Paradiplomacy and the State of the Nation
Transcript of Paradiplomacy and the State of the Nation
ParadiplomacyandtheStateoftheNation
ACOMPARATIVEANALYSISFRANCESCADICKSON
InpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsfortheDegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy
CardiffSchoolofLawandPolitics
CardiffUniversity
Submittedforexamination:2017
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DECLARATION
This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.
Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD
Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17
STATEMENT 2
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own.
Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17
STATEMENT 3
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.
Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17
STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Academic Standards & Quality Committee.
Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17
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AcknowledgmentsThisresearchwasconductedwiththegenerousbackingofaCardiffUniversityPresident’sScholarship,alongwiththekindsupportoftheGermanAcademicExchangeService(DAAD)toconductfieldresearchinBavaria.Thethesiscouldnothavebeenproducedwithoutthecontinuousencouragementandunwaveringsupport(includingthroughouttwoyear-longperiodsofmaternityleave)ofCardiffUniversity’sexceptionalWalesGovernanceCentreandeachofmycolleaguesthere,inparticularmygoodfriendManonGeorge.Itwasanunconventionalprocess,mostlyconductedpart-timefromafarminHerefordshire’sBlackMountains,amongsttheday-to-dayrealitiesofaruraltourismbusinessandduringthenap-timesoftwobabies;theunderstandingofallinvolvedatCardiffUniversity,theSchoolofLawandPoliticsandtheWalesGovernanceCentrewascrucial.SpecificthanksareowedtoDr.ChristianBeugerofCardiffUniversityandalltheparticipantsinourco-convenedworkshopon‘theMonstersofDiplomacy’in2014fortheirhelpinrefiningmythoughtsontheinternationalspacethatsub-stategovernmentsoccupy.IalsothankDr.FionaMcConnellofOxfordUniversityandtwoanonymousreviewersfortheircommentsonapieceofworkwhichhasgoneontoformthebasisofPartOneofthisthesis.InScotland,IamespeciallygratefultoDr.AndrewNealfromTheUniversityofEdinburghforselectingmeasapostgraduateresearchparticipantinhisESRC-sponsoredseminarseriesonSecurityinScotland,andfortheexposurethisallowedmetotheScottishpolicycontext.ThiswasofparticularvaluegiventhehighlysensitivenatureofthisissueareainScotlandduringthetimethatthisresearchwasconducted.IowethankstoProfessorPaulBehrensfromEdinburghUniversity’sSchoolofLawforconveningtheconferenceandeditingthesubsequentbook‘DiplomaticLawinaNewMillennium’,forfacilitatingmyattendanceattheconferencewithmy8-weekoldson,andforhishelpfulcommentsonmyworkonthistopic,whichformsthebasisofChapterThreeofthisthesis.InGermany,mythankstoProfessorArthurBenzofDarmstadtUniversityandhisdepartmentalcolleaguesforhelpingtoclarifyanddirectmyresearchinBavaria.ThanksalsotoProfessorChristopherDaaseandhiscolleaguesattheGoetheUniversityinFrankfurtfortheirworkshoponperformingagencyininternationalpolitics,whichprovidedaparticularlyusefulsounding-boardformyearlythoughtsonparadiplomacyandperformativity.MybiggestdebtofgratitudeisowedtomyPhDsupervisor,ProfessorRichardWynJones.Thisisnotonlyforthemanydetailedcommentsonthethesisitselfandtheunparalleledprofessionalsupportandguidancehehasoffered,butalsoforthebroaderresearchculturethathehascultivatedattheWalesGovernanceCentrewhich,amongstmanyotherthings,allowedmeahighdegreeofaccesstotheWelshpolicycontext.Mythankstoallthosebusyindividualswhoparticipatedintheproject,inparticulartothosewhogenerouslygrantedmeinterviewsandwhospokewithmuchcandourandclarity.MylastthanksaretomyhusbandEdandourchildrenfortheirpatience,andtotherestofmyfamilyfortheirmanyhoursofwillingchildcare!
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Abstract
Partofanewcohortofdiplomaticactors,sub-stategovernmentsrepresentaparticularlycomplexchallengeforourunderstandingofinternationalrelations.Theseactorsarebothterritoriallyconstitutedandgovernmental;theylookandsoundverysimilartostates.Crucially,however,theyarenotstatesatall.Whenparadiplomaticrelationsareconductedonthepartofsub-stategovernmentswithastrongregionalidentity,inparticular‘statelessnations’,therecansometimesbechallenge–implicitorexplicit–totheauthorityofthestatetospeakfor,orrepresent,itspeople.Thisthesistakesthreesuchstatelessnations:Wales,ScotlandandBavaria,andanalysestheirparadiplomaticactivities.Theuniquepoliticalcontextineachofthesecasestudiesisusedasaframewithinwhichtounderstandandinterpretboththemotivationsandimplicationsofsuchactivities.Usingaconceptualtoolkitlessfamiliartotraditionalparadiplomaticanalysis,includingsovereigntygames,performativityandmimicry,thestudyexploresthewaysinwhichsub-stategovernmentsacquireinternationalagency,andtheextenttowhichthisagencyiscontestedbyotheractors.Despitetherangeinpoliticalambitionsineachofthestatelessnationsconsidered,theparadiplomaticactivitiestheyconductedwereoftenremarkablysimilar.Whatdiffered,however,wasthewaythattheseactivitieswereinterpreted,dependingonthepoliticalcontextandthetenorofinter-governmentalrelationswithinthestate.Theparadoxofparadiplomacyisthatinmanywaysitremainsunremarkableinitsday-to-daypractices.Yet,atothertimes,sub-stategovernmentsusetheirinternationalrelationshipstomakeimportantclaimsabouttheirstatusandpositionwithintheirstate,thecurrencyofexchangesbecomingthatrarefiedconcept:sovereignty.Usingamarginalsiteofinternationalrelationssuchasparadiplomacy,thisthesisexplorestheheterogeneityofthefieldandthevarietyofrelationshipsthatexistandpersistwithinit.
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Introduction..................................................................................................................................1
Part1:TheParadoxofParadiplomacy.......................................................................................15
ChapterOne:LiteratureReview.................................................................................................16
Paradiplomacy:StructuresandOpportunities.....................................................................................19
I. Globalisation...........................................................................................................................19
II. TheEuropeanUnionandRegionalism....................................................................................20
III. DevolutionandDecentralisation.............................................................................................22
IV. Lecours2002:OpportunityStructures.....................................................................................24
TheAgencyofSub-stategovernments................................................................................................27
I. StatelessNations.....................................................................................................................28
II. The‘Self’andthe‘Other’.........................................................................................................32
III. Paradiplomacy,orMulti-LevelGovernance?...........................................................................34
TheSignificanceofParadiplomacy:ConceptualisingSub-stateActorness..........................................38
I. TheInternationalArena..........................................................................................................39
II. TheDomesticArena................................................................................................................40
TheoreticalFrameworks.......................................................................................................................41
I. TraditionalComparativePoliticsandIRTheory:ABridgeableDivide?...................................42
II. TheabsenceofIR.....................................................................................................................44
Conclusion:ThestateoftheLiterature................................................................................................47
ChapterTwo:AnewtheoreticalFramework.............................................................................49
Introduction.........................................................................................................................................49
Anewframeworkforthestudyofparadiplomacyinstatelessnations...............................................52
I. Delineatingautonomous,diplomaticactivities.......................................................................53
II. Hybridactors,hybridspaces:bringingIRtheoryintotheparadiplomaticfold.......................57
III. Mimicry,performativity,andlearningto‘talktheinternationaltalk’....................................64
IV. ParadiplomacyasaSovereigntyGame...................................................................................67
ResearchQuestions&Design..............................................................................................................71
Methodology........................................................................................................................................75
Methods...............................................................................................................................................76
Table1:AnalyticalFramework.AdaptedfromAdler-NissenandGad,2014:22..................................77
Limitations............................................................................................................................................78
CaseStudies.........................................................................................................................................80
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Part2:Paradiplomacy:TheWhysandTheWherefores............................................................89
ChapterThree:SkirtingOfficialdom...........................................................................................90
Introduction.........................................................................................................................................90
ParadiplomacyandDiplomaticLaw.....................................................................................................91
TheUK’sdevolvedregionsandtheVCDR............................................................................................92
Wales’OverseasOffices.......................................................................................................................96
Scotland’sOverseasOffices...............................................................................................................103
Germany’sBasicLawandtheStatusofBavariaundertheVCDR......................................................112
Bavaria’sOverseasOffices.................................................................................................................115
Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................124
Chapter4:‘It’s[notalways]theEconomy,stupid’:thePoliticsofParadiplomacy.................129
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................129
Sub-stateSovereigntyGames............................................................................................................132
NationBuildingandtheMimicryofStatehood:PlayingtheLongGame...........................................136
I. Wales.....................................................................................................................................139
II. Scotland.................................................................................................................................143
III. Bavaria..................................................................................................................................147
Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................154
Chapter5.Sub-stategovernmentsasInternationalAgents:Learningto‘WalktheWalk’?..157
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................157
ParadiplomacyasPerformance:AnIntroductoryNote.....................................................................160
Thenewrulesofthegame.................................................................................................................162
Speaking‘forthepeople’orspeaking‘likeastate’?ParadiplomacyandLegitimacy........................166
I. ThecuriouscaseofScotland’sPandas..................................................................................172
II. VanguardWalesinCopenhagen&Lesotho..........................................................................176
III. BavariainBrussels.................................................................................................................182
Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................186
Chapter6:Sub-stateDiplomacy:theGood,theBad,andtheUgly?......................................189
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................189
Internationalrelations‘alacarte’?....................................................................................................192
Characterisingsub-statediplomacy...................................................................................................197
I. Paradiplomacyofgoodintentions........................................................................................198
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II. Value-addedparadiplomacy.................................................................................................201
III. Competitiveparadiplomacy..................................................................................................203
IV. Paradiplomacyonthefringesof‘highpolitics’.....................................................................205
V. Theparadiplomacyofrecognition.........................................................................................214
Conclusion:the‘fairweather’diplomats?.........................................................................................218
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................221
Bibliography..............................................................................................................................234
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ForBenjaminRowan&ErinGraceTwojoyousinterruptionstomystudies
Introduction
Whodoesdiplomacy?Weknowthat it’sno longerthemonopolyof impenetrable foreign
offices,ministerswithstiffupperlipsandmanicuredmoustaches.Aplaceremains,surely,for
theappropriatelyattiredattaché,briefcaseinhand.Butwhatofsoftpower,thesubtleplays
ofpublicdiplomacy?TheTwitter-happy,Facebook-friendlyprotagonists,notjustpromoting
thediplomaticmessagesofstates,butofotheractors:faithgroups,advocatesofminority
rights,breakawaygovernments?It’satruism-andyetit’strue-thepracticesofdiplomacy
are changing, proliferating, becoming more inclusive. It is no longer easy to distinguish
‘official’diplomacyfromthiswiderpoolofinteractions.
Atthesametime,inanotherrealm,thepoliticalcurrencyofregionalism,self-determination
andnation-buildinghasanincreasedpotency.Ifonepullsatthisthread,allsortsofissues
come tumbling out. Regions and devolved governments in democratic states clamour for
more authority, more autonomy. Religious and ethnic factions break away into new
unrecognised governments or self-declared states. Indigenous peoples stake a claim on
incorporatedterritory,bethatforaseatatthetable-orforthewholetableitself.Fromcivic
nationalismthroughtocivilwar,thereisacontinuum.However,somethingdoeslinkboth
endsofthisspectrum:theuseofadiplomatictoolkit,toplaywiththerelativerolesorpower
positions that areheld. To secure specific, concreteobjectives or simply to challenge the
statusquo.
Wheretraditionaldiplomacymightfacea‘challenge’fromthepresenceofde-territorialized
actors,NGOs,transnationalcompaniesandinternationalorganizations,whatispresentedby
theabove,territorially-based,categoryofactorsissomethingreallyquitedifferent.Here,the
weakenedboundariesbetweenwhois,andwhoisnot,adiplomatmeetsimilarlyweakened
boundariesaroundwhatis,andwhatisn’t,astate.Weseethegovernment-territorynexus
particularlyclearlyastheseactorsexertsomeformofgovernmentalcontroloveradefined
territory,meaningthattheyhaveanawful lotmore incommonwithstatesthanwithany
NGO.Ofcourse;wemustnotgetaheadofourselves,orsetupstrawmen.Canadaisastate.
HayonWyeisnot(despitetheparodyperformedbytheself-proclaimed“KingofHay”).But
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whatofthestatusofquasi-sovereignactors,unrecognisedordefactostates,autonomous
regions,orregionsactivelyseekingstatehood?WhataboutNorthernCyprus,ortheTibetan
GovernmentinExile?Whatdowemakeoftheremnantsofcolonialism-overseasterritories
such as Guadeloupe, Gibraltar or Guam? What about regions such as Scotland, Venice,
Catalonia,KurdistanorQuebec?It isapparentthatmanynon-stateentitiesinfactpossess
manystate-likequalitiesandcompetences.
Ifdiplomacy is theconductbygovernmentalofficialsofrelationsornegotiationsbetween
states,thenthereisalargemassofgreyarearemaining.Wherethelooseningofdiplomatic
boundaries meets the proliferation of territorially based non-state - yet governmental -
actors,isanarearipeforresearch.Withinthisgrouparenotonlyunrecognisedstatesseeking
formal recognition from the international community, but also a whole host of regional,
governmental actors that increasingly employ the practices of diplomacy as part of their
attempts to reach and represent themselves upon a more global stage. Not seeking
statehood,butperhapsactingoutsideoftherestricted,parochialparameterssetoutforthem
-andoftenappealingtonationalsentimentsastheydoso.
Forregions -somewhorepresentsub-statenations,somewhoseek independence,some
whodoneither-thelureofadiplomatictoolkitishardtoresist.Acrosslargeswathesofthe
world,sub-stategovernments(mostoftenwheretheyareendowedwithaconstitutionalrole
and legislativeprofile) represent the interestsofa territoriallydefinedpeople,onewhose
constituencyoverlapswiththatofanation-state.Owingtothenecessitiesofourglobalised
age,thereareamultitudeofpragmatic,economicreasonsforsuchasub-stategovernment
to develop an international profile. In many cases, however, there are also compelling
politicalreasonsforthemtodoso.Thismaybebecausetheirconstituentsdemandagreater
voicewithin the state. Itmaybe inorder togain tractionona specific issueofparticular
importancetothatcommunity-fromfishingrightstominorityrights.Itmayalsobetoreflect
andpromotetheregion’sidentityoritsdemandsforself-government,nationhoodorother
formsofself-determination.
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Paradiplomacy - these international interactions, carriedoutbygovernmentsandofficials
belowthestate level - isone lenswithwhich to lookatwhat is,essentially,acollisionof
forces:theefflorescenceofaregionalist,sub-statenationalistorself-determinist ideology,
on the one hand, and the diversification and stratification of diplomatic practices on the
other.Theremaybeotherwaysinwhichtoviewthisrelationship,butthesheervolumeof
paradiplomaticexchangesandthedegreetowhichtheyhavebecomecommonplace,yetat
heartnotfullyunderstood,wouldsignalthatthisisagoodplacetostart.Theseemergent-
somemightargue,resurgent-practices,andthetwinforcesorphenomenathattheyreflect
(aburgeoningregionalistideology-andtheaccompanyinginstitutionalframework-andthe
diversification of diplomacy), may be on the periphery of what is considered ‘proper’
internationalrelations. Indeed, itmayseemtoomuchofa leaptodiscusstheminutiaeof
regionalexchangesinthesamebreathasthebighittersoftheIRmainstream:sovereignty,
authority,power.Butitispreciselyinthisunassumingborderlandbetweenthedomesticand
theinternationalthatthesethemesareplayedupon,challengedandreasserted.According
toAdler-NissenandGad(2012:3),enquiryatthemarginsofinternationalrelationshasthe
potentialtoshedagreatdealoflightintotheseforces,allowingthetrueheterogeneityof
practicestocometothesurface.It’sdifficulttoseesuchdynamics,astheyreallyare,when
wearing a ‘Westphalian straightjacket’, one that only allows either/or conceptions of
sovereigntyorstatehoodtobeconsidered(BuzanandLittle,2001:-25;Adler-NissenandGad,
2014:14).
Paradiplomacyisapracticepregnantwithcontradiction.Itcanrepresentasetoftoolsand
mechanisms by which hierarchically subordinate non-state actors attempt to reposition
themselvesinrelationtotheirstatecounterparts.Theyareabletospeakforagiven‘people’
inasensethatoverlapsaconstituencybothlevelsofgovernmentclaimtorepresentand,in
doingso,challengethecorefunctionsofstate-levelactorsandinstitutions.Yet,atthesame
time, itsmain composite activities - theMemoranda of Understanding between regional
governments, cultural exchanges and regional-twinning projects - are ordinary in the
extreme.Oratleast,theymayappeartobeso,giventheassumptionswetendtomakeabout
this tierof government. Likewise, in the self-perceptions andunderstandingsof sub-state
diplomats, their international role is both something minor and even expendable (‘low-
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hangingfruit’, inthewordsofone interviewee),and it isalsoan importantcomponentof
their nation-building projects, both implicit and explicit - some of which seek eventual
secessionfromthestateorafundamentalrecastingofstate-sub-statepowers.Aformof
politicaldoublespeakaboundsinthisterritory.Paradiplomacyisarguedtobe‘allaboutthe
economy’,groundedinthelegitimateandunavoidablyinternationalconcernsofrightfulsub-
stategovernance. Itcanalso,however,beabout identity,politicalpower,nationhoodand
even sovereignty. As this thesis will go on to explore, the broader implications of
paradiplomaticactivity-atleastinitsmostadvancedforms-aresimilarlyboundupinsuch
anoscillatorydynamic.Judgingwhetherornotaparadiplomaticactivityis‘advanced’ornot
is,ofcourse,asubjectiveprocess.However,therearesomeusefulparametersthatwemight
look to: does the activity stray outside of clearly or predominately functional, inward-
investment-seeking territory? Does the activity contradict, challenge or contest the
diplomacyofthestatewhichtheregionsitswithin?Isthereaclearconstitutionalbasisfor
theactivity?Doestheactivitygeneratedebateorcontroversy,withintheregion,thestate,
ormorewidely?Theresponsestothesequestionscanhelptoguideustowardsaclusterof
activitieswhichmayreflectamorecomplexsetofunderpinningforces.
Despite its recent resurgence as an area of academic interest, the extant paradiplomacy
literature has failed to adequately take account of this core feature of the practice - its
paradoxical,contradictorynature-ortoexplorethefullvaluethataninternationalrolemay
haveforsub-stateactorsfromanagency-orientatedperspective.Drivenbymoretraditional
comparativepoliticsperspectives,theviewhas-forthemostpart-beenthatparadiplomatic
actionscanbeexplainedawaybythedrivingforcesofEuropeanintegrationandglobalisation,
new internationalopportunitystructuresnecessitatingan internationalprofile for regions,
whose role is seen as largely reactive. In short, ‘it’s the economy, stupid’. Yet, sub-state
governmentsdisplayatremendousrangeintheirinternationalengagements,aswellasinthe
priorities they pursue on the international stage, and the ways in which they present
themselvestotheoutsideworld.Theyaredoingmorethansimplyrespondingtoexternal
forces: they are cultivating international personalities of different tenors, consciously
developingagencyinadomainwheretheirstatusis,toalargedegree,whattheymakeofit.
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Aspartofthesetop-down,consequentialistapproachestothestudyofsub-statediplomacy,
analyseshaveleanttowardsthedescriptiveratherthantheexplanatory(McConnelletal.,
2012:806).Consequently,suchstudieshaveignoredthewider,moreprobing,questionsthat
paradiplomatic practices can raise. For McConnell et al. (2012: 806) these surround the
legitimisingfunctionsthatdiplomaticactivitymayaccomplish,andtheperformativeaspects
ofparadiplomaticpractice.Meanwhile,thoughrelatedly,therehasbeenalackofwillingness
fromwithinthedisciplineofInternationalRelations(IR)toengagewiththistopic,outsideof
thenarrowerframeofglobalisation.NorhavecontributionsfromtheComparativePolitics
traditiontendedtodrawuponandutiliseinsightsfromotherfields,notablythatofIR,intheir
paradiplomaticinvestigations.Suchanapproach-drawingonthetheoreticalframeworksand
vocabulariesofbothinternationalrelationsandcomparativepolitics-would,however,seem
themostlogicalandappropriateoneforafieldofstudythatislocatedpreciselyontheborder
between the international and the domestic; nestedwithin the structure of a sovereign,
hierarchicalstateyetconcernedwiththeestablishmentofdirectrelationshipsandexchanges
withexternalactorsbeyondthatstate,bothsovereignandotherwise.Suchactivitieshavea
genesis, and indeedhave implications, that relate toboth the international anddomestic
spheres.Indeed,thisborderlandistheareathatAdler-NissenandGadidentifyasbeingmost
noticeablysubjecttothe‘blindness’ofacademicstothefullviewofwhatactuallyoccursin
politics, constrained by ‘either/or’ conceptions of sovereignty and rigid classifications of
politicalrelations(2014:14).
This study seeks to redress these imbalances. The approach adopted here is to place
paradiplomaticactivityinthe‘biggerpicture’,lookinganalyticallyatpreciselywhatitisthat
sub-state governments are doing internationally, the ways that they establish their
internationalagencies,themotivationstheymayhaveforpursuinganexternalroleandthe
implicationsoftheirdoingso.Theaimistouncoverthenuancesandcontradictory‘push-pull’
dynamicsevidentintherolesthatsub-stategovernmentsplayontheinternationalstage.At
thesametime,anattemptismadetoplaceparadiplomacyinacontextwhichallowsusto
see the value that diplomacy and international actornessmayhave for actors other than
sovereignstates.
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Thisthesisprogressesintwomainstages.Thefirststage(ChaptersOneandTwo)looksto
reposition paradiplomacy in a theoretical framework which better takes account of the
broadersignificanceofthepractice.ChapterOnesurveystheexistingliterature,highlighting
the dominance of top-down, structural and descriptive accounts of the practice, and the
absence of international relations narratives. In Chapter Two, a new perspective on
paradiplomatic activity is offered. This includes a deliberate attempt to distinguish
paradiplomatic endeavours - as autonomous, diplomatic activities - from awider pool of
interactions that include aspects of multi-level governance. The argument is made that
consideringthenuanceddifferencesbetweentheconceptsofparadiplomacyandmulti-level
allowsforamoredirectlighttobeshoneonthewaysinwhichparadiplomacytouchesupon
coreareasofstatecompetence,andthechallengesthattheseincursionspresent.Itisposited
thatmulti-levelgovernanceandparadiplomacycanrepresentmeaningfullydifferenttypesof
activity,conductedindifferentways,andwithdifferentaims.Instead,analternativerangeof
theoretical constructs are introducedwhich relatemore closely to the crucial element of
political contestation implicit in much paradiplomatic activity. At heart, it is an agency-
oriented framework. It allows for a consideration of the ways that diplomatic tools are
appropriatedbysub-stateactors,therolestheygoontoplayonaninternationalstageand
themeanings that these newly formed international identities have for such actors, and
indeedtheirstate-levelcounterparts.Specifically,thekeytheoreticalconstructsintroduced
in part oneof this thesis include: sovereignty games (Adler-Nissen andGad, 2012;Adler-
Nissen andGad, 2014),mimicry (McConnell, 2016; Duran, 2015;McConnell et al., 2012),
performativity(Neumann,2003)and-morefamiliartotraditionalparadiplomaticanalyses-
nation-building(Lecours,2002).ThefinalpartofChapterTwooutlinestheempiricalresearch
projectthatfollows,utilisingthealternativetheoreticalframeworkestablished.Itintroduces
thereadertoourthreecasestudies-Wales,ScotlandandBavaria-andthewaysinwhich
these caseswill be examined, via a tripartite analysis: institutional, discourse and praxis,
drawingonarangeofsourcesincludingsemi-structuredeliteinterviews,statutesandofficial
documentation,parliamentaryrecordsandmediareports.
Parttwoofthethesis(ChaptersThree,Four,FiveandSix)addressesasetof-sequential-
researchquestions,drawingonempiricaldatafromthreecasestudies,allofwhichsitatthe
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more ‘developed’ end of the paradiplomatic spectrum. Here, the sorts of paradiplomatic
activitiesthatthesub-stategovernmentengagesingobeyondpurelyfunctional,region-to-
regionexchanges.Theycaninclude‘official’diplomaticrelationshipswithfullnationstates.
Theycanincludelobbyingforsupportonindependenceorsecession.Theymaychallengeor
contestathemeordecisionmadebythegovernmentofastatethattheregionsitswithin,
looking to an international audience to support their cause. Or a region may use an
international cause - the environment, for example - or a particular event or disaster to
highlightdivisionorpoliticaldifferencewithinthestate.Thedecisiontolookspecificallyat
thissetofrelativelyadvancedparadiplomaticactivitiesrestsonthefactthatitisherethat
thechaffingoftheboundariesofstateauthorityismostevident.Thefocusofthisstudyis
indeedthisverypointoffriction,assessingthewaysinwhichdiplomatictoolscanbeutilised
bynon-stateactorsforarangeofpoliticalends;thechoiceofthreestatelessnationsthereby
allowsus to explore those actions less readily understoodwith reference toeconomicor
functional imperatives. For the purposes of this study, a nation is understood to reflect
Anderson’s “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006), and stateless nations – a nation
incongruentwith itsstate -areconsideredaparticular typeofpoliticalcommunity that is
growinginsignificance,“abletocaptureandpromotesentimentsof loyalty,solidarityand
communityamongindividualswhohavedevelopedagrowingneedforidentity”(Guibernau,
2004:1255).
Methodologicallyspeaking,theapproachadoptedissomewhat‘messy’,drawingasitdoes
on concepts both from comparative politics and IR. The particular value of such
methodologicaleclecticisminaproblem(ratherthanmethod)drivenareaofstudyhasbeen
previously established (Krook and Squires, 2006), and this rationale is explored in the
methodologysectionofthethesis.Apullingtogetherofdifferentintellectualtoolkitsseems
onlylogicalwhentryingtounderstandactivitiesthattakeplacewithinanestedstructure,and
thathaveaJanus-facednature.Tounderstandparadiplomacy,we-ofcourse-mustgeta
handleonthetown-twinning,memorandasigning,day-to-daymundanityofthepractice.But
at thesametime,wehave toat least tryandunderstandwhy theactof ‘representation’
abroadissocontestedbystateandsub-stategovernments.Weneedtointerpretthepolitical
calculationsinvolvedinasub-stategovernmentdissentingfromastate-leveldiplomatic‘line’.
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Certainly,weshouldattempttolocatethepreciseboundariesbetweenstateandsub-state
authoritywhenitcomestoexternalaffairs.Inshort:thetaskisinherentlybroadandvaried,
somustbethetools.Afocusonasiteofinternationalactivitysuchasparadiplomacy,one
thattakesplaceattheveryboundarybetweenthedomesticandthe international,would
seemtonecessitateanapproachthatbringsboth international relationsandcomparative
politicsintothesamefold.
Chapterthreeaddressesthefirstinthesequenceofempiricalresearchquestionsandasks,in
aninstitutionalcapacity,whatexactlyitisthatsub-stategovernmentsareable-andwilling-
todointermsoftheirdiplomacy.Asaproxyfora‘goldstandard’oftraditionaldiplomatic
activity, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) is utilised as a frame of
reference,againstwhichtoassessthescopeofparadiplomacyandthestatusofsub-state
governmentsintermsofinternationalanddiplomaticlaw.Thisisparticularlyimportantowing
tothefinelinethatsub-stategovernmentsmusttreadintermsofwhethertheirdiplomacyis
‘official’or‘unofficial’,whetheritdrawsonthelegalauthorityoftheirstategovernmentsor
whether it is executed independently from it.As the chapterexplores, there is apolitical
choiceattheheartofthisdistinction,particularlyforWalesandScotlandwhomaintainthe
unusualabilityto‘optin’totheVCDRviaco-locationwithUKoverseasmissions,shouldthey
chooseto.ThechapterbrieflyexplorestheongoingrelevanceoftheTreaty,andinparticular
thehostofchallengescurrentlyposedtoitscentralityindiplomaticlaw-manyofwhichalso
relate to theemergenceofnon-statediplomaticactors. It thenmoveson toexamine the
formal statusofparadiplomacy in theUKand inGermany,andprovideanaccountof the
variouswaysthatWales,ScotlandandBavariahavechosentoenacttheirdiplomacy,which
attimesvisiblypushesatthelegalboundariesthattheyoperatewithin.Particularattention
ispaidtothetypesofoverseasrepresentationsthatourcasestudieshaveestablished,and
totherelativedistanceorproximitythatsuchrepresentationsmaintaintothe‘host’-state,to
useCornago’sterminology(Cornago,2010).
On establishing the varied statuses that the three case studies exhibit in terms of their
paradiplomaciesinChapterThree-inotherwords,‘what’formsofdiplomacytheychoose,
orareenabled,topursue-thesubsequentchaptermovesontoconsiderthepoliticallogics
9
underpinningthedevelopmentofsuchdisparatestrategiesandinternationalprofiles.Simply,
whysub-stategovernmentsconducttheparadiplomaticactivitiesthattheydo.ThisChapter
(Four) looks beyond the economic rationales most commonly used to account for
paradiplomacy and instead reframes the issue as a type of sovereignty game; a way of
conceptualising the back-and-forth between sovereign and ‘other’ actors that revolves
aroundtherightfulsitesofpowerandpoliticalauthority(Adler-NissenandGad,2012;Adler-
NissenandGad,2014).Owingtothefactthatinternationalrelationsanddiplomacyarepolicy
areassocloselyalliedwiththeverynotionofsovereigntyitself,thepracticeofparadiplomacy
necessarilyplaysonandchallengesthetraditionalhierarchicalrolesofstateandsub-state
government.Thechapterexplorestheutilityofparadiplomacytothepoliticalambitionsof
eachofourgoverningparties,andthewaysinwhichtheydrawonand‘mimic’thebehaviours
anddiscoursesofstateness:helpingtoanchortheregionorstatelessnationinanaccepted
and familiardiscourse that strengthensandnormalizesnational sentiments in adomestic
setting.Thisisenabledbytakingon(mimicking)theoutwardappearanceofastate:adefining
characteristicofwhichbeingtheabilitytoconductdiplomaticrelations.
Inchapterfive,theprocessesofinternationalagencycreationareexploredingreaterdetail-
probing the question of how sub-state governments go about securing international
legitimacy. In particular, it employs the framework of performativity; going beyond fixed
classificationsofactorsandcapabilitiesandinsteadlookingattheactualinteractionstaking
place.Thechapterinvestigatesaseparate‘performance’,orsetofperformances,fromeach
ofourcase-studiesthattellbothexternalactorsanddomesticaudienceshowthesub-state
governmentseesitself,itsregionorstatelessnation,andtheplacethatitaspirestoonthe
worldstage.Theseinclude:theestablishmentofBavaria’s‘grand’Europeanrepresentation;
theWelshGovernment’sperformancesattheCopenhagenClimatechangeSummitandthose
surrounding the launch of its ‘Wales for Africa’ development assistance programme; and
ScottishdiplomacysurroundingthearrivaloftwoChinesePandasinEdinburgh’szoo.These
process-tracingexercisesprovideadetailedaccountbothof theattemptsat international
agency creation, and theways that such attempts are contestedor conditionedbyother
actors,inparticularhost-stategovernments.Suchaperspectiveattemptstoovercomethe
challengeofanalysingparadiplomaticactivities inawaythat takes intoaccount theoften
10
conflictualmessagessentbyitscomponentactors:sub-statepoliticiansandofficialsaswell
asdiplomatsatthenationallevelandthosefrom‘receiving’statesandregions.Asinchapter
four,thelanguageofmimicryisemployedthroughouttheanalysisinchapterfive.Essentially,
thisallowsustoconsiderthevariouswaysinwhichthesymbolsanddiscoursesofstate-level
diplomacyareusedor‘mimicked’bysub-stateactors.However,ratherthaninvestigatingthe
reasonswhyamimeticstrategymayhelptoestablishandreinforceasenseofnationhoodor
politicaldistinctivenessatadomesticlevel,itisinsteadusedasawaytounderstandhowsub-
stategovernmentsbringlegitimacyandcredibilitytotheirexternalroles,asperceivedbythe
internationalcommunity.Mimicry,inthiscontext,isusedtoaccountforthewaysinwhich
sub-stateactorslearnto‘walkthewalk’and‘talkthetalk’ofaninternationalagent,rather
thanadomesticallyboundactor.
Chapter Six builds on the explorations of ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ in the previous three
chapters to address thebroader significanceof paradiplomatic activity, and ascribe some
characteristicstothenatureofsub-stategovernmentsasinternationalagents.Thefirstpart
of the chapter explores the hybridity of sub-state governments as international actors,
arguingthattheir‘sovereigntybound,sovereigntyfree’status(Hocking,1997)hasimportant
consequences.Theycanbothclaimtolegitimatelyrepresentagiven‘people’,markingthem
apartfrommanyothernon-stateactors,andyetmaintainalargedegreeofselectivityintheir
internationalendeavours.Inourthreecasestudies,neitherWalesnorScotlandnorBavaria
carry theburdenof constitutional responsibility for international affairs, and indeed their
paradiplomaticactivitiesoftentakeplacewithverylittlescrutinyfromeitherparliamentary
ormediasourcesastothesubstanceoftheirinteractions.Whencombinedwiththeabilityto
drawonstate-levelresourcesandreputations(aswellasthoseofthesub-stategovernment
itself),thesefeaturesamounttoaparticulartypeofinternationaloperationalspace,witha
distinctrangeofqualities.Sub-stategovernmentsareabletooccupythisspacetodiffering
ends:allowingthemtoconductinternationalrelationsonalargely‘alacarte’basis,yetfrom
arestrictedmenu.Theultimateconstraintsthatsub-stategovernmentsoperatewithin,and
employ such selectivity within, are hard, unyielding ones: part of the paradox that is
paradiplomacy.ThesecondpartofChapterSixthusmovesontoconsidertherangeofways
inwhichthis-potentiallyquiteprivileged-spacecanbeutilisedbysub-stateactors.Ranging
11
fromthe ‘paradiplomacyofgood intentions’, through toparadiplomacy ‘on the fringesof
‘highpolitics’,thissectionidentifiessixseparatecategoriesofparadiplomaticactivitybased
on the nature of the challenge - or otherwise - that such activities represent for other
membersoftheinternationalcommunity,inparticularhost-stategovernments.Thischapter
presents an account of paradiplomacy grounded in both International Relations and
Diplomatictheory.
A concluding chapter exploreswhat is perhaps the central finding of this thesis: that the
contradictorynatureofparadiplomaticactivityresultsinbothsystem-reinforcingandsystem-
disruptive effects (McConnell et al., 2012: 811-812). Such oscillation is perhaps why the
significanceofthephenomenonhasbeensubjecttosuchscantacademicconsideration;itis
many things at once, a result of the ‘push-pull’ dynamics at the heart of the practice.
Paradiplomacyreinforcesthestatusof‘official’,state-to-statediplomacy,throughitsmimicry
of this genre. Furthermore, absolute conceptions of hierarchical state-sovereignty are
reinforcedthroughtheuseofparadiplomacyasastate-buildingtool,evidentinsomeofthe
most advanced cases, and arguably seen in the most recent manifestations of Scottish
paradiplomacy, particularly following on from2016’sUK referendumon EUmembership.
However, at the same time, paradiplomacy dilutes the monopoly that states hold on a
rarefiedformofdiplomacy,simplybyintroducingnewactorsintothegame(McConnelletal.,
2012:811-812);crucially,theseareterritoriallybased,governmentalactors.Theseactorslook
andsoundsomuchlikestatesthemselves-yet,ofcourse,arenotstatesatall.Sothesaying
goes:ifitwalkslikeaduck,swimslikeaduckandquackslikeaduck,weareinclinedtobelieve
itis-infact-aduck.Amorequalifiedconceptionofsovereigntyisthereforepromoted,by
virtueofsub-stategovernmentshavingwrestedsomeelementofcontrol -orat least the
perceptionofanelementofcontrol-inanareaofpolicy,internationalrelations,thatis“so
closely articulated to sovereignty that it is considered the prerogative of the sovereign”
(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:16).
Allofthisimbuesparadiplomaticactivitieswithaparticularsignificance,andperhapsserves
as indication as to how far such sub-state authority or legitimacy can stretch in different
contexts.Thepracticeofparadiplomacy,therefore,maybebestunderstoodasoneextended
12
sovereigntygame:agamethatplaysonandchallengesthelanguageofsovereigntyandits
associatedconcepts-authority,representation,legitimacy.Crucially,thegameappearstobe
playedinordertosecurethestatusofsub-stategovernmentsasrightfulparticipantsinthe
game itself, something seemingly common to each of our case studies, rather than any
particularsetofconstitutionalconcessions(Adler-NissenandGad,2014).Wherethisthesis
departsfrompreviousexplorationsofparadiplomacyinrelationtosub-statenationalismor
nationbuildingisinqualifyingthelinkbetweenthephenomena.Paradiplomacyasitrelates
tosub-statenationbuildingdoesnothavetomeanaconcreteendgoal.Wedonothaveto
proveanimminentwilltosecede,recastdevolutiondispensationsorfederalarrangements
to know thatby conducting certain typesof paradiplomatic activity, andby framing their
interactionsincertainways,sub-stategovernmentsareassertingtheirrightfulparticipation
inasovereigntygame.We’vehadtheducktest,nowfortheelephanttest:somethingthatis
hard to describe, but instantly recognisable when you see it. This is paradiplomacy as a
sovereigntygame.Rarelyisanexplicitclaimtosovereigntymade,butinamultitudeofways,
this right to participate - or seat at the table - is exactly the currency of many of the
paradiplomaticendeavoursdescribedintheempiricalanalysestofollow.
Thevalueofthisparticularstudythusliesbothinthesubjectmatterconsidered,andtheway
thatitisexplored.Regionalidentitiesarebecomingincreasinglysalientatpreciselythetime
when traditional diplomatic boundaries are being watered down, creating numerous
opportunitiesforsub-stategovernmentstorecasttheirpreviouslydomestically-boundroles
andrepositionthemselvesvisavistheirhoststates.Yet,previousstudieshavefailedtoutilise
the full range of available tools and frameworks, particularly those stemming from the
disciplinesofInternationalRelationsandDiplomaticTheory,tounderstandthewaysinwhich
adistinctcategoryofactorhasbeenabletocarryoutthisrecastingwork,andindeedthefull
spectrumofmotivationstheymayhavefordoingso.Thealternativetheoreticalframework
establishedinpartoneofthisthesis,whencombinedwiththeempiricalworkthatfollows,
aimstodojustthis:lookingbeyondthesuperficialexplanationsforsub-statediplomacyand
insteadaccountingfortheunquestionablypoliticaldynamicsthatunderpinit.
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Eachofourthreecaseshasauniqueapproachtotheirparadiplomaticendeavours,though
theymaintainmuch in common. They are cases that we all think we know, correctly or
otherwise.Aboastful,wilfulScotlandeagertoshoutdowntheir‘English’counterpartsatany
opportunity.AndforWales,‘seeScotland…toalesserdegree’:bumblingalongwitharelative
lackofambition,preoccupiedwithconcernsaboutitscrumblingvalleysandprecarioushill
farmers - and the rugby. BenignBavaria, too busy counting its coffers too challenge the
FederalGovernmentinanymeaningfulway;happywiththepivotalrolethattheFederalparty
system allows it to occupy at a state level, getting onwith the job of governing amajor
economy without the navel-gazing that stateless nationalism implies. In important ways,
however, the empirical findings of this thesis turn many of these - admittedly glib -
assumptionsontheirheads.TheScottishGovernmentprioritises‘official’diplomacy,tyingit
intoUK-widerepresentationsoverseas,oftenatthecostofadistinctiveScottishvoice;maybe
the traditional diplomacy of yore isn’t so outmoded after all.Wales,meanwhile, actively
utilisesthewayinwhichitcanoperate‘undertheradar’tobuildexclusiverelationshipsin
partsoftheworldwhereheadlinediplomacycaninhibitstate-levelinteractions.Ithasalso
proved particularly adept at mimicking prevailing international discourses - of gender
equality,e-democracyandenvironmentalism-craftinganinternationalimagethatalignsvery
neatlywithdominantnorms.InBavaria,‘cooperativefederalism’istakingaback-seatinthe
heatofarefugeecrisisthathasdraggeditsGovernment,perhapsunwillingly,intocoreareas
of Federal foreign policy. At the same time, Bavaria’s nationhood is never far from the
forefrontofitsparadiplomacy,somethingwhichishighlyunusualinaGermancontext.
Justastheinvestigationsintoeachofthesethreecaseshaveprovedrich,whentakenasa
grouptheyhavealso illuminatedseveralfeatures,orqualities,thatseemtobelongtothe
operational space that sub-state governments occupy at an international level. As
governmental, yet non-sovereign, actors, sub-state governments are able, but rarely
compelled,toactinternationally.Theybenefitfromgovernmentalresources-acivilservice,
a budget, the symbols and trappings of the office - and often operate with Federal
arrangementsordevolutiondispensations thathavepermeableboundariesbetween sub-
stateandnationalcompetences.Theseboundariesgetfurtherstretchedbyprecedentand
de facto compromises. Bavaria insists on using the term ‘Vertung’ (representation) to
14
describe its Brussels office, despite the fact that it is explicitly forbidden fromenacting a
diplomatic role. In response, the Federal Government simply calls it something different.
WalesandScotlandbothoperateinternationalaidanddevelopmentpoliciesonthepretext
ofadevolvedresponsibilityforsustainabledevelopment.Acompromise,ofsorts.
Thisfluidstatusandabilityto‘pickandchoose’internationalrelationsresultsinwhatmight
beperceivedasanenviableposition:tooptin,oroptout,offoreignpolicyandinternational
affairs, though with some important caveats. While newspapers and parliamentary
committees focus on scrutinising the national government, the activities of sub-state
governmentsoftenslipthroughthenet.Noone is looking,at leastupuntil thepointthat
somethingoutoftheordinarythrustsnationalattentionuponthem-suchastheScottish
Government’s2009releaseofAbdelbasetalMegrahi.Eventhen,poorunderstandingsofsub-
state authority and institutional competences often means that even if attention briefly
focuses at the sub-state level, once again - no one is really surewhere responsibility lies
(Kenealy,2012a:555).Byascribingcharacteristicstotheinternationalpracticesofsub-state
governments,weinchclosertounderstandingthenatureofthechallengethatitmaypose
tomoretraditionalconceptsofinternationalrelations.ForMcConnelletal.,thesetypesof
activity raise profound questions. In their consideration of other non-state actors
(micropatias,internationalreligiouscommunitiesandunrecognisedstates)andtheirmimicry
ofdiplomacy,theyarguethat:
Suchcasesfundamentallytransgresstheinside/outsidebinaryofinternationalpoliticsandshineaspotlightontheroleofcontingencyintheuntidydiscursiveproduction of international recognition, sovereignty and legitimacy(McConnelletal.,2012:811).
Inthetimethathaselapsedsinceworkonthesiswasbegun,severalbroadshiftsinboththe
paradiplomaticandbroadergeopoliticalplaneshave,arguably,takenplace.First,therewas
the2014referendumonScottishindependence-duringwhichtimeScottishofficialswere
extremely reluctant to discuss paradiplomacy, deeming it too politically sensitive. An
argumentperhaps that this isn’t ‘allabout theeconomy’,afterall.Thenwehadthe2016
Brexitreferendumandtheresultingintra-UKfall-out,supreme-courtbattlesandcallsfora
secondScottishvoteonindependence.And,ofcourse,2017sawtheinaugurationofDonald
15
TrumpasAmerica’s45thPresident-adevelopmentwhichwillsurelycatalyseparadiplomats
acrosstheglobe,particularlythosefromAmerica’smoreliberalstates.Allinall,iftherewas
everatimetoseetheimplicationsofamultiplicationofinternationalagents,thecontestation
anddilutionofnationaldiplomacyandthedefinitionoftheboundariesbetweendifferent
tiersofGovernment,thismustbeit.
