [to the limited cognizer], but rather non-plenitude alone, which has duality as its form [viz., the duality of knower and known]; thus it is that only difference is by him perceived.

Therefore, this doctrine of reflection is free from flaw.

Karikā 14Thus, the master having stipulated482 that the world consisting of thirty-six principles [is to be understood] as undifferentiated from Light [viz., consciousness] [kārikās 12-

478 ‘Etc.’ means insentient matter, in general.479 TS III (p. 19), quoted by AG in ĪPW I 5, 14 (vol. II: 203): ‘I have said this in the Tantrasāra, etc.’. Note that TAV III 65 quotes the same verse, with a variant: nijavimarśanasāravŗttyā, instead of nijavimarśanasārayuktyā.480 bhāvarāśi.481 akhyāti, avidyā: these two terms, which often seem to be used interchangeably, may nevertheless be distinguished in terms of their origins. In principle, akhyāti is employed more or less at the psychological or individual level, to designate one type of misapprehension or misunderstanding, and to characterize a certain theory of validity formulated in terms of that notion. The term is particularly associated with the Mīmāṃsā of Prabhākara, who denies any positive participation of the apprehending subject in the formulation of the error to which he is subject, avidyā, in contrast, is a term particularly associated with Advaita in its various forms, which designates a form of error at the cosmological level. For Śańkara, avidyā is the product of māyā, creative power par excellence, to which all men are subject at every moment. Our authors, it seems, utilize these terms in full cognizance of their original acceptations, although, case by case, their domains may very well overlap. This is unsurprising, in a monism of this sort — it is avidyā that is responsible for the fact that we confuse what is not our body with our body, which confusion in turn is fundamental in the various particular errors that govern our daily lives as enchained beings. We have generally translated akhyāti, when otherwise undetermined, as ‘failure to recognize [one’s own Self]’ or, with contextual variants, ‘failure to recognize [one’s identity with the Self]’ or ‘failure to recognize [the Self as such]’ — or, in those cases where akhyāti impinges on the domain of avidyā, quite simply, by ‘nescience’, keeping in mind, of course, the complex of ideas out of which it emerges.482 sthitiṃ vidhāya.

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13] — this in consequence of his having stated the true nature of the ultimate principle [kārikās 10-11] — he goes on now, in the [following] kārikās [viz., kārikās 14-22], to explain, in the order of their arising, the proper form of each principle:483

14. He [the Supreme Śiva] makes manifest the [conditional] state of the [unique] principle484 [just mentioned] by realizing differences among the five energies — which realizations are Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, and Īśvara and vidyā.485

[The verse is to be construed as follows:]He, that is, the Supreme Śiva, whose essential nature has just been propounded by

describing [him as] the ultimate principle [kārikās 10-11], makes manifest (bhāsayati) the [conditional] state of the [unique] principle [now] as qualified in five ways, by realizing differences among the five energies,486 that is to say, by discriminating each from what it is not487 — the energies that are five in number, Consciousness, Bliss,488 Will, Knowledge and Action, [each of them] the cause of innumerable [subsidiary] energies, and that [together] constitute the [Lord’s] own real nature; that is to say, he makes evident each in and through its proper characteristics. This is the purport.

How described is that [conditional state of the unique principle]?The master says: ‘Śiva, etc’ [— i.e., he speaks the verse in an effort to explain that

condition].

483 Cf. the condensed exposition of the thirty-six tattvas in ŚD I 29b-33.484 tattvadaśā.485 The uniform energy (of the unique Lord) is contextualized (or hypostatized; hence the term daśā) by dividing itself into five energies. Silburn translates: ‘II manifeste les categories: Śiva, Energie, eternel Śiva, et celle du Seigneur et du pur Savoir, en se servant des caracteres propres aux cinq energies’ [— ‘He manifests the categories: Śiva, Energy, Eternal Śiva, as well as those of the Lord and of pure Knowledge, by making use of qualities specific to the five energies’]. TĀV IX 50 (vol. IV: 1683) quotes this kārikā. PS 46 will deal again with the manifestation of the five śaktis as the first five tattvas. Emphasizing the ontological question of the division into five tattvas of the Supreme Lord who is one, YR follows the argument of TA IX 49b-52a: śivaḥ svatantradŗgrūpaḥ pañcaśaktisunirbharaḥ// svātantryabhāsitabhidā pañcad-hā pravibhajyate/ cidānandeśaņājñānakńyāņāṃ susphuţatvataḥ// śivaśaktisadeśānavidyākhyaṃ tattvapañcakam/ ekaikatrāpi tattve ‘smin sarvaśaktisunirbhare// tattatprādhānyayogena sa sa bhedo nirūpyate/, ‘Śiva, who is by essence free vision and is endowed with five śaktis, first divides himself into five [tattvas], by differentiation born of freedom itself— [and this is done] for clarification of [the pentad of śaktis] Consciousness, Bliss, Will, and Action. [Thus] comes to be the pentad of tattvas — termed Śiva, Śakti, Sadā[śiva], Īśāna and [śuddha]vidyā. [And] although each one of the tattvas is filled with all the śaktis, yet every distinct entity [i.e., tattva] is characterized by the predominance of such or such [śakti]’. See MM 13-15 and PM ad loc, which deal with the manifestation of the Lord’s energies as the first five tattvas.486 Lit. ‘through the division of the five energies’.487 atadvyāvŗttyā — the term means ‘by excluding what is not that [namely, what is not itself]’, which both glosses and emphasizes bhinnatvena — īśvara, for instance, being absolutely different from that which is not īśvara. For a similar usage of vyāvŗtti, see Gauḍapāda ad SK 28: mātraśabdo viśeşārtho ‘viśeşavyāvŗttyarthaḥ/ yathā bhikşāmātraṃ labhyate nānyo viśeşa iti/, ‘The word "only" (-mātra) is meant to specify, to exclude what is not [properly] a specification. If it is said: "alms only are received", it means that [what is received] has no other specification’. See n. 574 on viśeşe.488 nirvŗti.

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[In this verse, the term tattvadaśā, ‘conditional state of the (unique) principle’, is qualified as śivaśaktisadāśivatām in which the abstract suffix -tā] evokes that general condition of which the three terms ‘Śiva’, ‘Śakti’ and ‘Sadāśiva’ [appear as instances].

Similarly, [‘conditional state of the (unique) principle’ is qualified as īśvaravidyāmayīm in which the suffix -mayī] evokes that state whose [dual] form consists of Īśvara and vidyā [i.e., evokes that state which is made of Īśvara and vidyā as a pair].489

Now, the nature of each principle is explained.To explain in detail, śivatattva — that is, ‘the principle that is termed Śiva’ — is

nothing other than consciousness, whose material form is great Light, which transcends all the [other] principles, and consists of the state of wonder that is perfect ipseity (pūrņāhantācamatkārā) within all cognizers. Here, the exposition [of the Lord] as principle is done with reference to people who require instruction.490

[Universal] consciousness consists in the Lord’s becoming [potentially] all things, as when he knows (parāmŗśat): ‘I become all’.491 It takes the form of the Bliss that is proper to the Lord who is [pure] consciousness; it is slightly swollen (kiṃciducchūnatārūpa), being at this stage the seed of all things.492 This [condition of consciousness] is called the ‘state of Śakti’ (śaktyavasthā).

489 Lit, ‘Similarly [the compound ending with -mayīm is to be understood as expressing the idea that such "condition" (°daśa) is] that in which Īśvara and vidyā constitute the "substantial nature" (prakŗti)’. This passage is cast as a grammatical exegesis of the verse, especially of the suffixes -tām (at the end of the first compound) and -mayīm (at the end of the second compound) of the first hemistich.490 Such divisions and distinctions are but provisional modalities that are bound to disappear at the moment one dissolves in the Absolute.491 viśvaṃ bhavāmi.492 The reasoning, terminology and image appear to be borrowed from ŚD I 16-17 defining aunmukhya (lit, ‘direction toward’, ‘orientation’), the desire of creating which begins to deploy within blissful consciousness itself: kiṃciducchūnatā saiva mahadbhiḥ kaiścid ucyate, ‘Some philosophers name this desire [of creation] kiṃciducchūnatā, i.e., "slight swelling" ‘. According to Utpaladeva (p. 16), it is Bhaţţa Pradyumna who has recourse, in his Tattvagarbhastotra, to this image of the slightly swollen seed, which is about to eject the shoot it contains as a germ, in attempting to explain the moment when, as stated in MM 14, the Lord is ‘ready to desire, know and create the universe’; the PM ad loc. makes use of the same image: tasyaiva kiṃciducchūnatāvasthāyāṃ śaktiśabdavyapadeşa ity arthaḥ. As Silburn puts it (MM: 100), before quoting ŚSĀ XIII 15: ‘L’energie constitue la prise de conscience que Śiva a de soi en tant que Beatitude quand il tend ā s’enfler ou ā se dilater au sortir de la plenitude indivise et qu’il se met a vibrer spontanement en vue de s’exprimer’ [— ‘The energy constitutes Śiva’s awareness of himself as Bliss, when he intends to swell or dilate at the moment he comes out of undivided plenitude and starts to spontaneously vibrate so as he expresses himself]. It is worth noting that Bhaţţa Pradyumna, who forged the image of the slightly swollen seed that is used here in order to define the state of Śakti, was a śaivite Śākta (on Bhaţţa Pradyumna, see Dyczkowski SpK: 291).

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It is she [viz., Śakti] who is celebrated in all the esoteric doctrines (rahasyanaya) as one only,493 although sometimes in complete and sometimes in emaciated form, the two serving as metaphors of world creation and world dissolution.

Further, at this [stage, viz., that of Śakti, which is] the seminal level494 of the universe’s generation and which is termed [therefore] the ‘great Void beyond the Void’ (mahāśūnyātiśūnyā),495 the condition of Sadāśiva is reached, namely, the state of wonder that is perfect ipseity,496 a state proper to the Great Lord (Maheśa), who realizes: ‘I am this’,497 without differentiating [one from the other], for [at this level] the segment of [the energy of] Action [implied by the ‘this’, viz., the Lord’s creation]

493 Cf. PHvŗ 8 [Singh: 70]: [...] iyaṃ turīyā saṃvidbhaţţārikā tattatsŗşţyādibhedān udvamanā saṃharanti ca sadā pūrņā ca kŗśā ca ubhayarūpā ca anubhayātmā ca akramam eva sphurantī sthitā/ uktaṃ ca śrīpratyabhijñātīkāyām ‘tāvad arthāvalehena uttişţhati pūrņā ca bhavati’ iti/, ‘This venerable turīyā consciousness flashes forth ceaselessly, now creating multifarious emanations, etc., now withdrawing them, [thus] always full (pūrņa) [since it is able to project things out of itself] and yet always emaciated (kŗśa) [and therefore bound to reabsorb what departed from it in order to make up its loss], of both forms, and assuming none of them. It has been stated in the Pratyabhijñāţīkā: "When licking [i.e., reabsorbing] (avaleha) the objects, she [Śakti] rises [in her own nature], and so she is full"; also ŚSV 16, which deals with the incomprehensible nature of supreme energy in the context of the śakticakra: [...] atiriktāriktatadubhayātmatayāpy abhidhīyamānāpy anetadrūpā anuttarā parā svātantryaśaktiḥ kāpy asti, ‘There exists an energy of freedom (svātantryaśakti), unexcelled (anuttarā), transcendent (parā), not having any form [lit, ‘not having the form of that’, anetadrūpā], although it has been described as "being in excess" (atirikta) or "in no wise deficient" (arikta), or as manifesting both [viz., "excess" and "deficiency"]’. Singh and Silburn, supported also by Apte’s dictionary, understand atirikta as ‘beyond empty’, that is ‘extremely empty, quite empty’ [cf. Singh ŚS: "greatly empty"; Silburn: "elle a beau etre pleine, vide, a la fois pleine et vide, ou ni vide ni pleine"], thus apprehending here a catuşkoţi of the Madhyamaka sort. YR in his commentary appears to follow this line as well. However, neither B&R nor MW list such a meaning for atirikta, which they take in the usual sense of ‘excessive’, ‘de trop’, and so on — which meaning, if retained here, would vitiate the catuşkoţi. The Vācaspatya has perhaps the key to this puzzle: ‘atirikta: "atiśayite, śreşţhe, bhinne, śūnye ca" — and, to justify this last meaning, ‘empty’: ‘yasya yāvatpramāņaṃ yuktaṃ tato ‘dhikatve: "hīnāńgīm atiriktāńgīm" iti smŗtiḥ’, namely, ‘she who is "missing a limb" has gone beyond the norm established as proper [in the śāstras that govern such niceties], and so, in the words of a Smŗti, may be said to "have a limb in excess" [viz., to have gone beyond the norm in the matter of limbs]’. By this tortuous argument, ‘excess of limbs’ becomes ‘deficiency of limbs’! But, of course, this would not be the first case of an opportune remorphemicization in the interests of "clarity"; see, for instance, sura issued from asura understood as a-sura.494 bījabhūmi.495 Probably a Krama technical term, which implicitly refers to the Goddess Vyomavāmeśvarī (‘She who Vomits the [Five] Voids’), worshiped in the first phase of the pentadic cycle of the Five Voids, who represents ‘the initial and eternal vibration of thoughtless consciousness’ (Sanderson 1988: 696-697). Thus is Vyomavāmeśvarī at the level of Śakti. See the Krama text, the Mahānayaprakāśa (39b-40a) of Arņasiṃha, which describes Vyomavāmeśvarī: mahāśūnyātiśūnyatvāt samyakśāntatarāpi yā// sarvavyomāni vāmantī vyomavāmeśvarī tu sā/, ‘She who, though extremely at peace for she is "great Void beyond the Void" (mahāśūnyātiśūnya), vomits all Voids is Vyomavāmeśvarī’ (manuscript transcribed by Marc Dyczkowski, made available by the Muktabodha Indological Research Institute). The term mahāśūnya appears in SvTU II 154 (which cites VBh 149 and Kubjikāmatatantra [KMT] VI 23), SvTU IV 209, and IV 369; since SvTU IV 209 relates mahāśūnya with the śāntātītakalā, which corresponds to the level of Śiva/Śakti, the notion might be equated with that of

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still reposes in ipseity (ahantāviśrānti) [i.e., is still latent in the ‘I’], because [the energy of] Knowledge is yet predominant.498

Here reside the class of cognizers called the Mantramaheśvaras, the ‘Great Lords of Mantras’.499

Likewise, it is at this very stage [i.e., on the level of the tattva Sadāśiva], thanks to the absence of difference expressed in the judgment ‘I am this’,500 that the condition termed ‘Īśvara’ is reached, consisting in the marvelous experience of one’s own Self,501 for now the two moments of ipseity and ecceity (idantā) are held in perfect equilibrium, according to the "rule of the balance"502 [— which does not allow ‘this’, viz., the ‘other’, to present itself as differentiated].

mahāśūnyātiśūnya. It is to be distinguished from the notion of śūnyātiśūnya, the ‘Void beyond the Void’, which, according to SvT X 707, corresponds to the śakti named mahāmāyā (see SvTU VII 6 (two times), X 707, X 1213, X 1278, XI 16; TĀV VI 10, XI 20, NT VII 21, XXI 61 (two times), XXII 43, XXII 44); nevertheless PHvŗ 4 [Singh: 55] offers a different correspondence, which makes śūnyātiśūnya a synonym for Anāśritaśiva — a level of experience at the junction of Śakti and Sadāśiva, i.e., at the junction of the one and the many (°anāśritaśivaparyāyaśūnyātiśūnya°) — inasmuch as such ‘experience’ (if it can be called that) precedes all concrete or material creation (on these notions, see Appendix 7, p. 327).496 pūrņāhantāmayo yaḥ camatkāraḥ.497 aham idam.498 Trika texts develop a sort of norm which correlates icchāśakti with Sadāśiva, jñānaśakti with Īśvara and kriyāśakti with śuddhavidyā (see PS 14, TĀ IX 50b-51a, ĪPV III 1, 7 (avat.) and Torella ĪPK: 193, n. 13). Nevertheless, as emphasized by TĀ IX 51b-52a (quoted n. 485), it is more a question of the predominance of one specific śakti in a specific tattva than a regular correspondence, the other śaktis being also present in every tattva, even though in a subordinated way. This principle suffices to explain the relative discrepancies between the texts. In effect, according to some, it is jñānaśakti that operates in Sadāśiva, and kriyāśakti in Īśvara, whereas a residual trace of kriyāśakti is in action in śuddhavidyā, icchāśakti being correlated with Śakti; see ŚD I 29b-31, TĀ VI 43-44, and the rather enigmatic statement of the ĪPK III 1, 2, thus explained by the Vimarśinī: āntarī jñānarūpā yā daśā tasyā udrekābhāsane sādākhyam [...] bahirbhāvasya kriyāśaktimayasya [...] udrekābhāse sati [...] īśvaratattvam, ‘When the preponderance (udreka) of the internal condition characterized as "knowledge" (jñāna) becomes evident, there arises the tattva Sādākhya. [...] And when the preponderance of the external state, which consists of the energy of Action (kriyāśakti), becomes evident, there comes into being the īśvaratattva’ (on the etymology of Sādākhya and Sadāśiva, see n. 906); see also ŚD II 1, and PTV 1 (p. 3 [Skt. text]): tatra ubhayatra jñānakriyāśaktimaye rape sadāśiveśvarasāre [...]. Here, YR’s commentary appears to accord with such conceptions.499 On the hierarchy of the seven types of subject (saptapramātŗ) — Śiva, Mantramaheśvaras, Mantreśvaras, Mantras (including Vidyeśvaras), Vijñānākalas, Pralayākalas and Sakalas — see Appendix 10, p. 330. Those categories, to whom YR will refer in commenting on this kārikā and kārikā 23, represent different levels, or modes, of consciousness.500 aham idam.501 Here, YR does not relate the īśvaratattva to a specific śakti, be it jñānaśakti, as is generallythe case, or kriyāśakti (see n. 498). Moreover his exposition of the īśvaratattva differs fromwhat appears to be the norm. Most Trika texts establish symmetry between the Sadāśiva and the Īśvara states, to the extent that they even explain them through the contrastive metaphor of shutting and opening the eyes (nimeşa/unmeşa), as in ĪPK III 1, 3. In both tattvas, it is theexperience of aham idam, ‘I am this’, with a difference of emphasis: on ‘I’ (or internality), in Sadāśiva; on ‘this’ (or externality), in Īśvara. In Sadāśiva, ‘I’ overcomes ‘this’, since consciousness equates the universe with itself, in the movement of nimeşa, while closing, as it were, its eyes. According to ĪPW, vol. III: 264, the word itself — Sadāśiva, ‘Eternal Śiva’ — means that Śiva remains Śiva, i.e., consciousness, even if the object begins to emerge

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Here reside the class of cognizers called the Mantreśvaras, the ‘Lords of Mantras’.At this point, thanks to the subordination of ipseity and the predominance of

ecceity [that thereupon ensues], the state of wonderment consisting in the realization: ‘I am I’, [and] ‘this is this’, 503 is attained; [the predicates in these judgments] may be indicated [only] with a finger [for their content is as yet indistinguishable from their subject], just as is the] head of the new-born child.504 This is indeed the [condition] of the Lord [and is called] the principle of pure Knowledge (śuddhavidyā),505 because [this realization is] the very essence of knowledge (bodhasārā).506

Here, out of inherent benevolence, seventy million Mantras, replete with signification (vācakatā), attend, along with the Vidyeśvaras, upon the

within him. Symmetrically, in Īśvara, ‘this’ overcomes ‘I’, since now consciousness equates itself with the universe, thus making differentiation more evident, as the universe is, in effect, its own negation. On these reasonings, see ĪPV III 1, 2-3: [...] yadā aham ity asya yadadhikaraņaṃcinmātrarūpaṃ tatraivedaṃ samullāsayati tadā tasyāsphuţatvāt sadāśivatā aham idam iti/ idamaham iti tu idamityaṃśe sphuţibhūte ‘dhikaraņe yadāhamaṃśavimarśaṃ nişiñcati tadeśvaratā —iti vibhāgaḥ, ‘When the substratum of the "I", namely, pure consciousness, makes appear in that ["I"] a "that", then such [conscious] state is called "Sadāśiva", because the "that"[though appearing] is not there manifested clearly [i.e., as other than the "I"], viz., "I am this"; on the other hand, when, as [captioned in the phrase] "this is I", the "that"- aspect has achieved clarification as the substratum, then such [conscious] state is called "Īśvara", for in such [awareness] [the "that"] is anointed with an awareness of the "I"-aspect [that is, the"object" is endowed with the grace of consciousness] — such is the difference [between the two stages]’. See ĪPK III 1, 2-3; also ĪPK III 1, 5 and vŗtti ad loc, wherein is coined the concept of ‘perfect-imperfect state’ (parāparadaśā; parāparāvasthā) in order to account for these two ambiguous tattvas, whose perfection of consciousness (that of the ‘I’) is slightly altered by the mere presence of a ‘this’: atredantāmater aparatvam ahantayā sarvasya vedyasyācchādanāt parateti parāparāvasthaişā, ‘Here there is imperfection because there is the notion of ‘this’, perfection because all the cognizable is veiled by the ‘I’; this is therefore the perfect-imperfect condition’ (tr. Torella); cf. PHvŗ 3, where the concept of a parāpara condition is applied to the sadāśivatattva. On the other hand, YR, though admitting the simultaneous presence of ipseity and objectivity at the level of Īśvara, chooses to emphasize the perfection of the experience in which there is no sense of alterity. Kşemarāja’s exposition, in PHvŗ 3, accords with that interpretation: īśvaratattve sphuţedantāhantāsāmānādhikaraņyāṃ yādŗk viśvaṃ grāhyaṃ, tādŗk [...], ‘The universe, in the īśvaratattva, grasped as that kind [of entity] in which the co-referentiality of the "I" and the "that" has become manifest, is such [...]’. Note that the grammatical concept of sāmānādhikaraņya is applied to śuddhavidyā in ĪPK III 1, 3.502 samadhŗtatulāpuţanyāyena — same phrase in ĪPV III 1, 3, which is there applied to īśvaratattva alone, even though the Vimarśinī seems to understand the image in relation both to Sadāśiva and to Īśvara: [...] aham idam iti samadhŗtatulāpuţanyāyena yo vimarśo sa sadāśivanātha īśvarabhaţţarake ca. Yet, as the Bhāskarī explains, it is so formulated for fear of prolixity (vistarabhiyā), but in reality apart from this passage, the pre-eminence of the ‘I-principle’ is associated only with the sadāśivatattva (nanu tarhi sadāśivatattve samadhŗtatulāpuţanyāyo na yuktaḥ, satyam, vistarabhiyā atraivam uktam anyathā tu sadāśivatattve ahaṃbhāvasya prādhānyam eva vartate ity alam).503 aham aham/idam idam — some texts formulate the experience as ‘ahaṃ ca idaṃ ca’ or ‘aham idaṃ ca’.504 The illustration is most likely intended to reflect the infant’s "point of view" — which, mutatis mutandis, is that of the Lord: the infant confounds the external world with himself (or his own body), and is unable to designate it other than by pointing to his own head.505 In śuddhavidyā, the ‘this’, although now clearly apparent, still remains within the fold of the ‘I’, inasmuch as it is but the projection of the ‘I’ within itself. Thus, although at this stage some

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Mantramaheśvaras, the ‘Great Lords of Mantras’ and upon the Mantreśvaras, the ‘Lords of Mantras’, in order to free (uddhartum) the bound souls that are thereby signified (vācya).507

Here, although the category of [śuddha]vidyā is not distinguishable from the state of [pure] consciousness belonging to those cognizers called Vidyeśvaras, the display of difference (bhedaprathā) [that is here observed in the opposition vācaka/vācya] is brought about by the energy of māyā.508

Therefore, it has been sung in the Āgamas:There is mahamāya above509 mayā [ . . . ]

duality appears, that duality does not present itself in the form of alterity, to be subject to which is the destiny of the finite beings (Pralayākalas and Sakalas) living in the world of mutually exclusive subjects and objects. In the śuddhavidyā, even though the subject regards now the object as other, he does not deviate for all that from his perfect mergence with pure consciousness. Though apprehended, objects are known as they are in essence: as nothing but consciousness (cinmātrasāra, in ĪPvŗ III 1 , 4 = bodhasāra in YR ad 14). This is where the ‘purity’ of ‘pure’ Knowledge resides, as explained in ĪPvŗ III 1 , 4 . At this stage, the ‘this’ appears as "distinct" from the ‘I’, but not "different" from it, inasmuch as it is just an aspect of the ‘I’. It is noteworthy that YR uses the same term camatkāra, ‘wonder’, in describing each of the three levels of experience corresponding, respectively, to Sadāśiva, Īśvara and śuddhavidyā. On śuddhavidyā and its relation to the concept of śakticakramaheśvaratva, see n. 942.506 The sequentiality implied in the ordering of the śuddhatattvas is intended to clarify the process of creation, first as an immaterial extroversion of vibrating consciousness, then, from māyā onwards, as a material one. In this ‘pure path’ (śuddhādhvan), consciousness is the only reality; creation takes place within consciousness: it is in fact a projection of consciousness. In this sense, it is right to apply the term tattva to the five stages of consciousness, which are ‘principles’ or ‘reality-levels’, rather than ‘facts’ — and this usage is equally justified even if the term be understood in the etymological sense of ‘extension’, ‘projection’, as Indian commentators are wont to do (see YR ad 10-11, n. 433 and 434). They are states of consciousness in which the multiplicity of the world is at first submerged, then gradually revealed, though still in immaterial form.507 The Mantras, all varieties included, are vācakas, ‘expressors’, and the bound souls are vācyas, what is ‘expressed’ through them. So formulated is the distinction between signifier and signified: ‘to what object do those mantras pertain, etc.?’508 This is a paraphrase of ĪPK III 1, 6: bhedadhīr eva bhāveşu kartur bodhātmano ‘pi yā/ māyāśaktyeva sā vidyety anye vidyeśvarā yathā//, ‘According to others, [śuddha]vidyā is nothing but the notion of "difference" — similar to that which results from māyāśakti — that affects an agent endowed with consciousness in regard to entities [that he perceives] — such as is exemplified by the Vidyeśvaras’; a view that is not shared by Utpaladeva, who presents it as that of ‘others’, and which the ĪPV ad loc. attributes to the Rauravāgama, introducing in the same passage the additional tattva of mahāmāyā. At the level of śuddhavidyā, comments AG in his avat. ad ĪPK III 1, 6, the manifestation of difference cannot be explained without the intervention of māyā. Yet, difference is still ‘known’ — an aspect of ‘knowledge’ (vidyā). Therefore the māyā that operates there is, however, ‘not fully developed’ (aprarūḍhā) māyā, feeble (‘śithilā’, so glossed by the Bhāskarī) — an attenuated form of māyā, called mahāmāyā in the Raurava: tata evāprarūḍhamāyākalpatvān mahāmāyeyaṃ śrīrauravādigurubhir upadişţā. YR’s manner of exposition implies that the incomplete quote that follows (māyopari mahāmāyā) is likely borrowed from the Raurava; see n. below. Anyhow, it is in this sense, because the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras are ‘permeated’ (as stated here by YR) by the mahāmāyā, that is, are contaminated by its vicinity, that they are affected by the māyīyamala; but it does not mean that they are located in the mahāmāyā; rather, it is the next level of

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Hence [it is only in that limited sense that] the Mantras residing there are said to be finite souls, for they are penetrated by mahāmāyā.510

Above the māyā-principle and below the śuddhavidyā are the cognizers termed Vijñānākalas,511 who retain the impurity of deeming oneself finite [after shaking off the two other impurities].512

This form of Śiva, who is [in essence] one only, is yet spoken of in terms of a pentad of principles, i.e., as the Fourth state (turya), although he transcends the Fourth state (turyātīta).513

Hence this independent agent (kartŗ) manifests himself as one only. Therefore, this [Śiva], unique and autonomous, appears (prakāśate) as the agent [of creation], the

subjectivity, that of the Vijñānākalas, which resides in the mahāmāyā. Moreover, it should be noted that YR’s differs here from Utpaladeva’s view, as formulated in ĪPK III 1, 3, that ‘I’ and ‘this’ are, in the śuddhavidyā, in a relation of co-referentiality (sāmānādhikaraņya).509 māyopari mahāmāyā [...]. Cf. Rauravāgama, Vidyāpāda, IV 28b: māyopari mahāmāyā sarvakāraņakāraņam. It must be noted that the Vidyāpāda part of the printed Rauravāgama [RĀ] is in fact part of the Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha [RSS], which probably dates from a much earlier period than the printed Kriyāpāda of the Rauravāgama. The printed Kriyāpāda belongs to a different stratum of composition and was transmitted exclusively in South India (moreover, there is no Vidyāpāda at all in the South Indian RĀ). In the RSS, citations from the old Raurava are found, among them: māyopari mahāmāyā. For more information and a discussion of the dating and the relation of the two texts, see Goodall (Kiraņavŗtti: xl, n. 92, and xlviii-xlix). A similar line is cited by AG in his PTV 5-8 with attribution to the Kubjikāmata, but the verse is not found in the transmission of the Kubjikāmata (see Sanderson 2002: 2): māyopari mahāmāyā trikoņānandarūpiņī, ‘Above māyā is mahāmāyā, the embodiement of the bliss of the triangle’ (Singh PTV [Skt. text: 64; transl.: 176]; Gnoli PTV: 249); compare YR’s quote with that of PTV 5-9 (PTV [Skt. text: 40; transl.: 101]) and TĀV IX 91a: māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ, ‘Above māyā and below śuddhavidyā are the Vijñānakevalas’ (see n. 511). Also TĀ VIII 337b: mahāmāyordhvataḥ śuddhā mahāvidyātha mātŗkā//vāgīśvarī [...], ‘Above mahāmāyā, there is the pure great Knowledge ( = śuddhavidyā), the Mātŗkā, the goddess of Speech [...]’, and TĀV ad loc. according to which śuddhavidyā is termed mahāvidyā, on account of its purity (śuddhatvād eva cāsyā mahattvam ity uktam mahāvidyā iti); the term appears (as mahāmāyāśakti) in ŚSV I 2, quoted n. 226. At this stage, YR’s exegesis introduces the concept of mahāmāyā. The issue is that of explaining the paradox of a subjectivity unmodified by objectivity; such "objectivity" as there is remains under the dominion of the "subject"; it cannot be the product of māyā, but rather of this quasi-māyā. The paradox is brought out in the characterization of the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras, who, though belonging to the śuddhādhvan, are nonetheless subject to the māyīyamala (see Appendix 10, p. 332). On mahāmāyā, see also n. 495 and Vasudeva MVT: 170.510 The implication being that they are considered as finite souls (aņu) inasmuch as they are subject to the māyīyamala. YR refers here implicitly to ĪPvŗ III 2, 9, which states, as regards the Vidyeśvaras: [...] eşām aņutvam api syāt. Another characteristic of the Mantras and Vidyeśvaras (which distinguishes them from the Vijñānākalas) is that they are endowed with agency (kartŗtva; ĪPK III 2, 9) — a feature which is only alluded to in YR’s exegesis, when he presents that category of subjects as ‘signifiers’ (vācaka), that is, ‘agents of signification’, who are able ‘to free the bound souls’. As for the Vidyeśvaras, they are also agents, inasmuch as several Āgamas present them as instigators of the cosmic functions, later termed pañcakŗtya, the ‘five functions’, but here restricted to four. Scriptures differ as to the act they are exempted from; see Vimalāvatī I 1a, Parākhyatantra II 96b, RSS I 15b, and MVT I 20b-21: etān aşţau sthitidhvaṃsarakşānugrahakariņaḥ// mantramantreśvare śuddhe saṃniyojya tataḥ punaḥ/ mantrāņām asŗjat tadvat saptakoţīḥ samaņḍalāḥ//, ‘Having accorded [the status of] pure Mantramantreśvaras to these eight [Vidyeśvaras] in charge of preservation/creation (sthiti), destruction (dhvaṃsa), obscuration/protection (rakşā) and grace (anugraha), he then

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Light [viz., consciousness] of whom, at the level of Sadāśiva and īśvara, consists in the thought: ‘I am this’.514 It is this thought that, composed of pure knowing, is the instrument [of creation].515 The effect [thus produced]516 is the ensemble of [concrete] principles beginning with māyā and ending with earth that are yet to be explained.

Thus that unique transcendental cognizer (paramapramātŗ) named Maheśvara, the Great Lord who is the Self, expands himself517 as agent, instrument and action.518

Kārikā 15The master next explains what the proper form519 of the māyātattva is:

created in the same way seventy million Mantras with their respective spheres of influence/maņḍalas’ (tr. Vasudeva, modified; see Vasudeva MVT: 158-161, for an interpretation of the passage). Thus, as observes ĪPvŗ III 1, 9, the Vidyeśvaras are endowed with a partial agency, such that they are ‘different from the Lord and from one another’, and as such ‘they too must be considered as "arm"’ — which is just another way of formulating the reason justifying the aņutva of this category of subjects, the māyīyamala being the cause of their partial agency. One observes here YR’s emphasis on the level of subjectivity represented by the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras, who reside in śuddhavidyā. By underlining the Mantras’ role as vācakas and the liberating vocation of both the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras, YR anticipates the account of mantric practice he will give in kā. 41-46, where those pramātŗs named Mantras are also the personifications of the mantras of the tantric practice.511 This sentence is to be read as a paraphrase of the quote (probably an Āgama, although given without explicit attribution): māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ, which completes the argument of PTV 5-9 (and in TĀV IX 90b-92a; see below). The entire passage (Singh [Skt. text: 40; transl.: 101]) is as follows: māyātattvasyopari vidyātattvādhaś cāvaśyaṃ tattvāntareņa bhavitavyaṃ yatra vijñānākalānāṃ sthitiḥ/ yathoktaṃ māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ iti tathā hi mahāmāyābhāve māyāpade pralayakevalānām avasthitiḥ vidyāpade ca vidyeśvarādīnām iti kim iva tad vijñānakevalāspadaṃ syāt/, ‘There must exist necessarily another principle above the māyā-principle and below the [śuddha]vidyā -principle where abide the Vijñānākalas. As has been said: "Above māyā and below śuddhavidyā, are the Vijñānakevalas". Therefore, if mahāmāyā is not [accepted as a category], then, since the abode of the Pralayakevalas is in the domain of māyā, and that of the Vidyeśvaras, etc., is in the domain of [śuddha]vidyā, in which domain would abide the Vijñānakevalas?’ By alluding here to the PTV, YR refers implicitly to the notion of mahāmāyā he has just dealt with, thus completing its definition. This additional level, which has no name of its own in the quoted text, is to be identified as mahāmāyā and interpreted, spatially, as a full-fledged tattva. This is another argument in favor of the introduction of mahāmāyā in the general scheme of tattvas and pramāţŗs: an additional tattva has to be postulated in order to make room for the Vijñānākalas. TĀ IX 90b-92a confirms that line of reasoning, providing it with an ontological foundation: the Vijñānākala is stationed mid-way between the pure and impure paths, for, being affected by āņavamala, he cannot ascend, while, being free both from kārmamala, inasmuch as he is exempt from action (nişkarma, v. 90b), and from māyīyamala, inasmuch as he ‘resides only in pure consciousness’ (śuddhacinmātrasaṃsthita, v. 92a), he cannot descend. As TĀV ad loc. says: [...] asau ‘māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ’ ityādyuktayuktyā śuddhāśuddhādhvamadhyavartī śuddhabodhaikasvabhāvo ‘pi svātantryahāneḥ - āņavamalāṃśakŗtasya svarūpasaṃkocasya saṃbhavāt [...], ‘[...] that one, according to the reasoning at work in the statement: "Above māyā and below śuddhavidyā, are the Vijñānake-valas", abides between the pure and impure paths, although he is essentially pure knowledge - [a paradox] due to the loss of freedom, that is, due to the presence of the contraction of his own essential nature brought about by a trace of the āņavamala’. On such grounds, the apparently contradictory statements of Vasudeva (MVT: 170), namely, ‘Abhinavagupta locates

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15. The supreme freedom of the Great Lord, which accomplishes what is difficult to construe,520 is indeed nothing but the covering of Śiva’s own Self, [in which phase he appears as] the Goddess Māyāśakti — the energy of delusive construction.521

By supreme is meant ‘requiring nothing else’;522 by freedom of the Supreme Lord (parameśītŗ), is meant ‘the fact that he creates everything’; such freedom is realized in the energy, termed māyā, of him [the Lord] who possesses it).523

māyā is so called because by it is distributed (mīyate), that is, delimited (paricchidyate), the phenomenal display of knowers and knowns, culminating in

the Vijñānākalas in Mahāmāyātattva [...] but he is unable or unwilling to cite an authoritative scriptural passage substantiating this’, and ‘an unidentified Śaiva scripture quoted by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha also places the Vijñānākalas in the interstice between the pure and impure universes’, may be reconciled. For further details on the Vijñānākalas, see Appendix 10, p. 330.

512 Here YR briefly evokes the Vijñānākalas, who do not belong to the śuddhādhvan, the subject of the kārikā. Yet, he must refer to them at this point of his exposition, because of their intermediate status and location between śuddhādhvan and aśuddhādhvan. Thus, YR, following AG, reorganizes the various arrangements observed in previous texts of the Śaiva tradition. He locates here three categories of subjects unambiguously on the scale of the tattvas: the Mantras (along with the Vidyeśvaras), the Vijñānākalas and the Pralayākalas being respectively assigned to śuddhavidyā, mahāmāyā and māyā. He will take up the description of the last two categories of subjects, the Pralayākalas and the Sakalas, in his gloss on PS 23.513 The ‘Fourth state’ (turya) is Śiva’s experience of perfect, blissful, consciousness, transcending waking (jāgrat), dream (svapna) and deep sleep (suşupti); cf. PS 35 and YR ad loc; turyātīta, the ‘one transcending the Fourth’, is a still higher state, for turya is not completely free from contingent conditions (upādhi) such as the body or breath. Here the question of the existence of a thirty-seventh tattva is implicitly referred to by YR in agreement with ĪPK III and Bhāskara’s commentary. According to Bhāskara, though Śiva and Paramaśiva are not different in essence, Śiva is meant to refer to his specific nature (svarūpanirdeśa) while Paramaśiva is the all-inclusive form, which implies his pervading (vyāpaka) the whole scale of the tattvas. However, Paramaśiva is not to be considered a thirty-seventh tattva: he who pervades (vyāpaka) cannot be located in the same series as those pervaded (vyāpya). See Torella ĪPK: 189-190, n. 2.514 aham idam.515 This celebration of Śiva’s supreme agency echoes ĪPvŗ III 2, 5: ahetūnām api karmaņāṃ janmādihetubhāvavişayaviparyāsād abodhātmakakartŗgataṃ kārmam, ‘The impurity of [supposing oneself the agent of] actions, which pertains to the agent devoid of the Light of consciousness, arises from erroneously considering actions to be the cause of births, etc., whereas they are not causes [for the sole, real, cause is the supreme agent, the Lord himself]’. Actions, being insentient, cannot be the cause of anything. The only cause is the sole agent, the Lord.516 Cf. ŚDvŗ (p. 27), according to which the Lord ‘assumes the form of the thirty-six tattvas, all understood as "effects" (kārya)’ of that sole cause that is the supreme agent ([...] tattvarūpaṃ şattriṃśatsaṃkhyaṃ kāryaṃ rūpeņa bibharti).517 vijŗṃbhate — see the conclusion of YR’s commentary ad kā. 35. With this verb YR anticipates the next definition (kā. 15), for ĪPV III 1, 8 (pp. 234-235) states: atiduşkaravas-tusaṃpādanāpratīghātarūpā parameśvarasya māyāśaktiḥ/ ity etad vijŗṃbhate ityanena darśitam, "Thus, the power of the Supreme Lord that is māyā (māyāśakti) is characterized by freedom to accomplish the most difficult things. This is the idea conveyed by the word vijŗṃbhate’ (tr. Pandey 1986: 197, slightly modified).

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earth; or māyā is so called in terms of its capacity to delude everyone [and everything].524

Keeping in mind that she is associated with the god of playful nature (krīḍāśīla), [māyā] is [also] called the ‘goddess’ (devī),525 and it is not appropriate to state, as do the Brahmavādins,526 that there is a māyā who is distinct.

What sort of freedom is it? The master answers: 'which accomplishes what is difficult to construe'.

[By 'difficult to construe'] he means 'able to be effected [only] with difficulty';527

[through this freedom takes place] the accomplishing (saṃpādana) of that difficult (durghaţa) result, consisting in [the totality of relations between] cognizers and

518 By this statement YR defines ‘the absolute autonomy of a non-individual consciousness which alone exists containing the whole of reality within the bliss of a dynamic ‘I’-nature, projecting space, time and the interrelating fluxes of subjective and objective phenomena as its content and form, manifesting itself in this spontaneous extroversion through precognitive impulse (icchā), cognition (jñānam) and action (kriyā) as the three radical modes of an infinite power’ (Sanderson 1986: 170).519 svarūpa — viz., nature, essence.520 durghaţasaṃpādana — that is, the internal division of the single principle into innumerable subjects and objects. The compound can be understood as a karmadhāraya [KD], a tatpuruşa [TP] or a bahuvrīhi [BV]. It amounts to five possible interpretations, among which the main difference is whether durghaţa qualifies as an adjective the process of manifesting objectivity, or designates objectivity itself (‘that which is difficult to construe’); 1) as a KD — ‘which is a difficult accomplishing’, as an apposition to svātantryam; 2) as a TP — ‘which is the accomplishing of what is difficult to construe’; 3) as a TP understanding saṃpādana in the sense of saṃpādaka (see YR: prāptiprapākam, and Renou 1968: §§ 168, 180) — ‘which accomplishes what is difficult to construe’; 4) as a BV based on a KD (see 1) — ‘whose accomplishing [as the dichotomy of subjects and objects] is difficult’; 5) as a BV, based on a TP (see 2) — ‘which accomplishes what is difficult to construe’. The translation follows YR’s interpretation.521 Cf. TĀ VIII 332: ataḥ paraṃ sthitā māyā devī jantuvimohinī/ devadevasya sā śaktir atidurghaţakāritā//. PS 15 and 16a are quoted in TĀV I 37; PS 16b and 17 in TĀV I 39-40.522 ananyāpekşa.523 It is noteworthy that, in defining māyā, which is responsible for empirical bondage, the emphasis is laid on freedom. The theme of the divine play (līlā, in Advaita and Vaişņava traditions, krīdā, in Trika) culminates in the somewhat paradoxical notion that the freedom of the Lord is not complete unless he is able to obscure and delimit himself (cf. Hulin 1978: 306). In ŚSV I 2, the Lord’s freedom is defined as jñānakriyāsvātantrya, freedom to know and to do everything. Here, the kriyā aspect of the Lord’s freedom is referred to, since the exposition now takes up the aśuddhādhvan, the ‘impure path’, namely, actual (as opposed to virtual) creation.524 YR gives here two traditional etymological explanations of the term māyā, both of which seem to presume the root mā (passive mīyate) ‘measure out’: māyā is, on the one hand, the capacity to ‘produce’ forms, images, objects, and on the other, to ‘deceive’ thereby. For a summary of recent discussions of the problem, see Mayrhofer (EWA II: 349-350), who takes it as ‘wahrscheinlich’ that the term derives from the root mā ‘construct’, contra, inter alia, Thieme (ZDMG 95: 112 ff., Anm. 1), who would derive it from the root mī ‘alter’. As Mayrhofer points out (see also KEWA II:625; III: 777), recourse to the root mī does not appear at all necessary, inasmuch as the sense ‘capacity to deceive’ (mohakatā) can easily be deduced as an extension of ‘the capacity to measure’, that is, to construct forms that are in the last analysis illusory. Such acceptations are in evidence in the earliest period, as indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate, ‘Indra assumes many forms through his powers [of representation] (māyābhiḥ) (ŖS VI 47, 18; ŚB XIV 5, 5, 19; BĀU II 5, 19; JUB I 44, 1, 4), quoted by R ad APS 1 (while commenting

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objects of cognition — that is, such freedom effects the attestation of [such a universe].528

This māyā is the covering of Śiva's own Self — when, out of his free will he assumes the state of a bound soul. ['Covering'] here refers to the triad of impurities — impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — and is termed 'concealement of his proper form'.529

Kārikā 16Inasmuch as the various objects of experience, which are derived from primordial matter and appear to us in the form of the pleasurable, etc., are about to be explained,

on nivişţaṃ bahudhā guhāsu), by Bhāskara in his gloss ad ĪPV, mańgalācaraņa 2 , p. 13, and by ĀŚ III 24a (through its pratīka), in order to demonstrate that creation takes place in an illusory fashion; see also n. 528, the quotation in ĪPV II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): māyā vimohinī nāma, and TĀ VIII 332, quoted n. 521: jantuvimohinī. See also the phrase mohanīm māyām [...], in kārikā 51 and n. 969.525 Similar passage in TĀV VIII 333: devīti devābhinnatvāt. Cf. PTV (Skt. text: p. 3), which enumerates the meanings of the root div: divu krīḍāvijigīşāvyavahāradyuastutigatişu, "The root div is used in the senses "play", "desire to conquer", "worldly pursuits", "splendor", “adoration”, "movement"’. Dhātupāţha IV 1 gives some more meanings: divu krīḍā-vijigīşā-vyavahāra-dyuti-stuti-moda-māda-svapna-kānti-gatişu. Here, māyā is devī in a limited sense, as playful (krīḍāśīla), and she is playful because, as one of God’s energies/powers, she belongs to him, who is himself playful, according to one etymology of the name deva. See also TĀ I 101-103 (where the list of the divine qualities is slightly different): heyopādeyakathāvirahe svānandaghanatayocchalanaṃ krīḍā,’ [Il est dieu, deva, parce qu’Il joue] sans se soucier de ce qui est a rechercher et a rejeter. [Son] jeu est jaillissement en tant que masse indivise de sa propre felicite' (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 97 — '[He is God, deva, because he plays] without caring for what has to be sought and what has to be rejected. His play is springing up as an undivided mass of his own bliss').526The Brahmavādins referred to here are those who hold that brahman, understood as free of all activity (śānta/niḥkriya), is the only reality. For Śańkara, the very language of 'cause' and 'effect' is soiled by māyā. Therefore, the relation between the level of māyā and that of brahman is 'difficult to be expressed' (anirvacanīyā). Furthermore, since the 'world' is not a 'result' of brahman, it cannot be anything other than an 'appearance', like that of a rose in a mirror. Therefore, the Śaiva exposition given here of the Advaita doctrine should be treated with circumspection: according to Advaita, there is nothing "different" from brahman; at the same time, what appears as "different" is such only as erroneous 'manifestation' (as "different", it is not brahman — and therefore does not exist), māyā is thus a principle both independent and false, which cannot belonş to brahman as such. Nevertheless, it should be observed that for the "Idealists" of the Sańkara school of Vedānta, the cause of error has retroverted to brahman itself, from considerations of logical consistency: for the jīva cannot be, as Maņḍana maintains, both the result and the source of illusion. ĀPSV 56, p. 29, explains māyā as a transformation of the Lord who produces it, 'just as snow, foam, etc., are produced from water only as its transformations' (yathā jalāddhimaphenādayas tathā tathā partņamanasvabhāvatvād evajāyante). However, the māyā that is thus produced is 'not meant for any purpose, because the Lord cannot desire anything, having already all his desires satisfied' (na kim api prayojanam uddiśya, tasyāptakāmatvena kasmiṃś cid icchāsambhavād ity arthaḥ). In contrast, the Trika considers māyā a power (śakti) of the Lord partaking of his essence, and defines it as the Lord's desire (icchā) of diversity. YR will take up again this criticism of the Brahmavāda in his commentary ad 27, emphasizing that this system does not take into consideration the sovereign freedom of the Lord, which is itself responsible for duality.

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the master [first] speaks of the principle of individuation (puṃstattva)530 as such,531

which is manifested in the form of the enjoyer of experiences:16. Under the influence of all-encompassing māyā, consciousness is defiled,

becoming the individual soul, the fettered being, and is bound, thanks to [the limiting factors of] Time, Agency, Necessity, Passion and Ignorance.532

Consciousness,533 although omniscient and omnipotent, assumes the impurity of deeming itself finite on account of its loss of freedom (pāratantrya), brought about by māyā’s taking control [or possession]. This impurity is nothing but the failure to recognize [the Self as such] (akhyāti),534 as when one sets aside those qualities of omniscience, etc.

527 See TĀ XV 272b: atidurghaţaghaţāsvatantrecchāvaśād ayam, 'This is due to the force of the free desire [of the Lord] to construe what is difficult to construe', and TĀV ad loc, which explains ghaţā as ghaţanam, and refers to P. III 3, 104 (şidbhidādibhyo 'ń): ghaţanaṃ ghaţeti bhidāditvādań.528prāptiprāpaka — lit.,'brings it to discernibility'. In this context, it is inviting to understand prāpti in its 'grammatical' or '(psycho)logical' sense of 'the given' — what is presented to the observer as he contemplates his next step, whether it be the provisional stage of a word's derivation as it awaits the application of the following rule, or that which presents itself to the organs of sense as their immediate content, suitable or unsuitable. The two possibilities amount to the same thing here, for all intents and purposes, for it is the creative power of the Lord that 'causes to appear' (prāpaka) before our eyes that which 'appears' there as unconditioned (prāpti). YR implies here that the internal division of the single principle into innumerable subjects and objects is the problem — either that such a division is difficult to justify reasonably, or that the result is difficult to effect within the unity. The notion of durghaţasaṃpādanam is a leitmotif in Trika literature, as shown by parallel passages in which appear such terms as durghaţakārin (TĀV V 123), atidurghaţakārin (TĀ I 92, TĀV IV 173a, pp 814-815), durghaţakāritā (TĀ VIII333), durghaţakāritva (TĀIV10-11), atidurghaţakāritva (TĀV I 330, TĀ VIII 333), atidurghaţakāritā (TĀV VIII 333, XVII 20), atiduşkara (ĪPV II 3, 17), durghaţā [śaktiḥ] (TĀ V 123), atidurghaţaghaţ ā̊� (TĀ XV 272b); see ĪPV II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): itaś ca kim atiduşkaraṃ bhavişyatiyatprākāśātmany akhaņḍitatadrūpya evaprakāśamāne prakāśananişedhāvabhāsaḥ prakāśamānaḥ/ tasmāt parameśvarasyedaṃ tat paraṃ svātantryaṃ yat tathāvabhāsanaṃ paśurāpatāvabhāsanaṃ nāma grahakāṃśasamutthāpanaṃ taddvāreņa ca grāhyollāsanam api/ saiva bhagavato māyāśaktir ucyate/ yathoktaṃ māyā vimohinī nāma [...] iti, 'What is more difficult to accomplish than this: to manifest, within the One who is Light itself, the negation of Light, at the very time when his luminous essence shines forth undivided? Therefore, it is the supreme freedom of the Supreme Lord thus to manifest himself as the bound soul, causing that part [of the phenomenal world] that is the experiencer to arise, and, through that [experiencer], manifesting the objects of experience. This is called the power of māyā of the Lord, according to what has been stated: "māyā is that which deludes" '; also TĀ IV 10-11, which places on the same level 'play' (krīḍā), 'Illusion' (māyā), and 'the accomplishing of what is difficult [to construe]' (durghaţakāritva): kim tu durghaţakāritvāt svācchandyān nirmalād asau/ svātmapracchādanakridāpaņḍitaḥ parameśvaraḥ// anāvŗtte svarūpe 'pi yad ātmācchādanaṃ vibhoḥ/ saiva māyā yato bheda etāvān viśvavŗttikaḥ//, 'But, in virtue of his capacity of accomplishing, out of his pure freedom (svācchandya), what is difficult [to construe], the Supreme Lord skillfully plays at hiding his own Self. Although his essence is in no way veiled, this hiding of the Self by the Omnipresent is but māyā, from which proceeds the difference [that is seen] to this extent at work in all activities'; see also TĀV IV 10: grāhyagrāhakādyullāsāt tathātvenābhāsanam saiva kridā, 'This play is manifestation as such, due to the surging forth of subject, object, etc.'; also TĀ V 123: the śakti 'which accomplishes what is difficult' (durghaţā śaktiḥ, in the verse) is named svātantrya; it accomplishes the paradoxical exploit of expanding itself as the universe, while articulating itself as endless

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Wherefore, that [consciousness], [now] limited, having cut itself off from the infinite535 space of consciousness, just as the space confined in the jar (ghaţākāśa) [is cut off from infinite space], is called puṃstattva, the ‘person’.

Therefore, both maintained (pālya) and bound (pāśya) by māyā, it is called paśu, [the ‘domesticated animal’ or, figuratively, the ‘fettered subject’],536 being the locus of those very fetters (pāśa) which are the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions.537

Moreover [by saying: ‘bound (saṃbaddhā)] by Time, Agency, etc.’, the master indicates that [consciousness] is bound (baddhā) completely (samyak), that is to say, is tied down, due to its being permeated538 by Time, etc., whose proper form will be expounded next.

cycles of emanation and resorption. YR ad 7 has used the same formulation in a similar context.529Cf. YR ad 9. Such is the tirodhānaśakti. On the 'concealment of his proper form' (svarūpagopana), see PP II 9, p. 3: guruśaktir jayaty ekā madrūpapravikasikā/ svarūpagopanavyagrā sivaśaktirjitāyāyā//, 'Hail to this unique power of the guru which enables the blossoming of my own nature. Thanks to it, the energy of Śiva which is intent on concealing his own nature is overcome'. See also ĪPvŗ II 2, 5: tanmalatrayanirmāņe prabhor icchā māyāśaktir ucyate, māyāśakti is the Lord's will to create the three impurities'. Although māyāśakti is a śakti, its status is different from that of the triad of Will, Knowledge and Action, since māyāśakti is connected with differentiation.530 puṃstattva here stands for pumān, ‘person’, and is thus synonymous with puruşatattva. As shown by YR at the end of his commentary, puṃstattva is the condition of the fettered individual subject, delimited by māyā and the five kañcukas. puṃstattva thus represents the infusion of supreme ipseity into individual souls (now ‘atomic’, aṇu), who are themselves further affected by the three malas. Cf. ĪPvŗ III 2, 3, where the term puṃstva is found in the same sense. The term ‘individuation’ should not be understood in any sociological (or even psychological) sense, implying what has come to be designated as the "individual" of modern societies — it has rather to do here with the idea of the aṇu, or the āņavamala, the wholly deceitful ‘atomization’ of universal consciousness. Among the many discussions of the Indian "individual" — or whether such a term is at all appropriate in characterizing the pre-modern "person" — is Louis Dumont’s Homo Hierarchicus, q.v.531 Lit., ‘in its proper form’.532 The usual denomination of this tattva is vidyā, meaning ‘[limited] Knowledge’. The first hemistich is quoted, along with kā. 15, in TĀV I 37-38. The second is quoted immediately thereafter, along with PS 17, in TĀV I 39-40. The term kalā, here translated ‘[limited] Agency’, expresses more literally this sense of limitation, its primary meaning being ‘segment, phase (of the moon), etc.’.533 bodha is the universal divine consciousness, whose characteristics, according to PTLvŗ (p. 2), are avikalpatvam, ‘not subject to thought-constructs’, and pūrņatvam, ‘completeness’, ‘lack of internal division or external condition’. By contrast, abodha is empirical consciousness, characterized by vikalpa and apūrņatva.534 Cf. ĪPV II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): yā mūḍhatā [...] pūrņatvasya [...] svātantryasya [...] nityatādharmasya ca prakāśamānasyāpi yad aprakāśamānatayā abhimananam, ‘That confusion consists in wrongly considering perfection, freedom and eternality as not shining, although they are shining [within one’s self]’.535 pūrņasvarūpa — lit., ‘perfect’, ‘full’.536 For a similar definition of paśu, see YR ad 5.537 See YR ad 9.538 otaprotatā — lit., ‘interwoven with’. Cf. YR ad 18, where ūta is mentioned, and ĪPV III 1, 9 (vol. II: 238, quoted n. 546), where we find otaprota mentioned in a context similar to this one, viz., while are being defined the five kañcukas.

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Thus the puṃstattva consists in being enveloped by the hexad of principles [namely, māyā and the five kañcukas].539

Kārikā 17The master now propounds the proper nature of these principles, Time, etc., in the order of their enveloping that [embodied consciousness]:

17. I know540 just this thing, at this very moment only, to some extent only, by focusing my entire self on it.541 In this way, the hexad of sheaths, māyā being the sixth,542 is said to be [existentially] included543 in the finite soul...544

Thus, just as consciousness, though free, assumes the condition of a finite soul through its own māyā, so also its energies of Knowledge and Action, when restricted, are said to become respectively the [limited] Knowledge (vidyā) and [limited] Agency (kalā) of the bound soul.545

Just as by the king a small quantity of money is given, out of compassion, to him whose wealth has just been appropriated, so that he may survive, likewise, to consciousness which has assumed the condition of finite soul, its omniscience, etc.,

539 For māyā is a veil (āvaraņa, lit., a ‘covering’), and the kañcukas are ‘sheaths’. The literal meaning of the latter, ‘armor’, ‘cloak’, is found in the name of a traditional character in the Indian drama: the kañcukin, or chamberlain, so termed because of his close-fitting garment.540 The grammatical remark in the commentary indicates that YR is privileging, among the various ‘powers’, that indicated by the verb jñā, ‘know’; even though the other ‘powers’ are implied, they are easily supplied, and it is not necessary to cite them each time their "leader" is mentioned; cf. the symmetric statement in ĪPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238 (see n. 546).541 Note that the Sanskrit order of the sentence — adhunā, kiṃcit, idam, sarvātmanā, jānāmi, viz., kāla, kalā, niyati, rāga, vidyā — corresponds to the order of kārikā 16, which in turn reproduces the order according to which these kañcukas envelop the paśu, as taught by YR’s avat. ad 17. Thus there is logic in the ‘genesis of bondage’. Yet, one may find other orders of enunciation in other texts, for instance: kāla, niyati, rāga, vidyā, kalā in ĪPvŗ III 1, 9. The VIIIth chapter of TS (p. 84) solves the difficulty, giving the order of enumeration as a convention differing from one text to another: atra caişāṃ vāstavena pathā kramavandhyaiva sŗşţir ity uktaṃ kramāvabhāso ‘pi cāstīty api uktam eva/ kramaś ca vidyārāgādīnāṃ vicitro ‘pi dŗşţaḥ kaścid rajyan vetti ko ‘pi vidan rajyate ityādi/ tena bhinnakramanirūpaņam api rauravādişu śāstreşu aviruddhaṃ mantavyam, ‘In this regard, as a matter of fact, of those [sheaths] it has been stated that the origination is free of sequence; but it has also been said that an appearance of sequence is there. [In ordinary life] one can see that vidyā, rāga, etc., appear in a different order. For instance, one knows when he loves, whereas another loves when he knows, etc. Therefore, one should know that there is no contradiction in expounding a different order [of the kañcukas] as happens in śāstras as the Raurava’542 Lit, ‘associated with māyā’.543 antara gaṅ — see n. 549.544 The two kārikās 17 and 18 are to be read as a syntactic unit.545 And he exercises his limited powers of Knowledge and Agency through cognitive organs (jnānendriya, or buddhīndriya), and organs of action (karmendriya) as stated by the Tantrasadbhāva, quoted in ŚSV III 3: kalodvalitacaitanyo vidyādarśitagocaraḥ/ rāgeņa ranjitāt māsau buddhyādikaraņair yutaḥ//, ‘Consciousness [of the finite subject] is reduced to [limited activity] by kalā, the objects of sense (gocara) are shown to him by vidyā, he is emotionall affected by rāga, endowed as he is with organs of cognition, etc.’ See also ĪPV III 1, 10-11, vol. II: 242, quoted in Appendix 13, p. 337, and PHvŗ 9 (pp. 71-72), quoted n. 561, which develops this process in the course of explaining how the three śaktis of the Lord, icchā, jñāna and kriyā, transform themselves respectively into āņava, māyīya and karma malas. On jnānendriya and karmendriya, see PS 20.

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having been put aside, the ability to know [something] is conferred [by the Supreme Lord], with the ultimate aim of permitting limited Agency [and result].546

Because the power of knowing is thus predominant, the syntax of the sentence shows [the other sheaths, kāla, etc. (of kārikā 16)] as subordinated to the verb jñā.

This hexad of sheaths, associated with māyā as described above, veils547 the proper form of the finite soul (aṇu), that is, of the particular soul (puṃs), whose omniscience, etc., has been removed due to the impurity of deeming itself finite.548

[In this sense, the hexad of sheaths] is said to be ‘[existentially] included’, that is, is innate [in the finite soul], just as the flaw is innate in the gold.549

What does the hexad consist of? The master replies: ‘[just] now, etc.’.

546 Doing and Knowing are associated with Willing (icchā), and Willing is rooted in Bliss (ānanda). This is a positive way of seeing the kañcukas. They are not only corsets constraining free, infinite subjectivity, transforming it into a fettered individuality; they are also gifts conferred by the Lord as compensation for this ontological damage, as a partial return of its former powers. ĪPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238, synthesizes the entire process: evaṃ kalāvidyākālarāganiyatibhir otaproto māyayāpahŗtaiśvaryasarvasvaḥ san punar api prativitīrņatatsarvasvarāśimadhyagatabhāgamātra evaṃbhūto ‘yaṃ mitaḥ pramātā bhāti/ idānīm ida kiṃcij jānānaḥ idaṃ kurvāņo ‘tra rakto ‘traiva ca yaḥ so ‘ham iti, ‘Thus, the subject, being permeated (otaprota) with limited Agency, limited Knowledge, Time, Passion and Necessity, and being deprived of all sovereignty by māyā, manifests himself as limited, with a part of the whole sovereignty that is given back to him (prativitīrņa), [when considering]: "The one who knows and now does something, this much, and is attached to this, and to this only that one is me."‘ Hence, concludes ĪPV, ‘these [kāla, etc.] manifest themselves only as associated with the [limited] subject and, therefore, constitute his [limited] powers’ (ete ca pramātŗlagnatayaiva bhānti, iti tasyaiva śaktirūpāḥ). Therefore, in this world of difference inhabited by individuals, ‘they differ in the case of each subject’ (pratipramātŗbhinnā eva). This is how the formulations: ‘his Time’, ‘his Necessity’, etc., which are seen frequently in YR’s gloss, are also to be understood — in which the genitive refers to the aforementioned ‘aņu’. On the kañcukas considered as the degradation of the attributes of the Lord — omnipotence, etc. — see MM 18.547 ācchādaka.548 The function common to the five kañcukas is that of delimiting, particularizing, the universal experience characteristic of the śuddhādhvan. And this delimitation cannot arise without replacing the free vision (svatantradŗś) characteristic of completeness with the clouded vision brought about by māyā, the power of differentiation; cf. TĀ IX 49b-52a (quoted n. 485) where Śiva is said to be svatantradŗgrūpaḥ. Therefore, in order to give a full account of the process, māyā is to be added to the pentad of the kañcukas.549 Gold, like the soul, is in essence free from flaw. In the world of nature, however, gold, like the soul, is associated with flaws that, however, can be removed — the gold by fire (the technique consisted in melting the gold so that any impurities, always lighter than gold, might float to the surface), the soul by the realization that I am Śiva. Such flaws are ‘antara gaṅ ’ — a term used here with overtones of its grammatical meaning — in the sense that they find their ‘existential’ occasions before another ‘rule’ is applied or whose causes are found within the domain of another rule — for instance, the rule here promulgated, thanks to which we may be liberated from such flaws. The grammatical antara gatvaṅ has to do with priority of application founded on the principle that rules whose domain is included take precedence over those of the including domain — which is consistent with the present non-grammatical application, inasmuch as the inherent "part" of the rice grain is antara gaṅ with respect to the grain as a natural whole, or the flaw with respect to the nugget. Note that the literal sense of antara gaṅ is ‘inner element’ or ‘element within’. Same image of the flaw within the gold in YR ad 24 and 87-88. In kārikā 18, we will meet another image: that of the kambuka, the ‘bran’.

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I know at this very moment only550 signifies that this finite soul delimits itself in terms of present time [i.e., qualifies itself as present only, as expressed through the verbal endings of the present tense — as such excluding past and future]; [and mutatis mutandis, in terms of past or future time, as when it says:] ‘I knew it previously, I know, I will know’; similarly [for the verb ‘do’:] ‘I did, I do, I will do’.551

In so doing,552 [the finite soul] delimits even its modes of being in accordance with the proper nature of knowledge and action. Thus does Time (kāla), so [delimited], [become a fetter] of the finite soul.

And [I know] to some extent only,553 that is, [one knows and] one accomplishes delimited things only,554 for one is not capable of accomplishing everything. [The potter] undertakes to make a jar only, not a piece of cloth, etc.

Such is the limited Agency of the finite soul.555

[I know] just this,556 i.e., that one expects a determinate effect to follow from a determinate cause — such as smoke from fire, or enjoyment of heaven, etc., from performance of sacrifices like the horse sacrifice, etc.; one does not expect [the result] to arise from any [cause] whatsoever.557

550 Lit, ‘I know now only’ (adhunaiva jānāmi).551 The action expressed by the finite verb is always delimited by a temporal suffix, so that the tenses appear as exclusive alternatives; one cannot express the three tenses simultaneously. Thus is the soul ‘qualified’ by the verbal cum temporal context.552 tathā kalayan — on root kal, see n. 623.553 Lit, ‘just something’ (kiṃcid eva).554 Cf. ĪPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238 quoted n. 546: idaṃ kiṃcij jānāna idaṃ kurvāņaḥ [...].555 Implied here is not so much that our talents are limited to one or another metier, but that, at any given time, we are restricted as to what we do, by what we do. And the same goes for ‘knowing’. Only the Lord is ‘sarvakartŗ’, that is, can do or know everything at once — the universe that we experience only in limited ways.556 Lit, ‘this alone’ (idam eva).557 For the Śaivas, the yogin and the poet represent, in this world, the omnipotence of the free Lord, who creates whatever he desires without reference to any material cause; cf. ĪPK I 5, 7 (quoted n. 666) and ĪPvŗ as well as SpN I 2, quoted n. 265. Similarly, Mammaţa says in the ma galācaraņaṅ of his Kāvyaprakāśa: niyatikŗtaniyamarahitāṃ hlādaikamayīm ananyaparatantrām/ navarasarūcirāṃ nirmitim ādadhati bhāratī kaver jayati//, ‘Victory to the poet’s Speech, which projects a creation, free from the laws of Necessity (niyati), constituted by pure delight, independent of anything else, and charming on account of nine (or novel) sentiments (or flavours: rasa)’ (tr. Dwivedi Kāvyaprakāśa: 3, modified). The commentary Saṃpradāyaprakāśinī by Śrīvidyācakravartin contrasts this creation of the poet with that of the Creator (brahman), attributing to the former an eminence comparable to the latter’s: niyatiśaktyā niyatarūpā sukhaduḥkhamohasvabhāvā ņaramāņvādyupādānakarmādisahakārikāraņaparatantrā şaḍrasā na ca hŗdyaiva taiḥ tādŗśī brahmaņo nirmitir nirmāņam, ‘Formed into a definite shape by the power of niyati, characterized by pleasure, pain and delusion, dependent on material causes such as atoms and auxiliary causes such as action (karman), possessed of [only] six flavours and not invariably pleasant by these — such is the creation or production of the Creator’ (tr. Dwivedi Kāvyaprakāśa: 3). According to AG’s ma galācaraņaṅ to the Locana, the poet — the metaphor of the Supreme Lord — can create anything he wishes, such as a celestial flower, without abiding by the ordinary law of causality, i.e., without requiring any other cause than his own genius (pratibhā), which may be seen as the totality of the causes: apūrvaṃ yad vastu prathayati vinā kāraņakalām [...], ‘[The poet] manifests entirely new objects without requiring the least cause [...]’. Which affords yet another example in Kashmirian Śaiva thought of the

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Thus the niyatitattva of the [limited self] is that [tattva] according to which the self [during the course of its life] is necessarily determined558 by the merits and demerits arising from the host of actions done by reason of its own resolution.559

And [finally, I know] by focusing my entire self on it560 means that the bound soul is grounded in rāgatattva, the principle of passion, which is a deeming of oneself as incomplete, as when one thinks: ‘all such things are of use to me’, or ‘I would be [such and such; for instance: rich]’, or ‘may I never cease to be’.561

[Contextualized] passion (rāga) is an attribute of the intellect.562 It is nothing but [‘corporeal’] attachment as when one thinks: ‘here is my passion’, having set aside all else for the sake of the thing designated as ‘beloved’, [now located] in one place,

close parallel between the Lord’s powers and the poet’s — and indeed between mokşaśāstra and kāvyaśāstra. Note that, in the Trika, pratibhā, often translated as ‘genius’ in a poetic context, is both self-luminous consciousness (svaprakāśa) and self-consciousness (vimarśa).558 niyamena [...] niyamyate — for a similar usage, also in a context of physical determinism, namely, the successive rising and setting of the moon and sun, suggestive of human destinies, see Śakuntalā, IV, st. 2.559 saṃkalpa — the law of karman is one aspect of this general law of causation. Sanderson (1986: 179) translates niyati as ‘causality of karma’.560 sarvātmanā.561 I.e., ‘let me not lose the capacity of being an enjoyer’. The feeling that my possessions are not yet complete and a desire for continued existence constitute the principle of desire [or Passion]. The finite subject, forgetting his universal nature, identifies himself with something or someone else. In this sense, rāga is the degradation of plenitude (pūrņatva). This regular correspondence between the Lord’s śaktis — omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity [lit., ‘pervasion’] — and the five kañcukas is laid down in PHvŗ 9, pp. 72-73: tathā sarvakartŗtvasarvajñatvapūrņatvanityatvavyāpakatvaśaktayaḥ saṃkocaṃ gŗhņānā yathākramaṃ kalāvidyārāgakālaniyatirūpatayā bhānti, ‘Thus, by accepting limitation, the [Lord’s] energies — omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity — appear respectively as kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati’. The logical cum causal nuance of these terms should be kept in mind: the fifth fetter to which the subject is prone is here termed niyati; the unfettered Lord vis-a-vis the subject so fettered is described as vyāpaka. The term niyati here intends specifically the type of connection that is called "causal": from "smoke" we are obliged to conclude "fire", and the reason for this is that the domain of "smoky things" is without exception included (vyāpya) in the domain of "fiery things" (vyāpaka); such relation of inclusion is termed vyāpti, often translated as ‘pervasion’. Here the Lord is the ultimate vyāpaka, for he includes everything possible, and therefore everything can indifferently be termed a vyāpya. The relation of vyāpti is therefore "truistical" for the Lord, and no niyati can be said to characterize his relation to any effect — which relation does most definitely apply to his "fettered" subjects. Cf. also Kşemarāja’s Parāprāveśikā (p. 8): asya sarvakartŗtvaṃ sarvajnatvaṃ pūrņatvaṃ nityatvaṃ vyāpakatvaṃ ca śaktayo ‘saṃkucitā api saṃkocagrahaņena kalāvidyārāgakālaniyatirūpatayā bhavanti, ‘Omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity: those powers of him, although not contracted, become kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati respectively, when they assume contraction’.562 There are eight buddhidharmas: righteousness (dharma), gnosis/knowledge (jñāna), detachment/dispassion (vairāgya), sovereignty (aiśvarya) and their opposites (cf. SK 23, and GBh). Cf. ĪPV III 1, 9 (vol. II: 238): ca na tad buddhigatam avairāgyam eva, taddhi [avairāgyaṃ] sthūlaṃ vŗddhasya pramadāyām na bhaved api, rāgas tu bhavaty eva, ‘That [rāgatattva] is not simply the [specific] attachment [or passion] (avairāgya) that is associated with the intellect/volition (buddhi) [that is, it is not to be understood as the Sāṃkhya notion of avairāgya, that belongs to the category of buddhidharma], [for] [that specific attachment], in its gross form, is not observed in an old man in regards to a young woman, whereas the [principle of] passion (rāga=rāgatattva) [itself, or ‘in its general form’] very much is!’ Cf.

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wherever it may be — and it is not the case that the [word rāga is] coextensive with563 the [general] principle of passion (rāgatattva) which governs any expectation at all [for instance, the hope of final release, which illustrates rather the kañcuka itself].564

Moreover, I know means that I know something that is before my eyes such as this jar, etc., but not that distant object screened from view:565 such is the principle of vidyā (vidyātattvā), or limited Knowledge.

In [the previous] kārikā [16], the term avidyā, ‘absence of knowledge’ ‘nescience’, has been used with a view to [distinguishing this limited vidyā from] perfect Knowledge (śuddhavidyā), and not because [it implies a complete] absence of knowledge;566

associated with māyā [that is, māyā being the sixth] means that the hexad of sheaths is, for the bound soul, conjoined with the display of difference [brought about by māyā].

Kārikā 18How is this hexad of sheaths existentially included in the finite soul? The master says:

Rāmakaņţha ad Kiraņatantra I 16c-17 (Goodall Kiraņavŗtti: 201-208).563 samāna — that is, ‘expressive of’.564 At issue are two forms of ‘attachment’, one (rāga or avairāgya, as it is referred to in ĪPV III 1, 9, quoted n. 562) specific, exclusive, contextualized; the other (rāgatattva) general, inherent in the human condition, which diffusely establishes any object as ‘not mine’. Note also that the term avairāgya involves a double negation: ‘absence of dis-passion’: our author may be profiting here from that resonance as well, for a ‘contextualized’ passion is nothing more than the lack of a certain kind of discipline, itself associated with those objects of sense one wishes to abjure. The lyrical cry of Cherubino [Cherubin], in The Marriage of Figaro [Le Mariage de Figaro] by Beaumarchais (I, 7), may illustrate this concept of rāgatattva, craving for all objects of enjoyment: ‘[...] le besoin de dire a quelqu’un je vous aime, est devenu pour moi si pressant, que je le dis tout seul, en courant dans le parc, a ta maitresse, a toi, aux arbres, aux nuages, au vent qui les emporte avec mes paroles perdues. - Hier, je rencontrai Marceline ..." [— ‘[...] the need to say to someone "I love you" has become so compelling that I say it to myself when I run across the park, I say it to our lady and to you, to the clouds and the wind that carries them away along with my useless words. Yesterday, I ran into Marceline ...’]. The same distinction is made in Sanskrit aesthetics between the aesthetic feeling that is the rasa, śŗ gāraṅ for example, and the empirical affect (sthāyibhāva) that is its corresponding kāma; the former experienced by the audience at large, as a disembodied or "generalized" passion, the latter experienced by the person only on condition that the affect ceases to be generalized and is embodied elsewhere than in the imagination. On the association of rāga and niyati, cf. TĀ IV 17-18a, 28; XIII 28565 For the same terminology and issue, see YR ad 5.566 In spite of the etymology, avidyā should not be taken as complete absence of knowledge (vedanābhāva), but rather as imperfect knowledge, whether taken in the general sense of ‘nescience’, or as referring to a specific kañcuka. Indeed, the usual name of the kañcuka is vidyā, for although imperfect, it is yet knowledge.

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18. ... Just as the bran567 is tightly attached to the grain of rice, in a relation of non-separability, although it is different from it.568 Nevertheless, it is open to purification through the discipline of ardent engagement in the path of Śiva.569

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:] In practical terms,570 the bran, though different, is attached to the rice-grain in a relation of non-separability, to the point of appearing (bhāsate) interwoven with the grain of rice, with no difference [in evidence between them], such that it is removed571 even by the skilled [only] with much effort; being existentially included in the grain of rice, it does not present itself separately [to the person polishing].

In similar fashion, the [sixfold] sheath of māyā, etc. [i.e., of māyā together with the five kañcukas], which is figuratively represented by the bran [in the illustration above], though [really] separate from the finite soul, which is figuratively represented by the rice-grain, appears as if inseparable from that soul, due to its being existentially included in it, thus concealing the unfragmented essence of consciousness. This much is to be supplied.572

If this be so, how does that sheath, so difficult to detach, disappear? The master says: ‘it is open to [purification], etc.’.573

The particle ‘tu’, ‘nevertheless’, is here used in the sense of specification [i.e., restriction]574 for no other means is available in this case.

[There now follows a word-by-word exegesis of the second half of the verse:]of Śiva, that is, of the Great Lord that is one’s own Self;the path, that is, the method whereby one arrives at575 the awareness that one’s

own essence is resplendence (vibhūti), which takes the form: ‘I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, supreme and nondual’,576 or ‘this entire universe is mine alone — is nothing but the expansion of my own energy’;577

... ardent engagement in that [path] (aunmukhya), that is, directing oneself with perseverance toward meditation on that [method];

such [meditation] is discipline (yoga), that is, a grounding578 of the finite soul in its own Self seen as constituting its essential nature, that is, seen as plenitude.

567 kambuka — first occurrence of the term, usually attested as kambūka. Kārikā 23 contrasts the term with tuşa, ‘husk’. According to Mayrhofer, kambūka is Dravidian in origin, whereas tuşa is Indo-aryan [or Indic].568 The stress is laid on the inseparability of the bran/sheaths and the rice-grain/finite soul, which inseparability is apparent only, as YR emphasizes, while commenting on ‘tu’. Relying on the commentary, we differ from L. Silburn, who understands kambuka as synonymous with tuşa, ‘husk’ (Fr. ‘balle’): ‘La balle fixee au grain de riz (semble) inseparable de lui, bien (qu’en realite) elle en soit distincte. Mais cela est parfaitement purifie lorsqu’on se tourne ardemment vers la voie de Śiva’. As well, the full sense of ‘yoga’ is not hinted at.569 Thus a soteriological parenthesis is formulated in the exposition of the tattvas, factors of finitude.570 vāstavena vŗttena.571 prakşipyamāņa — lit., ‘thrown away’.572 Same reasoning in YR ad 24.573 bhajate — lit., ‘shares, partakes of’.574 viśeşe — see n. 487.575 Lit., ‘whose form is’.576 paramādvayacidānandaikaghano ‘smi.577 mamaiva idaṃ viśvaṃ svaśakuvijŗṃbhaņamātram.578 saṃbandha — lit., ‘connection with’.

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In this way, it, that is, the [sixfold] sheath, whose essence has been explained, is open to purification, and this in an exemplary fashion,579 that is, attends spontaneously upon its own dissolution without remainder.

And this should be said as well: when the bound soul becomes of purified heart, due to the Supreme Lord’s grace, then the veil (āvaraņā) of sheaths that afflict us with finitude spontaneously disappears, on account of the coming into being of the knowledge of one’s own Self consisting in the insight: ‘I am myself the Great Lord’.580

And, apart from such knowledge of the Self [won through this arduous method], no mere act grounded on worldly causalities581 and belonging to the realm of māyā would have the slightest chance of succeeding.582

Kārikā 19For such a finite soul, which is, as well, an enjoyer, an object of enjoyment must be posited.583 This being the case, the master next expounds the principles that have originated from primal matter [— that is, from pradhāna, or prakŗti]:584

19. Pleasure, pain and delusion: these alone constitute primal matter. Next comes the inner organ differentiating itself, in order, into volition, mind and ego, in accordance with [the functions of] decision, ratiocination and conceit of self [that each, respectively, assumes].585

That state of indifferentiation586 — referred to here as consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion — of [the three ‘qualities’] sattva, rajas and tamas where no

579 viśeşena = vi in the ‘viśuddhi’ of the karikā.580 aham eva maheśvaraḥ.581 Lit., ‘arising through the power of causal constraint (niyatiśakti)’.582 Lit., ‘would dare present itself [so as to effect such a reversal, that is, the dissolution of the kañcukas]’. Cf. a parallel statement in the commentary ad 9. Not only are rituals hinted at here, but also any action presuming to effect a result.583 evaṃvidhasyāṇor bhoktuś ca bhogyena bhāvyam — the statement is symmetrical with YR ad 5: evaṃvidhe cātra bhogyasvabhāve viśvasmin bhoktrā bhāvyam.584 After the exposition of pradhāna, or prakŗti, begins that of meya, cognizable reality, which is defined as follows (ĪPK III 1, 10-11): trayoviṃśatidhā meyaṃ yat kāryakaraņātmakam/ tasyāvibhāgarūpy ekaṃ pradhānaṃ mūlakāraņam// trayodaśavidhā cātra bāhyāntaḥkaraņāvalī/ kāryavargaś ca daśadhā sthūlasūkşmatvabhedaḥ//, ‘Made of twenty-three categories, cognizable reality consists of effects and instruments. As an undivided [category] (eka), pradhāna is that state in which [all cognizable reality] is unified (avibhāgarūpin). It is the primal cause [i.e., the material cause] (mūlakāraņa). The series of external and internal instruments has thirteen aspects and the effects are of ten kinds, being divided into gross and subtle’ (on avibhāgarūpin, cf. Pandey, ĪPK, vol. III: 199). The exposition of the meya ends with kā. 22.585 Cf. SK 33. ‘antaḥkaraņa’ is a term found also in Advaita, where it represents the ‘subjective’ side of the provisionally real, corresponding to the ‘objective’ māyā. Under its aegis are grouped together, as in Sāmkhya, the intellective functions of buddhi, aha kāraṅ , and manas. The sequence found in the kārikā does not imply that the Trika presumes for the "organs" an order of evolution different from that of the Sāṃkhya. By it is merely signified that the three "organs" correspond to and are explained by the three functions: niścaya, saṃkalpa, abhimāna. The translation differs somewhat from L. Silburn’s interpretation: ‘Ainsi la nature consistant uniquement en plaisir, en souffrance et en egarement constitue l’organe interne fait de decision, de volition et de presomption qui appartiennent dans l’ordre a l’intellect, au sens interne et a l’agent d’individuation’.

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dominance or dependence587 [of any of the three] is apprehended, is termed prakŗti, the primal cause (mūlakāraņa).588

The master says, beginning with the words ‘decision, etc.’,589 that from prakŗti proceeds the inner organ (antaḥkaraņa) — which has the form of its [viz., of prakŗti] effect.

By decision (niścaya)590 the master means the notion that ‘this is such and such’.591

By ratiocination (saṃkalpana)592 he means ‘organizational thinking’ (manana).593

586 sāmānyaṃ rūpam — the same notion is conveyed by sāmyāvasthā in GBh 16: tat kiṃ uktaṃ bhavati sattvarajastamasāṃ sāmyāvasthā pradhānam, and GBh 23: iyaṃ prakŗtiḥ sattvarajastamasāṃ sāmyāvasthā. According to the Sāṃkhya, when the equilibrium of the guņas — by which equilibrium prakŗti as such is defined — is disturbed by the mere proximity of puruşa, the process of creation takes place. However, the Trika develops its own notions on the sequence of tattvas that starts from prakŗti, postulating, notably, an additional principle, the guņatattva; see Appendix 11, p. 334.587 a gā gibhāvaṅ ṅ .588 This notion of mūlakāraņa is common to both Sāṃkhya (SK 3) and Trika (see n. 584). However, in the Trika, prakŗti is mūlakāraņa in a secondary sense, for prakŗti is not the supreme principle, as it is in the Sāṃkhya, but a manifestation of the Lord’s supreme energy.589 Here begins the definition of the several ‘functions’ (vŗtti) of buddhi, manas and aha kāraṅ . Cf. GBh 27: tatra manasaḥ kā vŗttir iti/ saṃkalpo vŗttiḥ. ŚSV III 1 uses also the term vyāpāra, ‘activity’: [...] adhyavasāyādivyāpārabuddhyaha kŗnmanorūpaṅ ṃ cittam, ‘citta consists of buddhi, manas and aha kāraṅ ; its activity consists in ascertaining, etc.’.590 Cf. the Sāṃkhya definition (SK 23), where adhyavasāya is a synonym of niścaya (see also ŚSV III 1, quoted n. 589). On adhyavasāya/niścaya as the function of the buddhi, see n. 401, n. 591, and p. 294; also, TĀ I 38b-40 and TĀV ad loc. (p. 76): adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ; TĀ I 215, IX 238. However, there is a definition of buddhi specific to the Trika, which is expounded in TS VIII, pp. 85-86: tato guņatattvād buddhitattvaṃ yatra puṃprakāśo vişayaś ca pratibimbam arpayataḥ, ‘Thereafter, from guņatattva, buddhitattva emerges, in which the light of puruşa [i.e., consciousness] reflects itself, as well as objects’. On niścaya, see also YR ad 32 and 63.591 That is, it is ‘just this’ and not ‘something else’. It is the faculty of distinguishing between objects and ascertaining their specific nature. The buddhi evaluates as well as discerns; it reacts in relation to the ‘I’: why indeed discriminate objects? The buddhi comes into play when a response of the subject is called for. Note that the buddhi is the initial evolute of prakŗti, where the notion of ‘activity’ is lodged. Thus the buddhi is not solely an intellective function, but also a volition, a desire to act, be it simply the ‘act’ of preferring one object to another. GBh 23 gives an example similar to that of YR: ayaṃ ghato ‘yaṃ paţa ity evaṃ sati yā sā buddhir iti lakşyate, ‘When one says: "This is a jar, this is a piece of cloth", this is what is defined as volition (buddhi)’. In the Sāṃkhya, it is to the manas that is given the task of representing to us the world of the senses, which appears both as external and internal, providing thus the groundwork for involving the individual (the ‘aham’) in actions. Thus is explained the characteristic function of the buddhi, adhyavasāya, that is, choosing, even willing (cf. the notion of aiśvarya, ‘sovereignty, power’, as a property of buddhi — buddhidharma — in SK 23 and Vācaspati’s TK thereon, even though the word has acquired a supra-human reference), on the basis of the data that are given to it by the manas. The buddhi makes its own the content delivered to it by the manas, thus anticipating the individuations represented by the aha kāraṅ and the host of the sense-organs, and to which the latter are instrumental; cf. TK 23: sarvo vyavahartālocya matvā ‘ham atrādhikŗta ity abhimatya kartavyam etan mayety adhyavasyati ataś ca pravartata iti lokasiddham, ‘It is well known that a man who is to act, considers [the situation], ponders over it, agrees that he is entitled to do it, determines that he should do it

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By conceit of self [or self-referentiality] (abhimāna) the master means ‘possessive behavior’ (mamatā).594

In the order thus described, [have been enumerated] the triad of volition, mind and ego (buddhiḥ mano ‘haṅ kāraḥ), termed [collectively] the inner organ,595

which appears as an effect of the qualities, [inasmuch as their equilibrium has been disturbed by notions of] dominance and dependence.596 And it appears also as a cause, with regard to the gross elements (bhūta), the [external] organs (indriya), etc.597

Kārikā 20

and then does it’.592 Or ‘projection’ — of an entity where there exist only the disjointed data of the five senses. Cf. SK 27, where manas is defined as saṃkalpaka.593 As is obvious, AG follows here verbatim the "evolution" of the categories as expounded in Īśvarakŗşņa’s Sāṃkhya; there, the function of manas is clearly that of collecting the senses’ data — scattered as such under the five domains of the individual organs — so that unique "objects" appear clearly before us, each of them endowed with the properties of the five senses — length, odor, color, etc. Thus is manas the common "theater" where all the five gather — much akin to the "common sense" of the English philosophers, which itself has antecedents in Aristotle’s κοινή . Advaitins, on the other hand, use the term άϊσθησιζmanana in another sense. Here, as well, it belongs to a triad, śravaņa, manana, nididhyāsana, which evoke the way one appropriates the truths of the system — first, they are ‘heard’ under the guidance of an enlightened teacher; then, one strives to convince oneself of their validity by efficient ‘arguments’, thus setting aside opposing theses as well as doubts originating in the "real" world; finally, they are incorporated in a new apprehension of the "real", which is now intuitive. Note that manana plays here as well the part of an intermediary between "external" and "internal" thought. TS VIII (p. 87) explains how manas proceeds from the sāttvikāha kāraṅ , along with the buddhīndriyas and karmendriyas: tatra sāttviko yasmād manas ca buddhīndriyapañcakaṃ ca, ‘From the sāttvika[aha kāraṅ ] manas and the pentad of the buddhīndriyas proceed’, and (p. 88): sāttvikād eva aha kārātṅ karmendriyapañcakam. Nevertheless, TS VIII (p. 89) mentions other views: according to some, manas proceeds from the rājasāha kāraṅ (anye tu rājasān mana ity āhuḥ); according to others, manas proceeds from the sāttvikāha kāraṅ , whereas indriyas proceed from the rājasāha kāraṅ (anye tu sāttvikād mano rājasāc ca indriyāņīti); see n. 605 and 613. In a similar fashion, Vācaspati considers the buddhi to be polyvalent — in some, it is sāttvikapradhāna, in others, tāmasapradhāna (TK 23).594 Lit., ‘the idea that "all this is mine, or for me."’ Similar definition in YR ad 70. Cf. TK 24: abhimāno ‘ha kāraṅ ḥ/ yat khalv ālocitaṃ mataṃ ca tatra ‘aham adhikŗtaḥ’, ‘śaktaḥ khalv aham atra’, "madārthā evam āmī vişayāḥ’, ‘matto nānyo ‘trādhikŗtaḥ kaścid asti’, ‘ato ‘ham asmi’ iti yo ‘bhimānaḥ so ‘sādhāraņavyāpāratvād aha kāraṅ ḥ/ tam upajīvya hi buddhir adhyavasyati ‘kartavyam etan mayā’ iti niścayaṃ karoti, ‘"The I-principle (aha kāraṅ ) is egotism (abhimāna)" and this "I-principle" is perceptible in such ideas as — "To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled" — "I am able to do this" — "all these things are for my use" — "there is no one else entitled to it" — "hence I am" — the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the "I-principle" — it is through this principle that the Will (= buddhi) performs its determinative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by me."‘ (tr. G. Jha). The notion of abhimāna implies ‘conceit of self’, ‘pride’, ‘egotism’ (see G. Jha), in sum, ‘presumption’ — bearing in mind that it is the ‘I’ itself that is chiefly ‘presumed’ (as well as the entirety of the ego’s relations to its surroundings) — or, in some contexts as TK 30, quoted next note, ‘self-referentiality’. TS VIII (p. 86) gives a definition of aha kāraṅ and emphasizes the way in which the Trika distinguishes itself from the Sāṃkhya: buddhitattvād aha kāroṅ yena buddhipratibimbite vedyasaṃparke kaluşe puṃprakāśe ‘nātmany atmābhimānaḥ śuktau rajatābhimānavat/ ata eva kāra ity anena

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The master now speaks of the external organs:598

20. The ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose599 are the cognitive organs600 in respect of sound, etc.601 And voice, hand, foot, anus and genitals are the organs of action.602

In respect of sound, etc., that is, in respect of the domain [wherein each operates] that is to be described [in kārikā 21], there are five organs (indriya), the ear, etc., which are predominantly cognitive [hence they are termed buddhīndriyas, or jñānendriyas]. And the five organs that are predominantly active [hence they are termed karmendriyas] are the voice, etc. The domains603 [wherein operate] the

kŗtakatvam asya uktaṃ sāṃkhyasya tu tad na yujyate sa hi nātmano ‘haṃvimarśamayatām icchati vayaṃ tu kartŗtvam api tasyecchāmaḥ/ tac ca śuddhaṃ vimarśa evāpratiyogisvātmacamatkārarūpo ‘ham iti, ‘From buddhitattva emerges the ego (aha kāraṅ ). It is responsible for mistakenly presuming the non-Self [i.e., the body, the intellect, the faculties, etc.] to be the Self, as happens when silver is mistakenly seen in the conch shell [in lieu of mother-of-pearl]. This [experience] takes place when the light of the puruşa [viz., consciousness] is tarnished by its connexion with the object reflected in the intellect/volition (buddhi). Therefore, °kāra [in aha kāraṅ ] denotes the factitious character (kŗtakatva) [of the ego]. This position is not that of the follower of the Sāṃkhya, who does not admit that the Self is endowed with the awareness of itself as an "I" [— inasmuch as, according to him, the conscious principle (the puruşa) is inactive, and cannot therefore refer to itself; such self-reference will not obtain until the aha kāraṅ makes its appearance, vis-a-vis the buddhi, ‘pure or active consciousness’], whereas we admit also the agency [of this "I"]. And that [agency] is pure, for [according to us] the "I" (aham)— being nothing but self-awareness — has the form of the marvel [ous experience] of one’s own Self (svātmacamatkāra), in reference to which there is no possible alternative (apratiyogin)’. Note, however, that this -kāra is often explained today by equating it with the -kāra of the grammarians: as in śakāra, the ‘vocable’ śa. Thus, aha kāraṅ , viz., the ‘vocable’ aham, would represent the irruption of reflexivity within consciousness, in the form of ‘aham’ (see van Buitenen 1957: 17ff.). Cf. also Kşemarāja’s Parāprāveśikā (p. 10): aha kāroṅ nāma mamedaṃ na mamedam ity abhimānasādhanam, ‘By aha kāraṅ we mean that [locus] wherein is realized the conceit [of egoism] (abhimāna), as instanced by the assertions, "this is mine", "this is not mine." ‘595 On the functioning of those three tattvas, see the example given in TK 30: yadā mandāloke prathaman tāvad vastumātraṃ sammugdham ālocayati atha praņihitamanāḥ karņāntākŗşţasaśarasiñjiņīmaņḍalīkŗtakodaņḍaḥ pracaņḍataraḥ pāţaccaro ‘yam iti niścinoti atha ca māṃ pratyetīty abhimanyate, athādhyavasyaty apasarāmītaḥ sthānād iti, ‘In dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain object; then, fixing his mind intently, he observes that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow leveled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that "the robber is advancing against me"; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place’ (tr. G. Jha).596 According to TS VIII, one should understand that the inner organ (antaḥkaraņa) is an effect of the guņatattva, the additional tattva postulated by the Trika between prakŗti and buddhi in order to explain why actual creation takes place, i.e., in what manner the equilibrium of the three guņas has been disrupted. See, in Appendix 11, p. 334, the development on kşobha.597 The Sāṃkhya and the Trika differ regarding the manner in which the evolution of the phenomenal world is to be conceived; see Appendix 12, p. 335.598 The jñānendriyas and the karmendriyas are collectively termed bāhyakaraņas. See ĪPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241), which emphasizes the instrumental character of the threefold antaḥkaraņa and the ten bāhyakaraņas: eşāṃ ca kāryatve ‘py asādhāraņena karaņatvena vyapadeśaḥ, ‘Though they are the effects [buddhi proceeding from guņatattva, ahaṅkāra from buddhi, the ten indriyas and manas from aha kāraṅ ], yet, instrumentality being their peculiarity, they are spoken of as such [i.e., as instruments]’ (see also YR ad 94-95).

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organs of action (karmendriyā) are speaking, grasping, moving, excreting and bliss.604

And in both cases, since both are accompanied by the ego in expressions such as ‘I hear …’ [viz., buddhīndriya] or ‘I tell …’ [viz., karmendriya], both are taken to be effects of the ego.605

Kārikā 21Now, the master describes the proper form of the domains of those organs: sound, etc.:

599 Note that the SK distinguishes clearly between the organ (indriya, e.g., the ear) and the ‘faculty’ (vŗtti), which is nothing but the organ’s manner of functioning; see Vācaspati ad loc: tatra rūpagrahaņali gaṅ ṃ cakşuḥ, etc., ‘The eye is the organ for perceiving color’ (tr. G. Jha), etc. In truth, the ‘function’ or ‘faculty’ enters into consideration only as a secondary phenomenon, but it is already implied by the strict relation that exists between the organ — the ear — and its ‘subtle’ object, that is, the tanmātra that is proper to it — in this case, sound. See also ĪPV III 1, 11, quoted note below.600 buddhīndriya or jñānendriya; G. Jha (TK 26) translates: ‘organs of sensation’, ‘sensory organs’. ĪPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241) defines them as ‘useful in acquiring the determinate cognition of sound, etc., within buddhi’ (buddhau śabdādyadhyavasāyarūpāyām upayogīni).601 Here the five tanmātras are referred to; see kā. 21.602 Cf. GBh 26: karma kurvantīti karmendriyāņi/ tatra vāg vadati [...], ‘They are called organs of action because they perform actions. Thus, the voice speaks [...]’. Cf. ĪPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241): tyāgo grahaņam iti dvayam — bahirvişayaṃ yat tatra pāņiḥ pāyuḥ pādaḥ — iti karaņāni/ etad evāntaḥ prāņe yena kriyate tad vāg indriyam/ tat prakşobhapraśāntyā viśrāntikriyopayogy upasthaḥ, ‘[Action] is of two types: giving up and grasping. In [actions related to] external objects, hand, anus and foot are the instruments (karaņa). Being in relation to vital air, which is internal, voice is the organ (indriya) that is able to perform the two kinds of action [viz., giving up and grasping, in the sense of exhaling and inhaling]. Hence [according to this logic], the genitals are that which is useful in the act of resting (viśrānti) which follows the cessation of the agitation [of vital breath]’ (tr. Pandey, modified) — an assertion that functions as an explanation for the vişaya assigned to upastha, that is, ānanda, ‘bliss’, ānanda being nothing but ‘the act of resting (viśrānti) which follows the cessation of the agitation of vital breath’. And the text concludes: sarvadehavyāpakāni ca karmendriyāņy aha kāraviśeşātmakāniṅ / tena cchinnahasto bāhubhyām ādadanaḥ pāņinaivādatta evam anyat/ kevalaṃ tattatsphuţapūrņavŗttilabhasthānatvāt pañcā gulirūpamṅ adhişţhānam asyocyate, ‘The organs of action pervade the whole body and are particular forms of the ego. Therefore, the person whose hands have been cut off and who receives [alms, etc.] by means of his arms really receives by means of his hands. The same may be said of other [organs] also. [The hand,] with its five fingers, is spoken of as the ‘abode’ [of the function] only because it is the seat wherein is manifested most clearly the full and complete function (vŗtti), viewed in relation to various [uses]’ (tr. Pandey, modified).603 What is termed here ‘object’ [or ‘field’, or ‘domain’] (vişaya) of the karmendriya is termed its ‘function’ (vŗtti) in Sā khya. Cf. SK 28 and GBh ad loc.ṃ604 ānanda — G. Jha translates: ‘gratification’. On ānanda, object of the upastha, see n. 616; cf. BĀU II 4, 11: [...] evaṃ sarveşām ānandānām upastha ekāyanam [...], ‘[...] as the organ of generation is the one goal of all kinds of enjoyment [...]’.605 Cf. TS VIII (p. 87), with correction of bhautikam in bhautikatvam: bhautikatvam api na yuktam ahaṃ śŗņomy ityādy anugamāc ca sphuţam aha kārikatvamṅ , karaņatvena cāvaśyaṃ kartraṃśasparśitvam, ‘It is not proper to consider them [viz., the organs] as material. Rather, since they are accompanied [by the ego] in [such statements as] "I hear", it is obvious that they proceed from the aha kāraṅ . Since they are organs (karaņa), they are necessarily

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21. The subtle domain, devoid of [internal] differentiation, which the [cognitive organs] are [severally] to apprehend consists of the pentad of abstract entities (tanmātra):606 sound, touch, [form as] light,607 savor and odor.

As regards the domain, that is, the field, to be grasped by [each of] these organs as something to be known or done,608 the master asks: — ‘What kind of thing is it?’ [First of all,] it is devoid of [internal] differentiation: its essence is the universal from which the particular has been expelled;609 it is [therefore] subtle. Such an entity is the tanmātra — sound [as such], etc., [grasped in its] universal form. Sound in its universal [form] (śabdasāmānya) is thus called śabdatanmātra, ‘sound as such’ [that is, devoid of reference to the other tanmātras, and therefore, as well, to particular sounds]. And as for the others [namely, the karmendriyas, their domains have been already dealt with (ad 20)].610

"touched" by the agentive part [of the aha kāraṅ ]’.606 Or ‘unmixed entities’. Judging by the term tanmātra ‘just that’, we should conceive of these ‘entities’ not only as ‘archetypal’ or ‘generic’ (Torella ĪPK; see the term sāmānya in TS VIII, quoted n. 613), but also as ‘pure’, considered in and of themselves, without admixture of the other four, that together make up the complex that constitute the normal condition of perception — an ‘intellective’ object, but an ‘object’ nonetheless. The tanmātra is then the obverse or the ground of the "real", required by the very hypothesis that postulates in the gross elements various degrees of elemental "mixture". This view, which seems originally to have been developed in the Vaiśeşika (Frauwallner 1973: 280), is not, of course, universally accepted (see n. 616).607 Here, light (mahas) replaces the usual rūpa, probably in order to emphasize the relationship, which will be set forth in the following kārikā, between rūpa as tanmātra, and tejas as mahābhūta.608 See YR ad 79-80.609 SK 38 defines the tanmātras as aviśeşa, ‘non-specific’, contrasting them with the bhūtas defined as viśeşa, ‘specific’: tanmātrāņy aviśeşās tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ/ ete smŗtāviśeşāḥ śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca//, ‘The Rudimentary Elements are "non-specific". From these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be "specific", because they are calm, turbulent and deluding’ (tr. G. Jha). According to Vācaspati ad loc. (tanmātrāņi tvasmadādibhiḥ parasparavyāvŗttāni nānubhūyante ity aviśeşāḥ sūkşmā iti cocyante) the criterion for distinguishing the bhūtas from the tanmātras is the capacity of each of the former to set aside instances of the others (parasparavyāvŗttyā) — whereas, evidently, ‘sound as such’(śabdatanmātra) cannot set aside or cancel ‘form as such’ (rūpatanmātra). The bhūtas are capable of entering into the field of our experience as distinct from one another, inasmuch as they are calm, turbulent and deluding’, that is, inasmuch as they abound in various degrees of sattva or rajas or tamas. They are therefore considered as both ‘specific’ (viśeşa) and ‘gross’ (sthūla). That is not to say that one cannot experience the ‘subtle’ object — for if one did not, one would not experience anything at all; all that can be said is that the ‘subtle’ objects (tanmātra) are not experienced in their ‘pure’ state — except perhaps by yogins — but only when they are exemplified through the ‘gross’ elements (mahābhūta). As such, the tanmātras are to be non-specific (aviśeşa) and subtle (sūkşma).610 The terms ‘jñeya-kāryatayā’ and ‘evam anyāni’ suggest that the commentary intends here the domains both of the buddhīndriyas and the karmendriyas, although the emphasis is put on the tanmātras, the domain proper to the buddhīndriyas.

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Due to the reciprocal implication611 of [cognitive] field and [cognitive] witness,612

the pentad of abstract entities derives, as do the organs [of cognition and action], from the [principle of] ego.613

Kārikā 22Earth, etc., are the result arrived at by a mutual commingling of those [sensible] domains [viz., the tanmātras]. This the master says:

22. The domain [thus described], now gross614 due to the mingling of the [subtle tanmātras], manifests itself as the pentad of gross elements (bhūta):615

ether, air, fire, water and earth.It is the particular, that is, the [now] gross domain that acquires the form of a

concrete element, due to the mingling of those [subtle ‘fields as such’ (tanmātra)], that is, due to their ability to come into contact with each other.616

For instance, from ‘sound as such’ (śabdatanmātra) proceeds ‘particular sound’ (śabdaviśeşa), namely, [the gross element] ether [in the sense that ether is the locus of tonal variety, as well as of ‘sound’ as distinguished from other ‘objects’]. From sound and touch proceeds air; from those two combined with form proceeds fire; from those [three] combined with savor proceeds water; and from those [four] to which odor has been added proceeds earth.617 Such are the five ‘great’ [that is, gross, physical] elements (mahābhūta).618

611 parasparāpekşitva — lit., ‘mutual expectancy’.612 vişayavişayin.613 Cf. SK 25, which distinguishes the indriyas that presume (along with the manas) a sāttvika, or ‘luminous’, form of the ego from the tanmātras, that presume a tāmasa, or ‘dark’, form of the ego, with the result that manas and the indriyas are ‘apt to fulfil their specific function’ (svavişayasamartha). Moreover, according to GBh 25, the ego ‘is said to be tāmasa to the extent that it is the origin also of the bhūtas, which abound in tamas’ (bhūtānām ādibhūtas tamobahulas tenoktaḥ sa tāmasa iti). In fact the ego is the ‘origin of the bhūtas abounding in tamas’ only in an indirect way: in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of evolution, the bhūtas proceed from the tanmātras, which are the evolutes of the tāmasa ego. Cf. TS VIII (pp. 89-90): śabdaviśeşāņāṃ hi kşobhātmanāṃ yad ekam akşobhātmakaṃ prāgbhāvi sāmānyam aviśeşātmakaṃ tat śabdatanmātram/ evaṃ gandhānte ‘pi vācyam, ‘That which is the undisturbed, unique, [principle] of specific sounds whose nature has been disturbed, such a universal (sāmānya) of a non-specific nature, which is prior to them, is called śabdatanmātra, "sound as such". This may be said also of the other tanmātras down to odor’.614 Cf. SK 38, quoted n. 609.615 bhūtas, or mahābhūtas — lit., ‘great (or gross) entities/beings’.616 According to GBh 38, one bhūta proceeds from one tanmātra: ether from sound, air from touch, water from savor, fire from form, earth from odor. However, this does not contradict the definition of PS 22, which agrees, as does the theoretical section (vidyāpāda) of the Āgamas (e.g. Kālottara, Pauşkara, etc.), with the classical Sā khya thesis (see ṃ Yuktidīpikā ad SK 38) of the tanmātras’ progressive accumulation, that is, that the physical elements are categorized by the adjunction one-by-one of sensible qualities, for it remains the case that each bhūta has one tanmātra as its primary quality (see Torella ĪPK: 196); see Appendix 13, p. 337.617 From clay to man, all earthly elements are fragrant.618 On the relationship of the tanmātras and the bhūtas, see Frauwallner 1973: 279ff.

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In consideration of the maxim, ‘the effect has the qualities of the cause’,619 [it follows that the mahābhūtas] have qualities that increase [in complexity] one-by-one [— each more complex element, in other words, has one more quality than the preceding simpler element].

Thus is prakŗti, whose nature is that of cause and effect,620 transformed into something that can be enjoyed by the mundane man (puruşa), through the Will of the Supreme Lord. And so has this world of thirty-six principles been described, tattva by tattva, by distinguishing [each principle from the rest].621

Kārikā 23As the master explained previously how māyā functioned as sheath (māyākañcuka) [kārikās 15-18], so [now] he explains how prakŗti serves as sheath with respect to the mundane man:

23. As the husk envelops the rice-grain, so does this creation, beginning with prakŗti and ending with earth, envelop consciousness in the manner of a body.

As the husk, the skin of the grain, envelops, or veils, the rice-grain, so does this creation too, starting with pradhāna and ending with earth, envelop once again consciousness — [already] enveloped by the sheath of māyā, figuratively represented by the bran — in the manner of a body, figuratively represented by the husk, that is, it veils [consciousness] as its outer enclosure.

Here [, at this level], are called Sakalas622 those cognizers who are of a bodily nature because of the factors of fragmentation (kalā),623 beginning with the organs in

619 The statement quoted here is an adaptation of SK 14, expounding the theory of satkāryavāda: kāraņaguņātmakatvāt kāryasya [...], ‘Because the effect has as its essence the qualities of the cause’, commented upon by Gauḍapāda as: loke yadātmakaṃ kāraņaṃ tadātmakaṃ kāryam api/ tathā kŗşņebhyas tantubhyaḥ kŗşņa eva paţo bhavati, ‘In mundane matters, of whatever nature is the cause, of the same nature is the effect. For instance, from black threads only a black piece of cloth comes into being’. The same logic underlies the theory of the progressive accumulation of tanmātras within the bhūtas as they increase in grossness (see ĪPV III 1, 10-11, in Appendix 13, p. 337).620 See Frauwallner 1973: 304ff. From the Trika point of view, prakŗti is also an effect, inasmuch as its proceeds from māyā, which is, in turn, nothing but the Lord’s energy of freedom.621 Here ends the description of the thirty-six tattvas. On the last twenty-three, which, from buddhi onward, constitute cognizable reality (meya), see ĪPK I 1, 10-11, and Vŗtti (Torella ĪPK: 195-196). This portrayal of the process of manifestation is ultimately meant to show the way the process may be reversed progressively and the world "reabsorbed", as one strives for liberation; see PTLvŗ 21-24 (which echoes ChU VI 1, 4ff.): yathā ghaţaśarāvaprabhŗtiprapañcavarjane mŗņmātram eva satyaṃ mŗdrūpātmakaprapancavarjane ‘pi gandha ity eva satyaṃ gandharūpatāviśeşāparamarśe ‘ham ity eva satyaṃ tathā, ‘As, when the phenomena that are the jar, the dish, etc., are set aside, what remains truly is clay itself, and as, when the phenomenon of clay is set aside, what remains truly is odor itself, and as, when one is no longer aware of any specific odor, what remains truly is the [absolute] ‘I’ (aham) itself, likewise [...]’ (our translation).622 The Sakalas, lit., ‘those endowed with kalā’, are affected by the three impurities, and their condition is that of life in this world. They are therefore also called māyāpramātŗs, inasmuch as they are deceived by māyā from which the dichotomy of subject and object begins. On Sakalas, see Appendix 10, p. 330.623 Commenting on kalāviluptavibhavaḥ [...] sa paśuḥ, ‘the fettered subject, deprived of his might by kalā’, SpN III 13 sets forth the meanings of kalā: kalayati bahiḥ kşipati pārimityena

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their «pure» state [that is, without adjunction of an object]624 and ending with particular [objects] [i.e., with the mahābhūtas].

And those who are freed from the particular [that is, from gross materiality] and from the body are Pralayākalas [as happens, for instance, in deep sleep].625

Such is this world: governed by the Rudras and by ordinary souls,626 in the company of the seven categories of subjects (pramātŗsaptaka), from Śiva to the Sakalas.

Kārikā 24The master now explains the triad of sheaths — the supreme, the subtle, and the gross:

24. In this world, the supreme covering is the impurity [also termed āņavamala]; the subtle one consists of the [sixfold] sheath, beginning with māyā627 [thus constituting the māyīyamala]; the gross covering is external, and has the form of the body [thus constituting the kārmamala]. Indeed the Self is enwrapped in a triad of coverings.

Inmost impurity, the āņava[mala] [viz., the impurity of deeming oneself finite],628 means here the [paśu’s] failure to recognize that he is consciousness — which failure, in turn, consists essentially in casting aside one’s own real nature.

paricchinattīti kalā māyāśaktiḥ [...] atha ca kalayā kiñcitkartŗtvopodbalanātmanā śaktyā tadupalakşitena kalāvidyākālaniyatirāgātmanā kañcukena viluptavibhavaḥ sthagitapūrņatvakartŗtyādidharmaḥ/ [...] kalayā akhyātyātmanāṃśena viluptavibhavaḥ saṃkucita iva, ‘The term kalā [lit., ‘(the verb) kalayati’] designates that which, projecting outside, cuts off and delimits, namely, the energy of delusion (māyāśakti) [...]. According to another interpretation, kalā means the energy/power (śakti) giving strength to limited agency (kiñcitkartŗtva). [This power named kalā] implies the [quintuple] sheath (kañcuka) of kalā, vidyā, kāla, niyati and rāgā. Therefore, "the fettered subject deprived of his might by kalā" designates the one whose attributes of perfection, [unrestrained] agency, etc., are veiled by that [quintuple sheath]. [...] [And kalā may be taken in the sense of a part (aṃśa). Therefore,] being deprived of his glory by a part, i.e., by the part[ial knowledge] that is akhyāti [the metaphysical ignorance of his own plenary nature], he is contracted [i.e., limited] as it were’. Cf. ĪPV III 2, 13 (vol. II: 263), defining buddhīndriyas and karmendriyas as the expansion (prapañca) of vidyā and kalā, viz., of limited Knowledge and limited Agency (vidyākalayoḥ prapañcabhūtau yau krameņa buddhīndriyakarmendriyavargau). Also ĪPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252), quoted n. 625.624 indriyamātra — implied here is the Indian notion according to which the organs, far from being mere receptors, play an active part in the act of perception. In this vein, the term grāha is to be taken literally.625 ĪPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252) defines the Pralayākalas as follows: […] kŗtā akalāḥ kalātattvopalakşitakaraņakāryarahitā, ‘They have been made "without activity (kalā)" (akala), i.e., devoid of the karaņas [the internal and external organs] and kāryas [the objects of those organs] which are implied by kalātattva [limited Agency]’. This is why the term Pralayākala has to be understood as ‘Inert in Dissolution’ [lit., ‘those devoid of limited Agency (akala), because of dissolution (pralaya)’] — a condition experienced, for instance, in deep sleep, when one reaches that state of total absorption (signified by the word ‘dissolution’) where neither sense-organs, nor objects of sense appear to be in play. It is thus a degree of consciousness higher than that of the Sakalas. Rudra is the model for such subjects. See Appendix 1, p. 317 and Appendix 10, p. 330.626 YR thus intends to place the Rudras and the ‘fettered souls’ on the same level of responsibility (or of deficiency).627 ... and ending with vidyā.

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By supreme is meant ‘existentially included [in the finite soul]’ for it remains as coexistent [with consciousness]629 in the manner of the flaw within the gold.630

By covering (āvaraņa) is meant ‘veil’ (chādana).The sixfold sheath beginning with māyā, and ending with limited Knowledge,

constitutes the subtle covering of the Self. Such a cover pertains to [the soul/consciousness] in such a way that it leans back

against it,631 as does the bran with respect to the rice-grain — thanks to which the display of the [limited] ability to know, act, etc., constitutive of difference,632 displays itself [before us — in reference to the «world» extending before us in apparent multiplicity]. It constitutes the impurity of regarding the world as objective.633

External, with respect to it, is the covering — figuratively represented by the husk — which is characterized as embodied existence (śarīrasattā) derived from pradhāna, and which is gross, for it consists of skin, flesh, etc.

This is the third impurity [namely, the impurity of supposing oneself the agent] of actions, due to which the subject becomes a receptacle for the accumulation of good and bad [results of] actions.634

628 The āņavamala is the fundamental, ontological impurity, that ‘concerning the aņu’ (cf. the ‘atom’ of the Vaiśeşika — the smallest particle found in "nature"). It represents the reduction of infinite free consciousness to a minimal, ‘atomic’, state. In the realm of experience, as stated in ŚSV I 4, the āņavamala is the ‘presumption (or intuition) of limitedness’ (apūrņaṃmanyatā), which makes the limited soul think: apūrņo ‘smi, ‘I am not full [viz., ‘I am imperfect’]’ (ibid.). Same definition in PHvŗ 9 (p. 72). Note that mala often signifies, by synecdoche, āņavamala, particularly in Siddhānta.629 The term tādātmya is used by Advaitins as a way of rationalizing their inability to describe in conventional terms the relationship between brahman and māyā — neither identity, nor difference, nor both (viz., the notion of bhedābheda, dear to the pariņāmavāda, but abjured by Advaita). It might be said that the Advaitin speaks of tādātmya in a way resembling Nāgārjuna’s use of the catuşkoţi — viz., in order to assert that the Absolute is ineffable. In the same fashion, here, even though it cannot be said why the flaw is within the gold, its presence therein is both irrefutable and "given" (nija). Here, tādātmyena glosses the epithet antara gaṅ , glossed previously as nija, ‘innate’ (YR ad 17).630 One might allege here a certain inconsistency in YR’s use of metaphors. In AG’s text, in effect, the analogy of the inedible bran (kambuka) of the grain is affected to the māyīyamala (kā. 17-18). Yet, commenting (ad kā. 17) on the ‘antara gatva’ of the hexad of sheaths that ṅconstitutes the māyīyamala, YR introduces the analogy of the flaw within the gold (kālikā) — an analogy which, in his commentary ad 24, is affected to the āņavamala, whereas that of the bran is affected to the māyīyamala. The following interpretation may solve the difficulty: in YR ad 17, the analogy of the flaw within the gold is affected to the māyīyamala only secondarily, inasmuch as the māyīyamala presupposes the āņavamala, which is indeed implied by the term ‘aņu’, in the genitive: māyāsahitaṃ kañcukaşaţkam aņor antara gamṅ idam uktam (17b); see YR ad loc. In YR ad 87-88, the analogy of the flaw within the gold is again affected to the āņavamala.631 Viz., that it is tightly attached to it.632 Here, the five kañcukas are referred to, as defined in kā. 17.633 ŚSV I 4 defines the māyīyamala as the ‘display of differentiated objectivity’ (bhinnavedyaprathā), which makes the limited soul consider his body as if it were his Self, such that he thinks: kşāmaḥ sthūlo vāsmi, ‘I am slim or fat’ (ibid.). Same definition in PHvŗ 9. See also YR ad 31.634 ŚSV I 4 defines the kārmamala as the ‘impregnating [of consciousness] with the dispositions that result from one’s good and bad [actions]’ (śubhāśubhavāsanā), which makes the limited soul think: agnişţomayājy asmi, ‘I am a performer of the agnişţoma sacrifice’ (ibid.). Similar

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Thus the Self, although fully open (vikasvara) becomes contracted (saṃkucitīkŗta) [i.e., is reduced to finitude],635 like space by the jar, and is enwrapped in this triad of coverings — the supreme, the subtle and the gross.636 In this condition, it is deemed ‘atomic’ (aṇu, viz., finite soul), and it is termed the fettered soul (paśu).

Kārikā 25Due to its relationship with those [three coverings, or impurities], [the Self] is harmed,637 as it were. The master says:

definition in PHvŗ 9.635 The contrast saṃkocavikāsa is specific to Trika, evoking the closing and opening of a flower, saṃkoca is a metaphor of finitude, vikāsa of liberation. The image will be taken up again in YR ad 56, 60, 61, in the course of discussing mokşa.636 Kşemarāja, commenting on his PH 9 (pp. 71-72), goes even further, presenting the three malas as limitations (saṃkoca, or parimitatā) of the icchā, jñāna and kriyā śaktis, respectively: icchāśaktiḥ saṃkucitā satī apūrņaṃmanyatārūpam āņavaṃ malam; jñānaśaktiḥ [...] antaḥkaraņabuddhīndriyatāpattipūrvam atyantaṃ saṃkocagrahaņena bhinnavedyaprathārūpaṃ māyīyam malam; kriyāśaktiḥ [...] karmendriyarūpasaṃkocagrahaņapūrvam atyantaṃ parimitatāṃ prāptā śubhāśubhānuşţhānamayaṃ kārmaṃ malam/, ‘icchāśakti, once contracted, becomes āņavamala, which consists in considering oneself imperfect; jñānaśakti, assuming the extreme contraction that begins with the acquisition of the inner organ and cognitive organs, becomes māyīyamala, which consists of the apprehension of objects as different [from one another and from the Self]; kriyāśakti, once contracted in the form of organs of action, becomes extremely limited, assuming the form of kārmamala, which consists in doing good and evil’.637 upahata — ‘harmed’ means here ‘forgotten’. Same image in YR ad 31: yad [anātmany api] ... ātmamāhitvam ... etad ativaiśasam.

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25. Due to the darkness of ignorance [which is akin to the disease of double-vision],638 the [Self]639 conceives its own essential nature640 as a multifarious diversity of objects and subjects, whereas it is one and nondual.

The [aforementioned] Self, bound up with the triad of coverings, because it has been brought into contact with the darkness that is the failure to discern the Self,641

knowsits own — that is, its inherent, viz., not borrowed from another —essential nature (ātmasvabhāvam = svabhāvam ātmānani) — namely,

consciousness, that essence whose distinguishing mark is the [pure] presence of the Self —

although one — that is, although of a nondual nature — [only] in terms of the phenomenal display — a display that consists of multifarious constructs [or (artificial) arrangements, dispositions], such as knower, means of knowledge and known;

or, in other words, it thinks of itself in terms of difference, the obverse of [original] non-difference.

For instance, the person afflicted with the [ocular disorder called] rekhātimira, though he is looking at just one moon, asserts that there are two moons in the sky and even points them out to people, saying: ‘Look at the two moons!’ Inasmuch as the

638 ajñānatimira — the term timira is here used both in its general sense (‘darkness’) and in a specialized medical sense, designating a certain disease of the eye (see also the gloss, here, of ajñānatimira by ‘ātmākhyātyandhakāra’ as well as kā. 31 and YR ad loc). What is at stake here is the specific ocular disorder that causes double-vision, which may be translated by the technical term ‘diplopia’. This diplopia, and its effect, the apprehension of a double moon, serves as a classic example of erroneous perception (bhrānti) and of metaphysical ignorance, or nescience (akhyāti), since by this defect of vision one perceives duality where there is only unity. The motif of diplopia is recurrent in Trika literature; see, for instance, TĀ I 331, ĪPvŗ III 2, 17 (dvicandrādibhrāntiḥ), ĪPvŗ II 3, 13; also Stavacintāmaņi 24: ajñānatimirasyaikam auşadhaṃ saṃsmŗtis tava/, ‘Your constant memory is the only remedy for the darkness of ignorance’, and Kşemarāja ad loc: timiraṃ pratibhācakşurāvārakatvena dvaitapradarśako doşaḥ, ‘timira, which is an imperfection [of vision] due to which one sees [real objects as] double, is [to be understood] as what obstructs the vision of the supreme consciousness (pratibha)’. Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāşya I 1, 1 (pp. 99-100) explains the apprehension of a double moon by the split of the visual rays that is produced either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to timira, understood in the technical sense of an ‘ocular disorder’: dvicandrajnānādāv apy aṅgulyavaşţambhatimirādibhir nāyanatejogatibhedena sāmagrībhedāt sāmagrīdvayam anyonyanirapekşaṃ candragrahaņadvayahetur bhavati, ‘Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon’ (tr. Thibaut, Vedāntasūtra: 123). The term rekhātimira is in itself a technical description of the trouble, since it means the ‘timira consisting in [confusing the] lines (rekhā)’. See YR ad 31.639 Despite the separate avat. ad 25, kārikās 24 and 25 make one grammatical unit, whose subject is the ātman (occurring at the very end of kā. 24) and whose predicate is the verb avabudhyeta.640 svaṃ svabhāvam ātmānam — agreeing with Barnett, Silburn translates: ‘alors qu’il est [...] ‘dentique a soi’ [— ‘whereas it is self-identical’], which appears to render svaṃ svabhāvam. See YR’s commentary on svaṃ svabhāvam ātmānam, rephrased as svam ātmasvabhāvam.641 ātmākhātyandhakāra — cf. the definition of the āṇavamala as caitanyasya ... akhyāti, in YR ad 24.

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moon is really single, it is due to his diplopia (timira) that it so appears. And thus, the person afflicted with diplopia experiences a practical result, be it anxiety or delight.642

Similarly, he takes as his goal the fruits of actions, as different [from himself], treating everything as different though it is not different from his own self — he by whom the display of difference has been taken for granted thanks to the darkness of ignorance [viz., of non-recognition of the Self].643

And thus he becomes again and again the enjoyer of heaven and hell [as a result of his actions].

In this way, diplopia is to be taken here as a metaphor644 for ignorance (ajñāna),645

for thereby things appear contrary [to reality].

Kārikā 26The master shows the nonduality of the Self through an illustration:646

26. Just as juice, skimmed froth, granular sugar, brown sugar, candy, etc., are in essence nothing but sugar cane,647 so are all forms only different states of the supreme Self, Śaṃbhu.648

As one and the same essence of sugar cane (ikşurasa) is [revealed in] the different forms taken on by the sugar cane, such as juice (rasa), etc., on account of the [same] ultimate sweetness found in all of them, so, likewise, all particulars that appear within phenomenal display through the relation of object to subject are — [like] waking, etc. — merely different states of the supreme Self (paramātman), one’s own essential nature, [which we term] Śaṃbhu, the Great Lord, consciousness itself.

For it is that very Lord, the inner self (svātmabhūta) of each and every one, who assumes those different roles649 out of his own freedom, and thus displays himself as 642 arthakriyāṃ prāpnoti — lit., ‘He acquires [viz., reaps the benefit of] its causal efficiency which produces either anxiety or delight’. Seeing those two moons, he watches them or shows them to others, deriving either anxiety or delight from this experience, or wishing others to experience the same feelings.643 Thus are referred to, respectively, the āņavamala (the darkness of ignorance), the māyīyamala (the display of difference), and the kārmamala (the acting in the world of differentiation).644 rūpaņā.645 Same phraseology in YR ad 30, which reformulates PS 25.646 It should be noted that AG’s PS 26-28 agrees here as to content and sequence with ĀPS 26-28.647 Cf. MM 25, which uses the same analogy in a different context. The PM ad loc. explains: yadvad ikşurasasya svapākayuktikramāt styānībhūtasya mādhuryaṃ gulapiņḍair na parityajyate, ‘[...] as sweetness is not alien to [viz., is still retained by] the lumps of gūr (solidified molasses), [that result] from the process of cooking the juice of the sugar cane until it becomes solidified’. Cf. ChU VI 1, 4: yathā saumya ekena mŗtpiņḍena sarvaṃ mŗnmayaṃ vijnātaṃ syāt vācārambhaņaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mŗttikety eva satyam, ‘Just as, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay becomes known, the modification being only a name arising from speech while the truth is that it is just clay’.648 Verse quoted in PM 25.649 bhūmikā — same image in YR ad 1 and 5. Compare YR ad 5: na punaḥ śivavyatiriktaṃ kiṃcit padārthajātam asti, ‘There is, in consequence, nothing to which language can refer that is other than Śiva’, and what is formulated here: na punaḥ svātmanaḥ tasmād bhinnaṃ kiṃcid asti, ‘Moreover, it is not that there is anything different from that Self. On bhūmikā in

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characterized by the states of object and subject, etc., in the same way as does the juice of the sugar cane [assume various forms].650 Moreover, it is not that there is anything different from that Self. Therefore, it is one and nondual, for consciousness pervades all the states.

Thus, visualizing everywhere the unity [of the Self], the cognizer becomes the knower of all.651

As the revered Śaṃbhu[nātha] has stated:652

One object has the nature of all objects. All objects have the nature of one object. Therefore, he who has seen one object in its essence has seen all objects in their essence.

And in Bhagavadgītā:Whereby in all beings one/ Unchanging653 condition men perceive,/Unmanifold in the manifold,/ Know that that knowledge is of goodness.654

Kārikā 27

the sense of ‘level [of subjectivity]’, see YR ad 41-46 (general avat.) and 45.650 The use of the word rasa here in its two senses (lit., ‘juice’ and fig. ‘essence’) confirms the word’s etymology. The connection of the two is so close that it may be doubted whether even a pun is intended.651 sarvadŗśvan.652 One of the teachers of AG who deserves specific mention in TĀ (I 12-13, I 16), Śaṃbhunātha (celebrated as Bhaţţanātha, ‘revered teacher’, in śl. 16) probably initiated AG in Kaula tantric practices.653 Our text agrees with the KSTS in reading akşaya 'imperishable' here. However, the received text of this line of the Gītā reads avyaya 'changeless', which is followed by Śańkara (who glosses it with kūţastha) as well as by other commentators (when this can be ascertained); and this reading was also adopted in the critical edition of the Mahābhārata (VI 40, 20) and in Edgerton's translation. For the reasons why we have retained the KSTS's variant, see our 'List of variants' in 'On the Sanskrit text'.654 BhG XVIII 20. This verse contrasts the knowledge proceeding from sattva with that based on rajas (śl. 21) and tamas (śl. 22). This sāttvika knowledge consists in realizing the Self (here bhāva, ‘Entity/Reality’) as nondual, however multifarious empirical diversity may be. BhGBh XVIII, 20 concludes: tadātmavastu vyomavan nirantaram ity arthaḥ, ‘That Reality which is the Self remains, like space, undivided — this is the purport’. And Ś adds in his avat. to 21: yāni dvaitadarśanāni tāni asamyagbhūtāhi rājasāni tāmasāni ceti na sākşāt saṃsārocchittaye bhavanti, ‘Being based on rajas and tamas, those doctrines that are dualistic are incomplete; therefore, they are not by themselves adequate for the eradication of [the pains of] worldly existence’.

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Though the variety [of reasonings]655 formulated by the other schools is accepted by us for purposes of provisional discussion,656 that variety is not becomingly employed657 in the arena of [those reasonings that have to do with] the truth. The master now says:

27. [The many differing conceptions of the Ultimate — that it is] Consciousness, or the Inner Controller, or Breath, or the Sovereign Body,658 or the Genus, or, finally, that it is the Particular — all these are for purposes of disputation only;659 in ultimate terms, none of them660 exist [as characterizations of the Ultimate].661

655 Note that bhedaḥ is rephrased as ete bhedāḥ (plural) at the end of the same commentary.656 saṃvŗtyartham — ‘for purposes of provisional [discussion]’ is a contextually determined "translation" of saṃvŗtyartham, here apparently understood by YR as a synonym of the kārikā’s vyavahāramātram. In any case saṃvŗti appears to be used here in a way consistent with its Buddhist sense; YR himself, while commenting on this very kārikā, uses the term saṃvŗtisatya, variously translated as ‘verite d’enveloppement’, ‘surface-level truth’, ‘relative truth’, or ‘truth of empirical order’, and contrasted with paramārthasatya, ‘deep-level truth’. On this opposition, see, inter alia, Edgerton BSHD, s.v., who translates ‘common-sense truth’; Sprung 1973: 40-53; Bareau 1966, vol. III: 179, 184, 196. Cf. Bhāmatī on satyānŗte mithunīkŗtya (BSBh I 1, 1, Adhyāsaprakaraņa: 17): na ca saṃvŗtiparamārthasatoḥ pāramārthikaṃ mithunam astīty abhūtatadbhāvārthasya cveḥ prayogaḥ.657 avakalpate.658 virāḍdeha — the cosmic Man whose body is the entire cosmos. Silburn distinguishes between virāj, translated as ‘corps cosmique’ [‘cosmic body’], and deha, translated as ‘corps ordinaire’ [‘ordinary body’]. So does Pandit PS: 37. We have followed YR’s gloss, which takes virāḍdeha as a unit. Note that R ad ĀPS 27 interprets also virāḍdeha as a single syntagm, and understands it as ‘the Brahmā Egg, stretching for 500 million yojanas’ (pa cāśatkoţiyojanavistīrņaṅ ṃ brahmāņḍam). Cf. BĀUBh I 4, 1, who identifies the ātman with Virāj or Hiraņyagarbha.659 Whatever translation we adopt, vyavahāra (in vyavahāramātram etat) should be taken as referring to this world of practical and provisional truths. Cf. also YR ad 37: ‘Moreover, in none of the other schools of philosophy do the terms jīva, puruşa, ātman, aņu, apply (vyavahriyate) to the Supreme Lord, a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness’. Cf. also MāU 7 and 12, in which ‘the ineffable final fourth part of the human self and the soundless fourth part of oṃ [...] are described as avyavahāra, "not susceptible of being dealt with, in language or otherwise." ‘ (Hacker 1972: 120). According to ĀŚ II 17-19 and Ś ad loc. (on the authorship of the Gauḍapādīyabhāşya, or Āgamaśāstravivaraņa [ĀŚV], and its traditional ascription to Ś, see notably Bouy ĀŚ: 31-33, and n. 140), prāņa, etc., are among the innumerable objects (bhāva) imagined (vikalpita) as the ātman. And those objects are endowed with saṃsāradharmas, ‘phenomenal attributes’ (ĀŚV II 17-18), or saṃsāralakşaņas, ‘phenomenal characteristics’ (ĀŚV II 19), such as cause and effect, exteriority, interiority, decay, death, etc., from which, as established by scripture (sarvopanişad, in ĀŚV II 17; śāstra, in ĀŚV II 18) through the via negationis, the ātman is altogether distinct (ĀŚV II 17 is quoted n. 667).660 And, ipso facto, the doctrines that expound them.661 This enumeration of different conceptions of the Real is rather unusual in Trika literature. The canonical scheme appears to be that of PS 32, which enumerates deha, body, prāņa, breath, buddhi, intellect or volition, and nabhas (or śūnya), the Void. A list that matches that of ĪPK I 6, 4, and of ŚSV I 1, which, commenting on caitanyam ātmā, explicitly attributes these different conceptions of the Real to their respective exponents or schools of thought: atha cātmā ka iti jijñāsūn upadeśyān prati bodhayituṃ na śarīraprāņabuddhiśūnyāni laukikacārvākavaidikayogācāramādhyamikādyabhyupagatāny ātmāpi tu yathoktaṃ

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By consciousness (vijñāna)662 is meant ‘nothing but consciousness’ (bodhamātra), in isolation (kevala), devoid of limiting attributes.663 Allthough devoid of name and form,664 [consciousness] appears variously, adopting the mode of externality, in shapes such as «blue» and «pleasure», etc.,665— thanks to the power of beginningless latent dispositions [constantly] reawakened (vāsanāprabodha)666 and infinitely various. Thus say the Vijñanavādins.667

The Brahmavādins,668 citing the texts:All this [universe] is verily Puruşa,669

and:

caitanyam eva, ‘And so, in order to explain to inquisitive disciples what the Self is, the author says: "It is not the body, as maintained by the Materialists (laukikacārvāka), not Breath (prāņa), as maintained by the followers of the Vedas, not the intellect (buddhi), as maintained by the Yogācāras, nor the Void (śūnya), as maintained by the Mādhyamikas, but, as already said, it is pure consciousness (caitanya)’ (tr. Singh, modified). For parallel passages, see Appendix 14, p. 338. The enumeration of kā. 27a may have been occasioned by ĀPS 27a, first hemistich, of which it is an exact borrowing. However, the perspectives of the two texts are altogether different. On the basis of their common terminology and approach, it appears that, as a Vedāntin, Ādiśeşa agrees with Bhartŗprapañca’s conception of brahman, or paramātman, passing through different states, or stages (avasthā), in the process of evolution, the ultimate reality becoming differentiated into the manifold objects of experience that are both identical to and different from it. These stages, or modes, of the saprapañcabrahman, to which the infinite variety of the universe is reduced, are eight in number, according to Bhartŗprapañca. In descending order, the hypostases, or ‘transformations’ (pariņāma) of brahman, are (see Hiriyanna 1924: 79-80): 1) antaryāmin; 2) sākşin; 3) avyākŗta; 4) sūtra; 5) virāj; 6) daiva; 7) jāti; 8) piņḍa. Thus, as Hiriyanna concludes (p. 80): ‘the whole brahman may be said to evolve in two distinct lines — one (1-2) the spiritual, and the other (3-8) the material, which constitutes either the adjunct or the environment of the spiritual’. In ĀPS 27a, those avasthās are said to be five, if one relies on R, who takes jātipiņḍa as a unit, glossing it "vyaşţidehāḥ", doubtless to be taken in its Sāṃkhya acceptation, which designates the particular ‘body’ only insofar as it constitutes a part of a larger whole. Thus Ādiśeşa enumerates vijñāna, antaryāmin, prāņa, virāḍdeha, and jātipiņḍa, even though those states imputed to the Self are in truth unreal, for it is only one, as established by ChU VI 2, 1 quoted by R ad ĀPS 27. Despite the similarity of their first hemistichs, verses 26 and 27 differ as to their purport in the two Paramārthasāra. In ĀPS, kā. 26 and 27 form a pair expounding the view common to Bhartŗprapañca and Adiśeşa of the evolutionary relationship between paramātman (or saprapancabrahman) and the modes in which the universe appears: rasaphāņitaśarkarikāguḍakhaņḍā vikŗtayo yathaivekşoḥ/ tadvad avasthābhedāḥ paramātmany eva bahurūpāḥ// vijñānāntatyāmiprāņavirāḍdehajātipiņḍāntāḥ/ vyavahārās tasyātmany ete ‘vasthāviśeşāḥ syuḥ//. On the contrary, AG’s PS distinguishes 26 from 27, which contrast is signaled also by the supplementary -ādyāḥ. Verse 26 is indeed an adaptation of ĀPS 26 (besides the adjunction of -ādi, note the suppression of vikŗti in a; the greater alteration of b). Verse 27 then becomes the doctrinal exposition of different conceptions of the Self, at the cost of making a few alterations in the half verse: vijñānāntaryāmprāņavirāḍdehajātipiņḍāntāḥ/ vyavahāramātram etat paramārthena tu na santy eva//. According to YR’s interpretation, the names given to the Self or Ultimate do not denote the different states through which it passes, but the different conceptions of the Ultimate that the different schools of philosophy attempt to establish. Thus, verse 27 aims to refute such doctrines in order to establish the Trika as the highest and only true view. From the Trika perspective, if there is an evolution, it is not of the Self, which is beyond evolution, but of speculations about the Self. And Trika represents the accomplishment of this long speculative process (see n. 689 and 946). Cf. ĀŚ II 19-28, which enumerates thirty-five

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There is not the least diversity here [in brahman],670

hold that it is the transcendental brahman itself, which they call the ‘Inner Controller (antaryāmin) of all’,671 that appears as difference through the force of beginningless nescience.

[We, however, reply:] — In both these [doctrines, though the conscious principle has been formulated as supreme], what has not been recognized is the freedom of that conscious principle (vedana), which, endowed with life,672 becomes the efficient cause673 of the construction of the universe.674

However, others, the Prāņabrahmavādins [viz., the Brahmavādins who hold that brahman is cosmic Breath], maintain that the entire universe has come into being in

conceptions of the Self or Ultimate, falsely represented as so many phenomena. ĀŚ II 30 concludes that the ātman, which assumes the form of the innumerable phenomena it itself creates, is in reality absolute and free from all ideation. Such phenomena do not exist independently of the ātman, which is their substratum, as shown by Ś ad loc, who quotes BĀU II 4, 6 [ = IV 5, 7]: idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā. Also, BSBh I 1. A separate monograph will be devoted to a detailed interpretation of this kārikā and its commentary.662 The question of how to translate the term is taken up in May 1971: 305. The term (one of whose synonyms is citta) is understood contextually as ‘cognition’, ‘pensee’ (‘thought’), or ‘conscience’ (‘consciousness’); May translates cittamātravāda, one of the appelations given to the Vijñānavāda, as ‘doctrine du rien-que-pensee’, ‘doctrine de la pensee sans plus’ (EPU II, s.v. citta). Cf. ĀŚ II 25b and BSBh II 2, 28.663 anupādhi.664 From BĀU I 6, 3, the syntagm ‘name and form’ signifies phenomenal reality as veiling the immortal ātman, equated with prāņa. Therefore, it designates the objective aspect of consciousness. "Name" refers to the "designating" subject, "form" to the "signified" object; in their opposition, they refer to a world conceived of as a totality half-objective and half-subjective.665 nīla, ‘blue’ [or yellow (pīta), etc.], is the standard example of the external form grasped by the sense-organs, whereas sukha, ‘pleasure’, is that of the internal, grasped by the antaḥkaraņa (see YR ad 30). Therefore, the syntagm nīlasukhādi represents the ‘knowable’ (vedya), or ‘objectivity’ insofar as it is an object of consciousness, whether external or internal. Such reasonings are common to Buddhist idealists and to the Trika, even though the latter (see SpK I 4) reaches the opposite conclusion: the existence of a permanent Subject, a substratum for the impermanent, incidental experiences of pleasure and pain, etc. On the Vijñānavāda, see Bouy ĀŚ: 229-235, 261-263 (who refers to Levi 1911, Bareau 1966, Bugault 1968, Yamada 1977, Dasgupta 1969, Mahadevan 1975); see also May 1971: 265-323.666 YR reproduces here the very terms of ĪPK I 5, 5, which formulates the Vijñānavāda doctrine through its refutation — to which Trika adheres — by the Bāhyārthānumeyavādins: na vāsanāprabodho ‘tra vicitro hetutām iyāt/ tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kiṃ nibandhanam//, ‘Not [even] a varied reawakening of the dispositions can be taken to be the cause here [viz., of the multiform world of phenomena], for in such case, what would be the cause of the variety of their reawakening [if not the existence of material entities outside the plane of thought]?’ (tr. Torella, modified); ĪPV15, 5 (vol. I: 212ff.), refutes the Vijñānavāda with two arguments: 1) vāsanās are able to cause remembrance only: vijnānavādinā yo hetur vaicitrye vāsanāprabodhalakşaņa uktaḥ sa na upapadyate/ ‘smŗtijanakaḥ saṃskāro vāsanā’ iti tāvat prasiddham, ‘What the Vijñānavādin holds, namely, that the cause of phenomenal diversity consists in the [re]awakening of the vāsanās (vāsanāprabodha), cannot be accepted, for it is well known that "the vāsanā is the residual trace (saṃskāra) responsible for remembrance (smŗti) [and nothing else]" ‘; 2) ultimately, the Vijñānavādins’ position is but ‘a kind of bāhyārthavāda under the guise of different words’ (tad ayaṃ śabdāntarapracchanno bāhyārthavādaprakāra eva); ĪPK I 5, 6-7 give the Trika position, which agrees with the Vijñānavāda in denying the independent existence of the material world, but disagrees with it

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accordance with the act of breathing (prāņana), once the resolve [of creating the universe] has been formed (āgūrya) [or, once [the brahman-prāņa] has proclaimed it].675 And since, according to them, brahman has no form other than Breath, brahman is Word [itself] (śabdabrahman) endowed with self-awareness (savimarśa).676

Others are agreed that the true form of brahman is the Sovereign Body (virāḍdeha)677 [that is, the cosmic body (deha), or creation] that has assumed the shape of Virāj (vairāja) — in accordance with such texts as:

inasmuch as it replaces inert thought (citta) by free, divine and omnipotent consciousness, as the source of the phenomenal world: cidātmaiva hi devo ‘ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ/ yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet//, ‘Indeed, the Lord, who is consciousness, manifests externally the multitude of the objects that reside within him, without having recourse to material causes, through his sole will, as does a yogin’ (ĪPK I 5, 7); see also BSBh II 2, 28, p. 395, which reproduces the debate between a Buddhist Bāhyārthavādin, who holds that the external object is the cause of perceptive cognition (prajñapti), and the Vijñānavādin, for whom it is thought or consciousness that transforms itself into objects. To the objection of the Bāhyārthavādin: kathaṃ punar asati bāhyārthe pratyayavaicitryam upapadyate, ‘How does one explain the variety of sense experience if the external object does not exist?’ the Vijñānavādin thus answers: vāsanāvaicitryād iti, ‘due to the variety of the [inherited, immemorial] dispositions’. See also YR’s commentary ad 91, which uses the same terms: vāsanāprabodha.667 Cf. ĀPS 26-27, which expounds an early vedāntic doctrine that agrees essentially with the teachings of the upanişads, on the states or modalities of the saprapañcabrahman in the course of its transformation, namely, according to Ādiśeşa: vijñāna, antaryāmin, prāņa, virāḍdeha and jātipiņḍa. Hence, R ad ĀPS 26-27 quotes, in order to explain vijñāna, BĀU III 9, 28: vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma, ‘brahman is knowledge and bliss’. Cf. also ĀŚV II 17, where the ātman is defined as pure consciousness and nothing else (viśuddhavijñaptimātra): tadhetuphalādisaṃsāradharmānarthavilakşaņatayā svena vtiuddhavijñaptimātrasattādvayarūpeņāniścitatvāj jīvaprāņādyanantabhāvabhedair ātmā vikalpita ity eşa sarvopanişadāṃ siddhāntaḥ. On the contrary, according to YR, AG’s intention is to present and refute the doctrines of the Self or Ultimate held by other systems of thought, namely, at this point, the Vijñānavāda, as does SpN I 5 in dealing with the Śāntabrahmavāda. Commenting upon SpK I 5: na cāsti mūḍhabhāvo ‘pi tad astiparamārthataḥ, ‘That exists in an ultimate sense where there is no insentience’, SpN explains: mūḍhabhāva aiśvaryātmakavimarśaśūnyaprakāśamātratattvo brahmarūpo ‘pi yatra nāsti yac chrutyantavidaḥ pratipannāḥ vijñānam brahma iti tasyāpi svātantryātmaka spandaśaktiṃ vinā jaḍatvāt/, ‘Even where insensibility does not exist, if that [sensibility] takes the form of the brahman that is, although pure consciousness (prakāśamātra), said to be devoid of reflection (vimarśa), such as have held the partisans of Vedānta — who say "brahman is consciousness" (vijñānam brahma iti) — even to that brahman insensibility [may be secondarily attributed], because [in addition to being devoid of reflection which is] the source of its sovereignty (aiśvarya), it lacks the power of vibration (spanda) which is the essence of its freedom (svātantrya)’. In the same way, YR (ad vijñāna and antaryāmin) treats as equivalent the Vijñānavāda and the Śāntabrahmavāda, glossing over their many similarities and differences, insofar as he emphasizes that both have erred equally in not recognizing the absolute freedom of the Lord as cause of creation. Thus perhaps YR echoes the criticism of the Vijñānavādins as formulated by the Mādhyamikas. In effect, according to the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavāda theory of cognition, involving the concept of ālayavijñāna, ‘consciousness-receptacle’, has surreptitiously reintroduced the germ of a substantiality which they [viz., the Mādhyamikas] denounced as a resurrection of the brahmanical ātman (see Bareau 1966: 196

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The One, of whom fire is the mouth, heaven the head, sky [space] the navel, earth the feet, the sun the eye, directions the ears, homage to him who is in the form of the universe.678

What the Vaiśeşikas and others679 call ‘genus’ (jāti) is [for them] the ultimately real (paramārthasat)680 entity, being the substratum of all qualities (guņa). It is characterized [in this doctrine] by using terms such as ‘universal’ (sāmānya) and ‘being as such’ [or the ‘universal per se’] (mahāsattā).681

Others maintain682 that particulars (piņḍa = vyakti)683 are ultimately real, and that no universal that would be one and [at the same time] the substratum of

and Bouy ĀŚ: 320) into Buddhist speculations that had been characterized by the doctrine of anātman [Pāli anatta] (viz., the non-existence of an imperishable ātman); see ĪPK I 5, 5, quoted n. 666.668 By the term ‘Brahmavādin’ YR may refer here to Śa kara’s Advaita or to preśa karite ṅ ṅVedānta, and most probably, to the Vaişņava stream of preśa karite Vedānta, as represented ṅby Bhartŗprapañca and Ādiśeşa — the reference made here to the puruşasūkta (ŖS X 90) Would corroborate such a hypothesis; on the identification of that Brahmavāda, see n. 41.669 ŖS X 90, 2. Same text in ŚvU III 15, quoted in SpN II 6-7, which reveals what is really at stake when confronting the upanişadic doctrine with the Śaiva: ātmājñātavya iti tatredam eva sarvajñasarvakartŗsvatantraśivasvarūpatayā pratyabhijñānam ātmano jñānaṃ na tu puruşa evedaṃ sarvam iti śrutyantaviduktam, ‘In the statement: "The Self should be known", what is meant is the recognition (pratyabhijñāna) of the Self as Śiva, who is omniscient, omnipotent and free. Such is the knowledge of the Self. That [knowledge] is not referred to by the Vedāntins’ (śrutyantavid) dictum, "All this [universe] is verily Puruşa." ‘ Then Kşemarāja concludes with a quotation from SvT IV 392a: ta ātmopāsakāḥ sarve na gacchanti paraṃ padam ity āmnāyokteḥ, ‘[It is not so] for, as stated by tradition [viz., SvT IV 392a]: "All those worshipers of the Self do not reach the highest state." ‘ As explained by Singh (SpK: 125), according to the Trika, the realization of [lit., ‘mergence into’] the Self (ātmavyāpti) is not the highest ideal, rather it is śivavyāpti, the realization of both the Self and the universe as Śiva. Cf. also BĀU I 4, 1: ātmaivedam agrāsīt puruşavidhaḥ, ‘In the beginning, this [world] was the ātman alone, in the form of the puruşa’ (cf. Radhakrishnan: ‘In the beginning this (world) was only the self in the shape of a person’), and the ‘Śaiva Āgama’ text quoted in PHvŗ 8: sthitā vedavidaḥ puṃsi, ‘The knowers of the Vedas rest [content] with the Puruşa’.670 BĀU IV 4,19. It is evidently a quotation from some older text (tad ete ślokā bhavanti: BĀU IV 4, 8), which is followed by this conclusion: mŗtyoḥ sa mŗtyum āpnoti/ ya iha nāneva paśyati, ‘He goes from death to death, who sees in it, as it were, diversity’. Cf. also KāU IV 10b and 11b; text quoted, by means of its pratīka, along with the pratīka of BĀU II 5,19 (= ŖS VI 47, 18: indro māyābhiḥ) in ĀŚ III 24a (neha nāneti cāmnāyād [...]), and in ĀŚ VII 31. Cf. also ChU VI 2, 1 quoted n. 893. The two citations given by YR, representing Brahmavāda-Vedānta, establish the thesis that duality is unreal: the Lord whose manifestation is the differentiated universe is inwardly free from differentiation. SpP 28-9 [= ad II 3-4, p. 37] quotes the Śruti: śrutiś ca ātmaivedaṃ jagat sarvaṃ neha nānāsti kiñcana, ‘Śruti declares: "All this universe is the Self alone, there is not the least diversity here."’671 R ad ĀPS 27 quotes BĀU III 7, 3: yaḥ pŗthivyāṃ tişţhan pŗthivyā antaraḥ, yaṃ pŗthivi na veda, yasya pŗthivī śarīram, yaḥ pŗthivīm antaro yamayati, eşa ta ātmāntaryāmy amŗtaḥ, ‘He who dwells in the earth, yet is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within, he is your self, the inner controller, the immortal’. BĀU III 7 (1-23) consists, in its entirety, of the definition, in the form of a litany, of the ātman as antaryāmin, ‘the inner controller from within who controls this world and the next and all things’ (ya imaṃ ca lokaṃ paraṃ ca lokaṃ sarvāņi ca bhūtāny antaro yamayati), who is ‘that thread by which this world, the other world and all beings are held together’ (tat sūtraṃ yasminn ayaṃ ca lokaḥ paraś ca lokaḥ sarvāņi ca bhūtāni saṃdŗbdhām bhavanti)

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numerous qualities684 ever appears (prakāśate) [to the senses]; nor may it be established by argument that such is the case. Therefore, ordinary usage, which deals exclusively with particulars (vyakti), is sufficient [and we need not resort to fictions such as the ‘universal’].685! What then is the use of positing a universal?

They dispute [the need to posit] such a universal by advancing speculations686 of various sorts. They say, among other things, that ‘particulars do not depend [on that universal for their existence], and that nothing else appears [in our ordinary experience] that is dependent on it’. Thus, they are agreed that ‘genus (jāti) is not ultimately real’.

[BĀU III 7,1]. The litany concludes (v. 23): nānyo ‘to ‘sti draşţā, nānyo ‘to ‘stiśrotā, nānyo ‘to ‘sti mantā, nānyo ‘to ‘sti vijñātā/ eşa ta ātmāntaryāmy amŗtaḥ, ‘There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other thinker but he. He is your self [ātman], the inner controller, the immortal’. Cf. also MāU 6, in which antaryāmin defines the prājña (on this notion, see kā. 35 and YR ad loc). Thus, the earliest references to the notion of antaryāmin are to be found in the Śatapathabrahmaņa and the upanişads, especially in the ChU and BĀU, from which is quoted ‘There is not the least diversity here [in brahman]’. In Vaişņava Vedānta, the antaryāmin, which occurs first in the enumeration of the states or modes of the paramātman, appears as a tattva. Different is the later vedāntic conception of the antaryāmin; see, for instance, Pañcadāśī VI 236; also BSBh I 2, 5, 18 (which discusses BĀU III 7), in which Śaṅkara holds that the antaryāmin is effectively the ātman, and is distinguished, at least provisionally, from the jīva (this being wholly determined by māyā), whereas what one has called the antaryāmin represents the core of what is real in the heart of the living being — impossible to slough off. Evidently, the antaryāmin is ‘considered from the vyāvahārika point of view’, but, at the same time, transcends that point of view — it is not the jīva, and to it is not attributed any ‘creative’ role. Similarly, Rāmānuja identifies the antaryāmin with Nārāyaņa, arguing against a pūrvapakşa which would have it the same as the jīva.672 jīvitabhūta — such terminology implicitly contests the vedāntic’s view that brahman is śānta.673 hetu — efficient or ‘impelling’ cause (according to the grammatical acceptation of the term — specifically, the causative ‘agent’ as contrasted with the embedded ‘agent’: P. 14, 55). Cf. Kallaţa’s Tattvavicāra quoted in SpP 1, p. 9: śaktiprasarasaṅkocanibaddhāv udayavyayau/ yasyātmā sa śivo jñeyaḥ sarvabhāvapravartakaḥ//, ‘[All things] arise and fall away in consonance with the extension and withdrawal of [Śiva’s] power. Know that their essential nature is Śiva, Who impels all things’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 145).674 According to the Trika, the inadequacy of the Śāntabrahmavāda consists in its considering brahman as pure prakāśa, inherently luminous consciousness, devoid of self-awareness (vimarśa), or dynamic freedom (svātantrya); see SpN ad I 5. Same argument in YR ad 15. See also SpN I 4, quoted in Appendix 16, p. 340. It is TĀV I 33 which, in order to establish the svātantryavāda, develops his criticisms of the Vijñānavāda.675 The entire passage is quite puzzling. A number of texts refer to those named Prāņavids, or Prāņātmavādins. For instance, according to ŚSV I 1 (quoted n. 661), they are Vaidikas. Cf. ĀŚ II 20, dealing with the different conceptions of the ātman: ‘Comme etant l’Energie pneumatique [le] concoivent ceux qui connaissent l’energie pneumatique’ (tr. Bouy — ‘It is conceived as pneumatic energy (prāņa) by those who know pneumatic energy’). According to Anubhūtisvarūpa, Ānandagiri and Svayaṃprakāśānanda ad loc, the Prāņavids are the Hairaņyagarbhas, worshipers of the Hiraņyagarbha eulogized in ŖS X 121, who take the prāņa to be the ‘creator of the world’ (jagatkartŗ), or, if prāņa is taken to be Īśvara, the Lord, those who, like the Vaiśeşikas, consider the Lord as the efficient cause (see Bouy ĀŚ: 127). Nevertheless, such an identification creates a problem: can these Hairaņyagarbhas, whoever they may be, be understood as the savimarśaśabdabrahmavādins of YR’s commentary? There

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The categories [here set forth] — viz., ‘[from] consciousness to particulars’ — are such as have been described. [In conclusion] we hold that ‘all these are for purposes of disputation only’. Since, in this doctrine of [Śiva’s absolute] freedom (svātantryavāda), the self-manifesting (prakāśamāna) reality cannot be concealed,687 those different categories do appear [also] as relative truths (saṃvŗtisatya), but, in ultimate terms, none of them exist [as characterizations of the Ultimate], that is, they do not exist in essence [i.e., in truth];688 they do exist as categories postulated in other systems of thought.

Therefore, it is the one Great Lord — namely, [one’s own] consciousness, the supremely real, the ultimate Light, the utterly free — who appears (cakāste)

remains the possibility that these Brahmavādins are to be identified with Bhartŗhari and his followers — the key to the puzzle being the reference here to the word āgūr(ya), although the word is itself as puzzling as the entire passage. However that may be, the different usages of the term agree with the sense, well attested in the older language, of the root gur/gūr (related to the root gī or gŗ by the majority of philologists): at issue is the articulation of a formula with ritual function in the course of a rite of some sort. Later lexicographers add the nuance of ‘proposition’, inasmuch as the majority of such formulae amount to invitations or to requests for actions. It should not then be surprising that the term figures here in the dissection of theses attributed to the Prāņabrahmavādins, who would derive the cosmos from a similar ‘proposition’ articulated quasi-verbally by "(Śabda)brahman". It is perhaps due to that ambiguity that our text does not specify the agent of the act of elocution, but the doctrinal context allows one to suppose that it is either brahman or the force of "breath" that brahman represents. Thus, it seems that YR expounds here the view (shared by Bhartŗhari and others) that words precede the things they name in the order of creation. Such speculations echo the śa karite exegesis of ChU I 11, 4-5, whose conclusion is that ‘ṅ prāņa is brahman’ (BSBh I 1,9, 23). Though Bhartŗhari’s philosophy does not give as much emphasis to the notion as it receives here, the view espoused is in conformity with his theory of four stages of enunciation —paśyantī, etc. (see, nevertheless, VP I 117: tasya prāņe cayā śaktiryā ca budāhau vyavasthitā). According to Bhartŗhari, whom YR is probably following here, prāņa plays a prominent role at the fourth and third levels of linguistic activity: vaikharī — where takes place articulation into phonemes, as prāņa, in its gross or physical form, strikes against the various organs of articulation (cf. VP I 122) — and madhyamā — in which intentions are formulated mentally. Consequently, prāņa represents as much the differentiated world as the cosmic principle from which it proceeds (on this question, see Iyer 1992: 123ff., 143-146, 106ff.). It seems, therefore, that the views attributed by YR to the Prāņabrahmavādins agree with Bhartŗhari’s theory according to which things are produced by word: chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyavartata (VP I 120); see also Ruegg 1959: 61 (n. 2c), 76-79. Moreover, such speculations may also imply a tradition of exegesis in which vedic speech, represented by the syllable oṃ, is considered to be at the core of the cosmic process — a tradition going back perhaps to ŖS X 121 (Max Muller’s hymn to ‘Deo ignoto’), in which Hiraņyagarbha, identified with Breath (asu), is said to be the effective source of creation, therefore associated (though later) with Prajāpati. In the same way, Breath is extolled as the cosmic principle in Atharvaveda XI 4, whose last stanza (possibly a later addition) compares it to Hiraņyagarbha. Thus, the Prāņabrahmavādins, in YR’s commentary, are less likely to be Hairaņyagarbhas (commonly referred to as Prāņavids, or Prāņātmavādins) than followers of Bhartŗhari, described in our text as identifying prāņa as the source of the entire cosmos.676 On the notion of śabdabrahman, see also Sāmbapañcāśikā 21 (along with Kşemarāja ad loc, in Padoux Sāmbapañcāśikā: 569): yat tad vedyaṃ kim api paramaṃ śabdatattvaṃ tvam [...] tat sad vyaktiṃ jigimişu [...] avyaktena praņavavapuşā [...] sacchabdabrahmaoccarati karaņavyanjitaṃ vācakaṃ te//, ‘Quant a Ta nature ineffable, qu’il faut connaītre, c’est que Tu es la realite interieure supreme de la Parole (paramaṃ śabdatattvam) [...] voulant devenir manifeste a partir de l’essence immanifeste du praņava. [...] Les organes de la parole etant

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variously [i.e., who appears as manifold], for there is nothing other than he that is different from him, and hence lacking in illumination, that can manifest itself.689

And it has been stated:After speculating,690 those who are fond of building systems of thought out of their own wisdom go on saying that the essence (tattva) is such and such. That essence is nothing different from you, O Lord; it is but a dispute of scholars about the names [to be given to you].691

Kārikā 28

[interieurement] manifestes, le veritable Brahman-son (śabdabrahman), qui est ce qui t’exprime, s’enonce’ [— As for Your ineffable nature, which is to be known, it is that You are the ultimate reality of Speech [...], desirous of becoming manifest [...] from the unmanifest essence of the praņava. [...] Once the organs of Speech are [internally] manifested, the true śabdabrahman, which is what expresses You, enunciates itself].677 The Sovereign Body (virāḍdeha) is the cosmic body, seen as the creation (deha) of Virāj, the cosmic ‘Sovereign’. The virāj is, according to the traditional etymology, the ‘all resplendent’, or the ‘Sovereign (per se)’: viśeşena rājate iti virāj. On virāj, considered both as a meter of ten syllables and as a demiurge, see ChU IV 3, 7-8. Senart observes (ChU: 49) that ‘Virāj’, the cosmic ‘Sovereign’ seems to correspond to the totality of the sensible world (n. 2), whereas the meter ‘virāj’ is to be considered as the expression of this world (n. 4). For a diachronic account of the notion, see Renou 1952: 141-154.678 Mahābhārata [MBh] XII 47, 44, quoted by Ś ad BS I 2, 25. Parallel statements are found in ŖS X 90, 13-14 (hymn to Puruşa), ŖS X 81, 3 [= Kāţhakasaṃhitā XVIII 2, as quoted in YR ad 35]), KāU V 9-12, MuU II 1, 4; ChU V 18, 2 gives a parallel description, applied to the ātman vaiśvānara, the equivalent, at the empirical level, of the divine and cosmic Virāj. On the vaiśvānara-ātman as a vedāntic notion, see PS 35 and YR ad loc, both texts expounding the MāU doctrine (developed by the ĀŚ and Śa kara’s ĀŚV) according to which the four states of ṅconsciousness coincide with the four elements or instants of the syllable oṃ. According to ĀSV 3 — which establishes the correspondence between the divine Virāj and the lowest level of the ātman, the vaiśvānara — to take brahman to be Virāj signifies, even in a vedāntic context, that one’s course has been interrupted on the way to liberation.679 The opposition vyakti/ākŗti, ‘particular [thing]/common [form]’ has been subjected to much scrutiny by Vaiśeşikas, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraņas, as have been the related notions of jāti, sāmānya, piņḍa and dravya. For the Mīmāṃsā, cf. Śābarabhāşya 13, 30: kā punar ākŗtiḥ kā vyaktir iti/ dravyaguņakarmaņāṃ sāmānyamātram ākŗtiḥ/ asādhāraņaviśeşā vyaktiḥ, ‘Qu’est-ce que l’akŗti? Qu’est-ce que la vyakti? L’akŗti, ce n’est rien d’autre que le trait commun — sāmānya — aux substances, aux qualites et aux actions. Quant a la vyakti, c’est la particularity individuelle — asādhāraņaviśeşa’ (tr. Biardeau 1964: 167) [— ‘What is ākŗti? What is vyakti? The ākŗti is nothing else than the feature common (sāmānya) to substances, qualities and actions. The vyakti is the uncommon particular — asādhāraņaviśeşa’]; cf. also Mahābhāşya I 2 6, opposing vyaktivādin and ākŗtivādin. Biardeau observes [1964: 292ff.] that Bhartŗhari, in dealing with the same notions, transforms the views of Patañjali and of the Mīmāṃsā. On these questions, see Biardeau 1964: 68-100; 155-203; 229-247; 292ff.680 paramārthasat is a term not well suited to a Vaiśeşika context, implying as it does, degrees of "reality". ‘Ultimately real’ may serve as a translation if one understands ‘what is real in and of itself, without qualification’. The problem of translation is essentially unresolvable because one cannot set aside the fact that here a partisan of monism is speaking of systems that are in no wise monist.681 YR’s account partly agrees with Vaiśeşika doctrine according to which ‘being’ (sattā), as the ultimate form of commonness (parasāmānya), represents the category of commonness

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Now the master offers an illustration of error in terms of its capacity to present unreal objects:

28. There is no serpent at the place occupied by a rope, and yet that serpent causes dread that may end in death. Truly, the power of error is great and cannot be pinned down.692

The great power of error cannot by anyone be pinned down: in other words, [its true nature lies] beyond anyone’s capacity of investigation — so great is its ability to make the real appear (pratibhāsana) other than it is,693 which [in the present case] means failing to recognize one’s own plenitude.

(sāmānya) as such (cf. Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 104 and 175-177). See Appendix 15, p. 339.682 The passage seems, in quarrels with the other schools on the ‘meaning of the sentence’ (śābdabodha), to echo the position of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeşika, which has insisted that the word refers literally only to the vyakti, and secondarily to the jāti. In this sense, a Śaiva such as YR may have understood that the Vyaktivādins considered the vyakti an ultimate principle. See Nyāyabhāşya [NBh] II 2, 58-69, in which the Vyaktivādin is perhaps a follower of Vyāḍi, an early grammarian, many of whose notions have been refuted by later Pāņinīyas; Vyāḍi teaches that the word refers to dravya, the ‘particular’, understood as a concrete thing (see Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 101-102); on Vyāḍi, see Ruegg 1959: 32-34; Renou 1940: intr., p. 19. As well, the point of view expressed here is consonant with that of the Cārvākas, according to the few authentic records of that school — a single authentic text of that "school" is thought to survive, the Tattvopaplavasiṃha; other references are found in always hostile compendia, such as the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha — where an attempt is made to demonstrate (ironically?) that ‘perception’ (pratyakşa) alone, which is always restricted to particulars, guarantees any semblance of validity, and that no ‘inference’ can be deemed certain, inasmuch as the universal (vyāpti) on which it depends can never extend, given our limited purview, to all possible instances. May also be intended here (so Ruegg, Private communication) the Buddhist Pramāņavāda (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, etc.), where the universal (sāmānya, jāti), as opposed to svalakşaņa (the term vyakti not being employed in this school) is not real. Favoring this interpretation is YR’s usage of language akin to that of the Buddhists, such as paramārtha(satya)/saṃvŗtisatya, vyavahāramātra, sāmānya/vyakti.683 vyakti is a Mīmāṃsaka notion, which is taken up again, with some alterations, by the Naiyāyikas (cf. Biardeau 1964: 234-235). The notion is discussed in Śābarabhāşya I 3, 10, 30-35 (cf. Biardeau 1964: 168ff.) For the discussion of piņḍa — lit., ‘lump’, ‘compact mass’, or ‘corporeal frame’, therefore ‘individu concret’ (‘concrete individual’), as translated by Biardeau (1964: 33) — synonym of vyakti, see Śābarabhāşya I 6, 6, 19.684 Cf. NBh II 2, 59ff.: varņaḥ śuklā gauḥ kapilā gaur iti dravyasya guņayogo na jāter iti, ‘[The explanation applies to] color: [When one says:] "a white cow", "a tawny cow", qualities (guņa) are united to the individual substance (dravya), not to the genus (jāti)’.685 Lit., ‘Therefore, ordinary usage (vyavahāra) suffices inasmuch as it relates to particulars’. See NBh II 2, 59ff., from which we extract the example: vaidyāya gāṃ dadātīti dravyasya tyāgo na jāter amūrtatvāt pratikramānukramānupapatteś ca, ‘When one says: "he gives a cow to the physician", there is a gift of an individual substance (dravya), not of a genus (jāti), for the latter is devoid of material form (amūrtatva), and is incapable of exchange, whether receiving or giving’. Thus, YR’s phrase — ‘Ordinary usage (vyavahāra) [which deals exclusively] with particulars (vyakti), is sufficient’ — can be seen as a resume of NBh II 2, 59ff., which enumerates the following worldly pursuits and usages and makes the same point for each of them: group (samūha), gift (tyāga), possession (parigraha), number (saṃkhyā), increase (vŗddhi), diminution (apacaya), color (varņa), compound (samāsa), lineage (anubandha); cf. Biardeau’s translation of the passage (1964: 230-232).686 vŗttivikalpa.687 Lit., ‘denied’.

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For instance, although it is a rope that in reality is seen, yet, due to the confusion (bhrama) caused by its long and coiled form, the witnesses (adhyavasātŗ) conclude: ‘this is a snake’ — for they apprehend (adhyavasāya) in the [real] object, the rope, a snake — itself an unreal object that merely appears (pratibhāsā) to them.

And it is precisely because [the snake] appears [to them] as a real object that [their mistake] causes a fear that death will terminate [the encounter].

This [sort of thing] is even well attested in experience: who has not undergone [a semblance of] heart-failure, thinking that a post is a living being,694 or having become confused, after conjuring up695 on his own some [supposedly] terrifying form?696

688 satattvatayā — cf. TĀ I 33b: itthaṃ samāsavyāsābhyāṃ jñānaṃ muñcati tāvataḥ, ‘Whether taken collectively or separately, these forms of knowledge liberate only from the corresponding [aspect of the saṃsāra]’.689 Same phraseology in YR ad 1. The polemic auto-commentary of PH 8 gives a complete panorama, arranged in a hierarchy, of the different conceptions of the Self, in order to demonstrate not only that the Trika is a synthesis of all the Indian schools of thought, but also that it surpasses them. These systems are classified into ten types according to the level of reality they have been able to reach, a level again roughly related to the Śaiva scale of the tattvas. These levels (sthiti), which other systems have failed to go beyond, are to be understood as different modes of identification with the inner, ultimate reality. Moreover, in accordance with the recurrent metaphor of the Lord-actor, they are taken to be the different roles through which the divine Actor manifests his essence. As the seven categories of subjects are seen as roles (bhūmika) assumed by the Lord in SpN I 1 (see Appendix 10, p. 330), so it is with the forms of the Self presumed by the different schools of thought, as stated by PHvŗ 8: evam ekasyaiva cidātmano bhagavataḥ svātantryāvabhāsitāḥ sarvā imā bhūmikāḥ svātantryapracchādanonmīlanatāratamyabheditāḥ/ ata eka eva etāvad vyāptika ātmā, ‘Thus, the divine one, whose essence is consciousness, in his absolute freedom displays all these roles. And it is this freedom that, by opting for relative degrees of concealment or unveiling, makes these roles differ from one another [choosing in varying degrees to unveil or conceal itself]. Therefore, there is only one Self pervading all these roles’. Therefore, one has to go beyond appearances, or roles, to reach the ultimate reality, the divine Actor. Such is the eleventh and highest sthiti, that of the Trika philosophers who maintain that the Self is both immanent in the universe and transcendent (see n. 59). Cf. ĪPvŗ I 6, 4-5, for which the erroneous identification of the Self with various entities such as the body, etc., constitutes a vikalpa, a mental construct.690 utprekşya.691 Bhagavadbhaktistotra 21. On Avadhūtasiddha’s Bhagavadbhaktistotra, see YR ad 9 and n. 426.692 Same theme as ĀPS 28. The sequence of ideas is this: since the aforesaid doctrines are erroneous to some degree, being only relatively true, it is now appropriate to explain how error is possible.693 atādrūpya.694 We take ‘iti’ as referring to ‘bhūtam’ alone, not to ‘sthāņuṃ bhūtam’ as in the KSTS ed. Moreover, all the MSS show a pause after etat — some have a single daņḍa, some a double, others a noticeable space; in all cases, the final -t of etat is signaled with a virāma, indicating a complete phrase. Note also that one MS gives iva in the place of iti.695 samullikhya — a sense suggested by certain figurative usages of the root ul-likh, among them the late figure of speech ullekha, signifying a rapid series of images evoking a single subject (upameya); see Gerow 1971, s.v.696 Here, sthāņu and the ākāra are envisaged as alternatives (indicated by the vā). The post seen in the distance at dusk serves, particularly in vedāntic literature, as a familiar illustration of ‘bhrānti’ — for example, Upadeśasāhasrī: avidyā nāma anyasminn anyadharmādhyāropaņā,

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Thus it is delusion (vibhrama) itself [defined, in this system, as the ignorance of one’s own plenitude] that is the cause of the display of finitude.697

Kārikā 29Now, the master shows the relevance [of this example] to the matter under discussion:698

29. Likewise, merit and demerit, heaven and hell, birth and death, pleasure and pain, as well as social class and the stage of life, etc., although [in reality] not existing in the Self, come into being through the force of delusion.

Just as a rope, really existing, but erroneously apprehended (vimŗşţa) as a snake, brings about the same [dreadful] effect as that created by a [real] snake,699 so likewise, do merit, etc., although unreal, that is, not existing really, take place, that is, come into existence, in the minds of those who take the body to be the Self (dehātmamānin), because of the confusion: ‘this [viz., the body] alone is real’, which confusion comes into being through the force of delusion, that is, the illusory (vyāmoha) influence of māyā.

By merit is intended ‘[a sacrifice such as the] aśvamedha’;by demerit is intended the ‘slaying of brahmins’, etc.;by heaven is intended ‘supreme happiness’;by hell is intended ‘torments’;by coming into existence is intended ‘birth’;by death is intended ‘cessation of existence [lit., ‘of birth’]’;by pleasure is intended ‘delight’;by pain is intended the ‘agitation arising from rajas’;and by social class is intended the ‘belief: «I am a brahmin»’, etc.;by stage of life is intended: ‘I am a celibate’, etc.;the mention of the word ‘etc’ here intends penance, worship, vows, etc.

yathā prasiddhaṃ rajataṃ prasiddhāyāṃ śuktikāyām, yathā prasiddhaṃ puruşaṃ sthāņāv adhyāropayati, prasiddhaṃ vā sthāņuṃ puruşe... (51-55, etc.); also BSBh I 1, 4: yathā mandāndhakāre sthānur ayam ity agŗhyamāņaviśeşe puruşaśabdapratyayau sthānuvişayau, ‘As in light darkness, the word and the idea of man is applied to a post when it is not distinctly cognized as "This is a post."’ As well, B&R cite a passage drawn from Śaṅkara’s commentary on BĀU: kiṃsvin naro vā sthāņur vā: ‘Might this be a man or a post?’ Elsewhere, the implication is simply that, in its indistinction, the dimly seen post occasions doubt and therefore fear; see also TĀ I 250a: sthāņur vā puruşo veti na mukhyo ‘sty eşa saṃśayaḥ/.697 apūrņatva — lit., ‘incompleteness’, ‘absence or loss of plenitude’. In Advaita Vedānta, error is understood as a twofold process whose first stage is the veiling (āvaraņa) of the real nature of the rope, and the second, the projection (vikşepa), or superimposition (adhyāsa), of a snake on the rope itself. Thus, the delusive power of māyā, understood as an external force, is behind error. The epistemological viewpoint of Trika is different: if error is the product of māyā (which is not external, inasmuch as it is a śakti), and implies a superimposition of an unreal object on the real one (see YR ad 30), yet, in ultimate terms, error is to be defined as the ignorance of one’s own plenitude, as imperfect knowledge, which the Lord’s freedom has made possible, by means of his māyāśakti.698 prakŗta — lit., ‘he applies this example to the matter under discussion’.699 Lit., ‘brings about the causal efficiency (arthakriyā) belonging properly to the snake [viz., terror]’.

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All that, whose essence is nothing but mental constructs, which emerges from the gaping [mouth of]700 delusion is deemed to be such on account of the power of differentiation, by which the Self is taken to be the body, etc. (dehādyātmatā).

All this proceeds from error [viz., from taking the body, etc., to be the Self], due to which fettered souls experience incessantly the bondage of heaven, hell, birth and death [viz., the inevitable results of dharma and adharma].

However, merit and demerit, etc., do not exist ultimately for the Self, which is a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness (anavacchinnacidānandaikaghana).701

Kārikā 30Thus, having examined the capacity of error to make unreal objects appear, the master now explains its origin:

30. That darkness [of error]702 is such that this wellknown conceit develops, in regard to entities, that they are other than the Self, though [in truth] they are not separate from the Self, owing to the fact that they appear to it.

In saying ‘That darkness (andhakāra) is such the master refers to the all-deluding (viśvamohinī) error that consists in our failing to recognize our own plenitude, as previously explained;

in saying ‘that... in regard to entities’, he refers to those ubiquitous objects, whose form presumes the opposition of cognizer and object of cognition, which are the very substance of Light, owing to the fact that they appear to it (prakāśamānatayā), that is, they cannot be accounted for except in terms of their having appeared, in accordance with the maxim:

That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself,703

[... and they appear such] even though not separate from the Self, that is, from consciousness, the Great Lord.

700 vijŗṃbhita.701 anavacchinna is here taken in its scholastic sense of ‘not discriminated, unqualified’ — the avacchedaka designating the quality or particularity that serves to distinguish one thing (or type) from another (as its dewlap distinguishes the Indian cow from other beasts). The usage of the term here indicates that the terms cit and ānanda are in this sense unqualified, inasmuch as they are universal and cannot be limited by anything whatsoever (which, if it were supposed, would contradict their comprehensiveness); see the use of the positive avacchinna in YR ad 58.702 That is, the first level of error consisting in taking the Self as non-Self; in other words, not recognizing one’s own essential plenitude, giving therefore rise to the belief in otherness. Thus, kārikā 30 echoes, or reformulates, kārikā 25 — which describes ajñānatimira, the ‘darkness of ignorance [which is akin to the disease of double-vision]’, again commented upon as ātmākhyātyandhakāra, ‘the darkness that is Self-ignorance’ — as well as kārikā 28.703 nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate — lit., ‘That which is not luminous cannot illumine’. Perhaps the fourth pada from Vāmanadatta’s Saṃvitprakāśa I 12: tvadātmakatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ vivadante na kecana/ yat prakāśyadaśayāto [v.l. prakāśyadaśāṃ yāto] nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate//, ‘No one disagrees that entities have as their essence you, in terms of their condition of needing illumination. Therefore, that which is not luminous is not manifest’. The verse is quoted in SpP 28-29 [= ad II 3-4]; cf. Dyczkowski’s transl. (SpK: 162): ‘None dispute that You (O Lord) are the essential nature of (all) things; it is not darkness (aprakāśa) that shines when (the light of consciousness) becomes the object of illumination’, and his edition of the Saṃvitprakāśa, for variants.

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Furthermore, this conceit that [these entities] are other than the Self (ayam anātmābhimānaḥ) [obliges me to think:] ‘those entities are to be grasped [by me] (grāhya), are external to and different from me, [exist] independently [of me, as their grāhaka]’. All this being the case (yat), [such conceit is nothing but] the unreal imposition704 of insentience on them,705 by denying their real form, which is consciousness.

Here is the purport of what has been said:706 as regards the appearance (prakāśana) of entities [viz., their manifestation as such to the subject], it is the Light of the Self that alone is independent, or, in other words,707 that manifests itself as «blue» or «pleasure», etc. [i.e., as objects apparently external or internal]708 — for it would be unintelligible to allege as the cause [of their appearance] something other [than consciousness], such as, for example, latent dispositions, etc., considered as external [to consciousness], and having the form of non-Light.709

704 āpādana — Śaṅkara speaks here of adhyāsa.705 Cf. TĀ I 332, which formulates lyrically this imposition of untrue insentience on objects; see also YR ad 31.706 The syntagm ayam āśayaḥ often flags a contrasting portion of the commentary in which emphasis is placed on argumentation, rather than on syntax or vocabulary — by introducing parallel considerations, offering analogies, etc. Hence, it may be translated as: ‘Now [let us turn to] the argument [of the verse]’, or ‘Here is the purport [of what has been said]’.707 arthāt.708 Cf. TĀ II 16, according to which everything is Light, Light is the sole reality: nīlaṃ pītaṃ sukhaṃ iti prakāśaḥ kevalaḥ śivaḥ/ amuşmin paramādvaite prakāśātmani ko paraḥ//, ‘Śiva is the only Light [shining] as blue, yellow and joy. In this absolute, nondual state, whose nature is that of Light, who is there other [than he]?’709 This extremely condensed statement includes an objection, which is not explicitly indicated as such, and its answer. The position of the Traika siddhāntin is that no entity can exist, absent its cognition, and that there can be no cognition without a persisting factor, which is consciousness: whatever exists, i.e., whatever is known, is nothing but Light/consciousness, or, to put it differently, Light/consciousness is the unique cause of the appearance of an entity. The siddhāntin answers here the objection of a pūrvapakşin according to whom some other cause independent of Light/consciousness, such as the latent dispositions (vāsanā), may explain this shining, or cognition, whether true or erroneous. For, if we try to reconstruct the objector’s argument, why does one see a snake, and not a garland, in a rope? In other words, why are things known in a particular way, sometimes differing from one individual to another? The objector would answer that one’s own vāsanās produce the erroneous cognition as well as the fear it involves: the latent impression of a snake lies in us, along with the disposition of fear; when conditions are brought together, this latent impression makes the snake appear in our consciousness, instead of the rope, and this implies the correlated terror. The siddhāntins refutation follows the same fundamental assumption: the cognition (hence the existence) of an object necessarily depends on consciousness. In other words, consciousness is both luminous in and of itself (svaprakāśa) and object-illuminating (arthaprakāśa) (cf. IPV I 3, 6-7). The opponent who would have recourse to vāsanās (presumably removed from present sentience) as the cause of this cognition would have to admit that vāsanās themselves are ultimately not different from consciousness. The reference is probably to Buddhists (particularly the Vijñānavādins; see n. 666) and Vedāntins, who take beginningless avidyā, or, what is the same thing, beginningless dispositions, to be the cause of the illusory phenomenal world. As emphasized, here, in YR’s commentary, the Trika viewpoint reflects its main Postulate: the absolute freedom of the Lord. It is this divine freedom that makes all entities appear, i.e., that makes them known and knowable. Diversity is the expression of the Lord’s freedom, and there is nothing that is not he (cf. TĀ II 16, n. 708).

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Thus, it is only ‘I’ (aham) — who am essentially consciousness (cit-svarūpa) — who appear [in fact] through the opposition of cognizer and object of cognition;710 but this real form [viz., the absolute ‘I’] does not appear [to the bound soul]; it is merely unreal difference that displays itself.