Part1:TheParadoxofParadiplomacy
16
ChapterOne:LiteratureReview
Paradiplomacy-theexternalrelationsofsub-stateorregionalgovernments-isnotanentirely
new practice; its precedents stretch back well into the 19th century, at a conservative
estimation(PaquinandLachapelle,2005::71).However,thelate20thandearly21stcenturies
have witnessed the ‘normalisation’ of the phenomenon (Cornago, 2010), becoming
increasinglywellestablishedasacompetenceofsub-stategovernment,andaconsequential
featureofinternationalsociety.Thisnormalizationreflectscompetingforces:theincreasing
willingnessofsub-stateactorsthemselvestodevelopaninternationalpersonality,andthe
mechanismstheydevelopfordoingso,alongsidetheresponsesofcentralgovernments in
attemptingtomanagethisdevelopment.Thishastypicallytakentheformofnovellegalor
politicalinstrumentsandarrangementsdefiningthecontoursof‘acceptable’behaviourinthis
regard(Cornago,2010:11).Cornagogoesontoarguethat,whilstconventionalapproaches-
specificallyfromwithintherealmofdiplomaticstudies-oftenunder-emphasiseorevendeny
the importance of paradiplomacy, this ‘normalization’ is indeed a “politically relevant
process”(2010:14).
Afullconsiderationofparadiplomacyentailsthreedistinct,ifratherbroad,levelsofanalysis:
structuresandopportunities,motivationsandagency,and implicationsor significance.To
date,paradiplomaticliteraturehasdevotedthevastmajorityofitsattentiontothefirstof
theseaspects,lesstothesecond,andcomparativelylittletothethird.Inaddition,therehave
been few attempts to link these three aspects together in an overarching theoretical
framework (Lecours, 2002: 92). In practice, this has meant that structural accounts of
paradiplomacyhavedominatedtheliterature,eventhough(aswillbeexploredinthisreview)
thevariationinparadiplomaticactivitysuggestsamuchgreaterrolefortheagencyofsub-
stateactorsthanisallowedforundertheseaccounts.Furthermore,thefailuretoadequately
considertheimplicationsofparadiplomacy-withinbothdomesticandinternationalcontexts
- has meant that an incomplete picture of the practice has emerged, and, crucially, the
meaningofthephenomenon,asapoliticalaction,isnotyetclear.Indeed,thecriticismhas
been levied that the current literature fails to take account of the novelty of sub-state
internationalengagementasawidelyidentifiablefeatureofcontemporarypolitics(Aldecoa,
17
1999:83).Alongsidethethreelevelsofanalysisoutlinedabove,thereisafurthertripartite
distinction to consider. The opportunities, motives and ramifications of the practice
materialise and transpire at the regional, state and international levels. This implicates
numerousschoolsofthoughtandareasofresearchinthestudyofthisphenomenon,and
necessitatesananalyticalframeworkdrawingonthetoolkitsofbothcomparativepoliticsand
internationalrelations.Thisisanendeavourthathasgeneratedonlylimited,andsporadic,
enthusiasm;reflectedintheliterature’simbalance.
Ifthefirstdefiningcharacteristicoftheparadiplomacyliteratureisthisimbalance,thesecond
isthecompartmentalisednatureofitsdevelopment.Criekemans(2011b:3),identifiesthree
distinctphasesofparadiplomaticresearch.Thefirstofthesewasawhollyempiricalexercise,
whichexaminedthedistributionofcompetencesbetweenregionalandcentralgovernments,
focussingonthe(domestic)legalandconstitutionaldimensionsofthepractice(dominated
by constitutional law experts). The second phase was also largely empirical, comprising
comparativestudiesofsub-stategovernmentsandexaminationsofterritorialmobilization
thatweredominatedbythefieldsoffederalismandregionalism.Thethird,amorerecent
trend,whichlargelyconsistsoftheworkofCriekemanshimself,alongwithcolleaguesatthe
UniversityofAntwerpandtheClingendaelInstitute(andthusisdominatedbydiplomacyand
foreignpolicyanalysisscholars)seekstosituateparadiplomacyinaninternationalmilieu.It
is argued that considering sub-national diplomacy as an expression of a new territorial
configurationofinternationalpoliticsmightovercomesomeoftheconceptualandanalytical
lacunas that have been identified, such as the lack of analytical frameworks or adequate
explanationsforthedevelopment(CriekemansandDuran,2011).Thedistinctionbetween
thesephasesisnotabsolute,noristheirprogressionstrictlylinear.Forexample,bothLecours
(2002)andCornago(1999)weretentativelyexploringsomeoftheinternationalaspectsof
thephenomenonrightinthemidstoftheliterature’smorecomparativephase.However,this
phasedconceptiondoeshighlightthegeneralcourseoftheliterature’sdevelopment,andthe
waysinwhichindividualfieldsofstudyhaveapproachedthephenomenon:largelyinisolation
fromoneanother.
18
LecoursandMoreno(2001:2)assesstheliteraturefromadifferentperspective,arguingthat
there are two distinct ‘angles’ from which to view the external relations of sub-state
governments.Thefirstisasaconsequenceofvariousotherphenomena(suchasglobalisation
andsupranationalintegration),wherebyparadiplomacyisappropriatedasevidenceofanew
form of contemporary territorial politics. This, the authors argue, has been the “most
popular” angle of analysis. The second, “less visible and less discussed” angle considers
paradiplomacy as a discrete phenomenon, whereby the action of sub-state governments
“projecting themselves onto the international scene and, consequently, becoming
internationalactors”isinvestigatedinandofitself,andwhereterritorialpoliticsisthusseen
as“anexplanatoryvariableforoneparticularinternationalprocess,namelytheinternational
relationsofregions”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:2).
There is an apparent contradiction between the ‘natural’ competences of a sub-state
government (assumed tobe firmly domestically located, concernedwith regional or local
issues that are understood to be bettermanaged by an authority ‘closer’ to the specific
environment)and thepracticeofdiplomacyor international relationson thepartof such
actors.Itwouldthereforeseemclearthatthesecondoftheapproachesmentionedabove,
consideringparadiplomacyasadiscretephenomenon,isinherentlymoreappropriateforits
studythanisthefirst,currentlymorepopular,angleofanalysis.Thisseemsparticularlytrue
whenwerememberthat,inmanyinstances,theappropriationofinternationalremitsbysub-
stateactorsisoften-thoughnotalways-asourceofdomesticpoliticaltension,andtherefore
politicalcapitalislikelytobeexpendedingainingthesecompetences.Itisnotoftenthecase
thatinternationalactornessfallsintothelapsofunsuspectingregionalgovernments.
To assess the ways in which the literature has thus far examined the practice of
paradiplomacy, this chapterwill consider thedistinct factors that havebeen identified as
relevanttothreekeyquestionsregardingthephenomenon:howithasemerged,whyittakes
place,andwhyitmatters.Thetheoreticaldevelopmentofthefieldwillbeconsideredinthe
contextof this finalquestion, lookingat thebarriers to,evidenceofandpotential for the
establishmentofoverarchinganalyticalframeworks.Inshort,thisintroductorychapterlays
out the approaches traditionally taken to paradiplomatic study; highlighting their
19
shortcomingsandsignallingtheneedforanew,morecomprehensiveframework,whichisto
beintroducedinthesubsequentchapter.
Paradiplomacy:StructuresandOpportunities
I. Globalisation
According toHocking (1999:18), theco-occurrenceofglobalisationand localisation isnot
coincidental,butratherthephenomenarepresenttwosidesofthesamecoin;reflecting“the
competing pressures and tensions created by a broader and more integrated global
economy”.Therehasemergeda“symbioticrelationshipbetweencoheringandfragmenting
forces”,whereby“thelocalisnottheantithesisoftheglobal”(Hocking,1999:9).Criekemans
andDuran(2011)meanwhile,highlighttheweakeningofthebarrierspreviouslysegregating
‘high’and‘low’politics,arguingthatthishasimportanteffectsforsub-stategovernmentsas
nationalforeignpolicyagendasbecomelesshierarchical,andthuspermeabletotheinterests
andconcernsoflocalorregionalactors(suchastheenvironment,trade,cultureandminority
rights).Inasimilarvein,Cornago(2010:18-19)emphasisestheestablishmentofregionsas
globally competitive units, as a result of “a new economic geography, institutional
restructuring,newtechnologicalfacilities,cross-nationalmigrationandnewenvironmental
concerns”, arguing that these ‘global dynamics’ can account for the proliferation of
paradiplomaticactivities.
Expandingonthiscentralidea,PaquinandLachapelle(2005:78)arguethatglobalization(and
therelated‘nationstatecrisis’)infactholdsthegreatestexplanatorypowerwhenitcomes
to understanding paradiplomacy. So, the argument goes: the economic imperatives of a
globalizedworldhaveledsmaller(regional)unitstocompetewithoneanotherforrelative
sharesofthe‘worldmarket’.Theauthorsarguethatthisformofeconomiccompetitionhas
come to replace alternative forms, in particular that “between sovereign powers for the
acquisitionofnewterritories”.Theinternationalengagementofregions,therefore,isseenas
afunctionalrequirementofthisparticularglobalorder(PaquinandLachapelle,2005:78).
20
Thedangerofthe‘glocalisation’argument,however,isthatittendstopresentana-historical
narrative,subsumingthepracticeofparadiplomacy intobroaderprocessesall tooreadily,
ratherthanexaminingthephenomenonasadiscreteendeavourwithitsownevolutionary
history.Forexample,inexploringtheroleofconsularrepresentationinanemergingstate-
Norway-LeiraandNeumann(2008)placethepracticeofparadiplomacyinthecontextof
the country’s state-building process,which substantially pre-dates the ‘post-modern’ era.
Likewise,whilePaquinandLachapelle (2005:71)arekeentoemphasise the linkbetween
globalisationandparadiplomacyintheirbook,theyalsoidentifyQuebec’sparadiplomacy,or
at the least strongprecedents for it,asmanifest fromasearlyas thenineteenthcentury.
‘Globalisation’canthereforebeseentoengenderattractiveopportunitystructuresforsub-
stategovernments,whichmayindeedbeakeyexplanationoftheproliferationofsub-state
international activities. But it fails to adequately explain the motivations behind
paradiplomaticaction;apracticethatpredatestheglobalizedera.Itisparticularlyillequipped
toexplainthoseactionsthatarenotclearlyfunctionalorprimarilyeconomicinnature.
II. TheEuropeanUnionandRegionalism
The twin processes of European integration and internal regionalisation (or micro-
macro/inter-intraregionalism)haveprovidedparticularlypronouncedopportunitiesforsub-
statemobilization.Thetwoprocessesaresaidtohavenotonly“coincided”(Aldecoa,1999:
86), but, more specifically, the argument has been made that within the sui generis
environmentoftheEU,the‘newregionalism’hasemergedinresponsetoincreasinglevelsof
interdependence(Sodupe,1999:58).Sodupegoesontoarguethattherelationshipbetween
integrationandregionalisationisamulti-faceted,reciprocalone,whereby“justasintegration
givesanewdimensiontoregionalism,regionalisminturnstimulatesintegration,sincethe
formercontributestoreinforceinterdependence”,andthatoneofthekeydynamicsinthis
process,indeedoneofitsmost“strikingaspects”isinter-regionalco-operation(1999:58).
Cornago, meanwhile (2010: 20) argues that, whilst the establishment of the EU initially
“undermined important sub-national competences”, it gradually came to provide a
“favourable”environment for themobilizationof sub-stategovernments, via itseffecton
“administrativecultures”amongstthememberstatesoftheEU.Concurrently,theEuropean
21
integration process enabled: “the spread of a shared perception concerning the need to
provide institutional venues for mobilizing sub-state governments across the European
region”(Cornago,2010:20).
For Paquin and Lachapelle (2005), European integration is a particularly clear example of
wider ‘internationalization processes’, whereby the proliferation of ‘new’ issues on the
internationalpoliticalagenda,suchastheenvironment,publichealth,transportationandso
on,increasinglyimplicatesub-stategovernmentsintheinternationaldomain.Here,relations
betweensub-stateandcentralstategovernmentsarekey:
Civilservantsandpoliticiansfromsub-stateentitiesworryaboutthefactthatinternationalissuesaffecttheirfieldsofjurisdiction.Sub-nationalentitieswillthussetupinternationalpositionsforthemselvesbecausetheirfailuretoactwouldhavegivencentralgovernmentsa freehand (PaquinandLachapelle,2005:86).
PaquinandLachapellearguethatinordertodefendtheircompetencesfromEU-widepolicy
decisions,whichmayredistributeelementsoftheirauthority,sub-stategovernments“will
pressure their ‘national’ government and European institutions into allowing regions of
Europetoplayagreaterrole”(PaquinandLachapelle,2005:87).
Looking in some detail at the distinct effects of European integration on territorial
mobilization andparadiplomacy,Hepburn andMcLoughlin (2011: 385) point to three key
facets.Firstly,thefactthatmanyEUpoliciesandareasofcompetenceoverlapwith,andhave
significant impact upon, commonly devolved areas of activity means that sub-state
governmentshavesignificantvestedinterestintheEUpolicymakingprocess.Thus,theyare
encouraged to engage,with a presumed legitimacy often lacking in other paradiplomatic
activities,inthisarena.Secondly,thetrendtowardsregionalisationwithinEuropehasopened
upthepossibilityofnewformsofautonomy:somethinglessthansovereignstatehoodbut
greater than devolved authority. Regional parties within EU member states have new
institutionsandnewpoliticalarenasinwhichtoestablishthemselvesasrelevantactors,and
defendtheirinterests:
While territorial political strategies were once focused exclusively on statestructures,regionalactorsnowlobbyattransnationallevelstoadvancetheirgoals,andEuropeanumbrellaorganisationshavebeenformedtorepresent
22
regional party interests in European institutions (Hepburn andMcLoughlin,2011:385).
In particular, the Committee of the Regions (though disappointing some of the more
enthusiastichopesofa‘EuropeoftheRegions’(ScullyandWynJones,2010:5))hasproved
fertilegroundforsub-stategovernmentslookingto“acquireanadditionalstate-likequality,
onethatcouldbuilditsinternalcoherenceandstimulateitsprocessofidentityconstruction”
(Lecours, 2002: 100). Thirdly for Hepburn andMcLoughlin, the ideological nature of the
Europeanintegrationprojecthas“encouraged”sub-statenationalistparties,suchastheSNP,
to adopt a ‘civic nationalism’, based on inclusive criteria and advocating “principles and
themescommontothoseoftheEU-suchassupportforfreetradeanddiversity”(2011:385).
TheEU isnot representativeof thedegreeof integrationwitnessed in regional structures
globally,butasthemostadvancedinstitutionalmanifestationofamoreglobal,andgradual,
trend, it does allow the dynamics of regionalisation, and their relationship to the
development of paradiplomacy, to be seen particularly clearly, and is therefore worth
consideringinthisgreaterdepth.
III. DevolutionandDecentralisation
Part of the ‘new regionalism’, identified in broader processes of governance, particularly
within the EU, relates to the dispersal of power (political, administrative or legislative)
‘downwards’towardstheregions,aswellastothesupranationallevel.Thisisbothasaresult
ofpressure from individual regions themselves (suchasCatalonia),andapartofbroader,
state-widereformprocess(asinFrance)(ScullyandWynJones,2010:5).Thetwoprocesses
of devolution and decentralisation represent alternative institutional embodiments of a
shared logic; that of building regional capacity (Cole and Baudewyns, 2004: 74-75). This
creation of “regional agents”, via devolution or decentralisation, is a logical, perhaps
necessary,precursortosuchagentsthendevelopingan internationalperspective(Lecours
andMoreno,2001:6). Indeed, theadvancementof legislativeautonomywithin regions is
seen by Criekemans (2010c: 38) to be reflected in the increasing sophistication of
23
paradiplomaticactivitiesthroughoutthesecondandthird‘waves’thatheidentifiesastaking
placeinthe1990s-2000s.
As in most federal systems, the ‘regional agents’ created through devolution or
decentralisationarealmostexclusivelydevoidof‘foreignpolicy’prerogatives(withanotable
exception being the Belgian regions), meaning that paradiplomacy falls into a “legal and
constitutionalgrey zone” (Lecours,2008:6). Havingsaid this,however, therearevarious
waysinwhichtheexternalroleofregionalagentshasalegalorconstitutionalbasisofone
sortoranother, thoughtheirrolemaybe-andmostoften is -heavilycircumscribed.The
moreinterestingquestion,then,isperhapscentredaroundwhatsuchregionschoosetodo
withtheirlimitedsetofcompetences,andthevariouswaysinwhichtheboundariesoftheir
internationalremitarechafedbytheparadiplomaticpracticesthattheyundertake.Thelack
of formal responsibility and accountability that regions typically have for ‘foreign affairs’
makesthedecisionofsub-stateorregionalactorstoconsciouslyexpandtheirremitinthis
areaparticularly interesting.Thedistinctqualities that thisengenders - thenon-statutory,
looselyinstitutionalisedspacethatsub-stategovernmentsoperatewithin,thelackofscrutiny
arisingfromthesheerincongruenceofmanyoftheseactivity,theability-yetoftennotthe
obligation-toact,allfeedsintohowparadiplomaticpracticemanifestsontheground,and
thusthepotentialsignificancethat ithas.Thesethemesarecentraltothisthesis,andare
exploredinmuchgreaterdetailinparttwo.
This‘newregionalism’,specificallytheprocessesofdevolutionanddecentralisationthathave
takenplace,particularlywithinEurope,offersenhancedopportunitiesforparadiplomacyto
emerge,owingto its institutionalisationorenhancementofaregionaltierofgovernment.
However, it does not necessarily follow that those regions with the greatest legislative
autonomyarethemostadvancedwhenitcomestotheirparadiplomaticactivities,andvice
versa.Forexample,CriekemanandDuran(2011)considertheparadiplomaticactionofthe
French Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (PACA), a region that is “devoid of strong legislative
powersoradistinctnational(ist)identity”,that,nonetheless(whencomparedtoothersub-
stategovernmentswithstrongerlegislativepowers),“ispursuingacomparableforeignpolicy,
makinguseofcomparablediplomaticinstruments”.Here,despitethefactthatthe“French
24
foreign ministry still firmly holds the reins of France’s diplomacy”, French regions are
increasinglyutilisingthe(comparativelylimited)remittheyholdinareasof‘low’politicsasa
meanstoactivelydeveloptheirowndiplomaticidentity,eveninternationalactorness(Duran,
2011:340&346).
IV. Lecours2002:OpportunityStructures
Theprecedingsectionshavesoughttoexplorethevariousopportunitystructures,enabled
by the processes of globalisation, European integration and decentralisation, which are
identifiedwithintheparadiplomacyliteratureaspromotingorfacilitatingthephenomenon
thatisparadiplomacy.Beforemovingontoconsiderthe,perhapsmoreintriguing,question
ofwhysub-stategovernmentsthemselveschoosetoutilisetheseopportunitystructuresand
engage in paradiplomacy, it isworth firstly considering a tentative theoretical framework
identifiedbyLecours(2002),whichdrawsattentiontothemulti-locationalnatureofthese
structures. What is required - in order to understand the practice of paradiplomacy -
according to Lecours, is a “multi-analytical framework where regional political systems,
national structures, continental regimes and the global system each contain opportunity
structuresthatconditiontheinternationalagencyofregionalgovernments”(2002:101).This
work represents perhaps the most advanced such framework iterated within the
paradiplomacyliterature,andisthusworthinvestigatinginsomedetail.
Lookingfirstlyattheregionallevel,twoinstitutionalvariablesaregivenexplanatoryweight:
thepartysystem(particularlytheexistenceofnationalistorregionalparties)andtheformal
institutionalpowers,orcourseofdevelopment,oftheregion.Itcomesasnosurprise,argues
Lecours,thatthemostprominentactorsinparadiplomacytendtobelocatedwithinfederal
regions(2002:101). Inevitably,asmanyquestionsareraisedbytheidentificationofthese
two primary regional variables as are answered. For example, though the existence of a
nationalistorregionalistpartymaycertainlypredisposetheregiontowardsparadiplomatic
action,theirexactroleindoingsomaybegreatlydifferentiated.A‘weak’nationalistparty
withlimitedelectoralsupportmaystillcatalysearegion’sparadiplomaticactivityindirectly,
viatheireffectonpartycompetition,incentivisingthirdorgoverningpartiestowardsamore
prominent external role (Royles, 2010: 162-163). Furthermore, the link between
25
paradiplomacyandfederalism,andthereforetheweightthatfederalismitselfhaspreviously
been given as an explanatory variable in much paradiplomatic research, is increasingly
questionable.Theprocessesofdevolutionanddecentralisationthathavebeenparticularly
pronouncedwithinEuropeinthelastfewdecadesraisenumerousquestionsastowhether
their open-ended dynamics produce different incentives or opportunities to engagewith
externalactorsthandoesfederalism,wheretheconstitutionalsituationmaybetakentobe
morestatic(theobviousexceptionhereisQuebecanditsrelationswithCanada).
Thesecond levelatwhichLecours identifiesasetofvariables is thenational (state-level).
Here,itistheconstitutionalframework,thenatureofintergovernmentalrelations(which,in
turn,arepartiallybasedonpartycongruenceacrossdifferentlevelsofgovernment(Royles
andWynJones,2010)),themechanismsforregionalrepresentationincentral institutions,
andthestate’sforeignpolicyagenda-specificallywhetherit ismoreorlesspermeableto
sub-state interests - that are seen as key. As referenced previously, Lecours andMoreno
(2001:7)pointtothebreakdownintheconceptualcategoriesof‘high’and‘low’politicsin
thepost-ColdWareraasakeyfactorconditioningthe(re)emergenceofparadiplomacy.
Again, the relationshipbetween thisvariableandparadiplomaticaction isnotabsolute. It
wouldseemthatina‘globalized’age,stateshavelittlechoicebuttoengagewithissueswhich
are particularly permeable to sub-state interests: the environment, for example. The
additionalpresenceof ‘highpolitics’onanationalforeignpolicyagendawouldn’tseemto
precludeparadiplomaticopportunitiesforsuchactors,thoughtheremaybeanargumentas
to the status-reducing effects of foreign policy reporting being focussed on attention-
grabbing ‘highpolitics’,wheresub-stateactorshave-orarethoughttohave- littleorno
presence.
ThethirdsetofvariablesidentifiedbyLecoursoccuratthecontinentallevel;situatedwith
theeconomicandpoliticalregimesinaspecificgeographicalsetting,atanintergovernmental
orsupranationallevel,theEUbeingthemostobviousexamplehere.Theexistenceofsuch
regimes,accordingtoLecours,legitimisespoliticalactionthatbypassescentralgovernment,
weakening its monopoly on policymaking or international relations, on account of their
26
“transformation of state sovereignty”. Therefore, it is the degree of cooperation or the
advancementofinstitutionalmechanismsthatrepresentsthepertinentvariableconditioning
paradiplomacyatthislevel(Lecours,2002:103).
ThefourthandfinallevelofanalysisforLecoursistheglobalenvironment,withvariableshere
comprising: the international organisationswithinwhich regions can be represented, the
numberofstateswillingtoengageindiplomaticrelationswithregions,andthelevelofinter-
regional cooperation which takes place. Furthermore, the global economy provides an
attractiveopportunitystructurethroughitsconstitutionoftheregionasaneconomicunitin
itsownright,alongsidethatofthestate(Lecours,2002:103-104).Thethirdvariable,inter-
regionalcooperation,isseenasparticularlyimportantbyLecours,duetoitsself-reproducing
nature:
Indeed,muchlikestateinteractionshavebuiltandsustainedastatesystemwhichinturnhaslegitimisedstatesasthecentralactorsofworldpolitics,thedevelopmentofawebofinter-regionalrelationscouldleadtoaninternationalregional system that would build up the international agency of regionalgovernments.
Lecours’ approach places a strong emphasis on structural variants, or the ‘how’ of
paradiplomacy,and,indoingso,producesaconvincingtheoreticalframeworkthataddresses
thisquestion.However,inordertofullyunderstandthephenomenonofparadiplomacy,and
toworktowardsagenuinelyoverarchingconceptualframework,muchcloserattentionneeds
tobepaidbothtothe‘why?’andthe‘sowhat?’piecesofthisparticularpuzzle.
27
TheAgencyofSub-stategovernments
Structuralopportunitiesalonecannotfullyexplainparadiplomaticactivity.Inparticular,they
failtoadequatelyaccountforoneofthekeycharacteristicsofthepractice:itsdiversity.US
states,forexample,haveamplestructuralopportunitiestoengageinternationally,butthe
often-limitedwaythattheyhavechosentodosostandsinstarkcontrasttootherregions:
All the US states and all large cities possess considerable governmentalcapacity to exercise international competencies, and all have used suchcapacitytoengagetheinternationalarena,butneitherstategovernmentsnorlocalgovernmentshaveplungeddeeplyintointernationalaffairs.Instead,theyskimthesurfaceofinternationalaffairsinsearchofspecificbenefitsfortheirjurisdiction(Kincaid,1999:121).
At best, therefore, structural opportunities are a necessary, but ultimately insufficient
conditioninexplainingthepracticeofparadiplomacy.Theroleofagency,ofthemotivations
promptingsub-stategovernmentsthemselvestodevelopaninternationalpersonality,must
also be examined to fully understand the phenomenon. Sub-state governments have
differentlegal,constitutionalandpoliticalpowersandremitsfromcentralstates.Thismeans
thatmany of themotivations assumed to lie behind traditional international relations or
diplomatic endeavours may not apply to the regional setting, and, therefore, that a full
investigationintothepurposesofparadiplomaticactionisnecessary.“Regionsrarelylookto
influencethebehaviourandpoliciesofotherinternationalactors;rather,theytendtohave
themoremodestobjectiveofdevelopinganinternationalpersonality”(Lecours,2002:96&
104).1Exactlywhyregionsmightwishtodevelopthisinternationalpersonalityisacentral
questionforparadiplomaticresearch.
AusefuloverarchingframeworkisdevelopedbyKeating(1999),whoidentifiesthree‘sets’of
motivations lying behind paradiplomatic activity: economic, cultural and political. Looking
firstlyateconomicmotivations,Keatingidentifiesboththedesire(or,perhapsincreasingly,
need)forsub-stategovernmentstoseekinwardinvestment,whichcompelsthemtoestablish
themselvesasattractiveeconomic locations internationally,anda“morealtruisticstyleof
1 Though there are indeed some similarities in the strategies, even aims, of sub-statediplomacyandsmallstatediplomacyCriekemansD.(2011b)RegionalSub-StateDiplomacyToday.DevolutioninaGlobalizedWorld.ChathamHouse,London.
28
external activity” in the programmesof international development assistance undertaken
mostnotablybyEuropeanregions(1999:4).2Culturalmotivations,meanwhile,areoftentied
mostcloselywithlanguagepromotion(KeatingcitesFrenchsupportforQuebec’slinguistic
programmeshere,thoughWales’promotionoftheWelshlanguageinPatagoniawouldbea
different,inter-regionalexample).
More controversial are the politicalmotivations identified by Keating: nationalist regions
“seekrecognitionandlegitimacyassomethingmorethanregions”,while“externalprojection
mayalsoservebyareverseeffecttohelpnation-buildingathome,byshowinglocalleaders
in international contexts”. According to Keating, “even in regions without nationalist
movements,theinternationalarenacanbeusedasaplatformforinternalregion-building,as
wellasfortheprojectionoftheregionalpoliticiansthemselves”(Keating,1999:5).Theneed
for ‘recognition’ by external actors, inherently realised in the conduct of ‘international
relations’isalsohighlightedbyPaquinandLachapelle,whopositthatthisactivity,alongside
theroleofparadiplomacyinthepower-strugglethattheauthorsidentifybetweensub-state
nationsandcentralstategovernments,meansthatparadiplomacyoftenconstitutesakey
component of the quest for legitimacy on the part of ‘stateless nations’ (Paquin and
Lachapelle,2005:82-85). Indeed, statelessnationalism isan importantvariable in itsown
rightandisaddressedinsomedetailbelow.
I. StatelessNations
A key component in many explanations of the less clearly ‘functional’ international
engagementsofregionsare‘statelessnations’.AsAldecoaandKeatingargue(1999b:v),aside
fromthestrongfunctionallogicsderivingfrominternationalcompetition,andthespill-over
effects of meeting such requirements in international trade, political explanations are
required to account for the development of paradiplomacy, “derived from the goals and
strategiesofsub-stateelites,buildingandpromotingthenationor,insomecases,preparing
2Thesemore‘altruistic’economicactivitiesmayperhapsbemoreappropriatelyclassedaspolitical innature,or at the least ‘cooperative’, given that the regiondoesn’t receiveanyspecificeconomicadvantagesfromsuchaction,rathertheyaregenerallyseentoformpartofnation-buildingendeavours.
29
thewayfornationalindependence”.Keating(1997)exploresthisconceptindetail,arguing
that a new type of civic (as opposed to ethnic) nationalist project has emerged inmany
locales:
Civicnationalism isa collectiveenterprisebaseduponcommonvaluesandinstitutions,andpatternsofsocialinteraction.Thebearersofnationalidentityare institutions, customs, historical memories and rational/secular values.Anyonecanjointhenationirrespectiveofbirthorethnicorigins,thoughthecostofadaptationvaries.Civicnationalismisbaseduponaterritoriallydefinedcommunity, not upon a social boundary among groups within a territory(Keating,1997:691).
What theseentitiesdesire,according toKeating, is self-determination.But,hegoesonto
argue; “the end of self-determination is not necessarily a nation-state, since that is a
historically contingent form” (1997: 693). Paradiplomacy legitimises this form of nation
buildingby“placingtheminoritynationinthewiderfamilyofnation-states”.Thisargument,
paradiplomacy-as-stateless-nationbuilding,isalsomadebyLecoursandMoreno(2001:1),
who contend that the “processes of nationalism…logically lead to regional governments
seekingthedevelopmentofaninternationalpersonality”.Royles(2010:142&161),makesa
similarcasewithreferencetoWelshparadiplomacy,wherebytheactionsofWelshLabour,
with“broadagreement”acrossthepoliticalspectrum,areinterpretedaspartofaconscious
nation-building exercise, with international activities “bolstering identity, enhancing
legitimacy and national recognition”. Indeed, Lecours and Moreno argue that
‘multinationalism’, rather than federalism, is the key variable conditioning a region’s
developmentofparadiplomaticactivity,andthattherefore,“paradiplomacy,at least in its
mostdevelopedform,needstobere-conceptualizedthroughatheoreticallinkagewithsub-
stateorstatelessnationalism”(2001:1-3).
LecoursandMorenogoontounpackthislinkbetweennationbuildingandparadiplomacy,
and, indoing so,discern threedistinctaimsorbenefits that sub-statenationalist factions
identify in external engagements. The work of these two authors represents the fullest
considerationofsuchlinksintheliterature,andisthusworthaddressingindetail.Thefirstof
theaimsorbenefitsaccruingfromparadiplomacywithregardstonationbuildingisidentity
construction;“nationalismisaformofidentitypolitics”andsuchidentitiesarediscursively
30
constructed;“creatingandshapingnationalidentitiesnecessitates‘speakingthenation’,that
is,promotingtheideaofanationalcommunity”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:3).
Therearetwoelementstotheroleofparadiplomacyinidentityconstruction.Thefirstisto
dowiththediscourseofinternationalrelations,specificallythefactthatthisdiscourseisone
ofnations, and that, therefore, “the very definition of international agents, at leastwith
respecttoterritorial-institutionalunits,entailsnationhood”.Theauthorsarguethat,when
lookedatfromthisperspective:“thedevelopmentofaninternationalagencyonthepartof
aregionalgovernmentisfullofsymbolicmeaning,andthereforeanattractivestrategicoption
fornationalistleaders”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:3-4).Thesecondelementrelatestothe
domesticaudience:
Highlyvisibleparadiplomaticactivitiesgivenationalistleaderstheopportunityto play to their domestic audience. They provide a scene from whichnationhood can be proclaimed most forcefully…in short, throughparadiplomacy,regionscanbothbehaveasnationsandpresentthemselvesassuch(LecoursandMoreno,2001:4).
Theseconddimensionofparadiplomacy-as-stateless-nation-building restson the fact that
paradiplomatic activity offers an attractive space for the “definition and articulation of
regional/group interests”, which, in turn, contributes to the further development of the
nation’scollective identity.Such interests,entailinga“specificconceptionof thecommon
good”,arebothculturalandideologicalinnature.Intermsofculture,nationalistmovements
“emphasize and politicize cultural distinctiveness; consequently, they tend to define the
‘national interest’ primarily in terms of cultural protection/preservation”.Meanwhile, the
authors continue, emergent nationalist movements tend to develop an “ideological
personality”,whichisthenrefinedwithreferenceto,andprojectedonto,theinternational
stage. Lecours andMoreno citeQuebec nationalists’ strong linkswith tradeunions as an
example here, but the international and sustainable development activities of many
Europeanregions,ScotlandandWales included,wouldalsoappear tobeevidenceof this
ideological personality. Interest definition is seen by Lecours and Moreno as “the most
straightforwardandvisible”componentofparadiplomacy,duetothefactthatsuchactivities
are seen to ‘mimic’more traditional foreign policy discourses, which are “fundamentally
31
about the definition, defence and promotion of a (state) national interest” (Lecours and
Moreno,2001:4).
ThethirdandfinallinkbetweennationbuildingandparadiplomacyasidentifiedbyLecours
andMorenoisthatofpolitical-territorialmobilization.Here,theoften-conflictualnatureof
paradiplomacyinrelationtothe‘host’statepresents“nationalistleaderswithopportunities
tostimulatepolitical-territorialmobilizationbecauseitpitstheregionagainstthecentre,and
sometimesregionalnationalistforcesagainstnon-nationalistones”.Giventhesensitivityof
‘foreignpolicy’,paradiplomacyrepresentsaparticularlyusefultoolinsuchmobilization:quite
simply,itisa“statementaboutpower”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:5).
While thecategoryof statelessnation,andcertainly theparadiplomacy-as-nation-building
argument,remaincrucialtounderstandingthepoliticalmotivationsbehindparadiplomatic
action,manyofthedistinctionsinherentinsucharguments,suchasthatbetweennationalist
andnon-nationalistregions,asidentifiedbyKeating(1999:4-5),orindeedethnicandcivic
nationalisms, are perhaps overly simplistic. Amongst the ‘nationalist’ regions commonly
classedas ‘statelessnations’,therearethose,suchasScotland,whoserulingpartyhasan
explicit independence platform, whilst there aremany others whose ‘nationalism’ is not
necessarily tied to an independence or secessionist agenda, or indeed (exclusively) to a
‘nationalist’party.Theexactmotivations,therefore,behindtheseregions’paradiplomacies,
andnationbuildingprojectsmorebroadly,wouldseemtobesignificantlydifferent,aswould
thesignificanceorimplicationsofsuchactivities.Moregenerallyspeaking,therealsoexist
‘nationbuilding’projectswhichareemployedinapurposefullycooperativewaywithregards
toanexistingstateidentity,Bavariahavingtraditionallybeenanaptexamplehere(Hepburn,
2008a:186).Thewillofdifferentiation,incasessuchasthese,maymanifestinamuchmore
conciliatorystyleofparadiplomacy-as-nation-buildingactivitythanseeninthosecaseswhere
antagonisticrelationsexistbetweencentralandregionalgovernments.
Therefore, whilst there is certainly a significant link between nation building and
paradiplomacy,theexactnatureofthis linkappearstobemorecomplexthan iscurrently
accountedforintheliterature.Someelementsofparadiplomaticactivitycanbeinterpreted
32
asattempts to ‘pave theway’ for independence, suchas inQuebecorScotland,whereas
othersremainpreoccupiedwithidentityconstructionwithinthedomesticconstituency.The
challenges such paradiplomacies may pose to state sovereignty, and the related inter-
governmentaltensionswithintheextantstate,mayalsodiffersubstantially.
Thoughmany authors have acknowledged the variety of potential ‘end points’ to nation
building exercises, there is currently no systematic analysis of the ways in which
paradiplomacy is utilised along this continuum. The relationship between those discrete
goals that are commonly attributed to ‘nation-building’, and the precise nature of
paradiplomaticactivitywouldappeartobeanoverdueitemontheparadiplomacyresearch
agenda.
II. The‘Self’andthe‘Other’
Duran(2011:342)arguesthatthecurrentbodyofliteratureaddressingthequestionofwhy
sub-stategovernmentsengageinparadiplomacyrepresentsadichotomousapproachtothe
phenomenon:”itiseitherconflictingwithorcooperativetothediplomaticactivitiesofthe
state the region is a constitutive part of”. The empirical data,Duran continues, “seem to
justifythisdichotomy”,duetotheprevalenceofparadigmaticcasestudies,focussingonthe
‘usualsuspects’whoseparadiplomacyiseasilyidentifiedaseithercooperativeorconflictual,
and isnotable for that reason (Duran,2011:339&342). Asaconsequence, thestudyof
paradiplomacyoftenignoresthepotentialofmoreconciliatoryapproaches,suchasHocking’s
(1999)multi-layereddiplomacymodel,and,theimplicationfollows,mischaracterisesmuch
of the practice. Duran argues that, in the case of one of the lesser-studied entitieswith
regardstoparadiplomacy(alongsidetheItalian,Argentinean,Brazilian,ChileanandChinese
regions,interalia),theFrenchregionofPACA,diplomaticpractices:
Surpass the often-cited conflictual logic according to which sub-nationalentitieswinwhatthenationaldiplomaticlevelloses….diplomacyisfirstandforemostameansofmediatingbetweentheSelfandtheOther.Seeninthatlight, paradiplomacy can be an integral part of a diplomacy aimed atemphasizing the commonalities instead of the differences or separatenessbetweenpolities(Duran,2011:340).
33
InthecaseofPACA,Duranarguesthatparadiplomacyisrelatedtotwodistinctprocesses:
thatofdecentralisationwithintheFrenchstate,andofidentityconstructionwithintheregion
itself.Thisparadiplomaticactioncanbe,andis,bothcooperativeandconflictualwiththatof
the central state, but, Duran stresses, the key is that such actions “are primarily about
managing relations with ‘others’” (Duran, 2011: 356). In this case, PACA has developed
significantlinkswiththewiderMediterraneanregionasakeypartofitsparadiplomacy:
BytreatingtheFrenchstateandotherFrenchterritorialcollectivesnotonlyaspartofthediplomaticSelf,butalsoasdiplomaticOthers,andbyconsideringtheMediterranean space as domestic, by advocating amultiple diplomaticidentity-Provencal,FrenchandMediterranean-theregionisfillingtherelativevacuumtheFrenchstateleftintheMediterraneanregion…Thustheregionisaffirming the diplomatic Self (PACA), recognising diplomatic Others (otherFrench regions, France, foreign interlocutors) but also the diplomaticSameness(theMediterraneanspace)(Duran,2011:357).
Thepracticeofparadiplomacy,therefore,embodiesprocessofdifferentiationandalignment,
somethingthatrefersnotjusttorelationshipsformedwithotherregionsorstates,butalso
betweentheregionandtheirhoststate,andotherregionswithinthatstate.Thoughnotthe
intentionofDuran,givenhisattempt tomoveaway fromconflictual logics, itwouldeven
seemthatthisconceptualisationcouldbeusedtounderstandtheways inwhichstateless
nationsuseparadiplomacyaspartoftheirnationbuildingendeavours:bothtodifferentiate
themselvesfromcertainactors(thecentralstate,otherregionswithinthestate,particularly
incasesofasymmetricaldemandsforautonomy)andalignthemselveswithothers;whether
theyareother‘statelessnations’(astheBavariangovernmenthasovertlyattempted“Bavaria
isverysimilartoScotland.Weseeourselvesasanation”(EberhardSinner,BavarianMinister,
inHepburn,2008a:184))orotherstates(suchasQuebec’srelationswithFrance).Thisbroad
conceptualisation(paradiplomacyasaprocessofdifferentiationandalignment)ispotentially
ausefuloneinexplainingthemotivationsofsub-stategovernmentsasageneral‘category’
ofactorindevelopingexternalrelations,withtheprecisecontoursoftheserelationsbeing
dependent,essentially,ontherelationshipthattheregionhaswithitsvarious‘others’(be
thatconflictualorcooperative).
34
III. Paradiplomacy,orMulti-LevelGovernance?
Aconsequenceofthescantattentiongiventoagency-orientatedaspectsofparadiplomacyis
thattheconcepthasperhapstoooftenbeenequatedwithMulti-LevelGovernance.Here,the
focusofanalysishastraditionallybeenrelatedtogovernanceoftheEuropeanUnion,andthe
variousopportunitystructuresthatthiscreatesforsub-stategovernmentsandotheractors
‘below’ the state.Morebroadly it representsauseful concept toexplaindecisionmaking
dynamicswithintheEuropeansphere,notfocussingjustonthestateastheunitofanalysis
butratheranexusofactorsandthewaysinwhichtheseactorsinteractwithoneanother
(Marks et al., 1996). Marks and Hooghe use multi-level governance to account for the
‘unravellingofthecentralstate’,andtotheoreisenewpatternsofpoliticalinteractionthat
werenolongernecessarilyhierarchicalintheirnature;asetofrelationshipsthatbypassed
thecentralstate,yetwithoutrenderingitirrelevant(MarksandHooghe,2003).Thesethemes
remain hugely relevant for paradiplomatic analysis. However, the conflation of the two
phenomena–paradiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernance–mayproveproblematic.Sucha
conflationispartlydowntothesharedsubjectmatterandoperationalspacesthattheyjointly
inhabit,butitisalsoencouragedbythesheervarietyofactivitiesandpracticescomprising
paradiplomacy,manyofwhichequatetomulti-level-governanceandcanindeedbeuseful
exploredunderthisoverarchingconcept.
Paradiplomacy manifests in numerous guises: at times utterly mundane, at times highly
contentious. The scope of these activities should come as no surprise to students of
regionalism.Regionsandsub-stategovernmentsarethemselvesan“extraordinarilydiverse
group”,possessing varyingdegreesof autonomy (Scully andWyn Jones, 2010: 3) .Unlike
sovereign states, there is nominimum legal or conceptual personality that regions share.
Logically, therefore, the motivations behind the international activities that these actors
undertakealsospanaspectrumofpoliticaldistinctiveness,particularlywithregardstothe
‘host’ state. In itsmore ubiquitousmodes, sub-state internationalismmight relate to the
functionalrequirementsofEuropeangovernance,ortheneedtoattractinwardinvestment.
Initsmostdevelopedforms,however,paradiplomaticactivitiescanspeaktotheambitions
of sub-state nationalism (Lecours andMoreno, 2001: 3). Thesemore developed forms of
paradiplomacytypicallytakethesub-stategovernmentintomorecontentiousareas:whether
35
thatisthematically(recognition,internationalaid,coreareasofthestate’sforeignpolicy),in
termsofthenatureoftheactivity(relationswiththirdstatesordeparturefromastate-held
position).
Whenconsideredintheseterms,thepotentialimplicationsofparadiplomaticactivitiestake
onapoliticalcharge.Forinternationalrelationstheory,thesecouldbeparticularlyprofound.
Unlike themyriadofothernon-stateactorsoperatingat the international level, sub-state
governments are territorially constituted, and this territory overlaps with that of nation-
states. Indeed, for Duran, not only is paradiplomacy a territorially-driven political
phenomenon,meaningthatsubstatediplomats“represent,communicateandnegotiatein
thenameofterritorialcommunities”,theyarealso“politicalexpressionsofthedynamicsof
de-andreterritorializationthatcharacterizeourcurrentinternationalenvironment”(Duran,
2015:63).Fortheminorityofsub-stategovernmentsthatrepresentadistinct‘nation’,the
potential becomes that of undermining a core function of the nation-state itself in
international relations: to speak for ‘the people’ of a given territory. Currently, the
internationalrelationsliteraturehasnoplaceto‘put’actorsthatarenotreadilycategorised
accordingtothe“traditionaldichotomy”ofstateandnon-state(Shadian,2010:486).Indeed,
areifiedconceptionofthenation-state“leadstoanimpoverishedconceptionofwhatthe
‘non-state’entails”(BulkeleyandSchroeder,2011:745). Increasingly,theactivitiesofsub-
stateactors,particularlythoserepresentingdistinctnations,ontheinternationalstageare
makingthisanuntenablesituation.
Takenasawhole,theliteratureonsub-stateinternationalmobilizationhasfailedtodevelop
atheoreticalframeworkabletofullyexplorethesemoredevelopedparadiplomaticactivities,
many of which correspond to the logics of sub-state nationalism. The ‘fuzzy’ boundaries
between frameworks addressing autonomous, diplomatic activities (paradiplomacy) and
morefunctionalengagementinmulti-levelpolicy-makingprocesses(multi-levelgovernance)
havemeant that thesemore distinctive activities have becomediluted in analyses of the
broaderphenomenon.