Since [Light as] the true essence (tāttvika) [of things] is not thus displayed, error has here been represented through the metaphor of darkness.711

Kārikā 31Once the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self712 has arisen, there arises the conceit that locates the Self (ātmābhimāna) in the non-Self.713 In explaining this, the author affirms the doubly delusive form of error:714

31. It is darkness upon darkness,715 it is a great ‘pustule upon a boil’,716 to think that the Self is located in the non-Self — the body, breath, etc.717

710 This is the first occurrence of the pronoun aham itself — a notion that is at the core of Trika speculation.711 Same phraseology in YR ad PS 25.712 That is, in terms of Śaṅkara’s Advaita, the superimposition (adhyāsa/adhyāropaņa) of the non-Self on the Self.713 Cf. YR ad 60, who develops the notion of the superimposition of the Self on the non-Self, whereas, in YR ad 61, apūrņatvakhyāti, ‘the [mistaken] cognition (khyāti) that [the Self] is incomplete’ stands for ātmany anātmābhimānaḥ.714 The reasoning resembles greatly that of Śaṅkara on the notion of adhyāsa/adhyāropaņa (abhimāna = adhyāropaņa); cf. Upadeśasāhasrī 51: avidyā nāma anyasminn anyadharmādhyāropaņā, ‘Nescience is [defined as] the superimposition of the qualities of [one] thing upon another’. The adhyāsa involves always two aspects — tasminn atad/atasmin tad, ‘not that in that/that in not that’ — and PS 31 deals with the second aspect, which is the contrary of the first, as clearly stated by YR ad loc: atādrūpye tādrūpyapratipattiḥ, ‘The apprehension of a thing as having such and such a form in [reference to an object] not having such and such a form’.715 Silburn translates timira as ‘troubles de la vision’. Better to reflect the coherence of the text, we take timira here as a synonym of andhakāra of the previous kārikā; see also kā. 25. It is the commentary that plays on the double entendre of timira.716 We borrow the idiom from Barnett.717 ātmamānitva — i.e., when that which is the non-Self (anātman), the body or vital breath, is taken to be the Self. Cf. YR ad PS 53 and 60. Cf. ŚSV I 2: evam ātmany anātmatābhimānarūpākhyātilakşaņājñānātmakaṃ jnānaṃ na kevalaṃ bandho yāvad anātmani śarīrāv ātmatābhimānātmakam ajñānamūlaṃ jñānam api bandha eva, ‘Thus, that [limited] knowledge, which is really ignorance in the sense that one is not aware that the non-Self [has been] erroneously superimposed on the Self, is not alone bondage; [as well] that [limited] knowledge, which is rooted in the ignorance whereby the Self is superimposed erroneously on the non-Self, viz., the body, etc., is also bondage’. At this point in his demonstration, Kşemarāja quotes SpK III 14 (symmetrically, in his commentary to SpK III 14, Kşemarāja quotes ŚS I 2), which defines the condition of the paśu, the fettered subject, thus explaining how the non-Self, the body, etc., is taken to be the Self: by metonymy, the body represents the innumerable ideas (pratyaya) of which it is the substratum, and by ‘ideas’ one has to understand words, as well as their corresponding objects, exclusively apprehended in their relation to the ego, as shown by the Mārkaņḍeyapurāņa XXV 15 (quoted by SpN III 14): tāteti kiñcit tanayeti kiñcid ambeti kiñcid dayiteti kiñcit/mameti kiñcin na mameti kiñcid bhautaṃ saṃdhaṃ bahuahā mā lapethāḥ/, ‘Do not indulge ceaselessly in material associations, saying sometimes "O father", sometimes "O my child", sometimes "O mother", sometimes "O beloved", sometimes "This is mine", sometimes "This is not mine."’ As stated by the kārikā itself, it is precisely the ‘rise of ideas’ (pratyayodbhavaḥ) that makes one who is

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In the first place, the darkness that is nescience (akhyātitimira)718 has resulted in the imposition of insentience, appearing as difference, onto entities that are in reality but one consciousness, such that those entities, which are not different from one’s essential Self (svātman), are yet displayed as different from it. Hence nescience, which is like darkness, is called ‘darkness’ (timira) [metaphorically].

As the one and only moon appears double due to [the disease called] ‘line-darkness’ (rekhātimira) [viz., diplopia], situated in the eye, such that one concludes: ‘There are here two moons’, so likewise does the double-vision that is nescience (akhyātitimira) make each and every object appear as if it had the form of non-Self, through [the principle of] difference, though [in truth the objective world is] one only and shares the nature of one’s essential Self.719

In this situation, another darkness ensues — a delusion engendered by a delusion — [it is as though] ‘a pustule grew upon a boil’.

Now, as regards (yat) ... the Self [which is] thought [to be located in the non-Self] (ātmamānitvam) [we say]: once the ubiquitous objects [of our normal experience] have fallen victim to insentience — their nature as consciousness (citsvarūpa) having been abrogated by not recognizing [their identity with the Self] — from among them, on one or another insentient [object] occupying the field of the knowable, such as the body, or breath, etc., now seen as other than the Self, is [superimposed], according to the principles of ordinary cognition, the belief that this is the Self (ātmamānitva) — or, [in general,] the apprehension of a thing as having such and such a form in reference to an object not having such and such a form — as, for example, when one asserts ‘I am thin’, ‘I am stout’, ‘I am hungry’, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am nothing’720 — so many assertions that [according to us] are outrageous [that is, fly in the face of common sense].721

Now, if it is objected that such an [experience, which is an] outrage to common sense exists [even] without postulating the conceit that locates the Self [in the non-Self], let it be so as regards such phenomena as «blue» and «pleasure».722

essentially pure and autonomous consciousness lose his independence (asvatantratām eti). Similarly ŚS II 8: śarīraṃ haviḥ, ‘Oblation is the body’, refers to the error that consists in taking the body to be the Self, and which has to be reduced to nothing in the fire of knowledge, in the way the oblation is consumed in fire; see ŚSV ad loc. Cf. BSBh I 1 and ĀŚ I 13 and 15.718 See kā. 25 (ajñānatimira) and YR ad PS 30.719 See PS 25 and n. 638.720 A reference to the Buddhist śūnya?721 ativaiśasa. The syntax is: yat... ātmamānitvam ... etad ativaiśasam.722 Viz., ‘such an objection should also apply to the internal and external objects of experience’ — an objection which we answer by saying that, on the contrary, it is difficult to do without the notion of superimposition as regards "blue" and "pleasure", because, according to you (might the objector be a Naiyāyika?), such qualities as "blue" and "pleasure" cannot exist in the absence of a substratum, which, in this case, is a Self. Perhaps implied is the Nyāya position that most cases of error such as that of the ‘red crystal’ may be accounted for without referring to ātmābhimāna, ‘superimposition of the Self on the non-Self, but even the Nyāya, says YR, adopts this notion in the case of the internal and external qualities of the Self.

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Or723 even if we could avoid referring to it [viz., the notion of abhimāna] in all cases,724 still there is, through the notion of [being associated with] a Self, the unction of ipseity sprinkled on this or that insentient object, such as the body, etc., itself nothing but a lump of clay.725 On the other hand, in the case of phenomena such as «blue», «pleasure», and so on, the attribution to them of a lack of relation to the Self [can be understood only] through the notion that they are related to nothing but themselves.726

The situation [that we have just described] is nothing but the round of existences in its full and lamentable form, for what drags the fettered souls [into the round of existences] is that very injury inflicted [on the Self]727 by the dualities [of pleasure and pain, etc.], brought into play through such conceits [as have been displayed in the preceding analysis].

As has been said by the yoginī Madālasā in the Mārkaņḍeyapurāņa:The chariot is situated on the ground, and the body is situated on the chariot, and in the body is situated yet another spirit (puruşa) [i.e., the Self]. Yet no one thinks of the earth as ‘mine’, as one does with his own body. Such extraordinary delusion!728

723 We understand this continuation of the argument as again directed to the Naiyāyikas, whose doctrine has been reformulated in terms more congenial to the Trika (ahantā/idantā, ahantārasābhişeka). But, another possibility might be that the former clause is addressed to a proponent of the Sāṃkhya, whose notion of buddhi and ahaṅkāra does indeed appear to conflate the conscious principle with the inert principle; the latter half might conceivably be addressed to a Buddhist, possibly a Vaibhāşika, whose notion of svalakşaņa appears to attribute an untoward ‘thatness’ to fleeting and self-referential experiences.724 Lit., ‘Or even, [let it be admitted that] there is no [such notion] in any case’. Note that, probably, the comma and the semi-colon introduced by the KSTS ed. should be interchanged: the semi-colon after astu, the comma after bhūt. Anyhow, in the corrected text presented in this volume, we have not maintained punctuation marks other than daņḍas.725 Same image of the unction of ipseity temporarily sprinkled on an insentient object (ahantāvyavasthārasābhişikta) in YR ad 8.726 idantayā — lit., ‘through the notion that they are nothing but "this"’. That is to say, according to the Vaibhāşikas, although there is no "Self" to serve as substratum to the unending series of cognitions, each cognition is momentarily distinguished from the next, and at that moment is endowed with idantā, ‘thatness’. Thus the Trika answers both the Sāṃkhyas (‘you do nothing but reformulate our notion of ahantā "I-ness"’) and the Vaibhāşikas (‘you do nothing but reformulate our notion of idantā "thatness"’) — and the result in both cases is the same: ‘this world is lamentable’ (eşa eva saṃsāraḥ śocanīyaḥ).727 abhighātaḥ.728 Mārkaņḍeyapurāņa XXV 18. This is a development of the ancient parable of the Self riding in the chariot being the chariot-driver, the mind (manas) the reins, the senses (indriya) the horses, the objects of sense (vişaya) they range over; see KāU I 3, 5. Once the first level of error has taken place, that is, once the entities constitutive of phenomenal reality have been taken to be different from the Self, earth, chariot and body are but mere substrata for the Self, i.e., they are objects equally insentient. Nevertheless, in a second phase, the limited subject identifies himself with the body alone, whereas he should identify himself with all the objects of the universe, thus recognizing that there is no object of the world that is different from the supreme Self, which is both transcendent and immanent. It is noteworthy that, in the same context — the definition of the paśu as he who takes the body to be the Self — SpN III 14 quotes a verse borrowed from the same chapter of the Mārkaņḍeyapurāņa (see n. 717). See also PS 39, which explains the reverse process, in which the two errors are successively dispelled.

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Kārikā 32Having established that, in this way, one binds one’s [true] Self with false mental constructs by failing to recognize that Self,729 the master now says:

32. How strange it is that one envelops one’s Self with notions such as the body, or the vital breaths, or with concepts belonging rather to the intellect, or with the expanse of the Void730 — just as does the silkworm with its cocoon!731

Once [the unity of] consciousness has been cast aside in failing to recognize the Self, each and every cognizer envelops his Self, though [it is in truth] pervasive, with the bindings732 of mental constructs which arise from himself. How? The master explains this by saying: ‘the body, etc.’.

[These mental constructs are:] notions (vimarśana) of body and vital breath [as the one and only Self]; concepts (jñānā) proper to the intellect, that is, the determinate cognition [or ascertainment] [of pleasure and pain, etc.]; and the expanse (prapañca), that is, the proliferation of [speculations on the] Void (nabhas).

with [notions] such as ... (yogena) means ‘by relating [his Self] to mental constructs such as the body, etc’ — for instance, saying: ‘I am slim, fat, beautiful, wise’.733— Thus do feeble-minded persons, children, and women, and, indeed, cultivators [who are absorbed only in their physical labour] take their body to be the Self, on the strength of their own understanding,734 and, in so doing, deem themselves

729 akhyātivaśāt — cf. ŚS I 2: jnānaṃ bandhaḥ, ‘[Limited] knowledge is bondage’.730 ‘Sky’ (nabhas) here metaphorically for the usual ‘Void’ (śūnya) — see below. prapañca may also be somewhat ironically intended — the marvellous extent of different speculations on emptiness. This enumeration of the four main modes of conceiving the Self agrees with that of ĪPK I 6, 4, ŚSV I 1, and PHvŗ 8 (see n. 661 and Appendix 14, p. 338). As made clear by the Virūpakşapañcāśikā 3, quoted in PM 19 (p. 54), those four main modes of conceiving the Self (namely, body, breath, buddhi, the Void) are nothing but realizations of ‘egoity’ (asmitā), as opposed to ‘ipseity’ (ahantā), which is the experience of the true Self; note that the Virūpākşapañcāśikā adds to these four, objects of sense and the senses themselves: sampanno ‘smi kŗśo ‘smi snihyattāro ‘smi modamāno ‘smi/ prāņimi śūnyo ‘smīti hi şaţsu padeşv asmitā dŗşţā//.731 An echo of this discussion is to be found in PS 51, as shown by YR ad loc. Relying on the commentary, and thus agreeing with B. N. Pandit (PS: 39), we propose translating jālakāra, lit., ‘net-maker’, as ‘silkworm’, rather than as ‘spider’, as do Barnett and Silburn. For, not only does YR gloss jālakāra as kŗmi, whose primary meaning is ‘worm’, but the detailed description of the entire process better suits the silkworm. Although not suggested here by YR, the metaphoric meaning of jāla, ‘deception’, ‘illusion’, ‘magic’, could also be implicitly intended here (cf. ĀPS 30).732 nigaḍa.733 Those who say: ‘I am wise’ are those who take the buddhi to be the Self.734 svavikalpena.

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discerning,735 at least to some extent. [But, we say,] the body perishes here and now; how can it be the Self?

On the other hand, those who take the vital breath to be the Self,736 thinking: ‘It is I who am hungry and thirsty’, may deem themselves a bit [but not much] more discerning!

[To which we reply:] now, both the body and the vital breaths are as insentient as is a lump of clay, etc.; how could either of them be the Self?

So, Mīmāṃsakas and others,737 [who think that the assertions:] ‘I am happy’, or ‘I am sad’, mean that it is the Self who feels pleasure and pain, show even greater discernment, for they take the subtle body to be the Self.738

[But, we reply,] how can affectations of the intellect,739 such as pleasure and pain, be said to be the Self?740

735 vivecakaṃmanya — Philosophically, this unsurprising position is just that adopted by the Cārvāka school of thought. Cf. ŚSV I 1, quoted n. 661, and PHvŗ 8: caitanyaviśişţaṃ śarīram ātmā iti cārvākāḥ, ‘The Cārvākas say: "The Self is identical with the body endowed with consciousness."’ On the Cārvāka doctrine, see Mahadevan 1974: 79-86: ‘The Cārvāka does not deny consciousness, but only that it is real independent of the body. When the elements come together in a particular mode to form an organism, consciousness (mind or soul) appears in it. Consciousness, thus, is an epiphenomenon, an after-glow of matter; it is a function of the body. [...] when the elements combine to form an organismic pattern, consciousness emerges, even as the intoxicating quality appears in a mixture of certain ingredients, none of which, taken separately, possesses it, or as the red color is produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut, and lime, none of which is red. That there is no soul apart from the body is evidenced by the fact, says the Cārvāka, that consciousness perishes with the body’. Note how the objector [?] reverses the argument in YR’s commentary.736 That is, inasmuch as vital breath is the prerequisite of all sense experience. Here YR’s exposition differs from that of kā. 27: there, he was referring to a philosophical school, the Prāņabrahmavādins, here he alludes to the ordinary, almost trivial, experience of breathing.737 Here, YR comments upon dhījñāna, lit., ‘cognition of the intellect’, of the kārikā. ŚSV I 1 (quoted n. 661) and SpN I 4 identify those who take the buddhi, or the act of cognition proper to the buddhi, to be the Self, respectively, as the Yogācāras, and as both the Yogācāras and the Mīmāṃsakas. According to PHvŗ 8 (quoted in Appendix 14, p. 338), which gives a more complete account of this position, they are Yogācāras, Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, each school developing its own views on the way buddhi stands for the Self. It seems likely, therefore, that here, the ‘etc’ refers to Yogācāras and Naiyāyikas.738 The Mīmāṃsakas’ purpose is to disclose the rationality inherent in the law of karman: the doer and the experiencer are one and the same person, even if the fruits of his acts are experienced after some delay, in another birth even. Therefore, they postulate a ‘soul’, puryaşţaka, which transmigrates from one birth to another. Thus the puryaşţaka, composed of eight elements, among which the subtlest is buddhi, both acts and experiences the fruits of its actions, in the form of pleasure and pain. SpN I 4 presents a similar exposition of the Mīmāṃsaka view of the Self (see n. 740). In addition, it shows that such a view, although not fully satisfactory, implies its own completion. In effect, to consider the Self as the experiencer, or the ‘I’, of ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sad’, is undoubtedly a progress with regard to those, Cārvākas and the untutored, who take the body to be the Self, and thus know only ‘I am thin’, ‘I am fat’.739 buddhidharma — here, buddhidharma appears to be understood in the sense of buddhyupādhi, ‘extrinsic affectation of the intellect’ (and not in the sense of the eight buddhidharmas: dharma, jñāna, vairāgya, aiśvarya, and their opposites), since pleasure and pain are so characterized in Trika texts — cf. PHvŗ 8, SpN 14, or YR ad PS 27. SpK I 4 and SpV ad loc. speak of [buddhy]avasthā.740 It may be interesting to compare this passage with Kşemarāja’s refutation — from the Trika point of view — of Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, ad SpK I 4: ahaṃ sukhī ca duḥkhī ca raktaś ca

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Hence the partisans of the Void741 assert that the Self [is rather to be found] where there is an [utter] absence (abhāva) of mental construct — whether it be that of body, vital breath, or intellect. Thinking that ‘whatsoever appears, I am not that’, they maintain that the Self is but that Void, defined as the absence of any [cognizable] content whatsoever,742 whose essence is the negation of all [definite cognition]. [This Void] is expressed here by the term ‘sky’ (nabhas).

But there is another ‘Void’ (śūnya) — that of the Brahmavāda743 — whose partisans maintain that, in the process of meditation (samādhāna), when it is realized that ‘here is another absence (śūnya) [that] is not myself’, they then posit that other absence as the Self,744 in accordance with the formula ‘not this, not this’;745

this amounts to giving up one particular Void and grasping [in its place] another, in series, as the essence of the Void.

These [latter speculations] have been characterized as ‘the expanse of the Void’746

in the kārikā.Furthermore, because they have not determined the nature [of the Self] to be

consciousness, those ascetics (yogin) who take the Void to be the Self — themselves

ityādisaṃvidaḥ/ sukhādyavasthānusyūte vartante ‘nyatra tāḥ sphuţam//,’ "I am happy, I am sad, I am devoted" — these and other cognitions have evidently their basis in some other [substratum] (anyatra) threaded through the states of happiness, etc., [like jewels on a necklace, or flowers on the string of a garland]’; note that SpN I 4 glosses sukhādyavasthānusyūte of the kā. as: antaḥsraksūtrakalpatayā sthite, ‘which is like the cord within [and binding together] the garland of flowers’; cf. YR ad 34 and 35; on the Mīmāmsaka position on the Self, see Appendix 16, p. 340.741 śūnyābhimānin — the same examination of the śūnyavāda is at issue in SpK I 12-13 and SpN ad loc, which treats the matter thoroughly. See Appendix 17, p. 341.742 Lit, ‘as the absence of any display’.743 It is a second version of the śūnyavāda that is at issue here, namely, that of the Advaita, interpreted according to the Traikas. The difference appears to be but a question of method — Buddhists say that the Void is the Void, namely, that it is apprehended only as such, whereas Advaitins want to particularize it, as it were, by distributing it over several acts of negation, in keeping with the formula ‘neti neti’. Thus it seems that YR wants to associate the Advaitins to the śūnyavāda while distinguishing them from the Mādhyamikas, by taking recourse to a literal reading of ‘neti neti’, which seems to pluralize the notion of Void.744 ‘When, at the moment [or in the process] of meditation (samādhāna) [...]’: here, the concept of abhāvasamādhi, ‘absorption in the Void’, that the Śaivas ascribe to such ‘nihilists’ as the Vedāntins and the Mādhyamikas, is referred to and refuted, as is also done in SpK I 12-13, SpN and SpP ad loc. Same argument in SpN 112-13: tvādŗśām avijñeyā [avasthā] avijñeyatvād vaktum aśakyety ucyatāṃ śūnyeti tu kutaḥ, śūnyatāpi cayāvad bhāvyate tāvad vikalpollikhitatvād asau vijñeyaiva [emending vijñaiva to vijñeyaiva], ‘If this state [named vacuity] is unknown to people like you, it should be said that, on account of its unknowability, it is impossible to express it. Then why call it Void? Even vacuity, as long as it is conceived, is indeed knowable, inasmuch as it is conceptually delineated’.745 neti neti. See Appendix 18, p. 342.746 SpN I 12-13 (Kaul Shāstrī: 28) denounces it as an ‘unfathomable abyss of supreme delusion’ (agādhe mahāmohe) into which the Śūnyavādins throw themselves and others.

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insentient747 and confused, immersed as they are in the cave of deep sleep — fetter the Self with insentience, the Self that is essentially consciousness.748

How strange! — that is, how astonishing this all is! Moreover, how absurd! This would never happen of its own accord!749

And here the master gives an example: ‘[...] with its cocoon, etc.’. Just as the silkworm, that is, a certain kind of worm, after making its cocoon, namely, an envelope formed of its own saliva, envelops itself on all sides, that is, binds itself with a view to its own death — for, later on, it there dies — so likewise does one who considers the body, etc., to be the Self, bind his own Self with his own thought-constructs, that is, with thought-constructs such as ‘I’ or ‘mine’ that he himself has made.

As Buddhists say:Where there is Self, there is thought of an other. Attachment and hatred arise from distinguishing the Self and the other. Compounded of these two [opposed ideas], all vices arise.750

Kārikā 33

747 Cf. SpK I 13a: atas tat kŗtrimaṃ jñeyaṃ sauşuptapadavat [...]/, ‘Hence, that [viz., non-being (abhāva)] should be considered a factitious [state] similar to deep sleep’; in other words, the abhāvasamādhi is taken to be a state of naught and insentience only in a hyperbolic or transitory sense, as is the case with deep sleep. For when one awakes from deep sleep, one knows that he has experienced, adventitiously, that state of naught and insentience; cf. SpN I 13a: ato mohāvasthaiva sā kalpitā tathā smaryamāņatvāt sā cānubhūyamānatvād anubhavituḥ pramātur avasthātŗrūpasya pratyuta sattām āvedayate na tv abhāvam iti, ‘Hence, that state of insentience is but a presumption (kalpita), since thus it is recollected (smaryamāņa). On the contrary, the fact that such a state is experienced attests to the existence (sattā) of the experiencer (anubhavitŗ), of the cognizer (pramātŗ), who is the substratum (avasthātŗ) of that experience, and not of any non-being (abhāva) [or Void]’.748 The experience of the Void remains an intelligible experience (pratipatti), which the yogin thus construes, after he has emerged from samādhi: ‘I was profoundly unconscious’ (gāḍhamūḍho ‘ham āsam). Therefore the experience is not possible without an experiencer, that is to say, without consciousness itself. Insentience cannot as a consequence characterize such an experience. Thus the Trika has formulated three objections against the śūnyavāda: 1) Taking the Self as a Void, defining it negatively, amounts to a regressus ad infinitum, for this involves the aporia that the object negated has by that fact been admitted. 2) Taking the Self as a Void implies its insentience. 3) From the Trika perspective, it is impossible to conceive the all-vibrating and fulgurating Self or consciousness as inert and insentient. On this argument as to the intrinsic dynamism of the Self or consciousness and the correlative principle of its sovereign freedom, see YR ad 27: ‘In both these [doctrines, though the conscious principle has been formulated as supreme], what has not been recognized is the freedom (svātantrya) of that conscious principle which, endowed with life, becomes the [efficient] cause of the construction of the universe’; see also Kşemarāja’s discussion on the same questions in SpN I 12-13.749 Namely, it can be explained only in terms of delusion, that is, in terms of our notion of abhimāna.750 Pramāņavārttika, Pramāņasiddhi 219, according to Vetter’s edition (= 221 in Pandeya’s edition). Note the inversion of the first two words in YR, who reads saty ātmani instead of ātmani sati. The identification is due to Birgit Kellner and Seishi Karashima, whom I thank. Prof. Raffaele Torella has drawn my attention to the fact that the verse is quoted anonymously in the Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka by Haribhadra (ed. Vaidya: 303, 545).

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How is this great delusion (mahāmoha) then dissolved, in itself difficult to fend off,751 which arises when the body, etc., is taken to be the cognizer? To this question, we answer: it is the freedom of the Lord only that is the cause [of such a dissolution]. The master says:

33. One should unveil752 his proper Self by a discipline that aims at manifesting the might of Self-knowledge. Thus does the Supreme Śiva extend [within our sphere] his play made wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation.753

[The compound svajñānavibhavābhāsanayogena is analyzed as follows:] Self-knowledge (svajñāna) here means the ‘awareness (avagama) of Self’s own freedom’ — that Self whose distinctive feature is consciousness;

the might (vibhava) of that Self-knowledge means the ‘flourishing (sphītatva) of [the acolyte’s] own freedom’, in the marvelous form of supreme ipseity, as his conscious form (cidrūpa) [becomes evident] as he sloughs off the conceit that takes the body, etc., to be the Self (dehādyabhimāna). Then he knows: ‘I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, [hence] I am free’.754

The manifestation (bhāsana) of that might that is nothing but the freedom of consciousness means illumination [namely, of the acolyte who] has located in his own Self everything that had been heretofore wrongly considered as external to it, saying [as it were]: ‘This might is all mine’.755

The discipline (yoga) aiming at this manifestation means the fixation of reflection on the Self that results from such a program of such determined practices.756

Thus, by a discipline that aims at manifesting the might of Self-knowledge, one unveils757 his proper Self — that Self, whose nature is consciousness and is not subservient to anything else.758

[By ‘one unveils’ is meant that] the Lord himself unfastens him who had been made fast in the chains that consist in considering (paramarśanā) the body, vital breaths, subtle body or the Void [as the Self], that is, now removes what had covered him, by making him aware of the truth: ‘I am consciousness, I am free’.759

Thus, the veiling of the Self that is the body, etc., which had come about through failing to recognize the Self as such, perishes now due to the power of recognition (khyāti),760 inasmuch as the fault [viz., the wrong identification with the body, etc.]

751 durnivāra — cf. YR ad 18, where the hexad constituted of māyā and the five kañcukas is also said to be durnivāra; see also, at the end of the passage, the absolutive: ... nivārya.752 These two kārikās are symmetrical: veşţayate, in kā. 32; udveşţayet, in kā. 33. The second hemistich of 33 is intended as a conclusion to both 32 and 33.753 See PS 60, n. 1039.754 cidānandaikaghanaḥ svatantro ‘smi.755 Quote from ĪPK IV 12: sarvo mamāyaṃ vibhavaḥ, which occurs again in YR ad 51 (avat).756 evaṃpariśīlanakrameņa.757 udveşţayate — udveşţayet, in the kā.758 This statement expands upon the preceding nija, ‘own, proper’. Consciousness is autonomous, in the sense that it is self-caused; it is not an effect, rather, it is the only cause of whatever exists. Or, as say the Advaitins, the language of cause and effect, being vyāvahārika, cannot be used to describe the ultimate principle, which is ‘without beginning’.759 caitanyasvarūpaḥ svatantro ‘smi.760 Here we note the only occurrence in YR’s commentary of the positive term khyāti, plainly and perhaps even playfully contrasted with akhyāti. The contrast suggests that khyāti is to be taken in the sense of pratyabhijñā, whose antonym a-pratyabhijñā is not attested. Cf. PHvŗ 4,

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is such insofar as it is made up from one’s own thought-constructs, as has been stated by the revered author of the Tantrasāra:

One becomes the Lord (pati) instantly — his self nothing but consciousness and his body nothing but the universe — through reasoning, whereby is obtained a firm conviction wholly other than the [false] conviction of the bound soul, [in the habit of] asserting [confidently:] ‘I am inert’, ‘I am bound by my acts’, ‘I am impure’, ‘I am governed by another’.761

But why does the Lord both bind and liberate? The master says: ‘Thus [does the Supreme Śiva extend his play made wonderful by (the alternation of)] bondage, etc.’.

Thus (iti), i.e., through the process expounded earlier, the free Lord, the Supreme Śiva, whose distinguishing feature is that the uniform mass of blissful consciousness of which he is composed cannot be perfected,762 creates bondage, establishing himself in the capacity of cognizer by means of the body, etc. — whereupon failure to recognize [one’s own identity with the Self] is made to appear through his playful habit that essentially consists in concealing his own real nature, thus covering over his own nature.

Similarly, mutatis mutandis (punaḥ), having suppressed the bondage of cognizing by means of the body, etc., through the process of revealing the knowledge he has of his own Self, he liberates (mocayati) himself of his own free will.

Thus, in two ways, he extends, or he spreads [before us], his play (krīḍā), his sporting (khelā), made wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation, that is, made marvelous by bringing out the essential nature of the transmigrating world and of liberation (apavarga) — [all the while] thinking to himself: ‘Alone, I do not rejoice’.763 For this is the very essence of the deity that, while remaining fixed in his own nature (svarūparūpaḥ san), he displays himself everywhere as the principle of experience itself, whatever state [or condition] he may assume. And this is precisely his freedom.

Kārikā 34And it is not just that [freedom or play that is the issue], inasmuch as any other particular state, to the extent that (eva) it reposes in its own form [i.e., appears as such], is [also] made to appear (avabhāsyate) by the Lord. The master says:

where the following verse, of unknown provenance, is cited: akhyātir yadi na khyāti khyātir evāvaśişyate/ khyāti cet khyātirūpatvāt khyātir evāvaśişyate, ‘If non-manifestation does not manifest [itself], then "manifestation" alone remains; if it does manifest [itself], then manifestation alone remains, because [the non-manifest] has the shape of the manifest’. The rhetorical model here is perhaps the upanişadic ‘pūrņam adaḥ pūrņam idam/ pūrņāt pūrņam udacyate/ pūrņasya pūrņam ādāya/ pūrnam evāvaśişyate (BĀU V 1, 1)’ or the ubiquitous Śaiva ‘nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate’.761 Tantrasāra IV (p. 32).762 pūrņacidānandaikaghana — lit., ‘whose uniform mass of blissful consciousness is already perfect/complete’.763 ekākī na ramāmy aham — cf. BĀU I 4, 3: sa vai naiva reme, tasmād ekākī na ramate, sa dvitīyam aicchat.

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34. Creation, maintenance and dissolution, as well as waking, dream and deep sleep, appear against [the backdrop of] the Fourth abode.764 Nevertheless, the Fourth abode does not appear as covered over by them.765

Now, whether it concern creation and the rest from the cosmic point of view, or particular states, such as waking and the rest, that apply to the cognizer under the dominion of māyā, in either case, these states appear against the [backdrop of the] Lord, a mass of bliss (ānandaghana), that is, against the Fourth abode (turīye dhāmani), namely, the Fourth (caturtha) state consisting of nothing but perfect ipseity (pūrņāhantā).

Reposing there as they do, such states nevertheless acquire a formal[ly independent] existence,766 [i.e., appear to exist] as external to it, when regarded from the perspective of the [limited] cognizer, himself constructed [by the Lord’s power of māyā].

That which does not appear (na prakāśate) against the backdrop of the Supreme Lord does not appear externally either. Thus [the Śivasūtra states]:

Like sesame oil, the Fourth state is to be sprinkled over the three others.767

764 The kārikā establishes the correspondence between the macrocosmic (creation, etc.) and microcosmic (waking, etc.) states. Kārikās 34 and 35 of AG’s PS correspond to ĀPS 31: tribhir eva viśvataijasaprājñais tair ādimadhyanidhanākhyaiḥ/ jāgratsvapnasuşuptair bhramabhūtaiś chāditaṃ turyam//. As observed by Mahadevan (1975: 21), it seems that sŗşţisthitisaṃhāra, ‘creation, maintenance and dissolution’, are paraphrases of ādimadhyanidhana, ‘beginning, middle and end’, in apposition with viśvataijasaprājña, in ĀPS 31.765 ... for it is the force behind their appearance. From the grammatical point of view, two interpretations of the last line (tathāpi tair nāvŗtaṃ bhāti) are possible, dependent on whether āvŗtam is construed with the subject phrase or as a part of the predicate (= na bhāty āvŗttam). Silburn adopts the first possibility: ‘Pourtant (ce quatrieme) ne se revele plus lorsqu’il est recouvert par ces (diverses conditions)’. We prefer the second as does YR. The negation then includes āvŗtam rather than excludes it. The ambiguity of the verse is perhaps not foreign to AG’s purposes, for reading it in one way expresses the standpoint of the paśu, and in the other that of the Lord. The latter interpretation is supported by Rāghavānanda’s Vivaraņa (p. 18) on the slightly different form of the kārikā in ĀPS (kā. 31, quoted above): bhramabhūtair iti jāgradādīnāṃ mithyābhūtatvān na vastutais turyaṃ tiraskŗtaṃ rāhuņevādityaḥ, ‘By saying [that the three anterior states] "have become illusion", it is meant that, since waking, etc., are false, the Fourth state is not in reality concealed by them — as is the sun by Rāhu’. chāditam, here, is to be read in relation to bhramabhūtais, so that chāditam assumes in effect the meaning of achāditam — if the Fourth state is concealed by something unreal, it is in fact not concealed. Cf. ĀŚ I 5, quoted n. 769, and MM 61: yogī jāgarasvapnasauşuptaturīyaparvaparipātīm/ citrām iva maņimālāṃ vimarśasūtraikagumphitām udvahati, "The yogin wears, like a marvelous jewel-garland [that is, like a rosary], the articulated sequence of [states of consciousness]: waking, dream, profound sleep, and the Fourth — strung upon nothing but the thread of his reflective consciousness (vimarśa)’.766 svarūpasattā.767 ŚS III 20. Adopting here Kşemarāja’s explanation ad loc: tailavad iti, yathā tailaṃ krameņa adhikam adhikaṃ prasarad āśrayaṃ vyāpnoti tathā āsecyam/,’ "As sesame oil" means "as sesame oil, gradually spreading little by little, pervades its substratum", so likewise should [the Fourth state] be sprinkled over [the three others]’.

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Thus, the Fourth mode is threaded768 through all states — this is the supreme purport of the verse.

But ‘can for all that his essential nature be veiled there [in that Fourth state] by those [phenomenal states], or not?’ The master answers: ‘Nevertheless, it [the Fourth state] does not appear to be covered over by them’.

And so, though covered over for the sake of [revealing] the formal independence [of entities in this world], [that essential nature] is still manifest (avabhāsate) everywhere, for, being the principle of experience itself at the heart of each and every percipient subject, he [the Lord] transcends all those states. And it is not the case that, there [viz., in the Fourth state], he hides his own nature of plenitude (pūrņasvarūpa) by concealing that [essential nature].

Thus is the abode that is Siva ever replete, in all conditions whatsoever.

Kārikā 35With language taken from vedāntic statements,769 the master treats of the nature of the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep; and [in so doing] he makes known the Fourth [state], which is beyond them, though infused in them:770

35. The waking state is this All, because difference is there. Dream is Splendor, because of the glorification there of Light. The state of [deep] sleep is that of the [pure] Knower, because it is a mass of consciousness; beyond there is the Fourth.771

768 anusyūta — YR’s commentary on the next kārikā presents the same image. The same term is found in SpK I 4; see also TĀ X 296 (also quoted in PM 61): trayasyāsyānusaṃdhis tu yadvaśād upajāyate/ sraksūtrakalpaṃ tat turyaṃ sarvabhedeşu gŗhyatām, ‘The Fourth is to be understood, within all the [three] different [states], as the string [holding together] the garland, through whose power comes into being the interconnection of [the elements of] the triad’. Note that MM 61 presents a somewhat different image: the string is vimarśa, and the Fourth is one of the pearls that are there strung.769 The themes developed in kā. 35 are based on MāU 2-12, and have been elaborated by preśaṅkarite vedāntic works, such as ĀPS 31 (quoted n. 764) and ĀŚ I 1-29 ad MāU 2-12. Note that, in the same context, Kşemarāja also refers to vedāntic reasonings. In order to substantiate his gloss on ŚS I 11: tritayabhoktā vīreśaḥ, ‘The enjoyer of the three [states] is the Lord of the heroes [i.e., of his sensorial energies] (vīreśa)’, he quotes (without giving the source) ĀŚ I 5: trişu dhāmasu yad bhogyaṃ bhoktā yaś ca prakīrtitaḥ/ vedaitad ubhayaṃ yas tu sa bhuñjāno na lipyate//, ‘He who knows both what is said to be the object of experience and the subject of experience in the three states is not affected by them [i.e., by those two conditions], even while he experiences them’. On the reasoning, see SpK II 4b, quoted by YR ad 1.770 anusyūta — lit., ‘threaded through them’.771 As to content, kārikās 34 and 35 correspond to ĀPS 31.

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The waking state is this All (viśva),772 i.e., the cosmic (vairāja) form of brahman.773

Why? Because of difference, that is, because the sense-organs — the eye, etc.774— of all cognizers operate within the fivefold domain [of sense objects] — sound, etc.,775 which the Supreme Lord has created as external to himself.776

Hence, it is one and the same brahman, [diversified] as to object and subject, that subtends the marvelous display of varied sensory cognition. Hence, it has been stated in the Śivasūtra:

The waking state is [ordinary] cognition (jñāna).777

This has been proclaimed as the cosmic state (virāḍavasthā) of brahman. As has been said in the Śruti:778

He who has eyes on every side, and a face on every side, who has hands on every side, and feet on every side, he forges together with hands, with [wings] that are worthy of sacrifice, creating the heaven and the earth, sole god.779

[As waking is the cosmic form of brahman,] likewise dream is the state of brahman that is tejas, ‘Splendor’ (tejovasthā).780

772 viśva, here, corresponds to the vaiśvānara of MāU 3, as developed by ĀŚ I 1-5 (which employs viśva, instead of vaiśvānara). Senart (ChU: 69) translates vaiśvānara, in ChU V 11, 2, as: ‘l’āme qui est dans tous les homines’, Minard 1949 (p. 156, § 432) as: ‘Pananthrope’ (observing in the note: ‘Ou Pamphyle ou Pandeme, si l’on entend "appartenant a tous les clans en commun", comme le fait Ren. Anth. 15 n. 1’), Bouy (ĀŚ: 84) as: le ‘Panhumain’. The first occurrence of the notion (although not yet included in the quadripartite scheme expounded in MāU) appears in ChU V, which elaborates it in seven chapters (11-18); see also ŚB X 6 1, 9; BS I 2, 24ff., and Ś ad loc.773 Cf. ChU V 18, 2, to be compared with MBh XII 47, 44, quoted by YR ad 27, as well as by BSBh I 2, 25.774 Viz., the buddhīndriyas (see PS 20).775 Viz., the tanmātras (see PS 21).776 Thus, as stated by MāU 3 and ĀŚ I 3, the waking subject is sthūlabhuj, ‘experiences the gross aspect (of objectivity)’. ĀŚ I 4 adds that not only does the waking subject, or viśva, ‘experience the gross’, but ‘the gross also satisfies him’: sthūlaṃ tarpayate viśvam. It is the state of external cognition: bahişprajñā (MāU 3; ĀŚ I 1).777 ŚS I 8.778 And it has been said profusely in the Śruti. This text (ŖS X 81, 3) is one of the hymns to Viśvakarman. It is also found (with variants) in Kāţhakasaṃhitā [KS] XVIII 2, Vājasaneyisaṃhitā [VS] XVII 19, Maitrāyaņīsaṃhitā [MS] II 10, 2, Atharvasaṃhitā [AthS] XIII 2, 26, Taittirīyasaṃhitā IV 6, 2, 4, Taittirīyāraņyaka X, ŚvU III 3. Here, the reading (namate, saṃyajatrair) is that of KS XVIII 2. namate is also supported by Taittirīyasaṃhitā and Taittirīyāraņyaka, which read namati. Main variants: dhamati (ŖS X 81, 3; VS, MS, ŚvU), in the sense of ‘to weld’, ‘to forge’, is supported by ŖS X 72, 2, where Brahmaņaspati ‘forged together’ (samadhamat) all things in this world; bharati in AthS. saṃyajatrair is found only in KS; elsewhere: saṃpatatrair, which is supported by ŖS IX 112, 2, describing the blacksmith who uses the feathers of great birds (parņebhiḥ śakunānām) for fanning fire; therefore, in order to make sense with saṃyajatrair, ‘worthy of sacrifice’, we supply ‘wings’ as the implicit noun to be thus qualified. Note that R ad ĀPS 6 quotes the last pada of ŖS X 81, 3. For other texts evoking Virāj, see YR ad 27, and n. 678.779 ŖS X 81, 3.780 I.e., the taijasa form of ātman/brahman, as defined by MāU 4 (and ĀŚ I 1-5). Not only does the dreaming subject ‘experience the subtle’: praviviktabhuj (ĀŚ I 3), but also ‘the subtle satisfies him’: tarpayate [...] viviktaṃ tu taijasam (ĀŚ I 4). This is the state of internal cognition: antaḥprajñā (MāU 4; ĀŚ I 1). Compare the following upanişadic passages, which

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Why? The master says: ‘because of the glorification of Light’.781 In dreams, neither do the external sense-organs make so bold as to operate on their corresponding sensory domains, sound, etc.,782 nor is anything there attested that is external and ultimately real, such as sound, etc., nor is any other cause of the determinate cognition [experienced in dreaming] to be apprehended as something external [to dream itself], whether slightly different [from dream], such as nescience, etc.,783 or as identical to it [viz., dream itself] nor can [such a cause] be established by argument [when the dream is over].784 Still, everything [that one can possibly imagine] does appear in dreams.785

predate the formulation of the notion of tejas/taijasa and its incorporation into the doctrine of the ātman’s quadripartition: BĀU IV 3, 9: sa [puruşaḥ] yatra prasvapiti asya lokasya sarvāvato mātrām apādāya svayaṃ vihatya svayaṃ nirmāya svena bhāsā svenajyotişā prasvapiti/ atrāyaṃ puruşaḥ svayaṃ jyotir bhavati, ‘When he goes to sleep, he takes along the material (mātra) of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up; he sleeps (dreams) by his own brightness, by his own light. In that state the person becomes self-illuminated’; and BĀU IV 3, 14: atho khalv āhuḥ jāgaritadeśa evāsyaişaḥ/ yani hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti/ atrāyaṃ puruşaḥ svayaṃ jyotir bhavati, ‘Others, however, say that (the state of sleep) is just his waking state for whatever objects he sees when awake, those too, he sees, when asleep; (not so) for in the dream-state the person is self-illuminated’.781 This Light is the manifesting power of brahman.782 Cf. BĀU IV 3, 11: svapnena śārīram abhiprahatya/ asuptaḥ suptān abhicākaśīti//, ‘Having struck down in sleep what belongs to the body, he himself sleepless looks down, on the sleeping (senses)’.783 For avidyā operates in the "objective" world, whereas the cause of whatever is experienced within a dream is to be found in dreaming itself or in the dreamer. The discussion will be taken up again in YR ad 48. Cf. BĀUBh IV 3, 9: the dream is circumscribed by the body of the dreamer, a ‘dream body’ (svapnadeha), ‘constituted of latent dispositions’ (vāsanāmaya), ‘like a māyic (or magic) body’ (māyāmayam iva) — ‘svayaṃ nirmāya’ nirmāņaṃ kŗtvā vāsanāmayaṃ svapnadehaṃ māyāmayam iva. According to Hiriyanna, Śaṅkara’s māyā and avidyā are to be understood as more or less referring to the same thing. If a distinction is to be forced, one may be taken to represent the "objective" side of the phenomenal world, the other its "subjective" side — but the distinction itself illustrates the force of māyā, and a fortiori, of avidyā. In other words, bound souls are the substratum of avidyā; whereas the substratum of māyā is Īśvara, who casts illusions on the bound souls as does a magician who is not trapped by it. And such is the deeply rooted effect of māyā that each bound soul clings to his ignorance; māyā is meant for elseone, not for Īśvara.784 The passage explains in what manner the dreaming subject experiences phenomena in their subtle form. See ĀŚ II 1-5, which discusses the unreality of dream-phenomena from a logical perspective.785 Cf. BĀU IV 3, 9-10: [...] atrāyaṃ puruşaḥ svayaṃjyotir bhavati// na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavanty atha rathān rathayogān pathaḥ sŗjate na tatrānandā mudaḥ pramudo bhavanty athānandān mudaḥ pramudaḥ sŗjate na tatra veśāntāḥ puşkariņyaḥ sravantyo bhavanty atha veśāntān puşkariņīḥ sravanatīḥ sŗjate sa hi kartā, ‘In that state the person becomes self-illuminated. There are no chariots there, nor animals to be yoked to them, no roads, but he creates (projects from himself) chariots, animals to be yoked to them and roads. There are no joys there, no pleasures, no delights, but he creates joys, pleasures and delights. There are no tanks there, no lotus-pools, no rivers, but he creates tanks, lotus-pools and rivers. He, indeed, is the agent (maker or creator)’. Note that ĀŚ II 3, in dealing with the unreality of dream-phenomena, alludes precisely to this text: abhāvaś ca rathādīnāṃ śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam/, ‘The non-existence of [dream-]chariots and the like is taught by the Śruti, accompanied by reasonings’.

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What is implied by all this786 is that it is he, the Lord, the luminous god787 endowed with his own essential nature [of consciousness],788 who has assumed the condition of diverse cognizers, and as if dreaming,789 who then reveals to each cognizer in his own dream a unique universe,790 after dividing (pravibhajya) his own Self into the marvelous diversity of numerous subjects, houses, cities, palaces, etc., through his illuminative [i.e., manifesting] [power of] freedom.

Hence, the Brahmavādins accept that the freedom of brahman is nothing else than dream [i.e., manifests itself as dream]. For it is stated in the Vedānta texts:

Dividing (pravibhajya) himself by himself and creating entities of various kinds, the Lord of all, being all forms, appears (prakāśate) as the enjoyer in a dream.791

786 ata idam arthabalād āyātam.787 deva is, etymologically, the ‘luminous one’ (see YR ad 15 and 45), which suits the commentary as it explains prakāśamāhātmyāt. Moreover, YR’s exposition agrees with the passage of the BĀU quoted supra, which establishes that the dreaming subject is luminous in and of himself, and, as such, creative.788 Or ‘whose essential nature is [to be] himself [viz., being pure consciousness, he cannot be other than himself]’.789 svapnāyamāna — note the denominative. Cf. BĀU IV 3, 13 concerning the golden (hiraņmaya) puruşa: svapnānta uccāvacam īyamāno rūpāņi devaḥ kurute bahūni/ uteva strībhiḥ saha modamāno jakşad utevāpi bhayāni paśyan//, ‘In the state of dream going up and down, the god makes many forms for himself, now as it were enjoying himself in the company of women or laughing or even beholding fearful sights’.790 asādhāraņa — here, Barnett seems to understand a contrario: ‘The Lord [...] reveals to each dreamer a common universe’ — whereas the privacy of dream is attested by one’s own experience: my dreams are mine alone. To the sovereign freedom of the Lord corresponds the equal freedom of the finite dreamer.791 Quoted in Vākyapadīyavŗtti [VPvŗ] I 119. The reading is vedānteşu, in KSTS and in all our manuscripts, except for the Wilson MS, which reads vedāntişu. We have opted for the reading vedānteşu — in any case more satisfactory grammatically. This verse is found as a quote in VPvŗ I 119 [119 Iyer = 127 Biardeau], with one variant: pravartate instead of prakāśate. Iyer translates (p. 115): ‘The Lord of All, the All-embracing, the Enjoyer, after dividing Himself and after having created many different things, proceeds to sleep’. Biardeau has (p. 163): ‘Se divisant lui-meme et creant des objets de toutes sortes, le sujet devient, dans le reve, souverain de toutes choses et fait de toutes choses’ [— ‘Dividing himself and creating objects of all kinds, the subject becomes, in dreaming, the sovereign of all things and is made of all things’]. The verse seems to have been famous in the Śaiva circles, for Rāmakaņţha quotes it — although with two variants: sarvaśaktiḥ, ‘endowed with all powers’ (for sarvamayaḥ) and prapadyate (for pravartate) — in his Vivŗti to SpK III 1-2 (p. 102), in the context of the Lord’s revealing himself in dream to the yogin. Now, what is the source of this verse? Rāmakaņţha attributes it to Bhartŗhari, from which statement we may infer that Rāmakaņţha, and probably other Kashmirian Śaivites, considered Bhartŗhari to be the author of the Vŗtti. The question that remains is whether Bhartŗhari too cites the verse, or whether it is his own (see Biardeau [VP: 162], who observes that the northern manuscripts attribute the verse to Bhartŗhari himself). Although, as observed by Biardeau (p. 163), the text sounds rather upanişadic (‘La resonance en est plutot upanişadique’), the verse has not been traced in the upanişadic corpus. Taking into account three indices, it may be inferred that this passage of YR’s commentary on the dream state reflects the views of the Grammarians, whose affinity with the Trika is so marked that YR believes himself able to reformulate in Traika terms Bhartŗhari’s positions: the three are 1) the source of the quote (VPvŗ I 119 [= 127]; 2) the presence of the same key-term, pravibhajya, both in YR’s gloss and in the quote supporting it; and 3) the frequency of the dream metaphor in the VP and in its Vŗtti — see, besides VP 119

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Thus, the cause here [viz., of what is experienced in dream] is the glorification (māhātmya) of his Light alone [that is, the glorification implicit in his power of manifestation].

Therefore, the dream of brahman is the condition termed ‘Splendor’ (tejas) [namely, ‘dream’ (in the kārikā) refers to the luminous state of brahman].

Likewise, the state of sleep is [that of] the [pure] Knower.The state of sleep (suptāvasthā), that is the deep sleep (suşupta) of all cognizers

is called the ‘Knower’ (prājña),792 meaning that it is the knowing state (prājñāvasthā) of brahman.

That is to say, in deep sleep, only the Wisdom (prajñā)793 of brahman remains, who has become thus the seed of the universe.794

[Deep sleep] is the great Void (mahāśūnya),795 where objects, etc., are dissolved, where root impressions796 only remain, inasmuch as phenomenal display has vanished

and its Vŗtti quoted here, VPvŗ I 1: [...] vivartaḥ / svapnavişayapratibhāsavat, ‘Phenomenal manifestation is like the appearances in a dream’; VPvŗ I 4: ekasya hi brahmaņas [...] svapnavijñānapuruşavad abahistattvāḥ [...] bhoktŗbhoktavyabhogagranthayo vivartante, ‘In this One brahman [...], "knots" of the nature of subject, object and experience manifest, having no external reality, like the beings perceived in dream’. It seems indubitable, then, that in introducing a citation that is to be found ‘vedānteşu’, YR is referring to a commentary on Bhartŗhari (and, perhaps, of Bhartŗhari); it follows that the ‘Brahmavādin’ whose doctrine is supported by the quote is a Śabdabrahmavādin, that is, a grammarian of the school of Bhartŗhari. Moreover, it is noteworthy that early (preśaṅkarite) Vedānta, the VP with its Vŗtti, and the Trika, all have a similar conception of diversity: they hold that phenomenal multiplicity is not illusory, that, in its subtle form, it is the Lord’s ‘manifestation’ (pratibhāsa, in VP; ābhāsa, in Trika), wherein the Lord as consciousness — as in a dream — appears as the triad of subject, object and experience itself.792 prājña — the term is variously translated: ‘Understanding’ (Barnett PS: 731); the ‘Cognitional’ (Hume BĀU: 392); ‘wise’ and ‘intelligent’ (Bhattacharya ĀŚ); ‘"serenely" aware’ (Fort 1990: 151); the ‘enlightened’, the ‘knower’ (Gupta ĀŚ: 180, 181); ‘le Percipient’ (Bouy ĀŚ: 86). The first occurrence of the term is probably found at BĀU IV 3, 21, which describes deep sleep through the metaphor of the man who "knows nothing without or within" while in the arms of his beloved. Defining prājña, MāU 5 borrows from BĀU IV 3, 19: [...] evam evāyaṃ puruşa etasmā antāya dhāvati] yatra supto na kaṃ cana kāmaṃ kāmayate na kaṃ cana svapnaṃ paśyati [...], ‘[...] even so this person hastens to that state (of self) where he desires no desires and sees no dream’; on the dissolution of all desires, characteristic of this state, see also BĀU IV 3, 21. It is the state of ‘massive cognition’, variously termed prajñānaghana (MāU 5) (‘masse de pure conscience objectale’, so Bouy, p. 86), ghanaprajñā (ĀŚ I 1), and jñānaghana, as here, in PS 35.793 So generally Conze 1974; Bugault 1968 translates ‘la sapience’.794 Cf. MāU 6: eşa sarveśvara eşa sarvajña eşo ‘ntaryāmy eşa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhutānām, ‘This is the Lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the inner controller; this is the source of all; this is the beginning and the end of beings’. From the viewpoint of the divine, the vaiśvānara corresponds to Virāj, and prājña to the universal Lord; cf. BĀU IV 4, 22: sarvasya vaśī sarvasyeśānaḥ sarvasyādhipatiḥ [...] eşa sarveśvara eşa bhūtādhipatir eşa bhūtapālaḥ [...].795 Cf. Bhāskarī ad ĪPV III 2, 12, according to which deep sleep, in which the experiencer is predominant, is the state of both the prāņapramātŗ and the śūnyapramātŗ (pramātŗpradhānāyāṃ prāņaśūnyapramātravasthāyāṃ suşuptāvasthā) — the śūnyapramātŗ, who belongs to the category of the Pralayākalas on the scale of the seven saptapramātŗs.796 We borrow this rendering of saṃskāra from Dasgupta 1975: 263 and passim.

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for all knowers, [along with] the dichotomy of knower and known. There, brahman remains at the very center [of all beings] as the principle of Knowing (prajñātŗtaya).

This [condition of ‘Knower’, viz., brahman] is the substratum of the root impressions implicit in the display of the world’s marvelous diversity — as blue, pleasure, etc. — that belong to every [individual] cognizer — as in [many] examples drawn from ordinary experience, such as that of the awakened one who [remembers what he] has experienced previously.797

Otherwise, had the stable798 brahman not shone forth as the nature of the Knower (prajñātŗ) in this condition [of deep sleep], by encompassing everything [that is knowable], wherefrom could have arisen, in the reawakened cognizer, the memory (smŗti) of things previously experienced — via the recall of such experience [through judgments like]: ‘just so this happened?’799 Nor could have arisen the experiences: ‘I slept well, I slept badly’, or ‘I [slept as though] completely senseless’.

So says Bhaţţadivākaravatsa:800

[O Lord, who is the Self,] if all experienced objects were not preserved within you by appropriating them fully, no memory, whereby [we are] not robbed of the things that we have [once] known, could possibly arise.

It has thus been proclaimed [by the kārikā] that deep sleep, consisting of consciousness [although still under māyā], [corresponds to] the state of brahman called ‘Knower’ (prājña). Why? Because it [the deep sleep] is a mass of consciousness (jñānaghanatvāt).801

[Moreover,] since this is to be taken as a cause in relation both to deep sleep and to the Fourth state, it [viz., jñānaghanatvāt] should be supplied in both places.802

This state of deep sleep is a mass of consciousness, inasmuch as it takes the form of Light.803

797 Lit, ‘such as [the memory of] what has been previously experienced by the awakened one’.798 sthira — cf. BĀU IV 4, 20, where ātman/brahman is said to be dhruva, ‘stable’.799 Or ‘to the extent that experiences move in us [namely, that we are conscious of them], expressed in judgements like [...]’.800 Probably another name of Bhāskara, the author of a commentary (the Śivasūtravārttika) on the Śivasūtra and of the Kakşyāstotra, a hymn to the goddess frequently quoted in Kashmirian Śaiva literature. Divākaravatsa, the ‘dear son [lit., ‘calf] of Divākara’, so styles himself in the colophons to his Vārttika. The verse quoted here is also quoted (and attributed to Bhaţţadivākara) in ĪPVV, vol. II: 3; it is quoted without its source in TĀV V 137, vol. III: 1067, in a passage dealing with memory. YR quotes another verse, borrowed from the Kakşyāstotra, in his gloss to PS 51; also ĪPVV, vol. II: 13, 14 and 145; for other quotes, see Dyczkowski SpK: 29-30 and notes.801 In deep sleep, absence of duality is experienced. The notion cidghana, ‘mass of consciousness’, implies that the subject no longer apprehends duality, recovers his basic unity (he is ekībhūta, as stated by MāU 4), with the result that he experiences bliss: ānandabhuj (MāU 5; ĀŚ I 9), that he himself is bliss: ānandamaya (MāU 5). Cf. ĀŚ I 12 on prājña: nātmānaṃ na parāṃś caiva na satyaṃ nāpi cānŗtam/ prājñaḥ kiṃ cana saṃvetti [...], ‘Prājña knows nothing — neither himself nor others, neither truth nor falsehood’ (tr. Bhattacharya); and, on the subject in deep sleep, BĀU IV 3, 21 (quoted supra); BĀU IV 3, 23: na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato ‘nyad vibhaktaṃ yat paśyet, "There is not, however, a second, nothing else separate, from him that he could see’. On the term jñānaghana, see n. 792.802 ĀŚ I 13a formulates the same truth: dvaitasyāgrahanaṃ tulyam ubhayoḥ prājñaturyayoḥ, ‘Non-apprehension of duality is similar in both prājña and turya’.803 See, infra, the quotation by YR of SpK I 18.

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Nevertheless, tarnished by the root impressions left there by the dissolution of the universe [viz., in the condition of deep sleep of brahman], it is not [absolutely] pure consciousness (śuddhacit).804

As it has been stated in Spandaśāstra:The all-pervading Lord reveals himself, in the two states [of waking and dream], as possessed of the supreme Power (paramā śaktiḥ) of [diversifying himself into] knowledge and the knowable, but, elsewhere, he reveals himself as consciousness.805

And, beyond it, there is the Fourth;806 beyond that — namely, deep sleep — different from it, there is the Fourth form of brahman, consisting entirely of unalloyed bliss, for the root impressions [that produce] the latent dispositions proper to the limited soul have there entirely vanished, as is suitable to the status [of the Fourth, understood as other than the third].807

Since no name suitable to the meaning [of that Fourth state] can be given, it has simply been called here the ‘Fourth’, thus designating it numerically by means of an ordinal suffix808 — namely, the ordinal of the cardinal ‘four’; for it is the repository809

of the triad of states previously expounded — the [string] threaded through all of them together.810

[To the question —] ‘How then, if it is threaded through the three states, can it be beyond them?’ the master responds: ‘Because it is a mass of consciousness’.

Since all those states — waking, etc. — are pervaded by the ignorance of cognizers, these being [necessarily] prone to difference, the Fourth has the shape of unalloyed consciousness (jñānaghana), Light and bliss, for all root impressions have there vanished, consequent upon the cessation of the perturbance (kşobha) bringing about differentiation into subject and object. Therefore, though situated within them, it is beyond, that is, is different from them, for it has transcended those [three limited] states, being nothing but consciousness itself.

804 ĀŚ I 13b also distinguishes between prājña and turya, but differently, by recourse to the concept of bījanidrā, ‘germinal’ or ‘causal sleep’, present in the former, and absent in the latter. In the former, diversity emerges again and again from the state of pure potentiality. Compare YR, here: ‘In deep sleep, only the sapience (prajñā) of brahman remains, who has become thus the seed (bīja) of the universe’.805 SpK I 18. As pointed out by SpN I 18, according to some exegetes, ‘elsewhere’ refers to both deep sleep and the Fourth state; according to others, to deep sleep alone.806 MāU 7 gives the first explicit definition of the Fourth state, called caturtha. ĀŚ I 10-18 develops this definition.807 For speculations on turīya (or its variant turya), see Malamoud 1989: 140ff. As he observes (n. 10): ‘L’analyse etymologique comparative permet d’etablir que turīya est construit sur une forme contractee du radical catur, "quatre". [...] Mais la speculation philosophique [...] fait de turīya un derive de la racine verbale TŖ, TUR, "franchir", et interprete cet adjectif comme "ce qui est au-dela". Cf. Renou 1978: 86’ [— ‘Comparative etymological analysis shows that turīya is constructed from a contracted form of the root catur, "four". [...] But philosophical speculation [...] made turīya derive from the verbal root tŗ, tur, ‘to cross’, and interpreted this adjective as "that which is beyond". Cf. Renou 1978: 86’].808 pūraņapratyaya.809 Viz., the place where the three previous states merge (see YR ad 34). This hints at the transcendent aspect of brahman.810 That is, the string accounts for the unity of the ensemble, the necklace, and, at the same time, is found within all the parts, the pearls; see YR ad 34.

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Thus, does the free and all-encompassing brahman expand811 its nature ultimately nondual, yet diversified into various states.812

Kārikā 36If so, then it would follow that the failure to recognize the Self would of necessity soil813 all classes of cognizing subject, inasmuch as the pure supreme Self still finds itself threaded through each and every cognizer. The master demonstrates that it is not so with an example:

36. As no cloud, smoke or dust can soil the surface of the sky, so the supreme Person is untouched by the alterations brought about through māyā.814

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:] the naturally clear surface of the sky remains unsoiled by clouds, smoke or quantities of dust, although these appear against [the backdrop of] that sky815 — nor are thereby its eternity and infinite extension negated; rather, the sky remains just sky, whatever [transitory] state embellishes it,816 as happens with reflections in the mirror,817 for the sky [like the mirror] is invariably recognized (pratyābhijñāna) as such.

Likewise, i.e., similarly, the Lord is not touched by the alterations brought about through māyā, although these alterations are situated in the Lord himself; these modifications arise out of [immemorial] nescience and consist of the numerous and diverse states occurring in innumerable cognizers: birth, death, etc.818 His own

811 vijŗṃbhate.812 YR’s concluding remarks on the vedāntic ātman/brahman are made in Trika terms. It is the supreme Śakti of the Lord, in the form of his power of absolute freedom (svātantryaśakti), that opts either for transcendence or for immanence.813 akhyātimālinya — lit., ‘dirt of non-recognition’.814 Verse similar to APS 35, apart from one important difference: prakŗtivikārair aparamŗşţaḥ paraḥ puruşaḥ// (ĀPS 35cd) / māyāvikŗtibhir aparamŗşţaḥ paraḥ puruşaḥ (PS 36). ĀŚ III 8 formulates the matter positively, denouncing those who are not enlightened: yathā bhavati bālānāṃ gaganaṃ malinaṃ malaiḥ/ tathā bhavaty abuddhānām ātmāpi malino malaiḥ//, ‘Just as, in the eyes of simple people, the sky is soiled with impurities, so, for those lacking in wisdom, the ātman itself is soiled with impurities (mala)’.815 Cf. the traditional derivation of ākāśa: ā samantāt kāśata ity ākāśam, ‘That which shines on all sides is ākāśa’. See ĀPS 35, BhG XIII 32 (yathā sarvagataṃ saukşmyād akāśaṃ nopalipyate/ sarvatrāvasthito dehe tathātmā nopalipyate//), ĀŚ III 8 quoted n. 814, Ś ad loc, BSBh I 2, 8; I 3, 19, II 3, 17. Cf. YR ad 72 and ad 83-84 (n. 1255).816 Lit., ‘by whatever [transitory] state it is variegated’.817 Cf. kā. 12-13 and YR ad loc.818 These are the ‘modifications of becoming’ (bhāvavikāra); see n. 295. Thus, by an analogy with space, it is shown that the ātman is the same in all finite souls, and that this ātman is neither soiled nor subject to transmigration in any real sense. Defilements and ‘modifications’ are but effects of māyā. Cf. ĀPS 51: janmavināśanagamanāgamamalasaṃbandhavarjito nityam/ ākāśa iva ghaţādişu sarvātmā sarvadopetaḥ//, ‘The Self of all, which is permanently free of connection to birth and destruction, to coming and going, and to impurities, is ever [seemingly] connected [to birth, destruction, etc.], like the ether in jars, etc., [in that the ether seems to be connected with the jar’s origination, destruction, etc., although it is not really connected to these]’, (tr. Danielson, revised), and the similar statement of ĀŚ III 9: maraņe saṃbhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api/ sthitau sarvaśarīreşv ākāśenāvilakşaņaḥ//, ‘Whether death, birth, departing and coming, or staying [in this world] is concerned, [the ātman] present in all bodies is not different from space’. See also, PS 29, and the corresponding statement in APS 21.

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nature has not been abrogated by those modifications, for he is the supreme Person (paraḥ puruşaḥ):819 he represents the first glimmering (ullāsa), and the [final] place of repose of all mundane men (puruşa).820

For this reason, he ever manifests himself (sphurati) as the principle of experience itself at the heart of each and every percipient subject. This has been indicated by the word ‘supreme’. Therefore, as happens with the magician821 [whose magical tricks, which he himself creates, delude others without deluding him], the modifications associated with māyā that proceed from him, consisting of non-Light, do not abrogate the Lord himself.822 As had been said by my teacher’s teacher’s teacher, in the Nareśvaraviveka:823

819 Cf. YR ad 50.820 Cf. YR ad 1, where sarvālaya of the kārika is glossed by sarvaviśrāntisthāna.821 aindrajālika.822 On the illusory power of the ātman (or Lord, here), see ĀŚ III 10a: saṃghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ/, ‘The corporal aggregates, as happens in a dream, are created by the illusory power (māyā) of the ātman’. Also ĀŚ II 12; 19; ŚvU IV 10a: māyāṃ tu prakŗtiṃ vidyān māyinaṃ tu maheśvaram, ‘Know then that prakŗti is māyā, and wielder of māyā (māyin) is the Great Lord’.823 Nareśvaraviveka = Ajaḍapramātŗsiddhi [APS] 20-21a. The editors of this volume in the KSTS (Jagadisha Chandra Chatterji and the "Pandits" of the "Research Department of the Kashmir State") have "corrected" the reference of the quote, attributing it to the Ajaḍapramātŗsiddhi, though their manuscripts all have: parameşţhinā nareśvaraviveke; all eight manuscripts at our disposal confirm this: all read "nareśvaraviveke". Indeed, the quote figures in the Ajaḍapramātŗsiddhi 20-21a, whereas the Nareśvaraviveka, although frequently quoted in the Śaiva literature, is not available. No such title as Nareśvaraviveka [NV] figures in the India Office Library Catalogue (ed. 1938-1957). The Catalogus Catalogorum of Aufrecht, based probably on a MS of our Paramārthasāra, notes it as the work of Parameşţhin, cited by ‘Vitastapurī’ (sic) — no doubt an error of interpretation of our passage of YR’s commentary ad 36, inasmuch as Vitastāpurī is the city designated by YR as his place of residence in the final strophe of his commentary. Yet, the NV is given an important place in the works of Śaivism (see, esp., its numerous quotations in the ĪPVV, and that in the PM, p. 57). Therefore, the question is: does the verse belongs to the NV or to the APS, and if belonging to the NV, what is this work and who is its author? The verse cited here is apparently wellknown. It is found in TĀV V 8a (citing the first verse: yady apy arthasthitiḥ ...), ĪPV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 143; first verse), ĪPV I 8, 9 (vol. I: 420; citing the same verse and a half as in YR), ĪPVV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 287; citing the pratīka: yady apy arthasthitiḥ), ĪPW I 8, 10 (vol. II: 433; citing the pratīka), and PM 19. There is no explicit attribution (whether title or author) in TĀV V 8a, nor in ĪPVV I 3, 7. Nevertheless, ĪPVV I 8, 10 attributes it explicitly to the APS, as does the PM. On the other hand, ĪPV I 3, 7 cites it as that of ‘the ācārya’ (‘yad uktam ācāryeņaiva’ — which is glossed by Bhāskara: ‘atrācāryasammatim āha’), and ĪPV 18, 10 as that of ‘the granthakŗt’ (‘yathoktaṃ granthakŗtaiva’ — glossed by Bhāskara: ‘atra śrīmad utpaladevasya sammatim āha’ and: ‘granthakŗtā — śrīmad utpaladevena’). From these occurrences, it can be inferred that the author of the verse is Utpala, and that the text from which it is borrowed is the APS, rather than the NV — inasmuch as AG almost always refers explicitly to the NV when he cites it: ‘yan Nareśvaravivekaḥ’ or ‘tathā Nareśvaravivekaḥ’, as observed by A. Sanderson (private correspondence). Despite the manuscripts of the Paramārthasāravivŗtti [PSV], there is little chance that the verse here cited by YR belongs to the NV, unless we admit that the verse is present in the two texts. Still, YR attributes this verse to his paramesţhin, the guru of the guru of his guru, that is, to Utpala (if the paraṃparā is as follows: Kşemarāja, Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva) — unless it is to Lakşmaņagupta that the verse is to be attributed, as proposed by A. Sanderson. On this basis, it might be supposed that YR could have been mistaken in the matter of the text’s name, and that the source of that confusion might be that the two texts

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Although common experience,824 is conditioned825 by reference to embodied souls limited by breath and the subtle body, yet it is anchored also in the supreme Self. How could there be limitation826 of it [the supreme Self] by breath [etc.], when breath has the Self for its very essence?827

Kārikā 37But how is it possible that mundane men, though in reality nothing but uniform consciousness (ekacit), are affected by a medley of various states, such as pleasure, pain, delusion, birth, death, etc., each of which is distinctive?828 The master gives an example:

37. Though the space within one jar is infused with dust, other [spaces within other jars] are not thereby defiled. So it is with those embodied souls that experience differences of pleasure and pain.829

had the same author, Utpaladeva — a mistake that could easily have happened, inasmuch as the two passages in the Vimarśinī where the verse here cited by YR appears refer only to the author, and that only generically, as ācārya or granthakŗt, and not to the work’s title. The hypothesis that the NV be attributed to Utpala would explain as well the evident doctrinal relationship of the NV and the ĪPK, and the many times the ĪPK cites the NV. It remains surprising, however, that AG cites the NV without ever mentioning that it is the work of Utpala (or of another of his teachers). R. Torella (private correspondence), recognizing an ‘Utpala-like’ character in the NV, may be mentioned as providing further support for this thesis.824 arthasthiti — lit., ‘state of things’, ‘course of ordinary events’. Bhāskara ad ĪPV I 3, 7 glosses: arthasthitir arthavişayo vyavahāraḥ, ad I 8, 9: arthasthitir arthavişayo jñānādivyavahāraḥ and concludes: na hi prāņapuryaşţakarahitād ghaţāder arthasthitir dŗśyate, ‘for such common experience (arthasthiti = vyavahāra) is not to be had from pots, etc., which are devoid of breath and the subtle body’.825 Bhāskara glosses niruddhā as ‘sthitiṃ gatā’ (ad ĪPV I 3, 7), and as ‘niyatā’ (ad ĪPV I 8, 9).826 Bhāskara glosses yantraņā as ‘pariccheda’.827 The context in which this verse is quoted in ĪPVV I 3, 7 is particularly illuminating inasmuch as it implies a reference to BhG XV 15 (mattaḥ smŗtir jñānam apohanaṃ ca, ‘From Me derive memory, knowledge and exclusion’ — our transl.): anena śaktitrayeņa viśve vyavahārāḥ/ tac ca bhagavata eva śaktitrayaṃ yat tathābhūtānubhavitŗsmŗtŗvikaipayitŗsvabhāvacaitramaitrādyavabhāsanam/ sa eva hi tena tena vapuşā jānāti smarati vikalpayati ca/ yathoktam ācāryeņaiva ..., ‘All worldly behaviors depend upon this triad of powers (śaktitraya) [namely, knowledge (jñāna), in the sense of direct experience, memory (smŗti), and exclusion (apohana), in the sense of differentiating, that is, limited, knowledge. It is this triad of the Lord’s powers that Caitra, Maitra, and all others, manifest, as so many experiencing, remembering and cognizing subjects. [In reality] it is he who knows [viz., directly experiences], remembers and cognizes through the variety of limited subjects. Thus said our teacher [...]’. Utpala’s own vŗtti ad ĪPK I 3, 7 cites BhG XV 15, in support of the view according to which the energies of knowledge, etc. (jñānādikāḥ śaktayaḥ), pertain to the principle of consciousness (cittattva) alone. The supreme Self (paramātman) of APS 20-21a is none other than the principle of consciousness (cittattva) of Utpala’s vŗtti ad ĪPK I 3, 7; see AG’s Traika interpretation of BhG XV 15, quoted n. 453.828 The argument here is slightly different from the preceding — its inverse, so to speak; compare the analogous dialectic of the Advaita, where, once the existence of a unique and omnipresent brahman is admitted, the problem becomes that of explaining the existence of Phenomenal diversity. It is the diversity of finitude itself that is the index of the non-reality of finitude. Infinitude alone is real.829 Verse exactly repeating ĀPS 36. Cf. also ĀŚ III 5 (echoing ĀPS 36?): yathaikasmin ghaţākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute/ na sarve saṃprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ//, ‘Just as, if one space within ajar is filled with dust, smoke, etc., not all [spaces in all jars] are so filled, so is the

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[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]Though one space within a [specific] jar is infused830 with quantities of dust, other

such spaces within [other] jars do not thereby become defiled, that is, infused, with dust; these spaces remain [essentially] spotless, because what is common to all of them is the quality of space [and not any adventitious quality, such as being dusty].

The space, itself spotless, pervasive and unvarying, that has come to be limited by the restriction (saṃkoca) of the jar, belongs as such to that jar only, nor are those [analogous] spaces [confined within other] jars or [behind] curtains to be confused with one another, whether they be fumigated with black aloe or made odorous with musk, or simply be bad-smelling831 — because it is of the nature of space to be one,832

and because the distinctions [if such there be] are made in reference to jars themselves and the like [and not to space as such].

Moreover, though real space is situated [everywhere] uniformly, jars and the like, delimited as they are by restrictions — such as [enclosing] sides — that refer only to the jar itself [and not to space], make display of a great variety of [apparently] different spaces.833

Thus, it is the restriction alone made by the jar that is thus qualified by a spatial predicate834 [and not the reverse], because in such terms alone are practical affairs conducted835 [namely, it is useful to speak of the ‘space’ as belonging to the ‘jar’; it is not useful to speak of the ‘jar’ as belonging to or delimiting ‘space’].836

case with the individual souls regarding joy, etc. [i.e., similarly, if one individual soul is filled with joy, etc., not all souls are filled with joy, etc.]’. ĀŚ III 6 (quoted n. 833) further develops the idea.830 samācchādita — lit., ‘covered’.831 The meaning of viţhira (a kāśmīra word?) is doubtful. A jar intended for pickles may be meant, for these are prepared with asa foetida. The fumigation or perfuming of the space in the jar, which makes the space unique, corresponds, as upameya in the analogy, to the vāsanās, the dispositions responsible for the seeming individuations of the universal ātman. YR is playing here, at the end, on the etymological ambiguity of the terms vāsanā and adhivāsita, which may be derived either from the root vas, ‘to dwell’ (a more probable etymology, according to Renou 1997, vol. II: 778, who translates ‘residence’), or vās, ‘to perfume’.832 Note the unique character of space (ākāśa) among the elements enumerated by the Vaiśeşikas; it is said not to be a sāmānya, ‘universal’, precisely because, unlike all the other elements, it has no instances.833 ĀŚ III 6 formulates the same truth: rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vail ākāśasya na bhedo ‘sti tadvaj jīveşu nirņayaḥ//, ‘The form, the function and the denomination [of the spaces contained in jars, etc.] differ indeed from one to another, although difference cannot be predicated of space itself. So it is with the limited selves’. Śaṅkara, ad ĀS III 5, mentioning containers such as jars (ghaţa), water-pots (karaka) and bedrooms (apavaraka), explains that they differ from each other by form (they are small, large, etc.), function (drawing water, keeping it, going to sleep), or denomination (ghaţa, karaka, apavaraka). The differences proceed from the containers, not from the space, which is not qualified by the containers.834 We have emended tathā avaśişyate to tathā viśişyate; see our ‘List of variants’ in ‘On the Sanskrit text’.835 arthakriyākāritvāt — lit., ‘[and this is justified] by the use to which the jar is put’.836 The affairs of men are conducted with particular ends in view, ends that are supplied by men (arthakriyākāritvāt) — it is thus more useful to suppose that space has been delimited by the jar (we say that this jar has ‘more’ space in it that another, and thereby that the jar is ‘larger’); it is less useful to affirm what is in fact the true point of view, that the jar is itself a

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Nor is it the case that this putative corruption, etc., of the space within a [specific] jar conceals the [undivided] nature [of space], nor that the different spaces thus delimited by the jar, etc., are confused837 with one another.

Like that — that is, in the same way — those embodied souls (jīva) — that is, mundane men (puruşa) — though essentially nothing but uniform consciousness, have been made finite by rejecting their own essence, which is full, pervasive, a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, enclosing themselves in the triad of coverings (kośatraya) that are [the impurities] of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions838 — in virtue of the Supreme Lord’s power of differentiation [or, power of delusive construction].

For which reason, although they are essentially uniform consciousness, they differ from one another, due to the evil disposition839 of the delimitation imposed on them by the three coverings [viz., by the triad of impurities],840 a delimitation that is specific to each [of the three], just as differ from one another spaces delimited by jars, curtains, etc.

For example, the delimitation brought about by the covering of māyā (māyīyakośa) is commonly referred to as the embodied soul.

Moreover, in none of the other schools of philosophy do the terms jīva, puruşa, ātman, aṇu,841 apply to the Supreme Lord, a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness.

Thus, these embodied souls, delimited by the sheaths [of impurities] — the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — are not confused with one another, acquiring diverse bodies perfumed by beginningless and wonderfully varied latent dispositions842 imposed on them by the impurity of supposing oneself the agent of actions, having diverse intentions, and partaking of the differences expressed by the pairs of opposites — merit and demerit, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain, birth and death — just as are not confused the spaces within different jars [etc.], which, delimited by a [particular] jar, etc., are variously perfumed by diverse substances.

random delimitation of space, in itself infinite and without parts. Usage normally reflects human activity and is thus explained; but metaphysics requires at times a more exact language.837 vyāmiśranā — examples of nouns in -anā (fem.) are attested — see Whitney 1983: § 1150.2.h, etc.838 āņavamāyīyaprakŗta — see kārikā 32. Note that, here, prākŗta [mala] stands for kārma [mala].839 daurātmya.840 Not all subjects are equally affected by the three impurities (mala). In effect, in the process of liberation, the mumukşu ascends the hierarchy of the seven "cognizers" (saptapramātŗ) according to his ability to free himself progressively from the impurities (see Appendix 10, p. 330).841 These terms, of course, have many acceptations in the different systems of Indian thought. Possible references are to the Lokāyatas, which takes the jīva, ‘principle of life’, as the sole reality; to the Sāṃkhya, which understands the puruşa as one of two fundamental Principles; and possibly to the Vaiśeşika, where ātman designates the category of "spiritual" substance and aņu the ‘atom’ or fundamental unit of "nature".842 Same terminology in YR ad 53.

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Thus, it is quite justified to conclude that, though essentially nothing but uniform consciousness, ‘[embodied souls] experience difference from one another because of their own delimitation’.

Kārikā 38Thus, the particular states that refer to the host843 of embodied souls are said to belong to the Lord only in a secondary sense [i.e., are only metaphorically ascribed to him], for none exist really there [viz., in the Lord]. The master says:

38. When the host of principles [namely, the sense-organs] is tranquil, the Lord is, as it were, tranquil; when delighted, he is delighted; when deluded, he is deluded; but, in truth, he is not so.844

When the host of principles, that is, the host of sense-organs, is tranquil, that is, when they have ceased to function, the supreme Self thereto pertinent is [also] deemed to have become tranquil, that is, to have perished, as it were.

Similarly, when that [host of sense-organs] is delighted (hŗşţa), that is, disposed to exult (sāhlāda), he is said metaphorically to be so [i.e., to be delighted].

Moreover, when [that host is] deluded (mūḍhe = vimohavati), enveloped in tamas, he is [deemed to be] deluded (mohavān = mūḍhaḥ), as for instance when he is seen as the origin of stationary beings.845

But in truth (paramārthataḥ), that is, in point of view of fact (vastuvŗttena), he, the Supreme Lord, is not so, that is, [does not exist] in the same way as do [those phenomena]. For everything that partakes of insentience must either be born or be destroyed [or both]; but neither destruction nor origination apply to the unchanging Lord, whose nature is consciousness and whom we refer to [as enclosed] within the sheaths of māyā, etc.846 Hence, the Lord is ever the same.

Kārikā 39The error that has come to pass in the process of elaborating [the world of our experience] (samutpattikrameņā) is moreover completely uprooted in the process of

843 maņḍala.844 In kā. 37, consciousness was considered from the perspective of the finite jīva, as involving an ever-recurring variety of states, such as pleasure and pain. Now, from the perspective of the Lord (bhagavat), these various states appear as aspects of his own Being here captioned in language suggestive of the three guņas of the Sāṃkhya. Same content, but slightly different formulation, in ĀPS 34 (note a misprint in Silburn, who compares this kārikā with ĀPS 37), the main variant being that, here, tattvagaņa replaces manas of ĀPS: śānta iva manasi śānte hŗşţe hŗşţa iva mūḍha iva mūḍhe/ vyavahārastho na punaḥ paramārthata īśvaro bhavati, ‘In the usual conception, yet not according to ultimate reality, the Lord is, as it were, calm, if mind (manas) is calm; he is, as it were, joyed, if mind is joyed; he is, as it were, deluded, if mind is deluded’ (tr. Danielson, modified); on the interpretation of ĀPS 34, see Danielson ĀPS, n. 136-137, pp. 56-57.845 sthāvarayoni — B&R cite, s.v. sthāvara, in re ‘fixed’ plants, the apparently parallel formation ‘sthāvarotpatti’ from a medical text (but do not offer a gloss) and the Bhāgavatapurāņa (III 10, 18ff.) avers that the seventh, among the nine "creations" of Brahma, is that of ‘fixed (taşţhuşām) entities — plants and trees — suggesting the possibility that Brahma himself might justifiably be called "sthāvarayoni". On sthāvara, ‘stationary being’, meaning the subcategory of ‘animals’ that include plants and trees, see n. 322.846 māyādikañcuka — it is the hexadic sheath consisting of māyā and the five kañcukas.

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achieving enlightenment (jñaptikrameņa).847 And [therein consists] one’s own freedom. The master says:

39. After initially setting aside the error that consists in the Self appearing in the form of the non-Self, the supreme Self sloughs off then the erroneous view whereby the non-Self is projected onto the Self.848

[The Self,] having firstly, that is, in the beginning, set aside its appearance in the form of the non-Self, that is, in such insentient things as the body, etc., as signaled by judgments such as: ‘I am slim’, ‘I am stout’, which is nothing but predicating the Self of the non-Self849 —

[— that is,] having abandoned the notion that the adventitious body and the like is to be seen as the cognizer,850 thanks to the irruption (sphuraņā) [into consciousness] of non-adventitious ipseity (akŗtrimāhantā), such that one now judges: ‘I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness; my nature is unconditioned; I am free’;851

[having first done this,] the Self, its bondage to the body dissolved, and having thus approached the status of supreme Self, then sloughs off the erroneous view (bhrānti) that consists in the display of difference — that display which is generated by the conceit attributing to the body and the like the capacity to cognize (dehādipramātŗtābhimāna).

847 In the context of the ‘process of creation’, the external manifestation of the Lord viewed as a succession of principles (tattva), which is also the ‘genesis of bondage’, kārikās 30 and 31 have dealt with metaphysical ignorance (avidyā). Symmetrically, kārikās 39-40 expound the reverse process, that of liberation through knowledge, or enlightenment, i.e., through the realization, or ‘recognition’, of ultimate reality.848 There are two levels or grades of the error that constitutes human finitude (see, infra, TĀV V 105b-107a, vol. III: 1032). The first, described in PS 25 and 30, consists in taking the Self to be the non-Self, i.e., in forgetting one’s own plenitude and in apprehending oneself as a finite subject, defined in relation to an object. Thereupon intervenes the second level of error: taking the non-Self (body, buddhi, etc.) to be the Self, that is, predicating the Self of the non-Self, so that we assert ‘I am fat’, ‘I am intelligent’, etc. As PS 31 formulates it, it is error heaped upon error (‘rengregement de mal’, to borrow from L’Avare), ‘darkness upon darkness’ (timirād api timiram idam), or, having recourse to another analogy: ‘a great “pustule upon a boil”’ (gaņḍasyopari mahān ayaṃ sphoţaḥ). Similar speculations on the two grades of error are seen throughout the PS (see YR ad 53, 60) and are also present in texts such as ĀŚ I 11, 13, 15. See n. 728; also TĀ V 105b-107a: ātmany anātmābhimatau satyam eva hy anātmani// ātmābhimāno dehādau bandho muktis tu tal layaḥ/ ādāv anātmany ātmatve līne labdhe nijātmani// ātmany anātmatānāśe mahāvyāptiḥ pravartate/, ‘Bondage consists in taking the body, etc., which is not the Self, to be the Self, whereas taking the Self as the non-Self persists. Liberation (mukti) consists in the dissolution of those [two errors]. When the belief that the non-Self is the Self has first vanished, [and, thereafter,] when the Self is no longer considered to be the non-Self, so that [the real nature of] one’s own Self is attained, the Great pervasion (mahāvyāpti) [i.e., the complete fusion with the ultimate reality] takes place’; on mahāvyāpti, see JR’s gloss: paraṃ pārameśvaryam udiyād ity arthaḥ, ‘Then, the supreme Lordship may rise’. TĀV ad loc. comments (vol. III: 1032): iha khalu dvidhā bandha ātmany anātmābhimāno ‘nātmany ātmābhimānaś ca, iti tad eva cāņavaṃ malam ucyate, ‘Here, there are two kinds of bondage: taking the Self as the non-Self, and the non-Self as the Self. This is called the āņavamala, the impurity of [deeming oneself] finite’. Thereafter TĀV V 105b-107a quotes ĪPK III 2, 4 defining the twofold āņavamala.849 Lit, ‘... [nothing but] consideration (parāmarśana) [of objects] having reference to the non-Self, in terms of the Self’.850 A synonym of kŗtrimapramāţŗ is kalpitapramātŗ; see ĪPV I 5, 1 (vol. I: 197).851 aham cidānandaikaghano ‘navacchinnasvabhāvaḥ svatantraś ca.

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This erroneous view [consists in the projection of the non-Self] onto that Self — the universal category852 whose form is manifestation (sphuradrūpa), whose embodiment is Light (prakāśavapus), even though it appears as its own components853 [that is, as multiple].

[This may be further explained as follows:] [the Self] grinds utterly to dust [such illusion], in the realization: ‘I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe’.854

Of this the purport is: as long as the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — the body, etc. — does not dissipate, so long does the delusion not dissolve855 that consists in valorizing difference856 in this world, [the things of] which are even so but the display of one’s own Self (svātmaprathā).

Hence, it is the Lord alone, the supreme Self alone — that is, the Great Lord that is one’s own Self857 — who causes the destruction of the error consisting in the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self, by destroying the erroneous view consisting in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — and in this matter none other has such capacity.

Kārikā 40Thus, because this pair of errors has been let go, there is left nothing at all for the adept of this discipline to accomplish, for he has become [identical with] the Supreme Lord. The master says:

40. In this way, when these twin delusions have been cut off, along with their roots, there is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else.858

852 viśvapadārtha.853 svāṅgakalpa.854 aham eva eko viśvātmanā sphurāmi.855 Same terminology in YR ad 53.856 bhedaprathā — lit., ‘display of difference’.857 Cf. TĀV V 151: svātmaiva hi parameśvaraḥ śivaḥ.858 In addition to accounting for the two levels of error and the resulting conception of mokşa, kārikā 39-40 deal implicity with the notion of śāktopāya, ‘way of energy’, which will again be taken up in those following (41 to 46). The doctrine of the upāyas has been considerably developed in the Trika at the instigation of AG who dedicates to their exposition, partly or entirely, the first five chapters of his TĀ. In TĀ I 167-170, AG presents the doctrine as derived from the MVT, the authoritative Scripture in this system, of which he quotes three verses (MVT II 23, 22 and 21), and says (TĀ I 213) that he received this system of classification from his teacher Saṃbhunātha. To the original threefold classification, AG adds a fourth category, the anupāya, or ‘non-means’, ‘non-way’. TĀ I 171-232 expounds in detail the four upāyas, āņavopāya, śāktopāya, śāṃbhavopāya and anupāya, beginning with the lowest (on the four, see TĀ I-V, Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 52-60). That the śāktopāya is alluded to within the span of kārikās 39-46 is shown by the avat. ad 39, which states that ‘the error is completely uprooted in the process of achieving enlightenment (jñaptikrameņa)’. For what distinguishes the śāktopāya from the higher śāṃbhavopāya is precisely its discursive and sequential character, inseparable from recourse to ‘enlightenment’ and the practice of yoga. The śāktopāya is also called jñānopāya, ‘means (or way) of knowledge’, thus named, for Śiva, as ‘possessor of the śakti’ (śaktimat), is known through his śakti, who further divides herself into Will (icchā), Knowledge (jñāna) and Action (kriyā). It is also called jñānaśaktyupāya, ‘means of cognitive energy’, for it consists in the yogin’s transforming his jñānaśakti, his cognitive energy, into an intuition, a mystical realization — bhāvanā in this system, śāṃbhavopāya is characterized by non-discursivity and immediacy; śāktopāya by discursivity and mediacy. śāṃbhavopāya and

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Once in this way, that is, in the manner expounded in the [previous] kārikā, the budding shoots of this pair of errors have been crushed,

of him who has attained his goal (kŗtārtha), that is, by whom the goal (artha) — the realization of [ultimate] human purpose (puruşārtha) — has been effected (kŗta), that is to say, reached, by sloughing off the entirety of restrictions limiting the recognition (parijñapti) of his own freedom, and who is thus disciplined in accord with most excellent yoga,

[of such a one] no penchant, that is, no activity of the mind, is ever directed to the accomplishment of anything else, that is, to any remaining acts such as pilgrimage, confining oneself to a certain region,859 initiation, silent (or whispered) recitation, meditation, listening to the exposition [of the canons], etc.,860 for,

This is the supreme dharma, namely, to see the Self through discipline.861

śāktopāya are respectively the effects of an ‘extremely intense grace’ (tīvratīvraśaktipāta) and of a ‘moderately intense grace’ (tīvramadhyaśaktipāta). Thus, TĀV (ad III 292, vol. II: 693) adduces the absence of ‘extremely intense grace’ as reason for the inability to follow the ‘way of Śaṃbhu’, and later observes (TĀV IV 276b) that ‘the one purified by the most intense grace’ is purified (pavitrita) with the śāṃbhavopāya: kaścid eva tīvratamaśaktipātapavitritaḥ. The repeated definition of the śāṃbhavopāya is "akiṃciccintana", the ‘thought of nothing’, that is, the experience of non-discursive consciousness (see TĀ I 168a = MVT II 23, which defines him who attains the śāṃbhavopāya as "akiṃciccintaka"; I 171; V 156b), whereas the meditative or mystical realization (bhāvanā), discursive by nature, characterizes the śāktopāya; cf. TĀV V 156b: akiṃciccintanaṃ śāṃbhavaḥ/ bhāvanā śāktaḥ; also TĀ I 178b-l79a: tenāvikalpā saṃvittir bhāvanādyanapeksiņī// śivatādātmyam āpannā samāveśo ‘tra śāṃbhavaḥ/, ‘Therefore, the absorption proper to Śaṃbhu is non-discursive consciousness, independent of all bhāvanā, etc., in which one attains identity with Śiva’; see also Intr., p. 51. On bhāvanā, see Appendix 20, p. 345.859 Confining oneself to a certain region is a vow, an observance (vrata); cf. TĀ IV 258b-263a. PS 79-80 will dilate upon the vow of the jñānin.860 Same development in PS 69 and YR ad loc. One observes the same logic of exposition in the fourth chapter of TĀ, entirely dedicated to the śāktopāya. In the course of expounding the procedures at work in the śāktopāya — vikalpasaṃskāra (or vikalpaśuddhi), ‘purification of the vikalpas’ (1-12), mantric practices (181b-193) and other truly mystical practices, such as japa, etc. (194-211) — TĀ IV deals with the uselessness of external rituals (109b-122a), and proclaims (212-277), citing as authority the MVT (quoting MVT XVIII 74-84 as ślokas 213-221a), the vanity of prescriptions and prohibitions, especially those relating to purity and impurity; see also TS IV, pp. 31-32 (tr. Silburn 1981: 194), which concludes: na hi śuddhir vastuno rūpaṃ nīlatvavat, anyatra tasyaiva aśuddhicodanāt, ‘Purity indeed does not constitute the essence of the thing, as does the blue color, for, elsewhere [viz., in other schools], the same thing would be declared as impure and as such the object of an injunction’.861 Yājñavalkyasmŗti [YājS] 18. The complete verse is: ijyācāradamāhiṃsādānasvādhyāyakarmaņam/ ayaṃ tu paramo dharmo yad yogenātmadarśanam//, "There are [dharmic] actions such as sacrifice, good conduct, restraint of the senses, non-violence, liberality, study of the Vedas, but above all, there is a supreme dharma, which is the witnessing of the Self through discipline’. YR’s version of the third pāda differs in a few particulars.

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Thus has been asserted the preeminence of the discipline tending to the realization of one’s own Self (svātmayoga).862 There is no [need of] effort elsewhere on the part of the consummate adept (pūrņayogin), since he has realized that discipline.

As has been stated in the revered Gītā:When the jungle of delusion/ Thy mentality863 shall get across,/ Then thou shalt come to aversion/ Towards what is to be heard and has been heard (in the Veda).864

Karikā 41

862 The yoga referred to in the śāktopāya should not be mistaken for the type of practice proper to the āņavopāya; cf. TĀ IV 88-109a, particularly 106-109a, which quotes MVT XVIII 74 (partly) and 78-79. TS IV, p. 27, defines the yoga proper to the śāktopāya: yad anapekşitavikalpaṃ svābhāvikaṃ paramārthatattvaṃ prakāśate tasyaiva sanātanatathāvidhaprakāśamātratārūdhaye tatsvarūpānusandhānātmā vikalpaviśeşo yogaḥ, ‘Yoga [here] means a particular [mental discipline, the mind exercising itself] vis-a-vis alternatives (vikalpaviśeşa), whose essence is concentration (anusandhāha) on the nature of the supreme truth that shines [in us] naturally and without alternative (anapekşitavikalpa), and is intended for confirming [or ‘making commonplace’: rūḍhi] that [truth] as nothing but that sempiternel shining (prakāśa) as such’.863 The reference to yoga and buddhi is an additional sign that the śāktopāya is at stake here; see TĀ I 214-215.864 BhG II 52. The perfect yogin no longer requires the teachings of the Śruti, i.e., of the Vedas, whether they are those he has already heard and followed, or those that are yet to be heard. Such a yogin — on whom acts cannot possibly be enjoined or forbidden (cf. TĀ IV 212-221a — quotation from the MVT XVIII74-82 — and IV 271-278a) is thus a jīvanmukta. Through one of the numerous etymological plays on the name Abhinavagupta, celebrated as the jīvanmukta par excellence, TĀV IV 278a further defines the jīvanmukta as ‘the one protected (°gupta = parirakşita) everywhere (abhi° = abhitaḥ), i.e., from all differentiation, by the praise (°nava = stava) [of his own Self]’, who is therefore an ‘extraordinary’ (ko ‘pi, glossed as alaukikaḥ) sage, ‘qualified [for that sacrifice (asmin... yāgavidhau) that is the practice of the śāktopāya]’.

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Having explained865 in [the kārikās] immediately following (saṃprati) [kā. 41-43] that [the supreme yogin] reaches a condition of identity with the universe,866 itself replete with apparent differences, from Earth to Illusion867 [— first,] by merging himself in (āveśa) the condition of Śakti,868 which represents [the essential simultaneity of] difference-and-non-difference;869 [— then,] by dissolving all difference as he realizes within himself (samāpatti)870 the condition of Śaṃbhu, which is a mass of perfect Light and bliss,

— the master proceeds then [kā. 44] to explain that [this universe] is like a series of waves871 which arise before our eyes as splendors surging ever forth from Śakti [as

865 From here, the style changes, now imbued with a mystical lyricism, equally evident in the kārikās (notably 47-50, with the striking entrance into the discourse of the first person) and in the commentary (in 41-46, metaphor follows upon metaphor and alliterations are frequent). As well, it is noteworthy that vv. 39-49 have no corresponding verses in the ĀPS, thus constituting a long parenthesis devoted to the esoteric teachings of the Trika. The correspondences resume with PS 50, which corresponds to ĀPS 50 and ĀPS 62. The syntax of this passage is complex. Grammatically, the entire avat. is one sentence, of which the main clause is our final paragraph (‘In sum...’); what precedes is structured as three dependent clauses organized in three times around a gerund (abhidhāya, implying relative past time), a present participle (abhidadhat, implying correlation with the main verb, here simply āha), and a future participle (unmīlayişyat, implying intention), which we have separated also by paragraph indications. The avat. makes reference implicitly to the doctrine of the upāyas, and particularly to two among them: the śāṃbhava° and the śākta°, to which the terms śāṃbhavapada and śāktabhūmikā allude. It is in this context, implicitly established by kā. 38-40, that kā. 41-46 deal, sometimes allusively, with tantric practice, including mantras and mudrās, with special emphasis on the significance and potency of the mantra _______, which is also, according to AG, the esoteric purport of the entire PT, the text referred to by YR ad 43. According to the separate avat. to 43 and 46, what is at stake here, in these five kārikās, is the esoteric mantric tradition (mantrasaṃpradāya), especially that related to the mantra ____. Kārikās 43-46 disclose (with the help of the commentary) the potency (vīryā) proper to the mantra ____, which itself depends on the higher potency of the supreme and primordial mantra, ____, which encloses in itself ‘the full power of all the phonemes, from A to HA, of which mantras consist’ and draws them together ‘in a single point of concentrated energy, the bindu, its final letter)’ (Padoux 1992: 386); see n. 876.866 tadabhedamayatā — cf. YR ad 39: aham eva eko viśvātmanā sphurāmi, ‘I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe’.867 The reference is to the three aņḍas: pŗthvyaņḍa, prakŗtyaņḍa, māyāņḍa.868 śāktabhūmikā — similar terminology in TĀ XXXIV 2 (śāktiṃ bhūmim upāśrayet) which describes a progressive ascent to the nature of Bhairava through āņava°, śākta° and śāṃbhava° upāya: tato ‘py āņavasaṃtyāgāc chāktiṃ bhūmim upāśrayet/ tato ‘pi śāṃbhavīm eva tāratamyakramāt sphuţam//, ‘Then, abandoning the level of the āņava[upāya], one attains the level of energy [viz., that of the śāktopāya], and, afterwards, in turn, clearly that of Śaṃbhu [viz., the śāṃbhavopāya]’. As stated by TĀ IV 187b-188a: tac chaktitritayārohād bhairavīye cidātmani/ vişŗjyate hi tat [...], ‘It is through ascending the triad of the śaktis (śaktitritaya) that [the world] is emitted (or projected: vişŗjyate = visarga: Ḥ) into the consciousness of Bhairava [where it rests]’. The process of reabsorption into pure consciousness is described here.869 Cf. the very similar avat. to kā. 46, which describes the symmetric process of emanation (sŗşţi), q.v. The śāktopāya corresponds to the state of experience termed bhedābheda, ‘difference-and-non-difference’ or ‘unity-in-difference’, since the Lord/sādhaka conceives of the phenomenal universe as both distinct and not distinct from himself; see Intr., p. 25.870 samāpatti — the term, derived from the root pad, means literally, ‘attain completely’ or ‘reach utterly’; therefore, in this context: ‘realization in oneself, ‘unison’, ‘coincidence’,

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their sole source], [splendors] themselves likened to a great current flowing from the abode of Śaṃbhu, a veritable ocean of nectar,872

— and he does this in order to reveal,873 next [kā. 45-46], the ‘Heart of supreme consciousness’ (parasaṃviddhŗdaya),874 which consists in the unison (sāmarasyā)875 of Śiva, Śakti and the finite self, and whose source is the absolute identity (paramādvaya) wherein all differences are dissolved; further, the essential potency (vīrya) [of that revelation] is contained in the Great formula (mahāmantrā), as may be confirmed in one’s own experience.

‘identity’, ‘fusion’, ‘union’; cf. SpN II 7 on tadātmatāsamāpattiḥ: tadātmatāsamāpattiḥ śivāikyāveśo na tu pañcavaktrāder vyatiriktasyākārasya darśanaṃ, na tu niścayamātreņa tadātmatāsamāpattir api tu icchato ‘vikaipaviśvāhantātmakaśivaikyarūpecchāparāmarśādhirūḍhasya, ‘tadātmatāsamāpatti [means] "absorption (āveśa) in Śiva in the form of one’s identity (aikya) with him", and not the visual identification (darśana) with a particular form of him, such as the five-headed Śiva. This identification is not the result of a mere determinate cognition (niścaya), rather it is that of an "aspirant" (icchat) who is firmly fixed (parāmarśa) on his desire to identify himself with Śiva (śivaikya) as the universal "I" (viśvāhantā) not [given in] discursive awareness (avikalpa)’. Also TĀ I 171: jñeyasamāpatti, ‘unison with what is to be known’, and JR ad loc: avikalpātmakasaṃvittādātmyam abhyeti, ‘One attains identity (tādātmya) with non-discursive consciousness’; similarly TĀV V 121 (vol. III: 1046), which glosses bījayonisamāpattyā (121b) as bījayonyātmakaśivaśaktyaikātmyena, thus establishing the equivalence: samāpatti = aikātmya, ‘identity’; also TĀ III 79, where, in a different context, samāpatti is glossed as apŗthagbhāvenāvabhāsanam, ‘manifestation [qualified] by non-separation’ [viz., ‘coincidence’, ‘fusion’] (see also TĀV ad loc). See also ŚSV I 14, and ŚSV I 22, where samāpatti glosses anusandhāna, ‘mental union’, in the sūtra: tatsvātantryāvabhāsitatadakhyātimayaṃ sarvam eva bandhaṃ yathoktodyamātmakabhairavasamāpataḥ praśamayantī, ‘Identity/fusion with Bhairava, the sudden emergence (udyama) [of supreme I-consciousness], as has been already stated [ŚS I 5], sets at naught all bondage that is of the nature of the ignorance brought about by the absolute freedom [of the Lord/consciousness]’. PHvŗ (avat. ad 19) equates samādhi, samāveśa and samāpatti, and defines them as the ‘attainment of consciousness and bliss’ (cidānandalābha): [...] cidānandalābhaḥ, sa eva ca paramayoginaḥ samāveśasamāpattyādiparyāyaḥ samādhiḥ.871 tattattaraṅgabhaṅgirūpatām — cf. VBh 110: jalasyevormayo vahner jvālābharigyāḥ prabhā raveḥ/ mamaiva bhairavasyaitā viśvabhaṅgyo vibheditāḥ.872 mahāpravāhadeśīyaśāktaprasarollāsapramukham — lit., ‘which arise before our eyes (°pramukham) as splendors surging ever forth (°prasarollāsa°) from Śakti (°śākta°), [splendors] themselves likened to a great current (mahāpravāhadeśīya°) [...]’. Cf. TĀ V 123 and its commentary which may help to elucidate this passage: atra bhairavanāthasya sasaṃkocavikāsikā/ bhāsate durghaţā śaktir asaṃkocavikāsinaḥ//, ‘There, accomplishing the impossible, the energy of Bhairava, who never expands or contracts, manifests itself in expansion and contraction’, and TĀV ad loc: atrānandapūrņe dhāmni asaṃkocavikāsino nistaraṅgajaladhiprakhyasya pūrņasya prakāśasya sasaṃkocavikāsikā sadaiva sŗşţisaṃhāramayī, ata eva durghaţakāriņī svātantryākhyā śaktiḥ bhāsate svātmaikātmyena prathate, yan māhātmyādiyān viśvasphāraḥ sadaiva sŗştisaṃhāradaśādhiśāyitām eāty arthaḥ, ‘"There" [means] in that place overflowing with delight; — "[Bhairava] who never expands or contracts" [refers to] all-encompassing Light, said to be [like] an ocean without waves; — "in expansion and contraction" [means] eternally composed of creative and destructive [forces]. — For this very reason, [his] "energy" [is said to] "accomplish the impossible", in virtue of which it may also be termed freedom; — [and so, that energy] “manifests itself”, [that is] it extends itself [as everything visible] inasmuch as it is [ever] identical with itself [viz.,

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In sum, he declares [kā. 41-46] that the universe is made one [and is absorbed in the pure Being], through the procedure of synthesizing (saṃkalana) the natures of the three spheres, as [stated] in the Āgamas:876

41. For877 the triad of Earth, Nature and Illusion,878 erroneously consigned879

to the status of ‘that which is to be known’, becomes, by the force of the realization of nonduality,880 a residue of pure Being.

As to the threefold [reality] in the form of the gross, the subtle and the supreme, which constitutes the essence of the spheres of Earth, Nature, and Illusion respectively, [that was at first] erroneously consigned to the status of what is to be known, that is, did attain the status of field of knowledge, [it is that very reality

incapable of abolishing its own nature]’. And JR continues: ‘— because of whose grandiose work (yan māhātmyāt), the emergence of the universe [is attested] in such a form (iyān — viz., "takes on the limited form that we apprehend"), eternally tending toward being governed by conditions of creation and destruction’. See also TĀ IV 184b: ūrmir eşā vibodhābdher na saṃvid anayā vinā, ‘[The spanda] is a wave in the ocean of consciousness, and consciousness [like the ocean] cannot be without a wave’, where the wave (ūrmi) serves as a metaphor for spanda/vimarśa, and the ocean symbolizes pure consciousness, or Light (prakāśa); also, the following verse (in SpN I 1), quoted from an Āgama’: ūrmir eşā vibodhābdheḥ śaktir icchātmikā prabhoḥ,’ [The Goddess, as Śakti] is the wave of the ocean of consciousness, the volitional power of the Lord’ (tr. Singh SpK: 11). Cf. the hymns of the Krama-Mahārtha that celebrate the Kālīs, emanations of the supreme Kālī, who are also worshiped in the Wheel of energies: Śrīkālikāstotra 11; Kramastotra 1; AG’s Kramastotra 10 (Silburn Anuttarāşţikā).873 unmīlayişyat.874 I.e., the pulsating Absolute, as invoked in the maṅgalācaraņa of Kşemarāja’s Parāpraveśikā: viśvātmakāṃ taduttīrņāṃ hŗdayaṃ parameśituḥ/ parādiśaktirūpeņa sphurantiṃ saṃvidaṃ numaḥ//, ‘Adoration to the Heart (hŗdaya) of the Supreme Lord, the absolute consciousness immanent in the universe and [as well] transcendent that manifests (sphurantī) in the form of the Supreme Śakti (parāśakti) and [in lesser powers], as well’. Thus, hŗdaya is the Anuttara, the ‘unsurpassable’ in which Śiva and Śakti unite, that is, the luminous consciousness (prakāśa) and the Light of Light, the ‘self-referential consciousness’ (to borrow the term of Muller-Ortega 1997), named vimarśa, of which spanda is one of the numerous synonyms. See also SpN IV 2: prakāśavimarśātmakaṃ hŗdayam eva. Definitions of the divine Heart emphasize sometimes its Śakti dimension, sometimes its prakāśa aspect, and sometimes they combine both. Nevertheless, the Heart, or Absolute, is to be seen as a triangle, for, as will be stressed by YR in his commentary on 41, this Heart-Absolute is the place in which merge not only Śiva and Śakti, but also nara, the finite soul, that is, the entire phenomenal world (jagat). It is also what is taught by the gloss on the Parāpraveśikā quoted above, but from the point of view of emanation: iha khalu parameśvaraḥ prakāśātmāprakāśāś ca vimarśasvabhāvaḥ [...] svayaṃprakāśarūpaḥ parameśvaraḥ pārameśvaryā śaktyā śivādidharaņyantajagadātmanā sphurati prakāśate ca, ‘The Supreme Lord who is luminous in and of himself (svayaṃprakāśa) appears and shines forth thanks to Śakti, his consort, as the world, starting from Śiva and ending in earth [— viz., the subtlest and the grossest forms of existence] ‘. On the Heart in Śaiva texts, see particularly Muller-Ortega 1997, Padoux PTLvŗ: 65-66; 1992: 387, 417-419. The mantra ____ — whose essence is _____, the paramantra, ‘supreme mantra’ — is the phonic form of this pulsating Absolute. Symbolizing the pulsating Absolute, this mantra is also a means to attain that Absolute, through the mystical realization (bhāvanā) proper to the śāktopāya. Cf. YR ad 43, which quotes PT 9-10, where the mantra ___ is said to be the ‘Heart’ (hŗdaya) ‘of the nature of Bhairava/supreme consciousness’ (bhairavātman).875 Here is one of the symbolic justifications of the term ‘Trika’, the ‘Triad’: nara, Śakti and Śiva stand respectively for the knowable (vedya, or the ‘object to be known’), knowledge (vedana), and the knower (vedaka), again symbolically equated with the phonemes ___ and ___ see PTLvŗ 21-24: tad etad vedyavedanavedakaviśrāntitrayam ayaṃ varņatrayasvarūpaṃ tat trayam,

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which now] becomes a residue of pure Being (sanmātra), that is, whose essence is nothing but Being, which, in turn, is nothing but Light, by the force, that is, the excellence, of what is [termed] the realization of nonduality, in accordance with the rule taught in the revered Kālikākrama:881

Cognition/consciousness (jñāna)882 manifests itself externally and internally as a variety of forms.883 In the absence of cognition/consciousness, no object exists. Hence, the world has the form of cognition/consciousness. In the absence of cognition/consciousness, no entities can be made into objects by anyone. From this it is concluded that cognition/consciousness constitutes the essence of those entities.

‘Such is the nature of the three phonemes [___]. It is a triad for it consists of a threefold repose in the knowable, knowledge and the knower’.876 After this preamble, YR’s commentary on each kā. makes clear that the progression of the text (kā. 41-46) is modeled on that of the enunciation of ___. It also indicates how the symbolic meaning of the mantra is to be construed, constituent by constituent. Kā. 41-42 allude thus to, the first phoneme of ___; kā. 43 associates __ with __; kā. 44 deals then with __ specifically; kā. 45 alludes to __, which completes the mantra, whose enunciation reflects the movement whereby the world is internalized within consciousness; kā. 46 represents the enunciation of ___ in the reverse movement of externalizing the world by the same consciousness.877 Glossing hi of 41b with yasmāt, YR’s commentary emphasizes the logical link between kārikās 40 and 41: ‘There is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else’ (40), ‘for’, by the power of bhāvanā, he sees phenomenal diversity as ‘a residue of pure Being’ (41).878 As shown by the gloss, three of the four aņḍas are referred to here.879 °āpatita.880 advaitabhāvana — note the usage here of the neuter (bhāvana), in the verse and commentary, for metrical reasons, instead of the more common feminine form (on bhāvanā as meditative realization, see YR ad PS 52 and 68). Kārikā 41 deals with the meditative realization in which the śāktopāya culminates. The last sentence of the general avat. ad 41-46 amounts to a description of that experience: ‘In sum, he declares that the universe is made one through the procedure of synthesizing the natures of the three spheres’. It is YR’s commentary that develops the esoteric meaning of the kārikā. It will take up the question again while explaining kā. 43, revealing more explicitly that mystical realization is obtained through meditation on the mantra ___. Therefore, by implication, it appears that kārikā 41 aims at giving a cryptically symbolic interpretation of [=, ‘pure Being’], the first phoneme of ___. Note that Silburn does not translate advaita° in the compound advaitabhāvanabalāt: ‘Car cette trinite: terre, nature, illusion, qui accede a l’objectivite se reduit, grace a l’efficace de la realisation mystique, a l’etre pur’.881 The same passage is quoted in PM 2, a Krama text, and attributed to the Devikākrama, which thus appears to be another name of the Kālikākrama. This text has not come down to us, except through quotations. Kşemarāja, in ŚSV III 30 (ad svaśaktipracayo ‘sya viśvam, ‘The universe is the unfolding of his own energy’), quotes a longer version of the same passage, ascribed to the Kālikākrama, whose conclusion is: yugapadvedanāj jñānajñeyayor ekarūpatā, ‘[The conclusion] that knowledge and the known have one and the same nature [derives] from their being simultaneously apprehended’ (cf. Silburn’s transl. [SŚ: 99] and Torella’s transl. [ĪPK: XXVIII, n. 42]) — an argument also made by the Vijñānavādins: the invariable correspondence between symbol and signified object establishes that the latter is not independent of the former; see Sanderson’s interpretation of the verse as quoted in ŚSV III 30 (2007: 369-370). The pratika of the verse that follows those quoted here by YR (asti nāstivibhāgena ...) is again quoted in ŚSV III 31. The same two verses quoted by YR are cited in TAV III 57 (vol. II: 418) and V 80 (vol. III: 2006), and ŚSV quotes other verses, ad III 31, 32, 40, 41, 44. It is interesting to note that YR quotes here a text of a Krama background; see Intr., p.

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hi is used here in the sense of ‘for’ (yasmāt).

Kārikā 42[The master] confirms this thesis [by means of an example], with the intention of [further] establishing the non-reality of difference:

42. Just as girdles, earrings, and bracelets, by setting aside their differences, are seen to be gold,884 so likewise, the universe appears as pure Being, when difference is set aside.885

As, indeed, golden ornaments — girdles, etc. — are gold and nothing else for him who is interested only in gold, by abstracting the particular form [imposed on the gold], namely, the girdle; and as gold, silver, bronze, copper, lead, etc., appear as metal only [and not as the particular metals the names suggest] to him who is interested in metal as such, so likewise, this universe, when difference is set aside, is pure Being (sanmātrā) — that whose essence is Being alone (sattāmātra) — for the yogin [whose mind is] grounded in non-discursive awareness (praribhāsa) alone, by whom has been jettisoned the stain of thought-constructs, such as those enjoining abandonment [of whatever is prohibited or not agreeable] or acceptance [of whatever

21.882 We translate jñāna as ‘cognition/consciousness’ in the light of Kşemarāja’s commentary on the parallel passage of the NT (also quoted in ŚSV III 30). jñānamaya, epithet of the Lord, is there glossed as cinmātraparamārthaḥ, ‘whose ultimate meaning is that it is "nothing but cognition/consciousness."’883 Consciousness appears externally as objective experience: of the jar, or the color blue, etc., and internally as subjective experience: of pleasure, pain, etc.884 At issue is the thesis that phenomenal diversity is not ontologically different from pure Being. Cf. SpP 2 [= ad I 2], pp. 12-13: yato bodhyasya svayaṃ sattaiva nāsty ato bodhŗrūpam anāvŗtam evāvasthādvaye ‘pi, ‘No object of consciousness can exist independently [of the subject], thus the conscious subject [who is, on the contrary, perfectly autonomous] is completely unobscured in both the states [of cosmic manifestation and withdrawal]’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 147). Thereafter, SpP 2 quotes two parallel stanzas, which explain the metaphor of gold and its ornaments as alluding to the double movement of creation and dissolution: yathā hemno rūpakeşu vaicitryaṃ svāparicyuteḥ/ atha nityasvarūpasya tathā te viśvarupatā// yathā galitarūpasya hemnaḥ piņḍātmanā sthitiḥ/ tathā galitavedyasya tava śuddhacidātmatā//, ‘Just as gold fashioned into jewelery is, without undergoing any change, wonderfully varied, so is Your form as all things [which You assume even as] You persist just as You are. Just as gold, losing its form, persists as a gold ingot (piņḍa), in the same way Your pure conscious nature persists when objectivity falls away [from You]’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 147, modified). See also, in a Vaişņava context, Saṃvitprakāśa I 104b-106a, quoted in SpP (p. 4). It establishes that, whether the world is an illusory change in the Absolute, or is considered a product of real change in the Absolute, such as is the case with the numerous ornaments made of gold, the Absolute, the ultimate reality and ground of phenomenal diversity, remains substantially the same: [...] pariņāme sa eva tvaṃ suvarņam iva kuņḍale, ‘[...] In case of [the world considered as real] change [in the Absolute], it is You who persist, as the gold [remains gold] in the very form of the earring’. Also Saṃvitprakāśa I 56-57 quoted in SpP 5 [= ad I 5] and LT XIV 38-39. Such speculations (and YR’s here in particular) go back ultimately to ChU VI 1, 4ff., Uddālaka’s discourse on the unity of Being: ... sarvaṃ mŗnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syād vācārambhaņaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mŗttikety eva satyam, etc.; the examples of gold (loha), and iron (kŗşņāyasa) follow.885 Through other analogies (limbs and body, clay objects and clay itself), ĀPS 46 presents the same argument, whereas ĀPS 58-59 describe how the yogin merges plurality (lit., ‘duality’, dvaita) into the state of brahman by meditative realization (bhāvanā).

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is prescribed or agreeable] — in accordance with the rule laid down by the revered Kallaţa:

That [viz., the mudrā śaktivikāsa, ‘blossoming of energy’] is accomplished by means of the transformation [of consciousness, even] in the presence of forms, etc.886

Kārikā 43Now, alluding to887 the tradition of the mystic formula,888 the master describes the ascent of the universe, limited as it is in the form of finite beings,889 to the state of Śakti [i.e., self-consciousness], according to the wellknown [path taught in the] Āgamas which depends upon abandoning the appearance of limitation:

43. That [universe so qualified], which is brahman, supreme, pure, tranquil, undifferentiated, even, whole, immortal, real,890 reposes in Śakti,891 whose form is luminosity.

[YR takes up these epithets, one after another, and comments on them, apprehending, if not a causal, at least a rhetorical sequence:]

This, namely, this universe, whose essence is pure Being is called brahman, because it extends.892 As say those expert in the upanişads:

In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone [...].893

Having said this (or ‘therefore’ — iti), it is supreme (para), because it is full (pūrņa);894 and it is pure (śuddha),895 due to the absence of [thought-constructs such as] injunctions and prohibitions;896 [furthermore,] it is tranquil (śānta), due to the repression of particularity; and for that very reason, it is undifferentiated (abhedātmaka); it is even (sama) [i.e., ever identical to itself], due to the absence of increase or decrease — [It is said:]

886 We have derived the meaning of this rather enigmatic statement from the context of PHvŗ 18, which quotes the same hemistich and similarly ascribes it to Kallaţa without giving the title of the work from which it is borrowed. On Kallaţa, see Appendix 19, p. 343.887 kaţākşayan — lit., ‘casting a sidelong glance at’.888 mantrasaṃpradāya — YR reveals here, although cryptically (for he quotes two esoteric verses of the PT), that this portion of the text can be seen, on a second level of interpretation, as dealing with the mystical meaning of the mantra ___ which is the phonic form of the Anuttara, the vibrating absolute in which the triad of nara (jagat), Śakti and Śiva ( = brahman) merges.889 See the avat. ad 41 and 46.890 The same pattern of enumeration is evident in kā. 10-11.891 That is, YR explains, ‘it becomes composed of that’ (tanmayībhavati), in effect, ‘becomes identical with [supreme energy]’.892 bŗhattvāt — on the etymology of brahman, see YR ad 51 (and n. 975) and 104.893 ChU VI 2, 1. The complete text is: sad eva saumya idam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam, ‘In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only without a second’. Note that the Laghuvŗtti ad PT (whose subject is the mantra___) quotes the same passage while commenting on verses 4-5.894 See YR ad PS 1 for a similar definition of para.895 As shown by PS 10-11, which enumerates śuddha among the epithets of the ultimate principle (paratattva), and YR ad loc, ‘pure’ means ‘free of stain (vimala), due to the absence of the soot-like impurity (aśuddhimaşi) found in thought constructs’. Symmetrically, impurity derives from those very thought constructs — hence, in māyā, from differentiation.896 See YR ad 42 who gives tyaktahānādāna as an example of vikalpa; also YR ad 10-11.

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Even a part represents the universality of brahman [viz., its capacity to assume all forms]. Neither has it been exceeded, nor can it be diminished.897

Such being the case, it is whole (sakala), and for that reason, immortal (amŗta), that is, imperishable;898 and it is real (satya), in keeping with the theses set forth by the revered Bhartŗhari:

Of the real and unreal elements that are found in every object, the real element is the genus, whereas the unreal one is the particular.899

And:That which exists in the beginning, in the end and also in the middle, alone has reality.900

897 Verse already quoted by YR ad 5, but, there, put in the mouth of an objector stressing the paradoxical character of a doctrine that maintains both that the Lord is all and that the finite soul is different from him. Here, PS 43 answers the objection with the epithet ‘real’ (satya).898 YR ad 10-11 glosses ‘free of dissolution and creation’ (layodayavihīna) with ‘eternal’ (sanātana).899 VP III 1, 32 (tr. Iyer). For the discussion of a variant, see ‘On the Sanskrit Text’.900 Lit, ‘(is) its [viz., brahman’s] truth/reality’. The element that perdures is equivalent to the Being of the object. In this way, it is signified that the gold, not the ring, is the Real. SpN I 5 quotes the entire verse (whose source has not been identified), of which the second hemistich is: na yad ābhāsate tasya satyatvaṃ tāvad eva hi//, ‘That which simply appears has no reality; it is real only as long as it appears’ (tr. Singh SpK: 48). Kşemarāja offers a clue for understanding the verse, explaining that eva has to be added three times in the first hemistich (sāvadhāraņatvāt sarvavākyānām evakāro ‘tra trir yojyaḥ), so as to read: yad ādau ca tasya eva satyatā, yad ante ca tasya eva satyatā, yan madhye ca tasya eva satyatā. The citation occurs in the midst of Kşemarāja’s discussion of the supreme Subject which, defined as spanda-śakti, is taken to be sole reality and is to be distinguished from the empirical, finite, psychosomatic subject (māyāpramātŗ). Other conceptions of ultimate reality that amount to taking as real what is but transitory (such as the Buddhist view of a continuum of instantaneous cognitions) are therefore unreal from the viewpoint of the Absolute (see Appendix 14, p. 338, the discussion in its entirety). The Lord’s eternity proves his reality; all other ‘realities’ being but transitory and mere appearance (ābhāsa). Whatever has a beginning and an end, whatever appears and disappears, does not really exist. Is real only that which is without origin and without end, in other words that which exists in the ‘beginning, in the middle and in the end’ — the eternal, the supreme principle, the ātman/brahman. Cf. BhG II 16a: nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ/, ‘Of the unreal [according to Śaṅkara, heat, cold, etc., i.e., pairs of opposites, and the body, subject to change] there is no existence; the real [ātman/brahman, according to Śaṅkara] does not cease to exist [lit., ‘has no non-existence’]’ (our transl.); VP I 1: anādinidhanaṃ brahma [...], ‘this brahman which is without beginning or end [...]’ Also ĀŚ II 6a [= ĀŚ IV 31a]: ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne ‘pi tat tathā/, ‘That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present [meaning: that which is not in the beginning, nor in the middle, nor in the end, therefore, that which is but transitory, is not real]’; cf. Ś ad loc: yad ādāv ante ca nāsti vastu mŗgatŗşņikādi tan madhye ‘pi nāstīti niścitaṃ loke, ‘That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, such as the mirage, etc., is not in the middle also. This is an established truth in this world’. This statement of ĀŚ II 6a is famous: not only it is taken up again in ĀŚ IV 31a, but also, in the same terms, in Pañcadaśī XIII 68b; and, with variants, in YV IV 45, 46 (very near to the text ascribed to Bhartŗhari quoted here by YR: ādāv ante ca yan nāsti kīdŗśī tasya satyatā/ ādāv ante ca yan nityaṃ tatsatyaṃ nāma netarat); V 5, 9; III 4, 62; III 11, 13. Although both YR and SpN I 5 attribute this verse to the ‘revered Bhartŗhari’ (tatrabhavadbhartŗhari), it is not found in the present VP. Might it be inferred that it belongs to the lost Śabdadhātusamīkşā quoted in ŚDvŗ, p. 84, as well as in SpP, p. 4 (as Dhātusamīkşa) and pp. 16 and 21 (as Şaḍdhātusamīkşā)?

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And so indeed this universe [viz., brahman], which has as its essence pure Being, reposes in that supreme energy (parā śaktiḥ) whose form is luminosity (bhāsvarūpa), which consists in the unison of the energies of willing, knowing and acting.901

[It reposes in, i.e.,] it becomes one with that (tanmayībhavati) supreme energy, in consequence of what has been stated:

The disposition of objects is founded on consciousness.902

Now903 [the term] śāntam, ‘tranquil’, [could be re-parsed as a compound of śa and anta]: ‘that which is at the end of [viz., follows] ś’ (śakārasyānte) [in the usual «alphabetic» order of the Sanskrit syllabary], namely, the cerebral [sibilant]. [Hence] the brahman, whose essence is Being (sat) alone, [that is] ‘tataḥ param’, ‘next to [viz., that follows] that [cerebral, alluded to by śāntam in the kārikā]’.904 It is [therefore termed] immortal (amŗta), [in the sense that it is a] ‘seed of immortality’

901 Thus forming the Trident (triśūla) of energies, itself equated with __ in the spelling of ___, so that the first two constituents of___are alluded to in kā. 43; on the Trident, see also n. 909 and PS 45 (n. 922).902 The source of the verse has not been traced. We have derived this interpretation of vyavasthiti from its grammatical usage, ‘conditioned alternative’. The assertion thus means that the things of the world do not dispose themselves according to their own rules or by some unknown fate; their disposition is founded on consciousness. Same quotation (with the variant: �vyavasthitayaḥ, plural), and in the same context, namely, that of the exposition of the mantra____in TĀV IV 185b (vol. III: 832), and — in the reading: saṃvinnişţhā hi vişayavyavasthitiḥ — in the context of defining bhāvanā, in TĀV XXVIII 358b-359a; commenting upon the two verses: yataḥ sarvānumānānāṃ svasaṃvedananişţhau// pramātrantarasadbhāvaḥ saṃvinnişţho na tadgataḥ/, JR observes that the existence of other cognizers is founded in that [consciousness] and not in [the object to be known and which is not visible], whose essence [viz., whose existence] can be known [only] through inference (... pramātŗ ... atra tannişţha eva, na tv anumeyasvarūpanişţha iti); TĀ XXVIII 359b-360a confirms: ghaţader astitā saṃvinnişţhitā na tu tadgatā// tadvan mātrantare ‘py eşā saṃvinnişţhā na tadgatā/, ‘[Just as] the existence (astitā) of the jar, etc., is founded on consciousness, and not in reference to that [jar]//, so likewise, as regards another cognizer (mātŗ), his existence is founded on consciousness, not in reference to that [other subject]’. See PT 24; also, Vāmana quoted by SpN II 3-4: ālambya saṃvidaṃ yasmāt saṃvedyaṃ na svabhāvataḥ/ tasmāt saṃviditaṃ sarvam iti saṃvinmayo bhavet//, ‘Since what is to be known [is known] after having taken refuge in consciousness, and not in and of itself (svabhāvataḥ), therefore, everything [is what it is] in virtue of its being known; this being the case, it would be made of consciousness’ (we differ from Silburn’s transl. [Silburn SpK: 105]).903 Now, YR begins again the interpretation of some of these epithets, in the esoteric context of phonemic emanation, and particularly, the realization of the mantra ___.904‘param’ here may well be the reutilization in another sense of the param of the kārikā. Let us summarize: 1. śāntam 2. what ‘follows that’ (tataḥ param); 3. what represents brahman as ‘Being’, ‘existing’ — which, as such, is also termed the ‘third brahman, as stated by PT 9, quoted further in YR’s commentary ad 43. In a passage dealing with phonemic emanation, TĀ III 167 defines the phoneme SA as ‘the undivided supreme brahman’ (tad eva brahma paramam avibhaktam). TĀV ad loc, after quoting ChU III 14, 1: sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma, has recourse to BhG XVII 23, which establishes the traditional nomenclature of brahman: auṃ tat sad iti nirdeśo brahmaņas trividhaḥ smŗtaḥ/ (verse again quoted by TĀV ad V 142-144, a passage which deals again with the mantra ___, from the point of view of the āņavopāya). Thus, is the third brahman (coming after oṃ and tat in the enumeration). Therefore, [or], the initial of, or the third brahman, is also symbolically designated as such.

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[or an ‘ambrosial seed’] (amŗtabīja),905 [as well as] pure (śuddha), on account of its contiguity to the abode of Sādākhya [viz., Sadāśiva].906

And for this reason, it [viz., brahman, or the universe] is even (sama) and whole (sakala), because everything has now an equal essence (sarvasamarasīkaraņa), consequent upon the experience: ‘I am this All’.907 And, finally, it is true (satya), due the dissolution [characteristic of the condition of Sadāśiva] of nescience [which is the source of error].

As has been taught by the Lord himself in the revered Triṃśikā:The third brahman, O fair hipped one, ...908

905 amŗtabīja, ‘ambrosial seed’, stands here for SA, and is not to be taken here in its strictly technical sense, namely, as the name given to the four cerebral vowels — ŗ ṝ ḷ ḹ — (see TĀ III 91-92a). The clue to interpreting this very passage of YR’s gloss is perhaps found in TĀ III 165b-166a: tata eva sakāre ‘smin sphuţaṃ viśvaṃ prakāśate// amŗtaṃ ca paraṃ dhāma yoginas tat pracakşate, ‘Therefore, it is in the phoneme SA that the universe clearly appears// And the yogins call it [viz., SA] the immortal and supreme abode (dhāman)’; TĀV ad loc. introduces the notion of amŗtabīja: [...] amŗtabījatayokteś ca guravas tatparāmŗtam dhāmapracakşate — sarvaśāstreşu kathayantīty arthaḥ, ‘[...] Because of the mention [of it, viz., SA] as being the seed of ambrosia (amŗtabījatayā), the teachers call it [viz., SA] the immortal and supreme abode, that is, they state [it as such] in all the śāstras’. In a different context, namely, while dealing with the four amŗtabījas, or amŗtavarņas, TĀ III 91-92a defines ambrosia (amŗta) as the supreme wonderment (paracamatkāra) of consciousness at rest within itself: [...] ātmany eva ca viśrāntyā tat proktam amŗtātmakam, ‘[This tetrad of cerebral vowels] is said to have ambrosia for its nature for it reposes in itself; see also TĀV III 91: asya varņacatuştayasya [...] svātmamātraviśrāntyā paracamatkāramayatvam, ‘Since these four phonemes repose in their own Self, and nowhere else, they consist in supreme wonderment (paracamatkāra)’.906 By pervading as sat the first three aņḍas, the third brahman represents the manifest world (though still in potentia, as it appears in the śuddhādhvan), and thus corresponds to the level of Sadāśiva; see PTLvŗ 9: yad idaṃ tŗtīyaṃ brahma sadāśivatattvātmakam [...] asphuṭībhūtedantātmakagrāhyarāśilakşaņam [...], "That third brahman (tŗtīyaṃ brahma), whose essence is the Sadāśiva principle, is characterized by the entire group of knowable objects, whose objectivity (idantā), nevertheless, is not yet fully manifested’. Same term (sādākhya) in ĪPK III 1, 2; ĪPV III 1, 2 (vol. II: 217-218) explains the word sādākhya from a nominal base sadākhyā, of which the second element ākhyā is understood in the sense of prakhyā, ‘appearance, manifestation’, which gives the result: ‘the manifestation (prakhyā) from this moment on of "sat" (yataḥ prabhŗti sad iti prakhyā)’. Such an explanation reinforces the connection with Sadāśiva of whose element ‘sadā’ is derived from the same root. It is possible that YR employs sādākhyā here as sadāśiva in order to bring out the element ‘sat’ in the ‘sanmātra’ of the preceding commentary, this particular derivation given by AG having become a common place of the tradition. This explanation would also serve as a reply to those who understand the name sādākhyā according to a more straightforward etymology as ‘concerning him whose name contains the element sadā (adj.)’, thus, by implication, sadāśiva. According to ĪPVV (vol. III: 264), sadā in Sadāśiva means that the nature of Śiva (śivatā) persists, even if, at this level, objectivity (idantā) begins to appear (idantonmeşe ‘pi śivatehi sadāśabdena uktam). The experience of śuddhabrahman takes place in the third tattva, that of Sadāśiva. When the entire universe is experienced as sanmātra, this experience is called the abode, or state, of Sadāśiva. For, in the state of Sadāśiva, when one experiences: ‘I am this universe’, all dichotomy is transcended.907 aham idaṃ sarvam.908 PT 9. YR gives only the pratīka of this famous śloka, itself alluding to ___ , without either enunciating it, or even naming its constituents, designated only through periphrases; the

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[the complete text is: ‘United with the fourteenth,909 O blessed one, the third brahman (defined as sat), O fair hipped one, well-joined with that comes at the end of the «Lords of the phonemes»,910 is the heart of Bhairava’s Self.]911

This [universe] is that very brahman — experienced (avamŗşţa) in the process of becoming immortal,912 at the heart of everything, and extending to the plane of Sadāśiva — which reposes in Energy, as previously described [viz., ‘whose form is luminosity’].

Kārikā 44

śloka is quoted in Dīpikā ad Yoginīhŗdaya [YH] II 4 (Dviveda YH: 109). The complete text is: caturdaśayutaṃ bhadre tithīśāntasamanvitam/ tŗtīyaṃ brahma suśro’ņi hŗdayaṃ bhairavātmanaḥ//. Thus this śloka cryptically spells out ( + + ) the mantra __. See Padoux 1992: 418; TĀ IV 186-189. 909 …(?) emanation. Referring to the MVT IV 25, TĀ III 104b-105a calls it triśūla, ‘Trident’: asmiṃś caturdaśe dhāmni sphuţībhūtatriśaktike// triśūlatvam ataḥ prāha śāstā śrīpūrvaśāsane/, ‘As, in this fourteenth stage, the three energies [namely, icchā, jṅāna, kriyā] are manifested, the [divine] Teacher has named it [i.e., this fourteenth stage] "Trident", in the First Teaching [= the MVT] (śrīpūrvaśāsana)’. See ŚSV II 7, where AU is designated as śūlabīja, the ‘germ of the Trident’, inasmuch as it proceeds from the fusion of the three śaktis — icchā, jñāna, kriyā — with a predominance of kriyāśakti: [...] śūlabījaṃ ca icchājñānaśaktivyāptapūrņakriyāśaktipradhānatvāt śaktitrayasaṃghaţţanamayaṃ pradarśya [...].910 PTLvŗ glosses tithīśāntasamanvitam with [...] visargaḥ tasmin samyag aviyogenānvitaṃ viśrāntam. There are fifteen ‘Lords of the tithis’, that is, fifteen vowels from a to the bindu aṃ; and tithīśānta, ‘that which comes at the end of the Lords of the tithis, viz., of the vowels’, designates the visarga, the sixteenth phoneme. On tithi, see Padoux PTLvŗ: 80, n. 57; on the visarga as the sixteenth tithi, see PTLvŗ 9: tithīśānāṃ pañcadaśānāṃ svarāņāṃ yo ‘ntaḥ paryantasthitibhūto visargaḥ, ‘The one that is at the end of the ‘Lords of the tithis’ (tithīśa), i.e., of the fifteen vowels, is the visarga, the ultimate abode [of manifestation]’, and Padoux PTLvŗ: 80, n. 59; also PTV 9 (Singh: 84 [Skt. text]): caturdaśa okārāṃkāramadhyagaḥ/ tithīśānto visargaḥ tŗtīyaṃ brahma şahamadhyagam/ etad bījaṃ vastuto viśvasya/ tathā hi yatkiṃcit sat pārthivaprākŗtamāyīyarūpaṃ bhāsate tad icchāyāṃ jñāne vā kriyāyāṃ vā patitam api sarvātmakatvāt trikarūpaṃ paratra śivapade visŗjyate sarvaṃ ca śivapadād visŗjyate, ‘The "fourteenth" is [au, the vowel] that comes between okāra and aṃkāra. tithīśāntaḥ is visarga. tŗtīyam brahma is that, which comes şahamadhya.[___], such is the [mantra that is the] generating seed (bīja) of the universe. Whatever appears as existing (sat) — whether it pertain to the sphere of the Earth, or Nature, or Illusion — it, falling within [the specific realm of] either icchā or jñāna or kriyā, takes still the form of the triad, for it is of the form of all. And this all that is emitted within the abode of Śiva is also emitted out of it [in the form of the visarga]’. Moreover, the PTV gives even more interpretations for each term of the śloka 9, including the sixteen interpretations given in reference to each of the sixteen phonemes. Sometimes, tithīśa (sg.), the ‘Lord of the vowels’, refers to the fifteenth phoneme only, ‘whose essence is the cognizer (vedakātmakabindu°), as stated by PTLvŗ 5-9. However that may be, tithīśāntaḥ, the ‘following tithīśa’, which is not counted among the tithis, because, as ‘emission’, it is at once the source of the entire process of the phonemic emanation.911 With such formulation (hŗdayaṃ bhairavātmanaḥ), the verse alludes again to the mantra, also named hŗdayabīja. On a PTV (p. 266, 1.4-267, 1.7) forced interpretation of the verse as referring to alcoholic liquor and the five ‘jewels’ or ‘ambrosias’ of the Kaulas (namely, semen, menstrual blood, urine, excrement, and phlegm), see Sanderson 2005: 111-114, n. 63.912 amŗtībhāva and amŗtīkaraņa are two terms occuring in sādhanā: it is the transformation of him who is perishable into imperishable, eternal.

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Whatever does not repose in the supreme energy under the headings of [i.e., as manifesting itself through the energies of] acting, knowing or willing, does not exist.913 The master says:

44. By contrast, whatever is not touched by that [source] whose essence is to illumine914 and [which will then manifest one of the three aspects of the Śakti, whereby] one may say: ‘it is desired’, ‘it is known’, or ‘it is done’, has the status of a flower in the sky.915

Whatever entity, even if present externally in the guise of an object,916 if it not be touched by consciousness and made radiant under the headings of Will, Knowledge and Action — if it not be endowed with that bursting forth of the Energy named Parā (parāśaktisphāra) [or parā for para, ‘supreme energy’], whose single essence informs universally917 the triad of its several energies — such an entity, devoid of any power [to appear] (vikala), inasmuch as it is indicated by a name alone,918 is like a flower in the sky.

By this argument has been pointed out the potency of the [three] modes [namely, Will, Knowledge, Action] constitutive of the Trident that [hover] over and above the

913 Lit, ‘amounts to nothing at all’. See Padoux 1992: 418; TĀ IV 186-189.914 YR glosses bhāsvarūpeņa with icchājñānakriyāmukhena bhāsvareņa [...] bodhena; see also TĀ VIII 3, n. below.915 Same reasoning and image in TĀ VIII 3 (quoted in TĀV VII 62, vol. III: 1342), in the context of describing the adhvans, which stand for the phenomenal universe: adhvā samasta evāyaṃ cinmātre saṃpratişţhitaḥ/ yat tatra na hi viśrāntaṃ tan nabhaḥkusumāyate//, ‘A path (adhvan), in general, is grounded in pure consciousness (cinmātra). That which does not repose there [in pure consciousness] is like a flower in the sky [i.e., does not exist [— is mere words]’; JR comments: nabhaḥkusumāyate iti na kiṃcit syād ity arthaḥ. Cf. TĀ IV 186b-188a, quoted n. 922, which, apropos the triadic śakti, argues similarly (the allusion being to the mantra ___). However, the Trika speculation goes even further, for even this flower in the sky, although it is indeed a thing materially non-existent, does exist really, inasmuch as, being imagined, it exists in consciousness itself. The phrase as such is thus equivocal and points perhaps to the same coincidentia oppositorum that often affects extremes. Thus conceived, existence is called mahāsattā, ‘great’ or ‘transcendental existence’; on these speculations, see ĪPK I 5, 3 (quoted n. 265); ĪPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 259-260): sā ca khapuşpādikam api vyāpnotīti mahatī, ‘This [existence (sattā)] is "great" (mahatī) for it pervades everything including the sky-flower’; and MM 32: kaḥ sadbhāvaviśeşaḥ kusumād bhavati gaganakusumasya/ yat sphuraņānuprāņo lokaḥ sphuraņaṃ ca sarvasāmānyam//, ‘From the viewpoint of real existence, what is the difference between the sky-flower and the [real] flower, since the world exists only as manifestation [of the Lord-consciousness], and that this manifestation-consciousness is the same in all?’ (the PM quotes ĪPV I 5, 14). On mahāsattā, see also PM 66; Sanderson 2005: 130, n. 100.916 yad vastu vastuvŗttena — The two occurrences of the word vastu are to be taken here as suggestive of the poetic figure paunaruktya: the second, in effect, qualifies the first.917 sāmarasya — the meaning here would then be: it is the same Śakti who animates the three emanations, and it is that undifferentiated energy alone that is capable of explaining the energies that each, in its apparent difference, embodies.918 Possible allusion here to the tatprakhyā(nyāya) of the Mīmāṃsā, an interpretive device that aids in the identification of names of rites in consequence of substances or divinities that have therein been mentioned — the idea being that neither of the latter need be mentioned twice, and consequently any second mention of same (such as the word ‘agnihotra’ in the injunction ‘agnihotraṃ juhoti’) has to be a name (to avoid the stain of pleonasm). See Edgerton Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa [MNP] 273: 146.

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modes of existence [— that is, that are presumed by everything that can be said to «exist»].

Kārikā 45By restating919 that the universe merges with the abode of energy, the master makes evident that it is identical [with supreme consciousness] as a complete realization of the abode of Śaṃbhu:920

45. This entirety is emitted by the god of gods into himself, the Supreme Lord, the ultimate reality to which has been given the name Śiva, who adopts the discipline of embracing the Trident of energies.

Thus, this entirety — by which is ultimately meant the brahman previously expounded,921 on account of its form as pure Being —

is emitted922 by the god, that is, by the Lord who is none other than Supreme Śiva ...

919 See kā. 41-43.920 śāṃbhavapadasamāpattyā — similar statement found in the general avat. ad 41-46.921 In PS 43. Lit., ‘this entirety (samastam api), whose highest reality [or whose ultimate meaning] (paramārtha) is that brahman previously spoken of [...]’.922 The verb visrjyate has also an esoteric meaning referring to the visarga [= Ḥ] at the end of the mantra ___. See TĀ IV 186-189a: tathā hi sad idaṃ brahmamūlaṃ māyāņḍasaṃjñitam/ icchājñānakriyārohaṃ vinā naiva sad ucyate//, tac chaktitritayārohād bhairavīye cidātmani/ vişŗjyate hi tat tasmād bahir vātha visrjyate/ evaṃ sadrūpataivaişāṃ satāṃ śakṅtrayātmatāṃ// visargaṃ parabodhena samākşipyaiva vartate/, ‘Indeed, this Being (sat) [that is, at once, the real (sat) universe composed of the three aņḍa described in PS 43, and the pure Being (sanmātra) that is its true essence], which, rooted in brahman [viz., in brahmāņḍa = pŗthvyaņḍa], is [ultimately] termed māyāņḍa [viz., the aņḍa inclusive of prakŗty° and pŗthvy° (or brahma°) aņḍa — as the four aņḍas fit within one another, as emphasized by YR ad PS 4 —], is not called ‘existent’ (sat) unless it rises to (āroha) [the level of the energies of] Will, Knowledge and Action [viz., to śaktyaņḍa]. For it is only by ascending (āroha) to that triad of energies (śaktitritā) that it [viz., that Being, or real world, in the form of the three aņḍa] is emitted (vişŗjyate = visarga) into Bhairava’s Self, which is pure consciousness [where it goes on resounding]; or that it is [again] emitted out from that [pure consciousness]. Thus, the reality (sadrūpatā) [sat] of those aņḍas, [which are] real [‘only inasmuch as they appear in the form of the universe’, explains JR], takes place only [viz., does exist only, or is realized only] through supreme consciousness (parabodha) [or with supreme consciousness (as supreme Agent)], when its [that of sat] coalescence with (samākşipya) the essence of the triad of energies and the visarga is accomplished [that is, according to JR, "[this reality] manifests itself by virtue of its identity with the supreme Cognizer thanks to the progressive ascent to the visarga"]’ (cf. Padoux’s [1992: 418], Sanderson’s [1990: 57] and Gnoli’s [TĀ: 103] translations); TĀV ad loc. explains: evaṃ yathoktayuktyā, eşāṃ brahmāņḍādīnāṃ satāṃ viśvarūpatayā pratibhāsamānānām eva, sadrūpatā parabodhena saha śakatrayātmatāṃ visargaṃ ca samākşpyaiva vartate, visargopārohakrameņa parapramātraikātmyena prasphuratīty arthaḥ. Thus it appears that, somehow, the exposition of the PS together with its commentary helps in understanding that puzzling passage of TĀ. And it is shown that the visarga symbolizes both the inward, referred to in PS 45, and outward projection of the universe (in PS 46). As Padoux (1992: 419) explains this synthesis: ‘The span of creation, from the Earth to māyā, is, in the mantra, taken in its essence as pure being (sat). It is then absorbed in the three energies of Śiva, thanks to which it is imbued with consciousness (more specifically with the self-revelatory and free awareness called vimarśā), to be afterwards (but eternally, out of time) emitted in consciousness [...] both internally and externally’.

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... of gods — deities, from Brahmā to Sadāśiva, but also, the sense faculties, which illuminate all things — 923

— into the ultimate reality to which has been given the name Śiva, that Supreme Lord, who is a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness, [or, in other words,] into the [adept’s] own essential nature,

— by adopting the discipline of embracing924 the Trident of energies (śaktitriśūla), that is by the progressive realization of the Energy named Parā [or parā for para, supreme energy] according to the method already expounded;925 [— in other words, the entirety that is in effect Śiva] attains identity with him [namely, himself], through complete absorption therein, due to the excellence of innerdirected awareness (vimarśana).

And it makes no sense to attribute agency to any other [being or principle] whatsoever, nor is there any other cognizer other than this Cognizer.

And it is that Lord alone, ascending through the different levels [of subjectivity], who appears (sphuraņa) as the different [categories of] cognizers, from ordinary souls to Rudras. Hence, it is most appropriate to state [that this ‘entirety’ is emitted into himself] by the god of gods.

Thus has been demonstrated the mode of existence of the [inward] emission [of the universe].926

Kārikā 46Thus, having shown so far, from the perspective of reabsorption, that the

differentiated world, the world of finite being, attains unison with Śiva, formed of undifferentiated consciousness, by ascending to the abode of energy [i.e., by attaining the śāktopāya],927 which is based on difference-and-non-difference,928 the master next says that it is Śiva himself, solely formed of consciousness, who, surging forth (ullāsya) as Energy, appears (sphurati) as the universe, [the universe] of finite being. Nor, he says, is there any form of Energy or of finite being separate from Śiva.929 It is Śiva himself who thus appears as the [universe, now seen as the] solidification of his own essence;930 — in other words (iti), [the master now] explains [in the following kārikā] the process of emergence which consists in the bursting forth of the Great formula (mahāmantrasphāra):

923 In accordance with its etymological meaning of ‘luminous’, deva can be taken by extension to refer to the sense-faculties; see the notion of karaņadevīs, or karaņadevatās, goddesses that are the organs of sense, in YR ad 47 and 80.924 parigama — cf. Abhijñānaśakuntalā’s final stanza (bharatavākya), where Śiva as Nīlalohita is given the epithet of parigataśaktiḥ, thus glossed by Rāghavabhaţţa: parito gatā vyāptā śaktiḥ sāmarthyam asyety anena tattacchaktitvaṃ vyajyate, ‘ "śakti", "energy", [means] "capacity", "gatā", "gone around", [means] "suffused by" (vyāptā), [parigataśakti means] "he whose energy has been encompassed all around"; by this expression he [the poet] suggests the possession of multiple energies’.925 Namely, by means of the mantra.926 visargavŗtti, as symbolized by the final visarga of the mantra.927 Same formulation in the avat. ad 43.928 Cf. the avat. ad 41.929 Cf. SpK II 4a, quoted n. 452, and TA IV 275a: sarvaṃ śivamayam.930 nijarasāśyānatā — see first maṅgalācaraņa of YR’s commentary, and n. 224.

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46. Conversely, through the orderly emergence of the five eneries,931 that wondrous triad of spheres932 is created also externally, by acquiring an outward Self.

It is the Supreme Śiva, whose Self is the unison of the pentad of energies, viz., Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action, by whom is created933 the triad of spheres, made wonderful by a variety of worlds, etc., and he does this by disclosing in turn the [five] levels [of pure subjectivity], viz., Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and śuddhavidyā, whereby [each one of the pentad of energies, viz.,] Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action, is severally displayed as predominant;934 [— in other words] by acquiring an outward Self, that is, by showing himself as external manifestation [that is, as the universe].

By the term conversely (punar api), the master shows that the Supreme Śiva himself, ever free, remains ever thus, projecting on the surface of himself (svabhitti) the play of the emerging and disappearing display of the universe, [a playful display,] which, although not different from his own Self, appears yet as different.935 And there is nothing that is different from him.

Kārikās 47-50And so, in response to questions such as ‘who is he, whom we call «Śiva»?’ — the Lord whose habitus is the play of the emerging and dissolving universe — and ‘where does he reside?’ and ‘by what means of knowledge do we know him?’ the master explains, using terms expressive of the pronoun ‘I’,936 that Śiva is the very self of everything that exists, that, being in evidence (sphuran) everywhere in virtue of being established first [as condition for everything else],937 he enjoins the creation and all that follows from it:

47. In this way, setting in motion, thanks to the discipline of his play,938 the machine939 that is the Wheel of energies, the god [, now the yogin, says:]940 ‘It is

931 This orderly emergence of the Lord’s energies or powers takes place first ideally, as śuddhādhvan, of which the śaktyaņḍa encompasses the last four constituents: Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and śuddhavidyā. The same orderly emergence of the Lord’s energies is responsible for the successive levels of Speech; see n. 443.932 I.e., the universe seen as a triad formed of the spheres of māyā, prakŗti, and pŗthivī, already enumerated in reverse order in kā. 41, which deals with the process of the reabsorption of the universe in consciousness.933 Thus is confirmed that kā. 46 deals with the sŗşṭikrama.934 Cf. PS 14 and YR ad loc.935 Cf. YR ad 34: ‘That which does not appear against the backdrop (bhitti) of the Supreme Lord does not appear externally either’.936 asmacchabdavācaka — on the "ahaṃstuti" that represent kārikās 47-50, see Intr., p. 25.937 ādisiddhatā — see YR ad 1, n. 255.938 That is, the play in which he engages by making appear and disappear the universe, as encoded in the mantra.939 See below: the image is that of the water-wheel (araghaţţa).940 Certain indications suggest here a transition from a cosmological and doctrinal perspective to one in which the practicing adept, or yogin, is central. Such are the term yoga, ‘discipline’, the term deva, applied often to men of a certain stature, the compound śuddharūpaḥ, suggesting a transformation, and the term nāyaka, with overtones of the dramatic ‘protagonist’ — the principal character in the eternal play of Śiva.

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I,941 whose form has been purified, who am situated in the role of the hero [setting in motion] the great Wheel of energies.942

48. It is in Me that the universe appears, as in a spotless mirror jars and the like. From Me comes forth the All, as does the wonderful diversity of dreams from one asleep.

49. It is I who have taken on the form of all things, thus resembling the body, whose nature it is to have hands, feet, and the like.943 It is I who appear in each and every thing, just as the nature of light appears in all existent things.944

50.Though devoid of corporeal sense-organs, it is I who am the one who sees, the one who hears, the one who smells.945 Though not an agent, it is I who compose the wonderfully varied Siddhāntas, Āgamas and Tarkas’.946

941 Silburn translates differently: ‘Et ainsi le dieu [...] est le Je [...]’.942 Cf. TĀ I 109-112 (Dyczkowski 1989: 117). AG’s Dehasthadevatācakrastotra, which celebrates the great Wheel of energies. Also MM 26. As emphasized by Kşemarāja and Utpalavaişņava in their commentaries, the first and last verse of the SpK are celebrations of the Lord of the Wheel of energies, the cakreśvara, defined in SpK III 19 as the bhoktŗ, the ‘[universal] enjoyer’, that is, the ‘ultimate (or transcendental) cognizer’ (paramapramātŗ, SpN ad loc). The commentary continues: paramapramātŗtāṃ satīm evapratyabhijñānakrameņāvalambate/ tataś ca prathamasūtranirņītasya śakticakrasya svamarīcinicayasyeśvaro ‘dhipatir bhavet/ anenaiva ca dehena maheśvaratvam avāpnoty even yāvat/, ‘He [viz., the yogin] attains the status of ultimate cognizer, which [he is] already, by means of the method of recognition (pratyabhijñāna). Hence, one becomes Lord of the Wheel of energies, referred to in the first verse, i.e., of the collective whole of one’s own "rays" [emanating from the Self]. In other words, one attains to universal mastery (maheśvaratva) with this very body’, whereas SpP 51 explains: evaṃ sati svātantryāptes tataś cakreśvaraḥ śakticakrasvāmī sarvajñatādiyutaḥ, ‘Being thus [i.e., in this state of absorption], [the yogin] is the Lord of the Wheel (cakreśvara), for he has attained freedom. He is the Master of the Wheel of energies (śakticakrasvāmin), who is endowed with omniscience and other [divine attributes]’. Also ŚS I 21: śuddhavidyodayāc cakreśatvasiddhiḥ, ‘When perfect Knowledge (śuddhavidyā) appears, one obtains full mastery over the Wheel [of energies] (cakreśatva)’, and ŚSV ad loc: vaiśvātmyaprathavāñchayā yadā śaktiṃ saṃdhatte tadā aham eva sarvam iti śuddhavidyodayāt viśvātmakasvaśakticakreśatvarūpaṃ māheśvaryam asya siddhyati, ‘When he joins [himself] to Śakti with the desire of extending [himself] as the soul of all things, then, thanks to the dawning [in him] of that Perfect knowledge (śuddhavidyā): "I am all", his universal mastery (māheśvarya) is established, whereby he takes the form of Master of the Wheel of his own energies (svaśakticakreśatva), which are the essence of all things’. Thus the Lord of the Wheel of energies, Śiva, and the jīvanmukta are identical.943 That is, ‘thus resembling the body, which is the same for all beings, consisting essentially of hands, feet, and the like, and yet assumes different forms’. According to YR (see the commentary ad 5 and ad 49), bodies are infinitely diverse, though consisting essentially of hands and feet, etc.944 Cf. ĀPS 46-47 (see Mahadevan 1975: 20). Here, PS 49 carries the argument to its conclusion: all entities, that is to say, all cognitions, are to be traced back to the Cognizer, who is the ‘I’. Therefore, ultimately, there is no reality other than the supreme ‘I’, whose very nature is to manifest itself, to ‘shine forth’, taking advantage of entities/cognitions, which have no other role than to facilitate that ‘shining forth’, hence they too are ‘bhāsvarūpa’.945 Cf. BĀU IV 3, 23-30, BĀU IV 4, 22: sa vā eşa mahān aja ātmā yo ‘yaṃ vijñāhamayaḥ prāņeşu, ‘Verily, he is the great unborn Self who is this (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses’.946 PS 50a rewrites and condenses ĀPS 62, itself inspired by ŚvU III 19, which quote YR ad PS 50 and R ad ĀPS 62. PS 50b borrows from ĀPS 65a the single word: siddhāntāgamatarkāḥ, and finesses the scholastic debate that is featured in ĀPS 62 by making Śiva, the god who is

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Thus (iti) means here ‘in the manner just explained’;setting in motion means ‘causing to revolve’;the machine (yantra) means ‘the infinite collection of energies implied by the

pentad of energies’ — Consciousness, etc.;947

thanks to the discipline of his play means ‘by his playful intervals948 of creation, etc.’, arising out of and sinking back into [his formless state], in the manner of a device consisting of jars forming a water-wheel [that descend into and emerge from a well].

I, myself (aham eva), here signifies the ‘god’ who is the ‘I’ of all living beings;949

such awareness of one’s own Self, the essence of which is the marvel of supreme ipseity, the sound that is never sounded (anāhato nādātmā), is the god who is nothing but the incontrovertable Self of every being, and who thus appears (sphurati) as engaged in play.950

It is thus established that Śiva is he who is founded in his own nature.951

Similarly, he ‘whose form has been purified’952 means ‘he, the context [of whose thoughts] has transcended the realm of mental constructions’.

Furthermore, he is situated, namely, he remains ever in the role of the hero953

[setting in motion] the great Wheel of energies — in the role that conveys to the presiding deities of the sense-organs (karaņadevatā) the freedom [to indulge ad libitum] in worldly pursuits, such as taking or rejecting objects. For, unless the capacities of the sense-organs [i.e., one’s own faculties] repose in consciousness, their existence as having such and such a nature is not evident [i.e., they do not really exist, being without function].

none other than one’s own Self, the supreme ‘I’, proclaim his absolute sovereignty. For an interpretation of PS 50, see Intr., pp. 6 and 9. Cf. BhG XV 15: vedāntakŗd vedavid eva cāham, ‘And I am the author of the Upanişads and the Vedas’ knower’, and AG ad loc.947 On the pentad of energies, emblematic of innumerable other energies, see PS 10-11 and YR ad loc.948 helākrama.949 Implicit here is a demonstration of God’s reality: for if God is none other than my own Self, to deny his existence is to deny my own Self — which to the Śaivas appears impossible and self-contradictory. Theme taken up again, now explicitly, in YR ad 50.950 YR’s commentary on this passage can be understood in several ways, depending on how one construes the various iti which are there found in rather confusing imbrication. The translation reflects what we have taken to be the most direct and, indeed, logical, reading — which seeks to link the two key terms of verse 47, aham ‘I’ and deva ‘god’, in such a way as to establish their identity. And this is done through the "middle term", ‘consciousness’, which is the essence of both. YR begins by citing the aham of the verse — aham iti — then notes that this reference to the first person singular implies reference to god himself, deva, as the ‘I’ of all conscious beings — devaḥ sarvaprāņinām aham iti. But such an ‘I’ is of course nothing but reflective awareness, freed of all personal attributes — parāmarśa — which YR goes on to describe in such a way to make evident the equation of ‘consciousness’ and ‘I’ — anāhato ... parāmarśaḥ, sa eva ... sarvasyaiva svātmaiva — at which level we encounter again deva ‘god’, as that very auto-referential all-encompassing consciousness, which by definition has no "purpose" other than that of manifesting itself — devaḥ krīḍanaśīlaḥ sphurati iti.951 svasvarūpanişţha — the yogin is referred to here.952 For alienation from one’s own nature, in the form of the āņavamala, is the supreme impurity (see PS 24).953 nāyaka — a term borrowed from dramaturgy: derived from the root nī ‘to lead’, the nāyaka of the drama is its ‘hero’ who ‘guides’ the plot.

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Therefore, in order to acquire even their own nature, they continuously rely on him alone who is possessed of energy[ies] [as their substratum].954

This being the case, because the Lord presides over the hearts of all cognizers, the notion that he presides over a limited range of existence (niyatabhuvana) [i.e., over a finite expanse of being only] is ruled out.

And so the All — whatever is thought to compose a whole — appears only in Me, after the manner of the reflection in the mirror, that is, it appears, its significance fully realized only in the experience of the ‘I’955 as previously explained; in other words, the All appears (sphurati) as the [absolute] ipseity that is its very essence.

And from Me, from that form that is complete, namely, my own Self, designated as ‘I’, the all-inclusive (sakala) universe comes forth, leaving no remainder, that is, it appears before the cognizer, as something removed from him.956

If one asks: — ‘How [is this possible]?’ the master replies: ‘as does the wonderful diversity of dreams from one asleep’.

Just as the diversely wonderful variety of objects appearing in dream — cities, enclosures, temples, etc. — expands from the sleeping cognizer in the dream-state, even though there is no external object — such objects being grounded in nothing but his own consciousness, as no other cause such as nescience, etc., can be said to exist957 — so, likewise, does the universe come forth from that form designated as ‘I’, a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness, for no other cause specified in the [other] schools of thought can be suitably alleged.

It is I who have taken on the form of all things.By ‘I’ (aham iti) he means [the ‘I’ that affirms itself in saying:] ‘I am’ (asmi),958

which is the complete self-reflection of consciousness in itself (caitanyaparāmarśa); [this is the ‘I’] who have taken on the form of all [things], because it has acceded to the status of cognizer in various bodies, etc. — in other words, all forms are mine, because [this same reflective consciousness] is evident, internally undifferentiated, even in cowherds, children, women, etc.

Is there a parallel [for this unprecedented plasticity]? [Yes, he answers:] ‘[thus] resembling the body, whose nature it is to have hands, feet, and the like’.

Just as, generally, the body, which is the same for all beings, consisting essentially of hands, feet, and the like, assumes different forms, in accordance with the particularity of each cognizer,959 just in the same way, the single entity, which we have characterized as consciousness, assumes all forms, for taking up residence everywhere.

954 Cf. the Sarvamaṅgalāśāstra, quoted by YR ad PS 4 and Appendix 4, p. 322.955 asmadarthaviśrāntam — lit., ‘having come to repose in the meaning of [the word/experience] "I"’.956 ‘As something removed [from him]’ (apahŗtatayā) — intended to explain mattaḥ: the "whole" is now divided into subject and object, percipient subject and objectified universe, which latter "appears" before me, as something "else".957 Cf. PS 12-13 and YR ad 35.958 aham and asmi are often treated as synonyms, such that one is often glossed by the other — as here. By this stratagem, the author elegantly reconciles the two aspects of cognition here concerned: aham, internal (contemplative, nominal) awareness; asmi external (active, verbal) awareness.959 Cf. YR ad 5.

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Similarly, it is I who appear (aham eva sphurāmi) in each and every thing, that is, in this [phenomenal universe] that takes the form of knower, knowledge and the known, for [it is I who] appear (prakāśanāt) as the principle of experience that is at the heart of every [existent thing/percipient subject] as its own Self.

How does this take place? The master replies: ‘just as the nature of light [appears] in [all] existent things’.

that is, just as, in diverse things, the nature of light (bhāsvarūpa), that is to say, something that has the inexhaustible capacity of illuminating (dyotanaśīla), blazes intensely, in the same way, in this soulless (jaḍa) world, a single entity having the form of consciousness blazes intensely as ‘I’.

Moreover, [the master says:] ‘the one who sees, etc.’.‘Though devoid of corporeal sense-organs960 [it is I who am the one who sees,

etc.]’ means that [the yogin finds his] purposes accomplished,961 inasmuch as he reposes everywhere in perfect ipseity (pūrņāhantāviśrānti), while saying to himself: ‘It is I who see, hear, smell, taste, touch, for my body is consciousness (cinmūrtatva) itself’.962

Indeed, the host of corporeal sense-organs thinks: ‘I see, etc’963 — but such cannot be the case in, for example, the state of deep sleep, for there is no one there who sees, etc.

Therefore, it is the supreme Person964 himself who is the enjoyer of our enjoyments of objects, who remains ever in the heart of all beings, who is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and who gives rise (samullāsaka) to the host of corporeal sense-organs, though he be devoid of them; it is he who is signified by the word ‘I’.

So says the Śruti:Without foot or hand, (yet) swift and grasping, he sees without eye, he hears without ear. He knows whatever is to be known; of him there is none who knows. They call him the Primeval, the Supreme Person.965

Thus, though not an agent, [it is / who compose] Siddhāntas, Āgamas, etc.That is, though not myself their creator, I cause the multitudinous wonders that are

the Siddhāntas, etc., [to come into being], having entered into the intentions of gods, sages and men, being [already] in essence their inner intuition (antaḥpratibhā) and desirous of expounding [these doctrines] either in abridgement or in more elaborate form.

Nor is it possible that corporeal sense-organs be the instrument of that process, being in themselves insentient and little better than clods of earth.

Thus, through all such intermediaries,966 it is I who am the creator of all valid means of knowledge.

960 YR here is not claiming that the jīvanmukta is devoid of sense-organs, but that his perceptions no longer function on the corporeal level, subjecting him to the body. And this, of course, is a sign of jīvanmukti.961 Same notion of kŗtakŗtyatā in PS 81 (adaptation of ĀPS 79); PS 40 presents a similar notion: kŗtārthatā. Cf. BSBh I 1, 4; thus is kŗtakŗtyatā another sign of jīvanmukti.962 cinmūrtatvād aham eva paśyāmi śŗņomi jighrāmi rasayāmi spŗśāmi.963 The position alluded to here, perhaps ironically, may be that of the Buddhists, for whom the skandhas are functionally independent.964 paraḥ puruşaḥ — cf. PS 36.965 ŚvU III 19. Same quotation in R ad ĀPS 62.966 vyavadhāna.

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For this reason, it might also be said that, in [support of] the existence of the Great Lord that is one’s own Self and is of the nature of supreme ipseity, no [otherwise suitable] valid means of knowledge can ever be adduced, nor is such ever employed. Thus is Śiva everywhere established — the very Self of all beings — in terms of their faculty of experiencing, as demonstrated in the ‘I’ that can never be denied. It is this Śiva who is established first as prior condition in [regards to the operation of] every valid means of knowledge [that is, the means of knowing cannot function unless Śiva be admitted as their basis].

Karika 51Thus, through the process expounded above, the yogin becomes one with the nature of the transcendental brahman, reflecting (pratyavamŗśan) with determination967 on his own Self: ‘This might is all mine’:968

51. Thus, once the postulation of duality has ceased, [the adept,] after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion,969 should merge in brahman as milk merges in milk, and water in water.970

In this way, by the device of sustained concentration [on the truth that] the ‘I’ [of the meditator] is one with all things (sarvāhaṃbhāva),

once the postulation of duality has ceased, that is, once the display of difference has vanished,

after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion, that is, after jettisoning the nescience implicit in the conceit of affirming the Self in place of the non-Self, that is the cause of the display of difference971 — having thus dismissed all constriction by virtue of the formula: ‘I, myself, am the Self of the universe’,972

he who has knowledge (jñānin)973 should [now] merge in brahman, that is, should, after dissolving all limitation, attain identity974 with brahman, which is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, is complete and is suited to expanding,975 and which is his own nature.

And to him who asks: — ‘What [might illustrate this mergence]?’ the master responds, saying: ‘in water, etc.’.

Just as water — the water drawn up [from wells] by means of different jars, etc. — or just as milk — differentiated as coming from thousands of cows, whether emaciated or corpulent —just as this water or this milk is nevertheless taken as one 967 dārḍhyena.968 ĪPK IV 12: sarvo mamāyaṃ vibhavaḥ: 2nd occurrence of the quote (see YR ad 33).969 mohanīṃ māyām. The association of māyā with the adjective mohanī, ‘bewildering’, ilustrates the difficulty inherent in translating māyā as ‘Illusion’. For, if māyā were nothing but an illusion, it would ipso facto be ‘bewildering’. In an Indian perspective, such ‘bewildering’ is not fully illusory — for māyā represents all the ‘reality’ of the actual world, thus agreeing with its derivation from the root mā, ‘to fashion’. The translation of māyā as ‘Illusion’ amounts to missing the active, productive aspect of the notion, which is precisely its force or power. It is this force, or power, on which all our notions of the Real are grounded, that is bewildering.970 PS 51 borrows from ĀPS 58 and 59 (PS 51a = ĀPS 59a; PS 51b = ĀPS 58a).971 Cf. YR ad 39.972 aham eva viśvātmā.973 First occurrence of the term.974 tādātmya — see n. 629.975 bŗṃhaņātmaka — etymological play on brahman, as ‘that which expands’ (root bŗh or bŗṃh, ‘grow, envelop, expand’); see YR ad 43 and 104, and n. 892, 1434.

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undifferentiated thing when it enters [as water] into [other] water or [as milk] into [other] milk, due to the disappearance of that limitation which is the [consequence of] differences among jars or among [cows] emaciated [or corpulent] — such that no difference is there evident, so, likewise, by setting at naught the notions [of brahman] as variously body, vital breath, subtle body or the Void, brahman verily is realized.976 As Bhaţţadivākaravatsa says in the Kakşyāstotra:977

Once the island consisting of the idea of the body has been washed away, once singleness of thought has been attained978 in the pure river of consciousness, and when, on the other hand, you have retained the host of senses in your inner being,979 [only then, O Lord,] do you appear, one, eternal, the essence of everything.

Kārikā 52Thus, for the yogin who has ascended to the state of brahman (brahmasattā), even the overwhelming presence of dichotomies has its source in brahman,980 and does not suffice to interrupt [the continuity of] his own nature. The master says:

52. Thus, once the host of principles has been reintegrated into Śiva through meditative realization, what sorrow is there, what delusion for him who views everything as brahman?981

Thus, in the way previously demonstrated, when — for the yogin whose bonds, the sheaths, have fallen off—the host of principles, namely, the group of sense-organs [as instruments of subjectivity] and their domains, the elements (bhūta), has been reintegrated into Śiva,

through meditative realization (bhāvanā) — that is, through the firm understanding that this universe is [identical with] his own unfragmented (ekā) consciousness — [when, in other words, the yogin] has attained the state of ultimate nonduality,982

976 See kā. 31, where the same issue is discussed.977 ĪPVV (vol. III: 388), SpV I 9 (p. 40) and SpP 25 [= ad I 25] (p. 31) quote the same verse from the Kakşyāstotra; on Bhaţţadivākaravatsa, see n. 800.978 prāptaikadhye — we take this to be a case of double sandhi: prāpta aikadhye.979 Lit, ‘when you have not caused the host of senses to detach (avyāvŗtya) from you inwardly’.980 brahmamaya — lit., ‘is made of brahman’, ‘is nothing but brahman’.981 PS 52 borrows again (see n. 970) from ĀPS 59, with alterations required by Śaiva doctrine, namely, tattvasamūhe for dvaitasamūhe, śivamayatvam for brahmabhūyam: itthaṃ dvaitasamūhe bhāvanayā brahmabhūyam upayāte/ ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayataḥ// ‘If, in that way, the sum-total of plurality has receded into the state of Brahman thanks to the force of realization (bhāvanā), what delusion, what grief [can there be] for one who sees brahman as the All’ (tr. Danielson, modified). Cf. Īśopanişad 6-7: yas tu sarvāņi bhūtāny ātmany evānupaśyati// sarvabhūteşu cātmānam tato na vijugupsate// yasmin sarvāņi bhūtāny ātmaivābhūd vijānataḥ// tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ//, ‘And he who sees all beings in his own self and his own self in all beings, he does not feel any revulsion by reason of such a view. When, to one who knows, all beings have, verily, become one with his own self, then what delusion and what sorrow can be to him who has seen oneness?’; also KāU I 2, 22: aśartraṃ sarīreşv anavastheşv avavasthitam// mahāntaṃ vibhum ātmānaṃ matvā dhīro na śocati, ‘Knowing the self who is the bodiless among bodies, the stable among the unstable, the great, the all-pervading, the wise man does not grieve’.982 paramādvaya — same term in YR ad 1 and PS 53. On bhāvanā, see YR ad 68 and Appendix 20, p. 345.

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then, for him who thus sees everything — that is, the group of principles — as brahman, the overwhelming dichotomies indicated by [the persistence of] sorrow and delusion are indeed as nothing, and hence, do not occasion any distress, for they all have their source in brahman, and have assumed the form of the yogin’s own nature [viz., of his consciousness].

Kārikā 53But, says an objector, inasmuch as the body of him who knows necessarily persists, even if he has acceded to ultimate nondual [consciousness], why would not, in that case, the accumulation of the fruits of his actions, be they auspicious or inauspicious, which are occasioned by that body, make itself evident? The master refutes this objection:

53. The auspicious and inauspicious fruits of actions arise only from association with faulty knowledge. Not easy to overcome indeed are faults arising from association, just as company kept with a thief [is dangerous] for one who is not a thief.983

The accumulation of the many fruits of meritorious and non-meritorious actions — performing the horse sacrifice or killing a brahmin, etc.984 — arises only from association with faulty knowledge (mithyājñāna).

‘I am possessed of a body’, ‘let this horse sacrifice, etc., be for me a means [of obtaining a desired result]’985 — such is perverse knowledge,986 consisting in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self.987

From embracing988 such faulty knowledge only [comes], for the fettered soul, the accumulation of the auspicious and inauspicious fruits of actions. Being constantly pervaded by such accumulation [— in the form of the latent dispositions989 — the fettered soul] becomes a receptacle for the sufferings of this world of transmigration.

But, says an objector, how is it, for all that, that such bondage (paśutva) continues to afflict the cognizer, though his nature be [identical with] brahman? In response, the master alludes990 to a parallel case, saying: ‘Not easy, etc.’.991

983 Verse partially similar to ĀPS 52, notably to 52b, which offers the same analogy of the thief. The reasoning and the image seem to be Sāṃkhya in origin — see SK 20, and GBh ad loc: yathācauraś cauraiḥ saha gŗhītaś caura iti, ‘As one who is not a thief, caught in the company of thieves, is taken to be a thief [...]’. We differ from L. Silburn who, taking saṃgama and saṅga in their first meaning of ‘attachment’, translates: ‘[...] facheux est le vice de l’attachement comme l’union d’un voleur a un homme qui ne serait pourtant pas un voleur’ [— ‘[...] regrettable is the vice of attachment as is the company of a thief].984 Cf. PS 70, and the very similar ĀPS 77.985 The favourable results would be svarga or cakravartitva, universal sovereignty.986 vaiparītyena jñānam — lit., ‘knowledge by inversion’, ‘knowledge that is not knowledge’. On these notions, see YS I 8: viparyayo mithyājñānam atadrūpapratişţham; ĀŚ XIII 2 and the three commentators ad loc. — namely, Ānandajñāna, Bodhanidhi, Rāmatīrtha — who take avidyā as the cause of mithyājñāna; Upadeśasāhasrī I 10, 8 and III 3, 116 (see Mayeda 1979: 45, 78, 95, 125, n. 9).987 Our text differs here from the KSTS edition. For a discussion of the variants and the textual problem, see ‘On the Sanskrit Text’.988 Thus is glossed saṃgama of the kārikā. SK 20 has saṃyoga.989 The term adhivāsita, ‘pervaded’, suggests the notion of vāsanā; see n. 831.990 upakşipati.

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[Bondage comes to afflict the cognizer, though his nature be identical with brahman,] because the faults arising from association are in all cases difficult to endure — that is, just as contact with a wicked person serves to convey a fault that pertains to that person alone even to him who is most righteous, likewise, association with delusion born of nescience brings the cognizer, though pure, into contact with auspicious and inauspicious actions, so that he assumes the state of a bound soul.

Kārika 54Birth, death, and similar [insupportable experiences] do not belong to the yogin who has assumed the form of brahman (brahmarūpa); rather, they belong only to cognizers under the dominion of māyā. Thus the master says:

54. Those fools who here cultivate the nescience that results from devoting themselves to worldly transactions go to birth and death, bound by the restraints of merits and demerits.

Those cognizers who, defiled by the desire for fruits, and thinking the body to be the Self, serve the nescience that consists of attributing merit and demerit to worldly transactions, by adopting means intended for the acquisition of fruits such as heaven, hell, etc., in this world — furthermore, [a nescience that is identical with] māyā that consists in the display of difference —

... are fools, that is to say, are ignorant, bound by the chains of merit and demerit; they are born and die again and again in order to experience the fruit of those [actions], and thus become receptacles for the unceasing sufferings of existence.

On the other hand, it is not the case that the yogin, whose veil of delusion (mohāvaraņa)992 has been destroyed, who has cast off the bondage of merit and demerit, and who is now of the nature of brahman (brahmasvabhāva), is born or dies.

Kārika 55Thus, actions, even those effected during the period of nescience, are destroyed by the emergence of knowledge only, and not otherwise. The master says:

55. For even those actions, whose nature is merit or demerit that have been stored up during the period of ignorance, vanish thanks to the radiance of knowledge, just as is consumed [in a moment] goose-down which has accumulated for a long time.993

During the period of ignorance, that is, during the contingent state994 in which the conceit of self posits an adventitious cognizer (kŗtrimapramātŗ),

991 The kārikā, it seems, addresses to the question of "human condition". Is man, by nature, bound to the karmic condition, or is the karmic condition, in some sense, occasional or accidental? AG responds here that the question is one of association rather than of nature and that liberation is therefore possible; cf. kā. 67-68, and YR ad 67, who emphasizes the fact that the law of karman depends, in ultimate terms, on vikalpas; cf. Upadeśasāhasrī II 2, 45-48.992 Same term in YR ad 56; see also kā. 15.993 That is, when touched by fire. YR glosses tūla as haṃsaroma, ‘down of the goose’, of which haṃsatūla, lit., ‘goose-cotton’, is a synonym. Barnett translates ‘down’, Silburn ‘cotton’ and Pandit ‘heaps of cotton’. Cf. Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama (vidyāpāda II 6-7), quoted in TĀV I 46: tataḥ sa bhagavān īśaḥ... pradadāha muneḥ sarvam ajñānaṃ tŗņarāśivat.994 avasara.

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action, which has been stored up, that is, made one’s own, in the form of [its resulting] merit or demerit, because of our striving after fruits corresponding to it,

thanks to the radiance of knowledge, that is, thanks to the radiance of a discriminating knowledge (viśişţajñāna),

vanishes.[In other words] the realization (vijñāna) that ‘I am indeed the supreme

brahman’995 is capable of consuming [as would a fire] the adventitious [condition of] cognizer; and thanks to the power of its effulgence (prabhā), the [actions accumulated] come to nothing, through repeated reflection [on one’s identity with brahman].

This process may be compared to what? The master replies: ‘It is like goose-down which has accumulated for a long time’.

Just as [avian] ‘cotton’ — that is to say, goose-down — which has accumulated for a long time is turned into ashes in a moment, when ignited by fire,

just so disintegrates the entire accumulation of the fruits of action in the lapse of an instant, when ignited by the fire of discriminating knowledge (vijñānavahni).

As has been stated in the revered Gītā:As firewood a kindled fire/ Reduces to ashes, Arjuna,/ The fire of knowledge all actions/ Reduces to ashes even so.996

Karika 56Not only are the [consequences of] actions previously accomplished dissolved by the grace of knowledge; neither does present action eventuate in enjoyment of results, thanks to the [yogin’s] vision fueled by knowledge [and thus burning up ignorance]. Hence the master says:

56. Once knowledge has been attained, action,997 though performed, tends to no fruit. Therefore, how could [the yogin’s] birth be effected? Once the connection with the bondage of birth is severed, the sun of Śiva shines with its rays unhindered.998

Once reflection on the Great Lord that is oneself has grown [viz., into a fixed practice], action, whether auspicious or inauspicious, though performed, is not so bold as to offer up its corresponding fruit, for the conceit of self [that leads to the notion] of an adventitious cognizer is now absent.

This being the case, because the fruits of action are lacking, in what way can [re]birth be said to exist — dependent as it is on the enjoyment of [the fruits of] action? Of the yogin there would be no rebirth. Such is the purport of the verse.

Now, one may ask: — ‘If he be not born again after the perishing of this body,999

then, of what sort is he? [viz., how is he to be described?]’The master answers: ‘Once [the connection with the bondage of] birth is

severed, etc.’.

995 aham evaparaṃ brahma.996 BhG IV 37.997 The nominative karma, of kā. 55, is the common grammatical subject of 55 and 56, as made clear by YR.998 Lit., ‘with its very own rays’.999 piņḍapātāt — lit., ‘after the perishing of this lump [of flesh]’.

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That is, [the yogin] is such that his connection (yoga), his relation, to bondage in the shape of birth has departed.

He whose veil of delusion1000 has been destroyed now shines as the sun in the guise of Śiva, that is, comes into evidence (sphurati) with [his] rays unhindered, with the host of rays of his consciousness (cinmarīci); and there is for him no such thing as the liberation postulated by other schools of thought, if that means going somewhere else [viz., such as svarga, heaven, as say the Mīmāṃsakas].1001 For him, there ensues only that state wherein his own energies are fully deployed (svaśaktivikasvaratā),1002 for the constriction imposed by the sheaths of māyā, etc., has vanished.1003

Karikā 57The master now describes [more fully] this process:1004

57. As the seed, freed from the husk, the bran and the beard, no longer generates the sprout, so likewise, the Self, freed from the impurities of deeming itself finite, of considering the world as objective, of supposing itself the agent of actions, no longer generates the sprout of existence.

Just as, separated from the beard, the husk and the bran,1005 the rice-seed, though still embraced by soil, water and the sun’s heat,1006 no longer functions as a 1000 Same term in YR ad 54. Cf. SpK I 25: [...] prabudhaḥ syād anāvŗtaḥ, ‘The Enlightened one is unveiled’.1001 kutracit prāptiḥ — Here, YR anticipates PS 60: mokşasya naiva kiṃcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/. Mīmāṃsakas, Vaişņavas and others are of the opinion that, from this world, the soul moves on to another abode — whether it be called svarga, ‘heaven’ — or simply the Lord’s presence. The path is that of saṃnyāsa, ‘renunciation’, or parivrājya, ‘going about’, as a mendicant. On the idea of mokşa in both Mīmāṃsaka schools, see Hiriyanna 1993: 332ff.1002 Same term in YR ad 60: svātmaśaktivikasvaratā; also YR ad 61: vikasvaraśaktiḥ. 1003 By contrast, in the nondual Śivaism of Kashmir, mokşa is defined — as it is here — as the ‘state wherein one’s own energies are fully deployed’ (svaśaktivikasvaratā), which results from the vanishing of the constriction imposed by the hexad of kañcukas; the metaphor is completed by its association with the "floral" image implied in the pair saṃkoca/vikāsa: just as bondage is the "closing up" of the innate śaktis, liberation is their "blossoming". Again, YR anticipates PS 60, where he glosses svaśaktyabhivyaktā of the kārikā with svātmaśaktivikas varatā. Cf. YR ad 24: ‘Thus the Self, although fully open (vikasvara) becomes contracted [i.e., is reduced to finitude] (saṃkucitīkŗta)’, and YR ad 60 and 61, in the course of his exposition of mokşa. That same notion of liberation is conveyed by prathā (prathana); cf. TĀ I 156: mokşo hi nāma naivānyaḥ svarūpaprathanaṃ hi saḥ, ‘Liberation is indeed none else than the display of one’s own essence’, and TĀ I 161-162: [...] ātmaprathā mokşas [...], ‘Liberation is the display of the Self. See also TĀV I 24, p. 57: saiva ca prakāśānandaghanasyātmanas tāttvikaṃ svarūpaṃ tatprathanam eva mokşam, ‘That [perfect knowledge (pūrņā khyātiḥ)] is the true essence of the Self, which is a mass of Light and bliss. The display of that [true essence] is liberation’. From among Śiva’s innumerable energies, five principal ones stand out. They, which were limited when Śiva chose to become a paśu, now blossom.1004 yukti.1005 Thus is mokşa defined as separation from the sheaths that are the three impurities.1006 Cf. the second conclusive stanza of ĪPV: [...] bhaumān rasāñ jalamayāṃś ca na sasyapuşţau muktvārkam ekam iha yojayituṃ kşamo ‘nyaḥ//, ‘No other than the sun is capable of uniting the juices (rasa) of earth and water for the development of grains’ (tr. Pandey); and Bhāskarī ad loc: bhaumān bhūmigatān rasān jalamayāṃś ca grīşmād eva kşīnān svamarīcicakrāntar niveśya varşiņyādimarīcibhiḥ sasyapuşţyau yojayitum arkaṃ vinā ko ‘nyaḥ kşamaḥ/, ‘What

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cause in respect of that effect indicated by the genesis of the sprout,1007 because of the absence of the ensemble of [factors such as] the beard, etc., which are [essential to] the very nature of the seed,

so likewise, freed, that is, separated, from the impurity of deeming itself finite (āņava), metaphorically represented by the bran, from the impurity of considering the world as objective (māyā), represented by the husk, and from the impurity of supposing itself the agent of actions (karman), represented by the beard, the Self, that is, consciousness, because of the absence of the ensemble of factors constituting the triad of impurities, no longer enjoins the sprout of existence, that is, [no longer supports] germination of phenomenal existence.