36
Bothparadiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernanceareconcernedwiththeun-boundingofsub-
stateunitsfromtheirdomesticterritorialsettings.Theseunitsengagetodifferentdegrees
and in various modes with external actors, comprising other regions, third states,
international networks and supranational organisations. As explored in the preceding
sections,thismobilizationisthoughttobepartiallyfuelledbyfunctionalimperatives,suchas
attracting inward investment,or shapingEUpolicy (Hocking,1999;Cornago,2010:18-19;
Tatham, 2010). However, at the opposite end of the spectrum, other, less tangible,
motivations may also be also manifest. These include status-, capacity- or even nation-
building(LecoursandMoreno,2001;Kincaid,1990;Wigell,2013;ColeandPalmer,2011;Wyn
JonesandRoyles,2012;Royles,2010;AldecoaandKeating,1999a;Duran,2011).Intheirmost
developedforms,theseactivitiescanentailtherepresentationofasub-stateunitasadistinct
nationon the international stage,promoting the interestsor valuesofanequallydistinct
‘people’. However, in much of the literature, regional mobilization, manifest in both
paradiplomacy and multi-level governance, is closely allied to the broader processes of
globalisation (Hocking, 1999; Paquin and Lachapelle, 2005), and European integration
(Aldecoa, 1999; Sodupe, 1999;Hepburn andMcLoughlin, 2011). This literature also often
impliesacausalrelationshipbetweenthesewiderphenomenaandsub-statemobilisationin
theinternationaldomain(Hocking,1999:9;CohnandSmith,1996:25;PaquinandLachapelle,
2005:78;Sodupe,1999:58).
NotonlydoesthisfocusonthelogicsofglobalisationandEuropeanintegrationmeanthat
theagencyofregionalactorsthemselveshasattimesbeenneglected,butitalsoleadstoa
confusion between different categories of international activity undertaken by sub-state
governments.Giventhebroadscopethatthephenomenonofsub-stateinternationalisation
encompasses,intermsofthetypesofactor,ofarenasandofactivities,thelackofcoherence
withinthetwomainliteraturesaccountingforthesepracticesisfarfromsurprising.Imprecise
boundarieshaveled,however,toasituationwherepartsoftheostensibly‘paradiplomacy’
literaturedealwithactivities thatmaybebetterconsideredundermulti-levelgovernance
frameworks(forexample:Tatham,2008;2010;2013;Hocking,1999:25).Afurtherdifficulty
arisesfromthefactthatmulti-levelgovernanceitselfisa“multi-levelconcept’:
37
Because itmovesacrossandconnectsdifferentanalyticalplanesandraisesdifferentnormativequestions.MLGisatthesametimeatheoryofofpoliticalmobilisation,ofpolicy-makingandofpolitystructuring,henceanytheorisationaboutMLGmaybecouchedalternativelyorsimultaneouslyinpolitics,policy,orpolityterms(Piattoni,2009:172).
Thus,whentheamorphousconceptofmulti-levelgovernanceitselfbecomesconflatedwith
the narrower frame of paradiplomacy, it may generate an analytical problem:
mischaracterisingandobscuringthesignificanceofparadiplomacy.Sub-stategovernments’
role inmulti-levelgovernance–at least inrecentyears- is typicallythoughttobeafairly
conciliatory practice (where sub-state governments act with a degree of presumed
legitimacy),concerningactivitieswithaclearfunctional impetus.Toocloseanequationof
this conceptwith paradiplomacymay therefore direct attention away froma category of
activities,muchfewerinnumberthoughtheymaybe,wherelesstangiblemotivationsareat
play,andthetoneofinteractionsmaybemorecompetitive.Inconductingparadiplomatic,as
opposedtomulti-levelgovernanceactivities,regionsoftenemulatestate-likequalitiesand,
insomecases,useinternationaldomainstobuildthe‘nation’domestically.Thiscategoryof
activitiesmayspeaktoagreaterdegreeofpoliticalcontestationthanistypicallyprovidedfor
undermulti-levelgovernanceframeworks.
The requirement for such a distinction has been recognised within both literatures, and
tentativestepshavebeentakentowardsdelineatingthedifferentcategoriesofinternational
activities.Forexample,Kincaid(2010)arguesthatthereisachoicefacingparadiplomacy(or,
usinghispreferredterm,constituentdiplomacy)actors:whetherornottoseparateEUand
worldaffairsintheirinternationalremits.Thisisbecause,heargues;“theEUisincreasingly
takingonthecharacteristicofa federalpolityandtherebyacquiringthecharacteristicsof
domesticratherthaninternationalpoliticsandgovernance”(Kincaid2010:23).Meanwhile,in
a study of the various cross-border institutions utilised by regions, Blatter (2001:181)
contends that distinguishing between “instrumental” on the one hand, and “symbolic or
identity-providinginstitutions”ontheother,isacrucialelementoftheirproperanalysis.
38
Moredeliberately,bothPalmer(2008)andKaiser(2005)haveattemptedtomakeanexplicit
distinction between the two concepts. Palmer (2008: 14) considers paradiplomacy as a
potentialcomplementtomulti-levelgovernance,alongsidethemodelof‘Europeandomestic
policy’, in order to “enhance the explanatory potential of the concept of multi-level
governance for understanding the dynamics of sub-statemobilisation in the EU”. Kaiser
(2005:92),meanwhiledistinguishesparadiplomacy“autonomoussub-nationalactioninthe
internationalsphere”,frommulti-levelgovernance,which,lookstoinvestigate“coordinated
policymaking across different territorial levels”. Kaiser argues that, while paradiplomacy
appliesprimarilytotheAmericancontext,andmulti-levelgovernancetotheEuropean,both
practicescanindeedbeevidencedineachdomain.Fromthesetentativestepstodifferentiate
the two concepts, Chapter 2 of this thesis draws deliberate boundaries around them;
suggestingarangeofwaysinwhichtheymayinteractwithoneanother,andincorporating
suchadistinctionintothenewtheoreticalframeworkthatisadvocatedhere.
TheSignificanceofParadiplomacy:ConceptualisingSub-stateActorness
Theimplicationsofparadiplomacy,particularlyastheymanifestontheinternationalstage,
have rarelybeenconsideredaspartofparadiplomatic studies.Asa result, theyareoften
eitheroverlookedentirelyorrelegatedtofunctionalorsecond-orderfieldsofstudy,suchas
publicornetworkdiplomacy.Moresignificantly,sub-stategovernmentsarefrequently,and
hastily,amalgamatedwithwhatHockingtermsthe“graballcategory”of‘non-stateactors’
(1999: 21). This category error - or the lack of specificity implied - elides the key and
internationallypertinentdifferencethatsub-stategovernmentsrepresentdistinctterritories
which overlap, often in highly sensitive and politically salient ways, with nation states,
meaningthatthesignificanceofparadiplomacyisfundamentallydifferentfromthatofde-
territorialised,purposefully‘global’actorssuchasNGOsorMNCs.
It is not just at the international level that the implications of sub-state governments’
internationalactionisunderexplored;Wright(2003:98)arguesthatboththeparadiplomacy
andmulti-levelgovernanceconceptsfailtoadequatelyexaminetheconsequencesofsuch
phenomenaforstate-sub-staterelations.Thislacunacanpartiallybeexplainedbythefact
39
thatsuchconsequencesvarydramatically,dependingonthetypeofparadiplomaticactivity
inquestion;specifically,whetheritoccursinconflictwith,parallelto,orindeedinconcert
withthediplomacyofcentralstategovernments(Criekemans,2010c:38-39).
Byvirtueofthefactthatmuchparadiplomaticactionoccursparalleltothecentralstate,and
isoftenfairly‘(AldecoaandKeating,1999a)’(AldecoaandKeating,1999b:14),therehasbeen
a tendency to de-emphasise its significance. As highlighted above, a similar impulse to
categoriseas‘paradiplomacy’activitiesthatmaybetterbeunderstoodwithreferencetothe
conceptofmulti-levelgovernancecompoundsthisproblemofunder-ormiss-reporting(for
example,Tatham,2008;2010;Blatteretal.,2008).Theparadiplomacyliterature,therefore,
hasfailedtotakeappropriateaccountoftheimplicationsoftheirfield,whilstinternational
relationsscholarsoftenoverlookthepracticealtogether,perhapsduetothe‘methodological
nationalism’ofmainstreampoliticalscience(Hepburn,2009:478;Jeffery,2008:545).
I. TheInternationalArena
Important questions related to the implications of paradiplomacy for traditional
understandings of international relations and the role of the nation state were raised,
somewhatrhetorically,earlyoninparadiplomaticresearch(AldecoaandKeating,1999a:vi;
Lecours,2002:109;Keating,1999:14).However,afterthisinitialflurryofenthusiasm,and
despitean increasing focusonsomeof the ‘international relations’aspectsof theactivity
(suchaspublicdiplomacy,seeHuijgh(2010)),thesefundamentalquestionshaveyettobe
answered,orevenconsideredinanysystematicway.Thusfar,it isscholarsofregionalism
andcomparativepoliticsthathavebeenattheforefrontofparadiplomaticresearch,leading
toanimbalanceintheliterature.
Inpart,thisimbalancemaybeexplainedbythefactthat,dependingontheparticularframe
ofreferenceorlevelofanalysisthatonechooses,the‘international’effectsorimplications
of paradiplomacy can be interpreted within a multitude of different frameworks. For
example,paradiplomacymaybe seenasanalternativeway toconceptualise someof the
processesmore commonly analysed under the framework ofmulti-level governance; the
increasing involvement of sub-state actors on the international stage, and the
40
internationalizationofsub-statepolitics(Kaiser,2005:90).Atthesametime,ifweconsider
paradiplomacy within the broadest possible frame of reference, paradiplomacy may be
interpretedasonecomponent(amongstmany)of‘transnationalism’,orevenevidenceofa
neo-medievalistconfigurationofinternationalrelations(Magone,2006).
This aforementioned imbalance within the paradiplomacy literature has meant that the
aspects of the practicewhich invite an international relations perspective have not been
adequately explored, with fundamental questions regarding the significance of the
phenomenon, and its implications for key units and concepts in IR theory, such as state
sovereignty,leftunanswered.Thisisasignificantvoidinthefieldofresearch:asthestrategies
ofsub-stategovernmentsbecomemorecomplex,andthelegitimacyoftheir international
action develops, the practice becomes increasingly important for international relations
theory.
II. TheDomesticArena
Theimplicationsofparadiplomacyforthecentralstate,fortheregionitself,andfor inter-
governmental relationswithin the state, differ greatly depending on the type of external
relationsbeingconductedbythesub-stategovernment.Criekemans(2010c:38-39)makes
thisdistinctiononthebasisofwhetherparadiplomacyisconductedinconcert,orinconflict,
with that of the central state. In a similar vein, Tatham (2008; 2010) contrasts EU
paradiplomacywhichisconductedthroughthememberstatewiththatwhichbypasses it,
optinginsteadfordirectinterestrepresentationorinteraction.Anotherclassificationrelates
towhethertheexternalrelationsofsub-stategovernmentstaketheformofparadiplomacy
or‘protodiplomacy’,amoreadvanced,oftenantagonisticformofexternalrelationsaligned
tosub-stategovernmentspursuinganindependenceagenda,orwhoareintheprocessof
secedingfromthewiderstate(Duchacek1988,citedinCornago,2010:31-32).
Thus far, however, much of the paradiplomacy literature has fairly modest expectations
regardingthedomesticimpactofparadiplomacy(forexample:Cornago,2010:31-32;Wolff,
2007).Inparticular,Cornago(2010:31-32)arguesthat‘protodiplomacy’isexceptionallyrare,
evenamongstthosesub-stategovernmentswhere“aclearwillofdifferentiationwithregard
41
tothehostingstateexists”. However,despitethecomparativerarityof ‘protodiplomacy’,
thereisnodoubtthatthismoreconflictualpracticeisindeedinevidenceasapartofcertain
sub-state strategies. For example, Scotland’s diplomatic endeavours do indeed seem to
resemble“those initiativesandactivitiesofanon-centralgovernmentabroad thatgrafta
more or less separatistmessage on to its economic, social and cultural link with foreign
nations” (Duchacek1988:240, cited inCornago2010:31).Overt Scottishattempts toalign
themselveswithaScandinavian‘arcofprosperity’,publicdeparturesfromtheUK’sEUpolicy
and the appropriation of a pair of Chinese Pandas as evidence of formal diplomatic links
betweentheregionandtheChinesestate,allseemtocomeveryclosetothisdefinitionof
protodiplomacy. Ifthis isthecase,thenScotland’sparadiplomacysuddenlyseemstohave
muchmoredramaticimplicationsfortheirrelationswiththeUKgovernmentthanisallowed
forunderthetypologyofbothWolff(2007:150)andCornago(2010:31-32).
In part, this limited conception of the challenge posed for central state governments by
paradiplomacy relates to, once again, to the tendency to equate paradiplomacywith the
‘bigger’ concept of multi-level governance. Here, sub-state interactions tend to be less
controversial, and their presence carries greater legitimacy (for example: Tatham, 2008;
Blatteretal.,2008;Tatham,2010).Thereiscertainlyagooddealofoverlapbetweenthetwo
concepts,bothconsideringtheinternationalactionsofsub-stategovernments,butthisrange
ofactivitiesencompassessomequiteradicallydifferenttypesofengagement,rangingfrom
interest representation in EU policy formation to forging bilateral partnershipswith third
states, or initiating international development programmes. Assuming that each of these
activitieshavebroadlyequalimplicationsfortherelationsbetweenthesub-stategovernment
and thecentral stateseems tobepotentiallymisguided,yet thisdistinctionhasnotbeen
examinedindetailwithintheextantliterature.
TheoreticalFrameworks
Astheprevioussectionshavesoughttodemonstrate,theimplicationsofparadiplomacy,both
ontheinternationalanddomesticstages,havebeenallbutignoredwithintheliterature.Two
further,andwidespread,critiqueshavealsobeenmade,regardingthefailuretodevelopthe
general theoretical perspectives or analytical frameworks necessary to understand the
42
phenomenon(Lecours,2002),andtoarriveatadequateexplanationsforthedevelopment
(BursensandDeforche,2010).Inpart,theseshortcomingscanbeaccountedforbythefact
that paradiplomacy falls into something of an academic ‘no man’s land’, between
internationalrelationstheoryandcomparativepolitics.
Atthebroadestlevel,paradiplomacyraisesthe‘bigquestions’thatarecentralto both comparative politics and international relations. Theorizingparadiplomacy…necessarily involves penetrating the structure-agencydebate…more specifically, paradiplomacy is a Janus-faced phenomenonwhoseverynaturedefiesitscategorizationasinternal-domesticorexternal-international,andwhoseexplanationinvolvesconsideringbothinternalandexternalvariables(Lecours,2002:109-110)
Boththepotentialforamore‘joinedup’approachbetweenthedisciplinesofcomparative
politicsandinternationalrelationsandthespecificroleof internationalrelationstheoryin
conceptualisingtheparadiplomacywillbeconsideredinthefollowingtwosections.
I. TraditionalComparativePoliticsandIRTheory:ABridgeableDivide?
International Relations research, according to Caporaso (1997: 564), remains narrowly
focussed on two conceptual categories: the state and the international system. This
specialisation,asaconsequence,largelyignoresdomesticpolitics,resultingina“pronounced
gapwithinthedisciplineasawholebetweendomesticpoliticsandinternationalrelations”.
Given the existence of phenomena, such as paradiplomacy, whose explanations and
implications lie concurrently in the domestic and international spheres, there seems an
intuitiveneedtobridgethisdivideinfutureresearch.Twodifferentschoolsofthoughtexist,
however, regarding whether or not this academic divide is, in fact, bridgeable; the cure
remainsdependentonthecause,andheretherearedivergenthypotheses.
The first is simply that the chasm is a result of academic specialisation and the logic of
divisionsof labour,encouragingpoliticalscientists,forthesakeofexpediency,tofocuson
relativelynarrowframesofreference.Underthishypothesis,thegapsthatcurrentlyexistin
thetwofields’researcharesurmountable,requiringarestructuringofworkingpracticesand
newresearchagendas.Thesecond,however,assumesthat the ‘problem’ issystemic,and
that“bothfieldsareintellectuallyautonomous,standontheirownfoundations,andcannot
43
bereducedtooneanother”.Here,anexplanationisofferedonthebasisthatthediscipline
of international relations is concernedwithstate survival,bargainingandpower,whereas
domestic politics is rule based, preoccupiedwith governance and institutions. Under this
assumption, integrating the research agendas of these separate disciplines is both
unnecessaryandill-advised(Caporaso,1997:564).
Attemptstoincorporatedomesticandinternationalapproachestophenomenawhichspan
thisconceptualdivide,and‘de-compartmentalise’politicalscience(Lecours,2002:109-110),
can, indeed,beidentified.Caporaso(1997)highlightstwoofsuchthatmaybeparticularly
relevanttothestudyofparadiplomacy:1)RobertPutnam’stwo-levelgames,and2)research
concerningthedomestificationofinternationalsystems(withtheEUasthekeyexemplar).
Caporasocites twoworksaskey to the ‘two-levelgame’approach:Putnam’s1988article
‘DiplomacyandDomestic Politics: The Logicof Two-LevelGames’ anda subsequent1993
editedvolumebyEvansetal.,entitled“Doubled-EdgedDiplomacy”. Thebasicpremiseof
these works is that the unitary actor assumption of the state in traditional IR theory is
misleading, resulting in incomplete understandings of ‘international’ phenomena and,
instead, a recognition of the “Janus-faced” nature of the state, “facing simultaneously
outward to the international systemand inward toward variousdomestic constituencies”
should form the basis of a more sophisticated approach (Caporaso, 1997: 566-567). The
editedbook,whichCaporasohighlights,focusesparticularlyonthisprocessofinternational
bargaining, disseminating the domestic and international explanations for particular
configurationsofpowerornegotiatingpositions.AccordingtoMoravcsik(1993:6),thedivide
betweeninternationalrelationsandcomparativepoliticsislessabsoluteinpracticethanitis
intheory:“pureinternationaltheories,whileattractiveinprinciple,tendtodegenerateunder
thecollectiveweightofempiricalanomaliesandtheoreticallimitationsintoexplanationsthat
include domestic factors”. The argument logically follows, therefore, that incorporating
domestic factors into the theory-building stage would allow for more accurate
conceptualisationsofprocessessuchasinternationalbargaining;“allsophisticatedtheories
ofinternationalrelations,domesticandinternational,tendtoconcedethatdomesticactors
areactiveparticipantsinforeignpolicymaking”.Thecontentiousissue,asMoravcsikseesit,
44
iswhichtheoreticalframeworkscanbestaccountfor“observedbehaviour”(Moravcsik,1993:
7).
ThesecondattemptatrapprochementbetweenthetwodisciplinesidentifiedbyCaporasois
thatwhichhetermsthedomestificationofinternationalpolitics(Caporaso,1997:579).Unlike
thetwo-levelgameapproach,thisendeavourcan’tbetracedtoasingleworkorgroupof
scholars, rather it is most closely related to the wealth of research into the emergence,
integrationandoperationoftheEU,asakeyexampleofthewayinwhichdistinctspheresin
theinternationalrealmhavebecomelessanarchic,more“governmentalized”andrulebased.
Ratherthanadvocatingatwo-levelapproach(wherethetwolevelsofinternationalsystem
anddomesticpoliticsare indeedfundamentallydifferent,butmustbothbeconsideredto
impact upon the process of ‘international relations’), as Putnam and Evans et al., this
approachasks:
Towhatextentdomestic and internationalpoliticsdiffer, in termsofdeeporganisingprinciples,theninterpretsthesedifferencesasonesofdegree(notkind),andproceedstoinvestigatethewaysinwhichtheinternationalsystemmay acquire the characteristics of domestic policy’ (Caporaso, 1997: 579-580:579-80)
Paradiplomacy is a prime example of a phenomenon that requires a multi-locational
theoreticalperspectivetoadequatelyaccountforitsdevelopmentanditsimplications.The
two-levelgameapproachtakentoexploreinternationalbargainingwouldseemaparticularly
usefulstartingpointinaddressingtheinternationalanddomesticvariablesrelevanttothe
practiceofparadiplomacy,andisanapproachseeminglymirrored,ifimplicitly,intheworkof
Lecours(2002),citedinprevioussections.
II. TheabsenceofIR
As also intimated above, paradiplomacy has gained surprisingly little attention from
international relations scholars; in fact none of the numerous ‘schools’ in IR theory have
examinedthephenomenon,offeredexplanationsfor itsdevelopmentoraccountedfor its
impactonthefield(theexceptionswhichprovethisruleareBursensandDeforche’shistorical
institutionalist,explanatory,accountofthedevelopmentofparadiplomacy(2010),builtonby
Royles(Royles,2016)).However,theliteratureisinchingclosertoincorporatingthetypeof
45
dynamicexhibitedbyparadiplomacyinto itstheorising;forexample,recentstudiesofcity
diplomacy(Curtis,2011)andglobaldiasporas(AdamsonandDemetriou,2007)havelooked
closelyatthereconceptualisationofunitsininternationalrelationsandthechallengesfora
prioriassumptionsof thenatureand importanceofsovereignstatehood(particularlyas it
relates to nationhood). Clearly, these are questionswhich relate in equal, if not greater,
measuretotheinternationalactivitiesofsub-stateregionalgovernments,particularlythose
whichcanbeclassedas‘statelessnations’.
ThoughthesetwoworkshaveanunambiguousIRfocus,theydrawonthebroader,multi-
disciplinary frameworkof ‘transnationalism’,wherebynewactors (suchas interestgroups
andglobalcorporations)andlociofpoliticalpower(includingsupranationalinstitutionsand
globalnetworks)increasinglyform‘webs’whichtrapwithinthemnationstates,constraining
theirfreedomofmanoeuvreandweakeningtherespectivepoweroftheirdomesticpolicy
apparatus(Cerny,2010:4-5).Sub-stategovernmentsareaparticularlyinterestingcaseinthis
regard;thefactthattheyareterritoriallyconstituted(asopposedtoissuenetworksorglobal
diasporas) on the one hand, but that they are often politically, as opposed to solely
economicallymotivated(incontrasttomostcitydiplomacy),andthattheymayrepresent
competingexpressionsofnationalismwithregardstotheirhost‘nationstate’,ontheother,
meanthattheireffectupontraditionalrolesandconceptionsofthestatewithininternational
relationsispotentiallyofgreatersignificancethaneitherofthetwophenomenacitedabove.
ThispotentialmakestheabsenceofIRresearchexploringthepracticeofparadiplomacyall
themoresurprising.Infact,thetransnationalismliteratureitselfseemstolargelyignorethe
phenomenon,withexaminationsofregionalismconcentratingonlyontheinter-,notintra-
statemode (particularlywith regards to theEU).Meanwhile, though the twoworks cited
above represent interesting steps towardsexploring thesenewdynamics in IR theorising,
bothauthorspointtotheoverallpaucityofresearchorinterestonthepartofinternational
relationsscholarsintheseareas.Specifically,AdamsonandDemetriou(2007:495)arguethat
what little IR theorising does engage with such issues, in particular diasporas and
transnationalidentities:
46
Has beenwritten largely froma postmodernist perspective,with a view todrawing attention to marginalised identities or practices as a means ofcritiquing hegemonic conceptions of the state…A conceptual focus on non-state identities isthereforeoftenpairedtoapoliticalproject locatedwithinthefieldofIR,ratherthananIRprojectthatseekstounderstandtherealworldofinternationalpolitics.
In attempting to explain what he determines as a fundamental flaw in the way that IR
theorising has developed, Neumann (2002: 630-638) argues that an unquestioning, over-
relianceonthe“systemicpointofdeparture”inIR,theWestphalianstatesystem,hasmeant
that;“wehavenowayofdiscussingempiricallytowhatextentthesystemofstatesinfact
remainscentraltoglobalpolitics.Thesystemappearsasontic,asanexogenisedgivenofthe
analysis”.
Inotherwords,ifthesystemofstatesisseenasagiven,thislimitstheextentofempirical
investigationsintootherexplanations,andIRtheorists“bracketoutotherpossiblewaysof
framingglobalpolitics,andsoeffectivelyhamperotherwaysfromemergingmoreclearly”.
Whatisrequired,accordingtoNeumann,isanabandonmentofthestructural-functionalism
inherent in this approach; IR theory should “follow the general turnof anthropology and
sociologyawayfromananalysisbasedonbeliefs,ideas,normsandsoon,infavourofmore
concreteanalysis”.Usingtheexampleofdiplomacytoillustratehispoint,Neumannargues
that,here,itisparticularlyimportantthatthedegreetowhichstateactorsarerequiredto
“grapple”withothertypesofactors,andtheeffectofthesechanges,areproperlyaccounted
for in IR theory, given that the practice of diplomacy “has traditionally been seen as a
mainstay of the states system, and so this should be a case where potentially systems-
transforminginnovationshouldbelessexpected”(Neumann,2002:693).ChapterTwomakes
adeliberateattempttoincorporateamorequalifiedconceptionofsovereigntyandstatehood
intoourframeworkforanalysis,allowingfortheconcreteconsiderationofthewaysinwhich
sub-stategovernmentschallenge,subvertorreinforcethemessagesofstate-leveldiplomacy:
in other words, the ways in which states are forced to grapple with their sub-state
counterparts.
47
Conclusion:ThestateoftheLiterature
The practice of paradiplomacy remains hugely differentiated. At one level of distinction,
paradiplomacycanbebothahighlypoliticised,almostantagonistic,undertaking,generally
by those regions engaged in an explicit nation-building project. Or it can be functionally
driven,tothepointofmundane(Keating,1999:13).Withinthisfirstcategory,similarmeans
mayactuallyreflectverydifferentidealisedends,fromindependence,togreaterautonomy
withinthestateorsimplyenhancedleverageoveraparticularissue.Thisdifferentiationof
bothpracticesandpurposescertainlycompoundsthecomplexityofthephenomenonand
can partly explain the limited development of the overarching theoretical frameworks or
explanatoryapproaches,ascalledforbyLecours(2002)andBursensandDeforche(2010).
Theparadiplomacyliteraturehasdevelopedinasporadic,yetcompartmentalised,fashion,
withcontributionsfromthefieldsofregionalismandfederalismcompletelyeclipsingthose
from the IR traditions.Given the ‘Janus faced’ nature of paradiplomatic activity (Lecours,
2002:110),andthustherelevanceofbothinternalandexternalcausesandconsequencesof
thephenomenon,thisisasignificantshortcoming.Perhapsasaresultofthisimbalancewithin
the literature,structuraldeterminants, suchas legislativeautonomyorglobalisation,have
beengivenparticularlyprominentweightingsinaccountsofthephenomenon’sgrowthover
theprecedingdecades.Whilst the roleof agencyhas steadily gained increasingacademic
attention(Lecours,2002;PaquinandLachapelle,2005;LecoursandMoreno,2001;Duran,
2011; Keating, 1999), the few works that look specifically at the motivations behind
paradiplomacyhavefailedtoadequatelyexploretherelationshipbetweenthemost-oftcited
variables, sub-statenationalismandnationbuilding,andparadiplomaticactivity.Thus far,
this small literature lacks the systematic, comparative analysis required to uncover the
nuancesofthesemotivations,andtheways inwhichsub-stateactorsperceivethetoolof
paradiplomacy. Instead, the paradiplomatic literature has focussed on exploring the
opportunity structures allowing for the mobilization of sub-state actors beyond their
territorial borders. Undoubtedly, this leaves a sizeable and obstructive gap in our
understandingofthephenomenon,andits‘normalization’(Cornago,2010)overthepasttwo
decades.
48
Meanwhile,andrelatedly,theimplicationsofparadiplomacy,bothfortheregionandstate
(intermsofintergovernmentalrelationsandconstitutionaldevelopment)andfortheconduct
andconceptualisationofinternationalrelations,remainunderexplored.Overall,theredoes
appear tobe anunwillingness to speculateon thebroader significanceof paradiplomatic
activity.Giventhat“fewhopeshavebeenmoreregularlydisappointedthanthosefocussing
onthewitheringawayofthestate”(ScullyandWynJones,2010:5),thiscautionisperhaps
unsurprising.However,the‘hybridity’ofsub-stategovernmentsontheinternationalstageis
significant.Thefactthattheyhaveaclaimtogovernmentalcontrol-andoftenappealto(sub-
state)nationalsentiments-overadefinedterritorywhichoverlapsthatofastate,alongside
their‘sovereigntyboundyetsovereigntyfree’status(Hocking,1999)rendersitsuch.When
combined with the absence of any analytical category in which to understand their
internationalactorness,theabovesuggeststhatthephenomenonislongoverdueaplacein
theIRresearchagenda.Systemicchangeisevidencedinthediplomaticsystem(Neumann,
2002:613),andthenormalisationofparadiplomacyisakeypartofthischange.Giventhe
primacyofthediplomaticsystemwithintheinternationalsystemasawhole,theemergence
ofnewactorsandpracticesinthisarenaisimbuedwithsignificanceforinternationalrelations
theory.
Perhapsthekeyconceptthattheextantliteratureonparadiplomacyhasfailedtoadequately
examine isone that finds itself at the coreofboth comparativepolitics and international
relations: sovereignty. The ways in which both regions or ‘stateless nations’ and central
governments view the boundaries of sovereign authority is inextricably linked to
paradiplomacy:tothemotivationssub-stategovernmentshaveinestablishinginternational
actorness, to the responses of central state governments to paradiplomatic actionwithin
their national borders and to the role of quasi-autonomous, territorial actors in the
international system. It is this, surprising, shortcoming that the current project aims to
address,aslaidoutinthefollowingsection.
49
ChapterTwo:AnewtheoreticalFramework.
Introduction
Posited in the previous chapter is a central failure - both of distinctly paradiplomatic
literatures,andthoseofInternationalRelationsmorebroadly-to‘joinup’thepracticesof
paradiplomacywithwiderconceptsandphenomenaininternationalpoliticsanddiplomacy.
ForMcConnelletal.(2012:806),paradiplomaticstudieshavetendedtowardsthedescriptive,
meaning that such accounts “rarely question the legitimating work that diplomacy
accomplishesorattendtotheperformativeaspectsofdiplomaticpractices”.Conspicuousby
their absence within the paradiplomatic literature, according to Criekemans, are “those
studies that employ both traditional comparative politics and an international relations
perspective”(2010a:4).
Aconsequenceofthisoversightisthatmuchoftheanalyticalsignificanceofparadiplomacy
is, in fact, missed. In multiple ways, the practices of paradiplomacy touch on the ‘big
questions’ofInternationalRelations(Lecours,2002:119).Whocountsasadiplomaticactor?
From where does international legitimacy derive? How is the narrative of sovereignty
challenged, subverted or appropriated by non-state actors? This thesis looks to re-site
paradiplomatic study within the discipline of international relations and explore the
implicationsthatparadiplomaticpracticeshaveforthebiggerquestionsofIRanddiplomatic
theory.Thefundamentaldisconnectbetween,ontheonehand,asetofday-to-daysub-state
international activities - activities that can sometimes tend towards thehumdrum,but at
othertimescanrepresentarealchallengetothediplomaticstatus-quo-andsomeofthe
morepressing,andenduringlyrelevant,dilemmasofinternationalpoliticsanddiplomacyis
verymuch the area that this thesis aims to shed light upon. Indeed, aswewill explore
throughoutthisthesis,attimestheverysameactivitiescanbeinterpretedatvariouspoints
alongtheabovespectrum,dependentontheactorsinvolvedandthepolticalcontextwithin
which the paradiplomacy is conducted. A set of general premises underpin the approach
adoptedhere.Thesearethreefold.
50
Firstly, regional or sub-state identities are becoming increasingly salient, a phenomenon
whichissimultaneously-thoughtovastlydifferingdegrees-drivingthedevolutionofcentral
governmentauthorityandlegitimacyinmanyareas,includinginternationalaffairs.Foreign
policyhas traditionallybeen thepreserveofnational governmentsalone, and is “anarea
traditionallysocloselyarticulatedsosovereigntythatitisconsideredtheprerogativeofthe
sovereign” (Adler-NissenandGad, 2014: 16). This imbuesparadiplomatic activitieswith a
particularsignificance,andperhapsservesasindicationastohowfarsuchsub-stateauthority
orlegitimacycanstretchindifferentcontexts.
Secondly, diplomatic practice is diversifying; bothwith regards to the type of actors now
engagedindiplomacy,ofonesortoranother,andintermsofthetoolkitsnowemployedby
diplomaticactors.Suchdiversificationmeansthatrelationshipsandpracticesthatmayhave
traditionally been excluded from the analytical framesof referenceutilisedby diplomatic
theoristsmustnowbeconsideredaspartofthemessierpictureofmoderndiplomacy.
Thirdly,enquiryatthemarginsofinternationalrelationsisacrucialpartofaccountingforthe
multitudeofactivities,actorsandpracticesthatself-evidentlyexistinthisfield.Accordingto
Adler-Nissen and Gad (2012: 3), by “focussing on what appear to be marginal sites of
internationalrelations,weareabletoseemuchmoreheterogeneitythanIRtheoryusually
allowsusaglimpseof”.Thevalueofthistypeofenquiry,therefore,liesnotonlyinthespecific
lessons learnedaboutdiscretepractices -suchasparadiplomacy-butalso in itsabilityto
speaktoabroaderpictureofinternationalrelationships,addingnuanceand,insomecases,
importantripostestotheclaimsofgrandtheory.
Drawingfrombothinternationalrelationsandcomparativepoliticsperspectives,severalkey
conceptswillbeemployedduringthecourseofthisanalysis.Theirselectionandapplicability
tothespecificresearchquestionstobeaddressedwillbediscussedinthefollowingsections.
Each,intheirownway,contributestobuildingapictureofparadiplomaticactivitythattakes
intoconsiderationitsmultiplefacets.Whatactuallyisitthatsub-stategovernmentsaredoing
on the international stage? How do theymanage to position themselves as credible and
legitimateinternationalagents?Whymightsuchgovernmentscovetaninternationalprofile?
51
Dosuchactivitiesholdanysignificancebeyondthatperceivedbythosedirectlyinvolvedin
paradiplomatic exchanges? In short, these concepts - which include hybridity, mimicry,
performativity and sovereignty games - provide the vocabularywithwhich to discuss the
meaningandthepotentialsignificanceofparadiplomaticactivity.
Whatfollowsinthischapterisanattempttobringtogetherthevarious,diverse,aspectsof
paradiplomaticactivityinamorecohesivetheoreticalframework.Thefirstpartofthistaskis
separating out autonomous, diplomatic activities from the wider pool of sub-state
internationalactivity-includingmulti-levelgovernance-thatitsitswithin,andtosketchout
the boundaries of the new approach advocated here. The focus is squarely on ‘affective’
regions, inScully&Wyn Jones’ terms(2010:7-8), thoseregionsorstatelessnationswith
strongsub-stateidentities.However,theanalysisemployedthroughoutthethesiswilltake
fullaccountofthecontoursoftherelationshipbetweenregionalidentityandparadiplomacy;
mapping them in apreciseway rather thanassuminganyuniformity to the linkbetween
them.Crucialtotheapproachadoptedhereisunderstandingandaccountingforthehybridity
oftheoperationalspacethatsub-stategovernmentsfindthemselveswithin:nestedwithin
state structures but carving their own diplomatic identities out with the state. In their
‘sovereignty bound’ yet ‘sovereignty free’ status (Hocking, 1999) we find particular
opportunities,andconstraints,ontheinternationalstage.Theselendadistinctflavourtothe
contributionsthatsuchactorscanmake.Newattentionisgiventothewaysinwhichthese
hybridactorsattempttocarveoutalegitimateinternationalpresence,andspecificallytheir
attempts to either mimic or subvert more traditional state-discourses. Ultimately, the
contention is made that the autonomous diplomatic activities of certain sub-state
governments (namely statless nations) can be perceived asmoves in a variant of Addler
Nissen & Gad’s ‘sovereignty games’ (Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2012; Adler-Nissen and Gad,
2014;Adler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansen,2008).Theseactorsareassertingtheirrightto
be a participant in such games - through their paradiplomatic interventions - rather than
seekinganyspecificend,inandofitself.Subsequentsectionsinthischapterintroducethe
specificresearchquestions,themethodologyandthecasestudiesthatwillinformanddirect
thisstudy.
52
Anewframeworkforthestudyofparadiplomacyinstatelessnations
Far from being an anomalous aspect of the broader phenomenon of sub-state
internationalism,themore‘developed’paradiplomaciesofregionsorstatelessnationswith
strongsub-state identities (‘affective’ regions inScullyandWynJones’ terms (2010: :7-8))
representoneofitsmostsignificantfeatures.Itistheseambitiousactivitiesthatpresentthe
moreprofoundchallengetodominantconceptsandassumptionsinbothcomparativepolitics
and international relations theory. Necessary for a full understanding of these types of
challengingactivitiesisanadequatetheoreticalframeworkwithinwhichtointerpretthem,
onewhichacknowledgestheneedfordifferentconceptualtoolsateitherendofthisbroad
spectrum.
Reconceptualisingparadiplomacytotakeaccountof itsproperscopeentailsarebalancing
fromsolelytop-down,towardstheinclusionofmorebottom-upexplanans,andfrompurely
structural tomore agency-oriented accounts. It involves distinguishing between different
types of international activity; being able to identify those initiatives that go beyond
functional requirements of regional governance in a globalized era. These forms of
paradiplomacysitatoddswithmuchoftheliterature;aliteraturewhosefocushasoftenbeen
onwhatmightbebettercharacterisedasmulti-levelgovernance.
However, those activities that chafe more profoundly at the boundaries of sub-state
authority, those that compete or conflictwith central state narratives, or indeed seek to
repositionthesub-stategovernmentinrelationtotheircentralstatecounterparts,andthose
that in otherways challengeour understandingof a ‘proper’ role for sub-state units, are
highlyusefulinsightsintothenatureofthephenomenonandthepotentialsignificancethat
it holds. The following sections I. - I.V. set out four ‘stalls’ which shape the theoretical
approachadopted in this thesis: I. delineatingautonomous,diplomaticactivities from the
wider pool of sub-state internationalism, II. conceptualising the hybridity of sub-state
governments and bringing IR theory firmly into the fold, III. accounting for the role and
53
importanceofinternationallegitimacy-andparticularlytheutilityofmimicryasalegitimising
strategy,and,IV.introducingtheconceptofsovereigntygamesasawaytounderstandthe
back-and-forthbetweenstateandsub-stategovernments,andthecontradictory,paradoxical
natureoftheeffectsparadiplomacymayhaveonthesystemofstates.
I. Delineatingautonomous,diplomaticactivities
An initial step towards seeing such activities in clearer focus is distinguishing between
paradiplomacy andmulti-level governance. This task is both a necessary and challenging
exerciseowingtotheoverlapoftheirsubjectmatter,andtheinter-relationshipbetweenthe
two practices (Kaiser, 2005: 90-92). The conception of multi-level governance as being
concernedwithpolicymaking,andparadiplomacyasfocusedonquiteseparate,autonomous
action in the wider international setting, is a useful starting point in drawing distinct
conceptualboundariesaroundthetwoapproaches.Thenatureoftheactivitiesthatmulti-
levelgovernance,ontheonehand,andparadiplomacy,ontheother,looktounderstandcan
bedividedintothebroadcategoriesof‘governance’and‘diplomacy’.Abriefconsideration
of sub-state representation inBrussels shoulddemonstrate this rangequite clearly.Here,
therehasemergedadefactodistinctionbetweenwhathavebeentermedthe‘classicBrussels
offices’,andsomething‘else’,whichisverymuchadiplomaticpresence(ColeandPalmer,
2011::386).TheexamplesdiscussedbyColeandPalmerarethoseoftheWalesEuropean
Centre, pre-devolution, whose role was primarily providing information on funding
opportunitiesforclients(whotypicallyincludedlocalgovernmentsanduniversities),andthe
Wales Brussels Office post-devolution, where the Welsh Government exercise strategic
leadership over the representation, and the unit is deliberately differentiated from local
governmentandpublicagenciesintheprocess.
Moore, meanwhile (2008b: 525-527) makes a more general argument, whereby
constitutional regions inBrussels (whohave“adelegatedsetof legislativecompetences”)
maintaina“strongpoliticaldimensiontotheirwork”,onethatisabsentinthedelegationsof
both‘administrative’regions,andtheregionsofnewmemberstates,whopurposefullydo
notrepresent“historicorlinguisticregions,asnationalgovernmentssoughtconsciouslyto
54
cross-cut inter-ethnic, religiousand linguisticcleavageswithin their state” (Moore,2008b:
:524).Thispoliticaldimensiontothepresenceofsuchconstitutionalregionsisnot,however,
uncontested.Forexample, theGerman federalgovernmenthavecontinued to stress that
Länder representations in Brussels must not action a diplomatic role, with the term
‘Vertreung’(representation)provingparticularlycontentious(Moore,2006::200-202).The
degreeofsensitivityoverthisissuewouldsuggestthat,inactuality,theGermanLänderare
indeedstrayinginto‘diplomatic’waters,adevelopmentthatcanbeseenparticularlyclearly
in the Bavarian government’s 2006move to “lavish and opulent” offices in a high-profile
Brussels’location(Moore,2006::192).
Therealsignificanceofthisdistinction,betweengovernanceanddiplomacy,relatestothe
fact that sub-state governments appear to be increasingly acting outside what has been
understood as their legitimate (limited) external remit. Rather than simply fulfilling the
accepted functions of sub-state governance in those domains now implicated in their
activities(whetherthisistogainresourcesforeconomicdevelopment,ortoarticulatepolicy
preferences),someregionsarealsoconductingarangeofactivitiesthatspeaktodifferent,
perhapsmorecomplex,underlyingmotivations.Thesediplomaticendeavoursmayrelateto
adesireonthepartoftheregiontoenhancetheirstatus,bothasitregardstheir‘host’state,
andotheractors.Dependingonthenatureoftheregionitself,thisexercisemightbegeared
towards building the nation domestically (external identity construction) or be centred
arounddemonstratingstate-likecapacity.Likewise,theymaybeconductedwiththespecific
aimof‘pavingtheway’forindependence,orperhapsgainingtractionwithinthestateovera
specificissue-orindeedaspartofamoresymbolicsovereigntygame(Adler-NissenandGad,
2012;Adler-NissenandGad,2014;Adler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansen,2008).
Itisthecontentionofthisthesis,andwassuggestedabove,thatmakingthesedistinctions
(betweengovernanceanddiplomacy) isnecessary for theadvancementofparadiplomatic
studies.Withouttherefocussingoftheparadiplomacyframework,totakebetteraccountof
theconceptualtoolsrequiredateitherendofabroadspectrumofactivity,thereisadanger
thata lackofclaritymay leadtotheparticularsignificanceofparadiplomacyasapolitical
actionbeingunder-reported,anditsnoveltyasafeatureofthemoderninternationalsystem
55
being obscured. As Criekemans argues (2010a: 6), “regions and their external activities
come…in many different colours, shapes and intensity when placed in a comparative
perspective”;inordertotakefullaccountofthisvariety,onemustbefullyconsciousofthe
implicationsthatdifferentframeworksmayentail.
Itispositedherethatparadiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernance,typically,considerdifferent
practices (diplomacy or governance), in differentmodes (transnationality or institutional
engagement). Whilst there are certainly exceptions to this very general rule, this broad
distinctionmeansthataconflationofthesetwoconceptsisunhelpfulandrisksbothpractices
being either over or under-reported. The differences outlined abovemay imply different
explanations;therangeactivitiesresultsinasimilararangeofimplicationsforthedisciplines
ofbothcomparativepoliticsandinternationalrelations.Havingsaidthis,itisalsoapparent
from the discussion above that the two concepts often share subject matter, with the
activitiesofsub-stategovernmentsoverlappingintobothframeworks,andthereforeableto
beusefully exploredwith reference tobothparadiplomacyandmulti-level governance.A
primeexampleherewouldagainbetheBrusselsofficesofEuropeanregions.Therearealso
importantconceptualandtheoreticalmarkersofthemulti-levelgovernanceapproachthat
wouldseemexcellentcandidatesforafullerencorporationintotheparadiplomacyliterature.
Firstly, multi-level governance places an emphasis on individual actors within a political
system.It‘”demandsthatthesocialanalystexaminethepoliticalactivitiesofthetherelevant
indidiualsandgroupsof individualsas thecausal linkbetweenmacroprocesses…andthe
rulesthatstructurepoliticalregimes”(Marks,1996:23).Inasimilarvein,Marksarguesthat
this actor-centred approach may engender an integration of comparative politics and
internationalrelations,inordertogaina“coherent”understandingofdecisionmaking.Ther
eisadeliberateattemptwithinthisworktoavoid“reifyingthestateasanactorwithinterests
orpreferences”(Marks,1996:24,34).Giventheabove,atthispointitisworthwhileoutlining
threewaysinwhichthetwoconceptscanrelatetooneanother.
Firstly,paradiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernancecanconstitutealternativeexplanationsfor
the same activities. For example, the conduct of ‘border diplomacy’ between European
regions,orparticipationininter-regionalnetworks,maybeexplainedbyparadiplomacyasan
56
aspectofexternal identityconstructionorstatusenhancement (forexampleDuran,2011:
:356-7),butauthorsfromamulti-levelgovernanceperspectivemayarguethatsuchactivities
arearesultofregionsneedingtobuildpolicy-coalitionsinordertopresentastrongervoice
attheEUlevel(forexampleSodupe,1999: :62).Therelevanceofvariousvariables–both
structureandagencyrelated,thoserelatingtosub-state,stateorsupranationaltiers-may
vary, depending on whether the explanation for a particular activity stems from a
paradiplomacyormulti-levelgovernanceframework.
Secondly,theycanrepresentparallelconcepts,consideringdifferentactivitieswithinashared
domainofsub-state internationalism. Itwouldseemthatthis is themostcommonway in
whichtherelationshipmanifestsitself,despitethefactthatthetermshavebeenusedinter-
changeably in parts of the extant literature. For example, paradiplomacy can be used to
explore the conduct of normative international activities, such as international aid
programmes(WynJonesandRoyles,2012),whilemulti-levelgovernanceaccounts forthe
activitiesoftheCommitteefortheRegions(Carroll,2011),inparalleltooneanother,with
verylittleinteractiontakingplacebetweenthetwoapproaches.
Thirdly,thetwocanrepresentcomplementaryapproaches,allowingforthefullexploration
of motivations and opportunity structures behind sub-state international activities that
overlaptheconceptualboundariesbetweenthetwoframeworks.Brusselsofficescanagain
beusedas anexamplehere: thereareboth functional, ‘governance’ requirementswhich
mean that the establishment of such offices is an important activity for sub-state
governments, and they may, to a large extent, determine the size and nature of such
representations.Butthereisalsoawholerangeoflesstangiblefactorsbehindthedegreeof
importancethatasub-stategovernmentattachestoBrusselsrepresentation,andindeeda
varietyoftypesof(diplomatic)activitythattakeplaceundertheaegisofsuchoffices.For
example,theBavariangovernmentmaintainsaparticularlylargeandwell-resourcedBrussels
office,totheextentthatthisrepresentationismuchmorevisible-inaliteral,aestheticsense
- thansomeof thememberstaterepresentations. Its locationmeansthat“everyonewho
57
comes to the European Parliament has to pass it”.3 Quite why Bavaria places so much
emphasisonthisformofinternationalengagementisaquestionthatarguablyrequiresboth
multi-levelgovernanceandparadiplomacyapproaches to fullyaccount for. Overall, there
exist “multiple dimensions of regional representative activity” in Brussels (Moore, 2008b:
:525),andthustheapplicationofthesetwoconceptswouldseemnecessaryfortheirfulland
robustanalyses.
Despitethedegreeofoverlapbetweenthesubjectmatterthatparadiplomacyandmulti-level
governance share, theyalsoattempt to account fordifferent typesof activity, orpolitics,
oftenwithequallydifferentrationales.Theyalsomayrelatetooneanotherinthesenseof
interpreting the same or similar activities in different lights. Therefore the relationship
betweenthemalsodifferssubstantially,dependingontheexactactivitystudied;theymay
representalternativeexplanations,parallelconcepts,orcomplementaryapproaches.Much
greaterclarity is therefore required in the two literatures,both in termsof specifying the
natureofactivitiesconsidered,andbeingexplicitasregardsthechoiceofframework.This
shouldnotbeaparticularlyarduousorcomplicatedtask:thedistinctionsoutlinedabove,such
asbetweengovernanceanddiplomacy,aremadeasamatterofcourseinstate-levelanalysis.
Forthepurposesofthisstudy,afocusonthoseautonomous,diplomaticactivitiesconducted
byourthreecasestudiesisadeliberateattempttorebalancetheparadiplomaticliterature
towardsthesemoreadvancedparadiplomaticdynamics,withacorrespondingemphasison
thepoliticalrationalestowhichsuchactivitiesrelate.Attentionispaid,specifically,totherole
thatdiplomacy-andbeingrecognisedasalegitimateactorininternationaldomains-plays
in thepolitical calculationsand the self-perceptionsof sub-stategovernments. In short, it
focusesonwhydiplomacymatterstothesetypesofactors,ratherthanonwhatfunctional
imperativesexistinthisdomain.
II. Hybridactors,hybridspaces:bringingIRtheoryintotheparadiplomaticfold
3Interviewwithauthor,seniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial2013
58
International relations theory is a crucial ‘missing link’ in the paradiplomatic literature.
Similarly, thepracticeofparadiplomacyhas failedtomake itontothe IRresearchagenda
itself.Thisisproblematic:theactivitiescomprisingparadiplomacynecessarilyimplicatethe
frameworksofbothcomparativepoliticsandinternationalrelations.Admittedly,themajority
ofactivitiesthatsub-stategovernmentsundertakeintheinternationaldomainmaybeless
thanremarkable;4atleastwithintheEuropeanenvironment,multi-levelgovernanceisthe
dominantdynamic.However,theseparatecategoryofautonomous,diplomaticactivitiesthat
some sub-state governments undertake does pose important questions for international
relationstheory.Evenmoresowhenthesesub-stateunitsrepresentstatelessnationsand
the tone of interactionsmay bemore ambitious, even provocative. Indeed, the external
activities of such actors pose questions at a series of intersections atwhich ambitious IR
theorizingalreadytakesplace:between‘identities,bordersandorders’(Albertetal.,2001).
Suchdynamicsalsofeedintomoreprofoundquestionsregardingtherelationshipbetween
nationhood, statehood and the function of international relations. The post-Cold War
internationalsystemhaswelcomedanumberofnewstateswhichhavebeencreatedalong
thelinesofnationalpopulations,relyingonthe“‘imaginedcommunity’ofthenationforits
legitimacy”.
Yet, state centric theories of IR have failed to adequately explain these developments,
relegatingmanyofthekeyissuesrelevanttotheiranalysis“tothestatusofepiphenomena”
(Hall,1999::4).Thereiscertainlyscopeforparadiplomaticactivitiesbasedonthe‘imagined
communities’ofstrongregions,statelessnations,indigenouspopulationsandDiasporasto
shed someall-important lighton these relationships. Though the focus in this study ison
statelessnations,therelevanceofotherformsofparadiplomaticandmulti-levelgovernance
tointernationalrelationsisofcourseacknowledged.Certainly,economicparadiplomacyhas
distinctimplicationsforIRsub-fieldssuchasinternationalpoliticaleconomy:theroleofglobal
citiesrepresentingakeytransformativedynamicintheinternationaldomain(Curtis,2011).
4 Of course, this same claim could be made of much of the state-level interaction thatcomprisesday-to-dayinternationalrelations.
59
However,themoredevelopedformsofparadiplomaticactivityperhapsbetterillustratethe
currentdisjuncturebetweeninternationalrelationstheoryandemergentpractices.
Sub-stategovernmentsareconceptuallydistinctfromthebroadercategoryofnon-stateactor
duetoakeylineofdemarcation:theyareterritoriallyconstituted.For‘statelessnations’,this
distinctiongoesevenfurther;theyrepresentasinglenation,andthuscanclaim(withvarying
levels of success) to speak for a given ‘people’. Sub-state governments are thus ‘hybrid’
internationalactors (Hocking,1986;1999); their claims topoliticalauthorityareexpressly
territorial,yettheyarenot(legally)sovereign.Assuch,theseactorsaresovereigntybound,
yetsovereigntyfree(Hocking,1999).Inotherwords,theyareboundbythesovereigntyof
their‘host’state(i.e.,theyarenot‘transnational’actorsinthetraditionalsense),yettheyare
alsofreefromtherequirementsandresponsibilitiesoffullmembershipoftheinternational
system.Thisenablesthemtocarveoutdistinctandnicheroles,correspondingtothespecific
ambitionsoftheirgovernments.
Towhatextent,then,doesthe(re)emergenceofthiscategoryofactorontheinternational
stage challenge extant conceptions of the nature of IR and IR theory? Arguably, the
normalizationofparadiplomacyisevidenceoftheweakeningofnation-statesovereigntyas
traditionallydefined.Fromoneperspective,itisemblematicofarelocationofauthoritythat
has resulted from the processes of globalisation, increasing interdependence and
intermesticity (Rosenau,1992;Hocking,1999;FossumandRoussel,2011;LaPorte,2012).
Thephenomenon,therefore,canbeinterpretedasanelementoftransnationalism,whereby
newactorsandlociofpoliticalpowerform‘webs’,trappingwithinthemnation-statesand
constrainingtheirfreedomofmanoeuvre(Cerny,2010::4-5).
Fromadifferentperspective,thepracticeofparadiplomacycouldbeseenasthepartialre-
emergenceofaformofglobalpoliticsthatpre-datesthemodernnation-statesystem.Here,
the prediction of Bull (1977) becomes an interesting marker. Bull contends that, should
modernstatescometoshare“authorityovertheircitizens”and“abilitytocommandtheir
loyalties”withregional/globalandsub-stateauthoritiestosuchanextentthat“theconcept
of sovereignty ceased to be applicable”, we could then say that a neo-medieval form of
60
politicalorderhademerged.Indeed,Criekemans(2011a::715)contendsthat“toacertain
extent, today’s diplomatic practices resemble a pre-Westphalianworld inwhich different
policy levels (macroregional, national, crossborder, substate, regions and cities) each
generatespecifictypesofdiplomaticactivitiesreflectingspecificneedsfeltattheirrespective
territoriallevels”.
Freidrichs (2001)examinestheconceptofneo-medievalism insomedetail,andconcludes
thatthereexistmultiplespheresofauthorityandcompetingorganizingprinciplesthatcan
currentlybeidentifiedintheglobalorder.Challengestothemonopolyofthenation-stateare
basedontwoprocesses,accordingtothisview:thetransnationalmarketeconomy(which
challengesthestate’straditionalmonopolyonlegitimatepoliticalactionintheinternational
sphere),andthefactthatthe“sphereofsymbolicreproduction”isde-couplingfromthestate,
with individual allegiances being directed elsewhere (Friedrichs, 2001). The spectrum of
activities undertaken by sub-state actors on the international stage can been seen to
contribute tobothof theseerodingprocesses,distinguishing themfrommanyothernon-
stateactors.
Morebroadly,thephenomenonofparadiplomacymustformpartofongoingdebateswithin
thedisciplineofIR,astoitsown(in)abilitytoaccountforchangeintheinternationalsystem.
According to Buzan and Little (2001: :24-25), the discipline of IR operates within a
‘WestphalianStraitjacket’,or“thestrongtendencytoassumethatthemodelestablishedin
seventeenthcenturyEuropeshoulddefinewhattheinternationalsystemisforalltimesand
allplaces”.Inasimilarvein,Agnew(1999::503;2005)pointstothefactthatconventional
understandings of the geography of political power are underpinned by a series of
assumptionsthatconceiveofstatehoodasthe“uniquesourceandarenaofpoliticalpower
inthemodernworld…togethertheyservetoputthemodernterritorialstatebeyondhistory”.
ForNeumann (2002: :630-638),meanwhile, “wehavenowayof discussing empirically to
whatextentthesystemofstatesinfactremainscentraltoglobalpolitics.Thesystemappears
asontic,asanexogenisedgivenoftheanalysis”.Self-evidently,“wearenotverygoodasa
discipline at studying the possibility of fundamental discontinuity in the international
61
system...we lack even an adequate vocabulary; andwhatwe cannot describe,we cannot
explain”(Ruggie,1993::144).
Clearly,sovereigntyisakeystartingpointforidentifyingtheeffectsthatparadiplomacyhas,
and may come to have, on the field of international relations; partially through its
multiplicationofthenumberofeffectiveinternationalagentswhoseauthoritystemsfroma
formofgeographicalrepresentation.AccordingtoMingus(2006),sub-stategovernments,as
partofbroadernetworksandstructures,are‘perforating’thesovereigntyofnation-states,in
certainpolicydomains.ThisviewisalsoreflectedintheworkofSendingetal.(2011::782-
791),whopointtothe“complextapestryofactorsandconcerns”acrosstheArcticregion,
necessitatingan“inclusiveactorperspective”intheanalysisofthediplomaticpracticestaking
place.Takingthesedebatesastepfurther,Agnew(1999::506-7)positsthatpoliticalpower
may bemoving from a ‘field of forces’model of territorial sovereignty, to a hierarchical
networkmodelwhereby “cores, peripheries, and semi-peripheries are linked together by
flowsofgoods,peopleandinvestment”.
WhateverimplicationsparadiplomacyhasforIRtheoryare,however,boundtobenuanced.
The activities of sub-state actors represent a crucial aspect of all of the process outlined
above,buttheyappeartoembodysomehowcontradictoryforces.Ontheonehand,atrend
towardsseparatismwithinextantstates“portendsa fragmentationthatcanreinforce the
field of forces model as new states emerge” (Agnew, 1999: :506-7). The utility of
paradiplomacyin‘pavingthewayforindependence’wouldthereforeseemtore-assertthe
dominanceofstate-sovereignty.Ontheotherhand,theroleofregionalunitsthatremain
withinnation-statesinperforatingthesovereigntyofsaidstateswouldseemtoworkinthe
contrarydirection.Thispush-pulldynamicisarecurringthemeinparadiplomacy:itrelatesto
the simultaneously bolstering and eroding effect of the mimicry of state-diplomatic
discourses(McConnell,2016;McConnelletal.,2012),asexploredinthesubsequentsection.
Theinternationalactivitiesofsub-stategovernmentscanalsobeinterpretedasameansto
consciouslyexpandtheirterritorial‘reach’.Ifthe“domain”ofadistinctpolity“includesthose
whoidentifywithit,thespacetheyoccupy,andtheissuesoverwhichthepolityexercises
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influence”,thenparadiplomacymustbeseenasanexpansionofthisdomainonthepartof
sub-stateactors (FergusonandMansbach,1996: :262-3). Wheretheseactorsrepresenta
nation, incongruentwith the state, thiswould seemto representaparticularly significant
dynamic; most notably for state-level actors. While it is not necessarily the case that
expandingthedomainofsub-statepolitiescreatesanequalandoppositeretractionofthe
state’s legitimate domain, there is certainly the potential for a conflict of interests that
manifestsattheinternational,ratherthanthedomestic,level.
Inextrapolatingthepracticeofparadiplomacybeyondthesometimes-parochialconfinesof
federalor comparativepolitics,weare facedwithadifferent typeofnarrative.Here, the
establishment of sub-state governments as international agents, albeit with limited
‘actorness’onaccountof theiropaque legal status, canbe interpretedaspartofawider
phenomenon that gradually blurs the boundaries between sovereign states and ‘new’,
potentially contesting, forms of representation. On the one hand, there currently exist a
sizeablenumberof‘unrecognisedstates’,whichmanageto“survive,andevendevelop”in
theinternationalsystem,despitelackingtheexternalsovereigntyotherwisegrantedbythe
act of international recognition (Caspersen, 2012: :1-2). These entities are able to govern
(moreorlesseffectively),providebasicpublicservicesandenjoypopularlegitimacy,yettheir
unrecognised status results from “the restrictive interpretation on the right to self-
determinationandtheoverridingprincipleofterritorialintegrity”(Caspersen,2012::27).On
theotherhand,non-stateactorswhoarenotterritoriallybound,yetnonethelesscanclaim
torepresentadistinct‘people’arealsodelvingfurtherintointernationalaffairs:Diasporas
andindigenouspeoplesaretwoclearexamplesofthispractice.Shadian(2010)examinesthe
caseof the InuitCircumpolarCouncil, ICC, in itsglobal interactions; representing“an Inuit
polityseekingtogainadegreeofsovereigntyasapoliticalcollective”.Theformofsovereignty
pursuedrevolvesaroundtherighttoparticipateinpoliticaldecisionmaking,ratherthanbeing
basedonterritorialintegrity,athemetowhichwereturnwhendiscussingtheconceptionof
sovereigntygames(Adler-NissenandGad,2012;Adler-NissenandGad,2014;Adler-Nissen
andGammeltoft-Hansen,2008):
TheICCservesasanexampleofacontemporarycollectivepolity-neitherleftoutside the state system nor possessing a state of their own. Rather thesovereigntyoftheICCdependsonitsabilitytomaintainthelegitimacyofits
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myth, which over time has evolved, adapted and changed (Shadian, 2010::504).
Both of these categories, unrecognised states and non-territorial ‘national’ or collective
political actors relate to a central question raised by paradiplomacy: that of sovereignty.
BarkinandCronin(1994::108)problematizethishistoricalconstruct(sovereignty) insome
detail. The authors argue that there has long been a tension between state sovereignty,
“whichstressesthelinkbetweensovereignauthorityandadefinedterritory”,andnational
sovereignty“whichemphasisesalinkbetweensovereignauthorityandadefinedpopulation”.
Thesetwotypesofsovereigntydifferfundamentallyintermsoftheirsourceoflegitimation:
state sovereignty rests on clearly demarcated boundaries and effective institutional
authority,nationalsovereigntyrestsontherepresentationof“communitiesofsentiment”,
forming“thepoliticalbasisonwhichstateauthorityrests”(BarkinandCronin,1994::110-
111).Theauthorsgoontoarguethattherearedistinctperiodsinwhichinternationalnorms
legitimiseoneorotheroftheseformsofsovereignty,butthattheselegitimisingprinciples
are subsequently queried during “major systemic crises”, reverting to a privileging of the
alternativeclaims.
Thepracticeofparadiplomacybystatelessnationsarguablymakesaclaimforthelegitimacy
ofa form ofnational sovereignty:howstates respond to this claim representsanequally
interesting marker as to the dominance of such international norms. At the very least,
stateless nations, autonomous regions and unrecognised states (though in very different
ways)all “question thedirect linkbetween internalandexternal sovereignty” (Caspersen,
2012::11).AsCaspersenindicates,sovereigntyisneitherstaticnorindivisible;normustitbe
absolute. Krasner (1999: :4-5) carefully dissects the construct, delineating between
international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and
interdependencesovereignty,allofwhichimplydifferentrulesandlogicsofappropriateness.
Itispossible,Krasnerargues,foranentitytohaveoneofthesevariantsbutnottheothers,
potentiallyallowingforthehybrid-natureofstatelessnationsas internationalactorstobe
meaningfullyconceptualised.
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III. Mimicry,performativity,andlearningto‘talktheinternationaltalk’
Atheart,paradiplomacyisanexerciseintransposingdomesticauthoritytotheinternational
stage,craftingaperceivedlegitimacytoparticipationinaffairslocatedoutsideofaregion’s
geographical borders, and - essentially - claiming, or performing into being, a diplomatic
agency thatwas dormant duringmost of the 20th century. The processes involved in the
creationofsub-statediplomaticagencythereforesharemuchincommonbothwithother
non-stateactors,andindeedwithstatesthemselves.Assuch,paradiplomacyoffersonelens
throughwhich toexaminenot just theparticularitiesof sub-statediplomacy,butbroader
diplomaticprocesses,performancesandstructures.
Legitimacy is central to paradiplomatic activity: either being asserted by the sub-state
government,orindeeddeniedorchallengedbyotheractors.Sub-stategovernmentsdrawon
multiple, overlapping and occasionally contradictory sources of legitimacy in their
internationalengagements.Themostcompellingof theseareoftentheir representational
qualities:aselectedrepresentativesofaclearlydefinedcommunityorlocale.Insomecases,
andcertainlyinthoseofstatelessnations,theclaimsofsub-stategovernmentscangoastep
further:torepresentadistinct‘people’.Clearly,theseclaimsoverlapwiththosemadebya
sovereignstate:representingthelargercommunityorterritorywithinwhichthesmallerunit
resides.
The particularity of a sub-state government’s claim to legitimacy is therefore premised
preciselyontheirdifferencetothe‘host’state.Whetherintermsofeconomicprowess,or
high-techindustries-asintheparadiplomaticactivitiesofCalifornia,BeijingandBavaria;their
normative credentials - as in the international and sustainable development activities of
WalesandScotland;or indeedtheir relativedeprivationorpoliticalorethnicsubjugation.
Sub-state governments appeal both to principles of national sovereignty and self-
determination-theattributesorinterestsofa‘people’ofaregionorstatelessnation-and
to functional discoursesof geo-strategic position, territoryor productivity. Such claims to
legitimacyonthebasisofdifferenceorparticularitycanbeidentifiedinsingularinstances,for
examplewhenaregionstandstobedisproportionallyaffectedbyanenvironmentalissue,or
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indeed if its position leaves it particularly vulnerable to conflict or international crime.
Domesticpoliticalconsiderationscanalsotemporarilymobilisetheseclaims.Moreover,the
discourse of particularity may be a near constant theme running through a sub-state
government’s internationalagency,and theclaims itmakes toa legitimatepresence.The
QuebecGovernment, for example, hasbeenable to secureobserver status in theUnited
Nationsonthebasisoftheircultural,linguisticandhistoricalparticularitywithintheCanadian
context(Balthazar,1999)
Thelegitimacy-orotherwise-ofsub-stateexternalrelationsposesseveralquestions.How
can we accurately conceive of ‘mini-diplomacies’ and tentative international relations
emanatingfromactorsthatarenotsovereign,yetoftenclaimtorepresentadistinctpeople
on the international stage? When these representations conflict with positions held at
sovereignstatelevel,whichmostaccuratelyspeaksforthepopulationconcerned-inother
words,whose legitimacy trumpswhose? This conundrum currently plays out on theUK’s
diplomatichorizon.InthecontextofaUK-widereferendumoncontinuedEUmembership,
Scotland’svotestoodincontrasttothatofEnglandandWales.Multiplevoicesfromwithin
theUKarethereforespeakingtothewiderworldonacoreelementoftheUK’sforeignpolicy,
whistlingaverydifferenttune,yetinunmistakablydiplomatictones.
Asub-stategovernment’sinternationallegitimacymaybe(notionally)premisedonqualities
thatitpossesses-betheyrepresentation,democracy,functionorcapacity-however,inorder
for this to be translated into an accepted presence on the international stage, specific
strategiesarerequired.Inshort,howdosub-stategovernmentsensurethattheyarelistened
to, takenseriously,acknowledgedbyotheractors?Akeyway inwhichthis legitimation is
achieved is that ofmimicry: essentially, learning to ‘talk the talk’ and ‘walk the walk’ of
diplomacy. Assuchthisthesisemploysthevocabularybothofmimicry(McConnell,2016;
McConnelletal.,2012)andperformativitytounderstandthewaysinwhichsuchlegitimating
work is accomplished (McConnell et al., 2012: 806). The ideaof ‘mimicry’ in adiplomatic
settinghas clear and compelling links tomuchparadiplomatic activity,whereby sub-state
governmentsoftengotoextremelengthstoappear‘state-like’.
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Inthefullestexaminationofmimicryinadiplomaticsettingtodate,McConnelletal(2012:
804)explorethewaysinwhich“non-statediplomaciesdrawon,mimicandinterveneinthe
realmofformalpoliticalactioninwayswhichbothpromote‘official’statediplomacyasan
ideal and dilute its distinction from other, ‘unofficial’ diplomacies”. Diplomatic
representations,fromamimeticperspective,arethereforenotsolely“strategichegemonic
toolsemployedbyconstitutedpowerstoexclude,butcanalsobetacticallyperformedby
entitiesthatchallengethecompositionandstatusoftheinterstatesystem”(McConnelletal.,
2012:811).Notonlydoesamimeticperspectiveallowustolookempiricallyatthewaysin
which sub-state governments may craft their international messages and diplomatic
representationsinawaywhicheithermirrorsordivergesfromstatepractice,italsoactsas
anotheranalyticallenswithwhichtoexaminetherelationshipbetweenthesub-andcentral-
statetiersofdiplomacy,andthewaysthattheyinteractwith,andpotentiallychallenge,one
another.
Meanwhile-andrelatedly-aperformativeperspectiveallowsustotakeacloselookatthe
waysinwhichasub-stategovernmentcommunicatesitsmessageontheinternationalstage
thatincreasinglylieswithinitsgrasp.Thatmuchdiplomacyisnow‘publicdiplomacy’directed
atmassaudiencesratherthanlimitedtoexchangesbetweenthediplomaticelitesofformally
equalsovereigns,iswidelyunderstood(Huijgh,2010;Huijgh,2012).Aconsequenceofthis
shiftinpracticehasbeenthattheperformativeaspectsofdiplomacyarenowmorevisible;
the‘performance’takesinnewanddiverseaudiences.However,evenwhenenactedinits
mosttraditionalvariants,diplomacyhasalwaysreliedheavilyonperformance;onsymbolism,
mutually understood and reciprocated signs and shorthand (McConnell et al., 2012). The
frameworkof‘Performativity’isprimarilyconcernedwiththeprocessesofagencycreation.
Itis,fairlyloosely,associatedwiththeEnglishSchoolofInternationalRelations,sharingan
interest specifically in the practices of diplomacy (Neumann, 2003: 1). It draws on a rich
history in social theory - from John Austin to Judith Butler - as well as on constructivist
understandingsofinternationalpolitics,butperhapsamoresignificant‘marker’intheway
thatitisutilisedinaninternationalrelationssettingisinfactthebreadthofitsintellectual
underpinnings. A key premise is - essentially - that international agents are made, or
performed into being, rather than simply born (Neumann, 2002; Neumann, 2003). The
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frameworkallowsafocusonthevariouspractices,processesoreventsthatconstitutethe
making of such international agents, in our case sub-state diplomats. Indeed, for
paradiplomacy,thephrase‘Ispeak,thereforeIam’seemstobeparticularlyprophetic.
IV. ParadiplomacyasaSovereigntyGame
Abstracting thepracticeofparadiplomacybeyond itsparochial confines, as thepreceding
sectionshavesought,thereforeleavesuswithquestionsofrealandpressingsignificanceto
contemporary IR theory.Are sub-state governments, in their role as international agents:
perforating or weakening state sovereignty; re-asserting the legitimacy of national
sovereignty;expandingandreconstitutingthedomainofsub-statepolities,furthereroding
the distinction between the international and the domestic; or un-bundling and
disaggregating Caporaso’s (2000) conceptual triangle of ‘territory, sovereignty and
authority’?Beyondthesequestions,theactivitiescomprisingparadiplomacyalsohavesome
utility in highlighting the limits of extant IR theory. Indeed, multi-national states,
unrecognised states and non-state actors capable of conveying the loyalties of distinct
nationalorethnicgroupsontheworldstagedonotexistintheabstract:theyareverymuch
areal,empiricalphenomenon.Asanincreasinglysignificantdynamicinallitsvariousguises,
paradiplomacy deserves a place on the IR research agenda, contributing most clearly to
embryonicdebatessurroundingthedevelopingrolesof‘hybrid’internationalactors.
Theconceptofnationbuildingisusedinvariouswaysandinhugelydifferingcontextswithin
thefieldofparadiplomacy.Forthepurposesofthisstudy,however,whatisofinterestare
the political projects that draw on a strong regional identity, undertaken by sub-state
governmentswithdifferingconstitutionalpreferences.Whether thismanifests in theself-
referentialtermof‘nation’ornotisoflesserimportancethanthefactthesegovernments
recognise a political or cultural distinctiveness in their polity. The basic assumption that
underpins the utility of this framework in exploring paradiplomatic activity is that, for
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statelessnations, theability to ‘speak thenation’ internationally,and touse international
settingstoperformanagencythatoutstrips,orevensimplyaugments,thatcraftedwithin
domesticcontexts,isparticularlyvaluable.Whenthe‘stakes’areraisedinthisway,wenot
onlystandabetterchanceofencounteringandunderstandingthetensionsbetweensub-and
central-statediplomaciesandstatuses,butalsothewaysinwhichinternationalagencyfeeds
backintotheself-understandinganddomesticpoliticalagendasofthesub-stategovernments
themselves;andinevitably,thoseofthecentralstate,also.
Inshort,whenweconsidertheparadiplomaticpracticesofstatelessnations,theunderlying
currencyisoftenthatmostrarefiedbeast:sovereignty.Sub-stategovernmentsassertaform
of sovereignty in their pretensions to an international role, speaking for their people and
interactingwithotheractors-oftenthird,sovereignstates,ontheworldstage.Likewise,for
thecentralstate,whenseekingtomonitororcontroltheinternationalactivitiesoftheirsub-
state counterparts, their rationales often retreat into absolute sovereignty: the ability to
speakwithasingle,unqualifiedvoiceontheinternationalstagebeingcentraltotheroleof
national foreign offices and governments. However, when we consider the practices of
paradiplomacyintheirreal-life,day-to-daymanifestationsweseethatthepictureismuch
morenuancedand, in fact,much lessabsolute.This leadsus toadifferent conception to
sovereigntyperse,thatofasovereigntygame.
ThenotionofsovereigntygamesisonesetoutingreatdetailbyAdlerNissenandGad,and
explored both in their edited volume entitled ‘European Integration and Postcolonial
SovereigntyGames:theEUOverseasCountriesandTerritories’,andwithspecificreference
totheNordicregioninaspecialissueofthejournalCooperationandConflict(Adler-Nissen
andGad,2012;Adler-NissenandGad,2014).InthecontextoftheNordicregion,theauthors
pointtotwinprocesses:Europeanintegrationandincreasingdemandsbypolities,suchas
Greenland,theFaroeIslandsandÅland,forindependence-inoneformoranother.Atthe
heartoftheirexplanationofthesetwinandseeminglycontradictoryprocessesisthenotion
that sovereignty is not absolute, and should not be treated as such; instead it must be
regardedasaqualifiedconcept.Theideaofsovereigntygames,therefore, isallaboutthe
negotiationofsovereignty.Thegames:“involvestrategiesmaybeplayedoutwithreference
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tosovereigntyaseither/or,andtheymayinvolvealternativetypesofpolitiesinadditionto
sovereignstates”(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:14).
The fact that the meaning of sovereignty has - mistakenly, the authors contend - been
understoodasfixedhasresultedinthescenariowherebythedominantmodesofconsidering
worldpoliticsclassifyrelations:
Intermsofeitherhierarchicalsubordinationorexternalequality.Forpoliticalpractitioners,thisleadstoblindnesstootherformsofpoliticalorganization.For academics, it leads to blindness to what (also) goes on in politics - ininternationalpolitics,indomesticpoliticsandparticularlyinthepoliticsontheborderbetween the international and thedomestic (Adler-NissenandGad,2014:14).
Such a border is precisely where paradiplomatic activities take place; territorially basted
actors,nestedwithinthestructureofasovereign,hierarchicalstate,yetestablishingdirect
relationships and exchangeswith external actors, both sovereign and non-sovereign. The
polities discussed by Adler-Nissen andGad sharewith certain sub-state governments the
inabilitytofitneatlyintocategoriesofferedbyconventionaltheoriesofinternationalpolitics.
Greenland or the Faroe islands are “neither formally sovereign nor simply hierarchically
subordinatedtotheirmetropole”(2014:16).Whilemostsub-stategovernmentsareinfact
hierarchicallysubordinatetothecentralstate,formanythereisaconsciouschallengingof
thisstatus,oneoftenexpressedthroughparadiplomaticendeavours.Thisdoesnotalways
translatetoaquestforformalindependence-thoughitcando.Instead,itmaybemanifest
in the extent of competences transferred to the sub-state authority or in thenature and
qualityofrelationshipsbetweencentralandsub-statelevels.Certainly,forthosesub-state
governments identifying in one way or another with the term nation, there is a self-
perceptionthatsharesmuchincommonwiththeNordicexamplescitedabove.
ForAdler-NissenandGad,asovereigntygame:
Involvestwoormoreplayerswho,intheirinteraction,makestrategicclaimsaboutauthorityandresponsibilitywithreferencetoa traditional ‘either/or’concept of sovereignty. Contemporary sovereign states and polities, whichqualify as potential states, manoeuvre between dependence and self-determination - and sovereignty is a card that can be played in thesemanoeuvrings-orplayedon-indifferentways.Notablythearticulationofthe
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either/or conceptof sovereigntyneedneither be explicit nor affirmative inorderforittobevitalforthegame(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:19).
In drawing on the discourse of sovereignty, the ‘games’ themselves therefore have both
system-reinforcing and potentially disruptive effects. Similar effects, in fact, tomimicry -
wherebynon-stateactors’adoptionofaformofstate-likediplomacyisseentobolsterthe
authorityofthelatter,atthesametimeasitdilutestheverydistinctionthatexistsbetween
the official and the unofficial (McConnell, 2016; McConnell et al., 2012). For sub-state
governments,and indeedotherpolities,thevalueofsovereigntygames isrelatedtotheir
ability to position them as legitimate player in the game itself. Post-colonial sovereignty
games,inthewordsofAdler-NissenandGad,“pertainnot(only)tosomeparticularinstance
ofdistributionofauthorityorresponsibility,buttothedistributionoftheverypossibilityof
articulating authority and responsibility” (Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2014: 20). Sub-state
governments,therefore,areabletodeclarethemselvesascountedamongthe‘players’or
meaningful units in a national scene, using the international scene to bring about this
domesticpower-shift.
Insum,anewapproachtoparadiplomacy-theapproachutilisedandadvocatedinthisthesis
-shouldfocus,unapologetically,atthemoredevelopedendoftheparadiplomaticspectrum,
consciously assessing thenatureof the challengepresented to stategovernments,or the
diplomaticstatusquomorebroadly.Instatelessnationsweseeanon-stateactorspeaking
loudlyandclearly for the interestsof,orat least inthenameof,apeople -sometimes in
conflict with a central state authority. We see a traditionally territorially bound actor
construct theirplaceon theworld stage, seek legitimacy for their internationalpresence,
mimickingdominantdiplomaticdiscoursesthatbothsubvertandreaffirmthemonopolythat
statesholdonsuchdomains(McConnelletal.,2012).Welearnabouttheboundariesofsub-
stateauthorityandterritorialreach,theprocessesofinternationalagencycreationandthe
methodsthatcentralstategovernmentshavetoconstrainordenyagency.Wecanprobethe
meaningofofficialdiplomacy;assess thecategoriesanddivisionswehavebeen routinely
employing in the description and analysis of diplomatic practice.We can learn about the
meaning of sovereignty, unpicking the associations between this central concepts and its
variousoffshoots:authority,territory,power.
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ResearchQuestions&Design
Theresearchquestionslaidoutinthissectionreflectthenewfocusandframeworkthathas
beendiscussedabove.They reflect the fact thatparadiplomacyhas recentlyundergonea
processof‘normalization’(Cornago,2010),beingundertakenbyahugelyvariedassortment
ofregionalandothersub-stateactors,inamultitudeofdifferentguises;attimesmundane,
attimeshighlycontentious.Despitetheabsenceofclearconstitutionalauthority,andoften
withoutademonstrablefunctionalimpetus,therealityisthatsub-stateactorsareprojecting
themselvesontotheinternationalstage,developingan‘actorness’thatmuddiesthe(already
murky) waters of the diplomatic system. Where a good proportion of these discrete
paradiplomaticendeavoursarereasonablyeasilyunderstoodandaccountedforwithrelation
to economic incentives (specifically attracting inward investment), or engagement with
Europeanpolicy-making,otheractionsaremore intriguing.Theproliferationofnormative
activities, such as support for international development or climate change initiatives,
alongside increasinglynormal, or ‘state-like’diplomatic relationshipsorencounters (often
wherebyaregionestablishesformal/longertermrelationswithasovereignstate)seemsto
speaktodifferent,morecomplexandperhapsmoresignificantunderlyingmotivations.
Of the relatively small amount of research that has previously been conducted into the
motivationsbehindparadiplomacy,theconceptofstatelessnationalism,anditscounterpart,
nation building, have beenwidely identified as at least highly significant, if not themost
relevant, variables (Lecours andMoreno, 2001; Royles, 2010; Keating, 1997; Paquin and
Lachapelle, 2005). It would seem that these concepts are particularly consequential with
relationtothelessclearlyfunctionalexternalactivitiesmentionedabove.However,thelink
betweennationbuildingandparadiplomacyisundoubtedlymorecomplexthaniscurrently
accountedforintheliterature,notleastbecause‘nationbuilding’isasomewhatamorphous
conceptitself.Whatistheintendedendproductofsuchexercises?Asovereignstate?Greater
devolvedauthority?Someformofconfederation?Self-determinationisclearlyaconceptthat
is in a period of flux, with the interrelated processes of devolution/decentralisation,
supranational regional integration and globalization providing a particularly colourful
72
backdrop.Analternativewayofthinkingaboutthisdynamic,whichseemstorevolvearound
therelativepowerandstatusofthestateandsub-stategovernment,iswhatAddler-Nissen
andGameltoft-Hansenterma ‘sovereigntygame’ (2008). In thisview,expandedbyAdler-
NissenandGadinrelationtotheNordicregion(2014),sub-stateinvolvementininternational
affairsmayrepresentatypeofsovereigntygamethatisnotreallyaboutanendgoalofanew
sovereignstate,butratheranassertionofthepolity’srighttoplaysuchagameatall.
Thislackofclarityregardingtheprocessofnationbuildingobscuresnotonlythemotivations
forsub-stategovernmentsinconductingparadiplomacy;italsomeansthattheimplications
of paradiplomacy, in the domestic and international arenas, are ill accounted for. For
example,whilebothScotlandandWalesmightbesaidtobeinvolvedinaprocessofnation
building (constructing and promulgating national identities, carving out areas of policy
differentiationwithregardstocentralgovernment,‘speakingthenation’)andbothundertake
manysimilarparadiplomaticactivities,itisnotnecessarilythecase(giventhequiteradically
different medium-term objectives of the governing parties in each case) that their
paradiplomacies are conducted for the samepurpose, nor that theirmeaning, or specific
implications, can be fused together. Whilst there is clearly a strong and convincing link
betweenparadiplomacyandnationbuilding,themultipleformsthatbothoftheseconcepts
can,anddo,takenecessitatesamuchcloserexaminationoftheselinks,somethingreflected
inthespecificresearchquestionsaddressedhere.Indeed,forthepurposesofthisstudy,a
broaderformulationthannationbuildingorstatelessnationsisemployed,focussingonthe
politicalprojectsofstatelessnationsthatdrawuponastrongsub-statenationalidentity.
Given this lackof conceptual clarity, and thewidelyacknowledgedpaucityofexplanatory
approaches to the study of paradiplomacy, this project will focus on a set of sequential
research questions that, taken as a whole, are intended to help place the practices in a
broadertheoreticalcontext.Theinitialthreequestionsarelargelyempirical innature.The
firstasks:whatsortof internationalrolesaresub-stategovernmentsabletoplayonthe
international stage? The second relates to the ‘why’ of paradiplomatic action, and asks:
beyondeconomicorfunctionalimperatives,whatdrivessub-stategovernmentstodevelop
international actorness? Thirdly, the study will address the question: how do sub-state
73
governmentsestablishcredibilityandlegitimacyintheirinternationalroles?Latterly,the
studywillmoveon toask: towhatextentdoes thepracticeofparadiplomacy challenge
dominantunderstandingsofinternationalrelations?Theanswertothisquestionisclosely
related to the findings of the initial empirical analysis: the motivations that sub-state
governmentshaveindevelopinginternationalactornessaffectsthenatureofthechallenge
such actions pose to our understanding of central concepts of IR theory, such as state
sovereignty.Thissecondary investigationwillconstituteamoretheoreticalaccountof the
nature of sub-state governments as international actors, their position in international
society,andtheimplicationsforotherunitsofanalysisinthetraditionalstudyofIR.
Asageneralrule,empiricalstudiesofsub-stategovernments’paradiplomacieshavelargely
focussed on paradigmatic cases, such as Quebec or Catalonia, where such activities are
particularlypronounced(Duran,2011::339).Atthesametime,analmostexclusivefocuson
theEU-relatedactivitiesofsub-stategovernments(Royles,2010::143)hasmeantthatmuch
of the paradiplomatic literature examines activities that could perhaps be better located
within the framework of multi-level governance. There would seem to be pertinent
differences in, for example, a council or local authority in an English region lobbying EU
institutionsforsupporttoaparticularindustryinaneconomicreformpackage,andthoseof
thedirectlyelectedgovernmentofa‘statelessnation’,suchasScotland,forminglong-term,
bilateralpartnershipswiththestatesofCentralandEasternEurope.Likewise,therewould
seemtobeafurtherrelevantdifferenceintheestablishmentofpredominantlyfunctional,
economic, international linkageson thepartof sub-stategovernments inorder toattract
inwardinvestment,andthosesamegovernmentsundertakingovertlynormativeactivities,
such as involving themselves in climate change mitigation networks or developing
internationalaidprogrammes.
Admittedly, some of these distinctions are, in practice, subtle. However, the difficulty of
separatingoutandcategorisingthesedifferenttypesofinternationalactivitydoesnotnegate
the need to do so: in fact, when we consider the, largely unanswered, pleas within the
literature for a re-conceptualisation of paradiplomacy through a linkage with sub-state
nationalism(LecoursandMoreno,2001::1-3),andthemuchmorewidelycitedrequirement
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for the development of theoretical frameworks and explanatory accounts of the practice
(BursensandDeforche,2010;Lecours,2002),thisprocesswouldseemmuchoverdue.
Sub-state governments engaging in diplomatic relations have, according to the literature,
fundamentallydifferentaimsthanthoseofstates.Lecoursargues that, for themostpart,
theseaimsaremore ‘modest’, relatedto thedevelopmentofan internationalpersonality
(Lecours,2002::104).Gettingtothebottomofexactlywhatthismeansinpractice:thevariety
of aims sub-state governments have, their expectations of the influence they are able to
wield,andonwhattypeofactors,necessarilyentailsamuchcloseranalysisofthetypesof
diplomacyorexternalrelationsthatsub-stategovernmentsaredeveloping.Indeed,thevery
notion that sub-state governmentshave international ambitions thatdiffer from thoseof
central-statesisonethatshouldbesubjecttochallenge.
Thusfar,thekeycategoriesthathavebeenusedtoanalyseparadiplomaticactionsrelateto
whethertheyareincarriedoutinconcertwith,parallelto,orareconflictualwiththeexternal
relationsofthecentralstate(Criekemans,2010c).Thoughthisdistinctionisindeedimportant,
italoneisincapableoftellingusmuchaboutwhatthesub-stateactoristryingtoachieve.It
maybethataregionalandcentralgovernmentdisagreeoveragriculturalpolicy,adomestic
debate that can easily be extrapolated to the EU, or even international, level. The
paradiplomaticactionsurroundingthisdisputemaywellbeinconflictwiththatofthecentral
government, but the sub-state government’s aimsmay in fact be domestically located, a
preferential policyoutcome for their constituents, rather thananattempt toestablishan
internationalpersonality.Incontrast,thehighprofileoftheBavariangovernment’sBrussels
office,theirdecisiontoinvestsuchresourcesindirectEUrepresentation,maytellusalot
aboutthewayinwhichthatthishistoric‘nation’seesitself,andthenatureofitsinterestsand
influence,despitethefactthatintermsofdirectlobbyingorpolicypositions,theymaybe
actingparallelto,oreveninconcertwith,theFederalGovernment.
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Methodology
Thestartingpoint,intermsofamethodologicalandtheoreticalframeworktoapplytothis
study,isthattheredoesnotappeartobeonethatcouldbeadoptedinanyuniformsense;a
resultofthevariouslacunasinthedevelopmentofparadiplomatictheoryasoutlinedabove.
Instead,therearearangeofpotentiallyusefulconceptsandframeworksthatexistacross
manyoverlappingandrelateddisciplinesandsubjectareas.Thoughundoubtedlymessy,as
starting points go, it is only in testing and applying these different tools or analytical
perspectives thatwe can start to ‘join up the dots’ betweenwhat is taking place on the
paradiplomatic landscape and the broader international and diplomatic environments.
Purposefully,conceptual tidinessandmethodologicalclarityhave insome importantways
beencompromisedforthefunctionofseekingnewinsightintoanareaofdiplomacythathas
traditionallyonlybeenstudiedinacompartmentalised,andthusfundamentallylimited,way.
Indeed, intheirarticleexaminingapproachesandmethods infeministresearchwithinthe
UK,KrookandSquires(2006:45)explicitlycallfortheprioritisationofmethodologicaland
theoretical eclecticism. Their studydemonstrated “adistinctivewillingness on thepart of
feministstoemployvarioustheoreticalframesandtoexplorepossibilitiesforsynthesizingor
juxtaposingmethodsininnovativeways”.Theauthorsgoontoarguethat“problem-driven
researchshouldbecultivatedattheexpenseofmethod-drivenwork”. Extrapolatingfrom
thisargument,thoughparadiplomaticpracticesrepresentadifferentsetof‘problems’from
thosedominating feminist researchagendas, theydotouchmeaningfullyoncoreareasof
politicallife:authority,nationhood,legitimacy,sovereignty.Inotherwords,theissuesthat
arisefromthepracticeofparadiplomacyareworthyofinvestigation–perhapsparticularlyso
giventhattheydonotfitneatlyintoanestablishedmethodology,andsuchenquiryrequires
thejuxtapositionofmultipletheoreticalframeworks.Ratherthanaimingforarobustmodel
forpredictingfutureparadiplomaticbehaviour,ormodellingparadiplomacyinunchartered
scenarios, theobjectives of this thesis aremore limited. They revolve aroundbuilding an
accurate picture, and a more kaleidoscopic understanding, of current practices and the
meanings that these relativelynew rolesand relationshipshold for theactors involved in
cultivatingthem.