None but the Great Lord himself there persists, contemplating (parāmŗśan) within himself the marvel of the host of objects that [constantly] appear and disappear, multifarious and ubiquitous.1008

Kārikā 58Thus, for him who has knowledge, whose seeds [of action] within those sheaths have been burnt up by the fire of knowledge (jñānāgni), there is no occasion at all for apprehension, nor is anything to be attained or avoided. Thus, the master says:

58. He who knows the Self fears nothing, for everything has his own form. And he is never aggrieved for, as regards the ultimate reality, the quality of the perishable does not exist.

He who knows the Self (ātmajña), that is, who knows the freedom of the Great Lord as his own, fears nothing, that is, he has no fear of anyone — king, enemy or any other living creature.

Why is this so? The master says: ‘for everything has his own form’.Since everything (sarva), that is to say, this world (viśva), the aggregate of

objects,1009 assumes, for him who knows the non-difference of the Great Lord and his own Self, the form, the shape, of his own Self, a body solely formed of great Light, in consequence of the fact that Light/consciousness is everywhere,1010

... [since this is so] it is Light alone that is evident (prakāśate), both as the [cognizing] Self [viz., the subject] and as the other [viz., the knowable, the object], because of its independence.1011

Therefore, whatever occasion for fear there may appear in this world, how can that occasion generate fear for him who is so, for it is, as it were, a part of himself? — Even more so, since only an entity different from oneself can become a cause of fear.

else than the sun, once it is installed within the circle of its own rays, is capable of uniting, by means of its rays, again accompanied by rain, the juices of earth (bhaumān = bhūmigatān) and water, exhausted by summer heat, so that seeds develop?’1007 The grain that is separated from its envelope loses its power of generation. Another possibility is to heat it, as exemplified in kārikā 58 and 62.1008 Same notion (viśvavartin) in YR ad 30 and 31.1009 Cf. the famous verse of TĀ I 332, which addresses the padārthajāta.1010 That is to say, ‘... for [the definition of reality as] Light is applicable everywhere [to whatever is real]’. Cf. YR ad 5 and 8: sarvatrasaṃvidanugamāt.1011 That is, because it can know no obstacle, is entirely self-referent. Let the reflections come and go in this mirror which I am — I, that unity, remain ever there. These are the very terms of APS 13 (see n. 265), quoted in ĪPV ad I 1, 5 and I 5, 3, as well as in SpN I 5.

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What Yama [the presiding deity of death]1012 or other deity, indeed, is there who, different from it, could set a limit to that Self, which is in all respects complete? Of whom would he who has knowledge be afraid? — he who has rejected the conceit that locates the Self in the body?

Therefore, once he comprehends his own form in all things, [the jñānin,] though abiding in this world of transmigration, remains one and unfragmented, and acts without apprehension, inasmuch as he has shaken off the dichotomy between himself and the [supposed] other.

As had been said by my teacher’s teacher’s teacher:For him who is eternally joyful in this world [understood as] completely filled with himself alone, what is there to fear? — He who sees, O Lord, this entire realm of objects as your body, lacking any alternative?1013

And also the author of the present work:One man says: ‘I am alone’ in this world of transmigration; he is distraught with the [bitter] taste of violent fears. There is another who says: ‘I am alone; who is other than I? Thus, my fear is gone, I am secure!’1014

Furthermore, he is never aggrieved, etc., that is, he who knows the Self is not aggrieved by such thoughts as, for instance: ‘my wealth is lost’, or ‘my wife etc.’, ‘I am devoid [of food, strength, etc.]’, ‘I am afflicted with disease’, or ‘I am dying’...

... and this is because, in the manner previously explained, the quality of the perishable does not exist, that is to say, the quality of the destructible is not to be found, as regards the ultimate reality — that primordial (tāttvika) entity whose form is consciousness, that is ever turned within and is [in the last analysis] nothing but the cognizer.

For everything that appears as something to be effected or is determined1015 as ‘this’ or ‘that’ [viz., as ecceity] — [everything] whose essence is conceit of self — originates and perishes.

But this is not so in the case of the Self, which consists of consciousness, whose essence is [absolute] ipseity, which is never adventitious and is [forever] free, for it makes no sense to posit of it an effort aiming at producing an effect [in any way other than itself].

Nor is it the case — for all that — that [for him, the contemplating ascetic] there is any interruption of his own form [viz., here involving continued existence in his body], [it is simply that, for him,] the contemplating ascetic, though he remains in his

1012 YR now takes up the question of the greatest fear, that of death.1013 ŚSĀ XIII 16. avikalpa — that is: ‘lacking any alternative [to yourself; hence to himself, who is not different from you]’. The term avikalpa is translated according to the grammatical meaning of vikalpa, ‘alternative’.1014 The source of the citation has not been traced, although it is probably quoted from a stotra of AG, the ‘granthakāra’. Śivopādhyāya’s commentary (18th cent.) ad VBh 104 quotes the verse (VBh: 90) which it attributes to a ‘pūrvaguru’. Cf. BĀU I 4, 2: so ‘bibhet/ tasmād ekākī bibheti sa hāyam īkşāṃ cakre yan mad anyan nāsti kasmān nu bibhemīti tata evāsya bhayaṃ vīyāya kasmād dhy abheşyad dvitīyād vai bhayaṃ bhavati//, ‘He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid. This one then thought to himself: "since there is nothing else than myself, of what am I afraid?" Thereupon his fear, verily, passed away, for, of what should he have been afraid? Assuredly it is from a second that far arises’.1015 avacchinna — see n. 701.

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body, sorrow and the like, which are born of the body, make no appearance as things covering over his essential form.1016

Kārikā 59And no defect of incompleteness could possibly attach to the mind of him who has this knowledge, because his sustained concentration on the nature of the Great Lord as nothing other than his own Self has become unshakable.

This the master now explains:59. What misfortune is there, and whose would it be, when he becomes the

Great Lord at the very moment he realizes: ‘It is I [who am the Lord]?’ There can be none on account of the collection that has been made of jewels of ultimate meaning,1017 heaped up in the most secret treasure-room of the heart.1018

Most secret (atigūḍha) here means ‘extremely well guarded’ (gupta); such is the treasure-room1019 that is the heart,1020 namely, the storeroom whose nature it is to serve as repository for the inmost essence of all ultimate meanings (paramārtha).

Thus, ultimate meaning — the essence of which is the knowledge of one’s own Self taught by a true teacher and engrained [in the student] thanks to an extraordinarily acute trust [in the teacher] — is said to be a collection of jewels, that is, it is like a collection of jewels, inasmuch as it is the source of all splendors (vibhūti). Thanks to this ultimate meaning, even the soul yet embodied becomes the Great Lord, that is, may experience the freedom of the Light that is his own Self, whose characteristic feature is repose in supreme ipseity (parāhantāviśrānti), a freedom that is complete and made manifest in the awareness: ‘It is I [who am the Lord]’,1021 that is, ‘I am all this [universe]’.1022

This being the case, what miserable misfortune, that is, sense of impoverishment, could for him obtain? Or, what meretricious excess of [spiritual] power (vibhūti),

1016 Here, the commentary answers a possible objection: ‘Had such a yogin really identified with Śiva, as you maintain, how could have he gone on living in his own form (svarūpa), that is, as still remaining in his body?’ Here, it is the notion of jīvanmukta that is discussed, a notion rejected by most of the "Realists", logicians and others. The Trika’s answer is that his form cannot be affected by his body, inasmuch as his body does not have any longer an influence on his mind, whereas sorrow is born from the association with the body alone.1017 Viz., of Śaiva doctrine. We might recall the equivocation that underlies the word paramārtha throughout this text: the ‘ultimate meaning’ (paramārtha) that is here taught is ‘the ultimate reality’ (paramārtha); see Intr., n. 7.1018 Same analogy in the mangalācaraņa ad ĪPV I 4: padārtharamanikaraṃ nijahŗdgañjapuñjitam/ grathnantaṃ smŗasūtrāntaḥ saṃtatyaiva stumaḥ śivam//, ‘We praise Śiva in continuous fashion, who strings together the multitude of objects, like jewels, that are gathered up in the treasure-room of his heart (hŗdgañja), [spacing them] along the thread of memory (smŗtisūtra)’.1019 gañja is attested in the Rājataraṅgtņī and in the Kathāsaritsāgara (10th-11th cent.), both also from Kashmir. Either the Sanskrit term is a sanskritization of the Persian ganj, or it is a borrowing from Old-Persian *ganja — a term, which, if it happens not to be attested in Achaemenid inscriptions, has been borrowed by Gk. ά; see Mayrhofer KEWA I: 315.1020 The similitude extends to aspects of the things compared — such as vibhūti, prarūḍha, gañja, which are understood as double entendres (śleşa) — as well as to the things themselves.1021 aham eva.1022 sarvam idam asmi.

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etc., might also be implied [if it were supposed that he were not already complete]?1023

For all objects are essentially of the nature of appearance and when they do appear, for the yogin they appear as though they were himself [viz., parts of himself].1024

Hence, how can the objects pretend [to further] either his perfection or corruption? Thus, for him there can be no misfortune, etc.

Furthermore, whose [misfortune would it be]? That is, ‘what possible substratum might there be for such misfortune?’ Well, let us admit [since misfortune is indeed experienced] that it is they who think the body, etc., to be the Self who are the substrata of this misfortune, inasmuch as they may either, by attaining it, become master (īśvara) of the desired object different from them, or, by losing it, be made void of that object.

He, on the other hand, who has knowledge, for whom the ultimate meaning [obtains] thanks to his reflection on non-adventitious ipseity — he who [thus] becomes the Great Lord, reflecting: ‘I am all’,1025 inasmuch as the object to be desired is now inseparable from him1026 — how can he be the receptacle of misfortune, etc., in the absence of either acquiring or losing that which is different from him?

Thus have been explained [suitably], as expressing (vācaka) non-fortuitous meanings, the qualifications ‘hŗdaya’ (‘heart’), ‘prarūḍhaparamārtha’ (‘heaped up [jewels of] ultimate meaning [viz., of Śaiva doctrine]’), and ‘mahān’ (‘great’), [as applying, respectively, to] ‘gañja’ (‘treasure-room’), ‘ratnasaṃcaya’ (‘collection of jewels’) and ‘īśvara’ (‘Lord’) [in the kārikā].1027

Kārikā 60The master now says what is the nature of liberation:

60. Neither has liberation any abode, nor does it involve a going elsewhere. Liberation is the manifestation of one’s own energies realized by cutting the knot of ignorance.1028

1023 Powers (vūmūti) employed for purely personal, that is, ‘magic’, aims, such as levitation, etc., are referred to here. According to YR, recourse to such ‘powers’ has its occasion in a sense of impoverishment, itself incompatible with the sense of plenitude characteristic of the true yogin.1024 svātmakalpa.1025 sarvam asmi.1026 Note the parallelism between ‘vyatiriktasyaişaņīyasya prāptyā īśvarāḥ’ and ‘avyatiriktena eşaņīyeņa maheśvaraḥ’.1027 YR here anticipates the objection that the figurative language of the kārikā does not suitably apply to ultimate reality, and that such comparisons are capricious or fortuitous. The analogy may be conventional as indicated by its use elsewhere in Śaiva texts, such as the maṅgalācaraņa ad ĪPV I 4 (quoted n. 1018).1028 ajñānagranthi — cf. ĀPS 73, whose second hemistich differs slightly: ajñānamayagranther bhedoyas taṃ vidur mokşam//, ‘Breaking the fetter which consists of ignorance: that is what one knows as Release’. Not only does the Śaiva PS introduce the concept of śakti, but emphasizes it, as shown by the commentary, which includes a syntactical śleşa on svaśakti; see n. 1036. Cf. also Sarvajñabhairava quoted by SpP 1, p. 7: nānyatra gamanaṃ sthānaṃ mokşo ‘sti surasundari/ ajñānagranthibhedo yaḥ sa mokşa iti kathyate//, ‘O fair Goddess, neither does liberation involve a going elsewhere, nor is it a place [apart to be discovered]. It is said that liberation is but breaking the knot of ignorance’. Cf. further the maxim quoted thrice by PM 53, 60, 64: calitvā yāsyate kutra sarvaṃ śivamayaṃ yataḥ, ‘If he sets out, where shall he

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Of liberation (mokşa), that is, of that state of isolation (kaivalya) the essence of which is the marvel of supreme ipseity, no abode is evident, no place apart, for [in such a state] the delimitations of space, time and particular embodiment are absent.1029

For the same reason, neither is liberation a going elsewhere, into some place apart,1030 a dissolution [of the self] — as it is in the view of the dualists, where it is said to dissolve above (ūrdhvam) [the cranial ‘aperture of brahman’ (brahmarandhra)], at a ‘point twelve finger spaces (ca. 20 to 25 cm.) directly above’ (dvādaśānta, viz., the uppermost cakra), by leaving (utkrāntyā) [the body], after piercing through the cakras, starting from the one at the base [of the spine] (ādhāracakra).1031

Such is liberation. As has been stated:If the existence of Śiva [as consciousness] is all-pervasive, what purpose is there in terminal Egress (utkrānti)? If the ultimate principle [— scil., ‘of reality’] is not all-pervasive, what purpose is there in terminal Egress?1032

go, since everything is made of Śiva?’; note that this hemistich is part of a longer text quoted in PM 60, which, Silburn tells us (MM: 171), is recited daily, at the end of meals, by Kashmiri pandits.1029 Similar phraseology in YR ad 64-66, which takes up again the definition of mokşa.1030 Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 quoted n. 1062 and Ś ad loc: atra asminn eva śarīre vartamānaḥ brahma samaśnute, brahmabhāvaṃ mokşaṃ pratipadyata ity arthaḥ/ ataḥ mokşaḥ na deśāntaragamanādi apekşate, ‘[...] And attains Brahman, the identity with Brahman, i.e., liberation, living in this very body. Hence liberation does not require such things as going to some other place’ (tr. Swāmī Mādhavānanda).1031 The term utkrānti, nominally ‘ascent’, is here to be understood in the technical sense of ‘terminal Egress’, or, as it is sometimes rendered, ‘yogic suicide’ (see Vasudeva MVT: 437ff.). As such, it refers to the practice of elevating the breath (that is, the vital principle) along the dorsal nervous cord from the generative nucleus at its base to the cranium, then "cutting it off" with the mantra named kālarātrī, the ‘Night which is Death’ (MVT XVII30), as it emerges from the top of the head. The notion is mentioned in MVT (XVII 25-34), Kiraņatantra, ch. 59, 1cd, and 28ab, SvT VII 314ab, Matāṅgapārameśvarāgama, Yogapāda VII 41-48, and in the Ūrmikaulārņava (available in MS only), quoted by TĀ XIV 31-32a and 33-35a as well as (in a more elaborate way) by TĀV ad loc. YR’s rejection here of the notion, attributing it to "dualists" inasmuch as it involves a "displacement" of the vital airs as a precondition of ‘liberation’, echoes TĀ XIV 31-37, where the notion is discussed in the context of jīvanmukti. Placing himself under the authority of the Ūrmikaulārņava, which denies to the ‘dualistic’ practice of utkrānti any salutary virtue, AG tries to resolve the paradox represented by the fact that utkrānti is nevertheless taught in the MVT, a text that is authoritative for the nondualistic doctrine of the Trika. The disapprobation here of "yogic suicide" is one with the view that becoming Śiva does not require the destruction of a body that is in any case not different from Śiva. Moreover, the idea that suicide is a means to liberation clashes with the notion of jīvanmukti, the core teaching of the PS. Dissociating itself from older notions of liberation, involving a ‘going elsewhere’ at the moment of death, Trika adopts a view more in line with its doctrine of śakti — ‘Liberation is the manifestation of one’s own energies [realized] by cutting the knot of ignorance’, as says PS 60. At the same time, Trika thereby clarifies the sense in which jīvanmukti itself is a necessary consequence of this "cutting": at the very instant the yogin severs the knot of nescience, he accedes to liberation, once and for all. A similar refutation of utkrānti is found in SpP 30, quoted in Intr., n. 151. Note also the generalized euphemistic sense of utkrānti, ‘the flight or passage of the soul (out of the body), death’ (Apte, citing BS II 3,19), of which this "yogic" application is little but a specialization.

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There are, as well, many other varieties of liberation of such sort, postulated by other schools. Were they to be dilated upon here, they would bring with them the danger of an overly prolix text. Hence, they will not be dilated upon. [In summary, however, we may say that] in all such cases [viz., other types of liberation], because they are open to the impurity of dualism (dvaitamala), the desire for liberation (mokşalipsā) [has been redirected] to what is not liberation (amokşā), resulting in the mere appearance of liberation (mokşābhāsa).1033

What then is the definition of liberation? The master says in reply: ... ‘[by cutting the knot of] ignorance, etc.’.

Ignorance is that delusion generated by the nescience implicit in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — the body, etc. — whose antecedent is the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self.1034

That very [delusion] is a knot, that is, is like a knot, for it engenders a constriction of the all-encompassing nature [of the Self]; that is to say, it is a fettering of one’s inherent pervasiveness,1035 etc., which we have characterized as one’s own freedom — a fettering that stems from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.;

[whereas] the cutting of that knot, its cleaving, means the splitting asunder of the knot we have characterized as the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., once the [adept’s] sustained concentration on the inherent freedom of his own all-encompassing Self has become unshakable.

Because of this tearing asunder, there is the manifestation (abhivyaktatā) [of one’s own energies ] — or [, what is the same thing,] the full deployment of the energies of one’s Self, through one’s own energies1036 — properties whose specific characteristic is the freedom of the Self. And it is this [full expansion] that is liberation unexcelled.

Here is the purport of what has been said. [Consider the following illustration:] Although it is space, and endowed with innate and eternal attributes such as

1032 The reference has not been found, although the text is very close to the passage from the Ūrmikaula[arņava] (or Ūrmimahākula), quoted by TĀV XIV 33b-35a (vol. V: 2432): [...] asti ced bhagavān vyāpī kathayotkramaņena kim/ nāsti ced bhagavān vyāpī kathayotkramaņena kim. On the Ūrmikaulārņava, a work of Krama Kaulism, which is available only in MS (NAK MS 5-5207 (incomplete) Paper. Newari script), see Sanderson 2005: 133-134. The Ūrmikaula is quoted in TĀ XIV 31b-32a, 33b-35a.1033 Cf. ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 26): anyatratyo hi apavargaḥ kutaścin muktir na sarvata iti niḥśreyasābhāsa iti vakşyāmaḥ, "The release [expounded] elsewhere, which [inevitably] has the form "liberation is contingent and not universal" [lit., "liberation is somewhere and not everywhere"], we will say is nothing but the appearance of the ultimate’. According to the Bhāskarī, the adjective ‘ "anyatratyaḥ", "existing elsewhere", points here to the doctrines of the Buddhists, etc’ (anyatra — bauddhasiddhāntādişu bhavaḥ anyatratyaḥ), and the Bhāskarī concludes: māyādes tattvāt na tu śuddhavidyāder api, ‘By this [he means that this so-called "liberation"] derives from the principle of māyā rather than from pure knowledge (śuddhavidyā), etc.’.1034 The order of the two errors is that adopted by YR ad PS 31 and 61; cf. YR ad 53.1035 Pervasiveness implies omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence; see n. 561.1036 Same terminology (svaśaktivikasvaratā) in YR ad 56, defining mokşa; see also YR ad 61: mukto vikasvaraśaktir bhavet, ‘liberated, that is, endowed with [fully] deployed energies’. The commentary involves a syntactical śleşa, the svaśakti° of the compound is to be taken both as an objective genitive (‘manifestation of one’s own energy’) and as an instrumental (‘manifestation through one’s own energies’).

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pervasiveness, etc., such space, when constricted by its relation to the [inner] sides of the jar, etc., is spoken of as ‘jar-space’ [viz., a ‘space belonging to or within the jar’] and is endowed with attributes such as non-pervasiveness, etc. — and so displays itself as different from [endless] space.

Similarly, once the constriction attributable to the sides of the jar, etc., is removed, that same ‘jar-space’, etc., [again] becomes instantly endowed with attributes such as pervasiveness, etc. — and there is no concurrent manifestation (āvirbhāva) of any novel attribute1037 deriving from the breaking of the jar, etc.1038

In just this way, consciousness, when constricted by the limitations deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., is said to be ‘as if bound’;

and similarly, once the bondage that consists of [the conceit] attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize, has come to an end through the manifestation of the knowledge of one’s own nature, that same consciousness is said to be ‘as if liberated’,1039 [since now it is] fully deployed through the discrimination of its own energies [of independence, etc.].

Hence bondage as well as liberation are both essentially [functions of] conceit of self affecting the limited cognizer; it is not that any events of this sort really take place in the reality that is consciousness (saṃvittattva) — the ultimate truth (paramārtha) [of this system].

Therefore, nothing at all novel is realized in liberation: there is displayed nothing but one’s own innate nature. The same truth is stated also in the Vişņudharma:1040

1037 In Vedānta, the ‘sides of the jar’ provide a standard example of upādhi — the ‘limiting extrinsic condition’ which, when present, falsely divides and multiplies a reality intrinsically one and indivisible.1038 Cf. Aps 51; ĀŚ III 4-5; BSBh II 22 and II 2; 24. For speculations on ghaţākāśa, see also YR ad PS 16, 24 and 37.1039 Bondage and liberation are equally illusory, a point often associated with Mādhyamikas. See also SK 62: tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsarati kaś cit/ saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakŗtiḥ; also SpP 1, which quotes Vāmanadatta’s Saṃvitprakāśa (referred to as the Ātmasaptati, the ‘Seventy Verses on the Self) II 58: vastusthityā na bandho ‘sti tadabhāvān na muktatā/ vikalpaghaţitāv etāv ubhāv api na kiñcana//, ‘In truth, there is no bondage; in its absence there is no liberation. Both are concocted from thought constructs, neither is anything at all’; as well as AG’s Anuttarāşţikā 2: saṃsāro ‘sti na tattvatas tanubhŗtāṃ bandhasya vārtaiva kā bandho yasya na jātu tasya vitathā muktasya muktikriyā/ mithyāmohakŗd eşa rajjubhujagacchāyāpiśācabrahmo mā kiṃcit tyaja mā gŗhāņa vihara [v.1. in TĀV I 331, vol. I: 305: virama] svastho yathāvasthitaḥ//, ‘Transmigration does not truly exist. Why then talk of the bondage of the embodied soul? Pointless is activity aimed at freedom when one is already free, bondage never having been; all such confusion is produced by erroneous delusion, as when one mistakes a rope for a serpent or a shadow for a demon. So give up nothing, acquire nothing; just take it easy! You are [already] healthy and well-situated’; also ŚD III 72: tathā tathā śivāvasthā svecchātaḥ sa tadātmakaḥ/ tadātmatve nāsti bandhas tadabhāvān na mokşaņanam//, ‘(Even when duality prevails) thus, Siva’s state is like that in accord with His own (free) will and that (duality) is of His nature. Thus as it is such, there is no bondage and liberation is not due to its absence’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 364); cf. ĀŚ II 32, ĀPS 69, YV III 100, 40.1040 Vişņudharmāḥ, ‘Precepts for the Worship of Vişņu’, of which the Vişņudharmottara professes to be the latter part, is ascribed to Śaunaka, the chief narrator of the text, by the Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāşya (IV 4, 3). It is a compilation, in the form of embedded dialogues and narratives, belonging to ‘the liturgical literature of early Vişņuism’ as stated by Grunendahl (Vişņudharma: IX). Its date is uncertain: between the 3rd and 11th cent. AD, as proposed by

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As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exist — for whence should that originate which is not?1041 As, when the bellows hide is ripped, the wind [that escapes] is not other than wind [itself]; just so, the soul is [not other] than brahman, once the bondage of merit and demerit has been destroyed.1042

Kārikā 61Now the master makes it known that he who has knowledge — whose bonds of ignorance have been destroyed — is liberated, though he continues to occupy his body out of benevolence for others:

Grunendahl (pp. 72-73), which is corroborated by Rāmānuja’s Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāşya (11th-12th cent.), which quotes the text, as well as by the present citation, from the same period. Rāmānuja’s reference to the Vişņudharma mitigates somewhat Grunendahl’s skepticism regarding the text’s ‘alleged authority among the Śrīvaisnavas’ (Visnudharma, pt 3: 61-63).1041 The first stanza of the puzzling verse, cited verbatim by Rāmānuja, is so translated by Thibaut (Śrībhāşya, pt. 3: 758), who takes the apparent hapax jalāmbara (‘water-garment’) as "rain water" — perhaps understanding the ‘sheet of water’ that makes an Indian downpour sometimes seem as substantial as a veil. Many variants occur, however, in the manuscripts (see note below), indicating that the image (whatever it was) was not universally grasped. Thibaut does not explain his translation further. Several other infelicities mar the Sanskrit of these lines, making the overall sense less than certain. In any case, if the citation is relevant to the present argument, YR probably understands the ‘expanse of water’ and the ‘well’ (that is, a ‘water-enclosure’) to function here much in the same way as he does the ‘expanse of space’ and the ‘jar’ (that is, a ‘space-enclosure’) of the following illustration. Note that, just before the verse (100, 51) quoted here by YR (‘As, when the bellows-hide is ripped [...]’), the Vişņudharma (100, 50) offers the analogy of the ghaţākāśa occuring earlier in YR’s commentary ad 60: ghaţadhvaṃse ghaţākāśaṃ na bhinnaṃ nabhaso yathā/ brahmaņā heyavidhvaṃse vişņvākhyena pumāṃs tathā//. In Thibaut’s translation, the following verse of the original text (VD 100, 50-51, see note below) reads as follows: ‘— thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal’.1042 Vişņudharma 100, 56; 100, 51. In Grunendahl’s edition, the two ślokas quoted here by YR are not consecutive; the former being 100, 56, the latter, 100, 51. It is noteworthy that the first śloka appears to have been popular, for it is often quoted, as, for instance, in the Ātmasiddhi and in Rāmānuja’s Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāşya IV 4, 3, two texts that have the same reading of the verse (in Narasiṃhācārya’s edition (1910) of the Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāşya, this verse is identified as Vişņudharma 104, 56). In the light of the edition of the Vişņudharma and the passage quoted by Rāmānuja, it would seem that YR has altered the text, omitting the correlative phrase of the first śloka, and joining to it an anterior verse. The original text, as quoted in Narasiṃhācārya’s and Abhyankar’s editions of the Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāşya, reads as follows: yathā na kriyate jyotsnā malaprakşālanān maņeḥ/ doşaprahāņān na jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā// yathodapānakaraņāt kriyate na jalāmbaram/ sad eva nīyate vyaktim asataḥ sambhavaḥ kutaḥ// yathā [tathā, in Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, LXVIII, pt I, 1914] heyaguņadhvaṃsād avabodhādayo guņāḥ/ prakāśyante na janyante nityā evātmano hi te//, ‘As the luster of the gem is not created by the act of polishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not created by the putting off of imperfections. As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exist — for whence should that originate which is not? — thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal’ (tr. Thibaut). Cf. the text critically edited by Grunendahl, which reads differently (and apparently less satisfactorily) verses 55-

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61. He who has cut the knot of ignorance, whose doubts have vanished, who has put aside error, whose merits and demerits have been destroyed, is liberated, though still joined with his body.

Even though conjoined with a body, he who has found the knowledge of his own Self, though he yet lives (jīvann api), is liberated (muktaḥ), that is, he is endowed with fully deployed energies (vikasvaraśakti), for there no more exists the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.

But, says an opponent, if bondage is [as you say] association with the body, how then could such a one be liberated, since an association with the [body is supposed]?

In response, the master says: ‘He who has cut, etc.’.He by whom the knot formed of ignorance has been cut, that is, split asunder, is so

[liberated] — the bond formed by the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., which has arisen thanks to the [mistaken] cognition that [the Self] is incomplete (apūrņatvakhyāti).

Similarly, [is liberated] he whose doubts have vanished, that is, whose doubts have been destroyed;

and again, he by whom error, that is, illusion formed of duality, has been put aside, that is, abolished, thanks to the acquisition of the knowledge of ultimate nonduality;

and finally (evam), it is he who is such [as has been described, namely, he who is liberated and yet lives], the auspicious or inauspicious [consequences of] whose [deeds] have been destroyed by sustained concentration — whether [those consequences] be conducive to dharma [viz., enjoined] or to its opposite [viz., prohibited], inasmuch as the root impressions [produced by them] have been dissolved, for there no longer exists any notion [associating the] body with the Self.

By this, it has been explained that ‘bondage is ignorance itself’1043 [rather than the body as such, or a connection with the body, as implied by the objection].

And he whose [ignorance] is destroyed, even while remains a rapport with the body, is at that very moment liberated (muktaḥ), though he still lives (jīvann eva). It is not that bondage involves necessarily a connection with a body.

The removal of that ignorance is liberation. However, [it may be added that,] with the perishing of the body, complete (pūrņa) liberation is attained.1044

Kārikā 62Though his body remains as the effect of actions [previously done], the acts of him who is thus liberated while living, while he continues to act, are ignited by knowledge [and are performed] merely for the sake of the body’s [previously enjoined] journey,1045 and not for the sake of any fruit. The master now explains this:

56: yathā na kriyate jyotsnā malaprakşālanādinā / doşaprahāņān na jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā// yathodupānakaraņāt kriyate na jalāmbaram/ sadaiva nīyate vyaktim asataḥ saṃbhavaḥ kutaḥ// yathā heyagaņadhvaṃsād avabodhādayo guņāḥ/ prakāśyante na janyante nityā evātmano hite// (Grunendahl observes that all MSS. have hybrid ‘-odupāna-’, except N1: ‘-oda-’, and B: yathopadānakaraņāt kriyate jalasaṃcayam; D-mss.: -lāntaram).1043 In fact, one of the meanings of the second sūtra of the Śivasūtra: jñānaṃ bandhaḥ.1044 First sketch, here, of a distinction between liberation in this life, jīvanmukti, and liberation at death, which later traditions will term videhamukti. The question will be taken up again in YR ad 83, and more explicitly at the end of the commentary on 85-86; see Intr., p. 431045 śarīrayātrā.

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62. Just as the seed parched by fire loses its power of sprouting, so is the act no longer conducive to rebirth that has been burnt in the fire of knowledge.1046

Just as the rice-seed parched by fire, though conjoined with soil, water and heat, is no longer capable of generating sprouts, etc., due to a defect in the [required] aggregate [of conditions], so, in the same way, the act that has been burnt in the fire of knowledge, that is, scorched by the radiance of ultimate nondual consciousness — whose power [of accruing results] has thus been burnt up — is no longer conducive to generating the fruit that is rebirth, when the body of him who has knowledge finally perishes;1047 that is, such an act does not cause the creation of a further body, like the burnt-up seed in respect of the sprout,

... and this is the case whatever be the action, whether auspicious or inauspicious, so long as it be performed by abandoning the thought of what is to be avoided and what is enjoined, this itself conditioned on one’s having ceased to confound the body, etc., with the Self — which occurs when one realizes: ‘It is I who appear (sphurāmi) as the Self of everything’.1048

Therefore, the act done in such a way as to focus (abhisaṃdhāna) energy of consciousness (citiśakti)1049 on the absence of consequence (aphala) is not able again to give rise to birth, inasmuch as that energy is formed of the notion that the ‘I’ [of the meditator] is one with all things [— viz., ‘I am this all’, or ‘this all is indistinguishable from me’].1050

Kārikā 63

1046 Cf. kārikā 57 where is described another way of rendering a seed unproductive.1047 This is the doctrine, expounded at length in the Bhagavadgītā, and proclaimed in the Buddha’s first sermon: it is not the act as such that binds, but the intention that motivates it; as long as its fruit is not desired, the act retains its constitutive and obligatory character, whether ritual (Gītā) or compassionate (Buddha); argument taken up again in PS 67.1048 aham eva itthaṃ viśvātmanā sphurāmi.1049 First occurrence of the notion. See ĪPK I 5, 13: citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā, ‘Consciousness (citi) has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Speech that arises freely’, and the Vimarśinī, where citi is commented upon by citikriyā, the activity of consciousness’. Cf. ŚSV I 1: citikriyā sarvasāmānyarūpā, ‘The activity of consciousness is universal throughout’; also PH 1 (quoted in PM 26): citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuḥ, ‘Free consciousness is the cause bringing about the universe’, and the auto-commentary ad loc. The principal concern of PH is the manner in which citi chooses to limit itself and become citta, empirical consciousness (v. 5), thereafter ultimately regaining its absolute being (v. 13). The term citiśakti is found in YS IV 34; qualified as ‘svarūpapratişţhā’, ‘established in its own nature’, it serves as a synonym to kaivalya, ‘autonomy’.1050 Similar statement in YR ad 51.

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If, then, this is so, how1051 has this energy of consciousness1052 come to be possessed of a body — since it is already fully developed (vikasvara) [as supreme ipseity] ? The master says:

63. Indeed, energy of consciousness,1053 delimited by the efficient force1054

[unleashed by ritual acts undertaken in this life, whose result] is a future body suitable to [the fulfillment of] those acts — acts themselves that are made possible by limiting the intellect [to egocentric purposes]1055 — comes into possession of a new body,1056 once this present body has fallen away.

[Yogarāja now undertakes an explanation of various problematic elements of the kārikā while composing them into a coherent statement of the kārikā’s purport:]

From what follows (yasmāt) [we will, in good time, draw a suitable conclusion, introduced by tasmāt, ‘therefore’, but in the meantime, it behooves us to clarify the

1051 The rare form kathaṃkāram is worthy of a grammatical note: such instances of the relatively infrequent gerund suffix ‘ņamul’ (-am), authorized by P. III 4, 27 are themselves exceptional (see another instance of ņamul in kā. 104). Monier-Williams cites Śiśupālavadha (2.52) for this form, where, according to Mallinātha’s commentary, the suffix has no proper sense, that is, does not alter the sense of the term to which it attaches — here the adverb katham. The Kāśikā specifies that in such usages, the ‘gerund’ must be understood as pertaining to the main predicate, which rules out its use in cases such as anyathākŗtvā śiro bhuṅkte, ‘having nodded [lit., ‘having disposed his head otherwise’], he eats’ (anyathākāraṃ bhuṅkte, ‘he eats differently’, would be legitimate). Same term in the avat. ad 85-86.1052 Or ‘that from of energy that is called "consciousness."’1053 citi — we translate as ‘energy of consciousness’, as YR glosses citi with citiśakti.1054 bhāvanā, here, in the light of YR’s gloss and the examples there given, seems to be used in its Mīmāṃsaka sense of ‘efficient force’ (so Edgerton, Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa, q.v.) attaching to the act, specifically to the ritual act (cf. its derivation from the causative, bhāvayati). Our interpretation thus differs from those of previous translators (we underline the renderings of bhāvanā). Cf. Barnett: ‘Owing to the conception of a future body corresponding to [present] works, [a conception] arising from limitation of intelligence, the Thought becomes accordingly contracted on the dissolution of the present body’; Silburn (echoing Barnett): ‘En effet, grace a la faculte qu’elle possede d’imaginer un corps futur conforme ā l’acte (qu’elle accompli!) en mettant en ceuvre un intellect limite, la conscience se contracte proportionnellement a la dissolution du corps actuel’; B.N. Pandit: ‘An individual finite I-consciousness, having a deep rooted conception of finitude with regard to itself, is lead (sic) by the impression of its future body, formed in accordance with its deeds, to the consequent position after the end of its current form’. These three interpretations appear to be based on a specifically Śaiva sense of bhāvanā, the spiritual realization preceding mokşa itself — which in any case is not that far removed from the original Mīmāṃsaka meaning. According to the Mīmāṃsā, the act does not end with its material result (which may be nothing but the ashes of the sacrifice), but is prolonged, through its ‘efficient force’ up to the moment of its "real" fruition: the fulfilled wish of the performer. Even this "real" result depends on the ‘efficient force’ generated by the previous ritual act. Those questioning this sacrificial model (cf. BĀU VI 2, 15-16; MuU I 2, 5-11) noted that since the previous (ritual) act is occasional, impermanent, its ‘efficient force’ (needed to maintain the sacrificer ‘in heaven’, for example) cannot be thought itself to be permanent, and must itself be destined to exhaustion in its turn, becoming then but another element in an endless series of impermanent causes and effects. Later on, YR will emphasize that this ‘efficient force’ is articulated through the vāsanās produced in the mind by ritual acts; see n. 1060. Cf. BhG II 66, where Edgerton’s interpretation of bhāvanā, ‘efficient-force’, should no doubt be understood in a more spiritual sense; cf. Śaṅkara: na cāsty ayuktasya bhāvanā ātmajñānābhiniveśaḥ.1055 Egocentric purposes such as attainment of sovereignty or possession of much wealth.1056 Lit, ‘becomes [again] thus’.

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various terms composing the kārikā and to state their syntactic interrelation more clearly:]

by limiting the intellect means ‘on account of the determination [to act in a certain way], originating in the failure to recognize [the Self as such], and [tainted] by the dirt of desire, which is itself conditioned on latent dispositions deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.’;

the act performed [in accordance with such limitation] means ‘an act suitable to an agent who is qualified by such latent dispositions’ — as for instance when he says: ‘I will perform a horse sacrifice’, ‘may I be happy in this world and in the world beyond’, ‘may I never be sorrowful’, ‘let me attain the abode of Indra through this rite’;

the future body [of that agent] means ‘the body that will come into being later’, once has been extinguished one’s entitlement to a body needed to enjoy the results of those actions whose fruition has already begun (prārabdhakarman)1057

— which body will be suitable to perform those actions that are assured further development thanks to the latent dispositions (vāsanāprarūḍhi) [preserved] in the mind, and thus is fit to serve as enjoyer of fruits acquired in conformity which such acts;

the efficient force attaching to that [future body] means ‘the further development of those latent dispositions’ [formed in the mind in consequence of the act], in which [are latent] the results of the action1058 wished for — as for instance, when one says: ‘Let me obtain universal sovereignty, etc., by performing a rite such as the horse sacrifice, etc.’.

It is through this [efficient force (unleashed by ritual acts undertaken in this life, whose result) is a future body suitable to (the fulfillment of) those acts] that the energy of consciousness, although replete in all respects, is affected by the impurity of supposing oneself the agent of actions, which itself originates in the impurities of deeming oneself finite, and of regarding the world as objective; this energy, though all-pervasive, becomes thus delimited,1059 just as does the space within the jar;

— and so, this energy [of consciousness], once the [present] body has fallen away, still affected by limiting factors such as the latent dispositions belonging [properly] to the body that enjoys the results following from its actions,1060 becomes again thus [that is, comes into possession of a new body].

[Here] the body is [said to be] the enjoyer of this, namely, the results of those actions whose fruition has begun;

— by its destruction is meant death, so-called because of the disappearance of those enjoyments;

1057 The act (karman) is often distinguished into three sub-varieties: kriyamānakarman, the act now being performed, whose results are yet to be enjoyed; sañcitakarman, act already Performed, whose results have not yet begun to be enjoyed, and remain stored up, latent; and prārabdhakarman, the act whose results have begun to be experienced, but not yet exhausted.1058 See n. 1054 and 1060.1059 saṃkucitā.1060 This is the notion of karmavipāka, the ripening of the act, whose ultimate source may be found in the philosophy of ritual. Between the actual performance of the act and the experience of its fruit, the efficient force of the act lies dormant in the form of a vāsanā, which, according to one of its etymologies, is a fragrance permeating the body. But the fruits of some acts require a different type of body — that of a man, woman, king, ant, elephant, nymph, etc.

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— and once the [present] body has fallen away, consciousness, wherein the latent dispositions provoked by actions [yet unfulfilled] have been roused, becomes [again] thus, that is, becomes endowed with that body, through whose agency the fruits of one’s previous actions are acquired, and which thus becomes the enjoyer of the results of those actions — on account of which even consciousness becomes a receptacle for the enjoyment of heaven and hell, etc. [as consequences of one’s good or bad actions].

[All this being the case,] it follows (tasmāt) that, once [consciousness] has taken on a body (śarīrībhūtva) [as described above], whatever action be performed in temptation of a finite fruit is more than capable of providing a new birth wherein one will enjoy the result [suitable to that action].1061

But, on the other hand, since the further development of latent dispositions (vāsanāpraroha) is no longer an issue, how can an action, having freed itself from the [thrall of the] body (aśarīrībhūtva),1062 and done under the guise of consciousness itself by one who thinks: ‘I am brahman, the All’,1063 be [thought] capable of facilitating the rebirth of all-pervading energy of consciousness?1064 This is the master’s intended meaning.1065

Karikās 64-66Now, if it is the case that action done in conformity with the principle of non-Self (anātmatayā) [that is, done while mistaking the Self for the non-Self] eventuates in the cognizing subject’s continuing transmigration, then surely the nature of the Self should be described, in virtue of which one does not become [again] enmeshed in transmigration. Although this has already been explained,1066 he speaks of it again in order that his disciples may take it to heart [and interiorize it]:1067

1061 Such is the answer to the objection raised in the avat.: ‘how can consciousness become embodied?’1062 On the notion of aśarīratva, see Intr., pp. 27 and 46, and n. 1212 ad 79-80. Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 (quoted in Jīvanmuktiviveka IV; the verse occurs also at KaU II 3, 14): yadā sarve pramucyante kāma ye ‘sya hŗdi śriāḥ/ atha martyo ‘mŗto bhavati, atra brahma samaśnute// iti tad yathāhinirlayanī valmīke mŗtā pratyastā śayīta, evam evedaṃ śarīraṃ śete, athāyam aśarīro ‘mŗtaḥ prāņo, brahmaiva, teja eva [...], ‘ "When all the desires that dwell in the heart are cast away, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains Brahman here (in this very body)." Just as the slough of a snake lies on an anthill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body. But this disembodied, immortal life is Brahman only, is light indeed [...]’; see Ś ad loc. (quoted n. 1030): considering his body, which formerly was nothing but an obstacle to his consciousness, as a mere tatter, of no more importance to him than is the skin that the serpent sloughs off, the ‘knower’ acts henceforth disinterestedly, indifferently, focusing only on his status as ‘liberated while living’.1063 sarvaṃ brahmāsmi.1064 Or, might vyāpinyāḥ citiśakteḥ be taken to be an ablative: ‘on account of that all-pervading conscious energy’?1065 iti tātparyārthaḥ — with this term the entire commentary concludes. Whereas the previous statements expounded a point of view in some sense negative, inasmuch as they sought to explain the idea of reincarnation, the final statement represents their ‘implication’ (tātparya), which is their positive counterpart, and serves also to relativize the previous exposition.1066 The same reasoning is at issue in kā. 9.1067 hŗdayaṅgamīkartum — recurrent idiom; see, for instance, hŗdayaṅgamībhāva in PTLvŗ 2a.

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64-66. Once one has become aware that his Self is formed of Śiva — the Lord that is unblemished consciousness, who has transcended all that involves knowers and agents,1068 who is extended [to the entire universe], is formed of the Light that neither sets nor rises, whose intentions are ever true,1069 who is beyond all mere inclination conditioned by [the particularities of] time or space, who is stable, immutable, ever replete, the unique cause of the processes of dissolution and origination that involve countless hosts of energies, the excellent instigator of injunctions of creation and so on1070 — is it possible that such a one be subject to transmigration? Of one who is extended [to the entire universe], whence or whither is motion possible?

Once the cognizer, whose heart has been transfixed by [the Lord’s] grace,1071 and who has overcome the conceit attributing to the body and the like the capacity to cognize,1072 has become aware that his own Self is formed of Śiva [see kārikā 66], that is, once he recognizes that he is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, how indeed could he — now knowing himself to be identical with the Great Lord — be subject to transmigration, that is, in what way could he become enmeshed [again] in the cycle of existence?

He could not. And as well, because he [alone] transmigrates whose nature is the subtle body which is composed of consciousness and non-consciousness on account of its connection with the impurity of supposing himself to be the agent of actions. How, moreover, could he who is formed solely of consciousness (cidekamūrti), who is, in substance, Śiva (śivamaya) be subject to transmigration — for his sheaths of impurity have been destroyed, notably that of deeming himself finite, etc.? Such is the author’s intended meaning.

An interlocutor may ask: — ‘What harm is there [viz., to your thesis] if one who is solely formed of consciousness were said to be subject to transmigration?’

Suspecting such an objection, the master utters the words starting with ‘extended’:of an extended [to the entire universe] cognizer, that is one not qualified by time,

space or their particular embodiment,1073 how is motion [‘to’ or motion] ‘from’ possible? Such a cognizer has already pervaded all things! He is [therefore] complete, inasmuch as the latent dispositions have terminated [that were occasioned] by what he had done while under the influence of the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.

Is there any place beyond him1074 from which he might differentiate himself [and thereto] effect a transmigration, a going elsewhere, [such other place] being different?

1068 sarvosamuttīrņaboddhŗkartŗmayam — the compound, which YR does not fully parse, appears to be susceptible of several analyses; as a BV, it could mean ‘who has transcended all that involves knowers and agents’; as a TP, it could mean either ‘made of all-transcending knowers and agents [referring to the jīvanmuktas, of whom there may be more than one]’, or ‘made of [viz., who has made himself into] an all-transcending knower and agent’.1069 In the sense that ‘whatever he desires, it happens thus’, as explains YR.1070 Cf. Barnett: ‘cunning creator of the laws of creation and other conditions’, and Silburn: ‘ordonnateur tres expert des oeuvres de creation et autres’.1071 paraśaktipāta — lit., ‘descent of [the Lord’s] supreme energy’; see YR ad 9.1072Same phraseology in YR ad 39 as well as YR ad 1: parimitapramātŗtādhaspadīkāreņa .1073 Similar phraseology in YR ad 60, which deals with the definition of mokşa.1074 tadatirikta.

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Indeed, the cases of ablative, locative, and so on, have opportunity only in regard to one who is qualified by the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize. It makes no sense even to apply the word ‘transmigration’ to the cognizer who, being solely formed of consciousness, is himself nothing but brahman (brahmabhūta), unqualified by [the limitations] of space and time.

What kind of Self is it — formed of Śiva [you say] — that he would become aware of? The master says in reply: ‘unblemished consciousness, etc.’.

[YR proceeds to a grammatical analysis of the components of the description given in the three kārikās:]

By [unblemished] consciousness is meant [that Śiva is] pure consciousness (śuddhacaitanya), as being free from impurity — that from which the accumulation of impurities, the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc., has departed.

Similarly, [he] has transcended everything, or is unexcelled, for his independence of knowledge and action,1075 already mentioned, is so described1076

[viz., as sarvasamuttīrņaboddhŗkartŗmayam].By extended is meant ‘all-pervasive’, due to the absence of delimitation brought

about by space, etc.Similarly, his form, that is, his body, is Light1077 itself, namely, the blazing torch

of consciousness, of which the setting or the rising, that is, the dissolution and the creation, are never seen.

And also, [that Śiva] is such that his intentions (saṃkalpa), that is, his unimpeded caprices (vihāra), are true (satya), that is, are ultimately meaningful (paramārtha),1078 in the sense that ‘whatever he desires, it happens thus’.

And [that Śiva] is [kārikā 65] free from [the need to] investigate, whose motivation is [conditioned by] time, space, or their particular embodiment, for he is endowed with the attributes of omnipresence and permanence.

He is therefore stable, that is, immovable; he is immutable, and imperishable; he is thus Lord (īśvara), and independent.

Moreover, he is ever replete, that is, he wants nothing [to complete himself, is free of dependency].1079

He is [the agent,] free as regards any injunction to arouse or suppress those very many, that is, exceedingly numerous, hosts of energies [manifesting themselves] in objects such as jars, cloths, etc. — energies that are presided over by the [deified] energies Brāhmī, etc. [viz., the mātŗkās], [and whose countless names] arise from the mass [or totality] of sounds.1080

1075 svātantrya may have been suggested to YR here by the mention of two of the three energies (icchā is not mentioned) said to be the first concretization of Śiva’s svātantryaśakti.1076 In this way, YR avoids glossing grammatically the problematic second half of the compound.1077 Same term bhārūpa in kā. 9; bhāsvarūpa in kā. 43-44.1078 Being never devoid of meaning, they are necessarily real, or necessarily exist.1079 Same definition in YR ad 10-11.1080 The image of the Wheel of energies (śakticakra) is implicit in this description; see PS 4 and SpK I 1, quoted n. 301. Moreover, the passage here is parallel with that of YR ad 10-11. The underlying perspective is this: all objects, whether insentient or sentient, whether past, Present, or future, may be seen as expressing the energies of Śiva’s consciousness. Such objects have for their presiding deities the eight mātŗs (or mātŗkās) who are forms assumed by Śiva, and were sent by Brahmā to earth to destroy demons. In effect, since there is no

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Also, he is the excellent instigator of the injunctions of creation and so on, that is, he is an extremely skilled instigator, or establisher [of such activities].

Thus, he who knows that the Great Lord is his own Self, replete in every respect, in accordance with the qualifications that have been detailed above, will no longer — whatever he does — participate in the cycle of transmigration, since the seeds of [further] action have been burnt up. In sum, he becomes liberated (vimuktaḥ) while still living (jīvann eva).

Kārikā 67In order to teach [once again] that an act does not eventuate in any fruit — provided it is done by him who knows, who no longer thirsts after the fruits of action thanks to the success of his reflection (pratyavamarśa) on himself — the master now offers a mundane illustration confirmed by everyone’s experience:

67. It has thus been established by all possible arguments1081 that the act done by him who knows bears no fruit. For, in worldly affairs, no fruit attaches to him who, persistently, affirms: ‘It is not mine, it is his’.

‘I am indeed formed [entirely] of consciousness, free, the accomplisher of all actions inasmuch as I exist as the innermost Being1082 of all cognizers’,1083 or [mutatis mutandis], ‘I am not their accomplisher, it is the divine (pārameśvarī) energy of freedom that does this’.1084 One or the other being the case,1085 what follows for me, who am essentially pure consciousness?’1086

It is due to such arguments, that is, due to reasonings whose nature has been previously set forth, that the action which is accomplished, namely, done and fully realized, by the cognizer who knows the nature of his own Self as previously set forth in both cases,1087 bears no fruit, that is is unconnected with any fruit, inasmuch as there is nothing left for him to avoid or to acquire, because of the absence of any notion relating the body, etc., and the ‘I’.1088

Since all adventitious constructions [such as taking the body as Self] have been dissolved for the knower of the Self (ātmajñānin) in both ways as previously

thought without corresponding words, the entire sphere of plurality may be seen as the work of Speech, which is itself, ultimately, that same potentality, or dynamism, of consciousness that has received the name of vimarśa in nondual Śivaism of Kashmir. The vācaka exists on three levels: varņa, letter; pāda, word; and mantra, sentence, utterance; in the same way, the vācya is triple: tattva, principle; bhuvana, universe; and kalā, fragment, or thought. varņas are also called mātŗkas, for they are the source of words; and, as such, they represent innumerable energies or powers. This bahutaraśaktivrāta, the ‘countless hosts of energies’, echoes here the śakticakra of SpK I 1. Here, one of the purposes of the triad of kārikās (64-66) is to teach the essential complementarity of the two aspects termed prakāśa and vimarśa, or Śiva and Śakti.1081 ‘api’ in its totalizing sense, viz., yuktibhir sarvair api.1082 antaratamatva.1083 aham eva cidghanaḥ svatantraḥ sarvapramātrantaratamatvena sarvakarmakārī.1084 nāhaṃ kartā pārameśvarī svātantryaśaktir itthaṃ karoti.1085 etavatā — lit., ‘from this much’.1086 Here, Yogarāja synthetizes the content of the three previous kārikās, making the jñānin speak in the first person. The conclusion, so far implicit, is: ‘it follows from the above that you can act without being burdened with fruits’.1087 The two cases referred to are the jñānin as agent, and the Lord as agent.1088 Here we understand dehādyahaṃbhāva on the model of vişayavişayībhāva.

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explained, where would the action, even though accomplished, make connection with a result?

The answer is: nowhere [that is, no connection is possible], for, in other words, no basis exists for enabling (svābhāva) the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize.

Indeed, the basis [of attributing a result to an agent] is the arbitrary convention of presuming, on the part of the cognizer, that the fruit pertains to the act done.1089

But the act of him who knows, which exhausts itself in its very form [without any reference to a result], due to the absence of any such presumption [that the fruit is that of the action done], is not connected with any result.

Now, where might we find a similar case, where an act is related to a result only through a presumption [on the part of the mind]?

The master replies, saying: ‘It is not mine, [it is his], etc.’.That is, [such a case] is [readily] seen, and is not unprecedented. For instance, the

sacrificial act, etc. [is done by the officiating priest, saying]: ‘It is not mine, it is his’,1090 [that is, it belongs] to a certain sacrificial patron who is desirous [of the result].

Thus (iti), in accordance with that idea, namely, that, though a sacrificial act has been accomplished [by me, the yājaka], that act is not [mine], given the lack of any intention [on my part] having to do with its fruit, for in the world [of affairs, loke], I am [seen as sufficiently] motivated by the salary [that I retain], and because the act itself is deemed to be associated with a supramundane1091 fruit [viz., ‘heaven’, etc.]. And so, in accordance with the maxim: ‘Officiating priests (yājaka) execute the sacrifice [for another, yajanti, active voice]; the patron of the sacrifice (yajamāna) sacrifices [for himself, yajate, middle voice]’, although the officiating priests (ŗtvij) accomplish by themselves the sacrificial act [it is with this in mind that they do so]: ‘This sacrificial act, this horse sacrifice, etc., does not belong to us at all; but rather to the meritorious [patron] who has taken the vow [to perform it] (dīkşita); we, in truth, here at this sacrifice, are desirous only of the stipulated remuneration.1092 [Actually] there are none of us here;1093 rather it is the patron of the sacrifice who enjoys the fruits, heaven, etc., brought about by this act’.1094

1089 rūḍhi — in its linguistic application, rūḍhi designates the direct and unmediated connection between the word (or its pronunciation) and its sense (or its apprehension) — what we would call the "conventional" sense of the word, as opposed to the "derived" meaning (yoga), in which etymological derivation plays a part. In the Indian view of things, the word may be seen as "growing" (root ruh) into its natural or inherent apprehension, as "flowering" according to a natural law. Here, it is the rūḍhi of ‘act’ and ‘fruit’ that serves as basis for assigning the act to an agent — a linkage that philosophical reasonings (as well as those of the Gītā) attempt to break, by dissociating the agent from the fruit. On rūḍhi, see also n. 1101 and 1371.1090 na mamedam api tu tasya.1091 pāralaukika.1092 Without which the ritual would be invalid.1093 This rather forceful expression is meant to emphasize the gap between the agent of the act and its result. The officiating priests are aware that they are at the sacrifice as agents, but not as enjoyers. They are formally present, but, in truth, only the yajamāna is there, inasmuch as the ritual act exists only in view of its result.1094 The question here is whether the adhikāra of the fruit is always attached to the kartŗ (by virtue of its karman — which is necessarily that of the kartŗ) or whether it can be transferred

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Thus, because for them there exists no presumption linking the act and the fruit, the act, though done by them, is not linked to any fruit such as heaven, etc.

But, here, the patron of the sacrifice, though doing by himself no sacrificial act, and expecting [i.e., requiring] the acts to be performed by the priests, thinks: ‘these sacrificial acts, this horse sacrifice, etc., are mine, and these priests are engaged in this act thanks to my wealth’. Thus ‘mine alone will be the results, heaven, etc., certain to ensue after my body perishes’.

Hence, though he does nothing [in fact], the act is for him connected with its result, since he insists on the presumption that the result of the act be desired.

It is for this reason that [the Pāņinīyas enjoin] the middle voice (ātmanepada) after [the term expressing] the agent dedicated [to perform the sacrifice] (dīkşita), in accordance with the rule kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale,1095 [thus giving the correct forms] yajate [3rd sg. pres.], yajamānaḥ [nom. sg. masc, present participle]; but when the agent is not intended [as the beneficiary], it is the active voice (parasmaipada) [that is enjoined — according to Renou, by I 3, 78], hence: yajanti (3rd pl., pres.), yājakāḥ (nomen agentis in -aka, by II 2, 15).

Such is the insurmountable power1096 of independent thought-constructs1097 that an act, though done by oneself, is not connected with its result [for that person], in the absence of any presumption [associating the agent with] the result; while an act, though done by others, may be connected [for oneself] with its result, if one insists on the conceit: ‘this [act] is mine’.

Therefore, just as priestly actions [are not fruitful], so the act performed by the yogin is not fruitful, in the absence of any such presumption as to the fruit.

Kārikā 68Thus, in all his actions [viz., in whatever action he undertakes], he who knows would be illuminated [as such], for his thoughts are bereft of the stains of supposition as to what he must or must not do. Thus the master says:

to someone else, in keeping with his expectation. Compare the Buddhists’ view that only desire creates bondage.1095 P. I 3, 72 (cited here without its initial portion, svaritañitaḥ [...]): ‘(Les desinences du moyen valent) apres (une racine munie dans le Dhātupāṭha d’un exposant consistant en un ton) module [...] ou un ñ, quand le fruit de Faction se dirige vers l’agent [...]’ (tr. Renou P.: 55).1096 mahiman.1097 Note that here the brahmanical sacrifice is part and parcel of "wordly affairs". And the notion of vikalpa is there required, either as the fruit is dissociated from the act or as the fruit is assumed by another, who merely witnesses the acts of others. Thus the example offered here aims at a circumscribed point: can the agent be dissociated from the fruit of his own act?

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68. Thus awakened by the winds of his meditative realization,1098 as he pours an oblation1099 of all his thought-constructs into the blazing fire of the Self, he becomes fire itself.1100

[The term] meditative realization (bhāvanā) is used [here by us, Śaivas] as conventionally synonymous1101 with ‘awareness’ (vimarśa), in the context of the Self [as justified by the insight]: ‘It is I who am the Great Lord in the form of consciousness, who manifest (sphurāmi) ever thus, intensely’.1102

Thus, that is, in the way elaborated earlier, awakened by [the winds of]1103 his meditative realization, he who knows, while pouring an oblation of all his thought-constructs ... — [by this, the master means that] all such suppositions as ‘I am a bound soul, tied up in the bondage of actions’, ‘I am my body, these are my sons, my wife, etc.’, or ‘this act will lead to heaven or hell, etc’ are set aside 1104 in the awareness that ‘It is I who am all this’1105 —

[... pouring thus an oblation] into the fire of the Self (ātmajyotis), that is, into the blazing fire of consciousness, whose essence is the marvel of supreme ipseity;

1098 See Appendix 20, p. 345.1099 Same speculation and metaphor in PS 76, describing the symbolic oblation (homa) of duality into the fire of consciousness. The parallelism of PS 68 and 76 is emphasized by the use of the present participle juhvat in the former and the noun homa in the latter, both terms being derived from the root hu, ‘to pour an oblation’. The śāktopāya is alluded to here, as shown by the word bhāvanā, and the metaphor of homa, which implies the wider metaphor of yajña or yāga, ‘sacrifice’, a Trika technical term, which stands for the practice of the śāktopāya; cf. TĀ IV 277-278a, and TS IV, p. 25: [...] tatra bhāvānāṃ sarveşāṃ parameśvara eva sthitiḥ nāhyad vyatiriktam astītt vikalparūḍhisiddhaye parameśvara eva sarvabhāvārpaņaṃ yāgaḥ, ‘The "sacrifice" is the offering of all things to the Supreme Lord in order to strengthen the conviction that everything abides in the Supreme Lord and that nothing is distinct from him’. Cf. Bhaţţa Śrī Vīravāmanaka’s verse (quoted in YR ad 76), which spins out the metaphor of the internal yajña. The image is as old as ChU V 19, I ff., VIII 5, 1, inter alia. It is implicit even in BĀU I 1, 1.1100 Cf. ŚS II 8: śarīraṃ haviḥ and ŚSV ad loc: sarvair yat pramātŗtvenābhişiktaṃ sthūlasūkşmādisvarūpaṃ śarīraṃ tad mahāyoginaḥ parasmin cidagnau hūyamānam haviḥ, ‘This body, gross, subtle, etc., that all beings consecrate (abhişikta) as "cognizer", is the oblation poured by the great yogin in the supreme fire of consciousness’; also ŚSV I 6: viśvasya saṃhāro dehātmatayā bāhyatayā cāvasthitasyāpi sataḥ parasaṃvidagnisādbhāvo bhavatīty arthaḥ, ‘Then occurs the dissolution of the universe, that is to say, though existence may continue as body and external objects, it is now identified with the fire of the highest consciousness (parasaṃvid) [viz., it appears only as consciousness]’.1101 rūḍhi, normally the direct and unconditionned denotative sense of a word, here taken somewhat freely as a kind of paryāya, ‘synonym’, in accordance with Renou’s insight (1942: s.v. ‘paryāya’) regarding technical terms. The synonymy may obtain only within a school, as, for example, within grammar, where terms such as vŗddhi, guņa, etc., signify classes of sounds (P. I 1, 1: vŗddhir ādaic), whereas outside the school they have other, more etymologically predictable, meanings, ‘growth’, ‘quality’ — or, in other schools, equally conventional but different meanings, as in dharmaśāstra, where vŗddhi may mean ‘interest’ (on a loan). The notation of a context here (ātmam) serves to distinguish this usage of bhāvanā from the more general usage.1102 aham eva caitanyamaheśvaraḥ sarvātmanā sarvadā evaṃ sphurāmi.1103 The full explanation of the simile has been placed at the end of the commentary in order not to interrupt the syntactical analysis of the verse.1104 śeşībhūta — śeşībhū means literally: ‘become a remainder’ or ‘become ancillary’.1105 aham eva idaṃ sarvam.

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that is, offering them by merging them into the essence of non-discursive consciousness,1106

he becomes Fire [itself], that is, once the fuel consisting of thought-constructs ready to be consumed has been exhausted, the fire of consciousness (cidagni), being that which consumes, is itself perfected. In other words, it is what remains [when the combustion is over], having no form other than that of the transcendental cognizer.1107

Inasmuch as this [meditative realization] proceeds steadily, it is called wind, that is, it is compared to wind; for, in a similar way, fire covered by ashes is awakened by the wind.

Kārikā 69How [concretely] does one who delights in practicing the discipline of supreme knowledge [or ‘that leads to supreme knowledge’] (jñānayoga), in the way expounded above, spend his time, by [what means] sustaining himself for the rest [of his life]?1108 The master says:

69. Eating whatever he finds, clad in whatever is available, tranquil, inhabiting anywhere at all, he is liberated who is the Self of all beings.1109

1106 Same idea, and same formulation in YR ad 71.1107 The allusion here to vedic rituals is obvious. Mīmāṃsakas have discussed at length the question of the ritual fire’s "efficacy", for its consequences were deemed to extend far beyond the cinders that were its only visible result. Here, the "fire" is interiorized, it is transformed into pure consciousness, and becomes itself the "remains" of the combustion of "transitory" states of mind; it occupies thus the place of the Mīmāṃsaka’s ‘apūrva’ or ‘adŗşţa’, which had been thought to be the mechanism through which the ‘karman’ of the sacrifice (viz., the sacrifice itself) worked itself out. But this ‘adŗşţa’ has one quality that the Mīmāṃsakas reasoned ‘adŗşţa’ most significantly lacked: it is the self-evidence of consciousness itself.1108 śeşavartanayā.1109 sarvabhūtātman — or, according to the commentary: ‘he whose being is [composed of] all beings’; cf. sarvātman in PS 82, and YR ad loc. Cf. ĀPS 76, a similar verse, but with yatra kvacana ca śāyī, in the place of yatra kvacana nivāsī. Cf. ĀŚ II 37b quoted n. 1129; on another interpretation of calācalaniketa, see n. 1112); also PS 81, which similarly emphasizes the yogin’s sovereign freedom: [...] tişţhati yatheşţam, ‘He remains [viz., lives on] [acting] as he wishes’. Here begins a long description of the yogin, which ends in kā. 84. For similar speculations on yoga as contemplative union, free from any consideration of caste, or pollution, see BĀU IV 4, 23 (sarvam ātmānaṃ paśyati, nainaṃ pāpmā tarati, sarvaṃ pāpmānaṃ tarati, ‘[...] He sees all in the Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil’), and BhG V 18, which holds that ‘In a knowledge-and-cultivation-perfected/ Brahman, a cow, an elephant,/ And in a mere dog, and an outcaste,/ The wise see the same thing’ (vidyāvinayasaṃpanne brāhmaņe gavi hastini/ śuni caiva śvapāke ca paņḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ//); also ĀPS 77 (almost identical to our PS 70), and ĀŚ III 39, which defines yoga as asparśa, ‘free from contact’, i.e., free from all ‘relation’ or ‘connection’ (saṃbandha) [Ś ad loc] with [Anubhūtisvarūpa and Ānandagiri ad loc] either the varņāśramadharma, the laws of caste and stage of life, or pollution (mala); cf. Bouy ĀŚ: 182. The yogin described here, in PS 69 [= APS 76], is, according to the Śaiva doctrine, the jīvanmukta, a state that AŚ II 38 describes without naming such an ascetic jīvanmukta: there tattvībhūta, ‘having become Reality’, is a synonym of BhG VI 27 brahmabhūta, ‘having become [one with] brahman’, which Ś ad loc. glosses as ‘who is liberated while living, i.e., who is sure that, indeed, the brahman is all’ (jīvanmuktaṃ brahmaiva sarvam ity evaṃ niścayavantaṃ brahmabhūtam). ĀŚV II 38 quotes BhG V 18c and BhG XIII 27: samaṃ sarveşu bhūteşu tişţhantaṃ parameśvaram/ [...] yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati//, ‘Alike in all beings/ Abiding, the Supreme Lord,/ [...] Who sees him, he (truly) sees’.

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Eating whatever edible object is put1110 before him, marveling at it [that is, delighting in it], accepting whatever comes to him without effort on his part, and paying no heed to the [usual] restriction: ‘this is pure, this is impure; this is bad food, this is dainty’ — for he has abandoned the suppositions as to what he must or must not do.

Likewise, clad in whatever [is available], that is, covered up with a tattered garment, or the hide [of an animal], or tree bark, or a cotton cloth, or even with those garments whose essence is the divine [sky] (divyātman, viz., naked); being thus desirous of simply covering his body, neither does he despise one or praise another, for in neither mode is there any question of distinction or discredit.

Why is this? Because he is tranquil, having transcended thought-constructs, such as pleasure and pain.

Likewise, inhabiting anywhere at all;anywhere, in a place of whatever sort, being merely desirous of shelter for

himself; nor should [holy] sites, shrines, or places of pilgrimage, etc., be adopted by him [as residences], just because they are pure, nor should cremation grounds or the dwellings of outcaste be avoided, etc., [merely] because they are impure.1111 He dwells at whatever place falls to his lot without any effort on his part, for [his thoughts are] bereft of the stains of weighing what is pure and what is not.1112

Such a one is liberated (vimucyate),he is liberated, for he spends his time acting [solely] for the benefit of others, thus

sustaining himself for the rest [of his life];1113 that is, he becomes one with the Supreme Lord (paramaśivībhavati).

As it has been stated:Covered by this or that [garment], fed with this or that [food], reposing here or there, such a man the gods know to be a [true] brahmin.1114

And in Mokşadharma[prakaraņa]:I, the pure one, observe the ‘vow of the python’, by which eating fruits, taking meals, or drinking are unregulated, in which space and time are ‘modified’ 1115 in

1110 Lit., ‘falls’, scil., ‘in his begging-bowl’.1111 TĀ IV 213-275, which quotes (IV 213-221a) the older text of the MVT XVIII 74-81, deals lengthily with the vanity involved in considerations of purity and impurity — the subject-matter of PS 69-71 and 73. See also PS 83 = ĀPS 81, and ŚDvŗ I 48, quoted n. 454.1112 Cf. BhG XII 19b, which defines him who is dear to the Lord as aniketa, ‘homeless’. Parallel statement in MBh XIV 43, 40b: acalaś cāniketaś ca kşetrajñaḥ sa paw vibhuḥ, and ĀŚ II 37b (quoted n. 1129), in which the ascetic (yati) is described as calācalaniketas, ‘n’ayant pas de demeure fixe’ [— ‘having an unstable residence’] (Bouy); ‘with an unfixed home (Bhattacharya); ‘having no residence whatever’ (Karmarkar). Ś ad loc. analyzes differently: ‘having as his residence the "moving" (calā) and the ‘unmoving" (acala)’, i.e., the body and the true nature of the Self (ātmatattva); accordingly, Gupta ĀŚ translates: ‘with the self alone for home or his body’.1113 śeşavartanayā.1114 brāhmaņa — that is, ‘one who is instilled with knowledge of the brahman’: MBh XII 237, 12 (Crit. Ed.), from the Mokşadharma, as is the citation following. The yas of the third pāda is, in the Crit. Ed., replaced by ca, itself considered problematic. The verse appears also several times in the addenda of the Crit. Ed.1115 vibhakta — lit., ‘declined’.

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accordance with the evolutions of fate [alone], which offers happiness to the heart [of him who observes it], and which is not observed by the wicked.1116

But how, by acting thus [— by living in this way], can the knower of the Self himself be liberated?

The master replies, saying: ‘the Self of all beings’.Because the knower of the Self knows himself as the Self of all beings — the

compound sarvābhūtātman meaning [both] that he is the Self of all beings, and that all beings are his own Self1117 — nothing exists for him as bondage; everything is conducive to his liberation.1118

Kārikā 70Nor does one so described, who is devoid of conceit of self,1119 suffer the slightest risk of acquiring merit or demerit, whatever he does. The master says:

70. Whether he performs a hundred thousand horse sacrifices, or kills a hundred thousand brahmins, he who knows ultimate reality is not affected by merits or demerits. He is stainless.1120

If sometimes he who knows ultimate reality (paramārthavid), that is, knows that the essence of his nature is the Great Lord’s identity with his own Self, performs prescribed acts such as the countless sacrifices — the horse sacrifice, rājasūya, aptoryāma,1121 etc. — he takes them merely as duties to be performed in a spirit of play only (krīḍārtham), for he is free from the conceit that consists in desiring a result (phalakāmanābhimāna);

— or, considering himself as non-identical with his body (aśarīratā), [if he commits] great sins all of which are prohibited, such as killing brahmins, partaking of liquor, committing theft, etc., which are the results of thoughtlessness;1122

— in either cases, he who knows [the true Self] is touched, or polluted, neither by the merits, that is, by the auspicious results, nor by the demerits, that is, by the 1116 MBh XII 172, 27. vratam ājagaram. See Nīlakaņţha ad ‘vratam ājagaram’: ajagaro hy ayatnenaiva jīvati, tasyedam [vratam]. The entirety of chapter 27th deals with the exposition of this vrata by an ascetic who develops the same themes as does YR here. In this passage of MBh, the metaphor of the python may illustrate yādŗcchika of AŚ II 37b. What is celebrated here is a life of randomness. It is exemplified by the ‘vow of the python’ to which a Hindi poet, Malūkadāsa (Malūkdās), in the 16th cent., refers: ajagara karai na cākarī, pañchī karai na kām/ dāsa malūkā kahi gaye saba ke dātā rāma, ‘The python does not attend and the bird does not work, [yet they receive their daily food]. Malukādās says that Rāma is the supreme bestower’. Moreover such a life may be also defined as a life freed from any social duty, as formulated by PS 40 and YR ad loc.1117 Cf. BAU I 4, 16: atho ‘yaṃ vā ātmā sarveşāṃ bhūtānāṃ lokaḥ, ‘Now this self, verily, is the world of all beings’; ŚvU III 21a: vedāham etam ajaraṃ purāņaṃ sarvātmānaṃ sarvagataṃ vibhutvāt, ‘I know this undecaying, ancient (primeval) Self of all, present in everything on account of infinity’.1118 Cf. Saṃvitprakāśa II 58, quoted n. 1039.1119 On abhimāna, see PS 19 and YR thereon, as well as YR ad 68.1120 Verse similar to ĀPS 77, with the difference that ĀPS, in contrasting a thousand horse sacrifices with a hundred thousand brahmanicides, lays stress on the seriousness of the sin. The verse is quoted in the Jīvanmuktiviveka (p. 74/p. 285), which attributes it to Śeşa’s Āryāpañcāśīti. Cf., for the content of kā. 69-70, the verses from the Niśāṭana quoted in TĀ XXVIII 72-75a, in n. 1240.1121 The aptoryāma is a particular way of offering the soma sacrifice.1122 pramāda.

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inauspicious [results — be they heaven or hell — pertaining to these acts, for the acts are done] with the thought ‘It is just the Will of the Supreme Lord that manifests itself (vijŗṃbhate) in this way; what matters it to me?’1123 for gone is the conceit of thinking that ‘this is mine’.

Why is this? The master replies: ‘he is stainless’, for the impurities of deeming himself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing himself the agent of actions, which are the causes of transmigration, have vanished, have perished [utterly].

Thus, it is the polluted cognizer who is subject to the [egotistical] conceit that ‘this belongs to me’, for his faculty of cognition is [lodged in] a body, etc., so qualified; [he alone is thus] subjected to the accumulation of merits and demerits, because of the waywardness1124 of the conceit that ‘this is my auspicious act, this is my inauspicious act’.

But how can he be touched by merit or demerit whose store of the consequences of action has been exhausted — those accumulated impurities that are themselves the causes of possessiveness — once conceit of self has vanished?

As it has been stated in the revered Bhagavadgītā:Whose state (of mind) is not egoized,/ Whose intelligence is not stained,/ He, even tho he slays these folk,/ Does not slay, and is not bound (by his actions).1125

Kārikā 71Pondering the manner of living fixed1126 for one who knows the Self, the master says:

71. Living without self-deception, excitement, anger, infatuation, dejection, fear, greed, or delusion; uttering neither praises [of the gods]1127 nor ritual formulae,1128 and having no opinions whatever, he should behave as one insensible.1129

1123 parameśvarecchaiva itthaṃ vijŗṃbhate mama kim āyatam.1124 daurātmya.1125 BhG XVIII 17.1126 niyatacaryā.1127 Cf. ĀŚ II 35a: vītarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ/ [...].1128 Cf. ĀŚ II 37a, quoted in the following note.1129 jaḍa — among the many possible (and misleading) translations of jaḍa, ‘insensible’ seems to capture best the several equivocations of the term; see Webster’s: "1) incapable or bereft of feeling; 2) insentient; 3) unconscious; 4) not apparent to the senses, hence indifferent, 5) devoid of sensibility, apathetic, also unaware; 6) devoid of reason, meaning (now rare)." Verse similar to ĀPS 78, although not identical. Note particularly, in the compound, °lobhamoha° replacing °paruşa°, the absence of avāgbuddhi (in 71a), and avādamatiḥ replacing agādhamatiḥ. We differ from L. Silburn who renders avādamatiḥ as ‘sans parole ni pensee’ [— ‘without words or thought’], perhaps under the influence of the avāgbuddhi, ‘without words or thought’ (ĀPS 78a). We understand avādamatiḥ, as ‘whose mind is not [filled with stray] opinions’— see the commentary below; on the description of the one who knows the Self as avāgbuddhi, see BĀU IV 4, 21: tam eva dhīro vijñāya/ prajñāṃ kurvīta brāhmanaḥ/ nānudhyāyād bahūñ chabdān/ vāco viglāpanam hi tat, ‘Let a wise Brāhmaņa after knowing him alone, practise (the means to) wisdom, let him not reflect on many words, for there is mere weariness of speech’. Similar statement in ĀŚ II 36b-37: [...] advaitaṃ samanuprāpya jaḍaval lokam ācaret// nistutir nimamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca/ calācalaniketaś cayatiryādŗcchiko bhavet//, ‘Having realized nonduality, one should behave as a fool among people. Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing svadhā [i.e., not offering libations to the Manes/Ancestors], with an unfixed home, and acting spontaneously [without

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Self-deception (mada) means the ‘conceit of attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize’;

excitement (harşa) means the ‘satisfaction’ that results from acquiring something not heretofore acquired;

anger means ‘wrath’;infatuation (manmatha) means ‘thirsting for enjoyment’;dejection (vişāda) means the ‘state of confusion’ (mūdhatva) caused by separation

from what one desires;fear means the ‘interruption [of composure]’ caused by an enemy or by lions,

tigers, etc.;greed means ‘small-mindedness’ [i.e., considering only my own advantage];delusion (moha) means ‘[considering things only] in terms of the relationship they

have to “one’s own self”’.1130

Though such [forms of limited] awareness arise from time to time as transitory affectations of the body, he [the jñānin] sets them aside, saying: ‘I am brahman, the All’.1131 He realizes that they are residues [left behind in the process] of becoming aware of his own Self, after merging them into his own non-discursive consciousness, as forms thereof.

Similarly, it is he who has gone beyond [the need of] praises and ritual formulae.1132 Inasmuch as there is nothing different from himself to be praised, he needs use no hymn of praise, etc.; nor has he to rely on ritual formulae (mantra) such as vaşaţ, etc., for there exists no specific divinity different from him [to be invoked thereby].

[What then does he do?] He should just behave as one insensible,1133 having no opinions whatever. Since he is himself replete, due to the absence of all expectations, he is like one at a loss (unmatta); his mind has banished considerations having to do with actions taught in the injunctive treatises, such as those that specify the manner of accomplishing [rituals, etc.],1134 or [those that involve] the existence of something to be apprehended in conformity with some mode of correct apprehension (pramāņa) and requiring an accompanying apprehender (pramātŗ), such as ‘this [conclusion] is proven, this [one] is not’.1135

willing anything] (yādŗcchika), one should become an ascetic’ (tr. Bhattacharya, modified as to the meaning of yādŗcchika; on another interpretation of calācalaniketa, see n. 1112). Compare BĀU III 5, 1 (partially quoted by ĀŚV II 36-37): etaṃ vai tam ātmānaṃ viditvā brāhmaņāḥ putraişaņāyāś ca [...] vyutthāya atha bhikşācaryaṃ caranti, ‘The Brāhmaņas, having known that self, having overcome the desire for sons [...], live the life of mendicants’.1130 atmatmiyabhava.1131 sarvaṃ brahmāsmi.1132 Same syntagm in ĀPS 78b. It is further developed in ĀS II 37a: nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca/, as well as in AG’s PS 73. Several parallel passages in MBh; especially MBh I 110, 9; XII 237, 24 (quoted by BĀUBh III 5, 1); XII 261, 2; XIV 46, 43 ; XIV 47, 10 (nirdvaṃdvo nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca); for further details, see Bouy ĀŚ: 141.1133 Compare ĀPS 78: jaḍavad vicaret and ĀŚ II 36b: jaḍaval lokam ācaret. Bouy ĀŚ: 141 translates ‘comme un sot’ [— ‘as a fool’], i.e., according to Ś ad loc, without showing one’s own powers and qualities.1134 itikartavyatā.1135 Two types of argument (vāda) are mentioned: that dealt with by the Mīmāṃsā concerning the correct mode of accomplishing a ritual act, always in the future, and that which pertains to perception, itself always actual — the sphere of logic (Nyāya), implying prameya, pramāņa

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Neither does he require instruction regarding himself, nor does he posit anything to be apprehended in order to instruct others.1136

Thus, having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is brahman,1137 he should disport himself for purposes of play. For this reason, he has been described here as insensible.

Kārikā 72If this is the case, then how is it that, while the body perdures, he who knows is not touched, as we are, by the group of [thought-constructs:] self-deception, etc., though they may be surrendered [unto the Self]?1138 Here, the master gives the reason:1139

72. The group made up of self-deception, excitement, etc., arises from delusion caused by difference. How, indeed, could one who is endowed with the highest awareness of the nondual Self be touched by such delusion?

The group made up of self-deception, etc., which has been explained in the previous kārikā, [arises] from delusion caused by difference.

Now, delusion caused by difference, having [always] the form of ‘myself’ and ‘what is mine’, is nothing but the view [that one’s own Self] is not complete [i.e., is fragmented].

From this [delusion caused by difference], [the group, self-deception, etc.] arises, that is, comes into being, through the error that imposes duality (dvaitabhrānti) on fettered cognizers, via the notion that such and such is to be avoided, such and such adopted.

But he who is the most excellent of knowers, and is possessed of awareness (bodha) of the supreme nondual Self, as [expressed in the dictum:] ‘I am brahman, the All’,1140 who thus becomes like space itself1141 — how, in what way, is he to be touched, that is, polluted, by this group, self-deception, and the rest?1142

Indeed, one thing may sometimes convey the nature of another thing different from it;1143 [as in the present case:] how can the group, made up of self-deception, etc.,

and pramātŗ.1136 YR refers here to the wellknown Naiyāyika distinction between reasoning employed for one’s own instruction, and reasoning aimed at communicating with others (svārtha/parārtha) — the former, for instance, not being confined within the syllogism of five members.1137 sarvaṃ brahma.1138 parivarjyamānenāpi — lit., ‘although they have been removed [from any influence over the liberated self]’.1139 AG has just explained that although such states perdure after our enlightenment, they subtend a different relationship with the body. The question then arises: if, as the argument implies, these corruptions — ‘self-deception’, etc. — persist, even removed from such influence, they cannot continue to manifest themselves apart from the complicity of the body, as their substratum, and inasmuch as the liberated self continues to exist in some relationship with the body — by definition, the state of jīvanmukti — then, how is it that the self is not further sullied by them, however unusual be the final relation between Self and body?1140 sarvaṃ brahmāsmi.1141 Due to its lack of internal differentiation.1142 The logic of the argument, here, rests on the traditional understanding of ākāśa; see YR ad 36.1143 Inasmuch as the object and the subject have the same nature — namely, brahman — one, the object, which had been considered as "different" may be taken to reveal the nature of the other, the subject, also "different" — and vice versa.

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once it is understood as composed of brahman, lend itself to the obstruction of the knower of the Self, who is composed of brahman, and is therefore of the same genus?1144

Kārikā 73And as well, the whole lot of hymns of praise and ritual oblations addressed to external [deities], all of which depend on duality, is not sufficient to satisfy him [the jñānin]. This, the master says:

73. There is nothing at all separate from the [knower of the Self] to be honored with an oblation or to be praised; would then he, who is liberated, who has no use for homages or ritual formulae, be satisfied with hymns of praise, etc.?1145

For the knower of the Self, whose form is that of nondual [viz., undifferentiated] consciousness, nothing exists that is separate from him — that presents itself to him as different; [there is nothing] to be praised, such as a deity, [nothing] to be honored with an oblation — such that it is [in fact] praised or presented with an oblation.

Nor does he who knows the Self (ātmajña) attain satisfaction by means of hymns of praise, etc., inasmuch as their execution is seen to be conditioned on an obligation.1146

Since he is composed of unfailing bliss, delighting ever in awareness of non-difference, he pays no heed to any adventitious [viz., non-spontaneous] [sort of] bliss.

Thus, it is he who has gone beyond [the need for] homages and ritual formulae that is celebrated in the Vedānta texts [viz., the upanişads] as the one liberated (mukta).

Kārikā 74Nor has he any use for a divine abode different from himself — his own body is the locus of the divinity that is his Self (ātmadevatā); nor is there any other support for his consciousness. There is thus for him no other divine abode.1147 The master says:

74. The divine abode for him is his own body — endowed with the thirty-six principles, and replete with œils de bœuf [viz., the sense-organs], constructions

1144 When all is brahman, the jñānin is included in brahman, and so must be self-deception, etc.1145 Note that the entire passage (PS 69-73) echoes ĀŚ II 35-37.1146 For merits arise from the act that has been enjoined, and demerit from the act that has been prohibited.1147 Compare kā. 74-80 with TĀ IV 194-211, which also deals with the mystical practices that are those of the jñānin in the śaktopāya.

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inset in the body1148 — or [if not his own, then] the body of another, or even an object, such as ajar.1149

For that knower of the Self, his own body or that of another [external to him],1150

is the abode of the deity, for it is the substratum of everything that is to be enjoyed [viz., external objects] by the deity that is his own Self.

However, external locales, such as [temples of the] Meru [type],1151 etc., become abodes of a deity, whenever they are so determined by a teacher through the adjunction (kalana) of the thirty-six principles, making them coextensive with a body.1152

1148 The image is quite appropriate here, the sense-organs being analogous to the symbolic "windows" (gavākşā) of the outward temple that allow "light" to pass, in retrograde fashion, from inside (that is from the deity itself) to outside, inasmuch as such "windows", being closed and as solid as a part of the wall, do not admit the rays of the sun into the temple; see Kramrisch 1946: 318-321, on gavākşa; and the term tamori (see below), ‘enemies of darkness’, that glosses gavākşa. The projection, in the process of Tantrika meditation, of the thirty-six tattvas upon the body transforms it into a microcosm; it is therefore a ritual notion, present in the oldest Tantras. The body as shrine appears to be a notion proper to the Kula branch, wherein the lineages (kula) of yoginīs are viewed as (extensions of) the sense-organs. We might observe here that the body-shrine of the kārikā, along with its architectural details, is possibly a late metaphor, inasmuch as the older Tantras do not generally mention statues, nor temples for public worship; see, nevertheless, the fourth chapter of the Brahmayāmala for references to images of wood or other substances used for worship. Hidden from the larger society bien-pensant, tantric rituals were originally celebrated in disused places, and were probably not housed in any permanent structure — although there was a ‘sanctum’ (yāgagŗha), a retinue of deities surrounding the site (bāhyaparivāra), and deities guarding its entrance; see Sanderson 1986: 173-174. Whenever AG speaks of daily external worship, its substratum is mainly a smooth mirror-like surface — for instance, a mirror or a sword-blade; it may also be ‘a lińga (provided it is private, moveable, not of fashioned stone, nor of any metal but gold), a rosary (akşasūtram), a skull-cup (mahāpātram), a skull-staff (khaţvāngaḥ), an image of painted clay (citrapustam), deodar wood or gold, [...] a copy of an esoteric scripture, an image on cloth (paţaḥ) or an image traced on a human skull (tūram)’ (Sanderson 1986: 170); on those questions, see also Torzsok 2003: 179-224, and Takashima 2005: 115-142.1149 We differ from Silburn, who translates: ‘Son temple c’est son propre corps [...]. C’est aussi ce qui differe de ce corps, a savoir vases et objets semblables’.1150 Probably a reference to the tantric partner; in the phraseology of the Gauḍīya Vaişņavas, the term parakīyā denotes the devotee and female partner par excellence, inasmuch as her love for the deity is unconditioned — unlike that of the svakīyā, who is linked to her husband by dharmic obligations.1151 Meru is probably intended here as an architectural term, designating a large temple; see Acharya 1979, s.v. (esp., Bŗhatsaṃhitā LVI/LV 20). On mount Meru seen as axis mundi, see SvT X 122ff. and TĀ VIII 43ff. (TĀ VIII 45b, which describes it as a ‘bhairavalińga’, is quoted by Kşemarāja ad SvT X 124).

1152 śarīravyāpti — lit., ‘... through [their] pervasion by the body — pervasion characterized by the adjunction of the thirty-six principles’. I interpret kalana in its general meaning, ‘effecting’, ‘putting on’, here as a synonym of nyāsa; on the technical meaning of kalana, see n. 1177. Note that the guru’s body as well as an external locale such as a temple, both involve imposition of the thirty-six principles, for the guru places them, one after another, on his own body, and then transfers them to an external object, such as a lińga, a temple, or the body of an initiand; on this process, see Somaśaṃbhupaddhati, vol. III; also, for an example of the process at work in interiorizing the thirty-six tattvas, see Sanderson 1986: 178-180, and fig. 2: 187.

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Once the [image of the] deity dwelling there, though external [to one’s own Self], is comprehended as formed of consciousness (cidghana) through being pervaded by one’s own Self, then even that [image] becomes the deity there.

Otherwise, how could either one or the other [viz., the temple or the image], both inert, mere bits of rock, save [viz., free] (uddharet) devotees [from transmigratory experience], or conduct the dead into [the deity’s] proximity, etc.?1153

Thus, the body itself is, in a direct sense,1154 the abode of the deity, for it is the dwelling place of consciousness. And, dwelling in that body, the Self of all beings is the deity. Therefore the body alone is the abode of the deity for those who are enlightened.

What sort [of body]? The master says: ‘endowed with the thirty-six principles’.The external [object] is determined [to be the abode of the deity] when pervaded

(vyāpti) by the thirty-six principles. Even more obviously is the body, in which the deity resides, endowed with [lit., ‘sustained by’ bhŗtam], that is, nourished,1155 by the same thirty-six principles.

In the external abode of the deity, there is an arrangement [of windows in the form] of œils de bœuf; so too this [internal shrine, which is the body, may be said to be:] replete with œils de bœuf — [viz., the sense-organs], constructions [that are inset] in the body;

[The foregoing compound is to be understood as follows:]— replete with means ‘not deficient in’,— construction means the ‘disposition of "enemies of darkness" (tamori)’ in the

corporeal body (vigrahe = śarīre) — viz., the series of entryways that are the sensorial faculties.

Hence, [the body] is similar to the external abode of the deity.Not only is the body [for the jñānin] the abode of the deity inasmuch as it is the

dwelling place of consciousness, but as well, whatever [other] objects there are that are governed by consciousness, all of them are abodes of the deity for him [the jñānin].

With this in mind, the master says [in the verse]: ‘or even the jar, etc.’, for the pentad of sensory domains that constitute the objects of our enjoyment — here suggested metonymically by reference to jars, etc. — are indeed governed by consciousness through entryways consisting of organs such as the eye, etc. Furthermore, according to the teaching of the Spandaśāstra, they are themselves composed of consciousness:

It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment.1156

1153 Probably a reference to different conceptions of mokşa (understood as proximity to, or identity with, the deity), or to different degrees in its attainment (see PS 96-102).1154 That is, not metaphorically. Here mukhyā vŗtti means abhidhā, the primary or denotative Power of the word.1155 YR seems to understand the term bhŗta as alluding to one of the etymologies of the name ‘Bhairava’, according to which the first element derives from the root bhŗ, ‘to carry, maintain, sustain’; see his commentary ad 75, where this etymology is given explicitly. For an analysis of various etymologies of Bhairava, see Kahrs 1998: 57-97.1156 SpK II 4b. Verse already quoted in YR ad 1. Cf. Bhaţţa Śrī Vāmana, quoted in SpN II 4: ālambya saṃvidaṃ yasmāt saṃvedyaṃ na svabhāvataḥ/ tasmāt saṃviditaṃ sarvam iti saṃvinmayo bhavet//, ‘Since all [objects] are known insofar as they rest on consciousness,

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The entire universe of objects, such as jars, etc., is the potential body of him who knows, just like his already existing [actual] body.

This being the case, it [the universe of objects] is not different from himself, no more than his own body; it is the abode of the deity; that is, the abode of the god, wherein the objects of enjoyment are governed — [the god who is] playful1157 and free, the Great Lord that is one’s own Self.

Kārikā 75Now, in external abode of the deity [viz., the temple], the devotee is, as a rule, seen to be engaged in worshiping the deity, having [previously] offered flowers, etc. But in respect of the abode of the deity that is the body itself, how does the knower of the Self behave, and what does he do? The master says:

75. And there [in that body so consecrated], he occupies himself in worshiping the great deity that is the supreme Self — Bhairava, also known as Śiva — ever accompanied by his own [consort of] energies, by offering thereunto articles of worship that are purified by awareness of the Self.