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Broadly, this thesis employs a constructivist methodology, seeking to “capture and
understand themeanings of a social action [paradiplomacy] for the agent performing it’,
recognisingthattheaccountofthescholarstudyingsuchactionisnotfreefromthe“biases
that surround us” (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 11). The approach draws from Rosenau’s
conceptualisationof international theory (1996:309-310),premisedontheunderstanding
that “it is sheer craziness to dare to understand world affairs…yet dare, we must”. In
addressingthistask,Rosenaucallsfor“asenseofhumilityandpuzzlement”,remaining‘in
aweofthecomplexitiesandchangesatworkintheworld,everreadytoconcedeconfusion
andalways remindingourselves thatourconclusionsmustperforcebe tentative”.Yet,he
continues,thereisarolefortheorisinginthistaskofunderstandingworldaffairs:usingitto
“tease meaningful patterns out of the endless details and inordinate complexities that
pervadeworldpolitics’mechanismsfordoingso(Rosenau,1996:310).
Methods
Forthiscomparativestudy,therearethreemainfociofanalysis:institutional,discourseand
praxis. Within these three areas a variety of materials will be considered, ranging from
constitutionsandmemorandaofunderstandingthroughtoin-depthinterviews.Qualitative
software,Nvivo,willbeusedinordertoaidthecodingandanalysisofthisvolumeofmaterial.
This range of analytical foci and sources is explored in the table below, adapted from a
frameworkenumeratedbyAdler-NissenandGad,whosedistinctionsbetweeninstitutional,
discourseandpraxisanalysisprovedinvaluableinfocussingtheanalysisundertaken(Adler-
NissenandGad,2014:22).
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Table1:AnalyticalFramework.AdaptedfromAdler-NissenandGad,2014:22
Method InstitutionalAnalysis
DiscourseAnalysis PraxisAnalysis
Site Formalscopeofdiplomaticpowers.DevolutiondispensationsorFederalvs.regionaldelegationsofpowers.
NegotiationofmeaningandidentityvisavistheinternationalactornessandlegitimacyofSSGs.
Diplomaticpraxis:theactualscopeofsub-stateinternationalengagement‘ontheground’
Typeofmaterial
Constitutions,MemorandaofUnderstanding,Concordatsandformalizedworkingandinter-governmentalarrangements
Parliamentaryrecords,mediadebate,partypositionpapers,governmentpolicydocuments,officialstatements,official/governmentalsocialmediaprofiles.Qualitative,in-depthinterviews-wherepossible.
Qualitative,in-depthinterviews-wherepossible.Participantobservation.Policydocuments,partypositionpapers,officialstatements,official/governmentalsocialmediaprofiles,
Analyticalstrategy
Understandingtheinstitutionalizationofsub-statediplomaticauthorityandboththelimitsandopportunitiesallowedbygoverningorconstitutionalarrangements
MappingcompetingvisionsoftheexternalidentityoftheSSGandtheproperscopeoftheirinternationalaction-asconceivedbybothsubandcentralstateactors
Lookingattheself-understandings,negotiationprocessesandstrategiesdevelopedinpositioningSSGsasdiplomaticactors.Focusingondiplomaticpractices
Thereweretwowaysinwhichthetimeperiodforanalyseswasnarroweddownineachof
ourthreecases.Firstly,duetotherapidlyevolvingnatureofparadiplomacy,therewasaclear
focus on the current activities of Wales, Scotland and Bavaria. This meant that the
programmes, interactions and institutional arrangements consideredwere – for themost
part-thosethatexistedwhilstthisresearchtookplace.Thisdatacollectingphasebeganin
2013andconcludedin2016.However,owingtothepotentialsignificanceofpartypolitical
controlandthepoliticaldynamicsunderpinningparadiplomacy,therewasabroadertime-
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frame that guided this research and provided the historical context within which
paradiplomacy tookplacewhichdiffered in eachof the case studies. Eachof these time-
framesreflectedacriticaljunctureinthepoliticalcontextofourcasesandwasselectedwith
somedirectionfromtheinitialinterviewsthatwereconducted.ForWales,thetimeframe
withinwhichtheanalysisisgroundedbeginsin1999,withtheestablishmentoftheNational
AssemblyforWales.InScotland,therelevantcriticaljuncturewasinsteadidentifiedasthe
formationof the firstSNPminoritygovernment inHolyrood in2007. InBavaria, the long-
standingdominanceoftheCSUanditscloserelationshipatvariouspointswithagoverning
CDU at the Federal Level meant that the critical juncture that best reflects the distinct
paradiplomacy that is currently conducted is, for our purposes, the premiership of Franz
JosephStrauss,beginningin1978.FranzJosephStrausswasrenownedfordevelopingwhat
hasbeentermed‘Nebenaußenpolitik’or‘foreignpolicyontheside’(Panara,2010),usinghis
statusasaformerFederalpoliticiantodo“todothingsthatnootherMinisterPresidenthad
donebefore”.5Datahasnotbeencollectedforthisentirenear-40yearperiod,rather it is
withinthisframeofreferencethatBavaria’sdistinctiveparadiplomacywillbeinterpreted,as
inScotlandandWales.
Limitations
Therewereanumberoflimitationstotheapproachadoptedinthisresearch,owingtothe
particularsetofcircumstancessurroundingthisstudyandthecasestobeanalysed.Perhaps
themostsignificantoftheselimitationsistheimbalanceinthedatacollectedforeachofthe
casestudies,specificallythelackofinterview-dataintheScottishcase.Thepoliticalcontext
in Scotland during the course of this research meant that officials were reluctant to
participate intheproject;thoughunfortunate,this levelofpoliticalsensitivitydid indicate
interestingdynamicswhichareexploredinsubsequentchapters.IntheabsenceofScottish
interview data, the thesis instead made use of another set of sources which served to
illustratetheintentionsandself-perceptionsoftheScottishGovernmentinitsinternational
endeavours: the policy-papers, debates and exchanges centred around the Scottish
5Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
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independencereferendumin2014.Inaddition,thecontributionsfromScottishGovernment
officialsaspartofa6-partseminarseriesonSecurityinScotlandgavefurtherinsightintothe
prioritiesandpositionsofScotlandinaninternationalcontext.Thesessionstookplaceunder
‘ChathamHouse’rulesandanexpectationofanonymity.Asecondimportantlimitationwas
thelackofGerman(orWelsh)languageskillsonthepartoftheresearcher.Thismeantthat
all interviewswere conducted inEnglish;however, reflecting the issuearea inquestion–
international affairs – all the relevant interviewees spoke fluent English, and for similar
reasonstheBavarianGovernmentpublishedsubstantiveinformationontheseinanEnglish
languageformat.Issuesrelatedtothechoiceofcasestudiesandcomparisonsbetweenthem
arediscussedinthefollowingsection.
The initial strategy of relying heavily on elite-level interview data was a risky one, and
ultimately it did not reap the intended rewards in terms of the numbers or balance of
participants. Where the initial aim was to secure interviews with three to four key
governmentofficialsoradvisors ineachof thecases, innoneof thecaseswas this target
reached. IntheWelshcase, interviewswereconductedwithfiveofficials,spreadbetween
theWelsh Government and the National Assembly forWales (which, in this case study,
providedausefulinsightintothe‘split’betweenparadiplomaticobjectivesintheexecutive
andlegislativebranches),inBavariatheywereconductedwithtwoofficials–oneeachfrom
theexecutiveandparliamentarybranches–andinScotland,asexplainedabove,therewas
anunwillingnesstoparticipateintheprojectowingtothepoliticalsensitivitiesatthetime.
Two broad factors worked to mitigate these set-backs in the original strategy for data
collection. The first was that, in the Welsh and Bavarian cases, while the number of
intervieweesdidnotreachtheintendedfigure,themostrelevantandappropriateindividuals
didparticipate.Thequalityoftheinterviewswasthereforeveryhigh,andtheaimofprobing
thewaysinwhichparadiplomacyfeedsintotheprioritiesofaspecificsub-stategovernment
and their broader political aims and strategies was met. The other was that alternative
primarysourcesof informationwerereadilyavailable,andintheScottishcasethesewere
particularlyabundant(asoutlinedabove),mitigatingtoadegreetheimbalanceofinterview
data.Theresearchstrategyunderpinningthisprojectthereforepivotedatarelativelyearly
stage; incorporating awider variety of sources of evidence and information andusing an
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analyticalstrategybroughttogetherthreeseparatemodes:institutionalanalysis,discourse
analysisandpraxisanalysis.
CaseStudies
Thecasestudies-Wales,ScotlandandBavaria-havebeenchosenprimarilyonthebasisof
their representing a group of stateless nations, amongst whom the political context is
substantivelydifferent.Inotherwords,whilstallthree‘qualify’asstatelessnations,eachare
governedbypartieswithdifferentpoliticalandconstitutionalpriorities.Thestrengthofsub-
statenationalidentificationalsodiffersacrossthecases,whichwillallowforaconsideration
oftherolethatthisvariablemayplayintheconstructionofsub-stategovernments’external
identities,anddegreesofinter-governmentalcongruenceorincongruencetobeconsidered.
Thecasesfurtherexhibita‘slidingscale’intermsofotherrelevantvariablesidentifiedbythe
paradiplomaticliterature:theextentoflegislativeautonomyandthenatureofthestate/sub-
staterelationship(inparticularthecontrastbetweendevolvedandfederalregionalunits),
the economic positionof the region relative to the rest of the state, and the strengthof
regional/national(ist)parties.
Thevariableofpartypolitical controlwithin the sub-stategovernmenthasnotbeen fully
explored in the literature on sub-state diplomacy, though the related concept of political
congruenceorincongruencehasbeenbetterstudied(forexample,seeWynJonesandRoyles,
2012; Cantir, 2015; Tatham, 2013; Tatham, 2014). Given the agency-driven nature of
paradiplomaticactivity(oftenlackinganyrobuststatutoryunderpinning),andinlightofthe
variationsobservedinthetypeofactivitiesengagedinbydifferentsub-stategovernments,
thisvariableseemshighlyrelevant.Bycomparingacrossthreesub-stategovernmentswith
qualitatively different political contexts, this project seeks to uncover thepreciseways in
whichgovernmentalactorsseektodevelopinternationalagencyandthewaysinwhichthe
internationalspherecanbeutilisedfortherealizationofpoliticalambitions.Theapproachof
thisstudyistodistinguishbetweenexternalactsorrelationsthatareprimarilygovernance-
based, from those whose emphasis is more diplomatic. Whilst recognising that this
delineationisnotstraightforward,norconstructiveinsomeinstances,theargumentismade
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thataparticularfocusonthoseactivitiesthatare,moreorless,autonomousi.e.,notonly
relatedtothefunctionalrequirementsofEuropeangovernance,mayshedsignificantlighton
anaspectofsub-stateactivitythathas largelybeenneglected intheextant literature.For
similar reasons, this project looks to investigate the nature and scope of international
activitiesbothwithinandbeyondtheEuropeanneighbourhood.
The cases were selected from an already narrowed pool: stateless nations within the
Europeancontext.Thelatterpartofthiscriteriastemsfromthefactthattheavailabilityof
broadly similar international and regional opportunity structures for sub-state
internationalismwasdeemedanimportantbase-line,allowingthepeculiaritiesofeachcase
(intermsoftheiruniquerelationswiththecentralgovernmentandtheprioritiespursuedby
politicalactorsatthesub-statelevel)tocometolight.Otherfactorsinfluencedthischoiceof
cases.ThisresearchwasconductedfromCardiff,meaningthatahighdegreeofaccesstothe
WelshGovernmentandthebroaderWelshpolicymakingcontextwasabletobefacilitated.
Thisproved important in termsofdata collectionas accesswas restricted inother cases,
owingbothtogeographyandtothepoliticalsensitivitiesintheScottishpoliticallandscapeat
thetimeofresearch.ThepotentialcomparisonbetweenWalesandScotlandwasdeemedto
beimportantowingtothedivergentpoliticaltrajectoriesoftheirgovernmentsfollowingthe
SNPssuccessinrecentyears,andtheresultingvariationindegreesofincongruencebetween
theUKGovernmentandScotlandandWales.Thus,despitesharingacentralgovernment,
other factors – both in termsof the constitutional framework anddifferingdelegationof
powersmediatingtherolesofthetwodevolvedgovernments,andintermsoftheinfluence
of governing parties at the sub-state level –may be seen to influence the nature of the
paradiplomacy that they conducted, and this was deemed to offer important potential
insight.InBavaria,theopportunitytostudyastatelessnationthatwasanoutlierinitsown
state–intermsofthestrengthofattachmenttothe‘heimat’andthewayinwhichthiswas
representedinitsexternalrelations–providedanimportantcontrasttothetwocasesfrom
inside the UK, as did the settled and written constitutional structure of the German
federation,andtherelationshipoftheLandertoit.Otherpotentialcases–suchassomeof
Spain’s autonomous regions – were considered but ultimately rejected on the basis of
representing paradigmatic cases (e.g. Catalonia and Wallonia) or lacking sufficient
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differentiationintermsoftheconstitutionalstructureandsymmetry/asymmetryofsub-state
competence(relatedtotheUK).
The selection of three sub-state governments that represent a stateless nation was a
deliberateone.Itisacknowledgedthat,asaresultofthepoliticsofregionalandsub-state
nationalidentity,theparadiplomaticactivitiesofWales,BavariaandScotlandmaynotreflect
similar motivations or strategies in regions whose identity is less salient or who do not
representstatelessnations.Itmaybethatthegeneralemphasisonexternalengagementis
greaterinstatelessnations,orthatthetypeofparadiplomacyundertakenisdifferentfrom
that inother regions.Havingsaid this, the threecaseschosenarenotgenerally (with the
mutedexceptionofScotland)amongthe‘usualsuspects’thatfeatureinparadiplomaticcase
studies,suggestingthattheirinternationalendeavoursarenotparticularlya-typical.
Thenotionof‘statelessnations’,simplynationswithouttheirown,correspondingstate,isan
essentiallycontestedconcept.This isunsurprising,giventhefactthatthenation itselfhas
long resided in this category (Hepburn, 2008a: :185). The particular problematique of
statelessnationsforpoliticalscience,however,restsontheirapparentincompatibilitywith
coreunits(infact,thecoreunit)ofanalysis inbothcomparativepoliticsand international
relations: the nation state. In a related vein, Shain and Sherman (1998: :321) point to
phenomenasuchasdiasporasandseparatistmovementsas‘countertheoreticalconcepts’
thatare“inconsistentwiththestructuralrationaleoftheglobalsystem”.Itwouldappearthat
this argument applies equallywell towhat have, latterly, come to be known as stateless
nations;whethersuchentitiescontainstrongseparatistmovementsorwhetherdemandsfor
self-determination manifest in a different way, being largely content with a degree of
autonomyinsidetheoverarchingstate.
Themeaningofthestatecanbedistinguishedfromthatofthenation,andindeednationalism
(Guibernau, 2004: :1252). However, the concepts have become fused together and their
distinctivenessobfuscated, inparttoallowforaconstructtomorereadilyunderstandthe
modernstatessystem.Thenationitselfisperhaps“oneofthemostcontestedconceptsof
our times” (Guibernau, 2004: :1251); its significance being amplified by this symbolically
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loadedterm.Whenwecometoinvestigatethediscretepracticeofparadiplomacy,itselfan
actionverymuchconcernedwithstatusandsymboliccapital(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:
:252),thestatelessnationbecomesaparticularlyrelevantanalyticcategory.Guibernaugoes
ontoarguethat:
To be or not to be recognized as a nation entails different rights for thecommunitywhichclaimstobeone,sincebeinganationusually impliestheattachment to a particular territory, a shared culture and history, and thevindicationoftherighttoself-determination.Todefineaspecificcommunityasanationinvolvesthemoreorlessexplicitacceptanceofthelegitimacyofthestatewhichclaimstorepresentit,or,ifthenationdoesnotpossesastateofitsown,thenimplicitlyacknowledgesthenation’srighttoself-governmentinvolvingsomedegreeofpoliticalautonomy(Guibernau,2004::1251).
However, alongside the inherent symbolismand sensitivity of the termnation, stemming
fromthespecialrightsthat itconfers, thereareadditionalcomplexities incertainpolitical
contextswhichmaymeanthatthetermisdeliberatelynotemployed(WynJonesandScully,
2009::7-8).ThekeyexamplehereisthatofBavaria/Germany,wherenationandnationalism
belong toa categoryof ‘sullied concepts’, associatedwithnational socialism, that remain
politically inappropriate (Hepburn, 2008a: :184). In the Bavarian case, an alternative
conception,theHeimat,isusedtodenoteaverysimilarphenomenon:asub-stateunitwhich
representsanhistoricnationwithitsownculturesandtraditions,thatisseentolegitimately
claima‘special’degreeofself-rule,orpoliticalautonomy,onaccountofthisdistinctiveness
(bothfromthefederalstateasawholeandfromotherLanderwhorepresentmere‘regions’).
This example brings into focus the ongoing debates regardingwhat exactly constitutes a
nation;whetherthatbeobjectivecriteria (suchas language,ethnicityorculture,ashared
history)ormoresubjectivefeatures,whereabodyofpeoplefeel,andarticulatethemselves
asbeing,anation(Hepburn,2008a::186).
Regardlessoftheexacttermusedtodescribethephenomenon,thesignificanceofstateless
nationsisarguedbyGuibernau(2004::1254)tostemfromtheirpositionas“potentialnew
politicalactorsabletocaptureandpromotesentimentsofloyalty,solidarityandcommunity
amongindividualswhoseemtohavedevelopedagrowingneedforidentity”.Relatedly,it
shouldfollowthatthe‘rise’,or,perhapsmoreaccurately,renewedpoliticalmobilization,of
statelessnationshasthepotentialtohaveasignificantimpactonthestateswithinwhose
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borderssuchentitiesreside.Inpart,thenatureofthisimpactdependsupontheapproach
takenbycentralstatestotheaccommodationofsub-statenations,andindeedthestrategies
ofthestatelessnationsthemselves
Giventheshortcomingsintheextantparadiplomaticliterature,itwouldseemthatafocuson
thoseparadiplomaticactivitiesthatcorrespondastatelessnationwouldbeofgreatestvalue.
They are more likely to have some form of political (alongside economic or functional)
motivation,theirinternationalactionsexpressanationalidentitythatisdistinctfromthatof
thecentralstate,andthus,theimplicationsofsuchactivitiesforinternationalrelationstheory
are, potentially, particularly pronounced. Paradiplomacy pushes at the boundaries of
sovereignauthority, blurring thedistinctionbetween stateandnon-stateactor; theexact
natureofthischallengewillbeseenespeciallyclearlywithafocusonthoseregionswitha
salientnationalidentityoftheirown.Exploringthemore‘developed’endofaspectrumof
activity isclearly fraughtwith itsowndangers.What is true foronecategoryofsub-state
actors,isbynomeansapplicabletoall.Additionally,whilesub-statenationsdoindeedengage
in autonomous, paradiplomatic actions that may correspond to the logics of stateless
nationalism,it isalsothecasethattheycarryoutpurelyfunctionalinternationalrelations,
corresponding to the logics of multi-level governance. Likewise, regions that do not
necessarily represent ‘stateless nations’ can also engage in highly ‘developed’ forms of
activity.ThoughCriekemans(2010a::6)correctlyidentifiesthedangersofmisinterpretation
lurkinginanyconsiderationofthe‘nationalism’variable(“whatsomeunderstandasbeing
nationalist (orworse, separatist)might rather be evaluated by others a form of ‘identity
politics’”),acarefulconsiderationofthisrelationshipisnonethelessvitalfortheadvancement
ofparadiplomaticstudies.
Fromtheperspectiveofparadiplomacy, thestrategiesofstatelessnationsareparticularly
interesting.Thisisdue,inpart,tothefactthattherewouldappeartobesomeactivitiesthat
areintrinsictothiscategoryperse(suchasattainingrecognitionoftheirdistinctivenessor
their‘nationhood’,bothfromthe‘host’stateandfromotheractors),andotherswhichwould
appear to depend very much on whether the strategy of the region was to pursue
independence,toseekmaximumautonomywithintheexistingstateortofocusonparticular
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areasofcompetence.Theutilityofparadiplomacy,anditsmodalities,wouldseemtodiffer
dependingontheexactstrategythattheregionwishedtopursue,allowingforacloseanalysis
of the meaning of the practice for the actors themselves, and of their motivations for
employingitsdifferenttools.Giventhefactthatthepossiblerangeofmotivationsis,logically,
broadestfortheactorswiththegrandestambitions, italsoallowsforthefullspectrumof
paradiplomaticendeavourstobeconsidered.
Aside fromthespecificagendasof statelessnations in seeking independenceordomestic
autonomy,thefactthattheyrepresentalternative,sometimesconflictual,identitiestothose
associatedwithacentralstate,meansthatparadiplomacyhasaparticularlyusefulapplication
forsuchentities:inallowingthemto‘speakthenation’.Theuseofparadiplomacyasanation-
buildingtoolhasbeenwidelyidentifiedwithintheliterature(seeforexampleKeating,1997;
Royles,2010;LecoursandMoreno,2001),andwouldseemtobeparticularlyimportantwith
regardstothesortofidentity-constructionthatappearstobeevidentincertainnormative
paradiplomaticactivities,suchasinternationalaidorsustainabledevelopmentprogrammes.
Likewise,thenation-buildingandidentity-constructinglogicsofparadiplomacymaywellbe
evident in attemptsmadeby stateless nations, or at least certain partieswithin stateless
nations, to self-consciously place themselves within this category, bringing with it the
legitimate claims to special treatment as associatedwith the term ‘nation’, as argued by
Guibernau(2004::1251).TheexampleofBavariawillbeexploredbelow,butthequestionof
inter-sub-national networking, and the effects of policy learning and exchange between
statelessnationsinthecontextofparadiplomacyisonethatisripeforresearch.
Bavaria is a German Lander with strong sub-state competence, able to exert a unique
influenceontheFederallevel,owingtotherelationshipbetweenitsgoverningCSUparty–
whichhasalong-standingdominanceintheLander-andoneofthemainFederalparties,the
CDU.Ithasperhapsthemostcomplexidentityofallofthethreecasestobeconsideredin
thisproject.Itdefiescategorisation,notbeingeasilytranslatedintotheconceptofstateless
nationalism as we understand it from archetypal cases, such as Scotland or Catalonia
(Hepburn,2007:109).However,asweshallexplorebelow,thestrategiesofthedominant
CSUparty are in fact very similar to those employedbymoreprominent ‘nation-building
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parties’withinsuchstatelessnations.Indeed,theCSUappeartobeself-consciouslyplacing
Bavariawithinthisexactcategory:
BavariaisoneoftheoldeststatesinEurope…weareverydifferentfromtherestofGermany,weliketobeindependent.Wefightformorecompetencesand powers for the regions…Bavaria is very similar to Scotland. We seeourselvesasanation’ (EberhardSinner,BavarianMinisterofEuropeanandFederalAffairs,quotedinHepburn,2008a:184).
DatafromacomparativestudyofEuropeanregions(CANS) illuminatesthisopaquestatus
quiteclearly.Bavariaappearswithinagroupofsevenregions(outof14surveyed)whose
attachmenttotheregionisgreaterthantothestate,butdoesnotappearinthesub-group
ofregionswithinthiscategory(numberingfiveofthoseseven)whohave“whatwouldappear
tobea strong senseofnational identity” (asopposed toa regionalone) (Wyn Jonesand
Scully,2009:3-4).Inconsideringthisdata,theauthorshintatakeyfactorwhichmayexplain
the apparent disjuncture between the strength of sub-national identity and the lack of
‘national’attachment:Germany’suniquepoliticalcontext.
ThecaseofBavariaisfascinating…withBavarianidentityapparentlyexhibitingmany of those features classically associated with nationality and nationalidentity: the typeof identity thatmighthavedeveloped intoa fully formedsenseofnationalidentityindifferenthistoricalcircumstances(WynJonesandScully,2009:4).
As mentioned previously, the term ‘nation’ is rarely used in the German context, its
connotationsbeingalmostentirelynegative.InBavaria,thetermHeimatisinsteadusedto
denoteasimilarconcept.However,accordingtooneauthor,“whetheronechoosestoterm
BavariaNationorHeimat,theunderlyingideologyfollowsnationalistprinciples”(Sutherland,
2001:26).TheextentofCSUdominanceinBavariameansthattheyinevitablyshape,and
even “determine” constitutional debates, compelling other parties to respond (Hepburn,
2007:142);politicalpartiesarekeyactorsintheestablishmentofnationalidentities,andthe
CSU has proved particularly effective in this regard (Hepburn, 2008a: 186). According to
Sutherland(2001:27-28):
Notonlydoes theCSUwant tocomeacrossas thebestparty to representBavarianinterestsinGermanyandEurope,itwantstostyleitselfastheonlytrueBavarianparty…ithas largelysucceeded increatinganelisionbetweenpartyandnation.
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Part of the complexity to the Bavarian identity, asmentioned above, relates to itsmulti-
layered aspect, where affiliationwith the central state is seemingly undiminished by the
strengthoffeelingataregional/Landlevel.Thereexistsaclearhierarchy,oratleastconscious
differentiationofallegiances,commonlyexpressedas:‘BavariaisourHeimat,Germanyisour
VaterlandandEuropeisourfuture’(Sutherland,2001:22).TherelatedpolicyoftheCSUis
similarlycomplex,beingatoncehighlysupportiveoffederalismandsteadfastthatBavaria
requiresmaximumautonomywithinthisstructure,leadingtodifferinginterpretationsofthe
party’s stance: as both nationalist and federalist (Hepburn, 2007: 109). According to the
former;“onlythesubstitutionofthetermHeimatforNationdistinguishesthestrategyofthe
CSUfromarchetypalnation-building”(Sutherland,2001:30).However,andinformedbythe
other side of this peculiar Bavarian coin, the party’s support for federalism, and the
contentedlyco-existingidentitiescorrespondingtotheBavarian,GermanandEUlevelsdo
distinguishthenatureofthisnation-buildingprojectfromthoseseeninbothScotlandand
Wales.
BothWales and Scotland exhibit a muchmore convincing ‘national’ attachment to their
respectiveregions.TheCANSstudyreferencedabovedemonstratedthatbothcaseshavea
degreeofattachmenttotheregionthatis“genuinelystriking,standingoutfromtherestboth
in termsof thestrengthof feeling for thepeopleof therespectiveregions,aswellas the
weaknessofsuchsentimentsatthelevelofthestate”(WynJonesandScully,2009:5).In
addition,andtoafargreaterextentthananyoftheotherregionssurveyed,bothScotland
andWalespreferredtheterm‘nation’todescribethemselves(asopposedtoregion)standing
at83%and70%respectively(ibid:8).ThenationbuildingprojectsofbothScotlandandWales
are similarly well established, though with different accents. Indeed, the UK stands out
internationally for the “extent towhich it has given recognition both to the plurinational
characterofthestateandtherightofnationswithinittoself-determination”(McEwan,2017:
70-71).BothScotlandandWaleshavemadeuseoftheopportunitystructuresprovidedby
asymmetricdevolutionin1999,whichcreatedaScottishParliamentandaNationalAssembly
forWales–thelatterofwhichhasbeensubjecttoseveralconstitutionalrevisions(WynJones
andScully,2012).Sincethe2011electionstotheScottishParliament,anSNPgovernment
has been pursuing an explicit independence agenda, with an (ultimately unsuccessful)
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referendumtakingplacein2014,andastatedintentiontoreturntothequestiononcethe
UKhasexited theEU.ThecurrentWelshLabourgovernment,meanwhile,hasbeenmore
concernedwith‘buildingthenation’domestically,and‘speaking’itmoreforcefullywithinthe
UK,arguablywithanaimtoredresssomeoftheasymmetriesofUK-widedevolution;with
somesuccess,inthecontextofthetwonewGovernmentofWalesActsthathavebeenadded
totheUKStatutebookssincethisresearchbegan.
Thisselectionofcases,aswellasprovidingtheaforementioned‘slidingscale’intermsofthe
strengthofsub-statenationalidentityandautonomy,andthecontrastingrangeofpolitical
contexts,allowsforfurtherinterestingcontrasts.Thefirstoftheseregardstheconstitutional
structuresofGermanyandtheUK,potentiallyallowingfortheparadiplomacy-relatedeffects
ofastatic,federalsystem,incontrasttoanasymmetricalsystemofdevolution,subjectto
seeminglyconstantcallsforrevisionorredressfrombothScotlandandWales,tocometo
light.Thisrelationshipwillbeexploredthroughoutthethesis,buttheredoesappeartobean
indicationofitmanifestinginperhapsacounter-intuitiveway;inparticularthatfederalism
may constrain a sub-state government more than devolution. Secondly, the disparate
economicresourcesofthethreesub-stategovernmentsunderconsideration,withBavaria’s
positionasoneof thewealthiest regionsgloballyand indeedrelative to its state,andthe
success of its specific approach to economic development, presented by the CSU as ‘the
Bavarianway’ (Hepburn,2008a:189)providingaparticularly interesting case, shouldalso
helptoilluminatethefullrangeofmotivationsbehindparadiplomaticaction.WithintheUK,
afurthereconomiccontrastcanbefoundintermsoftherelativepositionsofScotland-one
ofthestate’swealthiestregions-andWales,oneofitspoorest.
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Part2:Paradiplomacy:TheWhysandTheWherefores
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ChapterThree:SkirtingOfficialdom
Introduction
Wheredothe internationalactivitiesofsub-stategovernments ‘fit’ intheglobal legaland
diplomaticorder?Thoughtypicallylooselyinstitutionalisedandfrequentlynon-statutory,the
paradiplomaticpracticesofWales,ScotlandandBavariadoallhavesomesortofformalbasis,
varied though they may be. One perspective with which to compare and assess these
foundationalelementsoftheirparadiplomaciesis inrelationtoTheViennaConventionon
International Relations, a central document in international law which demarcates who
‘counts’asanofficialdiplomatandthewaysinwhichdiplomacybetweensovereignstates
mustbecarriedout.Itrepresentsa‘high-watermark’indiplomaticpractice.50yearsonfrom
its incarnation, questions have been raised about the extent towhich the treaty reflects
currentdiplomay(Behrens,2017).Reciprocally,theparadiplomacyofsub-stategovernments
offers auniquevantagepoint fromwhich toaddress suchquestions.How thisdiplomacy
manifests,howitdiffersfromsovereign-states,andtheinteractionbetweendiplomatsand
paradiplomatsmayyettellussomethingaboutthestatusandrelevanceoftheVCDRasit
entersits6thdecade.Cansub-statediplomatscarryoutasimilarrangeofactivitiestotheir
state-levelcontemporaries?Doesbeingpartofanofficial,diplomaticallyaccreditedmission
alterthesubstanceofsub-state‘diplomacy’?Inwhatsenseisparadiplomacysupplementary
to,orincompetitionwith,statediplomacy?Theseareallquestionsaddressedinthischapter,
wheretheinternationalrepresentationsanddiplomaticpersonalitiesofScotland,Walesand
Bavaria are considered. As such, the chapter both utilises the ‘gold standard’ of official
diplomacy tochart the relativepositionsofour three sub-stategovernments,and further
drawsupontheseparadiplomaticactivitiestoreflectonthecurrentstatusand‘fitnessfor
purpose’oftheTreatyitself.
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When trying to place paradiplomatic activities in the context of other pressures on the
traditional diplomatic landscape, as described and accounted for by the VCDR, themost
obviousmatch for itsdistinct challengesare thosealsoposedby the increasinglyassured
diplomaticidentityoftheEuropeanUnion.MuchofwhatWoutersandDuquet,intheir2012
articleontheEUandinternationaldiplomaticlaw,pointtointermsofthequasi,state-like
but non-state features of the EU as an international actor could also apply to sub-state
authorities(WoutersandDuquet,2012).BoththeEUandvarioussub-stateauthoritiestry
andinfluenceforeigngovernments(atlocalandnationallevels),haveformalarrangements
with such foreign governments (and occasionally with international organisations), and
maintainanetworkofoverseasrepresentationsthatoftenhaveasimilarfunctionalremitas
traditional nation-state Embassies (Wouters and Duquet, 2012). However, the two cases
divergemostsubstantially intwokeyareas.Firstly,somesub-stategovernments-notably
WalesandScotlandasdevolvedregionsoftheUK-areabletoformally‘opt-in’totheVCDR
throughoperatingoutof theofficialdiplomaticmissionsof their ‘host’ state.Thisunique,
chameleon-likeabilitytochoosethestatusandcharacterof itsdiplomaticrepresentations
makestheinternationalactivitiesofthesesub-stategovernmentsapotentiallyilluminating
casestudyininternationallaw,andinparticularthewaysinwhichtheVCDRrelatestonon-
statediplomacy.Secondly,forothersub-stategovernmentsthatdonothavetheabilityto
‘opt-in’ to theVCDR, such asBavaria, the absenceof any formaliseddiplomatic presence
meansthattheymust‘skirtofficialdom’.Thestatusoftheirparadiplomaticactivities-ortheir
diplomacy-isambiguous,andthusitsinteractionswithsubjectsoftheVCDR,andindeedthe
ways inwhich theirownandother governments attempt to characterise theirdiplomatic
relations,shedsfurtherlightonthesignificanceofararefiedformofstate-statediplomacy
thattheVCDRembodies.
ParadiplomacyandDiplomaticLaw
Forthosestudyingparadiplomaticpractices,thereisacentralparadox:howdowereconcile
the international presence of sub-state governments with the fact that they are not
recognisedaspossessinganydegreeofsovereignty.Asnon-sovereigns,paradiplomatshave
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noindependentstandingunderthetreaty,yet-undoubtedly-theirdiplomacyoftenlooks
and sounds very similar to that carriedoutby states. Sub-state identity is an increasingly
salientoneandsub-stategovernments,asdiplomaticagents,possessbothrepresentational
qualities and official resources - highly prized diplomatic commodities. Therefore the
diplomacy that they undertake stands apart from that of other non-state actors; NGOs,
Diasporas,multi-nationalcompanies,preciselybecauseof itssimilaritytostatediplomacy.
Theirrelationshiptothecentraltreatyindiplomaticlawisthusbothcomplexandpotentially
illuminating.
Sub-stategovernmentsrepresentanimportantexampleoftheabilitythatnewactorshave
toenterintointernationalpoliticsandbecomediplomats.Inthiscase,akeyfeatureofthe
newdiplomacyinquestionisitshybridstatus,possessinggovernmentalqualitiesyetwithout
anoverarchingresponsibilityforforeignaffairs(Hocking,1997).Awayfromtheinstitutional
checksandbalancesthatcomewithsucharesponsibility,alongwithpublicattentionsand
expectations,sub-stategovernments facea lessrigidoperationalcontext thantheirstate-
levelcontemporaries.Howthisimpactsonthecomposition,andquality,oftheirdiplomatic
endeavoursisawiderquestionthatwillbeaddressedbothinthisandsubsequentchapters.
InrespecttotheVCDR,themostpertinentquestionwouldseemtobewhetherthelegaland
politicaldifferencesthatthetreatyidentifiesbetweensub-andstate-leveldiplomacyactually
resultinameaningfuldivergenceintheirdiplomaticpractices.
TheUK’sdevolvedregionsandtheVCDR
InthissectionwewillbeconsideringtheUK’sconstitutionalprovisionsinrelationtosub-state
diplomacy, and the activities of the Welsh and Scottish devolved governments in an
internationalsphere.Therearemanyotherstates-unitaryandfederal -thatpermittheir
sub-state territories to carryoutparadiplomatic activities, to various extents. TheBelgian
regionshavethelargestdegreeofinternationalautonomy;representativesofFlandersand
Wallonia have Belgian diplomatic status and are permitted to sign official international
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treaties,in-facttheyareoftensolelyresponsiblefordoingso.Otherregions,meanwhile,do
notalwaysbenefitfromdiplomaticstatusfortheirofficials.Catalonia,forexamplehastried
andfailedtosecure it (Keating,2010b).Some largeEuropeanregions,ontheotherhand,
maintainasignificantamountofdomesticautonomybutaregenerallycontentwithstate-
leveldiplomaticrepresentation.Bavaria,aswillbediscussedinasubsequentsectionofthis
chapter,hasmultipleoverseastradeandinvestmentofficesreflectiveofitssizeandGDP,yet
only twoGovernment representationsbesides itsBrusselsoffice - Quebecand theCzech
Republic,bothofwhichbuildonhistoricalties.6
TheUK’sarrangementsarerelativelypermissive,fallingroughlyatamid-pointintermsofthe
international activities that sub-state governments are able to engage in. International
relations(includingrelationswiththeEuropeanUnion)remainfirmlytheresponsibilityofthe
UKGovernmentandParliament.Thereis,however,aclearrecognitionintheMemorandum
ofUnderstandingbetweentheUKanditsdevolvedregionsofsuchdevolvedregions’interest
ininternationalaffairs‘wheretheytouchondevolvedresponsibility’(UKGoverment,2010:
B4).Specificconcordats,supplementarytotheMOU,setoutingreaterdetailarrangements
for internationalandEuropeanaffairs in thecontextofdevolution.Threepassagesareof
particularrelevancetothedevolvedregions’diplomaticstatus,andareworthcitingindetail.
As regards representation in theEuropeanUnion, theconcordatsetsoutanarrangement
wherebydevolvedregionscanmaintaindirectrepresentationsolongasitformspartofthe
widerUKrepresentationinBrussels.Thepassagebelowissubjecttotheprecedingparagraph
B4.26statingthat“thestatusandfunctionsoftheUKPermanentRepresentationinBrussels
astheinstitutionrepresentingtheUnitedKingdomwithintheEuropeanUnionwillcontinue
unchanged”:
B4.27Thedevolvedadministrationsareable to takepart in the less formaldiscussionswiththeinstitutionsoftheEUandinterestswithinotherMemberstates. Subject toparagraphB4.26above, thedevolvedadministrationsareable, and have chosen to establish an office in Brussels, to assist directrelationships, including with other regional governments and with the
6Interviewdata,seniorofficialoftheBavarianStateGovernment2013
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institutionsoftheEuropeanUnion,sofarasthisservestheexerciseoftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctionsaslaiddowninthedevolutionlegislation and so far as it is consistent with the responsibility of the UKGovernmentforrelationswiththeEU.TheDevolvedAdministrationEUoffices(DAEUOs)arepartofUKReporganisationalstructureandtheirUK-basedstaffarepermanentUKcivilservants issuedwithBritishdiplomaticpassports.Aspart of the diplomatic representation of the UK they are subject to theauthorityof thePermanentRepresentative in respectof theusual issuesofpersonalconduct.Onthisbasis,thedevolvedadministrations’EUoffices,havediplomaticstatus,andarenotifiedtotheBelgianauthoritiesbythePermanentRepresentationaccordingly.BothUKRepandtheDAEUofficeswilldevelopworkingprocedureswhichreflecttheneedtobalancetheinterestsofallpartsoftheUK(UKGoverment,2010).
According to thesearrangements thestatusof thedevolvedadministrations inBrussels is
reasonably clear: they have diplomatic status because they form part of an official UK
representation.UndertheVCDRtheyarediplomaticagentsofasovereignstate-theUK.So
far,sostraightforward.ThekeyinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnionarerestrictedtoMember
States,naturallylimitingtheroleofsub-stategovernmentsandcreatingafairly‘neat’division
betweenofficialandunofficialpracticesinBrussels.Whenweturntotheinternationalrole
sub-stategovernmentscanplayinaglobalsetting,thepicturebecomesmorecomplex.Under
theheading‘RepresentationOverseas’intheconcordatonInternationalRelations,Common
Annex(D4),wefindthefollowingpassage:
D4.15Thedevolvedadministrationsmayestablishofficesoverseaswithintheframework of their responsibility for devolved matters (including for theprovision of information on devolved matters to the public, regionalgovernments and institutions, and promotion of trade and inwardinvestment).TheywilldosoinconsultationwiththeFCO.Whereappropriate,suchrepresentationmightformpartofaUKDiplomaticorConsularMission.Therepresentativesof thedevolvedadministrationcould thenmakeuseofthediplomaticbag,theFCOtelegramandothercommunicationssystems,andbe accorded diplomatic status in accordance with local customs andoperational requirements. The FCO will recover the costs of the servicesprovidedin linewith itspracticeforchargingUKGovernmentDepartments.UKEmbassies,HighCommissionsandotherMissionsoverseaswillcontinuetoservetheinterestsoftheUKasawholeandtoco-ordinateallofficialactivity(UKGoverment,2010).
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Here,weseethatsub-stategovernmentsarepresentedwithaclearchoiceintheiroverseas
representation:bepartof anofficialUKmissionand receive the resources andprivileges
associated, or ‘go it alone’. The choice is also thereforewhether to ‘opt in’ to the VCDR
through operating as a subsidiary of the UK Diplomatic or Consular mission, or operate
outsideitasrepresentativeswithoutdiplomaticstatus.Thepassagefurthermakesreference
toadistinctionbetweenofficialandunofficialactivities,somethingthatwillbeexploredin
further detail as part of this chapter. Lastly, the following paragraph on diplomatic and
consularrelationsmakescleartheUK’sretentionofoverallauthorityandresponsibilityunder
theVCDR:
D4.23TheFCOwill continue tobe responsible forpolicyondiplomaticandconsular relations with other countries and on all matters concerninginternationalorganisationsrepresentedintheUK.TheFCOwillcontinuetobethechannelsforallofficialcommunicationsonmattersrelatingtoForeignandCommonwealthconsulatesandinternationalorganisationsandtheirstaff inNorthern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The FCO will inform the devolvedadministrations of all career consular appointments in Northern Ireland,ScotlandandWales.TheFCOwillconsultthedevolvedadministrationsaboutthe establishment of new consular offices, new honorary consularappointments,andothernewofficeswherepersonnelwillhaveprivilegesandimmunities(e.g.certainculturalcentresandtradeoffices)inNorthernIreland,ScotlandandWales.Thedevolvedadministrationswillimmediatelypassontothe FCO any representations made by diplomatic/consular missions andinternationalorganisations.ThedevolvedadministrationswillalsopromptlynotifytheFCOofanyallegedbreacheswithintheirdevolvedcompetence.TheFCOwill thentaketheappropriateactionundertheViennaConventionsonDiplomaticandConsularRelationsoranyapplicableConsularConventionorHeadquartersAgreement(UKGoverment,2010).
Onthebasisofthesethreeextracts,andtakingthedocumentsintheirentirety,wecanmake
aseriesofsuppositionsastothediplomaticstatusoftheUK’sdevolvedgovernments.The
firstoftheseisthattheycan,indeed,berepresentedinternationallybytheirowndiplomatic
agents.Thelimitstothisrepresentationarethat,inordertoconduct‘official’diplomacy,sub-
statediplomatsmust‘opt-in’totheVCDRandoperateoutoftheUK’soverseasEmbassies
and Consulates, being under their auspices and ultimately accountable to the FCO. The
second,however,isthatrepresentativesofWales,ScotlandandNorthernIrelanddonothave
tooperateoutofsuchUK-widemissions.Instead,theycan-in‘consultation’withtheUKFCO
-establishindependentofficesoverseas,butsuchofficesdonotbenefitfromthestatusofan
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official diplomaticmission. The outstanding question is therefore,with official diplomatic
statuswithinthegraspsoftheUK’ssub-stategovernmentswhywouldtheychoosetooperate
withoutit?Whatisthevalueofthediplomaticcommoditieslistedinthesecondextractabove
-thediplomaticbagandofficialcommunicationssystems-forWales,Scotlandandindeed
Northern Ireland? What types of unofficial diplomacy can they conduct outside of this
system?
Wales’OverseasOffices
Aconsequenceofdevolutionin1999wasthenewabilityforWalesto“autonomouslyengage
withtheworldoutside”.This,accordingtothesameseniorWelshGovernmentadvisor,stood
in contradistinction to the international strands of the previousWales Office’s activities,
whereengagementwas“verymuchasasub-setoftheUK”.Suchanautonomousplatform
hasresultedintwostreamsofexternalengagement,onedrivenbytradeandinvestmentand
onedrivenbypolicy-“theabilitytoinfluencepolicyortotakepartinpolicyformation”.7Itis
within this context that the status and activities of Wales’ overseas offices must be
considered.
The Welsh Government has an overseas network consisting of 14 offices (including its
representationinBrussels)andaround32staff,alongside20-25officialsworkingonexternal
relationsandrelated issueswithintheWelshGovernment’sOfficesathome inWales.89A
separate,relativelynew,officeinLondonhasbeenestablishedtopromoteWalestooverseas
investorsandvisitingVIPs.ThereisalsoaseparateteamofthreestaffbasedinCardifflooking
aftertheWalesforAfricaprogrammeandleadingonfairtradeissues.WithinWalesitselfthe
FirstMinister takes responsibility for international issues - he is officially theMinister for
Europe, Wales for Africa and International and External Relations. Other departments -
7Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentadvisor20138Wales’overseasrepresentationwasoncemuchmoreextensive-withrepresentationsinAustraliaandmanyEuropeancountries,but-likemanyothersub-stategovernments-wasscaledbackratherdrasticallyinwhatwaswidelyreportedtobeacost-cuttingexercise9Thesefiguresareaccuratefor2016,asaretheequivalentsforScotlandandBavaria
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economy, science and transport, education and culture - also have a role in specific
internationalpolicyareas.Walesisalsoamemberofseveralmultilateralfora-thenetwork
ofregionalgovernmentsforsustainabledevelopment(nrg4SD),theconferenceofEuropean
regionswith legislativepower (REGLEG), theconferenceofperipheralmaritimeregionsof
Europe(CPMR).
Reflectedintheseexamples,theEuropeanpolicycontextisreallywhereWales’international
activitiesaremostcloselyfocussed.Partly,thisisbecauseoftheinstitutionalaccesspoints
providedtoregionswithinEuropeanstructuresandpolicymakingprocesses,partlyitisdue
to thedirect impactof EuropeanpolicyonWales itself. Indeed, a keyWelshgovernment
advisormadeclearthatoutsideofthisEuropeancontext,theabilityofsub-stategovernments
to contribute is greatly weakened; “different parts of the world have different resource
positions, they have different political traditions…and it becomes correspondingly more
difficulttooperateatagloballevelatthesub-statelevel,andmuchlessmeaningfulIthink”.10
The Welsh Government published their first written international strategy in July 2015,
detailinganumberofobjectives:strengtheningtheWelsheconomy,enhancingtheprofile
and reputation ofWales, developing effective bilateral andmultilateral relationships; co-
operatinginthesharingof informationandbestpractice; increasingWales’ influencewith
‘appropriate’ multilateral and international organisations and contributing to sustainable
development and ‘responsible global citizenship’. The strategy stresses the “ultra-
competitive”globalenvironmentfacingWales,andtheneedtoseekoutopportunitiesinkey
locations,nurturinglinksandrelationshipsbuiltovertime(WelshGovernment,2015d).
Atacountry-level,WaleshasrepresentationinBelgium,China,theUAE,India,Ireland,Japan
andtheUSA.TheseoverseasofficesworkcloselywithWelshGovernmentMinisters,who,
according to the international strategy “have a crucial role in supporting business and
diplomaticrelationshipsatthehighestlevels”(WelshGovernment,2015d).Butwhattypeof
‘diplomacy’dotheMinistersandoverseasofficescarryout?OfWales’14internationaloffices
10Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentadvisor2013
98
outsideoftheUK,allthreeChineseofficesalongsiderepresentationsinMumbaiandJapan
arehousedoutsideofBritishEmbassiesorConsulates.InShanghai,theWelshGovernment
representativehasrecentlyrelocatedto‘Britishhouse’,which-whileoutsidetheConsulate
- houses the British Council and the China Britain Business Council. In Dubai, Bangalore,
Ireland,inallfiveUSAofficesandinBrussels,WelshGovernmentrepresentationsformpart
of British Embassies, British Consulates, British High Commissions or, in Brussels, UKREP.
Numerically, this means that 5 out of 14 offices operate outside of the VCDR, its
representationsarepartofan‘unofficial’poolofdiplomacythattakeslargelyonaregion-
region basis. As such there seem to be some identifiable benefits to such independent
representation that make forgoing co-location with the UKFCO - and the associated
diplomaticresources-worthwhile.Theimplicationsofthiswillbeconsideredingreaterdetail
inasubsequentsectionofthechapter.
Within Wales itself, the international affairs department carries out functions that may
appearsimilartotheUKFCO;“weadviseondiplomaticissues,protocol”aswellasworkingto
raisetheprofileofWalesinternationally.Whiletherewassomesuggestionthatcolleaguesin
Whitehall would take umbrage at the suggestion that Wales has its own foreign office,
functionally the department represents its “nearest equivalent”. Nonetheless, theWelsh
Governmentstaffworkingboth inandoutofWalesaren’tusually identifiedasdiplomats,
despitetheirday-to-dayworkbeing“thediplomaticside”ofexternalrelations.11Thecurrent
FirstMinisterCarwynJonesinstigatedareorganisationshortlyafterhetookofficein2011
andbroughttheseoverseasofficesunderhisportfolio,andthereforeoperationallyunderthe
remitoftheInternationalRelationsdepartment.Arguably,thismoverepresentsabroader
shifttowardsviewingoverseasrepresentationaspartofamorecohesiveinternational-or
diplomatic-strategy.
Despite Wales having its own international offices - both co-located with the FCO and
independentofit-itisalsoclearthatsuchrepresentationisexpectedtoformasupplement
11Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial2013
99
totheactivitiesoftheUKFOandotherUK-widebodies,whohavearemittopromotethe
interestsofalltheUK’sconstituentparts.AccordingtoWales’internationalstrategy:
We maintain our own network of offices abroad where we have stronginterests to represent but these are a supplement, not a replacement, forwider UK representation. We cannot replace the reach and depth of UKrepresentationabroad,nordoweaimtodoso.WeworkwithUKbodiestoensurethatinterestsarereflectedandwedrawonUKresourcestoassistinthedirectpromotionofWelshpriorities(WelshGovernment,2015d)
EvenwheresuchstronginterestscallforadirectrepresentationfromWales,co-locationas
partofawiderUKrepresentationclearlyhas itsadvantages. Itappearsthatthesemay, in
part,dependupontheattitudesandlegalrequirementsinthereceivingstate.Forexample,
theWelshGovernment’srepresentativeintheUAEispartoftheUKBritishEmbassybecause
of the specific international context there;adiplomaticpassport is “necessary to liveand
workthere”.Likewise,intheEU,Waleshasdiplomaticmembersofstaffonitsteam,asthe
WelshGovernmentisable-indeedrequired-toactaspartofUKREP.Workingrelationships
withtheUKFCOare“generallygood”,aconcordatgovernstherelationshipandtheWelsh
Governmentwilltakeadviceif“somethinginnovativeorpossiblyconfrontationalcomesup.
Ifwe’reinvolvedinaparticularcountryandwe’rehavingavisitforexamplethenwe’lltake
expertadviceontheUKline”.12‘Generallygood’relations,ofcourse,impliesthatsometimes
theserelationsarenotsogood;adynamicthatisexploredinChapters4and5ofthisthesis.
TherationaleforwhattheWelshGovernment,asanindependententity,canandcannotdo
diplomaticallyisalwaysreferredbacktodevolvedcompetences.IfWalesisresponsiblefora
policyareadomestically,thenit-andbroadlytheUKGovernment-acceptsthatwherethis
areahasaninternationaldimension,theWelshGovernmenthasalegitimateinterestinit.
Onewayofconceptualisingthisaccepteddiplomatic‘space’istoconsideritaborderzone,
with“abackstopanda frontstop”.Thebackstop in thiscasewouldbe issueswhere the
Welsh Government knows that acting or intervening would be stepping clearly into the
territoryoftheUKFCO.Forexample,theWelshGovernmentasbeenlobbiedfromtimeto
12Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial2013
100
timeonhighlycontroversialissues-CongoleserightsundertheCongoDRC,the‘Armenian
question’(bothfromgroupswantingtheWelshGovernmenttorecogniseagenocide,and
indeedfromtheTurkishAmbassadordissuadingthegovernmentfromenteringthedebate)-
and has had to defer in these instances to the competence of the UKFCO. There is the
potentialforWelshMinisterstopassonsuchrepresentationsinformallytotheUKFCO,but
forthemostpart“thereisabackstop,thereisalinewewon’tcrossintermsofcompetence”:
Inreturnfortherecognition[fromtheUKGovernment]thatwehavetherighttoact in relation to theseareas…because they relate toour competences,thereisadutyonusnottoactonareasovertherewhichareclearlynot…andwherewewouldrisk,albeitatthemargins,sendingoutamixedmessage…acontrarymessagetothatoftheUKstateasawhole.13
With issuessuchas these,where there isaclear“UK line”,onhumanrights forexample.
Accordingtoadifferentinterviewee:
We’recarefulnottotrespassoutsideourpatch.IfwearetoldbytheFCOthatacertaincountryisnotinfavourorisnon-gratathenwewouldn’tarrangeameetingwithourministerandarepresentativeofthatcountry.WearepartoftheUK,wehaveourownsetofresponsibilities,it’snotinourinteresttotryanddevelopourownwayofdoingthings.14
Asforafrontstop,theWelshGovernmentwouldtherefore“onlyinterestourselvesinthe
thingsforwhichwehavedevolvedresponsibility”.Occasionally,however,maintainingaclear
dividinglinecanbe“alittlebittricky”.Thereisa“fuzzyarea”inthemiddleofsuchaborder
zone,wheretheWelshGovernmentmayactbecausethey“thinkit’stherightthingtodo”.
The examples quoted here were REGLEG, which aroused some suspicions in the UK
Government when Wales joined the organisation in 2000, and activities around climate
change.15
Nevertheless,unliketheScottishGovernment,whoseactivitieswe’llconsiderinthefollowing
section,theWelshGovernmenthasprioritisedregion-regioninternationallinkages,whichare
rarely subject to any significant controversy. In fact, a second seniorWelsh Government
officialnotedthat,whereastheScottishGovernmenthastwomembersofstaffat theUK
13Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor201314Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial201315Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor2013
101
EmbassyinBeijing,theWelshGovernment“don’thavepeopleintheEmbassy,sittingonthe
side”.Instead:
We’re developing relationships at regional level - Beijing municipalgovernment,Chongquinggovernment,Shanghaigovernment.TheScotsaren’ttakingthatsameapproach.Sothey’resittinginsidetheEmbassyandIthink,though I’m not sure anyonewould admit it, that’s caused certain tensionsbecausetheScotswanttodealdirectlywiththeChineseGovernment.16
Dealing with foreign regional governments doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that the
‘diplomacy’ is always informal, or simply ‘public diplomacy’. Though the UK’s sub-state
governmentscannotsigninternationaltreaties,thereisaformalelementtomuchoftheir
work. Bilaterally,Memoranda of Understandingwere a frequently usedmodus operandi,
particularlyintheearlyyearsofWales’paradiplomacy.Theyhavefallenoutoffavourrecently
-“wedon’tnowlookforapieceofpapertomakearelationshipwork”-thoughtheyarestill
widely used in China,where theMoUs are taken as a gesture of goodwill and away of
“opening up the dialogue”.17 Ministerial visits also form a key part ofWales’ diplomatic
relationships.VisitsfromtheFirstMinisterinparticularareseenashugelyimportant,butall
ministerialvisitsareviewedasawayto“opendoors”,particularlyincountriessuchasChina
whereGovernmentalstructuresaresosignificant.18TheWelshFirstMinisterisacabinet-rank
Minister in theUKGovernment,and thus shouldbenefit fromthesameFCOsupportand
facilitationasotherUKGovernmentMinisters.Whetherthisalwaysbearsoutinpracticeis
questionable,problemswithfasttrack,forexample,havebeencitedininterviewdata.
Indeed,theChinesecontextoffersaparticularlyinterestingcasestudyinthedecision-making
processaround‘optingin’to,orindeedoutof,theVCDR.TheWelshGovernmenthaspursued
a close relationship with the Chinese region of Chongquing since 2006, when the first
MemorandumofUnderstandingbetweenthetworegionswassigned.InSeptemberofthat
year,aWelshAffairsOfficerwasassignedtotheBritishConsulateGeneral inChongquing,
taskedwithtakingforwardtheWales-Chongquingrelationship,andwasquicklyfollowedby
16Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial201317Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial201318Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial2013
102
a second post a year later. However, in January 2011 theWelsh Government opened a
separateofficeinChongquing,andthetwopostswererelocatedthere.Theofficeislocated
neartoboththeBritishConsulateGeneralandtheBritishCouncil,butisnotformallypartof
the Consulate. In the case of Chongquing, both private interview data and published
ministerialreportshintattheadvantagesperceivedbytheWelshGovernmentindistancing
themselvesfromtherestoftheUK.AccordingtoawrittenstatementbyHuwLewis,aWelsh
GovernmentMinisterwhovisitedChongquingin2013:
Wales’relationshipwithChongquing…hasbeenthrivingsincethesigningofthefirstMOUin2006.TherelationshipisthemostextensiveandmostactivebetweenanypartoftheUKandChina.MyvisittoChinawasaneye-openingexperienceinanumberofways.IhavebeenhugelyimpressedbythewayourstaffonthegroundhavebuiltuptheprofileandreputationofWales,workingthroughtheGovernmentrelationshipswehaveestablished.ItistestamenttothestrengthofthoserelationshipsatGovernmentlevelthatWaleshaslargelybeenable toavoidgettingcaughtup in thetensionswhichareapparentatnationalUKandChinalevels.19
Operatingindependentlyataregion-regionlevelmeansthatwithouthavingtheburden,the
responsibility of all of foreign policy, there is an element of discretion, an element of
maximising the relationships for specificpolicygoals.Contrary towhatonemightexpect,
therefore,itappearsthatincertaincircumstances,notbeingpartofanofficialEmbassyor
Consulatemayactuallybebeneficialtorelationships‘ontheground’,particularlyincountries
such as China where controversial foreign policy issues abound. Where the decision on
whetherornottoco-locatemaybemadeonthebasisofpracticalities,insomecasesthishas
otherconsequences:helpfullyextricatingtheactivitiesofasub-stategovernmentfromtheir
state-contemporaries.Thissaid,however,therearealsosecurityissueswhichmaymakeco-
locationimpractical,andtheseareapparentalsointheChinesecontext.20
Alternately, explanations for co-location with British Consulates may also confound
expectations.In2002,theWelshGovernmentopenedits‘flagship’USofficeinNewYork’s
Chrysler building. However, in the face ofmounting criticism over the operating costs of
overseasofficesingeneral,andthisoneinparticular,theofficewascloseddownin2011and
19WelshGovernmentMinisterHuwLewis,writtenstatement14thMarch201320Privatecorrespondence,WelshGovernmentofficialJuly2015
103
staffmovedto theUKConsulate,amovewidely reportedtobe forcost-savingreasons.21
Thereiscertainlyalinkbetweenparadiplomacyandtheeconomicclimate-oneborneout
clearlyinWalesfollowingthefinancialcrisisin2008;“thesub-nationaldiplomacysceneislow
hangingfruitwhenitcomestore-orderingprioritiesinatimeofmonetaryausterity”.22Inthe
faceofexamplessuchasthis,thedecisionofwhetherornottoutilisethediplomaticstatus
andresourcesoftheUKGovernmentthroughoverseasco-locationappearlargelypragmatic,
possiblyrelatedmoretothecostofcommercialpropertyindifferentlocationsthantothe
valuetoWales’diplomacyofoperatingundertheVCDR.Indeed,thegeneralprincipleguiding
theWelshGovernment’soverseasofficelocationisthat,where“practicalandeconomically
viable”,co-locationisthepreferredposition.23
Scotland’sOverseasOffices
Making a comparison between the diplomatic strategies of Wales and Scotland is not
straightforward. Firstly, the Scottish SNP Government has clear ambitions for Scottish
independence, ambitions at the forefront of global attention during 2014’s referendum.
Secondly, Scotland’s overseas representation is divided between the activities of Scottish
DevelopmentInternationalandtheScottishGovernment,unlikeinWaleswheretheWelsh
Government itself is theonlyoutward-facinggovernmentalbody.SDIhas29offices in19
countries,includingScotlanditself,whiletheScottishGovernmenthasonly4international
officesinBrussels,Washington,TorontoandBeijing.SevenofSDI’sinternationalofficesform
partofofficialBritishrepresentations.Importantly,allfouroftheScottishGovernmentoffices
alsoformpartofofficialUKEmbassies,Consulates,HighCommissionsorUKREP.Wherethe
status of the ScottishGovernment’s overseas offices is perhaps simpler to assess than in
Wales; they are all official diplomatic representations as they operate out of official UK
missions, the status of Scottish Development International’s offices is less clear. The
unambiguoustradeandinvestmentfocuswouldseemtoimplythattheseofficeswerenot
21BBCnewsreport‘WalesstafftoleaveNewYorkChryslerbuilding’23rdDecember201022Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor201323Privatecorrespondence,WelshGovernmentofficialJuly2015
104
diplomaticentities,yettheirco-locationinseveninstanceswithofficialUKmissionssuggests
otherwise. As in the case of Wales’ overseas offices, it appears that housing Scottish
representations within UKmissions is often a more pragmatic choice - both in terms of
accessingforeignpolicymakersandinsimpleeconomicterms-than‘goingitalone’,butthis
isachoicewhichisdependentonthecountrytheofficesarelocatedwithinandtheattitudes
ofthisreceivinggovernment.
However,whatsetsthetwodevolvedregions’diplomacyapartmostmarkedlyisthatScottish
diplomacy is frequently directed at national governments, in contrast to the Welsh
Government’s region-region partnership approach. This shift can be traced back to the
formation of an SNP government in 2006, where they immediately began to “expand
Scotland’s role internationally” (Fabiani, 2014: 32). This took the form both of new
geographical and thematic foci (towards Asia and an expansion of the international
developmentfund),andintermsofthelevelofresourcesdirectedatinternationalaffairs:
seeinga54%real-termsincreasebetweenthebudgetfromthefinancialyear2004-2005to
2009-2010 (Fabiani, 2014: 36). According to former Scottish Government Minister for
Europe, External Affairs, Culture and the Gaelic Language Linda Fabiani, “the principal
differencebetweentheSNPGovernmentanditspredecessorswastheyweverydeliberately
presentedScotlandasanationinitsownright,rejectingthenotionthatScotlandissimplya
regionoftheUnitedKingdom”(Fabiani,2014:32).ReturningtotheScottishGovernment’s
current focuson relationswith states, agoodexample canbe found in the statedaimof
Scotland’s North American offices is to establish “solid government to government
relationshipsatFederalandstatelevel”.Thishasbeenachievedthroughfrequentmeetings
withtheStateDepartmentandestablishinglinkswithWhiteHousestaffintheUS,whilein
Canada“withtheassistanceoftheHighCommission”Scottishrepresentativeshavemetwith
“keyfederalofficialsfromanumberofministries”.Scottishoverseasofficesalsosupportlinks
with both the Scottish Canadian Parliamentary Association in Ottawa and the Friends of
Scotland Caucuses in the US Senate and House of Representatives. This overseas
representation in North America is the “Scottish government’s diplomaticmission to the
region”:
105
As such it has a role to play within the wider diplomatic communities inWashingtonDC and inOttawa. Over the past year, the SAO has sought toengage more pro-actively with diplomats from other nations to heightenawareness of its existence and to establish connections and network.ExamplesincludemeetingwithanumberofindividualsfromEUMemberStateEmbassies,individualsfromCentralandSouthAmericanEmbassies,engagingwiththeWorldBank,theInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,thinktanksandothermulti-nationalorganisations(ScottishGovernment,2015b:para28).
In China, the Scottish Government office in Beijing facilitates cooperation between the
ScottishGovernmentandboththeStateCouncilinChinaandtheLegislativeCouncilinHKSAR
(ScottishGovernment,2015b:para20).24Meanwhile,Ministerialvisitsfocusonnationallevel
politicians,apparentinbothAlexSalmond’shighlypublicisedvisittoChinain2010andNicola
Sturgeon’smorerecenttripstobothChinaandWashingtonin2015.AccordingtoProfessor
Michael Keating, giving evidence to a Scottish Parliamentary enquiry in 2010 “nationalist
Governmentswanttosigndealswithstatesbecausethatenhancestheirstatus”.Yet,atthe
same time “when it comes to practical functionalmatters, all Governments of whatever
complexionarelookingforregionallevelinterlocutors”(MichaelKeating,citedinareportof
theScottishParliament,2010:1718).Indeed,itisnotthecasethattheScottishGovernment
forgoesregionallinksentirely-theypartnerwith‘prioritygeographicareas’inChinasuchas
Shanghai,TianjinandProvinceofShandong-ratherthat,unlikemanyregionalgovernments
operatinginternationally,theyalsoaimtodealdirectlywithforeignnationalgovernments.
This focus on nation-state interactions is significant when assessing the effects that
paradiplomatic activity may have on the relevance of the VCDR. Scottish Government
diplomats are party to the convention as they operate exclusively out of official UK
representations, most often dealing with official diplomatic representations of a foreign
government.Thetypeofdiplomaticactivitiestheyengageinthereforemirrorstate-practices
veryclosely,yettheirdiplomaticstatusisoneloanedfromtheUKGovernment.Thereisan
24Written submission from the ScottishGovernment on thework of its overseas offices,providedtotheScottishParliament’sEuropeanandExternalRelationscommitteeaspartoftheirConnectingScotlandEnquiry.Meeting26thMarch2015.Paragraph20
106
outstandingquestionlurkinghere:wheredoScottishdiplomatstaketheirpoliticaldirection
from,LondonorEdinburgh?
Taking the internationalactivitiesof theScottishGovernmentat facevalue,onecouldbe
forgivenforassumingthatitwasasmallstate,ratherthanasub-stateauthority.However,
thevastmajorityofScotland’sdiplomaticactivitiestakeplacewiththefacilitationoftheUK
FCO:ministerialvisits,culturaldiplomacycarriedoutthrougheventsandactivitiesinBrussels
andtheScottishgovernment’sotheroverseasoffices,theoverseasofficesthemselvesand
engagementwith EU institutions. In a letter to the convenor of the Scottish Parliament’s
EuropeanandExternalRelationsCommittee,theSecretaryofStateforScotlandpointstothe
factthat,ofthe50internationalvisitsmadebytheScottishGovernmentina16monthperiod,
mostofthesewerefacilitatedbytheUKGovernment(SecretaryofStateforScotland,2014).
TheproportionofvisitsthattheFCOisrequiredtofacilitateseemstodependonthetarget
country in question, their openness towards sub-state governments, and the level that
Scottish GovernmentMinisters wish to access.Meetings with private firms and business
leadersmayformapartoftheScottishGovernment’sdiplomaticactivitiesthattheyareable
toorchestrate independently,butaccess toMinisters ina foreignnationalGovernment is
somethinggenerallymediatedbyUKauthorities.25
Whensub-stategovernmentsoperatesolelyataregion-regionlevel,thismaybeinterpreted
asanareaofdiplomaticactivitysubsidiarytothattakingplacebetweennationstatesand
thereforeonewhichfallsoutsidethescopeofthetreaty,andthetypesofactivitywhichit
wasintendedtoregulate.However,whenonesub-stategovernmententersintodiplomatic
relations with a foreign nation-state government, this strays more clearly and perhaps
disruptivelyintoadomaintypicallyreservedforstates.Theseactivitiesmaybepreciselythe
typeofinteractionsthatfallsquarelyundertheremitoftheVCDR,yetthepeculiarstate-like
yetnon-sovereignstatusofScotlandasadevolvedregionoftheUKmayyetexcludeitasan
independent entity from the terms of the treaty. In official diplomatic activities, Scottish
25ThefailureofAlexSalmondtosecuremeetingsindependentlywiththeFrenchandChinesegovernmentswasthesubjectofaseriesofreportsintheDailyTelegraphin2012,basedondossiersreceivedinresponsetotheirFOIrequests
107
diplomatswouldbe‘borrowing’theirstatusfromtheUKGovernment,yettaketheirpolitical
directionfromelsewhere.Howthissplitbetweenpoliticalaccountabilityandlegalstatusor
authoritymightmanifestinthefutureisakeychallengeforthefuturerobustnessoftheVCDR
asatreatyregulatingformaldiplomaticrelations.
One particularly ‘thorny’ issue in this area is recognition. In their analysis of the EU’s
diplomatic identity,Wouters andDuquet (2012: 33) point to thepossibility of a situation
whereby“theEUintendstoaccreditadiplomaticrepresentativetoathirdcountrythatisnot
recognizedbyall27memberstates”.Thiscouldhappen,theauthorsargue,despitethefact
that EUmember states retain theexclusive competence to recognizeother states and/or
governments,whichisapreliminaryconditiontoenterintodiplomaticrelations.Statesare
theonlyactorsininternationallawthatareabletorecognizeotherstates-“beitdejureor
de facto”. In thecaseof sub-stategovernments, similar scenarioshavearguablyemerged
already.TheScottishGovernment,forexample,hasunequivocallycalledfortherecognition
ofanindependentPalestinianState.InalettertotheUKForeignSecretaryPhillipHammond
inOctober2014,ScottishExternalAffairsMinisterHumzaYousafarguedcalledon theUK
Government“totakeactionandformallyrecognisethestateofPalestine”,andalsooutlined
“theScottishGovernment’ssupport fortheopeningofaPalestinianconsulate inScotland
andhighlightedtheneedforaPalestinianembassyintheUK”(PressReleasefromtheScottsh
Government,2014b).ThoughScotlanditselfcannotformallyrecognisePalestine,theissuing
of such unequivocal views on its status inevitably complicates perceptions of the UK’s
position.SimilarissueshaveariseninWales,where-inlargepartduetothesizeoftheSomali
DiasporawithinWales-theNationalAssemblyandtheWelshGovernmenthavebeenkey
targetsforactivitiesdesignedtosecureinternationalrecognitionforSomaliland.Inperhaps
the most contentious ‘diplomatic’ move, the National Assembly for Wales extended an
invitationtotheSomalilandgovernmenttoattendtheRoyalopeningoftheSeneddin2006,
aninitiativeinterpretedbytheSomaliland-andWelsh-pressesasofficialrecognitionofthe
break-awaygovernment’slegitimacy(TheSomalilandTimes,2006;WalesOnline,2006).
Thedifferencebetweentheactivitiesofsub-stategovernments,ontheonehand,andsmall
stategovernmentsontheothermaybeonethatisincreasinglydifficulttodiscernonaday-
108
to-daylevel.However,underinternationallaw,thisdistinctionremainsapertinentone.The
difference also has some relevance in a more pragmatic sense: the Welsh Assembly’s
reported ‘recognition’ of Somalilandor the ScottishGovernment’s support for a separate
Palestinian statedoesnot carry the samediplomaticor legal forceas similaractionsbya
sovereignstate.However,atapoliticallevel,this‘unofficial’recognitionmayindeedhavean
effect,albeitalesserone.Theambiguitysurroundingthestatusofsub-stategovernmentsis
compoundedbywidespread confusion regarding the architectureof devolvedor regional
government(suchasbetweentheNationalAssemblyforWalesasalegislature,andtheWelsh
Government as an executive) and the lack of a designated ‘foreign office’ from which
diplomaticmessagesaredirected.
Turning to Scotland’s approach to international affairs more generally, the Scottish
Government’s latest international strategy, published in2015, calls for an ‘embedding’ of
internationalisation across its areas of competence. It also points to the fact that
internationalisationhasbeenidentifiedasanintegralstrandinScotland’sEconomicStrategy,
and therefore,aswithmost sub-stategovernmentsparticipatingatan international level,
boosting trade and investment is a key priority taken forward to international
representations.However,thestrategyalsoidentifiestheimportanceofScotland’sroleasa
“goodglobalcitizen”,meaningthat:
Scotlandwillcontributetowidergoalsofpromotinginternationalstabilityandequalityinotherworldregions,which,inadditiontotheforemostobjectiveofworkinginpartnershiptodeliverpositivelocalchange,canacttosupportlong-term human and economic security within Scotland. As part of thiscommitmentwewillcontinueouradvocacyofhumanrights,wewillcontinuetocontributetothemultilateralmanagementofinternationalcrises,andwewillcontinuetodeliverourdistinctiveinternationaldevelopmentprogramme(ScottishGovernment,2015c:10).
It is not typical for sub-state governments to have this type of pronounced normative
dimensiontotheirparadiplomaticactivities,howeverthereareotherinstancesofsub-state
governmentsprioritisinginternationalaidanddevelopment.BothFlandersandtwoSpanish
regions, for example, have close development links with parts of South Africa and Latin
America respectively (MichaelKeating, cited ina reportby theScottishParliament,2010:
1720-1721).Similarly,theFinnishregionofAÅlandhasbuiltareputationaroundpromoting
109
its distinct model of conflict resolution and normative diplomacy around this area more
generally (Wigell, 2013). Wales shares some similar ambitions to Scotland, notably in its
WalesforAfricaprogrammeandactivitiesaroundaFairTradeWales. Indeed,thoughthe
stated ambition to be a ‘good global citizen’ and the prominence that normative issues
receive isdistinctiveaboutScotland’s international strategy,Waleshasalso foregrounded
theseissuesinmorerecentdocuments(WelshGovernment,2016),andlegislationsuchas
theWell-beingofFutureGenerations(Wales)Act2015.Whatisperhapsmoresurprisingin
Scotland’scase,however,isthatdespiteitsverylimitedformalcompetenceintheareasthat
mightequipitsglobalroleininternationalcrisismanagementorgoodglobalcitizenry,ithas
achievedsignificantrecognitioninthisareaaspartofits‘nationbranding’efforts(Scottish
GovernmentStrategicResearch,2012).Whetherit’saspeechaboutgenderequalitytothe
ChineseFriendshipAssociation,declarationsonUKGovernmentdefenceandinternational
developmentpolicyortheappropriationofChinese‘pandadiplomacy’,Scottishdiplomacy
aimstoinfluencenational-levelpoliticians,offeritsown‘line’onforeignpolicyandgenerally
take its brandof good global citizenry to theworld stage (see 'no aidmoney formilitary
interventions',ScottishGovernment,2013a;'AlexSalmondbamboozledthepubliconpanda
advert', The Independent, 2012; Speech by FirstMinister Nicola Sturgeon to the Chinese
FriendshipAssociation,ScottishGovernment,2015a).
Alongside its international offices and those of SDI, the ScottishGovernment engages on
specific policy issues identified in separate policy documents, aswell as its One Scotland
PartnershipCountryPlanswithChina, India,Pakistan,CanadaandtheUSA.Aspartof the
SNP’sprogrammeforGovernment2014-2015aseriesofInvestmentHubsin“keyoverseas
locations”willbepiloted,bringingtogether“resourcesandpartnersinparticularlocationand
co-ordinateanddeliveractivityontheground”(ScottishGovernment,2015c:6).Withinthe
ScottishGovernmentitself,underFirstMinisterNicolaSturgeonthereisaCabinetSecretary
forCulture,EuropeandExternalAffairsaswellasaMinister forEuropeand International
Development.These titles reflectasubtleshift in theScottishGovernment’s international
prioritiespost-referendumthatforegroundstheEuropeancontextevermorestrongly:the
Cabinet Secretary’s previous title was Culture and External Affairs and the Ministerial
portfoliowasforExternalAffairsandInternationalDevelopment.
110
Forsub-stategovernments,actingwithintheEuropeancontextisperhapsseenasamore
legitimate extension of their domestic competences than forays into the broader
internationalenvironment;itcertainlyrepresentsamore“institutionalisedandhabitualised
context” (Wyn Jones and Royles, 2012: 251). There is a general acknowledgement of
Scotland’slegitimateinterestindecision-makingataEuropeanlevelasitimpactsdirectlyon
Scotland itself in numerous policy areas. In the wake of 2014’s referendum on Scottish
independence,andinthespectreofasecondUK-widereferendumonEUmembership,this
contextnowoffersScotlandaspacetoconductparadiplomacythatbothengagesdirectly
withpolicymakingthroughitsrepresentationunderthebannerofUKREPandallows itto
foregroundits‘pro-Europeancredentials’tobothdomesticandEuropeanaudiences.
Undoubtedly,Scotland’sinternationalpresencehasbeenmarkedstronglyinrecentyearsby
theindependencereferendum.ThisappliestotheactivitiestheScottishGovernmentwishes
toengagein,positioningitselfasapro-Europeansmallcountry,naturalkintoitsneighbours
inthe‘Nordicarcofprosperity’.ItisalsorepresentedintherelationshipbetweentheScottish
andUKGovernments,whohavebeenonopposingsidesofahighlycontroversialcampaign,
and-naturally-whoseworkingrelationshiphasbeendulychallenged.Italsomeansthere
has been a wealth of speculation, in policy documents or position papers and from
parliamentaryinquiries,sheddinglightonthewaysinwhichthediplomacyofScotlandasa
sub-stategovernmentisseentobeconstrained(orotherwise)onaccountofthisstatus,how
itwoulddifferasanindependentstate,andthusonthecurrencyofofficialdiplomaticstatus
moregenerally.
TheviewoftheSNP, immediatelypriortothereferendumonScottish independence,was
thatScotlandwouldbebetterservedbyhaving“diplomatsdirectlyservingitsinterestsinkey
countries”,not just inBrussels,WashingtonandBeijing (ScottishGovernment,2009:para
4.5). Thesamepositionpaperarguedthatundera‘DevoMax’modelofdevolutionthere
could be ‘Scottish interest sections’ in British Embassies in major European countries,
alongsidetheScottishGovernment’sexistingoverseasrepresentation.Thispositionwould
seemtosuggestthatthereisnomajordissatisfactionwiththerolethatScottishGovernment
111
officialsareabletoplaywhentheyactasdiplomatsaspartofUKoverseasrepresentations.
Indeed,thepositionpaperfailstociteanyrealbenefitsthatawhollyseparaterepresentation
fromanindependentScotlandwouldrealise.
FromtheUKGovernment’sperspective,nothingwasguaranteedintermsofanyindependent
Scotland’sabilitytoutiliseexistingUKdiplomatic,securityandintelligenceresources.There
mightbeoverlappinginterestsbetweentherestoftheUKandanindependentScotland,but
theUKwouldonlycooperatetotheextentthatitwasinitsowninterest(UKSecretaryof
StateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,2013:para17).TheSecretaryofStatesummed
uptheexistingrelationshipasfollows:
Thebenefitsofthissupportandcollaborationaresubstantialforexampleinterms of promotional services in support of Scottish-based business, andpositioning Scotland within the UK offer, access to project leads andpromotionalactivitiesdesignedtoattract foreigndirect investment. It is forthis reasonthatmanyof the22ScottishGovernment’sofficesoverseasarelocatedwithin the UK’s Embassies and High Commissions (UK Secretary ofStateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,2013:para17).26
Certainly, there is an argument that the ability of Scotland, and theUK’s other devolved
regions,toutilisea‘two-track’diplomaticstrategy;drawingonUKstructuresandresources
as well as initiate independent activities, may magnify their international influence, and
effectiveness,inrelationtosimilarsizedsmall-states.Forexample,ithasbeenarguedthat
Scotland’s influence in the European Union may actually be weakened should it gain
membership as a small member state, rather than a region of a much larger state (UK
SecretaryofState forForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,2013:para105).27 Importantly,
however,thisaddedvalueisonlyrealisedwherethesub-stateandnation-stategovernments
haveoverlappinginterests.Inthecontextofthe2016referendumontheUK’smembership
oftheEuropeanUnion,andtheScottishGovernment’scallsinitswakeforasecondvoteon
Scottishindependence,itseemsunlikelythatanyresidual‘addedvalue’remains.
26ThisnumberincludesSDIoffices.27ThisargumentisstronglyrefutedbytheScottishGovernment.
112
Germany’sBasicLawandtheStatusofBavariaundertheVCDR
Germany’s Federal Constitution, the Basic Law or Grundgesetz (GG), enumerates specific
rolesfortheLänderinthefieldofforeignpolicy.Article32[ForeignRelations},below,states
that:
1. RelationswithforeignstatesshallbeconductedbytheFederation2. BeforetheconclusionofatreatyaffectingthespecialcircumstancesofaLand,that
Landshallbeconsultedinatimelyfashion.3. InsofarastheLänderhavepowertolegislatetheymayconcludetreatieswithforeign
stateswiththeconsentofthefederalgovernment
Underpinning this Article is the idea that the Federal Republic of Germany should be
represented as awhole, rather than as separate Länder (Nass, 1989: 165); a noteworthy
ambitiongiventhattheLänderthemselveswereconstitutedpriortotheFederalRepublic.
TheformalrightsoftheLänderinforeignpolicyareexercisedinthreeprincipalways:through
theirFederalchamberintheBundesrat(Article59),theirconsultationonalltreatiesaffecting
theirexclusivecompetences,andintheiroriginalrighttoconcludeinternationaltreatiesas
identifiedinArticle32(3)above(Nass,1989:-166).
However,thedraftingofArticle32leftoutstandingquestionsastotheroleitprescribesthe
Länderandaseriesofthesescanbeidentifiedregardingthedistributionofforeignrelations
competence between the Federal and Land levels. These range from a centralist
understandingwherebytheFederationisentitledtoenterintotreatiesinallfields,oreven
to implement any legislation it deems necessary to fulfil its foreign policy, through to a
federalist interpretationwhereby theFederationonlyhas rights to conclude international
treatieswithin its own, narrow, areas of legislative competence (Panara, 2010: 62-63). In
practice,however,arrangementsastoforeignaffairsaregovernedbytheLindauagreement
of1957,arguably“thebasisofmodernGermantreaty-making”thatsurvivedthereunification
processandisakeyfeatureofGermany’ssystemof‘co-operativefederalism’(Hernandez,
2013:502).UndertheLindauagreementtheLänderagreedtodelegate-forthemostpart-
theirtreaty-makingpowerstothefederalgovernment;allowingittoconcludetreatiesinits
113
ownrightwhenthesubjectwasdeemedtobeofpredominantlyfederalconcern-including
consulartreatiesandtreatiesconcerningtheestablishmentormembershipofinternational
organisations. In return, the Federal government agreed that, where a treaty was of
predominantly Länder concern, they would seek their approval before the agreement
became internationally binding (Hernandez, 2013: 502; Panara, 2010: 63-64). Though the
Lindau agreement is not constitutionally binding itself, Panara (2010: 64) contends that
infringement of the Agreement would arguably be “justiciable before the Federal
Constitutional Court since it would amount to a breach of the unwritten constitutional
principleofFederalloyalty(Bundestreue)”.
TheBasicLawdoesnot,however,speaktoanyareaofinternationalactivitybeyondtreaty-
making.Onceagain,thisleavesuswithquestionsastowhatsortsofactivitiestheLänderare
permitted toundertake.Undera strict interpretationofArticle32“contactsbetween the
Länderandforeigngovernmentsthatdonotservetoconcludeorexecutetreatiesarenot
permitted”, an interpretation further supported by the notion of external unity that
underpinsthearticle in itsentirety(Nass,1989:176).However,Nassgoesontoprovidea
contrastingviewpoint;ifArticle32onlyregulatesinternationalrelations,meaningdiplomatic
and consular relations, treaty relations “and other acts and deeds vis-à-vis states and
internationalorganizations”,otheractivitiesbytheLänderwouldnotbeforbidden,though
“theprincipleofallegiancetothefederationimposesuponthemcertaindutiesofloyalty”.
However,Nassconcludes,neitherextremeview“matchesconstitutionalreality”(Nass,1989:
167-168).AccordingtoPanara(2010:67),theLänder’sforeignrelationspower“islimitedto
signing internationalagreements.Thisprecludesthemfromperformingunilateralacts, for
example the recognition of foreign states or governments”. However, the Länder’s
agreementswith “those entitieswhichhaveno international legal personality (regionsor
othersub-stateentities),lieoutsideofthesphereofapplicationofArticle32(3)GG.Therefore
theFederalGovernment’sconsentisnotrequired”.
Whenitcomestooverseasrepresentationandministerialvisits,thereisacleardemarcation
between economically driven activities and diplomatic visits, the later being exclusively
organisedbytheGermanDiplomaticService“workingtocommoninterests”(Keating,2010a:
114
paragraph7.1),onceagainreflectiveofGermany’ssystemofcooperativefederalism.Indeed,
Länder overseas offices (which, as will be discussed below, are predominantly those of
Bavaria)includingthoseinBrusselsdonothaveanysortofdiplomaticstatus.Undertheterms
of the VCDR, therefore, German Länder, and Bavaria specifically for the purposes of our
discussion,arenotpartytotheconvention.ThequestionastowhethertheGermanLänder
haveanyinternationalsubjectivityintheirownright,however,isperhapshardertoanswer.
Ländercanmakeinternationaltreatiesintheirownname,yetthesetreatiesaresubjectto
consentbytheFederalGovernment,makingitunclearastowhotheinternationalsubject
actually is.AccordingtoPanara(2010:66)theprevailingviewisthat“theLänder’s limited
internationalsubjectivityisnotinherent,but‘conferredby’article32(3)GG.Thisshouldhave
arealconstituenteffectontheircapacitytoact.Consequently,ifaLandconcludesatreaty
withoutfederalconsent,thisshouldbeconsideredasbeingconcludedultraviresinrespect
ofbothdomesticandinternationallaw”.Therefore,despiteBavaria’sunusualabilitytosign
internationaltreatiesinitsownname,itcannotdosoindependently,i.e.intheabsenceof
approvalfromtheFederalGovernment.
In practice, though Länder do make use of this ability to sign international treaties, the
resultingagreementsaregenerallyfocussedonlocal-levelandcross-borderissues.DrPaul
Fischer from the Bavarian State Chancellery, giving evidence to the Scottish Parliament’s
ConnectingScotlandenquiry inMarch2015,outlinesBavaria’spositionasconcernstreaty
makinginsomedetail:
InoutliningthemainfeaturesofBavaria’sinternationalrelationspolicy,IwanttoemphasiseatthestartthatconductingexternalrelationsisaconstitutionalrightoftheGermanLänder.AlthoughArticle32(1)oftheBasicLawreservesforeignaffairstothefederalstate,Article32(2)allowsindividualstateswithintheir sphere of competence, which includes culture, education, media,security, health and environmental protection, and in agreement with thefederal Government, to negotiate and conclude treaties with foreigncountries.Bavariahasalwaysmadeuseof that constitutional rightandhastherebymaintaineddiplomaticrelationsbelowthelevelofforeignpolicy…Wewould not call most of them [Bavaria’s international treaties] treaties; wewouldcallmostofthemadministrativeagreements.WehavesignedonewithTunisia,forexample,anditwasnotatreatyof international lawbutoneinwhichourAdministrationsagreedtoworkinspecificfieldsofcooperation.Itisquiteraretohaverealtreaties…theyareveryrare(Fischer,2015).
115
Despite the conservativeway inwhichBavaria’s international treaty-making powers have
manifested,theoveralltrendisforLändertohaveanincreasingroleininternationalaffairs,
andthisisespeciallysoinBavaria(Panara,2010;Moore,2006).Thisisinpartduetoamore
generalreorganisationoftheGermandiplomaticserviceunderForeignMinisterKlausKinkel
duringthe1990s,wherebyclassicaldiplomaticmissionswererequiredtoextendtheirremits,
takingonimportanteconomicdevelopmentroleswhichrequiredthemtoworkmuchmore
closelywithLändergovernments.Additionally,globalisationandEuropeanintegrationhave
meant that “the fields of jurisdiction of the Länder… public administration, economic
development and cultural education, all these have achieved much more international
dimensions”.28Atthesametime,theactivitiesoftheEUareincreasinglyencroachingupon
Ländercompetences.InthecaseofBavaria,thishasresultedinanelementofeuro-scepticism
that feeds into itsEuropean-paradiplomacy,oftenexertingaconservativepressureonthe
Federal Government in this regard and being particularly vigilant when it comes to
Subsidiarity monitoring.29 In this context, the emphasis Bavaria places on its high-profile
Brusselsrepresentation(‘SchlossNeuwahnstein’accordingtocritics(Moore,2006))seemsto
reflectattemptstoportraythedistinctiveness,economicandpoliticalcloutoftheregion.