In the abode of the deity that is his own body, the accomplished yogin occupies himself in worshiping the deity who has assumed the form of the highest goal (śreyas) [viz., who has assumed the form of a goal more excellent than ‘heaven’ itself],1158 namely, Śiva, the auspicious deity, who is none other than Bhairava, [the three syllables of whose name stand for] maintenance (bharaņa), withdrawal (ravaņa) and ejection (vamana) [of the world],1159 inasmuch as [within him alone] all the sensory domains — sound, etc. — are enjoyed, dissolved, and made resplendent,1160 who is, in turn, none other than the supreme Self that is termed [by us] consciousness, transcending everything ...

... [he goes on worshiping that deity,] that is, he should become resplendent (parisphuret)1161 by propitiating that deity unceasingly, according to the process about to be expounded.

and not by themselves, they [exist only] as known. Hence, one should identify himself with consciousness’ (is this Bhaţţa Śrī Vāmana the same author as the Bhaţţa Śrī Vīravāmanaka from whom YR ad 76 quotes a verse?). The same notions of a body endowed with thirty-six principles, and of external objects such as jars, etc., seen as not different from consciousness, that is, from Śiva, is found in the Pratyabhijñāṭikā, quoted in SpN II 4: śarīram api ye şaṭṭriṃśattattvamayaṃ śivarūpatayā paśyanti arcayanti ca te siddhyanti ghaţādikam api tathābhiniviśya paśyanti arcayanti ca te ‘pīti nasty atra vivādaḥ, ‘Even those who perceive the body of thirty-six principles in the form of Śiva, and treat it with respect, acquire spiritual perfection. So do those who, investing even a jar, etc., with the form of Śiva, perceive it in the same way, and treat it with respect. There is no controversy about it’.1157 Here, YR develops one of the traditional etymologies of deva, derived from the root div, ‘to play’. See YR ad 15.1158 prakŗşṭaśreyorūpo devaḥ — or ‘the deity of an extremely propitious nature’; on śreyas, see n. 240.1159 "Bhairava" is, as here, traditionally explained as an acrostic — though its etymological meaning is also apparent: ‘terrifying’, a quasi-causative from bhīru, ‘timid’.1160 Here, sense-objects such as sound, etc., are treated experientially — as enjoyed, dissolved and made resplendent — rather than as elements in the process of creation — maintenance, withdrawal, ejection.1161 This is intended as a gloss on paripūjayan āste, which we have been obliged, for reasons of syntax, to place at the head of the foregoing sentence.

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— Now is it not the case that the external deity is always accompanied by [consort and] attendants? Accompanied, then, by what entourage, should this [inner deity] be worshiped?

The master replies: ‘[... the inner deity is] accompanied by his own [consort of] energies’.

Here, by his own [energies, or powers], the master refers to the capacities of the sense-organs, the eye, etc., which function as the [outward-extending] rays of consciousness, and through which [the five inner] energies — Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action — find their culmination;

by ‘accompanied by’, he means ‘surrounded on all sides’ by those [energies].Now, responding to the question: ‘Employing what [articles of worship] does he

go on worshiping?’, the master replies: ‘[employing articles purified by] awareness of the Self.

Here, the awareness (āmarśana) meant is: ‘My own Self is this All’;1162 that is, the reflection (parāmarśa) on oneself characterized by repose in perfect ipseity, achieved when all objects are experienced as formed of consciousness; further, the articles meant for worship, namely, the pentad of sensory domains, sound, etc., which are pure on account of the removal of insentience, have become spotless on account of that [reflection] whereby the imperfections resulting from the stain of duality have disappeared. It is with such articles that he worships, purified by the awareness of the Self.

Here is the purport of what has been said: the knower of the Self, having gathered up, effortlessly, the pentad of sensory domains, sound, etc., by means of the divinities that are the sensory organs, the ear, etc., and marveling at them in his heart, then effects their identity with his own Self, by abandoning [all thought of] the deleterious1163 distinction between what is to be sought out and what is to be avoided.

Thus, the state of internally undifferentiated wonder — which is nothing but the manifestation (sphuraņa)1164 of perfect ipseity — that accompanies each and every moment of apprehending the sensory domains,1165 is alone the worship appropriate to the god that is one’s own Self.1166

It is in this sense that sensory domains, sound, etc., are the instruments of worship. Knowing this (iti), the worshiper of the deity who is one’s own Self must at each moment be attentive when appropriating those domains.1167 This is what the knowers of the secret (rahasyavid) maintain.

1162 svātmaiva idaṃ sarvam.1163 kalańka.1164 On this association of camatkāra and sphuraņa, see the definition of camatkāra offered in the vŗtti ad DhĀl, in Appendix 3, p. 320.1165 Lit., ‘... that accompanies unceasingly each moment ...’.1166 Implicit reference, here, to aesthetic theory, as Śaiva thinkers developed it in Kashmir; see Intr., p. 55.1167 It is the simple act of appropriating the fields of experience, which everyone does without effort and incessantly, that is transformed into the means of realizing their identity with the Self.

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Indeed, this has been confirmed by Rājānaka Rāma1168 in one of his verses of praise:

Show me, [O Lord], that Bhairava form of yours that is propitiated [only] by those energies — fiery (taijasī), etc.1169 — that are engaged in conveying to you as offerings the things of this world collected through constant and unrestrained [i.e., spontaneous] exertion.1170 Show it to me, who am a hero (vīra) moving in this [dark] night of existence (bhavaniśā), in a body that is nothing but a cremation ground replete with abundance of flesh, blood, serum, and bones.1171

Kārikā 76At the conclusion of [the ritual of] worship, an oblation should be made into the fire. So, how does that [injunction apply] to the knower of the Self? The master replies:

76. For him who is engaged in offering into the blazing fire of consciousness all the great seeds of difference [that blossom forth] on the presupposition of inner versus outer, the oblation is made without effort.1172

1168 Rājānaka Rāma is one of the names by which Rāmakaņţha (ca. AD 950-1000; see Sanderson 2007: 411), the author of the SpV (and possibly of the Sarvatobhadra, a commentary on the BhG), is referred to in different sources. He presents himself, in the second conclusive stanza of his SpV, as the direct disciple of Utpaladeva (ca. 925-975; see Sanderson 2007: 352). Rājānaka Rāma is to be distinguished from two Bhaţţa Rāmakaņţha: Rāmakaņţha I, the author of a now lost Sadvŗtti, who was the guru of Rāmakaņţha II’s grandfather, and Rāmakaņţha II (fl. ca. AD 950-1000), the commentator on the Kiraņatantra (see Goodall, Kiraņavŗtti: IX). In his SpV (p. 164), Rājānaka Rāmakaņţha quotes a verse from a stotra that he says he composed himself; similarly, PHvŗ I 1 quotes a verse found in SpV, p. 135, ascribing it to Śrīrāma. Rājānaka Rāmakaņţha may also be identified as the ‘Śrī Rāmabhaţţāraka’ referred to in Vāmadeva’s Janmamaraņavicāra (p. 21). From such indices, it may be concluded that he was also a poet, author of devotional hymns. If he may be identified with the author of the Sarvatobhadra, a commentary on the BhG (see Goodall Kiraņavŗtti: IX), he has also laid claim to some poetical skill, referring to himself (p. 404) as the ‘king of the poets’ (kavīndra). ‘Rājānaka’ occurs frequently in titles of Kashmirian Śaiva teachers; see, for instance, colophons of Kşemarāja or Jayaratha, respectively to PH and TĀ. See Stein (ad Rājatarańgiņī [RT] VI 108) RT: 244 (n. 117): ‘The title Rājānaka, meaning literally "almost a king", used to be given for services rendered to the king. [...] The title has survived in the form of Rāzdān as a family name of very frequent occurrence among the Brahmans of Kaśmīr’. The services were probably those of a minister, as may be inferred from an oblique reference to such a function in RT VI 117: sa pārthivatvamantritvamiśrayā ceşţayā sphuran/ rājā rājānakaś ceti miśrām eva dhiyaṃ vyadhāt.

1169 The term taijasī, here, is probably the name of a śakti (or a kalā), who operates at the level of māyā, inasmuch as the verse of Rāmakaņţha, quoted here, describes Bhairava as Propitiated by means of the phenomenal multiplicity that śaktis unceasingly reveal. For the expression taijasī kalā, see TĀV IX 40 citing the Rauravāgama: tato ‘dhişţhāya māyāṃ sa parameśvaraḥ/ kşobhayitvā svakiraņair asŗjat taijasīṃ kalām//.1170 See ŚS I 5: udyamo bhairavaḥ, ‘Spontaneous emergence [of supreme consciousness], such is Bhairava’.1171 Meter: śārdūlavikrīḍita. Bhairava, the terrible Lord, inhabits the cremation ground. Hence, the body, which is, on the one hand, the abode of the deity, may also be seen, on the other, as a cremation ground. The implication is that the body of the yogin is subject to dissolution in the ‘fires’ of his austerities, as is the dead man’s corpse on the funeral pyre.1172 Cf. PS 68; also SpN II 5: mahāyogī jīvann eva prāņādimān api vijñānāgninirdagdhāśeşa bandhano dehapāte tu śiva evajīvaṃś cedŗn mukta eva na tu kathañ cid api baddhaḥ, "The great ascetic, even while he lives and is possessed of breath and the [other faculties], is [not

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For him — the worshiper, in the way just described, of the deity that is his own Self —

the oblation — the [pouring of substances] that refreshes the fire —into the blazing — radiating with the marvel of supreme ipseity — fire of consciousness, is accomplished,without effort — without the bother [associated with collecting and] owning sesame, clarified butter, fuel, etc.[And] what does [he in fact] do? The master replies with [the phrase beginning

with] ‘inner [versus] outer’. — Here,outer refers to the postulation, by a cognizer, of [something] beyond himself,1173 in

respect of what is to be cognized, such as [the color] blue, etc. —[inner refers to the corresponding] postulation in respect of what is to be grasped

within, such as pleasure, etc. — It isdifference of this sort, namely, the diversity native to the functioning [of the

antaḥkaraņa] that is the great seed (mahābīja) [of bondage], for out of it emerge the cognizer and cognizable objects — [functioning that consists in] definitive knowledge (niścaya — i.e., ‘this is not that’), postulation [of ecceity] (saṃkalpana — i.e., ‘these things are not me’) and conceit of self (abhimāna — i.e., ‘this is mine’);1174

[all such differences belong to or depend on the distinctions between] ‘cognizer’ and ‘thing to be cognized’, between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ — Now, it is

the collection [of such seeds] that he offers [into the fire of consciousness] — seeds that are themselves nothing but postulates of the mind (kalpanā) and being themselves the source of all [other] difference.

[This collection] is indeed a [shapeless] heap,1175 because difference is infinite.[And he] offers, makes oblation of, this [collection] into the fire of his own Self,

by merging it into non-discursive consciousness, achieved through the vision of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality.1176

This is the purport of the verse: for the yogin whose being is identified with the transcendental brahman, the essential (akŗtrima) oblation consists in annulling the

bound by] any fetters, which [lit., ‘is such that all his fetters...’] have been burnt up in the fire of his knowledge; when his body falls away, he is Śiva himself; and while living is, as such, already liberated, [for] he is not bound in any way at all’. Cf. TĀ IV 201-2; TS IV, p. 26 (tr. Silburn 1981: 193).1173 svapara.1174 The translation of the terms niścaya and saṃkalpana differs slightly from that of PS 19, for the point of view here is that of the yogin. For him, perception itself, which reveals difference, must be overcome; previously, the perspective was that of the ultimate, Śiva, engaged in elaborating the phenomenal world. Compare the "twin" perspectives of Sā khya and Yoga — ṃthe one elaborating a theoretical construct and the other promoting its abolition. In this world of diversity, every mental operation has three aspects: discrimination (or identifying the elements of the flux), differentiation (or identifying the self as subject vis-a-vis the flux, as object), and appropriation (or establishing a relation between the self and the object — the ‘this’, the ‘I’ , and the ‘mine’).1175 rāśi.1176 Cf. YR ad 83: paramādvayadŗś.

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determination (kalana)1177 that there be a subject who cognizes and an object to be cognized that are beyond himself;

[and annulling that, for him] comes about naturally (svarasasiddha), for there is no longer any conceit attributing to his body, etc., the capacity to cognize.

As has been stated by Bhaţţa Śrī Vīravāmanaka:1178

We perform obligatorily that supra-mundane sacrifice1179 in which the forest of duality provides the [required] firewood, and death itself is the great animal [to be sacrificed].

Kārikā 77The master now describes the [way of] meditation (dhyāna) of such a sacrificer:

77. And unceasing is his meditation; moreover, the Lord [who is his Self] creates manifold forms. That alone constitutes his meditation — [the realization] that the true form of things is nothing but that which is drawn [on the wall of consciousness] by his imagination.

Every form, thought to be a fixed form, is subject to disappearance, owing to the unsteadiness of the mind.1180

Moreover, that meditation is unceasing, since the Lord, the Great Master who, although infinite, has the form of one’s own Self, creates manifold forms, in virtue of his freedom [to compose] thought-constructs, whereby the essence of his energy of action [is manifested],

1177 kalana has a specialized meaning in the Trika. Padoux translates: ‘dynamisme limitateur’, ‘limiting dynamism’. Most traditional etymologies presume a link with kāla, ‘time’, which, according to Mayrhofer (s.v.) is illusory (he cites Lat. celer, Gk. κέλλω ‘impel’, which agrees nicely with the sense proposed here). Compare the term’s often attested (but also contested) medical meaning, ‘the "thrust" of the embryo in the womb’. The meaning should be something like ‘determine’, ‘compel to be precise’; it is the annihilation of that "thrust" toward determination, that "need" to distinguish, that "distinguishes" the mental oblation of the yogin. The notion of kalana would then be related to the ‘sheath’ (kañcuka) termed here kalā, ‘tendency to act in respect of a determinate agent’; cf. kalā vāyurūpā kiṃcitkartŗtvena prerikā (PTLvŗ 5ff.). Finally, ‘determination’ appears to capture the different meanings implied by Padoux’s excellent ‘dynamisme limitateur’. Also to be rejected is the false doublet sometimes proposed, kalana/karaņa.1178 Verse also quoted, without explicit attribution, by PM 42. In his introduction to Vāmanadatta’s Saṃvitprakāśa (pp. 7-8) M. Dyczkowski observes that it is not at all certain whether the Vīravāmanaka said here by YR to be the author of the quoted text is the same person as the Vāmanadatta, author of the Saṃvitprakāśa. Dyczkowski gives several arguments 1) Vāmanadatta, author of the Saṃvitprakāśa, presents himself as a Pāñcarātrin, whereas the epithet ‘vīra’ generally applies to Śaivas; 2) the sacrifice there described is more of a Śaiva than of a Vaişņava model; 3) the verse quoted by YR cannot be traced in the manuscripts of the Saṃvitprakāśa (although it might be supposed that those MSS are incomplete, or that the verse is quoted from another work of the same Vāmanadatta). In all probability, there is room to believe that we are dealing with two different authors, inasmuch as SpN II 4 cites a verse attributed to ‘Bhaţţa Śrī Vāmana’ (see n. 1156) — a verse that is not attested in the available manuscripts of the Saṃvitprakāśa. Might it not be then the case that the Bhaţţa Srī Vāmana of the SpN is the same author as the Bhaţţa Śrī Vīravāmana(ka) to which YR attributes the present verse?1179 See PS 68.1180 Lit., ‘due to the [constant] movement elsewere of the operation of the mind’. The forms subsist as long as they find a substratum in the mind, but the latter is not thereby constrained.

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— that is, he ceaselessly inscribes the numerous objects that are nothing but constructions of his imagination, as forms upon the mirror of his intellect.1181 It is these [constructions]

— that alone constitute the [jñānin’s] meditation, namely, his contemplation (cintana), itself exempt from coming into being and passing away, for there is nothing that is different from it.

But elsewhere, [when one meditates upon] a particular deity, there is a determination [of that stream of consciousness]1182 inasmuch as one predicates various faces and limbs [of the deity].

All acts of the mind are but sprouts emerging (sphāra) from this Energy named Parā [or supreme energy]; for him who knows this, the All [i.e., universe] has become without qualification, identical with the Supreme Lord.

And that alone constitutes his meditation — [the realization] that the true form [of things], namely, ultimate reality, is that which has been drawn, that is, painted, on the wall of consciousness (saṃvidbhitti) by the imagination (saṃkalpa), that is, by the [active] mind.

Thus, since all this that appears [viz., everything] has been delineated [for us] in the form of mental constructs, [it follows that] whatever has the form of an act of mind, never going beyond the realm of that which appears, is true [viz., real], for in every circumstance it is accompanied by consciousness.

This has been stated in the revered Svacchandaśāstra:Wherever the mind goes, there one should fix the mind. Having moved it [i.e., let go that fixation], where will you go, since all is composed of Śiva?1183

And similarly, in the Śaivopanişad:Wherever goes the mind, O beloved one, whether [its object be] external or internal, there is the condition of Śiva, for Śiva pervades everything. Where indeed will [the mind] go, [if not to him]?1184

Therefore, the meditation of such a yogin arises naturally.1185

Kārikā 78And his would be what sort of silent (or whispered) recitations [viz., of what rosary would he ‘speak’ or ‘tell’ the beads]? The master says:

78. When he rotates in his inner awareness the entire sequence of universes, the [thirty-six] principles arranged sequentially, as well as the group of sense-organs, then this is termed his ‘silent recitation’.1186

1181 The same term is found in YR ad 8, glossed by pratibhāmukura. Further, in the commentary ad 77, saṃvidbhitti, the ‘wall of consciousness’, appears as a gloss of buddhidarpaņa.1182 Such a statement implies that particular forms of the deity, if paid too much attention, may distract the yogin from contemplating the ceaseless stream of divine activity they manifest.1183 SvT IV 313. Same text quoted in ŚSV III 24, although with variants: yatra yatra mano yāti jñeyaṃ tatraiva cintayet/ calitvā yāsyate kutra sarvaṃ śivamayaṃ yataḥ//.1184 Śaivopanişad [= VBh 115]. Śaivopanişad is another name of the VBh to which AG refers also as the Śivavijñānopanişad in ĪPVV, vol. II: 405.1185 svarasodita — lit., ‘emerging from its own essence’.1186 The kārikā has been translated in accordance with our understanding of the commentary. Another interpretation is possible — akşagaņam understood in explanatory apposition to bhuvanāvalīm, and tattvakramakalpanām, as an adjective also qualifying bhuvanāvalīm (although YR does not gloss it as a BV): ‘And, when he rotates in his inner awareness (bodha)

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The constant[ly recurring] reflection on supreme ipseity as not different from the universe itself, [which is pursued] in the manner about to be described, is termed his ‘silent recitation’ [viz., the mental ‘speaking’ or ‘telling’ of a rosary], and this is said to be not adventitious [— that is, is not a passing state, but is rather, seemingly, inherent, or natural].

— What is that [‘recitation’]? The master says:‘[He rotates] the entire sequence of universes (bhuvana)’. That is, [he rotates]

the entire series of mansions (prākāra, viz., ‘worlds’)1187 numbering 224 that are encompassed within the host of thirty-six principles;1188 similarly, [he rotates] the arrangement in sequence of principles — that is, the arrangement, the accurate determination, of the sequence of principles, termed ‘Self (ātman), ‘knowledge’ (vidyā) and ‘Śiva’.1189

As well [he rotates] the group of sense-organs, that is, [he rotates] also the collection of sense-organs, both internal and external.1190

the entire sequence of universes, thought of as a [triadic] sequence of tattvas, [in the manner of] a collection of beads [viz., as his rosary (akşagaņa = metaphorically the akşamālā)], then this is termed his "[silent] recitation" (japa)’. Cf. the definition of the japa in TĀ IV 194 and TS IV, p. 26; also ŚS III 27: kathā japaḥ, ‘The conversation [of the jīvanmukta] is the recitation [of the mantra]’, quoted here by YR ad 78, and by Kşemarāja ad Sāṃbapañcāśikā 10 (see Padoux Sāṃbapañcāśikā: 570). Note the play on the words: akşagaņa of the kārikā being glossed as akşasūtra and akşamālā, with a śleşa on akşa (m.), ‘bead’ and akşa (n.), ‘sense-organ’.1187 According to MW, bhuvana may be a varia lectio for bhavana, ‘house’; thus might be explained the use here of prākāra, ‘mansion’, as a gloss for ‘bhuvana’.1188 Our text differs here from the KSTS edition concerning the number of bhuvanas. For a discussion of the problem, see ‘On the Sanskrit Text’. On the number of the bhuvanas, see Appendix 5, p. 323.1189 This refers to a manner of grouping the realities of the universe under three headings only — the three ‘principles’ (tattva) of ātman, vidyā, and Śiva — instead of the usual thirty-six of the Trika system: a ‘trinity’, named tritattva (SŚP, vol. III: 428ff.) or tattvatraya (YH III 85, Dviveda: 271), that is the object of a rapid form of nirvāņadīkşā, ‘liberating initiation’, designated as the tritattvadīkşā (SŚP, vol. III: 428ff.). On the correspondence between the three all-encompassing principles and the thirty-six recognized by the system, on the one hand, and the five kalās and the bhuvanas, on the other, see SŚP, vol. III: 428ff. On the correspondences between the three principles and the parts of the body of the adept, see SŚP, vol. III, pl. XIV. According to Helene Brunner, op. cit: 436-437, who follows the explanation of Somaśaṃbhu, the ātmatattva, which comprises the thirty-two inferior principles, up to śuddhavidyā (thirty-one, viz., up to māyā, according to some authors), represents the domain of individuality and finitude; the vidyātattva, which brings together Īśvara and Sadāśiva (as well as śuddhavidyā, according to all texts except that of Somaśambhu) is the domain of knowledge (vidyā), wherein the ātman enjoys both omniscience and omnipotence; the śivatattva, which coincides with the tattva Śiva, is the domain where the ātman is recognized as not different from Śiva, and since Śiva is indissociable from Śakti, the three tattvas enumerated to here comprehend the thirty-six tattvas of the usual list. See also Dīpikā ad YH III 85 (p. 272-273), and Padoux YH: 307-308.1190 Probable reference to the gross form of the thirteen organs as well as to their inner powers, or presiding deities (karaņeśvarī, karaņadevī), who appear to the adept at the climax of his practice.

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All this [he does] in his inner awareness (antarbodha), that is, in his own consciousness, which has become [viz., which has been identified with] the rosary,1191

formed of the energy of the middle breath (madhyamaprāņaśakti).1192

When he rotates [all this] according to the sequence of the flows [of the breath — which is none other than śakti itself, seen as vāc, or phonic energy, and symbolized by the kuņḍalinī — passing] through bindu and nāda1193 — that is, when he revolves all this in his own consciousness in the manner of a water-wheel, in accordance with the sequence: creation, sustenance, resorption, that defines each exhalation of his breath; in other words, when each and every moment he considers [all this] to be composed of [nothing but] subtle phonic vibration (nāda) —

then this natural repose in perfect ipseity is indeed his ‘recitation’.Here is the purport of what has been said: ‘recitation’ is but the uttering

[accompanied by yogic practice] (uccāra) of a mantra designating a deity fit to be denoted by it. And those recitations may be counted by means of the rosary1194

accompanied by the [practitioner’s] permeation with the energy of breath (prāņaśakti), by [the simple device of] sequencing the turning of its "beads" [i.e., turning them one after the other].

However, for the yogin [experiencing] ultimate [or transcendent] non-duality, his own energy of breathing has become the thread [of the rosary],1195 reverberating

1191 akşasūtra.1192 Breathing, with its exhalations and inhalations, mimics the creator god who ‘emits and ‘swallows’ the universe periodically. The yogin strives to regulate his breath, supposing that its moments are the ‘beads’ of a rosary, of which breathing itself constitutes the thread. The madhyamaprāņa is that prāņa which rises without deviating through the suşumnā canal, in the form of kuņḍalinī; as such, it is called udāna, the ‘rising breath’. According to Kşemarāja ad SvT VII 10, the madhyamaprāņa is that prāņa which rises in the ‘middle’ nādī: madhyanādyāśrayamadhyamaprāņa°. On madhyamaprāņa, see NT VII 7: tāṃ vahen madhyamaprāņe prāņāpānāntare dhruve, and Kşemarāja ad loc., vol. I: 153: madhyamaprāņe suşumnāsthodānākhyaprāņabrahmaņi vahed nimajjitaprāņāpānavyaptyunmagnatayā vimŗśet, ‘The madhyamaprāņa is the breath, termed udāna, that passes through [the nādī termed] suşumnā; in addition, it is termed "middle", because it issues from the fusion of prāņa [the "ascending" breath (viz., exhalation)], and of apāna [the "descending" breath (viz., inhalation)]’; for a complete description of the process, see Sanderson 1986: 177ff. See also TĀ XXIX 236, where the term madhyamaprāņa appears in the context of the vedhadīkşā (a dīkşā made by piercing the different cakras by means of the madhyamaprāņa). On the five prāņas, see Padoux 1992: 136, n. 140, and Olivelle BĀU: L-LI. On japa and its association with prāņa, see SvT II 140a: japaḥ prāņasamaḥ kāryaḥ; also Padoux 1987, and TAK II, s.v. japa.1193 bindu and nāda are different levels of the articulation (uccāra) of a mantra (see n. 1375). The commentary thus establishes that the kārikā refers to mantric practice, and associates that practice with kuņḍalinī breathing techniques; see Padoux 1992: 83, according to whom phonic energy ‘gradually condenses, and passing through an initial "resonance" (nāda), becomes a drop (bindu) of phonic energy, divides, and subsequently gives birth to the matrix of the phonemes (mātŗkā), then to the phonemes themselves (varņa), and to words. This sound process is "that which expresses" (vācaka), and induces thereby the emergence of that which is expressed" (vācya), namely, the world of objects (artha) or of the meanings that it expresses. The phonic energy is symbolized by the kuņḍalinī, in her twin aspect, human and cosmic, connected with "breath" (prāņa)’. Padoux (YH: 375) translates nāda as ‘vibration phonique subtile’ [— ‘subtle phonic vibration’], or (1992): ‘phonic resonance’, ‘subtle sound’.1194 akşamāla.1195 Note that the word tantu is often used to describe the middle śakti, which is compared to a fibre of the lotus stalk (mŗņālatantu); see Kubjikāmatatantra [KMT] XXIV 120-121, where the

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(nadantī) with the flow [of respirations] in the middle breath; emerging naturally, [this energy] is said to be an innate [kind of] rosary, as it comprehends all the senses.1196

Since all this world is [composed of] objects to be expressed, [and] given that the universe consisting of thirty-six principles1197 is established in this very same energy of breath, the Goddess (bhagavatī) who is supreme [awareness] (parāsvabhāvā — viz., parāvāc as parāśakti), assumes the form of vital breath via the sequence of arousal and release [that follow] at each exhalation of [the yogin’s] breath. [Ever] aware (vimŗśantī) [of the absolute, i.e., the Supreme Śiva], she causes the attentive yogin to execute naturally [a suitable] recitation in each vibration (spanda) of his breath.1198

Here, in the Śaivopanişad, [we find] the number of recitations [given]:The ‘recitation of the [mantra-]goddess’ [viz., the mantra ‘HAṂSAḤ’] is taught as easy to accomplish; [one may repeat it] 21600 times in the span of one day and one night. It is difficult [only] for those who are dull.1199

Goddess, in the form of śakti, the mother of the three worlds, situated in [the middle of, or between] idā and pińgalā, has the form of a lotus stalk (communication of J. Torzsok). Same image in VBh 35, where the Goddess is compared to the filament of the lotus stalk: bisasūtrābharūpā.1196 sarvakşakroḍīkāreņa sahajaiva akşamālā ucyate — after providing the generally accepted definition of the tantric japa, the commentary turns to the specific experience that is at issue in PS 78.1197 The terms sarvam and viśvam are coreferential, one implying a distributive view of the totality, the other a cumulative.1198 The prāņaśakti that, until now, had been conceived of as an entity is now identified with the Goddess, herself viewed as the kuņḍalinī (see TAK II, s.v. ‘kuņḍalinī’ and ‘uccāra’). In conformity with the two cardinal truths of the doctrine, 1) that everything is verbal (vācya), and 2) that the world is founded on breath (prāņa), the Goddess assumes herself the form of breath (an hypostasis that the conception of breath as energy justifies), and becomes indissociable from the japa as such. Thus the Goddess is at once breath, japa, and the energy that utilises the yogin to execute the japa, to the extent that she inhabits and animates him in every limb. Thus is the yogin ‘enthusiasmed’, as it were, in the original sense of the word, that is, ‘possessed by the deity’.1199 Śaivopanişad [= VBh 156]. Reference is made here to the mantra ‘) ____ ‘, that is, to the natural japa of a mantra that is the cycle of breathing itself, with its double movement of inspiration (ha) and exhalation (sa). The computation is effected thusly: if each cycle of inspiration and exhalation lasts for four seconds, there are fifteen cycles per minute, nine hundred per hour (15 x 60), and 21,600 per day (of 24 hours); the same computation is found in SvT VII 54-55a, and TĀ VII 47-52a (see Gnoli TĀ: 165). The practice of the haṃsoccāra is associated with the worship of the kuņḍalinī, one of whose modalities is the madhyaprāņakuņḍalinī (see TĀ V 135-136; and TAK II, s.v.). This śloka (VBh 156) is quoted (with some alterations) in Kşemarāja ad SvT VII 56, who attributes it to VBh; also in ŚSV III 27, but preceded by a verse that is absent of Śivopādhyāya’s commentary ad VBh: sakāreņa bahir yāti hakāreņa viśetpunaḥ/ haṃsahaṃsety amuṃ mantraṃ jīvo japati nityaśaḥ//, ‘[Breath] exhales with the sound sa and inhales with the sound ha. Therefore, the empirical individual ever repeat the mantra haṃsa, haṃsa’ (tr. Singh ŚS: 190, modified); on the strength of the ŚSV, Silburn restores (p. 170, n. 4) this verse to the VBh; Padoux (1992: 140, n. 149) identifies the verse as Dhyānabindūpanişad 62, although he observes: ‘this Upanişad as edited (or compiled) by Upanişad Brahmayogin (Adyar, 1920) gives the two letters in the reversed order: ha for exhalation, sa for inhalation, but the principle remains the same’. The mantra ‘haṃsa’ is the mantra of the absolute ‘I’, inasmuch as it symbolizes the supreme

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And, in Śivasūtra, it has been stated:His conversation is the recitation [of the mantra].1200

This recitation alone is the focus of those [adepts] whose feet are to be honored, possessed as they are of [perfect] concentration.

Kārikās 79-80And this is his vow. The master says:

79-80. When he regards everything with the same glance, when he deems his awareness fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground, and apprehends his body as nothing more than a staff surmounted by a skull,1201 and

identification ‘so ‘ham’, ‘I am this’. See SvT VII 56: prāņahaṃse sadā līnaḥ sādhakaḥ paratattvavit/ tasyāyaṃ japa uddişţaḥ siddhimuktiphalapradaḥ//, ‘The adept reposes always in the prāņahaṃsa and knows ultimate reality/. This is what is termed his recitation (japa). Thus does he obtain such fruits as liberation (mukti) and supernatural powers (siddhi)//’. Kşemarāja comments: iha prāņo nirņītaviśvamantravīryabhūtahaṃsāśrayatvāddhaṃsa iti/, ‘Here, the breath is termed haṃsa, because it is based on the haṃsa, wherein the efficacies of all the [other] mantras have been brought out’, and quotes VBh 156. The mantra ‘___’ is also known, although in texts later than the 12th cent, (e.g., in Śivopādhyāya’s 18th cent, commentary ad VBh), as ajapājapa [lit., as translates Padoux, ‘la recitation de la non-recitee’ [— the ‘recitation of the non-recited’], i.e., natural, or automatic, or spontaneous, japa. See Padoux 1987: 144-147; and TAK I, s.v. ajapā, ajapājapa; II, s.v. japa: ‘la pratique de l’ajapājapa identifie le mantra recite et le souffle, ce mantra etant haṃsa, lequel est a la fois ces deux syllabes, le souffle central ascendant et l’energie divine ou l’absolu, voir SvT 4. 262; BVU [ = Brahmavidyopanişad] 57-80’. The identification of the japa referred to in PS 78 with the mantra ____ offers a clue for understanding the passage of YR’s commentary ad loc: ‘when he rotates (yat parivartayati) [all this] according to the sequence of the flows [of the breath passing] through bindu and nāda [...]’, for, according to Jñānaprakāśa’s Śivayogaratna (śl. 4-5; 16th cent. AD), the breath is suspended thanks to the bindu which, being the anusvāra of the syllable haṃ of haṃsa, is in the center of the ajapāmantra (ajapāmantramadhyasthabindunā); see Padoux, 1987: 146; the Śivayogaratna has been edited and translated by T. Michael.1200 ŚS III 27. See also VBh 145, quoted in ŚSV III 27, and in SvTU II 139a: bhūyo bhūyaḥ pare bhāve bhāvanā bhāvyate hi yā/ japaḥ so ‘tra svayaṃ nādo mantrātmā japya īdŗśaḥ//, ‘Indeed, the realization (bhāvanā) that is realized again and again within ultimate reality is the [true] recitation (japa); there [viz., within that japa] of itself the sonic resonance (nāda) of this sort is to be recited, being of the nature of mantra’. Same notion of the natural japa in TĀ IV 194: akŗtrimaitaddhŗdayārūḍho yat kiṃcid ācaret/ prāņyād vā mŗśate vāpi sa sarvo ‘sya japo mataḥ//, ‘Whatever he does, firmly established in this non-adventitious Heart (hŗdaya), whether breathing or pondering, all this is considered to be his japa’. TĀV ad loc. quotes the same ŚS III 27 that YR refers to here, as well as (from some unknown source?): bahyair api yo jalpaḥ sa japaḥ [...]/ ityādy uktam.1201 Lit., ‘[an awareness] accompanied by the imagistic notion (kalpana) that his body is nothing but a "staff surmounted by a skull" (khaţvānga)’. In other words, his body is treated metaphorically as a ‘khaţvāńga’, the staff that accompanies the ascetic on his journeys and which is one of his "characteristic marks" — a staff whose superior part is provided with or imagined as a skull. The literal meaning of ‘khaţvāńga’ is ‘leg or member (°ańga) of a bed (khaţvā)’. In effect, the upper portion, or "head", of a bed’s leg, in the shape of a parallelepipede, is pierced with three holes, through which the cords are threaded that constitute the supports of the traditional Indian bed. The two upper holes, parallel to the floor and slightly apart, can be seen as the orbital cavities of a cranium, while the third, below and between them, resembles a mouth. The term khaţvāńga appears (in the guise of the adjective khaţvāńgin) once only in the Mānanavadharmaśāstra [MDhŚ] XI 105, doubtless in its literal sense ‘bed-post’; perhaps MDhŚ XI 72 (kŗtvā śavaśiro dhvajam, ‘having made the head of a

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when he is able to hold in his own hand [as his begging-bowl] any fragment of the knowable, [instead of] a skull,1202 filling it with the liquor of delighting in all the essences,1203 then that is his vow, both easy and very difficult.1204

When [he composes his mind] in the way that will be explained, then that is his, the knower of the Self’s, vow — a [self-imposed] restriction intended to propitiate the deity that is his own Self.

What sort of vow? The master says: ‘[a vow] both easy and very difficult’.Very difficult, that is, obtained by suffering made acceptable through the favor of

the Supreme Lord, putting aside all other means [of liberation], for nescience itself has vanished. And it is easy, for it is obtained without the bother of adopting external ornamentation, such as bones, ashes, etc., or [of observing] restrictions as to food, etc.1205

What is that vow? The master replies [with the phrases beginning with] ‘all’; that is, [this vow is observed] when he contemplates all this, which is presented to his mind1206 as formed of apparent difference with an eye to its lack of difference — [which sense of unity is inculcated] by reasoning, by traditional scripture, by

corpse his emblem’) refers to our khaţvāńga, as an attribute of the ascetic (see, infra, Baudhāyanadharmasūtra [BĀDhS] I 1, 3); see also YājS III 243, which describes the mendicant ascetic ‘carrying a bowl which is a skull’ (śiraḥkapālin) ‘with his emblem’ (dhvajavant); cf. Āpastambadharmasūtra [=ĀpDhS] I 10, 29, 1, khaţvāńgaṃdaņḍārthe [...], ‘[...] taking a khaţvāńga as his walking stick’; the commentator Haradatta (14th-15th cent.) mentions the two interpretations of the term: either khaţvāńga is a ‘part of a bed’ or ‘it is to be taken in the sense well known in the Tantra of the Kāpālikas’ (khaţvāyā ańgaṃ khaţvāńgam [...] kāpālikatantraprasiddhasya khaţvāńgasya vā grahaņam), also: Gautamadharmasūtra III 4, 4, 4, where the penitent is described as having two attributes: the khaţvāńga and the begging-bowl made of a skull (khaţvāńgakapālapāņir), and BĀDhS I 1, 3: kapālī khaţvāńgī [...] dhvajaṃ śavaśiraḥ kŗtvā, ‘carrying a skull and a khaţvāńga, [...] having made the head of a corpse his emblem’. Iconographically, the khaţvāńga is sometimes a stick surmounted by a skull (or by many skulls, as in Buddhist representations), sometimes a kind of stick or mace whose superior portion is sculpted in the form of a skull (see Illustration).1202 On kapāla, see MDhŚ VIII 93 (kapālena ca bhikşārthī [...]), where the term signifies simply ‘begging-bowl’, as it does in vedic texts (see, for instance, ĀpDhS II 9, 23-10, BĀDhS II 10, 17, 23 — in the context of the agnihotra); cf. YājS III 243, quoted n. 1201, and ĀpDhS 110, 28, 21: [...] puruşaśiraḥ pratīpānārtham ādāya, ‘[...] Having taken the head/skull of a man in order to drink’. J. Torzsok pointed out the aforementionned textual references on kapāla and khaţvāńga in a lecture delivered at the EPHE, Vth Section (February 2008).1203 viśvarasāsavapūrņaṃ... rasayati — lit., ‘he delights in [a begging-bowl that, rather than] a skull, [is nothing but] a piece of the knowable, which he holds in his own hand, filled with a liquor [composed of] all essences [or, of essences of all (things)]’. The term viśvarasa, interpreted as ‘all essences’ may imply a reference to the Tantric worship, in which the adept partakes of a mixture of sexual fluids, blood, alcohol, etc.; viśvarasa may, as well, be understood as ‘the essences [of all the things] of the world’.1204 Cf. TĀ IV 258b-263a, on the futility of ordinary vows, which are, by no means, required ‘for understanding the plenitude of one’s own Self in its omnipresence’ (svātmanas tathā vaiśvarūpyeņa pūrņatvaṃ jñātum); also TS IV, p. 27, which gives the Trika definition of vrata, quoting the Nandaśikhā: sarvasāmyaṃ paraṃ vratam, ‘The highest vow is [to take] everything as identical’.1205 Cf. TĀ IV 213-232a, 240-247b.1206 prātītika.

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experience and by meditative exercise (abhiśīlana) [and is confirmed in the insight]: ‘It is I alone who myself manifest as all this’.1207

Thus says the revered Bhagavadgītā:Himself as in all beings,/ And all beings in himself,/ Sees he whose self is disciplined in discipline,/ Who sees the same in all things.1208

Thus the vow consists in the idea of non-difference become unshakable.Moreover, when he deems his awareness fully satisfied with the world seen as a

cremation ground, then this also is his vow.[This is thus explained:] just as this world consisting both of objects to be known

and of knowers may be deemed to be overwhelmed by [a great many] hundreds of corpses, namely, objects characterized by insentience — jars, bodies, etc. — so, verily, it may indeed be termed a cremation ground, that is, a garden where dwell the Fathers.1209

As well, since consciousness, [assuming the form of] the Goddess, alone is sentient, and whatever appears different from it — namely, the entire universe, which is illumined (ullāsita) by that awareness — is insentient and may be compared to a corpse, so is the universe [here quite properly compared to] a cremation ground.

Furthermore, he deems his awareness satisfied utterly with that world seen as a cremation ground. That is, he understands [his awareness] to be situated in the midst [of a cremation ground], made extremely frightful in virtue of the fact that whatever has come into being is subject to destruction.1210

He who takes a [mundane] vow (vratin) dwells, does he not, in a cremation ground; but he who lives by an other-worldly (alaukika) vow takes up residence in this world of transmigration — itself [a veritable] cremation ground made frightening by the fact that all cognizers and objects of cognition are found to be perishable; like one insane, he plays games (krīḍā) with those fettered cognizers, who are [effectively] insentient, and with objects that are cognizable, such as jars, etc., which take the place of the dead [in the outward cremation ground]. [This he does,] considering: ‘I alone am the ultimate reality, [embodying] the unique principle of consciousness, [which extends] everywhere’.1211

Moreover he deems his awareness [fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground] accompanied with the imagistic notion that his body is [nothing more than] a staff surmounted by a skull.

Here, the body is imagined as a staff surmounted by a skull — which is the prescribed way of [viewing the body, metaphorically or in principle, as a] skeleton.

For the body of the yogin after all amounts to nothing but a corpse, is nothing but the remainder of root impressions [left by his previous experience],1212 for he deems

1207 sarvam idam ekaḥ sphurāmi.1208 BhG VI 29.1209 pitŗvana.1210 Or, taking the compound as a dvandva: ‘by virtue of [scenes of] creation and destruction’.1211 sarvatrāham eva ekacittattvaparamārthaḥ.1212 This analogy of the khaţvāńga represents a tantric metaphorization of the notion of aśarīratva, which, in BĀU IV 4, 7, quoted n. 1062, is rendered by the slough of a snake. Cf. YR ad 83: ‘free of the modes (bhāva) [determined] by the [hexad of] sheaths (kañcuka) whose first is māyā, he requires nothing else, merely supporting his body as [basis for exhausting] the [unexpended] remainder (śeşa) of [previous] impressions (saṃskāra), in the way the [potter’s] wheel [goes on] rotating (cakrabhrama) [after the potter has ceased impelling it]’;

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his [true] self to have gone beyond the body, owing to the extermination of his foul seizure by the conceit that his body is the locus of the cognizer.1213

For him who thinks thus, his body is imagined as stamped (°mudrā) with the form of a skeleton. [Therefore, his awareness] is furnished (kalitām), impressed (mudritām), with that [image], inasmuch as [his awareness is now presumed to be the] substratum for whatever is to be enjoyed.

Indeed, the heroic ascetic (vīravratin)1214 situated in a cremation ground should be [viewed as if] marked [with the sign, or imprint] of the staff surmounted by a skull; for he, whose [true] form is his awareness, considers his own body as different from that awareness insofar as it is something to be known — hence the ‘stamp of the staff surmounted by a skull’ [is justly said to be upon it]. And that also constitutes his vow.

Similarly, he delights in (rasayati) [a begging-bowl that, rather than] a skull, [is nothing but] a piece of the knowable — that is, he takes pleasure (carvayati) in it — for, the knowable is anything having the form of the enjoyable, characterized by the pentad of objects, sound, etc.; it is delimited both by what there is to know and what there is to do.1215 Thus the [knowable] is said here to be a piece, equivalent to the piece of skull [used as a begging-bowl by Śaiva ascetics], which is nothing but a [fragment of] skull, that is, a shard of the cranial bone — in which he delights, that is, at which he marvels, by reposing in perfect ipseity, periodically sipping the essence [of the knowable] — then that also is his vow.

That the drink of heroes (vīrapāna) placed in a skull is indeed savored by him who takes a vow is expressed by the words: [‘filled with a liquor composed of] all the essences [of the entities of the universe]’.1216

Moreover, the portion of the essence [present] in all [entities, or in the universe], that is contained in the fragment of skull having the form of the knowable pentad of objects, sound, etc., namely, the part made of the ambrosia that is delight (carvaņā) itself, is nothing other than what is called here the liquor [composed] of [all] the essences [of the entities of the universe], for it offers supreme bliss (paramānanda); it is the best of drinks, and [that "skull"] is filled with it.

And this might [also] be said: by skull is [here intended] ‘something serving as a receptacle’, namely, the resistant part of the ‘all’ that may be analogized to a ‘shard’; the ‘drink’ is the essential portion1217 contained in that [scil., ‘cup’], capable of creating wonder, for it offers exultation.

Now, a skull is held in the hand of one who has taken a vow; hence, the master says: ‘[It is] held in his own hands’. Here, his own means ‘those belonging to him’; the term ‘kara’, ‘hand’ [signifies also] the ‘rays of consciousness’, essentially, the goddesses that are the organs of sense such as the eye, etc.; in them [scil., the ‘hands’, i.e., the ‘rays’ of consciousness, i.e., the goddesses, i.e., the organs of sense] is received the fragment of the knowable that [momentarily] assumes the character of

and: ‘In any case, how could there be awareness (smŗti) at the end without there being affirmation of root impressions (saṃskāra) left by his previous experience (pūrvānubhava)?’1213 Lit., (taking durgraha in the sense of āgraha) ‘owing to the extermination of [those wise men’s] [stubborn] insistence that the body [etc.] is the cognizer’.1214 Lit., ‘he who has taken the heroic vow’.1215 See YR ad 21.1216 There may be here a veiled reference to Kaula rites; see Masson, Patwardhan 1969: 38ff., esp., 42; also TĀ XXIX, 6 and passim.1217 sārabhāga.

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an object, insofar as it is something to be enjoyed; hence the [metaphorical bowl] is said to be ‘held in his own hands’.

As a drink is drunk with the aid of a [begging-bowl made of a] skull held in the hand, so by the [true] yogin is savored the liquor [composed] of all the essences, gathered unto him by means of the sense-organs, the eye, etc., which are the ‘rays’ of his consciousness (saṃvitkara), with the aid of that "skull" which is any piece of the knowable.

Here is the purport of what has been said: the yogin, gathering up, by means of the goddesses that are the organs of sense, the pentad of objects constantly offered to him in this way, partakes of constant repose in Bhairava, who is his own consciousness, by the act of reasoning itself.1218 Until the very last moment, he leads [his life], as taught here, in conformity with the view that there is no second (advayadŗś).

Such is the vow of him who has cultivated the lotus feet of a true teacher. Beyond that is nothing but the desiccation of the body.

Kārikā 81Now, summing up what has been previously expounded, the master explains that this doctrine is preeminent [among doctrines]:

81. So, having attained [that condition which is] called by the name Maheśvara, namely, ultimate reality, wherein he is shorn of birth and death, [the yogin] remains [in this world], [acting] as he wishes, because all that he manifests [henceforth] is the [pure] state of the agent of experience;1219 he has accomplished whatever he had to do.1220

So, that is, in the manner just now expounded,1221 having apprehended the secret that is called by the name Maheśvara, namely, ultimate reality — that is, having correctly experienced the Great Lord as he is in reality, in virtue of the unshakable realization1222 [of that reality] in his own heart...;

[Answering the question] ‘what sort [of entity] is this [ultimate reality]?’, the master explains: it is ‘free from birth and death’, or, in other words, is that by which, when understood, there can be no more birth or death;

Having realized this [state], the yogin remains [in this world], [acting] as he wishes, having accomplished whatever he had to do.1223 [This means:] the yogin, the final goal of whose existence (parapuruşārtha) has been fulfilled, owing to the absence of anything further to be done, remains [in this world], that is, continues [to live], passing his time as he wishes, without ever exceeding [the boundaries of] his own desire, his body kept [‘in motion’] like the freely revolving wheel [which once set in motion by the potter goes on rotating without further effort on his part].1224

1218 A reference to the ‘view that there is no second’ (advayadŗś), as stated in the next sentence?1219 That is, unentangled with the perishable objects of this world.1220 Adaptation of APS 79. On the notion of kŗtakŗtyatā, see YR ad 50.1221 This interpretation of samanantara is required by the context (see the avat., and the iti of the kārikā).1222 pratipatti.1223 Cf. PS 40.1224 Cf. SK 67: samyagjñānādhigamād dharmādīnām akāraņaprāptau/ tişţhati saṃskāravaśac cakrabhramavad dhŗtaśarīraḥ, ‘By the attainment of perfect wisdom, virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the spirit remains a while invested with the body, just as a potter’s wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impulse previously

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How is this possible? The master replies: ‘because [all that] he manifests [henceforth] is the [pure] state of the agent of experience’ [un-entangled with the perishable objects of this world] — that is, because, in all conditions [viz., in whatever circumstances he finds himself], he is manifest as the [pure] agent of experience [and not as an enjoyer], his is the effulgence (parisphuraņa) attained through sustained concentration on that very secret. In other words, though remaining in his body, [the yogin] experiences bliss unsullied [by bodily contact].

Kārikā 82Among living beings, anyone at all who thus knows his own Self [to be identical with the universal Self], would become one with that Self — with this in mind, the master now teaches the absence of any restriction as to whether [the student] is entitled [ritually to pursue such knowledge]:

82. He who knows the Self of all, thus described — [source of] supreme and incomparable bliss, omnipresent, utterly devoid of diversity — becomes one with that Self.

He who knows — whatsoever animate being knows — the omnipresent Śiva, who has been thus — in the way mentioned — described, that is, made known as a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness by the methods of argument, scripture, experience and sustained concentration — that is, anyone at all who has abandoned [all mundane] limitation becomes one with that [Self] — would be none other than Śiva himself. So is the verse to be construed.

In this case, there is no restriction as to whether the [student is ritually] entitled to [pursue] the knowledge of the Self, for all those, whoever they may be, who are afflicted by the faults of birth, death, etc. — even if they be animals — become one with him by recognizing (pratyabhijñānāt) that the Great Lord is one’s own Self. Such is the reference1225 of the word ‘yat’: ‘he who ...’.

Further, [this omnipresent Śiva] is how [to be described]?[He is] the Self of all, the Self of all that cognizes and is cognized; or [taking the

compound as a BV] he is that whose Self is [composed of] the entirety of knowers and things known; in other words, he is both the transcendent (sarvottīrņa) and the immanent (sarvamaya).

Hence [this omnipresent Śiva] is [described as] having shaken off, or having set aside, diversity, the infinity of [phenomenal] difference, on account of his appearance (sphuraņa) in the form of consciousness always and everywhere; he is further described as that whose bliss is incomparable, devoid of qualification and most excellent, because expectation [of any thing at all, for him] is lacking.

Anyone who knows thus his own Self would become Śiva (śivarūpin).

Kārikā 83

imparted to it’ (tr. G. Jha) — of which the present passage ([...] cakrabhramavad dhŗtaśarīraḥ tişţhati [...]) seems merely an emprunt. TĀ XXVIII 312-320a quotes ĀPS 81 (v. 312) and comments upon it (vv. 313-320a). It is noteworthy that TĀV ad loc. (avat. ad XXVIII 317) — that is, in the same context, inasmuch as PS 83 reproduces APS 81 — puts the quote of the same v. 67 of the SK in the mouth of an objector. Cf. PS 69 and ĀŚ II 37b (quoted n. 1109): [...] yatir yādŗcchiko bhavet, ‘[...] one should become an ascetic and live spontaneously, without willing anything’. Same image and phraseology in YR ad 83.1225 parāmarśa.

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Such being the case, where should he who has understood that the Great Lord is his own Self give up his body, when his entitlement to that body has been extinguished, and to what [place] does he then go? The master now removes such doubts:

83. Whether he gives up his body in a place of pilgrimage or in the hut of an outcaste, be he conscious or not,1226 he goes [thence] to a condition of transcendent Isolation, his grieving at an end, for he was liberated at the very moment he acquired knowledge.1227

The knower of the Self who has thus concentrated with determination upon (pariśīlita) his nature and whose heart has truly gained confidence through the vision of ultimate nonduality, saying to himself: ‘All this universe is nothing but the freedom that is manifest in my own Self’,1228

— whether abandoning his body in a place of pilgrimage, that is, in a most sacred place such as Prayāga, Puşkara, Kurukşetra, etc., or in the most defiled [of places], the residence of an outcaste, by which reference is meant a dwelling of the lowliest of men;

— thus, in either case, free from the vexation of seeking or avoiding [such places],— he goes to a condition of transcendent Isolation (kaivalya) [viz., reaches

‘separation’ from the limited world of bondage] through knowledge of the Self alone; that is, in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (kevalatā) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness, a condition quite apart from the host of causes and effects, such as the primal matter, etc.1229

1226 Lit., ‘even if he be no longer conscious’.1227 This verse is borrowed from ĀPS 81 without alteration. AG quotes it in two other places: GAS ad VIII 5-7, referring to it as an ‘authoritative Śruti’ and TĀ XXVIII 312, where it is referred to by JR as an āgama — with a variant: parityajet for parityajan; note that TĀ XXVIII 315a comments upon the use of the optative, expressive of the possibility (saṃbhāvanā). The verse is quoted also (see S. Sastri ĀPS: 38, and Gnoli TĀ: 536, n. 5) in a late 14th cent. Vedānta text (2nd half of), Vidyāraņya’s Jīvanmuktiviveka (see Intr., n. 54). Cf. the similar verse from the Ratnamālāśāstra, quoted by the immediately preceding passage of TĀ XXVIII (v. 310): rathyāntare mūtrapurīşamadhye caņḍālagehe niraye śmaśāne/ sacintako vā gatacintako vā jñānī vimokşaṃ labhate ‘pi cānte, ‘Even if at his final hour he finds himself in a roadway, or surrounded by urine and feces, or in the hut of an outcaste, or some other vile place, or in a cremation ground — whether he be conscious or unconscious — he nonetheless attains liberation [viz., he is freed from the fetters of the body] [for these pollutions, which are of the body, do not modify his already perfected state]’; and the (anonymous?) quote that follows that of ĀPS 81, in the same passage of GAS VIII 5-7: tanuṃ tyajatu vā kāśyāṃ śvapacasya gŗhe ‘thavā/ jñānasaṃprāptisamaye mukto ‘sau vigatajvaraḥ//, ‘He may give up his body in Kāśī or in the house of an outcaste. He, whose [saṃsāric] fever is over, was liberated at the time of the attainment of jñāna’ (tr. Sharma GAS: 160) — a verse also quoted ‘from the Smŗti’ (smŗteḥ), in the Tattvabodha attributed to Śańkara. Compare PS 83 (kaivalyaṃ yāti) and TĀ IV 212 (atra yāto gato rūḍhiṃ kaivalyam adhigacchati/ lokair ālokyamāno hi dehabandhavidhau sthitaḥ), which reinforces our hypothesis that the śāktopāya is the point of view of choice for the PS when evoking the figure of the jīvanmukta — chapter IV of the TĀ being devoted to that path.1228 sarvam idaṃ svatmaprakaśasvatantryam.1229 Cf. the way TĀ XXVIII 316-320a and JR ad loc. comment on kaivalyaṃ yāti, whose ambiguity is underlined. On turya and turytīta, see PS 85-86 and Intr., p. 29.

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From which it follows that for him there is no longer any discrimination of [licit] object [scil., ‘of consciousness’] from illicit object,1230 for he sees with an indifferent eye that all this universe is permeated with his Self and is presided over by the Supreme Lord; therefore, the grief that arises from doubts occasioned by [the presence of] choice has been destroyed, i.e., rejected. His grief is thus said to be at an end.

As it has been said in the revered Nirvāņayogottara:It is a matter of indifference for them who know Śiva as ultimate principle whether death takes place in the Himalayas, or at Gańgādvāra [= Haridvāra], or in Vārāņasī, or Kuru[kşetra], or Prayāga, or [even] in the house of an outcaste, etc.1231

Nor there is any need for awareness (smŗti)1232 at the time when body falls away. It is with this in mind that the master says: ‘even if he be no longer conscious’. Here, the meaning of the word even is: ‘Let consciousness (saṃsmŗti) cease [, what does it matter]!’

Even if the knower of the Self is no longer conscious at the moment he abandons his body, being overpowered by the humors of wind, bile or phlegm arising at that moment1233— that is, if consciousness of his own Self has departed — even if he thus, helpless, leaves his body, now comparable to wood or stone, even so, having already attained the knowledge of his own Self, he undoubtedly reaches [absolute] Isolation (kaivalya). Therefore, there is no particular significance1234 attaching, at the time of death, either to awareness (smaraņa) or to its absence, provided that one has [already] attained knowledge of his own Self.

Now, if one were to object: — Let there, then, be no distinction made, for him who is [fully] cognizant of the knowledge concerning his own Self, between a place of pilgrimage and its contrary — but, when you say: ‘even if he be no longer conscious at the final moment’, then, as far as the self-knowledge is concerned that had been understood as providing a means (upāyatā) [to liberation], if, at the moment of the body’s falling away, he has [also] become unaware (vismaraņa) of that very knowledge, how could he then be [said to be] liberated (mukta)? As has been stated in the revered Gītā:

And at the hour of death, on Me alone/ Meditating, leaving the body/ Whoso dies, to My estate he/ Goes; there is no doubt of that.1235

And so, in such cases [as indicated in the Gītā], meditation (smaraņa) is indeed [shown to be] useful; and even if one could [somehow] attain identity with him [the Lord] at the final moment, in the absence of any meditation on the Supreme Lord, then all fettered souls, even the stupid, would at the time of death, realize within

1230 kşetra/akşetra.1231 On the Nirvāņayogottara, a manuscript of which is deposited in the Central Library in BHU (no./n° C 4246), see Dyczkowski Saṃvitprakāśa: 7, n. 1. On the vanity of prescriptions and prohibitions, see YR ad 69.1232 smŗti means ‘memory’ stricto sensu, but here, the word is employed more or less by synecdoche to signify ‘consciousness’ (of something) in general. The entire following discussion seems to imply the question: ‘Can one arrive at kaivalya without being conscious at the moment of death?’1233 Same development in YR ad 94-95.1234 viśeşa — lit., ‘difference’.1235 BhG VIII 5.

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themselves the Supreme Lord, for no distinction [between them and the knowers of the Self has been posited]; furthermore, all such statements [claiming some final benefit for the true knower, such as those you have been regaling us with in this work] would be unauthoritative.

But this is not the case. [Anticipating such arguments] the master says in reply: ‘[he who became] liberated at the very moment of his acquiring knowledge’. True, there may be no utilization of [conscious] meditation on his part [at the time of death]; however, it was at the very moment when the true teacher, [whispering] into the depth of his ear, conveyed to him the knowledge that the Great Lord is his own Self, that he acquired1236 the ultimate meaning of the knowledge of his own Self: ‘I myself am all this’.1237

Free of the modes determined by the [hexad of] sheaths whose first is māyā, he requires nothing else, merely supporting his body as [basis for exhausting] the [unexpended] remainder of [previous] root impressions, in the way the [potter’s] wheel [goes on] rotating [after the potter has ceased impelling it].1238 Thus, [once he has acquired true knowledge,] there is no reason, at the final moment, for him to bother about awareness or its opposite, inasmuch as the corporeal sheath is effective only so long as a relation with the sheaths of the impurities of deeming oneself finite, and of regarding the world as objective that arise from ignorance exists.

But since the sheath created by ignorance has already been destroyed by [the guru’s] instruction regarding knowledge of one’s own [true] Self, how can any such corporeal sheath, [even] moribund, effect any control over the knower of the true Self at the end?

Thus, he would have been liberated (muktaḥ) at the moment the knowledge of the Self was explained to him, and he will go on living (jīvann eva) [till his prārabdha actions are exhausted].

As has been stated in the Kularatnamālikā which has a thousand verses:When the most excellent teacher teaches him correctly, he is undoubtedly liberated at that very moment; thereafter he inhabits [a body] merely [moving] like the revolving wheel [of the potter].1239

1236 adhirūḍha — lit., ‘mounted upon’.1237 aham eva sarvam idam. Cf. TĀ XXVIII 72-73a, which quotes the Niśāţana (see n. 1240).1238 cakrabhrama — SK 67 is implicitly present here. Same image in YR ad 81.1239 Lit., ‘[thereafter] the mechanism continues to function’. Or ‘liberated at that very moment, he would merely dwell in time like a potter’s wheel [revolves for a time]’, yantra, meaning ‘device’ or ‘mechanism’ (in general), has been understood as referring to the potter’s wheel, an image frequently attested; cf. TĀV XIII 231a: yantram iti akiṃcitkaratvāt, ‘"A mechanism [scil., the potter’s wheel]" is referred to here, for [the body, so understood] no longer does anything’. This is a wellknown verse cited also in PM 66 (with the variant: yatra) in the context of initiation by ‘the teacher’s sidelong-glance’ (gurukaţākşapāta). ŚSV III 43 quotes it as belonging to the Kularatnamālā and gives the verse immediately following — verse that might refer to the jīvanmukti acquired through the ‘non-means’ (anupāya): kiṃ punaś caikatānas tu pare brahmaņi yaḥ sudhīḥ/ kşaņamātrasthito yogī sa mukto mocayet prajāḥ//, ‘How much more then the yogin of supreme understanding! If he is established in the highest Brahman with one-pointedness even for a moment, he is liberated himself and he liberates other people’ (tr. Singh). TĀ XIII 230b-231a (with variant: tadaiva kila mukto ‘sau for muktas tenaiva kālena) and XXXVII 27 both cite the same verse from the [Kula]ratnamālā: yasmin kale guruņā nirvikalpaṃ prakāśitam/ muktas tenaiva kālena yantraṃ tişţhati kevalam//, of which the 2nd hemistich has the same form as the 2nd hemistich of the Ratnamālā cited by YR ad 83

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And also in the revered Niśāţana:1240

[In the time it takes] to milk a cow or an arrow to fall, which may be encompassed in the blink of an eye, he who has once identified himself [lit., ‘united himself’] with the ultimate principle, is liberated and he may liberate others. How can there be then, for him whose Self has merged previously, for a moment, into the transcendental brahman, [any question of] awareness at the end of life?

Moreover, by whom else can the last moment of the knower of the Self (ātmavid) be directly experienced, apart from the witness that is his own experience? — On the strength of which witness one might posit the existence in him of awareness or its opposite, inasmuch as ‘those who see horizontally’ [viz., fettered subjects]1241 are not privy to any such realm of experience? Therefore, in this matter, let the omniscient ones be asked their opinion.1242

Moreover, from the mere movement of the body at the time of death, one cannot infer that the moment of abandoning the body is to be taken as either auspicious or inauspicious [that is, that it would lead or not to liberation] for him who has realized the ultimate truth.1243

and ŚSV III 43. The Kularatnamālā is abundantly mentioned in the TĀ as Śrīkularatnamālā, Śrīratnamālā, Śrīmālā (TĀ and TĀV I 274, XI 28, XIII 229b-231a, XV 594 (... śrīmanmāloditam), XXVIII112, 128 (śrīratnamālākulāgame), 145, 256, 309, 310, 415-417a, XXIX 55, 192b-195a, 201-202a, 238b-239a, 282-283, XXXI 60b (alluded to by devyāyāmalamālayoḥ?), XXXVII 25b-29 (variant of the text quoted in XIII 230-231).1240 The Niśāţana (Niśisaṃcāra, Niśācara, Niśicāra, Naiśasaṃcāra, Aţana) is a pre-10th cent. Kaula text, which has survived in a manuscript in Kathmandu: NAK 1-1606 (palm-leaf, Newari script); see Sanderson 2005: 110-112, 133; 2007: 375. It is abundantly mentioned in TĀ and TĀV: I 51, IV 78b, IV 177-178a, VI 31b, XII 23b-24a, XIII 197, 241b-242a, XIV 43b-45, XV 83-97a, 105b-107a, 596, XVI 200a (according to JR, śāstre is implicitly referring to the Niśāţana), XXVIII 72-75a, which quotes from the Niśāţana: śrīmanniśāţane ‘py uktaṃ kathanānveşaņād api/ śrotrābhyantarasaṃprāpte guruvaktrād vinirgate// muktas tadaiva kale tu yantraṃ tişţhati kevalam/ surāpaḥ steyahārī ca brahmahā gurutalpagaḥ// anyajo vā dvijo vātha bālo vŗddho yuvāpi vā/ paryantavāsī yo jñānī deśasyāpi pavitrakaḥ// tatra saṃnihito devaḥ sadevīkaḥ sakińkaraḥ//, ‘In the Niśāţana — as soon as it leaves the mouth of the teacher, as soon as it is received in the space of the ear [of the student], even if [the latter] must still inquire as to the sense of the teaching — it is said that [the hearer] is liberated at that very moment; the "machine" [viz., the body; the implicit image being that of the potter’s wheel] alone persists — whether he be a drunkard or a thief or a killer of brahmins or a visitor in the bed of his teacher, whether he be born a brahmin or born elsewhere, whether he be a child, an old man, or a youth; an enlightened man in the neighborhood purifies the very place, for the god is there present, along with his consort and retinue’.1241 Is the term intended in the sense of ‘those who see only what is in front of their faces’?1242 Is there a shade of irony here — "Therefore, in this matter, let the [so-called] omniscient ones (sarvajña) be asked [their opinion]’?1243 This passage refers to the practice, well attested in India, of inferring the future moral state of the dying person from his condition at the last moment — which is indeed decisive in that respect; see Edgerton 1927, pt III: 219-249. Likewise, AG, commenting upon BhG VIII 7, distinguishes between the external state of the dying man, which is purely ‘circumstantial’ (vastuvŗttopanata), and his internal state (antardāśa), which consists in being steeped in the thought of the Lord, i.e., in the awareness of one’s own Self. Of this condition people in attendance on the dying man are but deluded witnesses, and cannot presume anything as to his journey beyond, whereas the only true witness of that experience is the experience itself. GAS VIII 7 emphasizes, somewhat sarcastically, that there is no question of becoming that

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Therefore, necessarily, the Supreme Lord, abiding ever in his own Self, causes him who has acquired knowledge of the Self and who has been made over into the condition of that [viz., into the condition of the cosmos, or of the Supreme Lord]1244

to be aware (smarati) of his own nature, though at the time of death he resembles wood or stone.

As has been stated by the Lord in the Lakşmīsaṃhitā:1245

O Nārada, these mortals who are aware of me as they carry on their activities in perfect health,1246 I take note of them, who resemble wood or stone at the time of their end.1247

And:His mind firm and his body healthy, he who is ever conscious of my universal form, so long as perdures the equilibrium of earthly elements — I am aware of him, my devotee, as he dies, resembling stone or wood; I lead him on the supreme pathway.

Thus, here, the cause [of salvation mentioned] is the fact that he has once and for all become [identical with] the being of the [universe, or the Supreme Lord]. In any case, how could there be awareness at the end without there being affirmation of root impressions left by his previous experience? Therefore he who knows has no need of anything at all at the moment of dying.

Kārikā 84

object the thought of which accidentally crosses the mind at the final moment: kiṃ vastu vŗttopanatam eva tad bhavati tasminn antye kşaņe/ nanu putrakalatrabandhusmŗteḥ śiśirodakapānāder vāntye kşaņe dŗşţaṃ smaraņam iti tadbhāvāpattiḥ syāt/ maivam, ‘Can it be the case that he [the dying man] becomes only the object brought in fact [to his awareness] at the final moment? Can he possibly become what he sees or remembers at the final moment — a friend, wife, or child that he has recollected or the cool drink [that he has then been offered]? Hardly!’ (with the variants of the NSP edition); cf. PS 90-91 and 94-95.1244 tadbhāvabhāvita — the translation of tadbhāvabhāvita is borrowed from Edgerton ad BhG VIII 6. In his GAS VIII 6-7, AG discusses the term’s meaning, referring to the thought-processes of those who are enlightened (jñānin): ye hi sadā bhagavantaṃ bhāvayanty evaṃ bhūtvā bhavişyāma iti teşāṃ tajjaḥ saṃskāro ‘nyasaṃskārapratibandhīti nyāyena [...], ‘Those who constantly realize the Lord, thinking "having become [one with him], we will [ever] so be" — for them, "the root impression born of that [truth-bearing insight (ŗtambhārā prajñā, in YS I 48)] obstructs other root impressions (anyasaṃskārapratibandhin)" [YS I 50]. According to that maxim [...]’. Then, concludes AG: saṃvinmātrasatattvaparameśvarasvabhāvataiva bhavati, ‘one becomes merged with the Supreme Lord who is in essence consciousness alone’. Note that we differ in this matter from Sharma (GAS: 161), who has not recognized the reference to YS I 48 and 50; see, inter alia, Whicher 2005: 611. For other occurrences of tadbhāvabhāvita, see avat. to 90-91 (and BhG VIII 6 quoted by YR ad 90-91), YR ad 94-95, and n. 1328, which gives a longer excerpt of GAS VIII 6-7.1245 Not to be mistaken for the Lakşmītantra; the Catalogue of Pañcarātra Saṃhitā (ed. Sadhu Parampurushdas and Sadhu Shrutiprakashdas) cites (p. 57, 73) Dr. P.P.Apte’s unpublished thesis, Pañcarātra Saṃhitās: A Study (University of Pune, 1962) which distinguishes between the Lakşmī Tantram and the Lakşmī Saṃhitā (communication of Marion Rastelli). YR’s quote, attributed to the Lakşmīsaṃhitā, does not figure in the extant Lakşmītantra, which suggests that the two works may be different. Sanderson 2009: 69-70 refers to the Pāñcarātrika text, the Mahālakşmīsaṃhitā, available in MS.1246 Similar phraseology in YR ad 90-91 and 94-95.1247 The source of the first quotation is probably the Lakşmīşaṃhitā, as the following one, although the expression yad uktam (which introduces it) may allude to an unnamed source.

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If then having recourse to places of pilgrimage, etc., is, as stated above, not subsidiary [to the way of life of the renunciate, viz., not necessary to it] in any context whatever, then why are [such practices] adopted by the wise?1248 [In answer to this objection] the master describes the specific sphere [in which actions such as pilgrimage, etc., are licit]:

84. Visiting places of pilgrimage1249 is meant for acquisition of merit; going to one’s death in an outcaste’s dwelling eventuates in hell. But what does this matter to him who is unaffected by the stains of merit and demerit?1250

There are those, even though wise, who have not yet freed themselves completely from the notion that the body and the like is the locus of the cognizer,1251 and who have [developed as yet] no confidence in the inquiry into the knowledge of their own Self. It is they who, [in an effort to] accumulate merit, perform sacrifices or effect acts of pious liberality1252 [such as building wells, temples], etc., or who acquire demerit [by performing impious actions]. It is for them that visiting places of pilgrimage, such as Prayāga, etc., is ordained, [or] resorting to a holy region at the time of death in an effort to acquire merit, that is, in an effort to attain a higher world1253 [viz., a better birth].

Similarly, why would not going to one’s death in an outcaste’s dwelling — going to one’s death, that is, reaching destruction [of the body], in an impious place, referred to metonymically by the term ‘outcaste’s [etc.] dwelling’ — eventuate [for them] in hell? [Why would they not then] fall into a hell such as Avīci, etc.? For it is evident that they persist in considering the body as the locus of the cognizing subject.1254

Those such as are here described would for all intents and purposes be bound by unceasing birth and death, beset as they are by the confusion of the body, etc., and the Self, in accordance with the view that, after experiencing as well the pleasures [of heaven or hell] consistent with the place of their death, they are reborn in auspicious or inauspicious bodies, and die again.

For him, on the contrary, whose conceit that the body, etc., is the locus of the cognizer has entirely vanished due to the firm awareness [of the Self] arising from the knowledge of that Self — what signifies all this for him, whose consciousness is as [immaculate as] the firmament (cinnabhas),1255 once interruption of contact with the latent dispositions composed essentially of merit and demerit has been effected [viz., who is no longer affected by such dispositions] ?

1248 vidvas.1249 tīrthasevā includes tīrthayātrā, the pilgrimage itself, and tīrthāvasa, residence at the tīrtha.1250 Same verse as ĀPS 82.1251 Lit., ‘whose seizure by the notion that... has not yet completely vanished’.1252 On this notion, see ŖS X 14, 8, MuU I 2, 10; also Malamoud 1976: 165-166.1253 uttamaloka.1254 Lit., ‘For it is evident that [in their case] seizure by the notion that the body is the locus of the cognizer [yet persists]’.1255 This image is widely present in Indian speculation. If anything may be compared with consciousness, the comparans is often sky (nabhas), or ether (ākāśa), for both are in principle clear, omnipresent, without beginning or end, abstract yet sensible. The metaphor is repeated in respect of the heart: hŗdayākāśa.

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Thus, since resorting to places of pilgrimage, etc., is meant for those partaking of auspicious and inauspicious actions, there is no utility, for the pure knower of the Self, in visiting such places, etc.

As it has been stated in the Mānavadharmaśāstra:If you have no dispute with King Yama Vaivasvata1256 — the very one who dwells in your heart — then go not to the Ganges or to Gayā.1257

Here, Yama is nothing but the conceit that the body is the Self, which lies in the heart. Since this [idea] has been consumed [i.e., transcended] by those who have understood their own complete nature as [identical with] the Great Lord that is one’s own Self, how can they resort to places of pilgrimage, etc.? This is the established truth.

Kārikās 85-86Now, one may object: — It has been explained above [kārikās 57 and 62], has it not, that the Self, whose nature [is revealed] once the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions have been burnt up in [the fire of] knowledge, remains in its essential nature, when the body falls away, and does not engender any further sprouting of existence, just as a roasted seed does not engender any [further] budding.

Had the destruction of the body’s sheath been contemporaneous with the appearance of the knowledge of the Self [that is, had one died at the moment of revelation], let it be so that [the Self] not engender any further [rebirth]. [That is, we accept your thesis on that stipulation.] On the other hand, since the fetters represented by the body’s sheaths, etc., remain in evidence [in the case of the so-called jīvanmukta], how in heaven’s name1258 can he not be permeated by the attributes pertaining to the body [that is, with merits and demerits]? And once he is permeated by them how can he not become [again] a transmigrating self at death? The master now refutes this objection:

85.Placing the rice-kernel,1259 once it has been completely separated from husk and bran, again within the piece of husk, does not restore to the whole grain its identity1260 associated with that form [that is, does not restore to it its capacity of generation].

86.In the same manner, consciousness, once it has been separated from the complex of sheaths [that is the body, etc.], is [forever] completely alien to their

1256 ‘The son of the Sun’.1257 MDhŚ VIII 92. Gayā is a favorite place for offering śrāddha to the Ancestors (pitŗ).1258 kathaṃkāram — same adjective in the avat. ad 63 (see note thereon). It is used here for rhetorical reasons.1259 According to Apte’s dictionary, taņḍula is the ‘grain after threshing, unhusking and winnowing; especially rice’.1260 tādātmya — we take the term tādātmya in a technical sense (cf. its use in Vedānta and in aesthetics): ‘relatable only to itself, that is, an ‘identity’, understood as the ‘otherwise indescribable’ unity of its constituents, which, in this case, is alone able to produce the effect, viz., the sprouting. In the metaphor, tuşa appears two times, as tuşa and as tuşadala. As tuşa, it stands for a congenital impurity, as does kambuka; as tuşadala, it stands for the body that the jñānin occupies, much as cast-off clothes, after realizing the knowledge of the Self.

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touch, even though, as a liberated Self, it remains there [for a time] due to root impressions [previously accumulated].1261

[The compound tuṣakambukasupṛthakkṛtataṇḍulakaṇatuṣadalāntarakṣepa is to be understood as follows:] Placing ... the rice-kernel [that has been] completely separated from husk and bran ... [again] within the piece of husk — that is,]

placing within the piece of husk the rice-kernel, that is, putting it again where it was previously, [but now] well separated, that is, completely detached, from husk and bran —

does not restore the identity of [the husk and] the rice-kernel, that is, [does not restore] the tight coalescence [of the husk and the rice-kernel] — even though [that placement] was [previously] present in terms of a form1262 such that a sprout would be enabled [that is, would germinate].

[In other words] the husk and the rice-kernel remain distinct just like two iron rods, and are not focused on enabling a single action [that is, whatever action ensues derives from the parts separately and not from the whole, in this case the seed].

In the same manner, namely, in the same way, consciousness (saṃvit), i.e., the intelligence (cetanā) of the knower of the Self,

separated from the complex of sheaths, that is, from the accumulation of sheaths such as the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — that is, restored [to his pure state] by affirming through sustained concentration the knowledge of his Self, saying: ‘It is I alone who am manifest, always, everywhere, as the universal Self, whose nature is the Great Lord that is my own Self’ — 1263

[that consciousness] even though remaining there for some time, that is, even though established [temporarily] in this complex of sheaths as a part1264 [of a whole, composed of consciousness and body], thanks to the continuing existence of the body,

is [now] a liberated Self (muktātman), its bondage destroyed, and is completely alien to the touch of those [sheaths].

[To explain further:] it [viz., consciousness] is completely alien to, that is, is devoid of, the touch of that complex of sheaths, the body, etc. — [‘touch’ meaning here] the affliction1265 that is born of the impurity of supposing oneself the agent of actions appearing in the shape of merit and demerit and as such is capable of engendering the sprout of transmigration (saṃsārāṅkura).1266

1261 Silburn takes saṃskāra as ‘purification’ (as does Barnett), and translates: ‘De meme que la Conscience qui par des purifications est ici separee des cuirasses qui la recouvrent [...]’ [— ‘Just as consciousness which, by purifications, is here separated from the armors covering it [...]’]. These two verses correspond to ĀPS 44, although the metaphor is different: ‘Just as clarified butter, drawn from milk, is not in that [milk] as before, if it is cast [back into it], so the spiritual Self, if it has [once] been separated from the Qualities (guņa) of prakŗti, is not [together with these any longer]’.1262 tadrūpatayā = tadrūpa° in the compound.1263 aham eva svātmamaheśvarasvabhāvo viśvātmanā sarvadā sarvatra sphurāmi.1264 śeşavartanayā — from the point of view of the body, consciousness is not the ‘whole’ (śeşin), and their relationship, though necessary from a logical point of view, makes of consciousness the ‘part’ (śeşa) that, upon death, vanishes, thus putting an end to that ‘whole’.1265 uparāga.1266 Consciousness remains free from contact with merits and demerits, which, a function of the kārmamala, are the very cause of transmigration.

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In the same way, the rice-kernel, put back in the [separated] piece of husk, is devoid of that contact [with the husk and the bran] that leads to the generation of the sprout.

This can be said: transmigration is generally caused by ignorance; however, the consciousness of the yogin is not a cause of transmigration, owing to the deficiency of required conditions1267 [viz., the absence of the three impurities], themselves generated by ignorance, for his sheaths have been sundered by the knowledge of his own Self arisen in him. Nor is it the case that this bondage of the corporeal sheaths, remaining [for a time] as a remnant1268 thanks to the power of root impressions, is capable of giving rise to the sprout of transmigration through the manifestation of [bondage’s] own properties, for its root, ignorance, has been burnt up in the fire of knowledge.1269

This being the case, the [mind of the] knower of the Self (jñānī), while living (jīvann eva), is formed by the Fourth; and he transcends even that Fourth,1270 once his body no longer exists.

Thus, in either case,1271 [the yogin] need have no fear of transmigration.

Kārikās 87-88Now, one may object: — Even though its own nature has been apprehended, the consciousness of the yogin is nevertheless impure inasmuch as it remains in a body that persists as a remnant, this consciousness — owing to the presence there, to a limited extent, of impurity deriving from its contingent association with the body (dehopādhi). This objection the master refutes by example:

87. A gem, made flawless by the most skilled artisan, though appearing flawed by its contingent association with the jewel-box, is revealed as limpid by nature,1272 as soon as this contingency is removed.

88. Likewise, consciousness, whose [true] condition — thanks to the instruction of a true teacher — is flawless, freed as it is from its contingent association with a body, is freed as well from all other contingencies, and appears as Śiva.1273

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]A gem, its flawlessness verified1274 by an extremely skilled lapidary, though

[appearing] flawed, that is, though it becomes, in effect, clouded, thanks to the close contact of the jewel-box, reveals itself nevertheless as limpid by nature, that is,

1267 Lit., ‘assemblage, collection’; namely, a functional assemblage, therefore a set of means or conditions in view of something.1268 seşavartanayā.1269 Transmigration is the result of impurities, which are themselves the result of nescience, which consists in taking the body as the Self. The idea is that the body is not the sole cause of rebirth — ignorance is also required, which is a function of the spirit (not the body); and since ignorance has been consumed in the fire of knowledge, it no longer exists.1270 On turīya and turyātīta, see YR ad 1; on the "degrees" of liberation, see YR ad 61 and ad 83: ‘[...] after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (kevalatā) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness’.1271 The translation of puņaḥ would be superfluous in this context.1272 svacchaparamārthaḥ — lit., ‘such that its ultimate truth is limpidity’.1273 On the conjunction of particles, api, iva, see B&R, ss.vv.: §§ 2 (p. 303), 4 (p. 819).1274 udyotita — or ‘assured’ (lit., ‘clarified’).

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becomes flawless, just as it was previously, once it is separated from the contingent qualification of the jewel-box — such particular cause of obscuration (āvaraņa) being no longer present.

Likewise, in this very same manner,that consciousness, whose [true] condition — thanks to the instruction of a

true teacher — is flawless (evaṃ sadguruśāsanavimalasthiti vedanam) ...[which sentence is thus explained:][true teacher means] a most excellent instructor, who has completely realized the

knowledge of the all-encompassing Self;1275

[his teachings means] repetition [under his guidance, wherein is revealed] orally (mukhāmnāya) the [great] secret of the knowledge of the Self;1276

[consciousness] whose [true] condition [is flawless] means that the impurity of deeming oneself finite, which is the screen [on which are projected] the impurities of regarding the world as objective, and of supposing oneself the agent of actions, has vanished, like the flaw in the gold,1277 owing to sustained concentration on that instruction.

And consciousness [purified] in this way is also like the sky above, owing to the disappearance of the original stains; it,

freed, i.e., separated, from its contingent association with a body,1278 that is, from the qualification whose defining feature is the body, appears indeed as Śiva, owing to the absence of any further contingency ...

... or, what amounts to the same thing, [consciousness] manifests itself, when the body comes to an end, in virtue of the quality of Supreme Śiva [that it has acquired].

Just as the gem is manifest in and of its own nature, when its contingent association with the jewel-box is removed, so does consciousness, though immaculate already1279

in the awareness (avabodha) of its own nature, manifest itself as indeed purified, owing to the termination of its contingent association with the body, judged to be impure.

Now, one may object: — But, just as the gem, though freed from its contingent association with the jewel-box, may again become tarnished by the adjunction of any

1275 We take paripūrņa as qualifying both svātmajñāna° and °vid. On other definitions of the sadguru, see TĀ IV 33-85.1276 Same expression in YR ad 96.1277 Cf. YR ad 17 and 24.1278 In the terminology of Indian logic, where in all probability the word found its original technical meaning, an upādhi is a rectifying addendum that transforms an otherwise invalid argument or proposition into a valid statement, notably by restricting its over-extended range. ‘Where there’s fire, there’s smoke’ is an example. The proposition is false as it stands, for the phenomenon of "smokeless" fire is well-attested. To correct the proposition, it suffices to add the upādhi ‘provided that the fuel is moist’. Properly speaking, the upādhi in this sense belongs to the argument, not to the object, but because anything that serves to differentiate one entity from another may be considered an upādhi (as the branch that serves to distinguish one bird from another), the upādhi is often more or less loosely attached to the object, as in the present case. The upādhi, or ‘contingent qualification’, concerns then any circumstantial condition that cannot be said to belong to the object in terms of its very being, such as the weight of the lead, etc. The yogin’s consciousness is devoid of such contingencies (that is, is deficient in upādhi) — nothing limits it, nothing circumscribes it.1279 While referring to the lapidary phrasing of the kārikā, YR reformulates the line in more normal syntax.

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number of other contingencies [such as dust, etc.] so likewise, consciousness, though freed from the contingency of the body, will still be impure, if it should receive, like the gem, another contingent qualification, inasmuch as it is affected by that contingency.

The master anticipates this objection by saying: ‘[consciousness is] freed as well from all other contingencies’.

The parallelism1280 between the example and that which has been exemplified by it is not complete in all respects.1281 After the falling away of the [yogin’s] body — his only shape now the great Light formed of ultimate nonduality — all this [universe] becomes [for the yogin] his own body, as it were (svāńgakalpa) — [which] had been thought to be a mere contingency.

And, further, he [the yogin] cannot be qualified by any other contingency, for there is no contingency whatever standing apart from this [plenitude].1282

Thus, there is no [absolute] parallelism between [consciousness and] the gem as to the manner in which they accept contingent qualification. The acceptance of the contingency of a body is rooted, is it not, in ignorance, but once that ignorance has been cut off by the axe of Self-knowledge,1283 how can there again be contact with any [further] contingency?

As it is said in the revered Gītā:Knowledge is obscured by ignorance;/ By that creatures are deluded.// But if by knowledge that ignorance/ Of men’s souls is destroyed,/ Their knowledge like the sun/ Illumines that Highest.1284

Therefore, the yogin’s own consciousness is ever pure, and pure only, for he knows his own true nature [as being the Self of all things].1285

Kārikā 89The accumulation of root impressions in the mind of him whose conduct has with determination been so fashioned accordingly1286 [viz., fashioned to such ends as have been described in kā. 84 and its commentary] is the very cause in regard to which arise all contingent conditions. And indeed nothing else intervenes that is novel1287

[i.e., no other cause of transmigratory experience need be suspected]. This is what the master says:

1280 sāmya.1281 The universe becomes the permanent body of the yogin now freed from his transitory body. There, all contingent qualifications are impossible, for nothing can be added to or taken away from the by definition universal body.1282 Cf. YR ad 12-13.1283 Same image in TĀ IV 13: durbhedapādapasyāsya mūlaṃ kŗntanti kovidāḥ/ dhārārūḍhena sattarkakuţhāreņeti niścayaḥ//, ‘Ceux qui savent tranchent a la racine l’arbre funeste de la division avec la hache de la raison intuitive aiguisee au plus haut degre’ (tr. Padoux — ‘Those who know cut the root of the ill-fated tree of difference with the axe of intuitive reason highly sharpened’).1284 BhG V 15b-16.1285 This is another way of describing the experience of mokşa, which has already been defined, from the viewpoint of nondual Śivaism of Kashmir, in kā. 60. See also MBh X 47, 12-15, quoted n. 425.1286 yathāvatpariśīlitavyāpāra°.1287 nūtanatvena.

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89. Having first, on the basis of normative teachings, or like authority, identified himself [with the objects and purposes therein enjoined],1288 and with a faith1289 therein that is unwavering, one attains rebirth in heaven, hell or the human condition.1290

The cognizer, who has made a repeated effort (abhyāsa),1291 either in the domain of sacrificial action — whether for his own merit or for the benefit of others —

or in the domain of Self-knowledge — whether that effort is based on the authority of traditional scriptures, or on declarations resuming the traditional teaching of a preceptor,1292 or on his own sustained concentration [aided by] reasoning, or even on the faith that arises from previously implanted latent dispositions — 1293

1288 Cf. ŚB X 5 2, 20: taṃ yathā yathopāsate tad eva bhavati, ‘In whatsoever form they serve him that he becomes’ (tr. Eggeling); the reference being to Prajāpati, who assumes for the worshiper whatever form the worshiper meditates upon. This passage is frequently quoted by Śańkara in his commentaries; cf. MuU III 2, 9: sa yo ha vai tat paramaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati, ‘He, verily, who knows the Supreme Brahman, becomes Brahman himself’; BĀU IV 4, 6: brahmaiva san brahmāpy eti, ‘Being Brahman he goes to Brahman’; also BhG IV 11 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 66), BhG VIII 6 (quoted in YR ad 90-91), BhG XII 2 (quoted in SpN II 5); ĀPS 58 (quoted supra) and 66: sarvākāro bhagavān upāsyate yena yena bhāvena/ taṃ taṃ bhāvaṃ bhūtvā cintāmaņivat samabhyeti//, ‘By whichever appearance (bhāva) the Lord, who has all forms, is meditated upon, that appearance He adopts, as He is like a jewel fulfilling all wishes’, and ĀŚ II 29. Among Trika texts, see SpK II 4 ([...] na sāvasthā nayā śivaḥ, ‘[...] there is no state which is not Śiva’, and SpK II 6-7; SpN II 6-7 which quotes: śivo bhūtvā śivaṃ yajet, ‘One should worship Śiva by becoming Śiva’ (again quoted in ŚSĀ I 14, which corrects it in the same verse as ‘bhakto bhūtvā’, ‘One should worship Śiva after becoming his devotee’); ŚS II 2 (ŚSV ad loc. quoting SpK II 6); TĀ IV 207-8; YR ad PS 104. See also the concept of tadbhāvabhāvita in YR ad 83, ad 90-91 (n. 1308).1289 First occurrence of the term śraddhā.1290 This is a specific way of formulating the law of karman; see p. 29. In our translation, we differ from Silburn on two points: the understanding of pūrvam and that of the syntactical link of śāstrādiprāmāņyād and avicalitaśraddhyāpi. She translates: ‘Par une foi inebranlable aussi en l’autorite des Traites, etc., on devient identique a l’objet (de sa foi) et on accede juste avant (la mort) au ciel, a l’enfer (ou) a la condition humaine’ [— ‘By an unshakable faith also in the authority of the Treatises, etc., one becomes identical with the object [of one’s faith] and reaches just before [death] heaven, hell, [or] the human condition’]. We follow the commentary, which stresses the stages of the process: ‘having at that moment (tadaiva) attained ... the identity with that... he attains later (uttaratra), after death (dehapātāt), either heaven, or hell, or the human condition’.1291 On the notion of abhyāsa, see BhG VI 33-36 and Śańkara’s definition in his commentary ad BhG VIII (abhyāsayoga) 8: mayi cittasamarpaņavişayabhūta ekasmiṃs tulyapratyayāvŗttilakşaņo vilakşaņapratyayānantarito ‘bhyāsaḥ sa cābhyāso yogaḥ [...],’ ‘"abhyāsa" consists in the repetition of the same kind of thought, uninterrupted by any contrary idea, with regard to to Me alone who am the object of concentration of the mind; that repetition itself is "yoga"’.1292 Lit., ‘the declaration of the teaching-sequence of the teacher’s teachings’. The implication is that such a teaching has authority.1293 These addenda develop the ‘etc’ (ādi) of the kā. Cf. TS IV, p. 23: kiṃ tu guror āgamanirūpaņe vyāpāra āgamasya ca niḥśaṅkasajātīyatatprabandhaprasavanibandhanasamucitavikalpodaye vyāpāraḥ, ‘Moreover, the function of the teacher [lies] in laying out the Āgama texts; whereas the Āgama texts find their function in arousing a thought that is suitable to that text and founded on its development, [a thought] both devoid of doubt and commensurate [with the text]’ (cf. Silburn 1981: 191).

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[that cognizer,] having attained identity (tanmayatā) therewith, at that moment, thanks to the accumulation of root impressions based on such [activity] — an identity that is of the nature of the matters [therein] rehearsed time and time again —

when later on his body passes away, he reaches either heaven, that is, unexcelled felicity, or hell, that is, the sufferings consequent upon [residence in] the Avīci hell, etc., or [again] the human condition, that is, that state wherein both pleasures and pains [are native], in accordance with the latent dispositions [so engendered].

On the other hand, when his body perishes, nothing at all befalls the man (puruşa, viz., the knower of the Self) who has rehearsed no [acts engendering] latent dispositions.

Indeed, with whatever intention the cognizer rehearses [his actions], he becomes one with that intention, and at the moment of death the object that he desires with clarity (sphuţatayā) comes into evidence for the cognizer.