Bavaria’sOverseasOffices
BavariaisthemostactiveofalltheGermanLänderwhenitcomestooverseasrepresentation,
and indeed paradiplomacymore broadly. In fact it is the only Land thatmaintains a full
network of overseas offices, and the offices themselves are a relatively new concept for
Bavaria,onethat theBavarianGovernmentclaims isproving“verysuccessful…youhavea
permanent presence there, you can develop really modern networks”.30 Alongside its
overseas offices, Bavaria has several formalised areas of international activity: the
28Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201329Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201330Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
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international contacts of the members of the state government31, intergovernmental
commissions-withbothstatesandthirdregions,inter-regionalworkinggroups,cooperation
withconsularcorps(whichareparticularlynumerousinBavaria),aswellasprovidingsupport
for agencies with an international focus and individual projects. These broader external
relations are driven by a relatively recent written strategy that aims to codify and
institutionalise the much more personalised and ad hoc approach of previous Minister
Presidents.32
Intotal,Bavariahas23officesoverseaswithaglobalrepresentation,includinginEurope,the
USAandChina.Forthemostpart,theseofficesarecommercialinnature,thedecisionabout
wheretositethemisdrivenalmostexclusivelybyeconomicconsiderationsandtheirremitis
veryclearlytradeandinvestment.33TheofficesaremostlyrunbytheChamberofCommerce
andpartlyfundedbytheGovernment,runninginclosecooperationwiththeprivatesector
(Keating,2010b:1722appendix2).Thereare,however,threerepresentativeofficesthatdo
haveapoliticalfunction:Quebec,Brusselsand,mostrecently,theCzechRepublic.Someof
Bavaria’soverseasoffices-includingthe‘political’representationinQuebec-areco-located
withtheGermanChamberofCommerce,but,unliketheco-locationofScottishandWelsh
officeswithBritishEmbassies,arenotable to ‘opt in’ to thediplomatic statusofGerman
Federalinstitutions.
Bavaria’s Quebec office was established in Montreal in 1999, building on a cooperation
agreement already a decade old. The office has a “special status, accredited with the
Government of Quebec”, largely because “Quebec itself encourages this representation”
(Keating, 2010b: paragraph 4.3). Meanwhile, the representation in Prague “is quite
special…forhistoricalreasons,afterthewar,relationswithourneighbourstheCzech’swere
difficult…itisagreatachievementtohavethatofficeandrepresentationinPrague”(Fischer,
2015: 5). This office was established as part of a broader rapprochement between the
31 These contacts are appraised and monitored in an unusually thorough way, withaccompanyingstatistics.Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201332Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201333Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
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BavarianandCzechGovernmentsthatalsosawhigh-levelministerialvisitsbetweenthem.
Indeed,CzechPrimeMinisterSobotka“regardedtheopeningoftherepresentativeofficesto
beasignificantevent,andonewhichwillagainraiseCzech-Bavarianrelationstoanewlevel”
(GovernmentoftheCzech-Republic,2014:pressrelease).FromtheBavarianperspective,the
symbolismofsuchanofficeoverrodeconcernsastoitspracticalityoreconomicviabilitythat
wouldnormallyrulethesetypesdecisions.34
Within the EU context, Bavariawas one of the first Länder to open a Brussels office. An
‘informationoffice’wasopenedin1987beforebeingupgraded-initsownestimation-to
theRepresentationoftheFreeStateofBavariafollowingtheratificationoftheMaastricht-
TreatyandtheestablishmentofthecommitteeoftheRegionsintheearly1990s.European
representativeofficesareconsideredthe“most importantareaofexternalactivityforthe
GermanLänder”(Panara,2010:61).Bavaria’sBrusselsoffice,followingarelocationin2004,
isparticularlysymbolic,asexpressedbyoneseniorBavarianofficial:“it’sgrand,it’shistoric…
it’sanexclamationmarksayingwearehereinBrussels…we’reinthisbigareaandwetook
thishistoricbuildingsoeveryonewhocomestotheEuropeanParliamenthastopassit”.35
Bavaria’sEuropeanoffice-andthoseofitsLandcontemporaries-has,however,beenthe
subjectofcontroversyastotheirnomenclatureanddiplomaticstatus.TheLänderBrussels
officesaremodelledaroundtherepresentationofLändergovernmentsinBerlin,wherethe
dual roles of policy-influencing and representation are carried out using largely “soft
instruments”ofpoliticalinfluence(Moore,2006:196).Questionswereinitiallyraisedasto
the legality of these offices but by 1991 “the general legal consensus was that these
institutionswereconstitutionallyacceptable,aslongastheiractivitiesdidnotrunintothe
territory of classic diplomacy reserved for the federal government, such as consular or
diplomaticactivities”(Moore,2006:196).Ofparticularcontroversyisthetermbywhichthese
EUofficesareknown.GermanLänder - includingBavaria -opt to refer to theirEuropean
34Indeedtheeconomiccredentialsofthisofficewereclaimednottobeafactorweighingintothedecisiontoopenit.Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013;Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201335Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013
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offices as Vertretungen or representations, directly contradicting the spirit of a new
constitutional regulation, theEUZBLG,which“accepted the legitimacyofLänderoffices in
Brusselsaspermanent‘links’totheEUinstitutions,providedtheseactedmerelytosupport
Länderdomesticcompetencesanddidnotimpingeuponthefederalgovernment’sdiplomatic
role”. Federal officials in the German Permanent Representation in Brussels are “strictly
warnednottousethetermVertretungwhenreferringtotheLänderoffices,regardlessofthe
offices’ownnames,and to instead refer to thesesimplyasLänder informationorLiaison
offices(Moore,2006:200-202).
Bavaria’sextravagantEUofficesinparticularareseentofloutthisregulation,inestablishing
“astrongphysicalpresencefortheBavariangovernmentintheEU”andenhancing“thescope
of its political capability on European matters”, it is “clearly a representation of Länder
interests in Brussels” (Moore, 2006: 202). However, despite continued non-
acknowledgementofthetermbythefederalgovernment,itseemsthatthecontroversyover
theroleofLänderrepresentationshasabated,at leastonaday-to-daylevel;thequestion
“ariseseverynowandagain…thefederal levelhasacceptedthatwearethere”.36Despite
this,whencomparingitsparliamentaryEuropeanrepresentationwithitsScottishandWelsh
counterparts,oneBavarianintervieweeremarkedthattheFederalGovernment“wouldnot
eventhinkofgivingusdiplomaticstatus”.37
Alongside, and indeed illustrated by, the overseas officesmaintained by the Freistaat of
Bavaria, there are perhaps three key features which are particularly distinctive about its
‘diplomacy’.Theseare: itsability to interactwithstate-levelactors (in theabsenceofany
diplomaticstatus),theparticularrolethatBavarianpoliticianscanplayinternationallyowing
totheirpositionwithintheFederalgovernment,andtheself-assurednesswithwhichBavaria
carriesouttheroleof‘criticalfriend’bothtotheFederalGovernmentandtotheEU.
36Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201337Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013
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TurningfirstlytoBavaria’srelationshipswithforeignstates,wearepresentedwithaclear
narrative:“ifyouwanttounderstandBavariaandhowitoperatesinternationallytodayyou
havetolookathowBavariahasevolvedhistoricallyandculturally.HowBavariahasevolved
economicallyandasaresultofthathowtheconstitutionalandthepoliticalframeworkisin
whichweoperate”.38Bavaria’ssize,thestrengthofitseconomy,itshistoricsignificanceand
uniquepoliticalstatuswithintheFederalRepublicallgrantitaspecial‘status’thatallowsit
tointeractwithsovereignstatesonamuchmoreequitablefootingthanmanyotherregions.
This impacts Bavaria’s own paradiplomatic ambitions; its public strategy “Bavaria in the
world” highlights its manifold interactions with foreign Governments; “usually several
meetingsareheldeveryweek, inBavariaandabroad”39,aswellastheway inwhich it is
viewedandpartneredbystatesthemselves.Accordingtooneinterviewee:
Theanalysis that these statesmake is thatBavariamaynotbea sovereignstate,buttheylookatthesize,attheimportance,attheeconomicpower,andwhen you look at Bavaria in that context, even today by sheer physicalpresence,weoutweighperhaps8or9insidetheEuropeanUnion.Soweare,Bavariaitselfisbiggerthanmanystates.40
TheBavarianStateGovernmentdoesnotusethisadvantageindiscriminately.Instead,there
is a clearly targeted and sophisticated attempt to use these state-like characteristics to
interactwithnationstatesofasimilarsizeinitsEuropeanneighbourhood,muchaswefound
evidenceforinthecaseofScotland.Commentingonthelargenumberofforeignconsulates
inside Bavaria, which, at 110, is the highest concentration outside of Berlin, the same
intervieweeelaboratedonthisrelationship:
For them, for the Ambassador, it’s much easier for the Consul-General inMunichtodealwiththeBavarianGovernmentandmuchmorefruitfulforthecountry… very often an Ambassador in Berlin is one Ambassador amongstmanyothers.AndhehastoaccesstheChancellorandtheAdministration,sheisdealingwiththeRussiansandtheAmericans,somaybeherewehavemoreattentionforthesmallerones”.41
38Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201339BavariaintheWorld40Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201341InterviewData,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
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Thecompetitiveovertonesinthisexplanationwillbeexploredinfurtherdetailinsubsequent
chapters, but for the purposes of our current discussion the focus remains Bavaria’s
concentrationonaparticulartypeofforeignstatewithwhichtoconductitsparadiplomacy.
Adifferentintervieweeexpandsfurther,alludingtoanintra-EuropeanhierarchyandBavaria’s
positionwithinit:
Itmightalsodepend[Bavaria’sabilitytointeractwithstates]ontheweight,sotospeak,ofBavaria.ForExampleourMinisterPresident…hehasforexamplemetMrSamarasfromGreece,soaregionmeetsattheinternationallevel…IhaveseenlastweektherewasadelegationofCzechrepresentativestotheParliamentandtheysaidthatBavariawasakeypartnerand…‘Itisunthinkablefor them to go to Berlin without having stopped in Munich’… So this isinteresting,nowthat,fromtheEUperspective,weareregions…butstillwecan…wereallycangoquitefar.OfcourseasIsaiditdepends,wewouldnotclaimtohaverelationstotheFrenchGovernment-it’snotreally,thisissomesortofthingthefederallevelshoulddo.42
Fromthisseriesofextracts itappearsthatBavariatargetsstateswithwhich itcan‘work’;
similarsizedentities-either intermsofphysicalsizeoreconomicorpoliticalsignificance,
while leavingtheFederalRepublic’skeyallies,suchasFrance,aside.Theexplanationthat
relationswiththeFrenchGovernmentissomethingreservedfortheFederallevelseemsto
berelatedtothepreclusionofBavariafrom‘diplomatic’relations,thoughtheseparationof
suchrelationsfromotherareasofarelationshipbetweenBavariaandasovereignstatemight
seemsomewhatartificial.Panara(2010:68)explainsthismoratoriumasfollows:
TheLänderperformotheractivitiesintheinternationalarena[beyondtreatymaking]. For example they often meet representatives of foreigngovernments. This type of activity can have no diplomatic status becausediplomaticandconsularrelationsaretheFederation’sexclusiveresponsibility.TheLändercannotdepartfromthefundamentalguidelinesoffederalforeignpolicy.Thisistopreventthemfromdevelopingwhatisusuallyreferredtoas‘Nebenaußenpolitik’,whichtranslatesas‘foreignpolicyontheside.
As an example of this type of activity, Panara (2010: 68) cites the example of ameeting
betweentheMinisterPresidentofBavariaandtheIndianMinisterofFinancein2007,where
theyagreedonanannualmeetingoneconomic relationsbetweenBavariaand India that
42InterviewData,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013
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would take place in Munich. Though Panara argues that this does not represent a “full
‘Bavarian foreign policy’, it is significant”. Indeed, what marks the distinction between
diplomaticactivityor‘foreignpolicy’andthesesortsofhigh-levelencountersisparticularly
difficulttoenumerate.ThisisespeciallysogivenBavaria’sstatedfocusonconsularactivities,
akeyareaoftraditionaldiplomacy.
Compounding this ambiguity is the special significance of Bavaria in Germany’s Federal
politics,owingtothecurrentFederalCDU-CSUcoalitionGovernmentandtheCSU’slonger-
standingroleasafederallysignificantparty.Thishasveryclearimplicationsforthestatusof
theMinister-PresidentofBavaria,asleaderoftheCSU.Thisstatureisdeterminedbyexternal
perceptions,andtheseinturnare“determinedbythefactthatheistheheadofthepolitical
partyoftheCSUandhasdirectinfluenceintheFederalgovernment”.Assuch,thirdparties:
Knowthat,orarebeingtoldbydiplomats,thatheisprobably…numbertwoorthree in German politics. And that Chancellor Merkel cannot do anythingwithouthisconsent.Andthisissomethingofcoursethatweighsin.43
Thishasimplicationsatapersonallevel.ThedevelopmentofBavarianparadiplomacyowes
much toMinisterPresident Francis Strauss, a Federalpoliticianwho returned toBavarian
politicsbringingwithhimbothaforeignnetworkandnamerecognition.Strauss:
StartedtodothingsthatnootherMinisterPresidenthaddonebefore.LikegoingtoRussia.Andthen…becausehewasknownasapoliticalfigure…sotheydecided,theylookedathimandsaid‘heythisissomebodywecantalkto’.Sohewasintroducedanditwaseasyforhimtogetaccesstopeoplethatwerenotonthesamelevel.Becausehecamefromtheotherlevel.44
Additionally, Germany’s constitutional structure, and in particular the importance of the
Bundesrat,canprovidevariousopportunitiesforforeignnetworking,andthepositioningof
BavariaalongsideneighbouringEuropeanstates:
TherewasacaselastyearwhereBavariawasthepresidentoftheBundesratand ourMinister President hemade some trips, of course not as BavarianMinisterPresidentbutasarepresentativeofGermany,ofthesecondchamber,toeven,torepresentGermanytosomeheadsofGovernment-IthinkhewenttotheNetherlandsandtoBelgiumandsoon,sothisisaccordingtothe…its
43Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201344Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
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legalundertheGermanconstitutionitwasnoBavarianforeignpolicyofcoursebutitshowsthatalso,theregionshaverightstodoforeignpolicy.45
However,thepoliticallyimportantrolethatBavariaplayswithinGermanFederalpolitics,and
indeedthesignificancegrantedtoLänderingeneralundertheGermanconstitution,canalso
translateintoarestrictiveorconservativeforceuponGermanforeignpolicy.TheCSUhave
been vocal in their criticisms of what they see as Chancellor Merkel’s lenient policy on
migration,most notably in thewake of the refugee crisis of 2015. Absent fromBavaria’s
paradiplomaticportfolioisanyofthedevelopmentornormativeparadiplomacyseeninboth
ScotlandandWales.Relatedly,Bavaria’sattitudetotheEuropeanUnionismeasuredintone.
In particular, it has long been concerned about EU policy encroaching on its legislative
capacity,andittakesseriouslyitsroleasa“criticalbutconstructivepartner”ofboththeEU
andtheFederalGovernment.46
Indeed,theroleof‘criticalfriend’isonethatappearstimeandagaininreferencetoBavaria’s
externalactivities,andinrelationtotheirpositionvisavistheFederalGovernment.Once
again,Bavaria’suniquehistoryisrelevanthere.UnlikeboththeFederalRepublicandthepost-
unification‘hyphenated’Länder,Bavariahasexisted,withalmostidenticalborders,formore
than1500years,andwithaparticularlystrong“unbroken” identity.47Bavaria,whoseown
constitutionwascreatedin1946,wastheonlyLändertoinitiallyrejecttheproposedBasic
Law in 1949, believing it to have too few [centrifugal] federalist elements.48 Bavaria,
therefore,can“affordtobethecriticalpartner”,but-owingtotheconstitutionalandpolitical
stability of the German federation, indeed its own brand of ‘cooperative federalism’ -
“withoutquestioningthefederalismasawhole.So…itmaybeabit,well,thecounterpartto
Berlin…. forexampleheretheCSUtries tobeabitmoreright thanMerkel’sBerlinat the
moment but this is some sort of good-cop, bad-cop game”.49 In the absence of the
45Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201346Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201347Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013.SeealsoHepburnE.(2008a)TheNeglectedNation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavge in Bavarian Party Politics.GermanPolitics17:184-202.48Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013.49Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013
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independencedebates currently coursing through inter-governmental relations in theUK,
Spain or Belgium, the stability of German Federalism allows Bavaria some all-important
politicalleeway.
Moregenerally,Bavariaseesitselfascooperating“very,verywell”withFederalorganisations
-indeed,itreliesheavilyonfederalinstitutionswhenitcomestoaccessingforeignstructures,
embassies andministerial visits. However, “when wemeet there is always some sport -
there’sapoliticallanguage,weareBavariansandsoweplaywiththeimages,sowehavea
playfulandcolourful languagewhenwespeakbut…infactweareboundbythecommon
interest”.50ThiscongruenceofinterestsisparticularlypronouncedgivenBavaria’seconomic
status,whichallowsittoplayasignificantroleinthedirectionofGermany’s“innovationand
export driven economy”; other Länder are envious of this role, but “they don’t have the
budgets”.51
Astheprecedingpassageshaveoutlined,BavariahasnostatusundertheVCDR;itisnotparty
totheconventioninitsownright,norisitpermittedto‘optin’viaco-locationofitsoverseas
officeswiththeFederalRepublicofGermany.ThepositionoftheFederalGovernmentisalso
clearintermsofBavarianothavingtheabilitytoconductforeignrelations,inparticularthose
‘tools’inherenttoGermany’sownfederalforeignpolicy-diplomacyandconsularrelations.
However, here we also find grey-areas, and contradictions in term. Bavaria maintains
relationships with foreign sovereign states, it even signs negotiates and concludes
international treatieswith such states. It also has a select few ‘political’ offices overseas,
premisedonrelationshipswithstates(intheCzechRepublic),powerfulregions(Quebec)and
international organisations (Brussels). It boasts the highest concentration of foreign
consulatesoutsideofBerlin,andacknowledgestheattractivenessofitsowngovernmentas
a point of access for these Consulate-Generals. Its European office is quite deliberately
positionedsothatanyvisitortotheEuropeanParliamentmustencounterit.Itisdifficultto
reconcile this realitywithviewthatBavariadoesnotmaintaina foreignpolicy,orat least
50Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201351Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
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diplomaticrelations. However,equilibrium,ofsorts,seemstoexist.Forexample,Bavaria,
and other German Länder, maintain that their European offices are Vertretung or
‘representations’. The Federal Government hasn’t challenged this development in the
German Constitutional Court, yet they forbid their own representatives from using this
terminologytodescribewhattheytermthe‘informationoffices’oftheLänderinBrussels.A
commonly understood ‘line’ exists which the Bavarian Government is clear not to cross,
seemingly in return for the cooperation of the Federal Government in orchestrating an
advancedparadiplomaticplatform.Crucially,andincontrasttotherelationshipbetweenthe
Scottish and UK Governments, these endeavours are rooted in a congruence of - largely
economic - interests, and set within a robust framework of constitutional stability and
cooperativefederalism.Itiswithinthiscontextthathigh-levelrelationswithstates,suchas
IndiaandRussia,havebeenallowedtotakeplacewithlittleinthewayofcontroversy.52In
the contrast between Scotland and Bavaria we perhaps see similar behaviours being
interpretedinmarkedlydifferentways,owingtothepoliticalcontextineachcase.
Conclusion
Intryingtosurveythediplomaticrepresentationsofsub-stategovernments,Scotland,Wales
andBavariainthisinstance,Berridge’sclassificationof‘unconventional’bilateraldiplomacy
(2005:137-143)isperhapsuseful.Thoughthistypologyisintendedtodescribetheactivities
ofstates,whenresidentembassiesofthe‘conventionalkind’cannotbemaintainedforone
reasonor another, functionally - and indeed in some terminology - theseunconventional
activities describe fairly accurately the diplomacy of many sub-state governments. For
example,theWelshGovernment’soverseasthatoperateoutsideofofficialUKmissions,and
Bavaria’sthree‘political’officesbearmanyofthesamecharacteristicsofwhatBerridgeterms
‘representativeoffices’;“amissionthatlooksandoperatesmuchlikeanEmbassy,theonly
52Havingsaidthis,relationsbetweenBavariaandRussiasince2016havebeguntocauseagreatdealofpoliticaltensionwiththeGermanFederalGovernmentandwillbeexploredinChapterSixofthisthesis.
125
differencebeing its informality” (Berridge,2005:45emphasisoriginal).Additionally,akey
structureofunconventionaldiplomacyasexposedbyBerridge,interestsections,isprecisely
what the Scottish Government have called for under any possible ‘devo max’ model of
devolution,allowingthemtohaveamoreclearlydistinguishedrepresentationinsideBritish
embassiesabroad(ScottishGovernment,2009).
There is, therefore,aprecedentandaseriesofstructuresrelatingtosub-statediplomatic
representationsabroad-bothwhentheyoperateaspartof,and independent from,their
hoststate’smission.However,theproliferationofparadiplomaticactivitiesstillpresentsas-
yet-unansweredquestions.WhichGovernmentare ‘paradiplomats’ultimatelyaccountable
to?Ifco-locationwereinoperation,thenonewouldassumethiswastheforeignofficeofthe
host-state.53 However, where this might at times be a murky area - at other times it is
abundantly clear that political direction is taken from the devolved, not the national
government. In Scotland’s case, for example, the Scottish Government representation in
Brusselsisclearthattheytaketheirpoliticaldirectionfrom“Edinburgh,notLondon”(Scottish
Government,2009:para2.6).Anotherkeyoutstandingissueisthepracticeofrecognition.
Asdiscussedearlierinthechapter,sub-stategovernmentsarenotabletoofficiallyrecognise
breakawaygovernmentsorindependentstates,yettheydohave-anoftenpublic-viewon
suchmatters. Though their informal support or recognitionmay not carry anyweight in
internationallaw,itisnotatalldifficulttoimagineascenariowheretheirpositionswereused
toinfluenceothermembersoftheinternationalcommunity,and,certainly,mayconfuseand
evenhampertheirhost-state’spolicyinthisarea.Equally,onemightspeculatethatpositions
held‘undertheradar’bysub-stategovernmentscouldevenbeutilisedbyacentralstate,in
ordertosignaltacitsupportorimproverelations.
The titleof thischapteruses thephrase ‘skirtingofficialdom’. It isworth returning to this
centralthemeinconcludingthesediscussions.WalesandScotlandbothcarryoutofficialand
unofficialdiplomaticactivities.InWales’case,theGovernmenthasoverseasrepresentations
53 Indeed this iswhat theMemorandumofUnderstandingbetween theUKandDevolvedGovernmentsstatesinnouncertainterms.B4.27,D4.23
126
that form part of official UK diplomatic missions and representative offices that are
independent of the UK’s diplomatic structures, and thus by definition are ‘informal’
diplomaticentities.Astheprecedingsectionsdiscussed,thedecisionofwhetherornottoco-
locatewiththeUKGovernment,andgiveWelshrepresentationsdiplomaticstatus-‘opting
in’ to the VCDR - is made, perhaps surprisingly, on a fairly pragmatic basis. The Welsh
Governmentdoesnotseemtoexperienceanymajorproblemsincarryingouttheir‘brand’of
diplomacy outside of UK missions, and indeed - as referenced in the discussion of the
Chongquingrepresentation-actingoutsideofanofficialrepresentationmayevenhaveits
advantages.InthecaseofWales,itsemphasisonregion-regionlinkagesmeansthat‘informal’
diplomacyis,inmostinstances,perfectlyadequateforitsneeds.Diplomacybetweenregional
governmentsof thiskindmay lookandsoundmuch like ‘official’or ‘formal’diplomacy, it
certainlyhasthepompandceremonytofit,yetitremainsoutsideofthescopeoftheVCDR,
subsidiarytointeractionsatanationstatelevel.
Meanwhile, none of Bavaria’s international offices - including its three ‘political’
representations,enjoydiplomaticstatus.However,eventhoughtheserepresentationsare
un-affiliated and thus outside of the scope of the VCDR, interactionwith nation states is
possible,particularlysowhentheseareofasimilargeographicalsizeorweighttoBavaria
itself,thoughrelationswithstatesofavastlydifferentstatushavealsobeenevidencedinthis
Chapter.TakingplacewithinaparticularcontextofGermancooperativefederalism,Bavaria’s
economic prowess, political significance and independent historical status - alongside the
heightenedstatureawardedtoitspoliticiansasaresultofitsroleinaFederalconstitution-
a lack of diplomatic status does not seem to hamper the activities of Bavaria’s overseas
offices.Aswith all paradiplomatic activities takingplaceoutsideof themore regimented,
institutionalisedscopeofformalstate-staterelations,contextisking.Similarly,theaccordof
interestsbetweenBavariaandtheFederalGovernment,particularlyundercurrentgoverning
arrangements,meansthatMinisterialvisitsandotherhigh-levelaccessisabletobearranged
byFederal institutionswith little friction.Meanwhile, the fact thatBavariamaintainsonly
three ‘representative’ offices - aspartof amuch largernetworkof tradeand investment
offices - perhaps signals the Bavarian government’s satisfaction with diplomatic
representationasaconstituentpartoftheFederalRepublic.Arguably,thisdynamiciseasier
127
toachieveinafederationofpreviouslyconstitutedstatesthaninasystemofdevolutionsuch
astheUK,wherethedevolvedgovernmentsaresubsidiarytothenationalparliament,and
onceagainBavaria’ssecureidentity,Germany’ssystemofcooperativefederalism,andthe
CSU’s position within the Federal government all aid the smooth-operation of inter-
governmental relations. As for the status of Bavaria’s diplomacy, however, we do see
qualitatively different interpretations emerge, even a formof political ‘doublespeak’. The
BavarianChancelloryseethemselvesasbeingabletocarryout“diplomaticrelationsbelow
thelevelofforeignpolicy”.Yet,asourdiscussiononthecontroversysurroundingtheLänder’s
Brusselsofficesdemonstrated,theFederalGovernmentmaintainsthattheproperscopeof
Länderactivitiesexpresslyprecludesdiplomacy,somethingreservedtothefederallevel.In
theBavariancase,itappearsthatitislesstheprocessofdiplomaticnegotiationthatis‘off
limits’,ratherthanthesubstanceofcertainforeignpolicyareas.Thecontoursofthisexclusion
seem to vary along with the broader political context at the time, as strained relations
betweentheCSUinBavariaandChancellorMerkel’sFederalGovernmentsince2016have
demonstrated.
ForScotland,meanwhile,thedecisiontohostitsgovernmentalrepresentationsexclusively
withinUKdiplomaticmissionstellsussomethingdifferentyetagain.Inthiscase,theScottish
Government’sdesiretointeractwithstate-levelrepresentations,someofwhichareofvastly
differentsizeandinternationalsignificancethanitself-inChina,intheUSA,inJapanandin
Canada-meansthatitrequirestheformalityanddiplomaticstatusthatco-locationwiththe
UKbrings.Scotlanddoesalsomaintainrelationswithsmallerstates,ofanequivalentsizeto
itself:ithasofficesinDublinandOslo,forexample.However,theScottishexperienceperhaps
demonstratesthecontinuedimportanceof‘official’diplomaticrepresentations,amessage
oftensubsumedbydiscussionsofthebroadeningofdiplomaticpractices,theproliferationof
diplomaticactorsandtheweakeningof thetraditionaldiplomaticsystem.Tosecurehigh-
level access with states, to engage with the “wider diplomatic community” (Scottish
Government,2015b:para28)andtobeaccordedthestatusofadiplomat-forallsortsof
practicalreasons-theScottishGovernmenthasdeterminedthatactingundertheumbrella
oftheUKstate,andthusunderthetermsoftheVCDR,isanecessaryfeatureofitsoverseas
representation.Somewhatironically,thebitternessofthepillinthiscase-giventheScottish
128
Government’sdesireforindependence,andgenerallyfraughtinter-governmentalrelations-
isperhapstestamenttotheenduringrelevanceofamoretraditionalstyleofdiplomacy.
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Chapter4:‘It’s[notalways]theEconomy,stupid’:thePoliticsofParadiplomacy
Introduction
Byasignificantmargin,themostcommonlymaintainedexplanationforsub-statediplomacy
isaneedtopursueinternationaltradeandinvestment. Inotherwords, ‘it’stheeconomy,
stupid’.And,certainly,sub-stategovernmentsdoneedtofightfortheirplaceintheglobal
market,andmanyaremakinggreatsuccessesofdoingso.Aseconomicunits,leadingregions
-theCaliforniasofthisworld-outweighmanystatesintermsoftheirsizeandsignificancein
the globalmarketplace. Likewise, domestic policy platformsoften rely on the sourcing of
extra-nationalfunds,andtheelectoralsuccessofsub-stategovernmentsisthuspremisedon
theirabilitytomaketheregionknownasanattractiveplacetodobusiness.
However,beyondtherolethateconomicdevelopmentundoubtedlyplaysinthefortunesof
sub-stategovernments,thereareotherreasonsthatthe‘economycard’isbeingplayedso
consistently.Primarily, it representsaway tonaturallyplacesub-stategovernments inan
internationalcontext.Writinginthelate1990s,CohnandSmitharguedthat“international
involvementisstillnotconsideredtobean‘ordinary’activityformostsub-nationalunits,as
it is for central governments” (1996: 33). Though such activity has become much more
common in the intervening years, it maintains what Hocking described as an “aura of
inappropriateness” (1999: 36). Economic development, meanwhile, is seen as a primary
rationaleofsub-stategovernance:cloakingparadiplomaticactivity inthissamelegitimacy.
For example, Wyn Jones and Royles (2012: 256) contrast the international trade and
investmentpromotionactivity inWaleswith its internationaldevelopmentpolicy,arguing
that the former “is very clearly related to a devolved competence, namely economic
development,providingarobustlegalbasisforWAG’srole”.Intheeyesofarangeofactors
therefore - domestic constituencies, international partners and host-state governments -
paradiplomaticactivityisseenasmore‘normalised’inaneconomiccontext.
130
Relatedly,byvirtueoftheircoremission,internationaltradeandinvestmentactivitiesofsub-
stategovernmentsareinabetterpositionwhenitcomestonowubiquitousbudgetcutsand
re-prioritisation.TurningagaintotheWelshcase,thefollowingextractfromaninterviewsets
outthisrelationshipquiteclearly:
Thereisareally important interplaybetweenthestateoftheeconomyandthesub-nationaldiplomacyscene,becausethesub-nationaldiplomacysceneis low hanging fruit when it comes to re-ordering priorities in a time ofmonetaryausterity.Andweourselvesarenotimmunefromthat.We’vehadto,inthelast4-5years,bemuchmorequestioningaboutourabilitytojumpontoaeroplanesandgohereorthere,orwherever…wehaven’twithdrawncompletely,butwehavetothinkmuchmorecarefully.54
Therefore,ifaneconomiccasecanbemadeforparadiplomacy-ataskmadealltheeasierif
this isdirect tradeand investmentpromotion, though the ‘logic’ canalsobe stretched to
other profile raising activities - it acts as insulation against pressure to retrench to the
domesticsphere.
Appealingtoeconomicmotivationsforparadiplomaticactivitythuslendsitlegitimacy,while
helpingtoinsulateitfrombudgetarypressures.However,thefactisthattheactualpractice
ofsub-statediplomacy-ingeneralterms,aswellasspecificallyinourthreecases-goeswell
beyondthescopeoftradeandinvestmentpromotion.Thereareclearlyothermotivationsat
play.Theparadiplomacyliteraturehintsatwhatthesemightbe: identityconstructionand
thegenerationofsymboliccapital (Royles,2010;WynJonesandRoyles,2012),normative
ambitions(Wigell,2013),themobilisationofaterritorialcleavage(Hepburn,2008a),togain
policytractionatnationallevels(Albina,2010)and-mostresolutely-nationbuilding(Keating,
1997; Keating, 1999; Lecours andMoreno, 2001; Lecours, 2002; Lecours, 2007; Lecours,
2008).Ifweaskthequestion,therefore,‘whydoregionsgoabroad’,inthewaysoutlinedin
thepreviouschapter,theanswersareatonceideological,instrumentaland-perhapsinterms
ofgetting‘sweptupinthetide’-sometimesreactive.
ThisChapterconsidersthepoliticsofparadiplomacy;theways inwhichdifferingdomestic
and international contexts and themotivations of sub- and nation- state actors result in
54Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial2013
131
particulartypesofinternationalactivity,modesthatdonotcorrespondtopurelyeconomic
rationales. Inotherwords, itaskswhysub-stategovernmentsconductthemoreadvanced
paradiplomatic activities that they do - both in our three cases and more broadly. The
paradiplomatic literature has established that nation building (as a broad term) is a key
motivator for sub-state governments in their international endeavours. However, this
relationshipneedstobeconsideredingreaterdetailifwearetofullyunderstanditsnature.
Not all sub-state governments use paradiplomacy to ‘build the nation’ in the sameway.
Instead,arangeofstrategiesareusedtoachieveavarietyofgoals.ForWales,aligningitself
withthedominantinternationaldiscoursesofsustainabledevelopment,genderequalityand
citizenengagement isaway toplace thenation ina similarlyenlightenedgroupof ‘good
internationalists’,reinforcingthe“mythofWelshradicalism”.InScotland,paradiplomacyaids
nationbuildingbyaligningtheScottishGovernmentwithsimilarlysizedstates,mimickinga
foreign policy that puts it in a special category among its Nordic neighbours. In Bavaria,
paradiplomacy is used to demonstrate state-like economic and administrative actorness,
emphasisingBavaria’shistoryasasovereignstate.
Asastartingpoint,thischapteracceptstheassertionsoftheparadiplomaticliteratureand
acknowledges thatparadiplomacy isaparticularlyuseful tool in sub-statenationbuilding.
However, it probes this relationship further and - in doing so - reframes paradiplomatic
interactions as part of a sovereignty game. By using this terminology, the intention is to
conceptualise and account for the ‘back and forth’ between states and sub-state
governments that revolve around the rightful or legitimate sites of power and political
authority.Whileacceptingthebasicutilityofparadiplomacyinnationbuildingendeavours,
thisanalysistakesastepbackandplacesparadiplomacywithinthecontextofabigger-and
much longer - sovereigntygamethat sub-stategovernmentsareplayingwith theirnation
statecounterparts.Whilenation-buildingispartofthisgame,thegameitselfisbroader-itis
about the relative roles and power relationships between the state and the sub-state
government. It is these - traditionally hierarchical - roles and relationships which
paradiplomacy necessarily plays on and challenges. A brief outline of the framework of
sovereigntygamesfollows,beforethechaptermovesontoassessthenatureofthegames
132
beingplayed ineachofourcasestudies,andtheways inwhichparadiplomacyfeeds into
them.
Sub-stateSovereigntyGames
IntheirexaminationofWelshparadiplomacy,WynJonesandRoyles(2012:251)arguethat
sub-state diplomacy represents a particularly good field within which to study inter-
governmentalrelations,orIGR.Thisisduetothefactthattheleadingroleoccupiedbystates
ininternationalaffairs,aswellasthe“prerogativesandprivilegesthatareentailedbyit”,are
veryoften“jealouslyguarded”bystates:
Especiallyinthecontextofregionalactorswithinthebordersofthestatewhochafe at the restrictions inherent in thedesignation ‘stateless nation’. Sub-state diplomacy increases the potential for tension in central - sub-staterelationsandcanthereforehighlightthelimitsofIGR:ormoreprecisely,thepotentiallylimitinganddiscipliningroleofsovereigntyonrelationsbetweenstatesandregionalactors(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:251).
Anotherwaytocharacterisethisrelationship,andtheback-and-forthbetweenthestateand
thesub-stategovernment,iswiththevocabularyofasovereigntygame.ForAdler-Nissenand
Gad(2014:3),sovereigntygamesare,fundamentally“strategicclaimsinrelationtoauthority
and responsibility referring to sovereignty”. Thegames themselves, theauthors continue,
play out in “discourses, institutions and practices”, and in playing such games the actors
eventuallyendup“stretchingthemeaningandfunctionsofsovereignty”.
Byvirtueoftheassociationbetweenstatehoodanddiplomaticactorness,theinternational
relationsof sub-stateunits necessarily touchon - even in an implicit sense - sovereignty.
Therefore,aswellasparadiplomacyrepresentingausefulframeworkforexploringtherole
and limits of intergovernmental relations, the functioning of these inter-governmental
relationships,perhapsintheirmostbroadsense,furtheroffersanilluminatingframefrom
whichtounderstandthemotivationsandconditioningfactorsbehindsub-statediplomacy
itself. Different types of intergovernmental relationships - in terms of party political
congruence,thedivisionofcompetencesbetweentiersofgovernmentandtheinstitutional
andworkingarrangementsinplace-allpotentiallyimpactuponthenatureandthescopeof
133
paradiplomatic practices that the sub-state government engages in. In other words, the
precisecontoursoftherelationshipbetweenthedifferentactorsinasub-statesovereignty
gameareconstitutivetothenatureofthegameitself.
Ifweaccept themetaphorof a sovereignty game,we can identify them in allmannerof
guises.Callsforincreasedpowers,forcompetenceoverspecificissuesandrenegotiationsof
thebasisoffederalordevolvedarrangementsallrepresentclaimsaboutrelativepowerand
authority. These claims are often made with an appeal to popular sovereignty and are
grounded in the moral framework of self-determination. Paradiplomacy is one field, or
operationalspace,inwhichthisgameisplayedouttogreateffect.Thisisduetohowclosely
foreign affairs and the very nature of sovereignty are tied together. By conducting
paradiplomacy, sub-state governments are making a strategic claim about power and
authority - namely over a competence or issue area that sits within the broader field of
diplomacyor foreignaffairs. This strategic claim is theessenceof a sovereignty game.At
heart,suchactivities-inourthreecasestudies-seemtobeallabouttherecognitionofthe
sub-state government as something more than a ‘mere region’. It doesn’t have to be
recognitionasanaturalstate-in-waitingorevenapotentialstate,butratherthatithassome
sortofspecialstatusandsignificancewarrantingits‘seatatthetable’.
Sub-statesovereigntygamesare in fact remarkablysimilar towhatAdler-NissenandGad
categoriseaspost-colonialorpost-imperialsovereigntygames(Adler-NissenandGad,2014)
-indeedmanyoftheseunitswouldalsofallundertheumbrellatermofbeing‘sub-state’.For
Adler-NissenandGad,theconceptofapost-colonialsovereigntygameisawaytounderstand
the “interplay between postimperial relations and European integration”; it allows for
analysisofhow“micro-politiesmanoeuvrebetweendifferentcentres”,their‘metropole’or
referentstateandtheEuropeanUnion.Fortheauthors,post-colonial‘micropolities’–here,
AdlerNissenandGadarelookingspecificallyattheNordicregion–representaspecialtype
ofactor:
Beingneither formally sovereignnor simplifyhierarchically subordinated totheirmetropole,theself-governingcountriesarepoliticalentitiesthatdonotreadily fit the conceptual categories offered by the conventional theory
134
addressing international politics and international law… Self-governmentarrangementsmayevenincludethetransferofjurisdictioninsomeareasofforeign affairs (Loukacheva, 2008:109) – an area traditionally so closelyarticulatedotsovereigntythatitisconsideredtheprerogativeofthesovereign(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:16)
It is a way to ‘open up’ the concept of sovereignty and explore the ways in which it is
negotiated,takinginarangeofpossibleself-governingarrangementsanddegreesofrelative
subjetivity(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:7,14).
Just like postcolonial sovereignty games, sub-state sovereignty games revolve around the
acknowledgement of the polity or ‘potential state’ as a player of the game. The key
difference,however,isthatthe‘potentialstateness’ofsub-stategovernmentsasabroader
groupismorecontested,andtherelationshipbetweenthestateandsub-stategovernment
ismoretraditionallyhierarchical.Nonetheless,inthecaseofsub-stategovernments,itisthis
very right to participate that is beingnegotiated throughparadiplomatic actions, and the
acceptance of the claim varies to a significant degree across states and sub-state
governments.Insub-statesovereigntygames,paradiplomacy,inparticular,becomesaway
tomarkoutthe‘special’statusofthepolitythroughencroachingonatraditionallystate-held
domain,andinotherwaysrevolvesaroundthestatusoftheregionwithinthestate.Thechart
belowoutlinesthesovereigntygamestructureasenvisagedbyAddler-NissenandGad,with
theadditionofsub-statesovereigntygamesbytheauthor.
135
Essentially,theargumenthereisthatstatelessnationsmayconductparadiplomacyaspartof
asovereigntygame,oneplayedwiththeimplicitobjectiveofbeingacknowledgedasarightful
playerinthisgameitself.Thesovereigntygameisaboutthestatusoftheregionwithinthe
state,ratherthananysetend-pointorfixedobjective:itisplayedoutintheactionsofthe
sub-stategovernmentsandthecounter-actions,reactionsorrestrictionsfromthestate.Itis
shaped by the parties in power at each tier of government and the system of inter-
governmentalrelationsbetweenthestateandthesub-statelevel.
Sovereightygame:"strategicclaimsinrelationtoauthorityandresponsibility,referringtosovereignty"Adler-Nissen,2014:3
Atleasttwoplayers;asharedunderstandingofthegamebeingplayed;animplicitorexplicitreferencetoaneither/orconceptionofsovereignty;nofixedrules;centresaroundtherelationaldistribution
ofsubjectivity(Adler-NissenandGad2012).
VerticalGamesAtleasttwoplayers- involvesthe
allocationofcompetencesbetweensub-state,stateand
internationalactorssuchastheEU(Adler-NissenandGad,2012)
Postcolonialsovereigntygames:involvetheacknowledgementofthepolityor'potentialstate'asaplayerofthegame(Adler-NissenandGad,2012)
Firstround:polityaquiresindependence, becomesastateandthegamebecomesahorizontalone(Adler-
NissenandGad,2012,
Remaindersofthisprocess getstuckinthefirstround,don'taquire
independence. Nowthesovereigntygameisplayedthroughthetacticalnon-acquiringofindepdnece (Adler-
NissenandGad,2012)
Othersoveriegntygames:EU/memberstates.Revolvesaroundrelative
competencesandpowerdistributions(Adler-NissenandGad,2012)
Sub-statesoverigntygames:aboutacknowledgingthattheregionhassomesortofclaimtospecialstatus.
Firstround:someregionsseekandaquireindependence (becomesahorizontalgame),ortherightto
vote/decideuponindependence (claimtoaseatatthetableaccepted-
remainsaverticalgame)
Regionsnotactivelyseekingstatehoodorwhohavetiredandfailedtoaquireitnonetheless
utilisetheirclaimtoaseatatthetable,thegamebecomesaboutthestatusoftheregionwithin
thestate
HorizontalGamesAtleasttwoplayersofequal
(formal)status- mostcommonlybetweenstates(Adler-Nissenand
Gad,2012)
136
Thenotionofsovereigntygames,asAdler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansenarekeentopoint
out (2008: 7), is intended only as a heuristic device. However, the focus on a game as
comprisedofplayers,rulesandmovesisonethatisparticularlyusefulinthiscontext.Itisa
wayto“openup’theconceptofsovereigntyandconsideritsnegotiation,insteadoftreating
it as a static condition (Adler-Nissen andGad, 2014: 7, 14) Rather than focussing on the
perceivedend-goalofgoverningparties,wecan insteadconsiderthegame in itsentirety.
Much like devolution, famously “a process, not an event”, a sovereignty game is not
somethingwithadefinedend-point-itisthegameitself,ratherthananyeventualscore,that
isthesubjectofthisstudy.
NationBuildingandtheMimicryofStatehood:PlayingtheLongGame
Anessentialelementofasovereigntygameistheperformanceofsovereignty.Inotherwords,
tomakeastrategicclaimaboutauthorityandresponsibility,asub-stategovernmentmust
perform the narrative of sovereignty. In ‘vertical’ sovereignty games, “political and
administrative elites are playing on the different legal and symbolic structures related to
sovereigntytoenhancetheirautonomyinboththedomesticandthe internationalarena”
(Adler-Nissen andGammeltoft-Hansen, 2008: 12).Oneway for sub-state governments to
enact this performance of sovereignty is through the mimicry of a type of actor whose
sovereigntyisundisputed,andindeedisacentraltenetoftheircharacterandstatusonthe
worldstage:thesovereignstate.Suchmimeticperformancescanthereforebeunderstoodas
movesinthesovereigntygame,moveswhichmayrecastthebalanceofpowerbetweenstate
andsub-stateactorsorimpacttheself-perceptionoftheaffectiveregion.
Theconceptof‘mimicry’,forthesepurposes-astrategyofoutwardlydemonstratingstate-
likecharacteristicsintheabsenceofformalsovereignty(McConnell,2016;McConnelletal.,
2012)is,fundamentally,allaboutperception.Theperceptionsofexternalactorsthattheunit
hassomesemblanceoflegalcompetenceordiplomaticauthoritymatterseventhoughsuch
137
competence may, in fact, be absent. This feat is achieved by playing on the powerful
associationsbetweensovereignty,diplomacy,statehoodandnationhood.Insomeinstances
thismimicrymaytaketheformofparody;forexample,‘micropatias’orself-declaredstates
thatrepresentaprotestmovementdrawheavilyonformalisedperformancesandestablished
narrativesaroundsovereigntyandinternationalrecognition(McConnelletal.,2012:810).In
other cases, such as those of break-away governments and unrecognised states seeking
formalrecognitionasafullstate,themimicryundertakenhastheclearaimofestablishing
theirrightorappropriatenessasthelegitimaterepresentativeoftheirpeopleandeasingthe
path towards full statehood by appearing as natural kin to existing members of the
internationalcommunity.InthecaseoftheTibetanGovernmentinExile(TGiE),thestrategy
adopted is one keen to “appropriate symbols of legitimacy in order to maintain their
governmentalclaims,withthe“languageofstateness”(HansenandStepputat,2001:9)being
particularlyimportantastheynegotiatetheirplaceontheinternationalstage”(McConnell,
2016:806).