In this way, there can be no reversal [or setting at nought] of the matters that have been rehearsed [throughout life], nor can anything not of the nature of previously rehearsed activity come into play in some unprecedented fashion.1294

Thus, previous rehearsal (pūrvābhyāsa) is alone the cause of whatever [effect ensues]. This is the purport.

Kārikās 90-91Therefore, for him who knows the Self, the cause of his coincidence with plenitude (pūrņaprathā),1295 at the time of abandoning his body, is the fact that he has once and for all become identical with the being of the [universe];1296 nor should the moment of death, whether auspicious or inauspicious, be imagined a cause of heaven or hell for him, as is so often the case among ordinary people. To express this idea, the master says:

90.The final moment, as promoting an ulterior condition either auspicious or inauspicious, acquires the status of a contingent causal factor [only] for the deluded; for him [who knows], on the other hand, it is not a cause in regard to going onward [that is, in regard to his supposed acquisition of another body].1297

91.Even those [low-born —] domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and the like — who, perfected by previously acquired right knowledge, understand their [true] mode of being as that of the universal Self, attain that true mode of being [at the last moment].1298

1294 apūrvatvena — the term is borrowed from Mīmāṃsā, where it signifies that which is "unprecedented" in the prescription of a sacrificial act, and is therefore the source of that act’s "validity" or obligatory character (dharma). For example, an injunction to "cook" rice for presentation to the Ancestors has no such force, for we know already that rice must be cooked to be eaten, whereas the injunction to dehusk the rice "by hand" is dharmic, for of the many ways to thresh rice, that one alone is made known by the vedic text. The notion acquires ontological status in the developed doctrine of the ritualists — since the "authority of the rite is consequentially certain, the apūrva in fact "exists" as the link between rite and result (if not immediate).1295 Lit, ‘of his extension into or over that which is full’.1296 See YR ad 83 and n. 1244.1297 See the commentary.1298 Silburn translates: ‘Mais ce dernier instant qui, renforcant un etat de vertu ou de peche, devient pour les ignorants un facteur de l’existence (future), n’est pas (pour ceux qui savent) cause determinante de leur destinee. Alors meme qu’ils seraient bete de somme, oiseau,

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Since [the notion of] the jñānin has been thoroughly expounded, [in the previous kārikās, it is now possible to state that] the last moment, that is, the final point of time coinciding with the loss of the body, [which is deemed to] promote,1299 or serve, the auspicious or inauspicious condition [of the dying man], presumed by the witnesses (pramātŗ) in attendance on the basis of alterations in the body’s humors, or by the [painful or peaceful] way the malignant disease is experienced ...

... [that final moment] becomes a contingent factor, that is, becomes a cause [of transmigration], for those who are deluded, that is, for those [limited] cognizers only who mistakenly take the body to be the Self.

Let that miserable [last moment] pass [in such a way for them]. But not for all that would it follow, as far as the adept (yogin) is concerned— he who has abolished the conceit that the body is the Self, and who is ever expert in perceiving the Great Lord as his own Self — that the last moment is an incitement, that is, is a cause in regard to going [onward] [supposing that thereby he would] attain another body after this body.

In order to illustrate1300 the question: ‘How does that follow?’ the master says: ‘Even those who [...]’.

Even those of evil birth, namely, those who have acquired the status of an animal (paśu) due to the power of some intention or other [as revealed by the accumulation of their demerits], or because of a curse or the like, who come to realize, at the moment of death, their proper mode of being, that is, the state of their own self, as that of the universal Self ... 1301

... even they, deluded though they may be [in their present condition], attain to the condition of their own [true] Self, if favored by the awakening of latent dispositions left by an awareness of their own Self gained previously [i.e., in previous births].

Such was the manner of the Lord of the elephants’ liberation [from his curse],1302

who, though for a time an animal nature, was awakened through deeply ingrained memories of devotions (bhakti) to the Supreme Lord that had been practiced previously with determination — whereupon, having praised Lord Vişņu he attained [again] his own nature, completely shaking off all the sheaths [of corporeal existence]. And what cause operated in respect of such recollection [of Vişņu, if not the deeply ingrained memories of his previous devotion] ?

reptile, etc., ceux qui reconnaissent leur propre destinee comme etant celle du Soi sont nean-moins purifies par la parfaite comprehension qu’ils eurent jadis et ils vont (maintenant) a cette destinee’ [— ‘But that last moment which, strengthening a pious or sinful state, becomes a cause of the (future) existence for the ignorant ones, is not a cause determining (their) destiny (for those who know). Even if they are beasts of burden, birds, reptiles, etc., those who recognize their own destiny as that of the Self, are nevertheless purified by the Perfect understanding that they formely had, and they go (now) to this destiny’]. Our interpretation differs from hers; esp., ‘gati’ we take as ‘going’ onward (v. 90); as ‘manner of going, behaving, mode of being’ (v. 91); Silburn translates saṃskŗta (as does Barnett) by ‘purified’.1299 Lit., ‘nourish’.1300 The poetical figure nidarśana is defined as an illustration or a parallel case that confirms the general thesis or principle at issue — the ‘setting sun’, for example, which illustrates (and confirms) the thesis that ‘greatness is followed inevitably by decline’.1301 ātmatvena, viz. ‘... their own self as being the universal Self [...]’. In the kārikā, the term is tadātmatvena, corresponding to YR’s ātmatvena: the meaning appears to be the same. Similarly, Śańkara, commenting on BhG X 10, uses ātmatvena; see n. 1310.1302 It is episode of the gajendramokşa (Bhāgavatapurāņa VIII 2-4).

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This is the meaning of the verse: the knower of the Self does sometimes abandon a body made motionless as wood or rock1303 from the alteration of humors, etc.,1304

arisen in it; he [sometimes even] mouthes random [nonsense], auspicious or inauspicious, such as ‘monkey’ or ‘cat’ [as seen in delirium]; but from these [states, it should not be inferred that] the knowledge and other [attainments]1305 are lost1306 that he had perfectedin practice, while carrying on his activities in perfect health.1307

The various properties of the body, etc., pertain only to the body, etc.; they are not at all capable of occulting an object that is ever realized (bhāvita) [viz., the Great Lord as one’s own Self].Thus, in all such cases [whether it be a yogin or an ordinary person who dies], it is the ingrown [habit cultivated] up until the moment of death that is the supreme consideration (paramārtha) [that is, the deciding factor]. As it has been said in the revered Gītā:

Whatsoever state (of being) meditating upon/ He leaves the body at death,/ To just that he goes, son of Kuntī,/ Always, being made to be in the condition of that.1308

1303 Lit., ‘the jñānin, whose movements are those of [a piece of] wood or rock [...]’.1304 ’Etc.’ here intends all the karaņas, especially buddhi.1305 This ‘etc’ might refer to bhakti, as is suggested by a parallel passage in YR ad 94-95: [...] abhyastabhagavadbhakteḥ.1306 Same exposition in AG ad BhG VIII 6, which verse (VIII 6) is also quoted here by YR. AG there contrasts svasthāvasthāyām with asvasthāvasthāyām, in the obvious senses of ‘when healthy’ (lit., ‘in the condition of a man situated in himself) and its contrary, ‘when unhealthy’; cf. the two verses from the Lakşmīsaṃhitā quoted by YR ad 83. Probably to be understood as an argument a fortiori: if the last moment is not decisive in the case of the average man, how could it be so in the case of the jñānin?1307 svasthaceşţatayā — lit., ‘in the manner of acting as a healthy [man] (svastha) [acts]’; svastha means ‘situated in one’s self, and, in most cases, the one who is thus ‘situated in himself is considered to be ‘healthy’, after the manner it is said of gems that they are svastha, when they are not affected by any condition extraneous to their nature (see B&R, s.v.); see also M. Hara 1995.1308 BhG VIII 6. In the same way, BhG VIII 6 (and 7a) is quoted by TĀ XXVIII 325-326a, while discussing the status of the jīvanmukta at the final hour. Cf. YR ad PS 83 and 89. Note that PS 83 (= ĀPS 81) is quoted verbatim by AG — under the general category of śruti — in his interpretation of BhG VIII 6. BhGBh VIII 6 explains tadbhāvabhāvita as: tasmin bhāvaḥ tadbhāvaḥ sa bhāvitaḥ smaryamāņatayābhyasto yena sa tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ san, ‘tadbhāvaḥ means "existence in that [other]"; now, by whom (yena) that [existence] has been caused to exist — that is, exercised by repeatedly remembering it, it is he [of whom it may be said that he] "has been caused to be in the condition of that [other]": tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ’. According to GAS VIII 6, the meaning of the verse is this: na tu yad evānte smaryate tattvam evāvāpyate iti [...] sadā yena bhāvitam antaḥkaraņaṃ tad evānte prayāņānantaraṃ prāpyate/ tac ca smaryate na veti nātra nirbandhaḥ, ‘It is not that whatever is remembered at the time of death [i.e., whatever thought crosses the mind] that forsooth is obtained [...]. That with which the heart has been all along informed, that indeed is attained, in the end, after death. This is not conditional on whether it is presented to the memory or not [at the exact moment of death]’ (tr. Sharma, slightly modified). And, AG adds: sarvāvasthāsu vyāvahārikīşv apiyasya bhagavattattvaṃ na hŗdayād apayāti tasya bhagavaty eva sakalakarmanyāsinaḥ satatabhagavanmayasyāvaśyaṃ svayam eva bhagavattattvaṃ smŗtivişayatāṃ yātīti sadā tadbhāvabhāvitatvaṃ cātra hetuḥ, ‘He [the jñānin], from whose heart the divine truth is never lost even in the course of all worldly pursuits, who has cast off all actions on the Lord and who

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And:To them, constantly disciplined,/1309 Revering Me with love,/ I give that discipline of mind,/ Whereby they go unto Me.1310

It is the transformation of one’s inner organ [into the Lord, or not, as the case may be] that constitutes the cause granting immediate direction [to the soul at death].

Kārikās 92-93Thus, in accordance with the point of view set forth above, there is nothing unprecedented that can affect the knower of the Self once his body has perished — that would set aside, as something completely novel, his having become forever identical with the being of the [universe]. Thus it follows that the body only is perishable; it alone perishes [and not the identity of the liberated soul with the Lord acquired long ago]. There is no further growth of the dispositions [ensuant upon the moment of death]. So as to demonstrate this, the master says:

92.Thus, the conscious principle that survives in the interstices between bodies1311 is in effect composed of heaven or of hell.1312 When the body perishes, it proceeds to associate with another body, in accordance [with the dispositions it has accumulated].1313

is ever suffused with God, he definitely (avaśyaṃ) automatically (svayam) remembers the divine essence (at the time of death) — and the reason for this is that he is always steeped in it’ (tr. Sharma). See n. 1288. The issue of the dying man’s last thought and its effective force is dealt with seriatim until PS 94.1309 Śańkara glosses satatayuktānām with nivŗttasarvabāhyaişaņāņām, ‘to those who are free from all desire for exterior [objects of enjoyment]’.1310 BhG X 10. In his commentary on this verse, Śańkara explains: buddhiḥ samyagdarśanaṃ mattattvavişayaṃ tena yogo buddhiyogaḥ taṃ buddhiyogaṃ/ yena buddhiyogena samyagdarśanalakşaņena māṃ parameśvaram ātmabhūtam ātmatvena upayānti pratipadyante, ‘buddhi [here] means correct perception (samyagdarśana) having Me for an object; linkage (yoga) with that [correct perception] is buddhiyoga, or "yoga [viz., "discipline"] of correct perception". By this buddhiyoga which is distinguished by correct perception, they go unto Me, the Supreme Lord, having become [for them] the Self, [taking me] as their own Self (ātmatvena)’. The first mention of the notion of buddhiyoga in BhG is in II 49, where ‘action’ (karmari) — which is, according to Śańkara’s commentary, ‘undertaken by one longing for results’ (karma phalārthinā kriyamāņam) — is said to be ‘far inferior to buddhiyoga "discipline of wisdom" (or, as translated here by Edgerton, "discipline of mental attitude"), that is, far inferior to action undertaken with equanimity (samatva), because [action undertaken with desire for a result] is the cause of birth, death, etc’ (dūreņa [...] hy avaram [...] buddhiyogāt samatvabuddhiyuktāt karmaņo janmamaraņādihetutvāt). Hence Kŗşņa’s exhortation (II 49c): buddhau śaraņam anviccha, ‘In the mental attitude seek thy (religious) refuge’, on which Śańkara: paramārthajñānaśaraņo bhavety arthah, ‘Seek thy refuge in the knowledge of the ultimate reality [or supreme goal]; this is the purport’. Thus buddhiyoga is synonymous with jñānayoga.1311 dehāntarālaga — Silburn understands this differently (analyzing the compound, it would seem, as dehāntara-ālagaḥ): ‘L’homme emprisonne a l’interieur du corps est a lui-meme son propre ciel et son propre enfer’ (idem Barnett: ‘Man imprisoned within the body is its own heaven and hell’, and Pelissero, ‘tale e quel principio cosciente individuale imprigionato all’interno di un corpo’).1312 No doubt a synecdoche: the result (heaven or hell) replaces the process of getting there (the permanence of the vāsanās).1313 Lit, ‘due to what is suitable to itself’, glossed as yathāhitavāsanānuguņyāt. This usage recalls the poetical notion of aucitya — which principle asserts that no element of the drama

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93.Similarly, the [knower’s] own essential Self remains in the condition it was in when it became manifest once and for all at the moment knowledge was acquired;1314 it does not become otherwise when the body falls away.

Thus, therefore, the conscious principle (puruşa) which has entered into bodies, jars, etc., that is, the self (ātman) of each and every man, permeated as it is by the impurity of supposing itself the agent of actions, is formed of heaven, in the sense that its inner organ is permeated by latent dispositions1315 [tending to the realization of] fruits of actions previously performed with the intention of attaining heaven, etc.; in other words, that very Self is the enjoyer of the fruit that is [called] heaven, inasmuch as the Self is then qualified by latent dispositions that have come to fruition in results such as heaven.1316

Likewise, the [Self, in which have] developed latent dispositions [induced by] previous evil actions, is the experiencer of the fruit called hell.

Thus it is the body alone that is the abode wherein are enjoyed the fruits of both categories of actions [— good and bad].

When that [body] perishes,1317 [the conscious principle proceeds to associate with another body] in accordance with [the dispositions it has accumulated].

[The master means by this:] When the body perishes, [the conscious principle], in conformity with its own latent dispositions thus accumulated, associates itself without delay with another body, that is, with another abode whereby it may enjoy [fruits yet unexperienced] — through which association [the conscious principle] becomes the enjoyer at a later time of the fruits implied by the latent dispositions that were [strengthened] by specific actions [undertaken during a past life].

Likewise, at the moment of [acquiring] knowledge, that is, at the time the student [in the course of his instruction] becomes aware of (prakāśana) his own Self as taught by his teacher,

one’s own essential Self (svātman), or consciousness (caitanya), remains forever in the same condition it was in when it once (.sakŗt) became manifest, that is, [it remains] in the condition in which [it became manifest], once and for all (ekavāram), in consequence of this course of study1318 — or [in other words] [that very Self] has acceded to the condition of self-reflection (parāmarśa) which is limited [only] by its characteristic quality of perfect freedom.

That essential Self is displayed to the jñānin by whom it is constantly in such form contemplated (parāmŗşţa),1319 in accordance with that very form [in which it is

should violate the constraints of the main rasa.1314 This statement echoes the famous verse sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā, already quoted in YR ad 10-11.1315 Note the etymological figure: vāsita/vāsanā.1316 In all this exposition, as well as in kā. 92 itself, the notion of the puryaşţaka, or subtle body, is implicit, in the context of the paśu, for it is the puryaşţaka which, being the abode of the vāsanās, is responsible for transmigration (see n. 393 and 738). It vanishes only after mokşa has taken place.1317 Lit., ‘at the time of decomposition of that [body]’.1318 krama may be taken in two ways: either the particular tradition of instruction (e.g., advaitakrama) or the process, the procedure, followed by a particular guru in his teaching.1319 As he sees the Self, so he becomes the Self.

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contemplated],1320 because of the development of latent dispositions [in previous lives tending thereto].1321

Nor is it the case, when the body falls away, that the essential Self of the knower which is already manifest, becomes other than this, that is, becomes hidden [from itself],

nor could what has thus become apparent ever not be apparent,1322 for otherwise no one would devote himself to any discipline (abhyaset), and collapse of traditional practice1323 of every sort would ensue, and all [distinctions such as those stated in Sāmkhyakārikā] would become null and void:

By virtue is obtained ascent to higher planes, by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom results the Highest Good; and bondage from the reverse.1324

Therefore, at the moment of death, let the body be what it will; it is only the development of latent dispositions relating to the essential Self that constitutes the cause of every one’s bondage or liberation.

Kārikās 94-95If, moreover, in the body, due to a disorder of its humors, the ravage of dying are experienced, not for all that would the development of his practice [previously undertaken] be in any way impaired.

In order better to understand the condition [of the dying jīvanmukta] described above, the master develops the theme further:1325

94. Utter theft of the group of faculties, loss of memory, choking,1326 rupture in vital points, particular diseases: such experiences are born of modifications affecting the body.1327

1320 tādrūpyeņa.1321 Or, if one were to read ‘vāsanā-apraroha’, ‘...because of the non-development of dispositions [that would contrary such permanence]’. In either case, it is a matter of vāsanās that were accumulated during a previous life of the ascetic, and which either favor (or do not contrary) the acquisition of final beatitude, or act contrary to that acquisition, but which may be annulled. The reference here (as will be explained in the following verses) is to ascetic practices previously interrupted, but which have created "good karman" on which to draw in the lives to come.1322 na hi bhātam abhātaṃ syāt. For variants of this key-maxim of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, see YR ad 30: nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate and YR ad 10-11: sakŗd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā.1323 vyavahāra.1324 SK 44 (tr. G. Jha). These references (abhyāsa, vyavahāra), in YR’s commentary, are to ascetic practices — the commentator says in conclusion that if such contradictions be admitted, the ascetic tradition itself, as it is conducted, would be rendered inoperative, for the end of the practice (final beatitude or illumination) would become inexplicable.1325 parighaţayate — the sense to attribute here to the verb parighaţ- invites reflection: the only instance cited in B&R (from Mŗcchakaţikā) and by MW of this combination of verb and preverb involves a musical context — "strumming" a lute. May we then suspect here a metaphorical "playing" on a theme, in the manner of an Indian rāga? Without preverb, the root ghaţ often expresses the idea that the elements of an exposition "fit together" well, are "coherent" — and this usage is especially common in the negative: etan na ghaţate.1326 Or ‘death rattle’?1327 Silburn translates śarlrasaṃskāra as ‘predispositions corporelles’ [— ‘corporeal predispositions’]. Since the context is that of a ‘disorder of the humours’ (dhātuvaişamya), we understand the compound in the sense ‘modifications of the body’.

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95. How could such experiences not belong to him, inasmuch as he is still associated with a body? Therefore, even if he be afflicted with delusion at the hour of death,1328 the knower of the Self does not lapse from ultimate reality [experienced] as his own Self.1329

The purloining1330of the group of organs, viz., the thirteen external and internal sense-organs, means the complete disappearance of their essential function. As, for example, [when] the sense-organs, beginning with the eye, make no pretense as to apprehending [external] objects, such as colors, etc.; or when the organs of action, beginning with the voice, cease, insofar as their functions of speaking, grasping, etc.,

1328 It is possible to understand mohayoge as a BV qualifying maraņāvasare, and to translate: ‘at the hour of death, even if it [this hour] is associated with delusion’. But we follow YR’s interpretation in translating the kārikā (maraņakşaņajanitaśārīrājñānasaṃbandhe ‘pi). With this kārikā the question of the last moment is definitely resolved. This should be compared with AG’s commentary ad BhG VIII 7, summarizing his position, which he presents at the end as that of his guru in this field, Bhaţţendurāja: na hi so ‘ntyaḥ kşaņaḥ sphuţadehāvasthānāt/ na hy asāv antyaḥ kşaņo ‘smadvivakşito bhavādŗśair lakşyate/ tatra tv antye kşaņe yenaiva rūpeņa bhavitavyaṃ tatsaṃskārasya dūravartino ‘pi deśakālavyavahitānām apy ānantaryam iti nyāyena prabodhena bhāvyam/ tadvāśāt tatsmaraņaṃ tatsmŗtyā tadbhāvaprāptiḥ, ‘That [moment] is not the [true] last moment, because it concerns clearly the body [only]; on the other hand, the last moment that we are concerned with is not the last moment that these gentlemen [who speak in this way] intend. Whatever be the form [of an experience] that was once present [to the mind], one must, at the final moment, apprehend [the presence of] root impressions (saṃskāra) [left] by that [experience], however distant [it might have been] — in accordance with the dictum (YS IV 9, not quoted in its entirety by AG) "even [things, viz., in the YS’s context, vāsanās] separated in space or time may exist in proximity". Thanks to these [root impressions], there is recollection of them; and in virtue of that recollection, one takes on the existence [indicated] by them’. Note that YS IV 9 reads: jātideśakālavyavahitānām apy ānantaryaṃ smŗtisaṃskārayor ekarūpatvāt. In translating the passage, we differ from Sharma, who does not recognize the quote from YS, and translates: ‘By last moment is not meant the moment of obvious physical demise. The last moment we wish to talk of is not of the kind seen by you all (on the outside). At that last moment, whatever (mental) form ought to be will come to be by the logic that even a remote impression (saṃskāra), even in the case of those obscured by time and space, will be regained on account of belonging to the innermost nature. Under its influence memory (will arise) and through that memory that (appropriate) condition will be attained’. AG completes his exposition by saying that these ‘traces’ (saṃskāra) — hidden — may cancel the ‘traces’ more in evidence left by the behavior of the dying man at his final moment — because they enjoy a status that is more irrevocable, having in virtue of their very acquisition put an end to the temporality and Particularity on which the chance behaviors listed above depend. It is for this reason that Kŗşņa recommends that one remember him always — there exist saṃskāras (tajjāḥ: those born of that — the identification with the divinity) that are able to cancel other saṃskāras hostile to them (anyasaṃskārapratibandhin, YS I 50), even if one is unconscious of them at the end; see also n. 1243 and 1244.1329 Or, be the ablative understood as an ablative of cause (according to an alternative interpretation of the corresponding passage in the commentary): ‘Therefore, even if he be afflicted with delusion at the hour of death, the knower of the Self does not cease [to be such], because his own Self is now known as ultimate reality (or, be svātmaparamārthāt understood as a TP, ‘because of the ultimacy of his own Self)’. In the commentary, be the compound prarūḍhacaitanyapratyavamarśasatattvāt analyzed as a TP, the translation would be: ‘[...] because his own Self is now known as ultimate reality, that is, because his essential nature is the developed awareness of his consciousness’.

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are concerned. Neither can the intelligence (buddhi) [in such cases] determine1331 the object as it is, nor the mind (manas) find a basis1332 [in the data offered by the senses], and even the ego (ahańkāra) remains then in the condition of a latency (saṃskāra) [emerging only] from time to time.1333

Similarly, loss of memory means the spiriting away of the content of an experience: [as when] one who is about to die is unable to recognize an object placed before him, though apprehended hundreds of times [previously], even when urged to do so by his relatives.

For this reason, the fact that he has once and for all become identical with the being of the [universe, or the Supreme Lord] [— hence, his ultimate salvation] is beyond [viz., is not dependent on] vedic recitations [made at the time of death];1334

nor do acts of liberality or anything else [done by relatives] in the final hours, like drawings on the sky, have any effect on his mind when it is in that condition [of identity] — but [if the relatives want to do them], there is no obstacle to doing so, inasmuch as they have been enjoined in the ritual texts.1335

[As for the compound, śvāsakalilatā, ‘choking’, lit., ‘confinement of breath’:] — by ‘breath’ (śvāsa) [is meant] ‘vital air (vāyu) [that remains] in the throat’; its ‘restriction’ (kalilatā) in the area of the throat [is exemplified by] such things as stammering and hiccuping.1336

Similarly, rupture in vital points means ‘disruption of the ligatures that bind the bones, etc.’.

And by particular diseases is meant ‘fever, dysentery, and the like’.Now, because of a disordering of the humors — wind, bile, phlegm — of that

body, which is nothing but a material sheath (bhūtakañcuka), the experiences1337

born of such modifications affecting the body are the experiences of suffering belonging to that body.

How, then, in what manner, could that [experience] not belong to the knower of the Self as well inasmuch as he is [still] associated with a body? It would indeed be [experienced]!

1330 pramoşa.1331 On adhyavasāya, ‘determination’ (or niścaya), as the function of the buddhi, see n. 401 and 591.1332 anavasthiti — the term anavasthiti suggests the regressus ad infinitum of the logicians; its use here, in a Sā khya-like context, suggests a ‘mind’ ṃ (manas) that ‘goes in circles’, not finding its normal basis in sense-perception.1333 The saṃskāras are not normally said to function in the absence of the sense-organs, of which they are the "root traces". What YR means here, probably, is that, deprived of the function of the sense-organs, nothing remains of the ahańkāra apart from traces previously accumulated, which, as traces, never rise to the level of consciousness of the dying person. On the respective functions of buddhi, manas and ahańkāra in the process of cognition, see PS 19.1334 brahmavidyākathana — lit., ‘recitation of the knowledge of brahman’. We have opted for the (otherwise unusual) syntactical linkage of vinā with the following term.1335 Lit, ‘such may be done merely for its ritual effectiveness (itikartavyatā), and has been so enjoined (iti niyogaḥ)’. The passage suggests that the recitations and the gifts at issue are those of relatives or others in attendance on the dying jīvanmukta, made in the hopes of easing his agony or of assuring him an easier passage.1336 The same symptoms are described in GAS VIII 7: śvāsāyāsa, hikkā, gadgada; cf. TĀ XXVIII 327b. See also YR ad PS 83.1337 bhoga — lit., ‘delights’.

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Therefore, because of [such objections], [the master has affirmed that] the knower of the Self — who [after all] has overcome the conceit that takes the body, etc., to be the Self and who has mastered the relationship between the Great Lord and his own Self1338 — does not lapse, that is, does not go to a condition different, from ultimate reality [experienced as] his own Self 1339— experience whose essential nature is the developed awareness that [he is nothing but] consciousness, even though there remains [at that moment] a connection with an ignorance born of the body that is itself generated by dying.

Since the knower of the Self, by whom the connection with the body has been cast aside, is not able to identify with experiences born of that body, he does not apprehend the moment immediately adjacent to the casting off of the body1340 [such as would be the case] if he were merely an ordinary man. This being so, no unprecedented consequence ensues for him, whose heart is located in the Self1341 and who has practiced devotion to the Lord as he carried on his activities in perfect health, via intentions that are self-formulated.1342

Therefore [we say that] the knower of the Self is liberated (mukta) at the very moment that his Self encompasses [the universe — svātmaprathā]; the modifications affecting the body no longer constitute for him any restraint — as has been already explained hundreds of times.

As for him who[se life] is composed of [choices between] piety or sin, and who ever confuses the body with the Self, how can he not come to identify with that body — for such identification arises from the experience of pleasure and pain and the like brought about by modifications affecting the body?

As it has been stated:

1338 Or ‘who has taken upon himself [a state of identity] with the Great Lord’. That is, leaving no room for any suspicion of difference.1339 Beyond the Self recognized as such, there is no further or more ultimate Real to be sought.1340 The meaning is perhaps that the dying jīvanmukta is no longer, in any case, in contact with the body at the moment when it gives signs of ceasing to function.1341 svasthahŗdaya.1342 svasaṃkalpitābhiprāyeņa — the acts, whether involuntary or not, of the dying jīvanmukta have no effect on him (that is, they do not produce any apūrva), for his thought is self-dependent: it is not open to any external influences.

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But when under dominance of goodness/1343 The body-bearing (soul) goes to dissolution,/1344 Then to the worlds of them that know the highest,/ The spotless (worlds), he attains.1345

The [three] qualities — sattva and so on — which are attributes of Nature, constitute a constraint only for him who has identified himself with them [viz., with the qualities].

From which it follows moreover that, concentrating with determination [on them] as separate from that [Self], the qualities [constitute] no [constraint] for him. Therefore, the path of the knower of the Self is altogether different [from the path of those who have identified themselves with the qualities].

On the other hand, fettered cognizers who have not seen the feet of a preceptor [viz., who have not approached him for instruction], misconstrue1346 the qualities that are proper to the [knower of the Self]. For instance, they might say: ‘If he is a jñānin, why does he experience [such sufferings], his body stricken with disease, etc.? Why does he [still] support [them]?’1347 Or, if he becomes inert at the time of death, they might say: ‘He doesn’t remember anything’.

Who is there who will question them, quarreling amongst themselves, since they are afflicted with such many-sided nescience? [Who is there who will say:] ‘Even if this fellow is a jñānin and now gives evidence of traces [produced] by properties of the body, how for all that would he be defiled?’1348

1343 See XIV 14: yadā samagreņaiva janmanānavaratasāttvika-vyāpārābhyāsāt sattvaṃ vivŗddhaṃ bhavati tadā prāptapralayasya śubhalokāvāptiḥ, ‘When sattva becomes predominant as a result of carrying on sāttvika practices ceaselessly throughout one’s entire life, then follows the attainment by the deceased of benign worlds’ (tr. Sharma). Note that at the end of his commentary on XIV 14, AG takes advantage of the verse to reassert his own interpretation of the moment of death: ye tu vyācakşate maraņakāla eva sattvādau vivŗddhe etāni phalānīti tena samyak śārīre ‘nubhave pravişţāḥ/ yataḥ sarvasyaiva sarvathāntye kşaņe moha evopajāyate/ asmadvyakhyāyāṃ ca saṃvādīnīmāni ślokāntarāņi. According to the fact that the text would read better with te instead of tena (tena being superfluous here), we modify Sharma’s translation: "Those who say that these results follow upon the predominance of sāttvika or other qualities only at the moment of death are (pre-)occupied with physical experience [i.e., they take a grossly physical view of the situation]. For in case of everyone always at the last moment delusion (moha) alone appears. In this commentary of ours there are other verses consistent with these ideas’. YR here, by quoting BhG XIV 14 in the same context, seems to agree with AG.1344 ‘He goes to dissolution’, i.e., ‘he dies’ (pralayaṃ maraņaṃ yāti) — so Śańkara.1345 BhG XIV 14. The BhG deals elaborately with the guņas in this chapter. This statement of the BhG assumes as its context jñāna: what is the siddhi attained through knowledge? According to Śańkara, the ‘knowers of the highest’ are the ‘knowers of such tattvas as mahat — i.e., brahman, etc’ (mahadāditattvavidām), the ‘immaculate worlds of the knowers of the highest’ may be understood as referring to intellection (buddhi) — immaculate because sattva is properly the guņa of buddhi. Note that, in the same context, TĀ XXVIII 326b gives a paraphrase of BhG XIV 14-15, which TĀV ad loc. quotes in its entirety.1346 anyatra āpādayanti — lit., ‘transfer elsewhere’. The normal meaning of the verb suggests an inopportune transfer that augments the delusion of those already deluded paśus.1347 Lit, ‘why does he wear, viz., put up with such suffering?’1348 The implication is that no one but the jñānin is able to ask such a question, and he is not in a position to do so.

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The self-illumination of him who knows the Self remains ever the illumination of the Self, though that illumination be variegated by this or that [external] condition.1349

There is further no interruption in the pure experience of his own Self through which his knowledge might [in that interruption be said to] perish.

Though in him the power of the six qualities1350 was complete, did not even Lord Vāsudeva, in his incarnation as Kŗşņa, experience the pain born of a hunter’s arrow’s wound, and did he not then abandon his material body? In this case, was there any cessation of the essential nature of the Lord of the universe?1351

Modifications affecting the body, from that of the insect to Sadāśiva are all of this sort; however, the latter [Sadāśiva] has a body composed solely of awareness of his own Self, whereas the former [the insect] has for its essence the conceit that the body, and so on, is the Self. So much is the difference [between gnat and God].

Thus the corporeal properties of the knower and of him who is not a knower (ajñānin) are perforce similar; but not for all that, is there any similarity of consequence.

Such a truth has been stated in the revered Gītā:One acts in conformity with his own/ Material nature,1352 — even the wise man;/1353 Beings follow (their own) nature;/ What will restraint accomplish?1354

1349 Cf. YR ad 93: nahi bhātam abhātaṃ syāt.1350 şāḍguņya — lit., ‘the state of being endowed with six qualities’. LT II 24-36 enumerates the six along with their definitions: 1) jñāna, ‘knowledge’, ‘omniscience’; 2) aiśvarya (II 28), ‘lordship’; 3) śakti (II 29), ‘ability’, ‘potency’ [‘to become the material cause of the world’: jagatprakŗtibhāva]; 4) bala (II 30), ‘strength’, i.e., ‘absence of fatigue (śramābhāva) in connection with the production of the world’; 5) vīrya (II 31-33), ‘virility’, i.e., ‘unaffectedness (vikāravihara) in spite of being the material cause’ [this is a condition, says LT II 31, not found within the world where ‘milk quickly loses its nature when curd comes into existence’]; 6) tejas (II 34), ‘splendor’, ‘might’, which is said to be ‘power to defeat others’ (parābhibhavanasāmarthya). For a detailed exposition of the concept of şāḍguņya, see Schrader (1973: 37-39). According to Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā VI 25: şāḍguņyavigrahaṃ devam and LT II 6: jñānādyāḥ şadguņā ere şādguņyaṃ mama tadvapuḥ, Schrader concludes: ‘In their totality the guņas make up the body of Vāsudeva [...] as well as of his consort Lakşmī. [...] It is mainly in this form, to wit as a person qualified by the six guņas and distinct from his Śakti, that God is called Vāsudeva’. As Schrader observes (p. 36): ‘The old dogma that God is necessarily "free from [the three] guņas" (nirguņa) does not exclude His possessing the six ‘deal guņas which, on the contrary, must be ascribed to Him, because without them there could be no "pure creation", and, all further evolution depending ad loc, no creation at all’.1351 The episode is narrated in MBh XVI 5, 19-20.1352 Such is the explanation of Śańkara: prakŗtir nāma pūrvakŗtadharmādharmādisaṃskārāḥ vartamānajanmādau abhivyaktāḥ sā prakŗtiḥ [according to the text published in the POS, p. 59], ‘prakŗti means the modifications [or perfectionings] (saṃskāra), such as piety and impiety, etc., acquired during past [lives] that become manifest in this present life’.1353 The explanation of Śańkara is as follows: jñānavān api kiṃ punar mūrkhaḥ, ‘Even a wise man [so acts] — what indeed will a fool [do]?’1354 BhG III 33. Commenting nigrahaḥ kiṃ karişyati, ‘What will restraint do here?’, Śańkara adds, putting these words in the mouth of Kŗşņa, mama vā anyasya, ‘ [What will restraint do here] from Me or anyone else?’ The impressions of merit and demerit shape the nature (prakŗti) of every being, therefore they are also prakŗti, and the individual self behaves in keeping with this. It is common to both, jñānin and ajñānin, even if the result is not the same: the jñanin is able to move against prakŗti and, determining his own course, to attain liberation, whereas the non-jñānin falls prey to his own prakŗti determined by his own saṃskāras. The quotation from the Gītā substantiates the first part of the statement: when

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Kārikā 96Now the master, explaining that the cause [of insight] is nothing but the marvelous1355

descent of [the Lord’s] supreme energy (paraśaktipāta), posits a difference of result in the process of perfectioning that attends upon the discipline of [acquiring] knowledge — which process may be instantaneous or progressive:1356

96. When [the yogin] accedes to this way of ultimate reality immediately, [upon instruction] from the mouth of the preceptor [himself],1357 then he becomes Śiva1358 without further obstacle, in virtue of a grace that is extremely forceful.

At the moment in which a person — [he can be] anyone at all for whom this birth is the last — accedes, that is to say, engages upon, this way of ultimate reality which has been explained [to him] hundreds of times already,1359 [after hearing the teaching directly] from the mouth of the preceptor, that is, of a most excellent instructor — namely, the method consisting of the secret transmission by word-of-mouth [that leads to] perfect knowledge of one’s own self (svātmasaṃbodha), and whose chief characteristic is complete autonomy ... 1360

... [that person] then, that is, at that very moment — immediately upon [receiving] the teaching of the preceptor,

[becomes] Śiva himself, without further obstacle.1361 As it has been stated in the Śrīkula:1362

there is a body, the logic of the body will be there, whether it is the body of the jñānin, or of the one who is not ajñānin; this body will have to undergo all its attributes, or conditions, and no intervention, from any side, will be able to do anything. As far as the body is concerned, no control is possible: one cannot make one’s body eternal. However, the situation is a different thing when it comes to consciousness, the perennial substratum of the transitory body. Trying to overcome both hatred and attachment, i.e., all kinds of saṃskāras, the jñānin is able to restrain, to control himself (it is the nigraha referred to in BhG), thus to transgress prakŗti — if not in the realm of differentiation, at least at the level of unity, when he strives for it — and to attain liberation. GAS ad III 33 explains this verse in a very clear way: yo ‘pi ca jñānī na tasya vyavahāre bhojanādau viparyāsaḥ kaścit/ api tu so ‘pi sattvādyucitam eva ceşţate evam eva jānan/ ato bhūtānāv pŗthivyādīnāṃ prakŗtau vilayaḥ ātmā cākartā nityamukta iti kasya janmādinigrahaḥ, ‘He also who is a knower of the Self will be in no way averse to such worldly activities as eating, etc. Rather he acts properly in accordance with the sattva, etc., (that predominates in him) and he knows that "after this the elements such as earth, etc., will dissolve in prakŗti, but the ātman, which is a non-agent [a ‘non-actor’, as translated by Sharma] (akartŗ), is eternally free". [Therefore] to whom applies the restraint from birth, etc.? [I.e., to whom apply the measures intended to check the process of rebirth, etc.? Not to the jñānin]’; Sharma understands differently kasya janmādinigrahaḥ: ‘Who is imprisonned in birth, etc.? [Not the man of knowledge.]’.1355 Or ‘marvelously variegated’, ‘variable’.1356 The question of variable grace has been taken up in kā. 9. From here, through kā. 102, YR develops kā. 9 elaborately, emphasizing its esoteric dimension.1357 Viz., merely on the strength of the preceptor’s teachings.1358 ... eva śiva = śiva eva.1359 Same terms — paramārthamārgam enam — and same gloss in PS 100 and YR ad loc.1360 Same phraseology in YR ad PS 87.1361 According to YR, eva is to be taken with śivaḥ rather than with nirvighnam, as in the kārikā.1362 Perhaps, the text referred to here is the Kularatnamālikā, that YR quotes ad 83, especially because immediate liberation is the issue in both passages (note that Wilson MS ad 83 reads śrīkularatnamālikāsāhasrika). Nevertheless Śrīkula can be the short form of a number of texts,

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He, O dear one, is instantly liberated, on whom the [guru who] knows the essence [of things, who knows the real] casts his glances, whether inadvertently,1363 or playfully, or even respectfully.

Now, one may ask: — ‘How might [the guru] initiate [his disciple] into a secret [teaching that involves a] verbal transmission of this sort?’1364

The master replies: ‘in virtue of a grace that is extremely forceful (atitīvra)’. In other words, extremely forceful, that is, harsh, is the descent (pāta) of the energy (śakti) of the Supreme Lord, its transfer (avataraņa) to the lotus heart of the fettered soul, which is [also] termed [the Lord’s] ‘favor’ (anugraha) — by which descent even the fettered soul becomes Śiva, that is, is liberated while he yet lives (jīvann eva muktaḥ), after hearing the teacher’s communication of that verbal tradition.

As copper is turned into gold by pouring mercury upon it [so is the fettered soul transformed into Śiva].1365

for instance: the Kulasāra, which ŚSV III 43 quotes after the Kularatnamālā, the Ku-lapañcāśikā, the Śrīkulaguhvara [°gahvara] quoted or referred to in TĀV III 170, 174, XXVV 13-16, XXXII 49-50b, the Śrīkulakrīḍāvatāra (TĀV XXIX 36-39), the Śrīkulakramodaya (TĀV XXIX 63), etc. Reference is made here to the kulācārya and to the way his sidelong-glances (kaţāksapāta) constitute an "initiation", which gives the disciple access to jīvanmukti; according to the PM, MM 66 alludes to the instantaneity of realization (and therefore of liberation) which the sidelong-glance of the guru brings forth. In effect, the PM quotes a verse from the Ratnamālā (which is also quoted in two places in TĀ XIII 230b-231a and XXXVII 29, although with variants: yantram for yatra, prakāśitam for prabhāşitam): yasmin kale tu guruņā nirvikalpaṃ prabhāşitam/ tadaiva kila mukto ‘sau yatra tişţhati kevalam’, and comments: ‘[—] gurukaţākşapātalakşaņāt [...] kşaņād eva’. Similarly, MM 67, whose subject-matter is jīvanmukti, refers explicitly to the ‘deśikakaţākşapāta’, that is, as explained in the PM, to the kulācāryakaţākşapāta’. The sidelong-glance of the kulācārya is that of Śiva himself, adds the PM, citing an Āgama: kulācāryam adhişţhāya devo dīkşayitā śivaḥ, ‘Taking up residence in the teacher of the Kula, the god is Siva in the form of him who confers initiation’. Same reference to the deśikakaţākşapāta in PM 58.1363 helayā — it is perhaps worth noting that B&R, for the "root" hel, refers the reader to the root krīḍ. Mayrhofer recognizes no such "verb" but, for helā (whose etymology, as a noun, has not been satisfactorily clarified), refers chiefly to derived forms found in the two epics — to which one might add those of B&R for helayā: ‘leichtsinniger Weise, mit Leichtigkeit, ohne sich irgend einen Zwang anzutun, ohne Weiteres, mir nichts dir nichts’, which capture a range of the term’s allusions, but weigh more heavily on the side of ‘absence of intention’, thus according well with the present passage. Those usages that tend toward ‘elegantly, gracefully’, etc., seem to be either contextual interpretations or late acceptations. The nominalized helā, found in the dramaturgical literature, seems rather a technical usage which extends a bit further the usual sense of the "adverbial" term (on that notion, see Bansat-Boudon 1991: 199-226). According to the dictionaries, it is only in such texts that the term is employed in its full nominal dress: the quasi-totality of non-dramatic citations is "adverbial" — our helayā; see also YR ad 98-99.1364 mukhāmnāya — the relevance of the objection appears to concern the sense to be attributed to the term āmnāya, which in normal usage presumes a long apprenticeship at the feet of the teacher — as in the case of learning the Veda, which requires eight years of daily study (note the borrowing of the term āhnika to designate the chapters of the TĀ itself), or learning Sanskrit grammar, which requires even more. YR seems eager to adduce that a verbal transmission of this sort is at issue, at least in the sense that the concluding "lesson’ is received directly from the mouth of the master.1365 In the alchemical traditions of Āyurveda and Tantrism, mercury (rasa or pārada), by undergoing a certain process, called pāradasaṃskāra (which includes eighteen modes of transformation — saṃskāra), is ultimately ‘perfected’ (siddha). In the present context,

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Now the purport of this is as follows: the acquisition of the knowledge of one’s own Self has for its unique means (upāyā) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as silent recitation, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord’s] power of causal constraint, are ineffectual as means.

Rather, in this case, the secret of the verbal tradition [received directly] from the mouth of the deity1366 attracts violently,1367 without delay, the heart of him whose heart1368 has been pierced by the energy of [the Lord’s] favor — thanks to which [reception] he becomes the Supreme Lord at once. Hence, the marvelous grace of the Supreme Lord should not be brought into question [or ‘inquired into’, ‘doubted’].

Kārikā 97As for the [aspirant] unto whom the [Lord’s] grace descends with middling, feeble, or very feeble intensity, etc., he too may acquire the condition of Śiva (śivatvā), when the body falls away, provided he has meditated (vimŗśat) on the words of the preceptor up until the moment of death in accordance with the stages of his discipline (yogakramā). Thus, the master now explains:

97. Identification with Śiva1369 is his [also] who accedes to the utterly transcendent state in graduated steps,1370 finally gaining familiarity with the ultimate principle.1371

mercury, which is celebrated at length as a means to acquire an enduring body, is also seen as a means of attaining the highest goal, liberation; see Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha IX, where, at the outset, it is explained that ‘mercury is called pārada, because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states’, and the citation, there, of the Rasasiddhānta: ‘One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore there is and must be life’. YR’s commentary alludes only to that tradition according to which this mercury, poured into melted copper, instantly tranforms it into gold. Yet, the more speculative dimension of the alchemical process, as developed in what the Rasasiddhānta calls the raseśvaradarśana, is also implicitly present.1366 In the Āgamas, the first person is normally reserved to the deity, or to a sage; the office of the guru is to transmit their teachings.1367 Here the way of haţhapāka, ‘forced maturation’, is referred to, which TĀ III 260-262 deals with elaborately.1368 The repetition is in the text itself, although it is not a strict case of "repetition" by Indian standards, for one instance of the word hŗdaya is a noun, whereas the other is part of an adjectival compound describing the acolyte (to be supplied).1369 śivamayībhāva — lit., ‘making oneself into Śiva’.1370 sopānapadakrameņa — Silburn translates: ‘gravissant pas ā pas l’echelle (des categories)’ [— ‘the ladder (of the categories)’], but, in her commentary, which takes into account YR’s, she understands that the reference here is to the cakras, which seems to be more correct. Also see her Intr., p. 45, in which she stresses that YR ad 97 alludes to the ‘seven stages’ of the kuņdalinī’s ascent. It appears, nevertheless, that YR enumerates eight of them.1371 On the linguistic application of the term rūdhi, see n. 1089. The mention of rūdhi in this odd context, as well as in the avat. to 98-99, may help to fix the sense of this problematic term. In effect, the problem the aspirant is deemed to face here is twofold: the words of the teacher have not induced in him a "sudden" insight (kā. 97) nor has that insight been, vouschafed to him as he confronts his final moments (kā. 98-99). The term rūdhi applies suitably in both contexts: the acolyte has not understood the "direct sense" of the teacher’s instruction, and that sense remains mysterious to him even at the moment of death. In both cases, what is missing is the rūḍhi— the ‘immediate apprehension’ that guarantees liberation; hence our translation by ‘familiarity’.

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Thus, as has been said,1372 for him who, because of the feeble descent of the [divine] energy, accedes to the utterly transcendent state, without having [at first] appropriated the teachings [of his master] regarding perfect knowledge (pūrņajñāna), that is, who comes [at length] to experience directly the state that is above all the principles ...

— But, interrupts an objector, how [is this possible]? The master says: ‘[It is done] in graduated steps’, that is, little-by-little: [his awareness is concentrated first] in the bulb, then in the navel, then in the heart, etc.

The steps (sopāna°) are these: the ‘bulb’ (kanda), the navel (nābhi), the heart (hŗd), the throat (kaņţha),1373 the soft palate (lampikā),1374 the ‘drop’ (bindu), the ‘resonance’ (nāda, or ‘phonation’) [through which] energy [progresses], that is to say, they are the stages (ārtha) for moving [the śakti] upwards;1375 [each] of them is a

1372 kila — see Emeneau 1969: 241ff.1373 nābhi, hŗd, kaņţha, are three of the six cakras — but should not be confused with the organs themselves. The ‘bulb’, kanda (or meḍhrakanda), also named guhyasthāna, the ‘secret place’, is the opening of the mūlādhāra (the ‘radical support’, the lowest of the cakras, at the base of the spine, in the area of the genitals, where the different nā īḍ s, or canals of vital energy, join). In fact, represented as a triangle in tantric accounts, the mūlādhāra may be turned downwards (then called adhovaktra, the ‘downwards opening’), or upwards, and called kanda. Located at the root of the sexual organ [Avalon says ‘between the genitals and the anus’] (i.e., five fingers below the navel, and two fingers above the membrum virile), near the anus, it allows the virile power to pass into the central channel; at that point, it is called trikoņa, the ‘triangular sanctuary’, inasmuch as it is made of the three divine śaktis: icchā, jñāna and kriyā. See Silburn 1983: 43.1374 Rather, lampikā (or lambikā, lit., ‘which hangs down’) is the uvula, the flexible extremity of the soft palate. It is also called tālu, or catuḥpada, for it is seen as the intersection of four ways, and, as such, symbolized by a lotus with four petals where the two ways of the ordinary external breath (one descending in the lungs, the other going up through the trachea) cross the two ways specific to the interiorized breath of the kuņḍalinī (one descending to the mūlādhāra, the other going up to the brahmarandhra). Described as located below the brahmarandhra, and turned toward the bhrūmadhya, the lampikā, as is the case with the lalāţa (in the middle of the forehead) or the triveņi (also situated at the level of the bhrūmadhya), is not a cakra. Rather it is a place where air gathers in such a way that breath changes its nature, and, becoming tenuous, is a source of peace and bliss. See Silburn 1983: 45, Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 274, Hugues 1997: 106-107, Sanderson 1986: 177-181.1375 bindu, nāda and śakti are included in the stages of ascent of the kuņḍalinī (see VBh 30, and its commentary which details this twelvefold process, in Silburn VBh: 81-82). Explicitly relating to the realm of phonic energy, the first two are also associated with a specific place in the subtle body, bindu, representing "mental" energy, is located in bhrūmadhyacakra, and nāda, representing conceptual thought, in the space which extends from lalāţa, in the middle of the forehead (the place for those subtle modulations of the phonic energy which are ardha-candra and nirodhinī, between bindu and nāda in the ascending movement), to the summit of the head, śakti (as a level of sound in the uccāra, viz., in the articulation of the mantra and the upward movement of phonic energy) is beyond the corporeal process, since the yogin has transcended the frame of the body at this stage. Through nāda, its unarticulated and almost imperceptible resonance (itself ending in nādānta, even more subtle, which resides higher, at the level of the brahmarandhracakra), that power of the mantra dissolves into śakti, Śiva’s Energy, which is its very source, and where some form of sonorous vibration remains. Then the dissolution of this sonorous vibration goes on, within śakti itself, with three more stages which are not referred to here, by YR, viz., vyāpinī, the ‘Pervading’, samanā, the ‘Conscious’, and unmanā, the ‘Transmental level’. On this entire process, see Padoux PTLvŗ: 83ff., and Sanderson 1986: 178-180 (from whom we borrow the translation of vyāpinī, samanā and

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state (°pada°) and [at the same time] an acquisition; [by going] from one [to another], by abandoning one and accepting another, there is sequence (°kramaḥ) —1376

... there is for this [kind of] yogin as well acquisition of the condition of Śiva 1377 on the occasion of abandoning his corporeal body,1378 to the extent that he has grasped the ultimate reality evolving1379 [within him] — [an acquisition] "by degrees".

Thus has been expounded the sequential procedure (kramayukti) [which too permits merging in the absolute].

Kārikās 98-99Should such familiarity1380 [with the object of his practice] not be acquired, even though the adept has practiced confidently the yoga of "stages" (kramayoga), then some obstacle to the attainment of his desired goal has intervened. And if death itself should intervene with his goal yet unattained, then ‘what will be the issue’? The master removes this apprehension:

98.But, it may at some time or other happen that for him [the "sequential" yogin], because of a pause1381 in the course of his practice, death intervenes

unmanā).1376 Thus, according to the commentary, kuņḍalinīyoga seems to be referred to in the kārikā (see also the avat. which speaks of yogakrama). Unless (though less probably) one is to understand that AG meant another ascent: perhaps from an inferior practice, such as the visualization of deities, to the superior one of the PT, as AG understood it, meditation on sounds, etc. (see PT: 265-266, where occurs the desiderative noun ārurukşuḥ, ‘the one who desires to ascend’). This process of the ascending kuņḍalinī is indissociable from the yogin’s ascent through successive levels of phonic energy, experienced in the articulation of a mantra (probably the parabīja __), as may be inferred from the similar passage of TĀ V 54b-62a); such is suggested by the reference to bindu, nāda and śakti. This ascent also coincides with the process of the reabsorption of the differentiated into pure consciousness (itself correlating with the cosmic reabsorption of the entire phenomenal manifestation). What is hinted at, here, is a complex and most elaborate practice involving the differentiated stages, up to the nābhi, of the āņavopāya, the ‘means, or way, of the finite soul’, and the śāktopāya, the ‘means, or way, of energy’, referring to the ascent of the subtle energy through five stages (hŗd, kaņţha, tālu, bhrūmadhya and lalāţa) before reaching the supreme phases that start from nāda (see Silburn VBh: 82). As stated above, PS 97 may be compared to TĀ V 56b-57a, not only because both passages use the term sopāna, but also because they appear to describe the same process. By enumerating bindu, nāda and śakti, YR’s commentary seems to echo TĀ V 56b-57a, where the kuņḍalinī, explicitly mentioned, is seen as ‘blossoming into a garland (mālikā) [of subtle energies] going, through successive stages, from bindu, in the middle of the eye-brows, to nādānta and śakti’. JR, explaining bhrūbindunādāntaśaktisopānamālikām, expounds the process more fully, adding the missing items, viz., nāda, vyāpinī and samanā: ‘The garland of [the subtle energies:] bindu, nāda, nādānta, śakti, vyāpinī and samanā, which are [considered as] degrees (sopāna), inasmuch as [the yogin] has recourse to ascending the steps higher and higher (ūrdhvordhvapadārohopāyatvāt)’.1377 Lit., ‘of a condition whose essence is Śivahood’.1378 Such a yogin will attain the complete liberation that is named videhamukti, only at death, for the body remains in some way a sheath for him. This explains the two concepts of jīvanmukti and videhamukti.1379 paramārthapraroha.1380 rūḍhi — see n. 1089 and 1371.1381 See YR ad loc. viśrānti — ‘pause’, ‘cessation’, sometimes understood positively (‘repose’), sometimes less so (‘rest’). Here it is to be taken neutrally, for, despite the commentary, the

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before he has gone to the extreme limit where ultimate reality is experienced,1382

though his heart yearns to reach the [highest] state.99.He, whom the Teaching1383 terms ‘fallen from discipline’, becomes in

consequence a lord of worlds full of wonderful enjoyments; then coming again into existence in a following birth, he will become Śiva,1384 thanks to the stage of progress achieved when he paused.1385

And so,because of a pause in the course [of his practice] means that, due to some

obstacle, [the adept] who practices yoga (yogabhyāsa) in progressive stages1386 has remained content with the experience acquired on one of the [lower] cakra-levels;

and, before he has gone to the extreme limit where ultimate reality is experienced means that he has not attained the state proposed [by his preceptor],

‘cessation’ of discipline may be either voluntary (as from laziness or premature satisfaction) or involuntary (as by lightning or sickness). The term, like many others in this tradition, has "poetic" overtones: the sense of fulfillment or completion that characterizes aesthetic experience (rasa); see Bansat-Boudon 1992.1382 Lit, ‘that extreme edge [of that which is] made of ultimate reality’. Silburn understands dhārā as the ‘culminating point’: ‘Mais celui qui s’arretant a mi-voie du recueillement n’accede pas au point culminant qui est la realite supreme [...]’.1383 śāstra — see n. 1390.1384 śivībhavati.1385 Cf. BhG VI 41-44, particularly 41: ‘Attaining the heavenly worlds of the doers of right,/ Dwelling there for endless years,/ In the house of pure and illustrious folk/ One that has fallen from discipline is born’, and BhG VI 43-44a: ‘There that association of mentality/ He obtains, which was his in his former body;/ And he strives from that point onward/ Unto perfection, son of Kuru (43).// For by the same former practice/ He is carried on even without his wish (44a)’. GAS VI 41 glosses ‘for endless years’ (śāśvatīḥ samāḥ) as ‘for three years of Vişņu’ (śāśvatasya vişņoḥ samāḥ — vaişņavāni trīni varşāņī)!1386 ullaṅghanakrameņa.

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which, above and beyond all the paths (adhvan),1387 has the form of the ultimate principle;

If, however, though his heart yearns to reach the [highest] state, that is, though eager to realize1388 the presence of ultimate reality, as taught [by his preceptor],

at some time or other, in the midst [of the process], an inopportune event1389 is seen to befall him, then, what will be his future course when the body falls away, [inasmuch as] he had not attained what was to be attained?

The master replies: ‘He [whom the Teaching terms] "fallen from discipline", etc.’.

He is, in the Teaching, that is, in the authoritative text,1390 termed or said to be ‘fallen from discipline’ (yogabhraşţa),1391 that is to say, he is one fallen, or swerving,1392 from the discipline [of realization] (yoga), from absorption (samādhi) [in the absolute] — or from both.

What sort of person, then, would he be?The master replies: ‘[A lord of worlds full] of wonderful [enjoyments], etc.’.When the body falls away, he becomes a lord (pati), a potentate (īśvara), in

worlds (bhuvana) that correspond to the levels [of meditation] attained when a pause [in his practice occurred] — worlds inhabited by the Lords of the tattvas

1387 The paths referred to here are the ‘six paths’, the şaḍadhvan — the six factors of differentiation, thanks to which the entire creation or manifestation begins. By reversing the process, they are also ways of returning to unity — a meaning that is underlined by the traditional etymology of the word, from the root ad, ‘to eat’; see TĀ VI 30: adhvā krameņa yātavye pade saṃprāptikāraņam/ dvaianāṃ bhogyabhāvāt tu prabuddhānāṃ yato ‘dyate, ‘ [The term] adhvan (‘route’) — given that the [final] state is to be reached in stages — here signifies the means of finally reaching [that state]; hence, because all things possessed of duality are [‘en route’] to be consumed [lit., ‘of the nature of something to be enjoyed’], [that ‘route’] is said to be ‘eaten’ by those who are enlightened’. TĀV ad loc. explains: yātavye pada iti śivatattvātmani/ bhedadaśāyāṃ hi tattattattvollańghanakrameņa şaţtriṃśaṃ śivatattvaṃ prāpyatvenoktam/ bhogyabhāvād ity adanīyatvāt/ adhigatasaṃvittattvā hi sarvaṃ svātmasātkurvantīti bhāvaḥ/ tenādhvaivādhvā, adyata ityadhvā ceti, ‘By "a place to be gone to" he means [the final stage of the discipline] invested with the Siva-principle. Indeed, it has been said that the thirty-sixth principle, Śiva, is to be approached gradually by proceeding [upwards] from principle to principle — it being obvious that the condition of difference [then prevails]. By "for it is of the nature of something to be enjoyed" he means that it is fit to be eaten. The meaning is that those who have approached [or mastered] the principle of pure consciousness (saṃvittattva) [the 36th] have transformed everything into their own self [have "eaten" everything]; such is the meaning. Thus by "path" is here meant either "path" [simply, viz., the process], or "what is [to be] eaten, or consumed" [viz., the result — for in progressing toward the śivatattva, the route may also be said to be "eaten, or consumed" ‘. See n. 441.1388 āsādana — viz., ‘bring himself into’.1389 vipatti = maraņa, in the kā.1390 Thus is śāstra glossed as āgamagrantha. It seems likely that the ‘śāstra’ referred to here is the Bhagavadgītā, especially its sixth chapter, which deals with the nature of yoga. A discussion of the yogabhraşţa and his fate occurs there as well (see, in n. 1385, BhG VI 37-45, esp., v. 41, which is to be compared with PS 98-102). Even YR’s question: ka gatiḥ echoes that of Arjuna to Kŗşņa, at the outset of the passage: kāṃ gatiṃ gacchati. Furthermore, in the commentary to kā. 102, below, YR explicitly quotes its first and last verses. See also ĀPS 85b (= PS 101b): bhuvaneşu sarvadevair yogabhraşţas tathā pūjyaḥ.1391 Or ‘from [the path of] yoga’.1392 Cf. BhG VI 37: yogāc calitamānasaḥ, he ‘whose mind falls away from discipline’.

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(tattveśvara), and which abound in wonderful enjoyments,1393 that is, in various marvels, such as women, food, beverages, garlands, garments, anointments, songs, music, etc. — in other words, immediately after dying, he is associated with these divine delights.

Again, once his entitlement to such delights is exhausted, how would he fare, who had fallen from discipline? [That is, what happens then to

The master replies: ‘[Thanks to the stage (of progress) achieved] when he paused, etc.’.

Now, by stage [of progress] achieved when he paused, is meant the place, [for example, one of the cakras, the] kanda, etc., [at which his meditation was interrupted];thanks to that [stage, means], thanks to its power of awakening root impressions

[that were occasioned] as he exercised himself in that [place wherein a pause occurred],

he, coming [again] into existence in a following birth, viz., the next birth — that is, having acquired another fit body suitable for yogic practice in this world of transmigration,

and, after much effort, having taken possession [again] of the yoga he had previously practiced,

easily1394 rises to1395 the [highest] state [wherein is experienced] ultimate reality — which was his goal in his previous life — and, when his body falls away, becomes Śiva himself.1396

Kārikās 100-101Now, when the body falls away, what is the [future] course of [the adept] who, though he practices [yogic] discipline [assiduously], finds no repose [viz., satisfaction], be it only a little [viz., ‘even slight’], in any part [of the discipline], due to unsteadiness of mind (manaścāñcalya) — yet [despite this] retains faith in the discipline itself?1397 To this concern, the master replies as follows:

1393 Or ‘where each world exhibits, in principle (°pradhāna), an enjoyment proper to itself, such as that of women, of food [...], etc.’.1394 helayā; cf. n. 1363.1395 Lit., ‘mounts upon’.1396 śiva eva bhavati. His practice has lasted for two lives.1397 In the preceding verses (98-99) are treated two types of "failed" aspirants — both failures signaled by a ‘viśrānti’ in the discipline. Either the aspirant has found a ‘satisfaction’ (viśrānti) in some lower stage of the discipline (or presumably even outside it) that ‘stops’ him prematurely, or some unforeseen obstacle has intervened to give his practice pause (viśrānti) before it culminates — leaving him ‘blocked’ at an intermediate stage. In these kārikās (100-101), the final possibility is confronted — that even this last ‘satisfaction’ (viśrānti) is not vouchsafed to the aspirant: though he has pursued his practice assiduously and tirelessly, no ‘pause’ of any sort is accorded him before his demise. The sense of this puzzling term — viśrānti — is thus made clearer by AG’s treatment here. The last possibility alludes perhaps to the case of the less-than-able student, destined to remain a ‘failure’ (in the present birth at least), determined though he may be. To him may be offered only the hope of ‘pleasurable worlds’ as a reward, a kind of booby prize, no doubt — a prize, perhaps, that shows also the inroads made by the bhakti tradition even in those traditions that would seem to have no place for easy devotion. Here as well, selfless faith has found its reward. Cf. BhG VI 34: cañcalaṃ hi manaḥ, and 37, where Arjuna enquires about the unsuccessful yogin who is yet

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100.But, as for [the adept] who, though practicing this path of ultimate reality,1398 does not attain true discipline, he will yet with delighted mind rejoice at length, partaking of the pleasures of the worlds of the gods.

101.Just as a monarch who rules over the entire earth is venerated by all people in his domains, so is he who has fallen from discipline venerated by all the gods in their worlds.1399

Although he practices this path, whose essence is knowledge of his [true] Self, that has been explained [to him] hundreds of times, that is, though he devotes [himself to that practice] with faith and devotion,

— should he die in the midst of life without attaining the repose that is the mark of yoga proper, due to the circularity1400 of mental faults [such as inattention, anger, etc.],1401

— then he, [whom we term] ‘fallen from discipline’, partakes of the pleasures of the worlds of the gods, his mind rejoicing; there he remains joyful for a long time, thanks to the force of his devotion, which to him is a favor, and the faith that had grown strong in him regarding [the efficacity of] the discipline leading to [final] insight; he is venerated by the gods themselves in their worlds, that is, in their respective abodes.

To whom is he comparable?The master replies: to ‘[... him who rules over] the entire [earth]’.Just as a monarch who rules over the entire earth, that is, a universal emperor,

lord of the seven continents, is venerated, shown respect by all people in his domains, in his various territories,

so likewise is he praised even by the gods, saying: ‘By us is he to be revered, for his [next] birth will be his last;1402 [indeed] he has cultivated nothing but dispassion [in this life]; merits and demerits have ceased to be for him objects [of experience]. It is he [after all] whose striving in a previous life was motivated by a desire to know regarding his own Self. This is the purport.1403

Kārikā 102What will be his future course after his entitlement to experience the pleasures of other worlds terminates? Replying to this question, the master says:

Possessed of faith (śraddhayopetaḥ).1398 mārga — scil ‘met-hodos’, ‘method’; see YR ad 18 and PS 96.1399 Cf. ĀPS 84-85: paramārthamārgasādhanam ārabhyāprāpya yogam api nāma/ suralokabhogabhogī muditamanā modate suciram// vişayeşu sarvabhaumaḥ sarvajanaiḥ pūjyate yathā rājā/ bhuvaneşu sarvadevair yogabhraşţas tathā pūjyaḥ//, from which PS 101-102 borrows almost verbatim.1400 anavasthāna — lit., ‘absence of basis’.1401 That is, the more one submits to their influence, the more they constitute obstacles to the yogin’s progress. Or ‘due to the absence of basis [of his practice, caused by] faults of the mind’.1402 In YR ad 96, the same compound appears in the context of the jīvanmukta and has been translated accordingly ‘of whom this birth is the last’.1403 The explanatory order of the commentary is here reversed. It seems that the clause: ‘surair api bhuvaneşu nijanijasthāņeşu pūjyo bhavati’, which precedes the question: ‘To whom is he comparable?’, is to be taken as a resume of what follows, which is in fact the gloss of the final portion of the kārikā; this detailed explanation then closes with iti yāvat, indicating that it is "another" way to interpret the resume.

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102. He reaches again the human condition after a considerable time and, then, by practicing [anew] his discipline, he attains [finally] divine immortality — from which state he does not return.1404

Having enjoyed the delights available in the divine worlds as just described, after a very long time, he who has fallen from discipline obtains, on the dissolution of his body, divine immortality (divyam amŗtam), which is of the nature of the ultimate principle.1405

[This happy result following ineluctably ...]— once he returns to the human condition in this world of transmigration, that is,— once he acquires [again] a body fit for the realization of yogic practice,

1404 Cf. ĀPS 86: mahatā kālena mahān mānuşyaṃ prāpya yogam abhyasya/ prāpnoti divyam amŗtaṃ yat tat paramaṃ padaṃ vişņoḥ/, and BhG VI 45, which, developped by our verses 100-102, is quoted below by YR at the end of his gloss on 102: prayatnād yatamānas tu yogī saṃśuddhakilbişaḥ/ anekajanmasaṃsiddhas tato yāti parāṃ gatim//, ‘But striving zealously,/ With sins cleansed, the disciplined man,/ Perfected thru many rebirths,/ Then (finally) goes to the highest goal’.1405 In our text, the words divyam amŗtam, ‘divine immortality’ (qualified in the text of Ādiśeşa by paramaṃ padaṃ vişņoḥ) constitute a problem in the sense that they could be interpreted in a dualistic manner, as referring to some divine paradise, akin to our ‘Elysian Fields’ where the departed are indeed happy, but from which they must return eventually — as observes the avat. to PS 102 about the ‘divine worlds’ (suraloka) of kā. 101: ‘after one’s entitlement to [experience] the pleasures of other worlds terminates’. The words might also refer to a notion of liberation comparable to that of Rāmānuja, who considers mukti to be a devotee s residence without end in the proximity of the Lord — a notion more in conformity with the requirements of bhakti — where the idea of an ‘identification’ with the Lord is seen rather as arrogance or lese-majeste. The very notion of bhakti or devotional fervor seems to require an object worthy of that fervor — which is evidently not the devotee. Such an interpretation, where ‘residence’ occupies the place of ‘liberation’, might hold in the case of the first PS, strongly colored by Vaişņava devotionalism (though even this interpretation is debatable), but it cannot be held in the context of the second PS, strongly nondualist. The substitution, by the second PS, of yasmād āvartate na punaḥ for yat tat paramaṃ padaṃ vişņoḥ of the first (ĀPS 86) is well conceived for dispelling the ambiguity introduced by divyam amŗtam. YR’s commentary, as well as the organization of the textual ensemble of kā. 97-102, leaves little room for doubt as to the interpretation of what is intended by these words. This ‘divine immortality from which one does not return’ is a periphrasis, unusual indeed, for ‘liberation’. We have seen that kā. 100-102 evoke a type of inferior ascetic ‘fallen from discipline’ (yogabhraşţa), whose practice is entirely unsatifactory. To him, whose aspiration to achieve liberation in this life has failed, is ascribed delightful (and lengthier) residence in ‘divine worlds’ (kā. 100-101); he is then reborn, takes up the practice of yoga where he had left it, and is ‘freed’ at the end of his second life, without however experiencing jīvanmukti (kā. 102). Similarly, YR observes that ‘divine immortality’ (divyam amŗtam), is ‘of the nature of the supreme principle’, and concludes by citing the Gītā (VI 45): ‘perfected thru many rebirths,/ [he] Then (finally) goes to the highest goal’. Thus kā. 103 may fairly end by assuring the devotee that he will reach the ‘condition of Śiva’ (śivatva), that is, ‘liberation’, designated in the commentary of YR ad loc. by terms such as prakŗşţamukti, śreyas, paraśreyas, and paramapuruşārtha. As well, it is noteworthy that kā. 103 summarizes kā. 97-102. Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 (quoted n. 1062), where the adjective ‘immortal’ (amŗta) has been interpreted by Śańkara as designating a state of jīvanmukti. Cf. also BĀU IV 4, 8, understood by Radhakrishnan in the light of Ś ad loc: tena dhīrā apiyanti brahmavidaḥ svargaṃ lokam ita ūrdhvaṃ vimuktāḥ//, ‘By it, the wise, the knowers of Brahman go up to the heavenly world after the fall of this body [Ś: itaḥ: asmāc charīrapātāt], being freed (even while living) [Ś: jīvanta eva vimuktāḥ santaḥ]’, and Ś’s exegesis of svargaṃ lokaṃ: apiyanti apigacchanti brahmavidyāphalaṃ mokşaṃ

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— [and starts] cultivating [again] that yoga, constantly practicing it1406— a discipline that was difficult to acquire in his previous lives due to unsteadiness of mind, but which is now [acquired] effortlessly, [re] awakened thanks to root impressions [bringing to the fore] latent dispositions that were produced by the discipline previously cultivated, which had grown strong through the faith and devotion he had previously given evidence of.1407

In other words, he becomes unshakable in [his attachment to] the ultimate principle.1408 For this very reason, there is thence, for him, no return.1409

Even a bit of reflection on the important and auspicious subject which is that of Self-knowledge tends not to the perpetuation of the round of existences.

As has been said in the revered Gītā:In it there is no loss of a start once made,/ Nor does any reverse1410 occur;/ Even a little of this duty/ Saves from great danger.1411

And one should [also] remember the text, recorded by the Sage [Vyāsa], that starts from the question:

An unsuccessful striver who is endowed with faith,/ Whose mind falls away from discipline/1412 Without attaining perfection of discipline,/ [To what goal does he go, Kŗşņa?]1413

and ends with the answer:

svargaṃ lokam/ svargalokaśabdaḥ trivişţapavācyapi san iha prakaraņāt mokşābhidhāyakaḥ/ itaḥ asmāc charīrapātāt ūrdhvaṃ jīvanta eva vimuktāḥ santaḥ/,’[...] they go to the heavenly sphere, or liberation, which is the result of the knowledge of Brahman — ‘Heavenly sphere’ generally means heaven, the abode of gods, but here from the context it means liberation — after the fall of this body, being freed even while living’ (tr. Swāmī Mādhavānanda).1406 YR does not comment samabhyasya (=abhyasya of the kā.).1407 Cf. a similar phraseology in YR ad 103, obviously inherited from BhG, especially VI 37, which YR quotes, below, at the end of the passage.1408 Lit., ‘he goes to a condition of unshakability with respect to the essence of the ultimate [principle]’.1409 Cf. BhG VIII 21: yaṃ prāpya na nivartante, and XV 6b: yad gatvā na nivartante. 1410 The allusion is medical: medicine may sometimes cure, sometimes not; such inconsequences do not affect the path of karmayoga, the ‘yoga of action’, which, according to Śańkara, means ‘the performance of actions [rites and duties] with detachment after destroying the pairs of opposites, with the intention of adoring God’ (niḥsańgatayā dvaṃdvaprahāņapūrvakam īśvararādhanārthe karmayoge karmānuşţhāne). Also Śańkara: kiṃ ca nāpi cikitsāvat pratyavāyo vidyate: ‘Nor does any contrariety result, as happens in therapy’. Same argument in YR ad PS 103. GAS II 40 offers another image: yathā ca parimitena śrīkhaņḍakaņena jvālāyamāno ‘pi tailakaţāhaḥ sadyaḥ śīto bhavati evam anayāpi svalpayā yogabuddhyā mahābhayaṃ saṃsārarūpaṃ vinaśyate/, ‘Just as a burning pan of oil immediately cools down with [the application of] a small amount of sandal-paste, even so the great terror of saṃsāra is destroyed even by a small bit of Yogic doctrine’ (tr. Sharma, who does not translate ‘mahā’ of mahābhaya).1411 BhG II 40. Cf. the commentary of Śańkara: mahato bhayāt saṃsārabhayāj janmamaraņādilakşaņāt, ‘The great fear, i.e., the fear proper to that world of transmigration characterized by birth, death, etc.’. Same verse quoted in ĪPV I 1, vol. I: 31.1412 Śańkara comments: antakāle ca yogāc calitaṃ mānasaṃ mano yasya sa calitamānaso bhraşţasmŗtiḥ, where calitamānasaḥ is explained as bhraşţasmŗtiḥ, ‘whose memory/consciousness has been lost’. This explanation may take us back to the argument discussed in the commentary ad kā. 94-95.1413 BhG VI 37.

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... Perfected thru many rebirths,/1414 Then (finally) goes to the highest goal.1415

Kārikā 103The master now explains that those whose hearts have been softened by reflection (viveka) should be wholly attentive to the cessation of birth and death, inasmuch as the excess of glory (vibhūti) attaching to one who has even slightly been touched by the ordered discipline leading to [final] insight is so great as to be indescribable:

103. This being the case, [the adept] should bend every possible effort toward that ultimate goal, thinking that whosoever is deeply engaged in this right path [to liberation] reaches the condition of Śiva.1416

Because, in this way, the practice of reflecting (pratyavamarśa) on one’s own Self, thanks to the method just explained, [itself involves] obtaining the highest result,1417

therefore it is shown, by the words ‘whosoever engages in this very beautiful path’ — that is, in the path leading to the most excellent [form of] liberation (prakŗşţamukti) — that there is no restriction of qualification [on such practice].1418

Now, by whosoever is deeply engaged is intended anyone who, stricken with the countless afflictions of birth, death, disease, etc., delights fully in that path with a discerning mind — who is therein immersed, placing there his entire faith.1419

Such a man, very soon, that is, without delay, reaches the condition of Śiva,1420

that is, he attains to that goal that has no goal beyond it1421 within [the confines of] a single birth after having shaken off all the afflictions of this world of transmigration.

As has been stated in the teaching entitled Śivadharmottara:1422

1414 According to BhGBh VI 45, ‘perfected’ or ‘accomplished’ (samsiddhaḥ) means ‘he by whom perfect insight has been attained’ (labdhasamyagdarśanaḥ), through the accumulated saṃskāras: [...] anekeşu janmasu kiṃcitkiṃcitsaṃskārajātam upacitya tenopacitenānekajanmakŗtena saṃsiddhaḥ [...] labdhasamyagdarśanaḥ/,’[...] Accumulating little by little in many births a homogenous mass of root impressions, he is [finally] accomplished (saṃsiddhaḥ) through that totality [viz., those root impressions], acquired in many births [...], that is, he attains perfect insight’.1415 BhG VI 45. Commenting on this, AG emphasizes that the verse refers to the ‘yogabhraşţa exclusively devoted to God’ (yasyānanyavyāpāratayā bhagavadvyāpārārmrāgitvaṃ sa yogabhraşţa iti), who has to practice yoga through several lives before being liberated, and that this liberation takes place only after the dissolution of his body: na cāsau tenaiva dehena siddha iti mantavyam/ api tu bahūni janmāni tena tadabhyastam iti mantavyam//, ‘He is not perfected [viz., he does not attain realization, or liberation] in that very body; this ought to be noted. And it should be also noted that he has practiced that [yoga] through several births’.1416 Note that, inadvertently, this kārikā has been omitted in Silburn’s translation.1417 The compound uttamaphalalābhaḥ is taken as an appositional predicate (a KD) of the subject svātmapratyavamarśābhyāsaḥ.1418 That is, such practice is subject to no prerequisites, such as the prior qualifications, whether ritual or social, that condition the sacrificer’s ‘authority’ (adhikāra) to perform the sacrifice.1419 This passage is doubtless intended to echo the portrait of the disciple who comes to question Ādhāra that is sketched in kā. 2-3.1420 śivatvam eti.1421 paraśreyas — the terms paraśreyas (also YR ad 105) or niḥśreyas (YR ad 104) appear to contain, as it were, the memory of an historical evolution, whereby the notion of mokşa replaced (or complemented) the śreyas of the ritualists; taken literally, paraśreyas means ‘that which is beyond, or exceeds, śreyas’.

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Here is expounded the liberation that takes place within the span of one life [only]. Let it be examined [first]! [But, if that fails,] what prevents you from attaining the liberation that takes place within the span of several lives?

Thinking that such is the case, that is, reflecting on it (vimŗśya) [viz., reflecting on the promise that whosoever engages in this path reaches the condition of Śiva], he should strive in whatever way possible, by every possible means, to reach that ultimate goal (paramārtha), that is, he should make this preeminently his effort.

Keeping in mind [the maxim]: ‘The effort done for the highest [objective], [always] brings [highest] fruit’,1423 not the slightest pride need be presumed [on the part of the adept] in this matter.

Hence, if the formation of one’s own self[-awareness] is perfected by practicing the discipline, then the desired [goal] of ours [i.e., liberation] is attained [in this birth]; if not, the attainment of other divine worlds [is ours].

And, once he returns therefrom, he takes up again the discipline, on the strength of the awakening in him of the latent dispositions left by the discipline previously practiced.1424

Thus, no hindrance of any sort afflicts the practitioner [of yoga] as a result of engaging with determination in the path leading to the ultimate goal.1425

And not the slightest pride need be presumed on the part of the one who devotes himself to the attainment of the ultimate human goal (paramapuruşārtha). Let it be auspicious.1426

Kārikā 104The author of the treatise1427 [here commented upon, viz., Abhinavagupta] has in this way expounded, in accordance with the system of nondualistic Śaivism, the teachings

1422 Referred to, here, as a ‘śastra’, the text has not been edited, but has survived in several MSS; see e.g. Goodall 1998: 375-376 (n. 616), 421; Sanderson 2004: 406 and passim. It belongs to the Śivadharma corpus, whose affiliation is that of a ‘laukika’ Śaivism, which preaches ‘devotion to Śiva for pious laity’ (Goodall 1998: 376, n. 616; Sanderson 2004: 231). We are indebted to D. Goodall for the communication of Śivadharmottara X 26-30a, from 2 MSS: Cambridge Add. 1645 (dated 1136 AD (saṃvat 256); palm-leaf, early Newari script) and a paper transcript in Devanāgarī, IFP, T. 510. Here, YR’s quote agrees with the MSS for the second hemistich (X 30a), but the first hemistich does not correspond verbatim with what precedes in 1645, namely, jijñāsyatām iyatāvan muktir ekena janmanā/ yadi nāma na muktiḥ syād ekenaivātra janmanā// X 29 — from which one could infer that there could have been two different recensions of the text.1423 Mahābhāşya (paspaśāhnika) which reads: pradhāne kŗto yatnaḥ phalavān bhavati. The issue, for Patañjali, is that of interpreting the injunction to study the Veda ‘along with its ancillaries’ (yedāńga) that is incumbent on any brahmin. According to Patañjali, that means, first and foremost, ‘along with grammar (vyākaraņa)’, for this is the most important (pradhāna) among the six vedāńgas, and by studying it without delay, one arrives more quickly at the desired goal. See also BhG VI 40: na hi kalyāņakŗt kaścid durgatiṃ tāta gacchati//, ‘For no doer of the right/ Comes to a bad end, my friend’.1424 Cf. YR ad 102.1425 śreyas — for a similar statement, see YR’s commentary ad 102.1426 iti śivam — the formula signals that kā. 103 is a sort of praśāsti. Compare the similar promises found in the epic and purāņic literature promising success to those who hear even a single word. The text thus magnifies its own efficacy.1427 śāstrakāra.

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on the essence of ultimate reality (paramārthasāra)1428 [first] uttered by the revered Śeşa, with the aid of argumentation, experience and scripture;1429 he now proceeds to sum up the purpose of the text, indicating that ‘it alone is the teaching that serves as means for realizing the highest among the goals of [human] life’ — subscribing here his own name with no other goal [in mind] than that of expressing his own delight:1430

104. To him who meditates on this transcendental brahman, as concisely expounded by Abhinavagupta,1431 Śivahood comes without delay, once it has pervaded1432 his own heart.1433

This transcendental, or most excellent, brahman, which has been explained as ‘that which expands that which is unfolding’1434 is [so called] because [of its inherent

1428 Or ‘has set forth the [ensemble of] instructions known as the Paramārthasāra’.1429 See the avat. to PS 8 and 10-11.1430 Probably a pun is intended: the line may also be read expressing the delight proper to his [absolute] Self. The teacher seeks no glory, power nor wealth; like a Bodhisattva, he delights only in the benefit others may derive from his teaching. Not only has he passed on the secret knowledge to someone qualified, but his teaching serves to express his obeisance at the feet of Śiva.1431 Or, by punning on Abhinavagupta’s name: ‘To him who meditates on the transcendental brahman in reference to which a concise summary has been stated [in such a way that such a brahman is now understood as something] quite novel (abhinava), and [heretofore] hidden (gupta) [...]’.1432 nijahŗdayāveśam — this āveśam is doubtless to be taken as a gerund of type ņamul, which often appears in composition with its direct object, as here (see Whitney 1983: §995c, Renou 1968: §§104-105). The gloss āviśya indicates this as well, and the fact that YR does not take āveśam as the direct object of the verb. He also prefaces his gloss of nijahŗdayāveśam with the adverb katham, implying a circumstantial function of the compound. The ņamul is generally employed, as Renou observes, in order to emphasize ‘la rapidite du proces’ — which suits very well here the sense of the kārikā: acirād eva [...]. We differ therefore from other translators, who apparently understand āveśam as an accusative; cf. Barnett: ‘The being of Siva speedily comes to penetrate the very heart of him who meditates [...]’; Silburn: ‘Lorsqu’il medite [...], avant peu la nature de Śiva penetrera dans son propre cœur’; B. N. Pandit: ‘An aspirant who Meditates [...] attains quickly a samāveśa of Śivahood in his heart’; Pelissero: ‘La condizione d’identita con Śiva penetra velocemente nell’intimo del cuore di chi mediti [...]’. The ‘kŗtvā’ feat follows in the commentary the pratikā (nijahŗdayāveśam) is a gloss intended to flag the odd gerund; it functions thus as a parenthesis, to note that a noun is not at issue, that is, as a grammatical notation of the usage itself.1433 That is, his core consciousness. The kārikā is somewhat puzzling in its construction, and in construing it, we have followed the commentary. The participle dhyāyataḥ is best understood as a genitivus commodi, which implies the ellipsis of the object, for, according to YR, śivatvam (as subject) ‘comes to’ him who meditates (requiring an accusative in Sanskrit); such śivatvam is not ‘his’ (genitive); see Renou 1968: §222E. This is probably why the object of abhyeti is not mentioned — being clearly, by a sort of ūha, understood as the underlying subject of the participle. The construction śivatvam ... abhyeti invites normally the reverse parsing: ‘goes to Śivahood’ (see previous kā.: ... eti sa śivatvam). Abhinavagupta may have changed this on purpose, for two reasons. First, to show that Śivahood is produced by itself, and that the meditating subject does not need to act any further. Second, the structure of the whole sentence may avoid the subject/object relation deliberately, to express in grammatical terms that such dichotomy cannot characterize the relation of one’s self and Śivahood. The Self is Śiva, and, accordingly, the sentence has only a subject, without any object.1434 The translation reflects one of the several possible constructions of this first line of the commentary — one that goes somewhat against expectations, prathamānam is not taken as the incipit of a gloss of idam (which would then refer at least indirectly to ‘this’ world,

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tendency to] grow [or to strengthen] and is [thus] composed of utterly complete bliss (paripūrņānanda), being of the nature of one’s own Self.

Now, to the person who meditates on that [brahman], who is able to reflect (pratyavamŗśat) effortlessly on his own Self, Śivahood comes without delay, that is, speedily, not after numerous births, [for] he has become brahman already in the way mentioned. [This means that for him] the ultimate goal1435 is [now] attainable.

How [does Śivahood come to him]? [Śivahood comes to him ...]... once it has pervaded his own heart, once it has entered into his own heart, the

very locus of self-awareness {parāmarśa).1436

What sort of brahman is this?It is like unto [that brahman], in reference to which a concise summary

(saṃkşepa) containing the essential purport (tātparya) [of our doctrine] has been stated, and explained, by Abhinavagupta, whose name is to be mentioned with reverence [i.e., celebrated].1437

And this also may have been intimated [by the author], on the pretext of mentioning his name: ‘It is like unto that brahman in reference to which a concise summary has [here] been stated, or revealed, in such a way that the exceeding secret of that transcendental brahman, is [now understood as something] quite novel (abhinava), never before seen by others, and [heretofore] hidden (gupta), concealed, as it were [from others]’.

And in making this known in this way, the difficulty of access of the teaching is set forth [by the master].

Kārikā 105Mentioning the size of the text, the master declares his authorship in respect of this manual:1438

105. Thus, the supremely recondite core of the teaching has now been condensed in one hundred āryā-verses by me, Abhinavagupta, illumined by remembrance of Śiva’s feet.

This core of the teaching (śāstrasāra), that is, that essence (satattva) spread throughout numerous texts, has been condensed by me; that is, has been stated [by Abhinavagupta] after having mastered it himself, within the small span of a hundred verses, though it can hardly be explained in a thousand texts. By this is stated [as well] the resourcefulness [of the author’s] luminous consciousness (pratibhā).

The pronoun ‘me’ [in the phrase ‘by me’] is how qualified?[The person referred to is said to be] ‘illumined [viz., inspired] by remembrance

of Śiva’s feet’.[This compound is to be analyzed as follows:]... illumined means ‘resplendent with the marvelous experience of supreme

ipseity’; [by what is he illumined?]

brahman in its ‘extended’ form), but is simply an unglossed quotation of the idam of the kārikā, pointing to brahman itself. The relative clause terminating in yat is thus in effect the "gloss" of brahman, ‘which has been previously expounded as "having expanded" (vitatya) that which "is expanded" (prathamānam)’ — the visible world.1435 Or ‘uitimate felicity’ (niḥśreyas).1436 On the syntactical construction, see n. 1432.1437 Same expression in YR ad 105; see also YR ad 2-3.1438 prakaraņa — see n. 276.

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... by remembrance (smaraņa) — that is, with constant awareness (nibhālana) when perceiving such [external] objects as sound, etc., never, at any moment, being deprived of the experience of his own Self (svānubhava); [by remembrance of what?]

... of the feet, that is, the rays of consciousness1439 [that are]

... of Śiva, [appropriation of] whose nature is [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal, who reposes in one’s own self (svātmastha), who is solely formed of blissful consciousness (cidānandaikamūrti).

Hence is the [master’s] name to be celebrated.Otherwise [viz., if not to Abhinavagupta — that is, if his name had not been

mentioned], could authority and authorship in a teaching such as this [of limited] size, on ultimate reality (mahārtha),1440 be reasonably attributed to anyone else, who was beset by the confusion of the body (and the like) and the Self and who had not recognized that his essence is the identity of his Self with the Great Lord? Only he, whose nature is so described, would dare to discriminate [the true doctrine from so many false doctrines]!

Thus, by this expression [‘illumined by remembrance of Siva’s feet’] it is [also] said that the very nature of the Great Lord has coalesced with the preceptor. Let it be auspicious.

***Thus ends the Paramārthasāra, ‘The Essence of Ultimate Reality’, composed by

the master Abhinavagupta, most eminent among the great Śaiva teachers.1441

This commentary, whose subject is the nondualism of plenitude,1442 has been composed by me, by name Yoga[rāja], an ascetic, without passion, who resides in the auspicious Vitastāpurī,1443

Under the tutelage of the revered Kşemarāja, a scion of the lineage of true teachers, in whom Maheśa himself is incarnate.1444

***

1439 caraņa, ‘foot’, is here given an esoteric interpretation, as meaning ‘ray’, probably after the fashion of kara, which means both ‘hand’ and ‘ray’ (see p. 269).1440 Or ‘on ultimate meaning’. Perhaps also an implicit allusion to the Mahārtha mystic tradition, from which the Krama current proceeds; cf. the Mahārthamañjarī of Maheśvarananda (12th cent.), which sets forth a synthesis of the various mystic and philosophical currents of monistic Śaivism as they then flourished in Kashmir, those that are referred to as the Mahārthadarśana (also termed Mahānaya and Krama), the Kula (originating in Assam), the Trika (in the restricted sense of Spanda) and the Pratyabhijñādarśana.1441 This is the colophon (puşpikā) to the Paramārthasāra. YR’s formulation echoes that of his direct master, Kşemarāja, who paid homage similarly to his own direct master, Abhinavagupta, in the colophon to the commentary on the first chapter of ŚS.1442 pūrņādvaya — or ‘entirely composed of [the doctrine that teaches] non-difference from the plenum’.1443 Another name of Pravarapura, the modern Śrīnagar? TĀ XXXVII 48-52 describes it as situated on the bank of the river Vitastā (the modern Jhelum), which, according to legend, has its source in blow struck by Śiva’s trident (on the legendary origin of the Vitastā, see Jayadratha’s Haracaritacintāmaņi XII 2-34, and RT, vol. II: 411).1444 These verses, called puşpikāśloka, precede the colophon to the commentary.

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Thus ends the commentary on the compendium [entitled] Paramārthasāra,1445 the work of the revered Rājānaka Yogarāja, most eminent among the Śaiva teachers.

Appendix

1. Rudra (YR ad 1)In rudrakşetrajña, Rudra, or, rather, the Rudras, emblematically represent the

category of the adhipatis, presiding deities of the ‘spheres’ (aņḍa) constituting the universe, which are at the same time levels of subjectivity and experience; on Rudras, see TĀV VIII 306 (50 ‘vyaktam adhişţhāya prakaroti jagan niyogataḥ śaṃbhoḥ/ śuddhāśuddhasroto ‘dhikārahetuḥ śivo yasmāt //): tacchaktīti tacchabdenānantaparāmarśaḥ / anena ca na kevalamayaṃ kşetrajñānām eva sthitiṃ vidhatte yāvad rudrāņām api — ity uktam//, and MVT V 12. Thus Rudra is ‘the one who presides over the condition of pure [limited] subjectivity represented by the Void or by an extremely subtle body formed by the puryaşţaka — in other words, over the condition in which there is a reabsorption of every other cognizable reality’ (ĪPvŗ III 2,1, tr. Torella ĪPK: 197). The deity presiding over a given level of subjectivity and experience brings his devotees to this plane. Therefore, Rudra is also the model for such a subject: he who is able to reabsorb within himself all cognizable reality, he is Pralayākala seen in his divine dimension (on Pralayākala, see YR ad 14 and 23, n. 625, and Appendix 10, p. 330). Responsible for the withdrawal from phenomenal world, Rudra is thus ontologically higher than Brahma and Vişņu, ‘who preside over the manifestation of differentiated cognizable reality, the former causing creation and the latter continuity’ (ĪPvŗ III 2, 1, tr. Torella: 197). In the hierarchy of the cognizers, the line is clearly drawn between Rudra (or the Rudras) and the kşetrajñas. Rudra(s) as well as Brahma, Vişņu, etc., belong to the category of the Lords (pan), for, as stated by ĪPK III 2, 3, ‘they see things (bhāva) [i.e., the universe (viśva)] as their own body (svāńgarūpa) [i.e., as their own Self]’. Thus, they transcend the ordinary dichotomy of subject and object, as do yogins; cf. ŚSV 114, which comments on dŗśyaṃ śarīram, ‘[The yogin’s] body is the perceptible’, in almost the same terms: yad yad dŗśyaṃ [...] tat tat sarvaṃ [...] svāńgakalpam asya sphurati na bhedena, ‘Whatever is perceptible, all that [...] appears to him [...] as his own body [i.e., as his own Self], and not as different from him’. Therefore, the Lords are endowed with ‘sovereignty’ (aiśvarya); see ĪPvŗ III 2, 3. As such, Lords (pati) rule over their subjects, who thus deserve to be called ‘cattle’ (paśu, viz., ‘fettered souls’, according to the traditional etymology — TĀV IX 144b-145a): pāśyatvāt paśur ity ucyate, ‘He is called paśu for he has to be fettered’ (see also YR ad 5) — for not only do they abide by the law of their Lord, but also by the law of difference. The concluding verse of TS IV, p. 32 (quoted by YR ad 33), shows that the paśu is a potential pan’ and vice versa. It is the supreme pati, Parameśvara, who

1445 This is the colophon to the commentary. It is doubtful that paramārthasārasaṃgraha should be taken as another title of AG’s work. Rather, it is a characterization of the work entitled Paramārthasāra, which is a summary, a concise exposition (saṃgraha, ‘compendium’) of nondualistic śaivite teaching. This interpretation is corroborated by the 2nd mańgala verse, where YR refers to himself as the author of a commentary on the compendium (saṃkşepa = saṃgraha) that is the Paramārthasāra (paramārthasārasaṃkşepa). Both synonyms are most likely intended as oblique references to the saṃkşiptam of AG’s final kārikā. It is probably because of this colophon that several manuscripts of the commentary are catalogued as Paramārthasārasaṃgraha-vivrti or - īṭ kā.

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opts for servitude, in the free movement of his play. Taking their bodies — as the locus of all worldly experience — to be the Self (or the cognizing subject), instead of consciousness, they are also called kşetrajña or kşetravid, lit., ‘knower of the field [viz., of the body in which pure consciousness finds a substratum]’. The notion is defined by BhG XIII 1-2: idaṃ śarīraṃ kaunteya kşetram abhidhīyate/ etad yo vetti taṃ prāhuḥ kşetrajña iti tadvidaḥ// kşetrajñaṃ cāpi māṃ viddhi sarvakşetreşu bhārata/ kşetrakşetrajñayor jñānaṃ yat tajjñānaṃ mataṃ mama//, ‘This body, son of Kuntī,/ Is called the Field./ Who knows this, he is called/ Field-knower by those who know him./ Know also that I am the Field-knower/ In all Fields, son of Bharata./ Knowledge of the Field and Field-knower,/ This I hold to be (true) knowledge’. AG comments on these two verses, adding a third verse found only in some versions of the Kashmiri recension of the BhG (see Schrader 1930). For the detailed and most intricate demonstration, see Sharma’s translation of the entire passage (GAS: 182-183). We quote here only AG’s development of the kşetra metaphor: saṃsāriņāṃ śarīraṃ kşetraṃ yatra karmabījaprarohaḥ, ‘For those involved in the process of saṃsāra, the body is the field (kşetra), wherein the seed of karman sprouts’ (tr. Sharma). See a similar explanation in TĀV IX 144b-145a: karmabījaprarohāvahaṃ kşetraṃ śañram evātmatvena jānānaḥ, ‘He who takes the body, i.e., the field bringing about the sprouting of the seed of karman, to be the Self [is called kşetrajña or kşetravid]’. As such, the kşetrajña belongs to the category of the aņu, the finite soul, thus defined by TĀ IX 144b-145a: aņavo nāma naivānyat prakāśātmā maheśvaraḥ// cidacidrūpatābhāsī pudgalaḥ kşetravit paśuḥ/, ‘The finite souls, indeed, are not different from the supreme Lord who is of the nature of Light. When he manifests his conscious as well as unconscious state, he is [known as] pudgala, kşetravit or paśu’. See also YR ad 5 and ad 45: ‘And it is that Lord alone, ascending through the different levels [of subjectivity], who appears as the different [categories of] cognizers, from ordinary souls to Rudras’.

2. sarva (YR ad 1)Cf. MBh XII 47, 54: yasmin sarvaṃ yataḥ sarvaṃ yah sarvaṃ sarvataś ca yaḥ/

yaś ca sarvamayo nityaṃ tasmai sarvātmane namaḥ//, ‘To that omnifarious one do I bow, in whom lies all, from whom all starts, who is all, who is everywhere, and who is eternally made of all’. As developed byRāmakaņţha, in the long avat. of his Sarvatobhadra ad BhG (pp. 1-14), that verse is the concluding śloka of the hymn — designated by Rāmakaņţha (p. 3) as the stāvarājan, ‘king among hymns’— addressed to the Lord by Bhīşma, in the Mokşadharmaprakaraņa of the MBh. Rāmakaņţha quotes (and comments on) it in order to establish the essential meaning of the BhG, which he formulates (p. 3) as: ātmaivedaṃ sarvam, ‘This entire [world] is the Self, thus agreeing with the upanişadic statement: idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā (BĀU II 4, 6 [= IV 5, 7]). He emphasizes the interplay of the two pronouns, yat and sarva, showing how the Lord, represented by yat, is described in terms of the [Lord’s] relation to the universe (sarva): tasmai yac chabdapañcakaviśişpiviśeşaņapratipādyasvarūpāya sarvātmane namaḥ, ‘Salutation to him, who is of the nature of the All [viz., the universe], and whose essence is to be expounded in terms of qualifications determined by the pentad of the word yat [i.e., in terms of five relative clauses declining the different modalities that presuppose a commonality of essence between the Lord and the world]’. YV VI 36, 18 also quotes the verse in the chapter entitled

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Parameśvaravarņana. In turn, AG quotes it, segment after segment, as a part of his argument, while commenting on PT 4 (see PTV: 27-32, Skt. text). It is noteworthy that, in the same passage, AG also cites SpK I 2: yatra sthitam idam sarvaṃ kāryaṃ yasmāc ca nirgatam/ tasyānāvŗtarūpatvān na nirodho ‘sti kutracit, which establishes the transcendence of the Lord ‘in whom all this world (sarva) rests and from whom it has come forth [as an ‘effect’, kārya]’. SpN I 2 first develops the logic of the inherent presence of the effect in the cause; cf. SpP ad loc, p. 13 of Dyczkowski ed. (1898 ed. omits it): satkāryatvāt. It establishes that the world (sarva) as an ‘effect’ (kārya), i.e., a product, is produced by the action of an agent, not by any insentient cause, for the word kārya, as a gerundive (kŗtya), presupposes the activity of a sentient agent: kāryapadena cedam eva dhvanitaṃ kartuḥ kriyayā nişpādyaṃ hi kāryam ucyate na tu jaḍakāraņānantarabhāvi, ‘The word kārya, "effect", suggests only this much: that is said to be an "effect" which is to be accomplished by the action of an agent, and not that which is consequential to an insentient cause’. On this point, Śaivites differ from Buddhists, for whom the inevitable priority and posteriority of cause and effect demonstrate, not the logical priority of the agent, but a mere temporal succession. Then, in the same passage, he demonstrates that the Lord, being all, does not require anything additional in order to create the ‘All’ (sarva) — that is, any material cause, viewed as different from the agent — as does the potter, who needs clay: sarvaśabdenopādānādinairapekşyaṃ kartur dhvanitam, ‘The word [viz., the pronoun] sarva, "all", suggests that the agent is independent of any material cause, etc.’. Cf. also ĪPK I 5, 7: cidātmaiva hi devo ‘ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ/ yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet//, ‘Indeed, the Lord, who is consciousness, manifests externally the multitude of objects that reside within him, without having recourse to material causes, through his sole will, as does a yogin’; also ĪPvŗ ad loc. and ŚD I 44-45a: yoginām icchayā yadvan nānarūpopapattitā/ na cāsti sādhanaṃ kiṃcin mŗdādīcchāṃ vinā prabhoḥ// tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate/, ‘The yogins, by their sole will, create various forms, without having recourse to any cause — such as clay — other than the Lord’s will. Similarly, it is by his sole will that the Lord generates [all objects] in this way’. This is a way of establishing the absolute freedom (svatantratā) of the Lord, which SpK I 6-7 defines as akŗtrimā, ‘natural’, ‘non-adventitious’, that is, according to Rāmakaņţha’s SpV ad loc. (p. 33), ‘innate’ (sahajā), insofar as it is ‘not dependent on any material cause or other auxiliary cause [in achieving its object]’ (na tūpādānasahakāryādikāraņāntarāpekşiņī). Similar reflections on sarva are found in BhG X 8, which SpV IV 21 (= ad III 19) quotes (along with BhG X 9-11) in the Kashmiri recension, in support of the kārikā celebrating the advent of the supreme Subject (bhoktŗ) as the Lord of the Wheel (cakreśvara): ayaṃ sarvasya prabhava itaḥ sarvaṃ pravartate// [for ahaṃ sarvasya prabhavo mattaḥ sarvaṃ pravartate//]/ iti matvā bhajante māṃ budhā bhāvasamanvitāḥ//, ‘ "This is the source of all and all things evolve out of this". Realizing this, enlightened men, filled with fervor, adore Me’ (our transl.).

3. camatkāra (YR ad 1)In Trika texts, and especially, here, in YR’s commentary, camatkāra appears

mainly in composition, mostly with parāhantā or its synonym pūrņāhantā, or with sva, or svātman, or cit; thus is described as wondrous the experience of supreme ipseity, or of consciousness itself, or of the Self. It seems that the first occurrences of

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the concept (also in the form of its synonym: camatkŗti) are to be found in Ānandavardhana’s vŗtti ad DhĀl IV 16, quoted below (the only occurrence of camatkŗti in DhĀl), and in Utpaladeva: ĪPvŗ I 5, 11; ŚDvŗ I 8, where camatkāra, defined as svarūpaparāmarśarūpaḥ, ‘awareness of one’s own essence’, glosses āmoda of the kārikā; and ŚSĀ XIII 41 (camatkŗti). The usual explanation of the term’s etymology takes camat° as an exclamation of wonder, probably an onomatopoeia. According to V. Raghavan (1942: 269), ‘[...] originally the word camatkāra was an onomatopoeic word referring to the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste something snappy, and in the course of its semantic enlargements, camatkāra came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any feeling of a pleasurable type’. However, on the basis of ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278, and at the cost of correcting the manuscript — camataḥ karaņaṃ, instead of ca manaḥkaraņaṃ — Gnoli (1968: 59-60) has proposed taking camat as the present participle of the root cam, to sip’; camatkāra then would be the ‘action of one who tastes’. Such an etymology appears doubtful: not only the -kāra here is much more likely the same -kāra we have in oṃkāra, etc., but the reading ca manaḥkaraņaṃ makes perfect sense (see, below, the complete text). Various characterizations of camatkāra have been given. See, for instance, very probably the first description of the experience, that of the vŗtti ad DhĀl IV 16: sphuŗaņeyaṃ kācid iti sahŗdayānāṃ camatkŗtir utpadyate, ‘"Here some extraordinary [meaning] flashes forth" — such is the wonderment that arises in sensitive readers’. Cf. YR ad 75, who develops the notion in the context of speculations proper to PS. It is noteworthy that two texts of AG, the ABh and the ĪPVV, one from the sphere of aesthetics, one from Pratyabhijñā, give almost the same definition of the term; compare ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278: bhuñjānasyādbhūtabhogaspandāvişţasya ca manaḥkaraņaṃ camatkāra iti, ‘The word camatkāra, indeed, properly means the mental activity of the enjoying subject (bhuñjāna) who is immersed in the vibration of a marvelous enjoyment (bhoga)’, and ĪPVV I 5, 11 (vol. II: 177): camatkŗtir hi bhuñjānasya yā kriyā bhogasamāpattimaya ānandaḥ, ‘camatkŗti means the action of an enjoying subject (bhuñjāna), that is the bliss (ānanda) consisting in the perfect realization of enjoyment (bhogasamāpatti)’. Later on, ĪPVV I 5, 11 (vol. II: 179) enumerates a few glosses for parāmarśa, among which is camatkāra: [...] rasanaikaghanatayā parāmarśaḥ paramānando nirvŗtiś camatkāra ucyate, ‘Since it is indistinguishable from rasa [lit., ‘being of one mass with rasa’], reflective awareness is called "supreme bliss" (paramānanda), "serenity" (nirvŗti), "wonderment" (camatkāra)’. The immediately preceding passage of the ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278 deserves to be quoted. Defining camatkāra as ‘the form of consciousness that is devoid of obstacles’ (sā [...] avighnā saṃvit), it adds: tajjo ‘pi kampapulakollukasanādir vikāraś camatkāraḥ/ yathā "ajja vi harī camakkai kaha kaha vi ņa maṃdareņa daliāiṃ/ caṃdakalākaṃdalasacchahāiṃ lacchīiṃ aṃgāiṃ"// tathā hi sa tŗptivyatirekeņācchinno bhogāveśa ity ucyate, ‘The changes proceeding from it, namely, trembling, horripilation, joyful movements of the limbs, etc., are also called camatkāra. For instance: "Hari is still in a state of wonder: How, o how is it that the limbs of Lakşmī, which are as beautiful as fragments of the moon, have not been broken by Mount Mandara [churning the ocean]?" Indeed, this [camatkāra may be] likewise [defined as] immersion in an enjoyment that can never achieve satiation and is thus uninterrupted’ (tr. Gnoli 1968: 59, modified). Note that such a statement Would justify the reading ca manaḥkaraņam, since it contrasts the mental aspect of

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camatkāra (referred to as ‘mental activity’ or ‘consciousness free from obstacles’) with its physical effects (trembling, horripilation, etc.). On camatkāra, see also Torella ĪPK: 118-119, n. 23.

4. śaktayo ‘sya jagat sarvam ... (YR ad 4)This verse is frequently mentioned in Kashmirian Śaiva literature, with a few

minor variants: jagat kŗtsnam, śaktayas tu (or śaktayaś ca); śaktayo ‘sya jagat kŗtsnam is the reading of TĀ V 40a. It appears, in this form, in JR’s long discussion of TĀ VIII 168-174 (vol. IV: 1474, pāda c), which as we have seen, quotes and develops the definition of aņḍa given by the Raurava. One should note particularly that all the commentaries on SpK I 1 quote it: Kşemarāja’s SpS I 1 (pp. 14-15; second hemistich) and SpN I 1 (pāda c, p. 7), Rāmakaņţha’s SpV I 1 (p. 9; full verse), and Utpalavaişņava’s SpP 1 (p. 12; full verse). This confirms that PS 4 and its gloss should be understood in the light of SpK I 1. See also Utpaladeva’s ŚDvŗ III 18-20: 107 (pratīka of the second hemistich: śaktayas tu jagat kŗtsnam; see below), Kşemarāja’s ŚSV III 8, III 30 (pāda c) as well as Varadarāja’s ŚSvā III 30 (second hemistich), Abhinavagupta’s PTV 1, on khecarīsamatāṃ vrajet (second hemistich, in Singh, p. 13), as well as TĀV I 112 (vol. II: 155; full verse), III 67 (vol. II: 428; pāda c), III 79 (vol. II: 441; pāda c), III 99 (vol. II: 460; second hemistich), III avat. ad 143 (vol. II: 497; second hemistich), III 190 (vol. II: 538; second hemistich), III 205 (vol. II: 549; pāda c), III 228 (vol. II: 569; pāda c), TĀ V 40 (vol. Ill: 963; second hemistich) and TĀV V 40 (ibid.; full verse), TĀV V 68 (vol. III: 990; full verse), VIII 174 (vol. IV: 1474; pāda c); IX 154 (vol. IV: 1754; pāda c), XIII avat. ad 266 (vol. V: 2363; pāda c); also in SvYU XI 194 (pāda c) and (second hemistich) in Dīpikā ad YH III 203 (Dviveda: 390) (and Padoux YH: 401). The Sarvamangalā is given as the source of the quotation by YR as well as by the authors of ŚSV III 8 and TĀ V 40; the latter quotes the entire second hemistich and attributes it to the ‘Māṅgalaśāstra’ expounded by Śrīkaņţha. As observed by Torella (ĪPK: XXX, n. 43), the Mańgalā ‘is included in the list of Bhairavatantra given by the Śrīkaņţhīsaṃhitā’’. According to Padoux (TĀ: 270), the Sarvamańgalāśāstra, known only through this quotation, could be a hymn in praise of Siva, whose names include Śrīkaņţha. Citing the full verse, the SpV (ad 1, p. 9) refers to the Pārameśvara[śāstra]; this does not however permit us to conclude that the same work is referred to under a different title; it should be noted that SpV (p. 9), quoted above, attributes the statement to Śiva him self, by referring to the text it quotes as pārameśvara, and that TĀV IX 154uses the term udghoşyate, ‘is proclaimed’ (yad abhiprāyeņaiva śaktayo ‘sya jagat kŗtsnam ityādyudghoşyate). Other texts make allusions to its source as āmnāya, ‘Tradition’ (in ŚSV III 30), Āgama (in SpN: 7, SpS: 14-15, and Varadarāja’s ŚSvā III 30), and rahasyaśāstra, ‘esoteric Scripture’ (in SpP; 12). Similar assertion in ŚD III 2b-3: na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiņī// śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum īhate/ śaktiśaktimator bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varņyate//, ‘Neither is Śiva devoid of energy, nor is energy independent [of him]. Empowered in this way, Śiva exerts himself to create objects of his own free will. Indeed, according to Śaiva doctrine, energy and the Possessor of energy [or energies] are not described as different [‘as do unauthoritative schools of thought (aprāmāņikādarśaneşu)’, comments Utpaladeva]’; also ŚD III 20b: [...] sarvaṃ śivātmakam, which Utpaladeva glosses by quoting the aforementioned passage of the Sarvamańgalā: śivātmakam eva sarvaṃ na tu

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śaktyātmakam/ vyāvahārikaśaktibhedāśrayeņe tu śaktyātmakam uktaṃ śaktayas tu jagat kŗtsnaṃ iti vastutas tu śivātmakam eva (ŚDvŗ III 20b); also, TĀ III 168b: śaktiśaktimadaikātmya°; cf. TĀV III 205 and avat. ad V 68, which both quote the "maxim": śaktimataḥ khalu śaktir ananyā ityādinītyā; śaktimataḥ khalu śaktir ananyā ityādyuktayuktyā, ‘Indeed energy is not different from the possessor of energy’. The source of such Trika notions might be MVT II 2a, quoted by TĀV I 196: śaktimacchaktibhedena dharātattvaṃ vibhidyate/, ‘The tattva ‘earth’ divides into energy and possessor of energy [or energies]’.

5. aņḍas, tattvas, adhvans, bhuvanas (YR ad 4)Quoted in TĀV XI 8, MVT II 49 enumerates the four aņdas: pārthivaṃ prākŗtaṃ

caiva māyīyaṃ śāktyam eva ca / iti saṃkşepataḥ proktam etad aņḍacatuşţayam//. The word aņda, lit., ‘egg’ or ‘envelope’, connotes a form which is both impenetrable and constrictive. Underlined by TĀ VIII 169-170 and XI 12b-14a, constriction is a main feature of the aņdas, in terms of which the infinite is reduced to the finite. Thus Paramaśiva becomes a paśu, rather all the varieties of paśus. Defined in YR ad 4 (by citing TĀ VIII 169) as an ‘aggregate of entities’, i.e., as an aggregate of bodies, faculties and worlds, and clearly described in YR’s commentary as four sheaths fitted within one another, these aņdas are not only to be seen as cosmic spheres. They are also metaphors for the different grades of experience, whether this experience takes place at the level of pure manifestation, or pure subjectivity, which is that of śaktyaņḍa, or at the level of phenomenal manifestation and embodied subjectivity which māyāņḍa, prakŗtyaņḍa and pŗthvyaņḍa account for. Everything starts with śaktyaņḍa, lit., the ‘sphere of Energy’. In fact, śakti, the very power of the Lord, once transformed by him, out of his absolute freedom, into the power of negating his own essential nature, which is plenitude, gives rise to the other three levels of experience which are, as śaktyaņḍa itself, as many levels of bondage.

Why is this theory of the aņdas set forth at the very outset of the exposition? It is because the entire text, considering the main problem of empirical being to be that of delimitation, aims at explaining how diversity takes place so as to enable the reversal of the process and the recognition and re-experience of one’s own fundamental plenitude. This reversal of process takes place through adhvaśuddhi, the ‘purification of the paths’. In kārikās14-22, the PS enumerates in decreasing order Paramaśiva’s "manifestations", the thirty-six principles that the methodical analysis of perceptual diversity reveals. Nevertheless, before broadening the analysis of the constituents of external and internal reality meant to explain Creation itself, the treatise endeavors to apprehend the manifestation of sensible experience in its totality, in its seemingly paradoxical relation to the deity, the unique entity, the supreme reality, which is defined by its essential freedom. Thus, it is an essentially philosophical effort that produces the theory of the four aņḍas, or concentric ‘envelopes’, through which the exposition seeks to account for the organization of the Creation — thus giving rise to the concept of the cosmic ‘sphere’ — as well as to account for the degrees of experience understood as degrees of finitude and bondage, which are to be overcome in order to regain one’s essential plenitude. This is the reason why śaktyaņḍa, the first of the four aņdas, is composed of the three inferior tattvas of the ‘pure path’ (śuddhādhvan), starting with Sadāśiva, where first emerges ‘this’ as an ideal potentiality. Yet it is a finitude and a bondage altogether relative, for what is at stake,

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at this level of nonduality, is the pure manifestation that has not yet materialized itself into actual creation. As Michel Hulin states: Śiva follows the pure path ‘pour faire, si l’on ose dire, le tour de sa nature’ [— ‘... so as to, so to speak, take an overall view of his own nature’] (1978: 305). The position of the śuddhādhvan is, for the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, a way of showing that consciousness ‘does call for cosmic manifestation’ and that ‘far from being defilement and degradation, its relationship to multiplicity is enjoyment, because it expresses its inmost possibility’ (Hulin 1978: 286). This is why YR states, in his avat. ad 4, that ‘this universe is nothing but the blossoming of the Lord’s energies’, and later on, that ‘the universe is in essence nothing but the marvel of supreme ipseity’. BĀU I 4, 1-3 describes of the Primordial Androgyne as one who ‘evokes in imagination a possible cosmic multiplicity and rejoices in realizing that he already encompasses all of it’ (Hulin 1978: 302). The same description is appropriate for Paramaśiva, pure consciousness, itself understood in this system as the unity of prakāśa and vimarśa. Yet such a consciousness ‘cannot be satisfied to contain the objects as "a bag contains nuts"; it possesses them only if it recovers them at every moment’ (Hulin 1978: 301; note that the image is present in SpN I 2, where it is said that the world ‘has not come out of him [the Lord], as does a walnut from a bag’ — na prasevakād ivākşoţādi tat tasmān nirgatam api). Thus there is a double movement: on the one hand, cosmic dispersion, when consciousness, disaggregating its host of energies, brings about the creation of the universe; on the other, its reabsorption within consciousness. Moreover, such delimitation, seen as bondage, is nothing else than the alteration, freely chosen by Śiva, of his own śakti, energy or power. Hence, his omnipotence, in play (we meet here the notion of divine krīḍā) reducing itself so as a ‘this’ emerges as antagonist to the T, appears as the altered and constrictive form of the śaktyaņḍa, the ‘sphere/envelope of Energy’, that is the reduced, as well as reducing, energy (or power) of the Lord.

Actual creation begins with the power of division and dichotomization that is māyā, associated with the five kañcukas. Thus is constituted māyāņḍa, the ‘sphere of māyā, or Illusion’. Its seven tattvas, from māyā to puruşa, stand for that level of experience where the one who was pure subject starts seeking, in illusion and delusion, for what is outside of him. As such māyāņḍa is the condition required for the manifestation of prakŗtyaņḍa, the ‘sphere of Nature’, which, beginning with prakŗti and consisting of the following twenty-three tattvas, offers the complete delineation of cognizable reality (meya) divided into draşţŗ, the ‘seer’ (who is but his karaņas), and dŗśya, the ‘seen’, viz., the five tanmātras and the five bhūtas.

At the core of prakŗtyaņḍa, the last ‘sphere/envelope’ is to be found — which coincides with the grossest tattva, earth — which stands for the body itself, according to reasonings first put forth by Sārņkhya (see kā. 22 on this point). Thus is constituted the pŗthvyaņḍa, the ‘Terrestrial sphere’. It represents the grossest level of experience, where one mistakes the body for the Self, i.e., when pure consciousness fully appropriates to itself those fictitious contents, the body and so forth (buddhi, etc.), that are extrinsic to it. Thus the way the four aņdas are fit into each other expresses the progressive constriction of pure, free, ever-radiating consciousness, in other words, a ‘genesis of bondage’, to borrow the formula coined by Hulin (‘une genese de la servitude’) in the context of the theory of the thirty-six tattvas (1978: 304).

Since the entire manifestation exists within the four aņḍas, they may be seen as encompassing an infinite variety of worlds and their inhabitants. Again those

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inhabitants are endowed with an infinite variety of bodies and faculties which may differ from world to world, as well as, within the same world, from one level of being to another (see YR ad 5). The eighth chapter of the TĀ deals with the bhuvanas (as well as with the notion of aņḍa, in 168b-174) in the course of expounding the deśādhvan, ‘Path of space’, of which the bhuvanas represent the most concretized aspect. As recorded by TĀ itself, their number varies widely from text to text, although they are fundamentally innumerable, as indicated by SvT X, which posits universes along with their subuniverses. Quoting SvT X 2-5a, JR observes, in his avat. to TĀ VIII 9, that ‘since there is an infinite number of bhuvanas, there is an infinite number of their presiding deities also. Therefore, nobody would attain the Absolute ever, by meditating on each of them, even if one devoted innumerable births to it. Such a practice would be thus impractical’ (bhuvanānām ānantye tadadhīśānām api ānantyam/ id teşāṃ pratyekam evam anusaṃdhāne janmasahasrair api na kaścit pāraṃ yāyāt/ ity etad aśdkhyānuşţhānam). In a reply to such reservations, TĀ VIII 9-10 refers to Śrīkaņţhanātha’s Dīkşottaratantra (XIII 63-67); according to which there are just five bhuvanas, presided over by Brahma Vişņu, Rudra, Īśvara and Anāśritaśiva respectively. However, according to SvT IV, TĀ VIII407-427 reckons 224 bhuvanas. TĀ VIII 428-434a refers to the account of the bhuvanas in the Matańgatantra. At the end, TĀ VIII 436-452 adopts the count of the MVT (V 1-33), which TĀ VIII 436b reaffirms to be the main authority in the Kashmirian nondual Saivism. Thus 118 bhuvanas are enumerated, related to just four of the five kalās, since the fifth kalā, in MVT, does not contain any bhuvana (contrary to the SvT which attributes 16 bhuvanas to the fifth kalā). JR offers an explanation (avat. to TĀ VIII 428) for such discrepancy of classification: the bhuvanas are expounded in keeping with the specific prakriyā, or process of initiation (dīkşā), adopted by such and such authoritative text, the difference of the prakriyās corresponding to the difference of the aspirants’ entitlements. However, the common feature of all these expositions is that they are made in the context of dīkşā, which SvTU V 88a (vol. Ill: 38) defines as ātmasaṃskāra, ‘perfecting the Self; thus the Vth chapter of the MVT is entitled dīkşāprakaraņa, and the Xth chapter of the SvT: bhuvanādhvadīkşāviddhi. This process of dīkşā implies the process of the ‘purification of the paths’ (adhvaśuddhi), whose lower level is the ‘purification of the universes’ (bhuvanaśuddhi).

Apprehended in the light of these spatial correspondences, the four aņdas are evidently to be seen as cosmic spheres, all the more so as a presiding deity rules over each of them.

Vv. 41-46 of the PS (esp. 41 and 46) deal again with the aņdas, as related to the mantra ___, the hŗdayabīja, which stands for the whole, inasmuch as it is posited that the first three aņdas (or kalās) are pervaded by SA, and the fourth by AU, whereas the fifth kalā is pervaded by the visarga Ḥ: such is the teaching (see MVT IV 25 and PTLvŗ 21-24 in Padoux 1975: 110ff., n. 241 and 275). The correspondences do not end here since in the context of the ritual of absorption within the hŗdayabīja (PTLvŗ 27-28), the four aņḍas are again related to four limbs or organs of the body, according to their place and function. In the PTLvŗ, the correspondences are just alluded to. Nevertheless, according to Swami Lakşman Joo quoted by Padoux in his translation (PTLvŗ: 118, n. 303), the four aņḍas — from pŗthvyaņḍa, the lowest one — are respectively related to pāda, hasta, pāņi and mukha, an interpretation that

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requires a slight alteration in the order of the text which reads: pādapāņihastamukha°. Similarly, correspondences are established between kalās and parts of the body (see Brunner SŚP, vol. III: fig. III, IV), as well as between tattvas and parts of the body, in the process of internal worship (see Padoux 1986: 178-180).

6. spanda (YR ad 4)On the notion of spanda, see AG’s definitions in ĪPV III 1, 3 (vol. II: 221-222):

śuddho ‘yaṃ spandaḥ [...] kiṃciccalanātmatayā sphuradrūpatvāt, ‘ [Sadāśiva] is pure spanda, for he manifests himself in a form which is subtle movement’, and TĀ IV 184-186a: kiṃciccalanam etāvad ananyasphuraņaṃ hi yat, ‘ [spanda] is subtle movement, autonomous glitter’ (see also Torella ĪPK: 121). The same definition of spanda is found in SpN I 1: citsvābhāvyād acalasyāpi śrībhagavataḥ svātantryaśaktir [...] kiṃciccalattātmakadhātvarmānugamāt spanda ity abhihitā, ‘The svātantryaśakti of the Lord, though he moves not, being of the nature of consciousness, is known as spanda in accordance with the root-meaning of the word signifying "subtle movement" (kiṃciccalattā)’. That this movement be imperceptible is required in order to prevent the objection that the dynamism of the ultimate principle, consciousness, implies its perishability (for activity implies the transformation of the cause, hence its perishability). The Trika postulates self-awareness in the form of a vibration, or a pulsation, that is, a movement that is not a movement, continuous, yet unchanging, and therefore imperceptible. ĪPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 256-257) develops this line of thought: spandanaś ca kiṃciccalanam/ eşaiva ca kiṃcidrūpatā yad acalanam api calam ābhāsata ity/ prakāśasvarūpaṃ hi manāg api nātiricyate ‘tiricyata iveti tad acalam evābhāsabhedayuktam iva ca bhāti/, ‘spanda means imperceptible movement. And this imperceptibility [of the movement] consists in this, that what is surely motionless appears as if in motion. For, although the essential nature of consciousness is not to change, it appears to change; [in other words,] that [essential nature of consciousness] which shines as motionless appears as endowed with an infinity of manifestations’. Similarly, TĀ IV 183b defines spanda as svātmanyucchalana, ‘expansion in one’s own self, before developing it (TĀ IV 184b) through the metaphor of the wave that is not different from the ocean (quoted n. 872).

7. Anāśritaśiva (YR ad 4)See TĀ VIII 10, giving the exposition of the bhuvanas according to the

Dīkşottaratantra: [...] anāśritaḥ śivas tasmād [viz., sādākhyagocarād] vyāptā [...], ‘Anāśritaśiva pervades [the tattvas] beyond [the realm of Sādākhya, viz., beyond śuddhavidyā, Īśvara and Sādākhya (or Sadāśiva)]’. JR ad loc. observes: tasmād iti sādākhyagocarād arthād ūrdhvaṃ śakńtattvasthāne tu, ‘He pervades [the tattvas] beyond the realm of Sādākhya, that is to say, he remains above, at the level of śaktitattva’. At this level of experience, the subject, viz., the yogin, is no longer Paramaśiva who contains the universe within himself. As observed by Silburn (Kālikāstotra: 37) this yogin does not possess the form of perfect consciousness, which, consisting of the free play of exteriority (idantā) within interiority (ahantā) and vice versa, enjoys cosmic bliss (jagadānanda). Cosmic bliss, as defined by TĀ V 50-52a, implies a relation of the Self with the universe, in the form of their co-essentiality. It is in this sense that the yogin deprived of this experience of jagadānanda is deemed ‘unrelated [to the universe]’ cidaikyākhyātimayānāśritaśiva°,’[...] Anāśritaśiva does not experience the unity of absolute consciousness [in which the universe is identified with consciousness]’

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(PHvŗ 4). Nevertheless, Anāśritaśiva is the stage of experience in which the universe yet to come, that is, empirical manifestation is prepared, since it is the state (avasthā) in which Śakti begins to veil the Self temporarily, and, separating the universe from it, to produce akhyāti nescience, or failure to recognize the real nature of the Self. This is the reason why śūnyātiśūnya, the ‘Void beyond the Void’, or ‘absolute Void’ is given in PHvŗ 4 (p. 55) as a synonym for Anāśritaśiva: cidaikyākhyātimayānāśritaśivaparyāyaśūnyātiśūnyātmatayā [...]. Paramaśiva, the Whole having nothing outside himself, has to create a Void within himself in order to make room for the universe that he wishes to manifest as different from himself. And it is this Void that will assume the form of the objective universe. Cf. TĀ VIII 402: anāśńtaṃ tu vyāpāre nimittaṃ hetur ucyate, ‘In the process [of creation], the cause that is not dependent (anāśrita) is called the impelling [cause] (hetu)’, and TĀV ad loc: vyāpāre id sŗşţyādikriyāyām/ iha hi sa eva paraḥ parameśvaraḥ svasvātantryāt prathamaṃ śūhyātmatām avabhāsayan anāśritādirāpatayā prathitaḥ, ‘In the "activity", i.e., in the act of creation, etc., the Supreme one, Parameśvara, out of his freedom, first manifests himself as Void, and, manifest in that form, is known as Anāśrita’. In terms of mystical experience, Anāśritaśiva represents the yogin’s stage of passive samādhi, or extasis (cf. Silburn Kālikāstotra: 27, 36-37). ŚSV I 2, quoted n. 226, whose phraseology is similar to that of YR here, describes Anāśritaśiva as the first manifestation of auto-limitation, freely chosen by Paramaśiva, which eventuates in the māyāpramātŗ.

8. Gahana (YR ad 4)TĀ VIII 317-319 has Gahana the first among the six Rudras occupying the lower

fold/cavity (puţa) of the māyāgranthi, the gross level of māyā madhye puţatrayaṃ tasyā rudrāḥ şaḍ adhare ‘ntare/ eka ūrdhve ca pañceti dvādaśaite nirūpitāḥ// gahanāsādhyau hariharadaśeśvarau trikalagopatī şaḍ ime/ madhye ‘nantaḥ kşemo dvijeśavidyeśaviśvaśivāḥ// şaţsu ca puţageşu tatparāvŗttyā/ parivarttate sthitiḥ kila devo ‘nantas tu sarvathā madhye// ‘Within that [māyāgranthi], there is a triad of folds/cavities (puţa). In the lower one, there are six Rudras, in the middle there is one, in the upper one there are five. Thus twelve Rudras have been described. The six [Rudras] are Gahana, Asādhya, Harihara, Daśeśvara, Trikala, Gopati. Ananta is in the middle. [The five Rudras are] Kşema, Dvijeśa, Vidyeśa,Viśva and Śiva. [Regarding those five] and those six [Rudras] remaining in their [respective] folds/cavities, the location is liable to change, for they are interchangable. Nevertheless, Lord Ananta always remains in the middle’. Those two lines are a paraphrase of SvT X 1124-1127, as shown by TĀV VIII 317-319, which quotes it (p. 1566). Although SvT X 1124-1127 enumerates thirteen Rudras, placing six Rudras in the upper fold, among which Ananta (to be distinguished from the Ananteśa in the middle fold, who is defined as jagatpati, the ‘Lord of the world’), the two lists are parallel: Daśeśāna in SvT corresponds to Daśeśvara in TĀ; Kşemeśa to Kşema; Brāhmaņasvāmin, the ‘Lord of the Brāhmaņas’, to Dvijeśa; Vidyeśāna to Vidyeśa, and Viśveśa to Viśva. One observes that JR’s reading of SvT 1124-1127 allows emendation of the SvT ed.: brāhmaņasvāmī instead of brahmaņaḥ svāmī (since Brāhmaņasvāmin is the synonym of Dvijeśa), viśveśa instead of vidyeśa (since Viśveśa is the synonym of Viśva).

9. Phonemic emanation (YR ad 10-11)

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Such speculations appear to be quite in keeping with those of VP 11-2 and its vŗtti, which establish that since, in our cognition, we identify the objects with their words, the objects are essentially of the nature of the word. Cf. VP I 1-2: anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akşaram/ vivartate ‘rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ// ekam eva yad āmnātaṃ bhinnaśaktivyapāśrayāt/ apŗthaktve ‘pi śaktibhyaḥ pŗthaktveneva vartate//, ‘Ce Brahman sans commencement ni fin, Parole principielle, Phoneme (imperissable), qui se manifeste sous la forme des objets et d’ou precede le monde anime, Lui qui, revele comme un, est le support de pouvoirs differents et parait divise sous l’effet de ses pouvoirs, quoi qu’il soit indivis [...]’, which may be summarized as follows: brahman, which is Word-principle (śabdatattva), ‘appears as the objects’ (vivartate ‘rthabhāvena). Thus, the creation of the world proceeds from it. The brahman is the one appearing as many, for it is the holder [lit., ‘substratum’] of a multiplicity of powers (śakti). Though not different from its powers, it seems to be so. As Biardeau (VP: 25, n. 1) puts it: ‘C’est l’Absolu lui-meme qui se manifeste sous la forme des phenomenes par l’intermediaire de ses pouvoirs. Le śabdabrahmavāda est done un monisme de type bhedābheda’ [— ‘It is the Absolute itself which manifests in the form of phenomena through its powers. Therefore, the śabdabrahmavāda is a monism of the bhedābheda category’]. Here also, the process of the Lord’s manifestation is nothing but the progressive display and differentiation of his supreme energy — a notion which MVT III 5-9a, quoted in both SpN III 13 and ŚSV III 19, clearly develops: yā sā śaktir jagaddhātuḥ kathitā samavāyinī/ icchātvaṃ tasya sā devī sisŗkşoḥ pratipadyate// saikāpi saty anekatvaṃ yathā gacchati tac chŗņu/ evam etad iti jñeyaṃ nānyatheti suniścitam// jñāpayantī jagaty atra jñānaśaktir nigadyate/ evaṃ bhavatv idaṃ sarvam iti kāryonmukhī yadā/’ jātā tadaiva tad vastu kurvaty atra kriyocyate/ evam eşā dvirūpāpi punar bhedair anantatām/ arthopādhivaśād yāti cintāmaņir iveśvarī//, ‘When the Master of the world wishes to create, his [supreme] Śakti, the Goddess who is said to be inherent in him, becomes Will [viz., energy of Will]. Listen how she though one, becomes many. Similarly, when she makes the knowable known as definitely "this" and not as something else, she is named in this world "energy of Knowledge". Similarly, when she becomes intent on acting, considering: "Let all this come to be [just as I have willed and known it]", [that same energy], arisen at the very moment she creates the object, is then named the " [energy of] Action". Thus, though [already] of two forms [Knowledge and Action], she differentiates herself again, becoming innumerable, thanks to those objects, which [function as her] contingent attributes. Therefore, this sovereign Goddess is to be compared to the thought-gem that yields all desires’. MVT III 9b-13a goes on to describe the form assumed by the supreme Śakti when considered from the point of view of phonemic emanation: becoming Mātŗkā, she shifts from the level of parāvāc to that of paśyantī, again dividing herself into different phonemes or groups of phonemes, grouped into eight vargas and presided over by eight mātŗkās. Thus emerge from one another in succession the Lord’s energies, seen as a ‘wheel’ — a multitude assuming the forms of all possible words and things.

10. saptapramātŗs (YR ad 14)The notion of a hierarchy of subjects — usually seven in number, but not

uniformly — is common to all schools of Śaivism, including those that are dualistic. The notion itself of a ‘heptad of subjects’ (pramātŗsaptaka) seems to be mainly of

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Saiddhāntika origin, as is suggested in TĀV X 7-8 (avat.), wherein a Traika adept questions the need for the seven just mentioned (TĀ X 6-7a): nanv asmaddarśane naraśaktiśivātmakam eva viśvam iti sarvatrodghoşyate tat katham iha siddhāntadarśanādisamucitaṃ pramātŗbhedam avalambyaitad uktam [...], ‘But, one might object, is it not everywhere proclaimed, in our school, that the world consists of nara, Śakti and Siva? So why has this [doctrine of the seven pramātŗs] been stated here [in TA X 6-7a] by adopting the types of pramātŗs congenial to schools such as the Siddhānta?’

The seven subjects represent different levels, or modes, of consciousness, that is, of cognitive experience, as is made clear by the metaphor of SpN I 1, in which they are said to be different ‘roles’ (bhūmikā) assumed by Śiva: śrīmān maheśvaro hi svātantryaśaktyā śivamantramaheśvaramantresvaramantravijñānākalapralayākalasakalāntāṃ pramātŗbhūmikāṃ tadvedyabhūmikāṃ ca gŗhņānaḥ, ‘By his power of absolute freedom, the glorious Great Lord assumes [on the subjective level] the cognitive roles of Śiva, the Mantramaheśvaras, the Mantreśvaras, the Mantras, the Vijñānākalas, the Pralayākalas and the Sakalas [, whereas, on the objective level,] he assumes the roles [of the objects that are] made known thereby’. For other examples of the theatrical metaphor applied to Śiva, or the Self, and of the use of bhūmikā in the sense of ‘role’, see ŚS III 9-12, YR ad 1 and 5; see also SvTU VIII 31 (vol. Ill: 175): devaḥ parāvākśaktimayaḥ śivabhaţţāraka eva sadāśiva iti gŗhītatattadbhūmikaḥ svayaṃ guruśişyapade sthitveti, ‘Sadāśiva is Lord Śiva [half-] made of that śakti that is supreme Speech (parāvāc). And the fact that "he adopts by himself the [double] posture of the teacher and the pupil (guruśişyapade sthitvā)" means that "he [alone] assumes each of those roles (bhūmikā)."‘ As modes of consciousness, the seven categories of subject are related to the tattvas understood as different levels of experience.

So variable are Śaiva texts, both in describing the levels of subjectivity and in locating them on the scale of the tattvas that it would be difficult, within the limits of our expose, to give an account of them in detail (see, notably, Torella ĪPK: 199ff., Vasudeva MVT: 151-178). It is, however, possible to account for the more systematic classification of the ‘heptad of subjects’ later proposed by AG and his immediate followers, which is modeled on the MVT (I 14ff., II 1-9), itself reformulated in ĪPK III 2, 6-20. And it should be noted that AG, particularly in his TA, emphasizes the regular correspondence not only between the levels of subjectivity and those of manifestation (tattvas), but also between the levels of subjectivity and the three impurities (mala), or, more exactly, between those levels and the stages of the process by which the aspirant gradually frees himself from those impurities (see TĀ IX 93b-96, translated by Vasudeva MVT: 172). AG elaborates, and, indeed, rationalizes the Śaiva doctrine of a hierarchy of subjects in TĀ IX 84-96, X 6ff. (he refers again to that doctrine elsewhere, such as TĀ XV 339-341, etc.), TS IX, PTV 5-9b, ĪPV III 2 and ĪPVV ad loc. (vol. III: 319-323) and ad I 7, 14 (vol. II: 404-405). So do, on the one hand, his exegetes, Jayaratha ad TĀ and YR ad PS (see kārikās 14 and 23), and, on the other hand, Kşemarāja, in his PH (sūtra 3) with auto-commentary, and in several other commentaries (SpN I 1, quoted above, ŚSV I 2-3, etc.). We sketch here the hierarchy of the seven subjects in descending order, as does YR in his gloss to PS 14, dealing with the first five, and in his gloss to PS 23, dealing with the

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last two, according to the distinction between śuddhādhvan and aśuddhādhvan: 1) As pure, undivided, vibrating consciousness, Śiva (i.e., Śiva/Sakti) is the highest subject. 2) The Mantramaheśvaras, the ‘Great Lords of Mantras’, are located at the level of Sadāśiva. Thus the level of Sadāśiva is that very high level of consciousness where ‘this’, although appearing at the horizon of consciousness, remains immersed within the ‘I’. Nevertheless, the essential unity of consciousness has been somehow fragmented, as shown by the plural applied to those Mantramaheśvaras. 3) Then come, a grade below, the 118 Mantreśvaras, the ‘Lords of Mantras’. Located at the level of Īśvara, they represent the level of consciousness that operates there. Whatever may be the interpretation of the experience which the Īśvara state symbolizes (see YR’s exegesis ad PS 14, which differs in some way of the classical one), it is the level of consciousness corresponding to the state in which one experiences more distinctly the emergence of an ideal objectivity, without deviating from one’s own essential ipseity. As different modes of this essential ipseity, Śiva, the Mantramaheśvaras and the Mantreśvaras are free of all impurity. 4) Being located at the level of śud-dhavidyā, pure, perfect Knowledge, the Mantras still belong to the plane of the śuddhādhvan. Nevertheless, although ideal, the clear introduction of differentiation, which characterizes the stage of śuddhavidyā, implies the presence of māyā, even if not yet fully developed (aprarūdhā), inasmuch as no sense of alterity is generated (see n. 508). Therefore, the experiencers located at this level, the Mantras, are affected by the māyīyamala (see ĪPK III 2, 9 on the Vidyeśvaras, with Utpaladeva’s vŗtti). They are associated with the Vidyeśvaras, a group of eight deities (SpN II 2 mentions two of them: Anantabhaţţāraka and Vyomavyāpin; see also ĪPV III 1, 6: vidyeśvarā bhagavanto ‘nantādyā vartante), whose specific task is that of accomplishing four of the five cosmic functions (pañcakŗtya), as well as striving for the liberation of limited souls, ‘acting as intermediaries in the revelation of the teachings of Śiva, etc’ (Torella ĪPK: 201, n. 14); see n. 510. Being etymologically ‘those who ideate [creation]’, the Mantras are perfect instruments for the Vidyeśvaras who employ them in this double task. Thus the plane occupied by the crowd of the seventy million Mantras headed by the Vidyeśvaras represents ‘the mode of consciousness in which vast but internally differentiated segments of the universe flash into view’ (Sanderson 1986: 192). Facing a reality considered other than themselves, the Vidyeśvaras, residing at the plane of śuddhavidyā, are omniscient inasmuch as ‘they are identified with consciousness’ (ĪPvŗ III 2, 9). For the same reason, since that consciousness is made of both prakāśa and vimarśa (that dynamic principle which manifests itself as the activity of the ‘I’ and receives therefore the name of kartŗtā, ‘agency’), they are endowed with agency, as is shown by their accomplishing four of the five ‘duties’ (kŗtya). Yet, since they conceive the objects of their action as different from themselves, due to the māyīyamala, such agency is partial (ĪPK III 2, 9), and can be contrasted with the omnipotence of the Mantreśvaras and Mantramaheśvaras. ‘Therefore, ĪPvr III 2, 9 coneludes, they too must be considered finite souls (aņutva)’; see n. 510. 5) The presence of agency, even though partial, is what distinguishes the Vidyeśvaras/Mantras from the next level of consciousness, namely the Vijñānākalas (or Vijñānakevalas) — defined (ĪPK III 2, 6-7) as pure consciousness (śuddhabodha), in the sense that ‘they no longer contaminate self-representation with the projection of the impure tattvas from māyā to earth (pŗthivī)’ (Sanderson 1986: 191). In other words, they no longer consider

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what is not the Self, viz., the body, the mind, etc., as the Self (a mode of consciousness which is that of the Sakalas). Therefore, in contrast to the Vidyeśvaras, the Vijñānākalas are free of the māyīyamala, the impurity of differentiation, and in contrast to the following states, Pralayākalas and Sakalas, they are also free of the kārmamala, the impregnating of consciousness with impressions left by one’s good or bad actions; thus do not transmigrate any longer. On the other hand, they are completely devoid of agency (kartŗtā), i.e., of I-consciousness (vimarśa, or spanda), with the result that they consider themselves incomplete or deficient. Thus, they are subject to the āņavamala, the impurity consisting of the intuition of limitedness, that is, they fail to recognize their own creative freedom (svātantrya) and own essential plenitude (pūrņatā). Their name, ‘those Inert in Gnosis’ as Sanderson translates it, accounts for those two symmetric features. So does their location on the scale of the tattvas, since, according to some texts (notably YR ad 14, and PTV 5-9b quoted n. 511), they hang suspended between the pure (śuddhādhvan) and the impure universe (aśuddhādhvan), being placed below śuddhavidyā and above māyā, in an intermediary tattva, created ad hoc for purposes specific to Śaiva speculation, namely, the mahāmāyā, the ‘Great Illusion’. Thus the Vijñānākala represents the mode of consciousness belonging to the yogin engaged on the path leading to liberation. According to the ĪPVV (vol. III: 322), it is a kind of experience (bhogaviśeşa) which may be attained through a special initiation intended to facilitate leaving [behind] the realm of māyā, either through meditative realization (bhāvanā), or through concentration (dhāraņā), contemplation (dhyāna) or absorption (samādhi) that have māyā for their object (cf. Torella ĪPK: 200, n. 12). Thus, PTV (Skt. text: p. 57) teaches that ‘the Vijñānākalas and the Pralayākalas do not have the idea of mama, "[this is] mine", [in certain states as samādhi]’ (vijñānākalānāṃ pralayākalānāṃ ca [...] mameti vyatiriktaṃ nāsti). 6) The Pralayākalas, or Pralayakevalas, ‘those Inert in Dissolution’, represent the mode of consciousness in which the Self is suspended in a state of inertia, which explains the common analogy of deep, i.e., dreamless, sleep. On the meaning of the term ‘Pralayākala’, see ĪPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252), quoted n. 625. The ‘dissolution’ of their name is a metaphor for the state of total absorption found in deep sleep, which is itself further analyzed as twofold, according to whether some internal sensation (savedya or prāņa) persists or not, the latter stage being that of real absorption or ‘dissolution’. Thus the doctrine distinguishes between two levels of Pralayākalas (ĪPK III 2, 8). Sanderson (1986: 191) defines the lower one, as ‘analogous to dreamless but blissful sleep (savedyapralayākalatā) and the other to dreamless sleep completely void of sensation (apavedyapralayākalatā)’. ln Utpaladeva’s fourfold division of the limited self (māyāpramātŗ), the lower Pralayākala is also termed prāņapramātŗ, for he experiences the Self as an internal sensation (prāņa), and the higher one is termed śūnyapramātŗ, for he experiences the Self as the Void (śūnya). In the prāņapramātŗ, the māyīyamala persists, whereas it is transcended in the śūnyapramātŗ, with the complete, although transitory, dissolution of the māyic world. However, kārmamala remains at both levels, for, though all actions have dissolved in the perfect inertia of deep sleep, ‘the impressions of past actions remain, waiting to regenerate world-experience’ (Sanderson 1986: 191) when the period of dissolution comes to an end, that is, when one awakes. Thus, as is the immediately inferior Sakala, the lower Pralayākala is subject to the three impurities, whereas the higher Pralayākala is free of the māyīyamala. See also YR ad 23, who

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defines the Pralayākalas as the ones ‘who are freed from the particular [that is, from gross materiality] and from the body’. 7) At the bottom of the ladder, the Sakala, ‘endowed with factors of fragmentation (kala)’, is the ordinary limited consciousness existing solely in the states of waking and dream, immersed in the māyic world, taking as the Self what is not the Self, and denied even the transitory redemption of dreamless sleep. See YR ad 23: ‘Are called Sakalas those cognizing subjects who are of a bodily nature because of the factors of fragmentation (kalā), beginning with the faculties in their "pure" state [that is, without adjunction of object] (indriyamātra) and ending with particular [objects] [that is, with the mahābhūtas]’. For a detailed exposition of the reverse process, through which the meditator, gradually freeing himself from the sentiment of differentiation, aims at reaching the intuition of identity with the deity, that is, consciousness itself, see TĀ IX 90b-97a, XIII 275b-76; also Sanderson 1986: 190-193.

11. guņatattva (YR ad 19)In Sāṃkhya, unconscious nature (prakŗti) is the "cause" (at least in the sense of the

material cause) of the world; in Trika, consciousness itself is that cause, the world being nothing but its external manifestation. The Trika explains the phenomenal world as resulting from the progressive obscuration and constriction of the Lord’s supreme energy, which is his freedom. Thus it establishes a ‘genesis of bondage’ (Hulin 1978: 304 une ‘genese de la servitude’) against the background of an essential vibration which, though progressively weakened, or so it seems, never ceases to tremble. Śakti is the fundamental principle that distinguishes Trika from Sāṃkhya, despite similarities in the cosmologies of the two systems. The Trika understands empirical diversity in terms of the dichotomy of enjoyer (bhoktŗ) and object of enjoyment (bhogya). In this context, puruşa is the enjoyer whereas prakŗti represents the totality of such objects — an argument similar to that of the Sāṃkhya concerning the puruşa, who "contemplates" prakŗti as though she were a dancer, or an actress, performing before him (SK 59). prakŗti offers the entire objective world to the enjoyer, although its objectivity is as yet potential. Thus TS VIII, p. 83 contrasts the actualized world (prakŗtitattvasya sargaḥ), with prakŗti defined as the homogeneous and quiescent aggregate of the three guņas. prakŗti is not only creation in potentia, it is also the fundamental principle persisting in each and every particular object of enjoyment, once creation has taken place: [...] eşa eva sukhaduḥkhamohātmakabhogyaviśeşānusyūtasya sāmānyamātrasya tadguņasāmyāparanāmnaḥ prakŗtitattvasya sargaḥ, ‘[...] Such is the creation pertaining to prakŗtitattva; this prakŗtitattva, which is nothing else than the common principle (sāmānya) inherent (anusyūta) in [each] specific object of enjoyment made of pleasure, pain and delusion, is also termed the equilibrium of those guņas (tadguņasāmya)’. The TS (pp. 84-85) gives an alternative definition of prakŗti as bhogyasāmānya, ‘state of equilibrium of the objects of enjoyment’, which makes it the archetype of objectivity itself. Some disturbance of this ideal equilibrium is necessary so that actual objectivity emerges from its potential "cause". So TS (p. 85): evaṃ kşubdhāt pradhānāt kartavyāntarodayo nākşubdhād iti, ‘Thus other effects [buddhi, etc.] emerge from the disturbed pradhāna, and not from the undisturbed one’. The point is of so much importance that the TS postulates additionally a guņatattva: kşobho ‘vaśyam eva antarāle ‘bhyupagantavya iti siddhaṃ sāṃkhyāparidŗşţaṃ pŗthagbhūtaṃ guņatattvaṃ, ‘One must necessarily accept that

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this disturbance takes place in-between [the two principles]. Thus has a guņatattva distinct [from prakŗti and buddhi] been established, which Sāṃkhya has failed to discern’. The term ‘kşobha’ has itself been borrowed from the Sāṃkhya, more precisely from late Sāṃkhya, where it appears intended to gloss over a glaring lapsus in the system — for the initial coming into contact of two utterly unlike principles (for so it conceives puruşa and prakŗti) is indeed difficult to justify. A true dualism is thus difficult to maintain, and this may have been the reason for the introduction of the three qualities, which are never, in fact, in a state of equilibrium; their ‘resting’ being then nothing but an hypothesis motivated by the doctrine itself. This means that, regarding the guņas, the loss of equilibrium is as much a category in its own right as the equilibrium itself, and thus deserves to receive a name, that of guņatattva.

12. Evolution of the phenomenal world (YR ad 19)In the Sāṃkhya (see SK 22), whereas puruşa stands isolated, neither an effect, nor

a cause, buddhi and ahańkāra proceed successively from prakŗti, the primal cause; cf. also SK 3, which defines four types of entities by having recourse to the opposition ‘producer-product’ (prakŗti-vikŗti). Then, from ahańkāra, the ‘group of sixteen’ emerges, which includes manas, the five buddhīndriyas, the five karmendriyas and the five tanmātras. A further analysis (SK 25) distinguishes the ‘group of eleven’ (manas and all the ten indriyas), effect of the sāttvikāhańkāra (also named vaikŗta), from the five tanmātras, products of the tāmasāhańkāra (also named bhūtādi, for it is the secondary cause of the bhūtas); see n. 593. And all of them are directly, i.e., horizontally, related to ahańkāra, instead of vertically evolving from one another (SK 25-28). As for the five bhūtas, they proceed from the five tanmātras; see Hulin 1978: 73ff. and Larson 1979: 179ff., 236 (chart). On the other hand, although SK 33 defines the antahkaraņa as threefold, its identity as a whole is not fixed, buddhi, ahańkāra and manas being clearly distinguished from each other and endowed with different status. The Trika also derives the manas and the ten indriyas from the sāttvikāhańkāra (see n. 593), whereas the five tanmātras proceed from the aspect of the sāttvikāhankāra in which tamas assumes predominance, as shown by two parallel passages of TS VIII. See TS VIII, p. 87: tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca buddhīndriyapañcakaṃ ca, tatra manasi janye sarvatanmātrajananasāmarthyayuktaḥ sa janakaḥ, ‘From the sāttvika [ahańkāra] manas and the pentad of the buddhīndriyas proceed. Once the manas is evolved [from the sāttvikāhańkāra], the same ahańkāra [in the aspect in which tamas is predominant] becomes the cause capable of giving rise to all the tanmātras’, and TS VIII, p. 89: bhoktraṃśācchādakāt tu tamaḥpradhānāhańkārāt tanmātrāņi vedyaikarūpāņi pañca, ‘However, from the [aspect of the sāttvika] ahańkāra in which tamas assumes predominance, and which veils the enjoyer’s part [viz., the subjectivity], proceed the five tanmātras, which are only object of knowledge (vedya) [and which do no partake of the knower, as is the case with the manas and the indriyas]’. This conception of the tanmātras originating from the sāttvikāhańkāra (even though it is from its tāmasa part) is an innovation as regards the Sāṃkhya scheme. In fact, in the Trika reasonings, the sāttvikāhańkāra itself is triguņātmaka: although it abounds in sattva, some traces of the two other guņas remain; see Mukund Rām Shāstrī ad TS VIII, p. 87, n. 80 (ad tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca...): sāttvikaḥ sattvapradhāno yato guņībhūtatayā rajastamasor api sambhāva ity arthaḥ. Therefore, one has to understand that, once the manas has emerged from the

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sāttvikāhańkāra equally characterized by the three guņas, the five tanmātras are produced from the subordinated tamoguņa of the sāttvikāhańkāra. The Trika agrees again with the Sāṃkhya by making the bhūtas directly emerge from the tanmātras. However, its perspective is altogether different, since it emphasizes, with the concept of kşobha, ‘disturbance’, the persistence of vibrating consciousness within all the levels of phenomenal diversity. Thus, the entire process of the manifestation of the tattvas takes place according to the principle that the cause in its disturbed form is called the effect (see TS VIII, p. 90, in Appendix 13).

13. tanmātras (YR ad 22)Each tanmātra is considered to be the quintessential form of the corresponding

mahābhūta, inasmuch as it constitutes its distinctive quality. Thus sound is associated with ether, or cosmic space, considered to be the substratum of the propagation of waves; touch with air, etc. Yet, with the exception of ether which has sound for its unique quality, one has to admit that other mahābhūtas possess more than one sensible quality, or, to put it differently, that one tanmātra may be present in more than one mahābhūta: for instance sound is present in all the mahābhūtas. Thus classical Sāṃkhya (e.g., Yuktidīpikā 38) has elaborated the theory of the progressive accumulation of the qualities, furthermore explained — | just as in YR ad 22 — as the cumulative combination of the tanmātras, according to the principle that the effect is proportionate to the cause. Hence, if space is experienced as sonorous, air as sonorous and tangible, fire as sonorous, tangible and visible, water as sonorous, tangible, visible and savory, earth as sonorous, tangible, visible, savory and fragrant, it is because space proceeds from sound, air from sound and contact, etc. This is also the position of the Trika (see YR’s commentary itself) with the difference that emphasis is once more laid on the principle of kşobha, as shown by TS VIII, p. 90 (emending śabdatanmātraṃ to sparśatanmātraṃ): tatra śabdatanmātrāt kşubhitād avakāśadānavyāpāraṃ nabhaḥ — śabdasya vācyādhyāsāvakāśasahatvāt/ sparśa(śabda)tanmātraṃ kşubhitaṃ vāyuḥ śabdas tv asya nabhasā virahitābhāvāt/ rūpaṃ kşubhitaṃ tejaḥ pūrvaguņau tu pūrvavat/ rasaḥ kşubhita āpaḥ pūrve trayaḥ pūrvavat/ gandhah kşubhito dharā pūrve catvārah pūrvavat/ anye śabdasparśabhyām vāyuḥ ityādikrameņa pañcabhyo dharaņy iti manyante/ guņasamudāyamātraṃ ca pŗthivī nānyo guņī kaścit/, ‘From disturbed (kşubhita) sound (śabdatanmātra) emerges the ether [or space] (nabhas), with its function of providing space — for the word [as articulated sound] gives place to the expressed meaning. Air (vāyu) is nothing else than disturbed touch (sparśa); however, sound (śabda) is also present, for air cannot exist without space (nabhas) [whose quintessential quality is sound]. Fire (tejas) is nothing else than disturbed form (rūpa); however, the two preceding principles [i.e., tanmātras] are also present, as in the previous scheme. Water (āpas) is nothing else than disturbed savor (rasa); however, the three preceding principles are also present, as in the previous scheme. Earth (dharā) is nothing else than disturbed odor (gandha); however, the four preceding principles are also present, as in the previous scheme. Others maintain that earth proceeds from [all] the five [tanmātras] in keeping with a scheme according to which air proceeds from both sound and tangibility. Moreover earth is merely the aggregate of the qualities [i.e., of the tanmātras] and there is no substratum of qualities (guņin) which would be different from [earth as aggregate of the qualities]’. For what matters in soteriological systems as the Sāṃkhya and the Trika is not so much the question of creation as

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manifestation as the correlated questions of the process of cognition and that of liberation. This is why the Sāṃkhya contends that, during the process of cosmic dissolution, each mahābhūta is reabsorbed into the tanmātra from which it proceeds, and all the tanmātras are in turn reabsorbed into ahańkāra. ĪPV III 1, 10-11, vol. II: 242, synthesizes the Trika’s viewpoint not only on the entire meya, that cognizable reality made of twenty-three elements (the thirteen karaņas and the ten kāryas) whose cause is prakŗti, but also on the entire ‘genesis of bondage’ which starts with māyā. Observing that, in ĪPK III 1, 11, the bhūtas are mentioned first, before the tanmātras, AG develops all the implications of such an order: sthūlaṃ kāryaṃ pŗthivy āpaḥ tejo vāyur nabha id pañca bhūtāni/ sūkşmam eşām eva rūpaṃ gandho raso rūpaṃ sparśaḥ śabda iti/ tatraikaikaguņam ākāśādy ekaikavŗddhaguņaṃ veti darśanabheda iti na vivecito ‘nupayogāt/ tatra sthūlaṃ vibhaktam avibhāgasyānumāpakam iti sthūlarūpopakramam uktam/ atra pŗthivyādyābhāsā eva miśrībhūya ghaţādisvalakşaņībhūtāḥ karmendriyair upasarpitā buddhīndriyair ālocitā antaḥkaraņena saṃkalpitābhimataniścitarūpā vidyayā vivecitāḥ kalādibhir anurañjitāḥ pramātari viśrāmyanti/ iti tātparyam, ‘The gross effect [manifests itself] as the five physical elements (bhūta): earth, water, fire, air and ether. Their subtle forms are odor, savor, color, touch and sound. On this point systems differ. Some hold that ether, etc., have only one quality each. But others maintain that each item, in the order given here, has one quality more than the item succeeding. However, since this point is not very important, it has not been discussed here. The gross, which presents the state of differentiation, is the means of inferring the undifferentiated state. Hence the gross categories are stated here first. According to this system [i.e., to the Trika], the manifested principles (ābhāsa) such as earth, etc., mixing with one another, assume the form of a definite object, such as jar, etc. They come to rest in the subject as they are approached by the organs of action, or perceived by the cognitive organs, synthesized, taken as one’s own, and ascertained by [the manas, the ahańkāra and the buddhi constitutive of] the antaḥkaraņa, differentiated by circumstancial Knowledge (vidyā) and affected by [the other kañcukas as] kalā, etc. This is the implied meaning’ (tr. Pandey, modified); see the Tantrasadbhāva, quoted n. 545.

14. Doctrines of the Self (YR ad 27)See also PH 8 and its vŗtti: naiyāyikādayo jñānādiguņagaņāśrayaṃ

buddhitattvaprāyam evātmānaṃ saṃsŗtau manyante, apavarge tu taducchede śūnyaprāyam/ ahaṃpratītipratyeyaḥ sukhaduḥkhādyupādhibhiḥ tiraskŗta ātmeti manvānā mīmāḥsakā api buddhāv eva nivişţāḥ/ jñānasaṃtāna eva tattvam iti saugatā buddhivŗttişv evaparyavasitāḥ/, ‘The Naiyāyikas, etc., admit a Self, which, being the substratum of knowledge and other qualities, is for all intents and purposes (°prāya) identical with the category of buddhi, as far as worldly experience is concerned. At the moment of liberation, when all [guņas] disappear, the Self is for all intents and purposes identical with the Void. The Mīmāmsakas are settled [in taking the Self] as buddhi, inasmuch as they consider the Self that which is apprehended in the cognition ‘I’, veiled by the contingent conditions (upādhi) of pleasure and pain. The followers of Sugata [i.e., Yogācāra Buddhists] have concluded that [the Self is to be found among the] modes of the buddhi (buddhivŗtti), holding that the Real (tattva) is nothing but a series (or continuum) of cognitions (jñānasaṃtāna)’.

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15. Vaiśeşika and Vaiyākaraņa concepts of jāti, sāmānya, sattā, and mahāsattā (YR ad 27)

It is a typically Vaiśeşika notion that even the ‘universal’ (sāmānya) must be distinguished into at least two varieties: ‘being’ (sattā) — which is devoid of external distinction, therefore, unqualified — and what comes to be known as jāti, ‘genus’ — which is common to various individuals but differs from genus to genus, on which distinctions depends our behavior in the world. Frauwallner observes, apropos (II: 104), that what are called sāmānyaviśeşa, ‘Gemeinsamkeit-Besonderheit’ (‘generality-particularity’), occupy the logical space between sāmānya as such, that is, sattā, ‘being’ (untouched by particularity), and viśeşa as such, the ‘particular’ (the ‘atom’, untouched by any universal). This ‘sāmānyaviśeşa’’ was by the Vaiśeşikas then termed ‘jāti’, so as not to confuse it with their ‘ākŗti’, which for them did not mean ‘common form’ (op. cit: 102). YR seems however to confound ‘genus’ (jāti) with ‘universal’ (sāmānya), which, according to Frauwallner, should be distinguished, mahāsattā as such is not a Vaiśeşika term. It appears in the grammatical tradition, particularly in Helārāja’s commentary on Bhartŗhari (avat. to VP III 1, 33), in a characterization of the ‘advayanaya’, presumably the advaya of Bhartŗhari: [...] advayanaye paramārthasatyekaiva jātir mahāsattākhyā parabrahmasvabhāvā, ‘In a monistic doctrine, this jāti termed mahāsattā is of the nature of parabrahman, the highest brahman, the only ultimate reality (paramārthasatī)’. The term mahāsattā appears also in the Trika; see ĪPK I 5, 13-14 (quoted n. 238), which passage characterizes consciousness endowed with awareness as supreme Speech (parāvāk), freedom (svātantrya), sovereignty (aiśvarya) of the supreme Self, fulguration (sphurattā), ‘great being’ (mahāsattā), unmodified by space and time (deśakālāviśeşinī). In the Trika tradition, the mahā- of mahāsattā may be understood as a reference, somewhat corrupted, to Vaiśeşika and Vyākaraņa doctrine, ‘great’ signifying ‘par excellence’, vis-a-vis all the other ‘sāmānyas’ that are tinged with particularity — as ‘great’ in the English idiom "God is the one great cause". On theVaiśeşika notion of sattā, see further Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 103-104-Lysenko 2007. It is difficult to recognize in YR’s idiosyncratic account any particular Vaiśeşika theory (see Keith 1921: 192-196; Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 3-180; Halbfass 1992; Scharf 1996; Lysenko 2007). What is implicitly at stake here is the Trika criticism of the Vaiśeşika system which distinguishes radically between dharmin, ‘substance, substrate’ [lit., ‘that which has the property’], and dharma, ‘property, quality’ — whereas Trika holds the contrary view, namely, that there is no essential difference between dharmin and dharma, or in Trika terms, between śaktimat and śakti(s); see TĀV I 158-159 (vol. II: 194): [...] khalu kāņādā ātmatvābhisaṃbandhād ātmā ityādinā dharmirūpam ātmānaṃ nirūpya [...], ‘Verily, the followers of Kaņāda, having explained that the ātman is "that which supports the attributes" (dharmin), according to the statement: "The Self (ātman) is such due to its connexion with Selfhood (ātmatva)". [...]’ — meaning that, for Vaiśeşikas, ātman is considered a dravya, a substance, and as such is connected with its jāti, namely, ātmatva, as well as with its qualities (guņa), namely, jñāna, sukhaduḥkha, etc., and is thus a dharmin distinct from its attributes (dharma). JR concludes his gloss by affirming the Trika position: na vastutaḥ kaścit śaktitadvator bhedaḥ, ‘In reality, there is no difference between energy (śakti) and its possessor [viz., śaktimat]’.

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16. Mīmāṃsaka position on the Self, according to the Trika (YR ad 32)After interpreting SpK I 4 from the Trika viewpoint, according to which anyatra,

‘elsewhere’, refers to the Supreme Lord, or supreme Self, Kşemarāja shows that the verse may also be understood both as formulating the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine and as its implicit and logical refutation, ‘anyatra’ thus refers to the puryaşţaka — a position conditionally adopted by Kşemarāja in order to demonstrate that one must not stop at that understanding, but should rather recognize, within this puryaşţaka, a transcendental Subject who is Śańkara or Śiva, as a ‘[uniform] mass of blissful consciousness’ (cidānandaghana); see SpN I 4: Mīmāṃsakaparihārāya tv etad itthaṃ vyākhyātavyam/ ahaṃ sukhītyādisaṃvido yās tā anyatreti puryaşţakasvarūpe pramātari sukhādyavasthābhir anusyūte otaprotarūpe [...] na tv asmadabhyupagate ‘smiṃś cidānandaghane śańkarātmani svasvabhāve -— iti na sarvadā sukhādyupādhitiraskŗto ‘yam ātmāpi tu cinmayaḥ/ yadā tu nijāśuddhyā vakşyamāņayāyaṃ svasvarūpaṃ gūhayitvā tişţhati tadā puryaşţakādyavasthāyāṃ sukhitvādirūpatāsya tatrāpi na nirodhas taiḥ sukhādibhir asya [...]/ ahaṃ kŗśo ‘haṃ sthūla ityādipratītiparihāreņa ahaṃ sukhī duhkhītyādi vadato ‘yam āśayaḥ, ‘In order to refute the Mīmāṃsakas, this [i.e., the term ātman] should be interpreted as follows. The cognitions such as "I am happy", etc., exist elsewhere (anyatra) [i.e., ‘in another substratum’, viz.,] in the cognizer (pramātŗ) in the form of the puryaşţaka, which is threaded through (anusyūta) the states of happiness, etc., that is, which is interwoven (otaprota) with them. [But] it does not signify for the [Mīmāṃsakas] that essential nature which is accepted by us, namely, Śańkara [Śiva] as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness. [As a consequence of our definition], this Self [according to us] is not always veiled by contingent attributes (upādhi) of pleasure, etc. [as Mīmāmsakas say]; rather, it is pure consciousness (cinmaya). When, through his own impurity (aśuddhi) [that we will later expound], he conceals his own nature and appears [conditionally] (tişţhati), he then, being in that state of puryaşţaka, etc., takes on the form of [the experiencer of] pleasure, etc. Even in this state, there is no obstruction [of his real nature] by those experiences of pleasure, etc. [...]. This is the real intention of him [viz., the Mīmāṃsaka] who says: "I am happy", "I am sad", etc., in rejection of assertions such as "I am thin", "I am fat", etc. [as characterizations of the Self]’; in other words, from the Trika point of view, the Mīmāṃsaka’s real intention is that the substratum of such experiences is a transcendent Self, defined as one mass of consciousness and bliss. Showing thus that the Mīmāṃsaka view implies within itself its own completion, Kşemarāja adds that one has only to submerge the puryaşţaka along with phenomenal diversity within the supreme Self (SpN I 4): sukhitvādipratītisaṃbhinnāṃ puryaşţakabhūmiṃ antarmukhe pade nimajjayaṃs tadanuşańgeņa bāhyasyāpi dehaghaţāder galanāt pratyabhijānāty eva svaṃ śivasvabhāvatvam, ‘Indeed, one recognizes (pratyabhijānāti) one’s own essential nature as Śiva by submerging one’s own condition, that of puryaşţaka, replete with experiences of pleasure, etc., in the inner state [viz., the Self], and by dissolving along with it the externality that consists of body, jar, etc’ (tr. Singh, modified).

17. śūnyavāda (YR ad 32)According to the avat. of SpN I 12-13, the Śūnyavādins are ‘the Vedāntins

(śrutyantavid), the Naiyāyikas (viz., Ākşapāda) and the Mādhyamikas, for whom remains only the principle of naught or universal destruction’ (viśvocchedarūpam abhāvātmakam eva tattvam avaśişyate). The Vedāntins (or Brahmavādins) are

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otherwise called Abhāvabrahmavādins, as this is developed by PHvŗ 8: asad evedam āsīd ity abhāvabrahmavādinaḥ śūhyabhuvam avagāhya sthitāḥ, ‘The Brahmavādins, adepts of non-Being (abhāva), descend into the region of Void (śūnyabhū) on the basis of [ChU VI 2, 1]: "In the beginning, this [world] was just Non-being" and remain [there]’. The discussion of SpN I 12-13 starts with the same quote from the ChU, whose full form is: sad eva saumya idam agrāsīd ekam evādviuyam/ taddhaika ahur asad evedam agrāsīd ekam evādviāyam/ tasmād asataḥ sad ajāyateti, ‘In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only without a second. Some people say "In the beginning, this was non-being alone, one only; without a second. From that non-being, being was produced." ‘ Similarly, the Śūnyavādins include the Mādhyamika Buddhists, as stated by PHvŗ 8 (mādhyamikā apy evam eva), ŚSV I 1 and TĀ I 33a, which formulates thus the Mādhyamika position: antahśūnyo ‘ham, ‘I am internally Void’. SpN I 5 describes the Mādhyamikas as sarveşām abhāvavādinaḥ, ‘those who assert the non-existence of everything’, whereas SpN I 12-13 quotes and refutes Nāgārjuna. See also ĀŚ II 23, which characterizes the Mādhyamikas as those who take the ātman to be amūrta, ‘without form’, which, according to the commentaries, means nihsvabhāva, ‘devoid of essence’.

18. neti neti (YR ad 32)This apophatic phrase comes first as a litany in the BĀU at the moment of

celebrating the ātman. Cf. BĀU II 3, 6: athāta ādeśo neti neti/ na hy etasmād iti nety anyat param asti, ‘Now therefore there is the teaching not this, not this for there is nothing higher than this, that he is not this’, and Ś ad loc; also BĀU III 9, 26: sa eşa neti nety ātmāgŗhyo na hi gŗhyate ‘śīryo na hi śīryate ‘sańgo na hi sajyate ‘sito na vyathate, na rişyati, ‘That self is not this, not this. It is incomprehensible, for it is not comprehended. It is indestructible, for it is never destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself. It is unfettered. It does not suffer. It is not injured’; same text in BĀU TV 2, 4; IV 4, 22; IV 5, 15. See also MāU 7 and ĀŚ III 26 (which quotes the pratika of BAU III 9, 26): sa eşa neti netīti vyākhyātaṃ nihnute yataḥ/ sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājaṃ prakāsate//, ‘De ce que [le passage scripturaire:] "II n’est, quant a lui, ni ainsi, ni ainsi..." nie tout ce qui avait ete expose en detail, en invoquant comme raison [son] insaisissabilite, il appert clairement que le [brahman est] non-ne’ (tr. Bouy — ‘Since, by stating: "It is not this, it is not that", [the Śruti] denies what it had elaborately expounded, giving as a reason that [the brahman] is entirely ungraspable, it clearly appears that this [brahman] is unborn’); also ĀŚ IV 83a, where the Śūnyavādins’ position is alluded to by [...] nāsti nāsāti. [...], in the course of referring to various conceptions of the Self (ātman), considered qua its being or existence. As observed by Ānandagiri ad loc, the repetition (vīpsā) of nāsti is meant to signify the Void as absolute (ātyantika). Note that the Yogācāras have accused the Mādhyamikas of professing nihilism (cf. Bouy ĀŚ: 295-296). So do the Śaivas, as YR demonstrates here. They hold that not only does nihilism amount to an aporia, but also that it has for its corollary the superimposition of a false insentience on the Self. Even though the Mādhyamikas deny the accusation of nihilism, claiming rather that their doctrine of śūnyatā is catuşkoţivinirmuktā, ‘free from the tetralemma’ — that is, the four alternative propositions: idaṃ sat, ...asat, ...sadasat, ...na sadasat, ‘X exists, ‘...does not exist’, ‘...both exists and does not exist’, ‘...neither exists nor does not exist’, Śaivas take all this to be mere empty logic.

19. Kallaţa (YR ad 42)

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As stated in the auto-commentary, PH 18 deals with mystical techniques alternative to ‘the rigorous disciplines that are prāņāyāma, mudrā, bandha, etc.’. Kşemarāja quotes Kallaţa in the context of the exposition of the śaktivikāsa, ‘blossoming of energy’, which he presents as extraneous to Pratyabhijñā doctrine (śaktisańkocādayas tu yady api pratyabhijñāyāṃ na pratipāditāḥ), and as ‘resorting to the sacred tradition’ (āmnāyika), which the context further allows us to identify as the Krama (see PHvŗ 19, which refers to the Kramasūtras). Kallaţa’s line appears there as an aphoristic definition of the śaktivikāsa, a technique of inner absorption with external expansion of the senses, also called bhairavīmudrā (bhairavīmudrānupraveśayuktyā bahiḥ prasaraņam), and described as śakter vikāsaḥ antarnigūdhāyā akramam eva sakalakaraņacakravisphāraņena, ‘The blossoming of the energy hidden internally results from the simultaneous opening of the entire wheel of sense-organs’. It is again defined by the Kakşyāstotra cited in the same passage (also quoted in SpN I 11): sarvāḥ śaktīś cetasā darśanādyāḥ sve sve vedyeyaugapadyena vişvak/ kşiptvā madhye hāţakastambhabhūtas tişţhan viśvādhāra eko ‘vabhāsi//, ‘Throwing by will all the powers like seeing, etc., simultaneously and on all sides into their respective objects and remaining [unmoved] within, like a gold pillar (hāţakastambha), you [O Śiva] alone appear as the foundation of the universe’ (tr. Singh). Later on, the vŗtti relates the śaktivikāsa to the practices at work in the ūrdhvakuņḍalinī, according to a process requiring ‘the restraint of the prāņa between the two eyebrows, which [restraint] is accomplished by the energy of the subtle prāņa which develops gradually through the regulation of the vibrations in the cavities of the nose’ (nāsāpuţaspandakramonmişatsūksmaprāņaśaktyā bhrūbhedanena; tr. Singh, modified); on the details of this esoteric and complex procedure, see the lengthy exposition of PHvŗ 18, Singh PH: 41-42,150-152. It is noteworthy that the śaktivikāsa resorts to the śāktopāya (Singh PH: 30), inasmuch as the exposition of PS 41-46 is mainly made from this viewpoint. Therefore, Kallaţa’s aphoristic statement means that the ‘blossoming of energy’ takes place by means of the transformation of extroverted into introverted consciousness, at the very moment that consciousness turns outward, simultaneously opening all the sense-organs; a paradoxical practice that consists in reaching the greatest interiorization at the moment of, and through, the widest externalization.

The hemistich quoted here by YR is not found in the Spandakārikā, if indeed the text is to be attributed to Kallaţa at all: according to some, among whom Bhāskara (ŚSvā I 4-5: 2-3), and Utpalavaişņava (SpP, 7th liminary verse), Kallaţa is the author of the SpK, whereas Kşemarāja (ŚSV II 4-7) ascribes the authorship of the SpK to Vasugupta (on this question, see Dyczkowski SpK: 21-24, and Sanderson 2007: 405-407, who concludes in favor of Kallaţa’s authorship). Nor is the hemistich found in Kallaţa’s vrtrj to the Spandakārikā — a brief gloss, which he himself calls Spandasarvasva in his first concluding stanza. According to AG (ĪPVV, vol. II: 30), Kallata is also the author of two commentaries on the ŚS, the Tattvārthacintāmaņi [TĀC] and the Madhuvāhinī, of which the TĀC is most often referred to and quoted (see Sanderson 2007: 405, n. 578). From all those quotes, it appears that the TĀC had a section dealing with the movement and spiritual properties of breath; cf. TĀ X 187-227, and probably TĀ XXVIII 338-340, on which JR comments by citing three sūtras (among which: prāk saṃvit prāņe pariņatā, also quoted in TĀV III 141, V 6, V 44-48a, XV 303, XVII 85, XXVIII 293, 338-339), which he ascribes to Kallaţa, although

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without giving a source. It appears also that the TĀC dealt with a peculiar method of animal sacrifice involving the withdrawal and absorption by the officiant of the animal’s breath, referred to in TĀ XVI 36-45 and in Kşemarāja’s NTU XX 27ff. (vol. I: 226), where the teaching of this technique is ascribed to Kallaţa’s TĀC. The TĀC seems also to have been famous for its exposition of the mystical practice of tuţipāta, the ‘fall of the moment’. It is indirectly referred to by TĀ X 208 (vol. V: 2026), which names Kallaţa, while JR quotes from TĀC: tuţipāte sarvajñatādayaḥ; SpP 22 [= ad I 22]: 31, quotes it more extensively, although not referring explicitly to TĀC: tuţipāte sarvajñatvasarvakartŗtvasarveśitādayaḥ/ eşa ca gurūpadeśenādārāt pañkşyaḥ, ‘It is during the "fall of the moment" that omniscience, omnipotence and mastery of all things, etc., (become clearly manifest) and (so) that should be examined with reverence in accord with the Master’s teachings’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 159, modified); same quote in PTV 5-9a (Gnoli PTV: 61). Let us note that Utpalavaişņava takes Kallaţa, whom he considers to be the author of the SpK, to be the author of two other works: the Tattvavicāra and the Svasvabhāvasaṃbodha, from which he quotes (in SpP 1: 9, and SpP 30 [= II 4a]: 38-39, for the former; in SpP 1: 7-8, for the latter). For lack of other clues, we may only advance the hypothesis that the line from Kallaţa quoted by YR and Kşemarāja may belong to the TĀC, insofar as the verse that SpP 21 [= I 21], p. 30, draws from the TĀC agrees with the context in which the PHvŗ (ad 18: 98, in Singh ed.) quotes that same line of Kallaţa, namely the description of mystical techniques of inner absorption responding to the Krama doctrine. This is this verse from the TĀC: itthaṃ tattadanalpamohadalanaprāptasvarāpodayo yogī nityam anāmabhāvavirahāt svātmasthito nirvŗtaḥ/ dŗśyadraşţŗvivekavid bhavapadavyāpī vimuktāmayo vyutthāne pi samādhibhāg bhavati san mokşaśriyaḥ kāraņam//, ‘Thus, blissful is the yogin who, cutting through each of the many [forms of] ignorance, has attained the dawning of his own nature. Established within himself, eternally free as he is of [all] that he is not, perceiving the distinction between the seer and the seen, he, from whom every sickness has been expunged, pervades the plane of ordinary existence. He delights in contemplation (samādhi) even when he rises from [his meditation] (vyutthāna), and so is the fount of the glory of true liberation’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 158, modified). Similarly, as we have seen, PHvŗ 18 quotes Kallaţa in order to support its definition of the bhairavīmudrā, a Krama practice, and PH 19 describes the great yogin whose samādhi-state persists even in vyutthāna, i.e., even when he rises from his meditation, which is exactly the purport of the TĀC quoted above. Moreover, Utpalavaişņava’s SpP 43 [= III 11] might offer a clue as to whether the line of Kallaţa (quoted in YR ad 42 and in PHvŗ 18) that deals with the practice of the bhairavīmudrā should be ascribed to the TĀC. In effect, Utpalavaişņava identifies the yogin’s state described in SpK III 11 as the vikāsavŗtti, ‘process of expansion’, in other words as the bhairavīmudrā or śaktivikāsa described also in PHvŗ 18 and SpN I 11. In support of his interpretation, Utpalavaişņava not only quotes the passage of the Kakşyāstotra that is also quoted in PHvŗ 18 and SpN I 11, but he explicitly refers to the TĀC as a text describing the same state (sthiti), which is called there ‘secret mudrā’ (rahasyamudrā): yā caişā sthitiḥ saiva tattvārthacintāmaņau rahasyamudrety uktā. In addition, one should consider Kşemarāja’s assertion (SpN I 1:6) according to which his first two interpretations of śakticakravibhavaprabhava (in SpK I 1) [the first taking the śaktis to be the twelve Kālīs of the Wheel of energies; the second re-

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establishing the absolute sovereignty of the Lord] agree with the very terms of Kallaţa’s vŗtti: tad uktaṃ śrībhaţţakallaţena vijñānadehātmakasya śakticakraiśvaryasya utpattihetutvam/ ity etad vŗttyakşarāņām atra vyākhyādvaye ‘py anurūpyam, ‘The revered Kallaţa has said: "It is he, whose soul and substance are [nothing but] consciousness, who has [therefore] mastery of the Wheel of energies, who is the cause of the production [of the universe]". The two interpretations given here [by me] agree with the wording of his gloss’; cf. Kallaţa’s vŗtti ad SpK I 1 quoted above, where Śiva is said to be ‘the cause of the generation of the Wheel of energies’, and his Tattvavicāra quoted in SpP 1: 9: śaktiprasarasańkocanibaddhāv udayavyayau/ yasyātmā sa śivo jñeyaḥ sarvabhāvapravartakaḥ//, ‘[All things] arise and fall away in consonance with the extension and withdrawal of [Śiva’s] power. Know that their essential nature is Śiva, Who impels all things’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 145).

20. bhāvanā (YR ad 68)On bhāvanā, see TĀ II 12-13, which distinguishes between bhāvanā, ‘realization’,

and avadhāna, ‘concentration’; TĀ IV 14b defines it as illumination or revelation: sphuţayed vastu yāpetaṃ manorathapadād api//, ‘[bhāvanā], which discloses suddenly a reality exceeding the realms of desire [that is, a reality that transcends anything one might imagine] As emphasized by TĀV IV 13-14, bhāvanā is nothing but the ‘ultimate term[or limit]’ (para kāşţhā) of reasoning (tarka, in TĀV IV 14, or sattarka, in IV 14), namely, the ‘ultimate term [or limit]’ of the certitude (niścaya, in śloka 13) that is proper to ‘those who know’ (kovidāḥ, in IV 14), that is which consists in knowing that nonduality is ultimate reality: tarka eva hi parāṃ kāşţhām upagato bhāvanety ucyate, ‘When reasoning reaches its ultimate limit, it is called bhāvanā’ (TĀV IV 14, vol. III: 629). Similarly, TĀV IV 13, vol. Ill: 629: sa eva hi mahātmanāṃ dehādyāīocanena yathāyathamabhyāsātiśayāt vikalpaśuddhim ādadhānaḥ, parāṃ kāşţhām upagataḥ son, bhāvanātmakatāṃ yāyāt, yenāsphuţam api saṃvidrūpaṃ sphuţatām āsādayet//, ‘Indeed, after [reasoning] has effected the purification of the thought constructs (vikalpaśuddhi) through one or another of the ways of reaching the end of the stage of repeated practice — [in other words] by studying the revered great Masters’ [teachings] concerning the body, etc. — [that reasoning,] thereby reaching its ultimate limit, becomes bhāvanā, by which [process] what was unclear, even though of the form of consciousness, reaches clarity’. This passage of JR’s commentary sheds light on the organization of PS 39-41, for ‘the revered great Masters’ [teachings] concerning the body, etc’ alludes to the eradication of the double error expounded in PS 39-40; once that process of eradication is complete (that is, when reasoning has reached its ultimate limit, annulling all idea of difference), that certitude becomes bhāvanā (the matter at issue in PS 41), the fulgurating awareness of one’s own essence as consciousness. Thus is formulated the experience that transforms the yogin into a jīvanmukta (YR ad 39): ‘I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe’. See also the definition of bhāvanā given by SpN II 6-7: 52-53, quoting the SvT: [...] sarvaṃ śivaśaktimayaṃ smaret [v.l. (KSTS 44) sarvaṃ śivamayaṃ smaret] (SvT VII 244b) // [...] jīvann eva vimukto ‘sau yasyeyaṃ [v.l. (KSTS 44) yasyaişā] bhāvanā sadā/ yaḥ śivaṃ bhāvayen nityaṃ na kālaḥ kalayet tu tam [v.l. (KSTS 44) śivo hi bhāvito nityaṃ na kālaḥ kalayec chivam] (SvT VII 259)//, ‘"One should consider everything as made of Śiva and Sakti". [...] He becomes

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liberated, even in this life, who gives himself over once and for all to that realization (bhāvanā), for time could not act on him who would realize (bhāvayet) Śiva continously’. Thus bhāvanā is defined as the ‘realization that everything is made of Śiva and Śakti’, that is, as perfect knowledge: tad evaparamaṃ jñānaṃ bhāvanāmayam işyate, ‘Supreme knowledge consists of bhāvanā’ (quoted in TĀV IV 14, vol. III: 630). As such, bhāvanā is characterized as instrumental in attaining the state of jīvanmukti. Also Silburn 1981: 191; Chenet 1987, and 1998-1999, vol. II: 545ff.

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