Ifweacceptthatakeymotivatorforparadiplomaticactivityisthedesireto‘buildthenation’
domestically, thenamimetic framework isonewithinwhichwecanmost clearly see the
processunfolding.Inonesense,paradiplomacyispartofanation-buildingprocessinthatit
helps to anchor the nation in an accepted and familiar discourse that strengthens and
normalizesnationalsentimentsinadomesticsetting.Thisisenabledbytakingon(mimicking)
theoutward appearanceof a state: a defining characteristic ofwhichbeing the ability to
conduct diplomatic relations. In this regard, the goal of nation building is realized in a
domesticsetting,withintheaffectiveregionitself.Inanothersense,mimicryhelpstoconvey
the image of the nation outwards, again by appearing state-like and therefore more
legitimate in the eyes of the international community. Coming full circle, this enhanced
international legitimacy further reinforces the perception of the sub-state government as
something ‘morethan’amereregionwithin itsownconstituency,andwithinthestateas
whole.This, inturn, iswhatasovereigntygameisallabout:relativepowerandauthority.
Indeed, it neededent be within the restricted parameters of identifiable nation building
projectthatthisdynamicplaysout,itislessthe‘nation’componentthatiscriticalthanthe
desire touseastrongsub-state identityaspartofapoliticalproject,makingastatement
138
aboutrelativepowerandauthority.Thewaysinwhichmuchparadiplomacycanbeconstrued
as projecting and bolstering an identity that chimes with dominant liberal international
norms,forexamplearounddemocracypromotion,genderequalityandenvironmentalism,
canbeseenasevidenceofthisrelationship.
McConnell(2016)pointstothisphenomenon-ofcraftinganinternationalmessageto‘fit’
dominantinternational,predominantly‘Western’norms-inthecaseoftheTGiE.Here,the
argumentisthat“therationaleformuchoftheTGIE’sinvestmentinstate-likeinstitutions,
practicesanddiscourses’”hasbeenthe‘seekingoflegitimacy’;“oftheexileadministration
wanting to prove itself trustworthy and deserving of support in the eye of international
audiences”(McConnell, 2016: 161). This formof diplomacy and statecraft hasbeenabout
crafting a message and an identity that fit in with the expectations of contemporary
internationalpolitics.It’s“aclassiccaseoftellingparticular(Western)audienceswhatthey
wanttohear”.Inthiscase,itisthattheTibetanpeoplearepeaceful,democratic,concerned
withtherightsofWomenandtheenvironment.Infact,McConnellgoesontoarguethat,“in
recentyearstheTGiEhasbeenengagedinanalmosttick-boxexerciseofmeetingthecriteria
ofthesenormsofgoodgovernance”(2016:160).
Thereareclearparallelsbetweenthisexerciseandthenorm-driveninternationalactivitiesof
ScotlandandWales,bothintermsoftheprecisethemesthataredrawnuponandtheways
in which such messages attempt to marry the external perceptions of the nation with
dominant international norms. Most notable in this regard are their international
development programs - Wales for Africa and Scotland-Lesotho - but the work of both
Scotland and Wales around the UK’s response to climate change and the democracy
promotion exercises of the legislatures in both nations (specifically with regards to e-
democracy and citizen engagement) also point to such a project of norm-alignment. In
Bavaria,theroleofmimicryintheirparadiplomaticendeavoursappearsmorecloselyaligned
totheireffectivenessandeconomicactorness,key‘state-like’characteristics,ratherthanany
thematic mimicry of liberal international norms. Having said this, they do also conduct
normativeparadiplomacy-seenmostclearlyinthetechnicalandlegalassistanceprovidedto
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. An outline of the nature of the
139
sovereignty game being played in each of our case studies, and the range of mimicking
strategiesthateachsub-stategovernmentemploysintheirparadiplomacies,willbeexplored
inmoredetailbelow.
I. Wales
ThesovereigntygamebeingplayedinWalesisonethatcouldbedescribedasvolatile.AsWyn
Jones&Scullyargue:“therecordofWelshconstitutionbuildingisarecordoffailure…the
successiveedificesconstructedhavebeencharacterizedbyalmostcontinualinstability”(Wyn
JonesandScully,2012).Theoriginaldevolutiondispensationagreedin1998andgrantingonly
secondarylaw-makingpowerswasprofoundlyflawed.Theagreementwasreplacedin2006
byanewGovernmentofWalesActformallyseparatingtheNationalAssemblyandtheWelsh
Assembly Government and unlocking some primary lawmaking powers - though heavily
circumscribed.ThepowersoftheNationalAssemblywerefurtherenhancedin2011,allowing
full law-making powers - though still in limited areas conferred to the Assembly by
Westminster.DespitetwofurtherGovernmentofWalesActs,thescopeofthepowersheld
bytheNationalAssemblyforWalesarestillthesubjectofdebate,bothintermsofthespecific
issueareasoverwhichtheAssemblyhascompetence,andontheprincipleofaconferred,
ratherthanreserved-powers,modelofdevolution.Inadditiontothisconstitutionalvolatility,
otherfactorsleavetheirmarkonthenatureofthesovereigntygamebeingplayedinWales.
TheelectoraldominanceofWelshLabour,andthe‘clearredwater’historicallyseparating
WelshLabourfromitsnationalcounterparts,hasmeantthatthenation-buildingprojectin
Waleshasnotbeenmonopolisedbyasub-statenationalistparty,butratherhasbeenamore
inclusiveproject towhichpartiesacross thepolitical spectrumseemtosubscribe to,with
greaterorlesserenthusiasm(RoylesandWynJones,2010:253).Inmorerecenttimes,there
is a sense thatUK-wide Labour party has insteadmoved to the ‘left’ ofWelsh Labour; a
different dynamic perhaps, but the key element of differentiation remains. Lastly, party
politicalincongruenceacrossthewholeoftheUKmeansthattherearemorethantwoplayers
in this sovereignty game: Scotland is used as a reference point, to seek additional or
reconfiguredpowersandtoprovideprecedentandcontextforWales’externalrelations.The
natureofthisgameasitplaysoutinaparadiplomaticframeisexploredbelow.
140
ThewaysinwhichtheNationalAssemblyforWales,asadevolvedlegislature,engagesinthe
projectofnation-building is particularly illuminating, andpoints to theways inwhich the
mantleofnationhoodaddsprestigeandlegitimacytodifferenttiersofgovernment(Lecours
andMoreno,2001;Lecours,2002;Keating,1999).TheNAfWcanbeseentohavecarvedout
adistinctiveapproachtoparadiplomacy,onethatwasledthematicallybytheprioritiesofits
Presiding Officer, Welsh Labour’s Rosemary Butler between 2011-2016.55 These themes
definedabody-widestrategyadoptedfor internationalengagement,basedaroundcitizen
engagement,e-democracy,sustainabilityandscrutiny.Addedtothislististheissueofgender
equality,whichthePresidingOfficerprofiledinanumberofinwardvisitsandpublicevents.56
According to senior officials within the Assembly, the point of distinction between their
approach to paradiplomacy and that of the Welsh Government is that, where the
Government requires economic outputs from its interactions, the Assembly is “driven by
democraticgoals”.57Thedesiretobeseenas“abeaconforlearning”-forexamplesharing
bestpracticeonscrutinywithAfricanParliamentsofasimilarsizetoWales’devolvedbody-
speaks clearly to a strategyofmimicry; promotingdominant international norms to third
countries-mimickingthediplomaticanddemocracypromotionrolesofWesternstates-isa
waytoevidencetheirprevalencewithinWalesitself.Asanationbuildingmechanism,this
allows the nation and the values it embodies - as a young, transparent and tolerant
democracy,“small, smartandsuccessful” (Royles,2010) - tobecommunicatedexternally,
demonstratingtotheinternationalcommunityitscommitmenttothesenormsbyespousing
themelsewhere.Thisformofmimicryalsoactstobuildthenationinternally,bringingthe
prestigeofaninternationaleducator,anexemplarinthefieldofdemocracybuilding,backto
thehomefront.
TheWelshGovernment’sparadiplomaticactivitiesalsohaveastronglinktosuchdominant
international norms, despite the economic rationales that are frequently cited. This is
particularlyapparent inthewaysthattheirdiplomaticendeavours feed intothe ‘myth’of
Welshradicalism(WynJonesandRoyles,2012)andthe‘clearredwater’betweentheWelsh
55Interviewdata,SeniorNationalAssemblyforWalesofficials,201356Interviewdata,SeniorNationalAssemblyforWalesofficials,201357Interviewdata,SeniorNationalAssemblyforWalesofficials,interview2013
141
andUKLabourparties.WynJonesandRoylesexploretherolethatWelshparadiplomacyplays
in identity-building, finding that this has not primarily been seen in themobilisation of a
territorialcleavagebyasingleparty,butinallparties’responsestotheemergenceofone.
Suchevidencecanperhapsbededucedfromthefactthat-asinScotland-itwasLabourand
Conservativepoliticianswho“playedtheleadingroleinsub-statediplomacy”.Thiswaspartly
becauseofthe“politicalusefulnessofsub-statediplomacyforsuch‘unionist’politiciansasa
meansofundermining‘nationalistclaimsthatindependenceisaprerequisiteforengagement
ininternationalaffairs”(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:253).However,theauthorscontinue
withtheirsuspicionsthattherewasmorethansimpleinstrumentalismatplayintheWelsh
case,arguingthat“membersofstate-widepartiesmaywellsupportthedevelopmentofsub-
statediplomaticactivitynotonly toheadoff ‘theNats’butalsobecause they themselves
subscribetoanationbuildingprojectatthesub-statelevel”(2012:253).Thisnation-building
project, the authors argue, can explainmuch of theWelsh Government’s paradiplomatic
activity;“inparticular,theprogrammeexpressedadesiretoprojectacertainvisionofWelsh
nationhoodthatstressesinternationalismasacoreelementofthe‘radicaltradition’,itself
oneoftheconstitutivemythsofWelshpolitics”(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:260).InWales,
theinformalityofmuchparadiplomaticactivityallowsforadistinctidentitytobeplayedout
inamultitudeofwaysthattranscendtherelativelynarrowscopeoftheWelshGovernment’s
authority under their current devolution dispensation. Furthermore, the coherence of
paradiplomatic activities around the themes of international development - including
brandingWalesa‘thefirsteverfairtradenation’,theprotectionofminoritylanguagesand
actiononclimatechangeseemstosuggestastrategicalignmentwithdominantinternational
norms,bolsteringitsnation-buildingproject.
Onewouldassumethatpartypoliticalcongruenceorincongruence(where"governmentsat
differentlevelswithinastateareledbydistinctpoliticalparties”(McEwanetal.,2012:187)–
would matter greatly in a sub-state sovereignty game. However, evidence from Wales
demonstratesthattherelationshipbetweenthesetwovariablesisnotatallstraightforward;
constitutionalissuesandterritorialcleavagescross-cutthemoretraditionalleft-rightaxisof
theUK’spartypoliticalsystem.Aswehaveseen,itisnotjustsub-statenationalistpartieswho
engageinnation-building,utilisingparadiplomacyintheprocessesand-likewise-it isnot
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necessarilythecasethatparty-politicalincongruencewillalwaysmanifestinanantagonistic
paradiplomaticstance.ThecasesofWalesisinfactquitecomplexinthisregard.Despitea
furtherdegreeofincongruencebetweenWelshandUKGovernmentsfollowingtheformation
of a Conservative - Liberal Democrat coalition Government in Westminster in the 2010
Parliament(whereaspreviouslyaWelshLabour-PlaidCymrucoalitioninWalesandaLabour
GovernmentinWestminsteralignedthetwoGovernmentsalongleft-leaningterms),there
remainedasurprisinglevelofcontinuityintermsofWelshparadiplomaticactivity.Thiscould
partlybeattributedtotherebeingalesspressingneedforthegroup-interestdefinitionand
territorial-mobilizationfunctionsofparadiplomacy,giventhatthedomesticagendasofthe
two governments are already divergent to a significant degree. Indeed, one Welsh
intervieweepointstothefactthat,contrarytowhatonemightexpect:
TherealdivisionwithintheUKintermsofpolicydynamics,fromtheWelshcontext,isnotbetweentheLabourpartyinWalesandtheConservativepartyat theUK level, the real difference is between Cardiff Bay andWhitehall…whoeverisinpoweratWestminsterandWhitehall,itisstillWestminsterandWhitehall… in the internationalcontext, that’s themore importantdivision,it’sthedivisionbetweendifferenttiersofgovernment.Thisisprobablymoresignificant, in away, than the difference between the parties, the politicaldifference.58
That this divisionbetweendifferent tiers of governmentwas the salientone, rather than
anythingmorepartypolitical, lendweighttotheargumentthat - ratherthanbeingabout
specificissuesorparty-politicaldynamics,thesovereigntygameisfirstandforemostabout
relativepower and subjectivity.Additionally, the existenceof party-political incongruence
between Welsh Labour and the (then) Conservative-Liberal Democrat UK Government
coalition actually enabled inter-governmental relations thatwere in someways improved
fromthestatus-quoante.AccordingtothesameWelshGovernmentinterviewee:
Inasense,when…thecoalitiongovernmentcameinthreeyearsago,therewas probably an element of sort of mutual relief… at that point, if theadministrationheredisagreeswiththeadministrationthere,itfeelsentitledtosaysoveryfreelyandveryeasily,there’snoembarrassmentaboutsayingsoandtheyexpectthatandtheyacceptit.Where,ofcourse,withtheLabouradministrationstheyhadtoburythemandthesesortofsubterraneancables
58Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial2013
143
werelaidinplace,everythinghadtobeunder-ground,inacuriouswaynowitisalittlebiteasiertodisagree.Yes,there’stension,everyoneexpectstheretobetension,youcantalkaboutthetensionsnow.59
This‘mutualrelief’hasbeenenabled,however,bythefactthattheincomingUKGovernment
coalitionhasnotattemptedto‘clampdownorinhibitourabilitytooperateinthisspace”,
insteadhonouringthe“protocolandprecedentswhichexist”.60However,currentUKpolitical
discussionaroundBrexitwillundoubtedlyintroducenewstrainsonthisrelationship,notleast
becausethe‘stakes’arenowsomuchhigher.
InWales,therefore,weseeaclearattempttoaligna‘newdemocracy’withdominant,liberal
andinternationalistnorms.TheWelshGovernment’smimicryofboththisparticularnarrative
andmorebroadlyofthesymbolsandlanguageofstatenesscanbeconstruedaspartofan
attempttobuildthenationdomestically,toenhancethecredibilityofWalesasa‘realplayer’,
deserving of a seat at the international table. Specifically, paradiplomacy - owing to its
informal, largely non-statutory nature - enablesWales to perform sovereignty in amore
visible and arguably convincingmanner than it is traditionally allowed, within its narrow
purviewofconferredpowers.Thismeansthatitremainsaparticularlyeffectivetoolforthe
WelshGovernment,andseemstorepresentacoreelementofitsbroadersovereigntygame
andefforts toreposition itself inrelationbothtotheUKGovernmentandotherdevolved
nations.
II. Scotland
ThesovereigntygamethatScotlandplaysisonewithheightenedstakes.UnlikeinWalesor
Bavaria,theprospectofanindependent-i.e.fullysovereign-Scotlandisacredibleone;the
Scottish Government in 2014 directly raised this prospect through a referendum of the
Scottishelectorate.Althoughthevoteresultinanarrow‘no’toScottishindependence,the
59Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial201360Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial2013
144
gamewasindeliblymarkedbythemovesmade-bothbytheScottishGovernmentincalling
forthevote,andbytheUKGovernmentinitsacknowledgementoftherightoftheScottish
peopletoultimatelydecideoncontinuedmembershipoftheUnion.Thegameisalsomarked
bytherecentparty-politicaldominanceoftheSNP,adominancethat‘ought’tohavebeen
impossibleunderthevotingarrangementsagreedfortheScottishParliament(Cairney,2011:
2)and,asinthecaseofEuropeanpost-colonialsovereigntygames,isoftenplayedoutwith
referencetotheEU-inparticular,withthenarrativeofanindependentScotlandintegrated
withinaEuropeanUnion.
Just as the nature of the sovereignty game in Scotland stands apart fromour other case
studies,Scotland’snation-buildingproject,andtherolethatparadiplomacyplayswithinit,is
alsomarkedlydifferent to that evident inWales andBavaria. Formany statelessnations,
Walesincluded,independence-aneventualstatecorrespondingwiththenation-isnotthe
overridingaimofnationbuildingefforts,at leastnot inthemediumtermperspective.For
Scotlandhowever,alongsidenationssuchasCataloniaandFFlanderss, there isarguablya
moreexplicitprogrammeofstatebuildingthatistheperceivedend-pointof‘softer’nation
building strategies. In these instances, the value of sub-state diplomacy is potentially
heightened:notonlydomimickingstrategiesenhancethecredibilityofthestatelessnation,
by allowing it to appear a natural bedfellow of established states, they also allow an
alternative‘state’messagetobecommunicated,differentiatingthestatelessnation-interms
ofitsstyleofdiplomacyorinternationalpolicy-fromthehoststate.Thistwin-trackapproach,
seekingbothcredibilityasaninternational‘player’anddistancefromthehoststate,wasvery
much in evidence in the period leading up to Scotland’s independence referendum in
September2014,anditisherethatthisanalysiswillfocus.TheScottishGovernment’swhite
paperon independence setsout, ina chapteron international relationsanddefence, the
pointsofdifferentiationenvisagedundertheconditionsofa ‘yes’voteinthereferendum.
SeveralthemesemergethataremarkedintheirexplicitdistancingfromUKpolicy:levelsof
militaryspending,approachestonuclearweaponry,attitudestowardstheEuropeanUnion,
the relative importance of international consensus and coalition building, the placing of
constitutional ‘locks’ on military action, and the value of international development and
peace-building.
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Introducingthissectionofthewhitepaper,theScottishGovernmentlayouttheiralternative
visionforforeignanddefencepolicypost-independence:
Under our plans, Scotland’s foreign, security and defence policies will begroundedinaclearframeworkofparticipatinginrules-basedinternationalco-operation to secure shared interests, protecting Scotland’s people andresourcesandpromotingsustainableeconomicgrowth(ScottishGovernment,2013b:206).
So far, so uncontroversial; though there does seem to be an implied rebuke to the UK
Government in this statement. Indeed, the chapter then moves on to draw lines of
comparisonbetweentheenvisagedapproachofan independentScotlandandthecurrent
andhistoricalinternationalpoliciesoftheUKGovernment,lamentingthefactthat“weare
representedbyaWestminsterGovernmentthathasbaseditsactionstoooftenondifferent
international priorities.We see thatmost clearly inmatters ofwar andpeace and inour
relationshipwiththeEU”(ScottishGovernment,2013b:209).Drawingthisdistinctionmost
markedly,thewhitepapercontinues:
WhiletheUKseeksanabilitytoprojectglobalpower,anindependentScotlandcan choose a different approach. If in government, we will direct ourinternational efforts, first and foremost, into deepening and consolidatingrelationshipswith friendsandpartners,newandold,across theworldand,throughthis,expandingopportunitiesforpeopleandbusinessesinScotland(ScottishGovernment,2013b:210).
WhiledistancinganindependentScotlandfromtherestoftheUK,thewhitepaperisalso
keentodrawallegiancesandmakereferencetoexistingstateswhoseapproachestoforeign
policyweremoreorlessinlinewiththatbeingproposed.Thisstrategyfurtherevidencesthe
Scottish Government’s twin track approach to its nation-building efforts: at once placing
Scotlandhappilyamongstacohortofothersmall,liberaldemocraciesandatthesametime
allowingtheirdistinctiveness,andthespecificvaluesofScotlandasastatelessnation,indeed
state-in-waiting, to be articulated. The first element of this strategy is exemplified in the
followingpassage:
Scotlandstartswithanenviablereputationandastronginternationalidentity.Ourinternationalbrandisoneofourmostimportantassetsasacountry.Evenwithout independent status, Scotland’s international brand value alreadyranks15thoutof50nations,accordingtointernationalcomparisonspublishedin2012.Scotlandhascontinuallyscoredhighlyandisrankedsimilarlyto-and
146
oftenaheadof - other comparably-sized, high incomedemocracies suchasDenmark, Finland, Ireland and New Zealand (Scottish Government, 2013b:210-211).
OncethesimilarqualitiesofScottishandotherrelativelysmall,liberaldemocracieshavebeen
established, the white paper then moves on to transposing those aspects of Scottish
nationhood, their national values of tolerance, openness and pragmatism, onto the
frameworkofforeignanddefencepolicy.Theimplicitcontrastrunningthroughthefollowing
passageisthatbetweensuchvalue-ledapproachestointernationalaffairsthatdrawstrongly
onsoft-powerresourcesandarecoheredaroundarespectforcoalitionsandmultilateralism,
versusthemilitarismanduni-orbilateralismoftheUKstate-whoseoverseasfootprintis
basedon “an imperial past” and “adesire formoreglobalpower” (ScottishGovernment,
2013b:211):
An independent Scotland canemulate comparable countrieswith themosteffective approach to international affairs: soundly based policies whichenable the country to engage seriously and competitively in the world;rigorous priorities for our international focus; and the right externalrelationshipstoadvanceandprotectour interests.CountriesofcomparablesizetoScotlandtake leadroles in internationalorganisations.Sweden,NewZealand,SwitzerlandandFinlandhaveallmadesignificantglobalcontributionsto security, peace and reconciliation initiatives. New Zealand, for example,playedakeyroleintheOsloProcessthatbannedclusterbombsandsimilarweapons.Thesenationscapitaliseontheirsoftpowerandbuildcoalitions-normallyinformalandrelatedtospecificissues-toadvancetheirobjectives.Theeffectivenessofa coalition lies less in the sheernumbers involvedandmoreintheirabilitytodevelopstrongandsoundargumentsfornegotiations(ScottishGovernment,2013b:225).
ThedistinctionbetweenanindependentScotland’sinternationalpoliciesandthoseoftheUK
isdrawnmostclearlywithregardstodefencepolicy,andnuclearweaponrymorespecifically,
asthefollowingpassagedemonstrates:
AnindependentScotlandwillhavetheopportunitytodecideourowndefenceprioritiestoensureoursecurity,inpartnershipwithouralliesandwithinthewiderinternationalcommunity.ItwillbethepeopleofScotland,throughourParliamentwhowilldecidewhetherornotouryoungmenandwomenaresent towarandwecanchoose, throughourwrittenconstitution, toput inplace safeguards to ensure that Scottish forceswill only ever participate inmilitaryactivitythatisinternationallyrecognisedaslawfulandinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoftheUNcharter(ScottishGovernment,2013b:234).
147
InsteadoftheUK’sperceivedmilitarism,anindependentScotlandwouldinstead“createan
approachtodefencethatpositionsusaspartnersforpeaceinthewiderworld”,takingits
place as a non-nuclearmember of NATO and committing to the compete withdrawal of
Trident.Partofthisnewapproachwouldbethedevelopmentofawrittenconstitutionfor
Scotland,banningnuclearweaponsonScottishsoilandincludinga ‘triple lock’onmilitary
deployments (ScottishGovernment,2013b:235-236). The inclusionof thispolicy -on the
developmentofawrittenconstitution-allowsforthefurtherdistancingofanindependent
ScotlandfromtheUKanditsarcane,perhapsoutdatedunwrittenconstitutionandthe‘old
boy’s club’ of Westminster politics. Instead, it places the Scottish nation amongst an
assemblage of modern, liberal, democracies who prioritise an open and accountable
parliamentaryprocess.
These particularmoves,made by Scotland in its sovereignty games throughout the 2014
referendum process, all highlight the broader strategy that Scotland employs in its
paradiplomacy.Specifically,itmimicsacertaintypeofstate:asmall,liberaldemocracyakin
toitsNordicneighbours.Duringthereferendum,thenatureofthesovereigntygamechanged
asadirectchallengewasmadetotherelativepowerdistributionbetweenScotlandandthe
UK;itwasnolongeraboutaseatatthetableasa‘potential’state.
III. Bavaria
ThesovereigntygameevidentinBavariaisonepremisedonanaltogethersounderandmore
settledconstitutionalarrangementbetweenitandtheFederalGovernment.UnlikeinWales
and Scotland, the power dispersal between state and sub-state government is both
(reasonably) clear and stable. Instead, the game is played largely with reference to the
financialburdenandresponsibilitybornebyBavaria,withoccasionalmovesmadetoremind
theFederalandotherLandGovernmentsofthiswillingactofself-sacrifice.Thehistoryof
Bavaria as a sovereign is frequently played on and referenced as a way to push at the
boundariesoftheirformalconstitutionalcapabilities,inareassuchasEUrepresentationand
policy input -witha key componentof its sovereignty gamesbeing the resistanceof any
further encroachment (as the Bavarian Government sees it) by the EU on their own
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competences.Therefore,whilethesovereigntygamesbeingplayedinBavariamaybe‘milder’
than those in ScotlandandWales,bothofwhom - indifferentways -want to recast the
relationshipbetweenstateandsub-stategovernment, thegamedoes indeedharness the
discursive power of sovereignty in appealing to the special status of Bavaria within the
German Federation. In the current political climate,whereBavaria’sGovernmentwish to
exertaconservativemoderatingforceontheFederalCoalition,thisgameisplayedinmultiple
arenas-boththroughtheactionsoftheBavarianStateGovernment,andthroughthePrime
Minister’sroleintheFederalGovernment.
ForBavaria,thewaysthatparadiplomaticactivityfeedintoitsnation-buildingprojectstand
apartfromthosedemonstratedinWalesandScotland.Almostentirelyabsentareappealsto
dominant,liberal,internationalnorms.Instead,thehistoryofBavariaasan‘ancientstate’,
andboththepoliticalandeconomicpowerthatitcurrentlywieldswithintheGermanFederal
Republicare theresourcesuponwhich itdraws in itsmimicryofstatehood.Thematically,
Bavarianparadiplomacyinfactdepartsfromsuchdominantnorms,reflectingaconservative
agendathatiswarybothofEuropeanintegrationandbroadermigration.Thenationthatis
reflectedandbolsteredthroughsuchengagements,therefore,isonewhoselegitimacystems
fromtheessentialtenetsofstatehood:effectiveness,influenceandthehistoricalarchitecture
ofafullyfledgedsovereign.Whatisbeingmimicked,inthiscase,isnotthespecificdiscourse
ofdominantinternationalnorms,butinsteadtheefficiencyandeconomicactornessofastate
perse.The internationalpersonalitythat iscreated,however, isalsoonethatreflectsthe
national distinctiveness of the Bavarian people, both rebellious and self-assured in their
traditions;traitsthattheconservativeparadiplomacyofthestateperformsforthebenefitof
domesticandinternationalaudiences.
ThenarrativeofBavarianstatehoodisthusoneofaneffectiveandancientstate,willingly
relinquishinganelementofsovereigntytobelongtotheGermanFederation,butevermindful
ofthefactthatitpossesssuchstate-likequalitiesinitsownright.Bavaria’scurrentborders
are“almostidentical”toitsorigins:“theshapehassomehowbeentransformedbydifferent
events,butthecoreofitisstilltheresince1500years”.ImportanttoBavaria’scurrentstatus
istheperiodofWiltesbarkrule,between1180and1919,analmost800yearperiodof“one
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singledynasty leadingthispartof theworldandshaping its identity”.Thisstable identity,
combinedwiththegeographicalpositionofBavaria,allowedittooccupyaparticularplacein
thehistoryofEuropeasa‘middlepower’:
Bavariahasalwaysbeenakindofamiddlepowerinsidealltheseturmoilithasconsidered itself - ithasstrivedtobe-amore importantpower,bymaybetryingtobecomeking,theKaiser,orEmperor,andhasalwayshadcoalitions,it has always beenmarked.Munich has never achieved the ambitions thatwere there to Paris, Vienna, Berlin and Rome - because these are reallydescribedthefour,thequadranglethatwearelocatedinthecentreof,whichhasalwaysshapedthespecialinfluence.61
ThisnarrativeisoneinextricablyboundwiththepoliticalidealsandobjectivesofBavaria’s
dominantparty,theCSU-apartywhoseverysuccessisinturnboundupintheirabilityto
carveoutandmobiliseadistinctterritorialcleavageinthestate’spolitics(Sutherland,2001).
According to Hepburn, the CSU hasmobilised a Bavarian identity “as part of its political
project”(Hepburn,2008a:184-185),andtheirabilitytoharnesstheideaofBavariancultural
distinctivenesshasbeenkeytotheirgainingpoliticalpower(HepburnandHough,2012:93).
TheinternationalstageisaparticularlyusefulonewhenitcomestoarticulatingthisBavarian
identity. Speaking in relation to the choiceof the term ‘nation’ todescribeBavaria, in an
English-speakingcontext,HepburnseessuchdeclarationsasevidenceoftheCSU’sdesirefor
Bavaria“tobeconsideredasadistinctpoliticalandculturalentityonaparwiththestateless
nationsofthedevelopedworld”(Hepburn,2008a:185).Asamoveinthesovereigntygame,
Bavariaisappealingtoothersub-stategovernmentsinternationallyandclaimingmembership
ofthismoreexclusiveclubofnations.ThereisarelateddesireonthepartofBavarianofficials
and politicians for their international activities to reflect and reaffirm Bavaria’s ‘special
history’;ahistorythatprovidesenduringlyrelevantreferencepointsinanexplanationofhow,
andwhy,Bavaria’sparadiplomacyhasevolvedtoitscurrentstate.Thefollowingextractfrom
an interviewwitha seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,discussing the leadershipofKing
Maximilianduringthe30yearswar,demonstratesthislinkagewell.62
His philosophy was to lead an internal reform of the state, not a reformthroughreformationbutinternalreform.HecalledupontheJesuitshecalled
61Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentOfficial,201362Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,interview2013
150
on theDominicans and other clergy that should conduct a reform. And heconducted a reform of the state and he reigned over Bavaria… during thisperiodthewarofthirtyyearsandhecameoutwithalmostabalancedbudget.Sothisisreallyacomparison,Idon’twanttodrawtheseparallelstoooftenbut this was a remarkable man, his decisions shaped really Bavaria anddeterminedthepositionofBavaria insidethethenconfessionallyseparatedpartsofGermany,itwasreallyhismarkthatheleftuponBavaria.63
Indeed,itsdistinctivehistorybindsBavariatothevery“birthofEurope”.64Thiscentralityto
the major events in European and latterly German history has left Bavaria with a self-
assuredness that marks it apart from other German Länder, and is reflected in their
understandingoftherelationshipbetweentheFederationandstategovernments:
Soin1946theBavarianconstitutionwhichisnowourconstitutionwasmade,andin1949,onlyin1949,theGermanconstitution.SoitsanimportantfacttonotethattheLänderwereconstitutedbeforethefederalrepublicofGermany,anditwastheLänderthatsattogetheranddrafted-underthesupervisionofthealliedforces-anewconstitutionforGermanyandthenvotedonit.AndBavariavotedagainstthenewconstitutionbecauseitwassaidtohavetoofewfederalist elements - in our case federalismmeans centrifugal rather thancentripetalpowers-andso,butatthesametimeitwasdecidedthatifalltheothersacceptedwewouldgothroughanyway.Sothisiswhathappened.AndthenwebecamepartofthisnewfederalrepublicofGermany,Bavariawasoneofthe-youcanseebythename-wasoneofthestateswhowasleftfairlyuntouched in its historical shape, unlike all those who have these hyphennames,youcanseeitbythehyphenthattheyarecomposedasnewentities.65
The legacy of Bavaria’s unbroken identity, its centrality to the ‘birth of Europe’ and its
historical‘middlepower’statusisthatitseesitselfasapolitywithmuchtoteachincipient
states.Akeystrandofitsinternationalactivitiesrelatetothesupport-whatmightotherwise
betermeddemocracyassistance-ofcountriesinCentral,EasternandSouth-EastEurope“on
thewayintotheEU”.Itis,inotherwords,normativeparadiplomacy.Specifically,theBavarian
Governmentfocuseson:“thefightagainstorganisedcrime,cross-bordercooperationamong
administrative bodies, the exchange of expertise and qualification of executive staff”,
63Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,201364Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,201365Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,interview2013
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primarily through the frameworkof twinningprojects. Examples includeexperts from the
Bavarian judiciary providing advice on legislation in countries of Eastern and South-East
Europeinfieldssuchasunder-coverinvestigationandthefightagainstcorruption,andthe
advisoryserviceofBavarianadministrativepersonnelonissuesinvolvingstatesupervisionof
localauthorities(BayerischeStaatskanzlei,2010).Thisformofnormativeparadiplomacymay
notfollowtheprecisetrajectoryofinternationaldevelopmentprojectsinWalesandScotland,
andthebroadernarrativesaroundthemmaydiffer,yettheemphasison‘officialtoofficial’
learning and exchange is really quite similar to the reciprocal approach to sustainable
developmentthatisatthecentreofboththeWalesforAfricaandScotlandLesothoprojects.
Themimicryof this typeof lowprofile, pragmaticdemocracyassistance is alsoa formof
diplomacythatdemonstratesitsstate-likequalitiesinapragmaticway,focussedonexpertise
andexperience.Thisparadiplomacy thusdisplays thoseattributesofBavariannationhood
thatarepremisedonitshistoryasanancientstateanditsoverallcompetenceandpolitical
prowesswithinaFederalstructure.
ContrastedwithWales’paradiplomacy-drawingonthe‘mythofWelshradicalism’-Bavaria’s
paradiplomacydrawsonperceptionsofefficiencyandtransparency,demonstrablyapartof
theself-identificationoftheBavariannation.DemocracyassistanceinCentral,Easternand
South-EastEuropealsobuildsonaspectsofBavariannationhoodthatrelatetoitsmorerecent
history - and indeed the aspect of ‘self-sacrifice’ implied in its ratification of theGerman
Constitution despite the perceived lack of protection for Länder autonomy. Perhaps in a
consciousrejoindertoitslegacyasthebirthplaceoftheNazimovement,Bavaria’sresponse
toGermanreunificationinthe1990spresentedanopportunitytorecastthenationinamore
positivelight,willinglyabsorbingsignificanteconomiccostforthebenefitoftheFederation
asawhole:
In 1990 with the unification came the enlargement or the unification ofGermanywhichledagain,Bavariapositioneditselftobeproudtobepartofthis–it’sanunquestionedsituationthat,nobodyeverinBavariawithalltheseparatism that is part of our political folk lore, has never questioned theunificationprocess.Idon’tknowifitissurprisingbutitisnoteworthy,thatthis
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issomethingthatwasevenwithalltheeconomicdifficulties,hasneverbeenquestioned.66
After German reunification, the population of Bavaria expanded significantly, leading the
state to become “muchmore German and international than it used to be”, leading the
reunificationphasetomark“anotherera”inthestate’sdevelopment,allofwhichfeedinto
itscurrentnation-buildingexercises.67
Theparadiplomacyofsub-stategovernmentsreflectshugelydifferentlevelsofcontestation.
Of course, whether or not a region cooperates with state-activities, or adopts a more
confrontationalstancecanvaryonanadhocbasis,butitcanalsobediscernedasanoverall
featureofparadiplomaticstrategy,intermsoftheprevalenceofoneapproachovertheother.
IntheGermancontext,Bavariaiskeentostressthatitconducts‘foreignaffairs’,ratherthan
‘foreign policy’, a reserved area of activity which remains solely the purview of Berlin,
something which Criekemans argues is reflected in the limited number of ‘political’
representationsthatitmaintainsabroad(Criekemans,2010b:41).However,despitethefact
thatBavaria’sCSUisacorememberoftheFederalGovernmentcoalition,thediplomacyof
Bavariacouldbeinterpretedasbeingslightlymoreconflictual-oratleastassertive-thanone
mightexpect.Bavarianofficialshavespokenoftheroleof‘criticalfriend’thattheyareable
andwillingtoplayintermsoftheirparadiplomacy,vis-à-vistheFederalgovernment.Thisrole
is facilitated both by the constitutional stability of the Federal Republic and Bavaria’s
individualstrengthwithinit;“nooneisreallyquestioningussowecanaffordtobethecritical
partnerwithoutquestioningfederalismasawhole…wearestrongregionswithinastable
state”.68Thisroleofcriticalfriendentailsadegreeofpolitical‘play’;withinanoverall“spirit
ofcooperation”,thereremains“somesport,there’sapoliticallanguage-weareBavarians
andsoweplaywiththeimages”.69TheBavarianCSUpositionsitself,quitecarefully,as“abit
more right” thanMerkel’sBerlin, aspartof a “good-cop,bad-cop routine” related to the
unique position of the state within the Federal coalition government. Bavaria’s recent
66Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013.67Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013.68Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201369Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
153
responsetomassmigration-thistimefromoutsideEurope-hasinturndemonstratedthe
limits to its openness, and has precipitated amore ‘hard-line’ diplomatic stancewhen it
comestoissuesaroundmigration.
Indeed,theweightofBavaria-inpoliticalandeconomicterms–seemstomakeitparticularly
attractiveasathepartnerfortheFederalGovernmentinmanyinternationalendeavours;the
claimfromaseniorBavarianGovernmentofficialisthatotherGermanstatesareinsomeway
“envious” of the extent that they are able to cooperatewith the Federal Government, a
positiondeemedunavailabletootherGermanLänderbecausetheysimply“don’thavethe
budgets”.70Itisthiscombinationofaneconomicallyprivilegedposition,withthehistorical
weightandcurrentpoliticalsignificanceofBavaria-andtheleadersofitsgoverningCSU-
thatseemstoallowBavariatocarveitsownrelationswithstates,notablyGreeceandthe
CzechRepublic,andtoensurethatitseuro-scepticismisheardveryclearlyonbothGerman
andEuropeanstages.71Thisconservativeapproachtointernationalpoliticsmayalsomanifest
asaconstrainingforcewithintheFederalCDU-CSUcoalition,thoughthis‘behindthescenes’
influence is harder to assess. The public criticism of ChancellorMerkel’s response to the
2016/2016-refugee crisis from Bavarian State Premier Horst Seehofer and other CSU
politicians indicates thatsuchpressures,on issueswithkey foreignpolicy implications,do
indeedexistwithintheFederalcoalitionGovernment(DeutscheWelle,2015).
The Bavarian Government’s paradiplomacy thus reflects both its own, autonomous,
internationalstanding-asanhistoricallyimportantpower-andthedesiretoensurethatit
maintains its privileged position with relation the Federal Government. In other words,
Bavaria’suniquepositionwithinGermany-andtheroleof‘criticalfriend’thatitplaystothe
FederalGovernment-bothfacilitateandmotivateitsparadiplomacy.Theinternationalstage
offersanimportantarenaforBavaria’sculturalandpoliticaldistinctivenesstobeperformed
for the benefit of multiple audiences: both within the state and the Federation. The
sovereigntygamebeingplayedinBavariais,inmany-perhapssubtle–ways,differenttothat
70Interview,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,201371Interview,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial,2013
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in bothWales and Scotland. Bavaria has always occupied an unusual positionwithin the
broadlystableGermanFederation:aprevioussovereignstatewithaparticularly longand
consistent ‘un-hyphenated’ history,72 it was the only Länder to reject the German
Constitution,beforeeventuallyratifyingitfortheperceived‘greatergood’.Ithasbeenthe
mostactiveLänderinparadiplomatictermsandhasconsistentlypushedattheboundariesof
its legal competence, particularly in the representative functions of its overseas offices,
notablyinBrussels.TheBavarianGovernmenthasplayedonthisspecialstatusinthemoves
that itmakesaspartof theirbroader sovereigntygame:using thesemarkersasaway to
safeguard its competences (which it seesasunder threat fromEuropean integration)and
regionaldistinctiveness.
Conclusion
Webeganthischapterwithreferencetotheeconomicrealitiesfacingsub-stategovernments,
anditisworthbrieflyreturningtothatstartingpoint.Allparadiplomaticactivityrepresents
an expenditure of resource: whether that is the running costs of a full overseas office,
entertainingvisitingVIPs,theplaneticketsandhotelroomsrequiredfor ‘overseasjaunts’,
theadministrativeburdenofbelongingtonetworks,signingMemorandaofUnderstanding-
eventheMinisterialtimeandenergiesinvolvedinresponding,via.pressrelease,toglobal
issuesorcrises.Thecurrentfinancialcontextfacingsub-stategovernments,atleastinEurope,
isstraightened,andgovernmentatalllevelsfacesnewexpectationsintermsofaccountability
for themoney that theyspend.Given this, thequestionofwhysub-stategovernments in
thesecircumstancesstillpursueparadiplomacy-where itdoesnotprovideanobvious,or
arguable,economicreturnonpreciousinvestment-isonethatweshouldcontinuetoask.
Theanswerisn’teasilydeducible.Veryrarelyisthereasingle,clearandrationalecalculation
thatwe can point to. Do sub-state governments use paradiplomacy to ‘build the nation’
domestically?Yes,undoubtedly.Inreality,however,theydothisinvariouswayandtovarious
ends.Thevalueasovereigntygamesmetaphorliesinallowingustoconsiderthismultitude
72Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
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ofmotivationsonthepartofallthecompositeplayers,themovesinthegamemadebothby
thesub-stategovernmentanditsnation-statecounterpart(orotheractors-withScotland
often providing a frame of reference for Wales’ sovereignty game), and the shifting,
expansionandcontractionoftherulesthatthegameoperatesunder.Inshort,itenablesus
toseeafullerpictureofthemorepoliticalmotivationsthatdriveparadiplomacy,anactivity
thatisoften-owingtothecloseassociationbetweeninternationalagencyandsovereignty
orstatehoodperse-astatementaboutrelativepowerandauthority.Thesestatementsare
notalwaysexplicit,nordomovesinthegamehavetoberationallydirectedtowardsanything
atallforthemtostillbe“meaningfullyconceivedasincludedinthegame”(Adler-Nissenand
Gad,2014:18).
Thesovereigntygamesbeingplayedineachofourcasestudiesdifferinimportantways:there
aredifferentconfigurationsofpowerbetweeneachofourcasesandtheirrespectivestate
governments, aswell as different systems of intergovernmental relations and degrees of
party-politicalcongruence.Though,perhapssurprisingly,eachcase-atdifferenttimesandin
differentways-utilisesthestrategyofmimicryinasimilarrangeofways:toappearasnatural
kintoexistingstates,todemonstrateadherencetodominant,liberalinternationalnormsand
to emphasise state-like capacities or effectiveness. The games themselves encompass a,
perhapsmoredistinct,varietyofmoves:towardsindependenceinScotland,aprotectionof
existingcompetences inBavariaandan incrementalrebalancingofdevolvedandreserved
powersinWales.
And, yet. These sovereignty games are also remarkably similar. At heart, the gamebeing
played in each of these three cases is about the recognition of their ‘special’ status, as
somethingmorethana‘mereregion’.Sovereigntygames,togobacktoAddler-Nissenand
Gad’sconception,areabouttheveryconstitutionofoneoftheparties‘asapartytothegame’
itself(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:20).Inreachingandconductingthemselvesuponaworld
stage,making forays intoanareaofpolicy “so closelyarticulated to sovereignty that it is
considered the prerogative of the sovereign” (Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2014: 16),
paradiplomatsaredoingmorethansimplydealingwiththenecessaryoverspillofdomestic
competence.Insum;‘it’sallpolitical’.
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Chapter 5. Sub-state governments as International Agents: Learning to ‘Walk the
Walk’?
Introduction
Agency is a relatively unexplored concept in the field of paradiplomacy. That structural
dynamicshavetakentheforegroundinanalysesofsub-statediplomacyowesmuchtotiming;
regions and ‘stateless nations’ were (re)establishing themselves as units of political
significance just as the tide of globalisation, internationalisation and ‘intermestic’ politics
swepttheinternationalrelationsstage.Therewasclearlyanimportantinterplaybetweenthe
twophenomena.Theblurringofboundariesbetweenthedomesticandtheinternational,and
thoseseparating‘high’and‘low’politics,thediffusionofpoliticalauthorityamongststates
andneweractorsofincreasingsignificanceallimplicatedsub-stategovernmentsinstructures
and policy areas previously beyond their competences. Sub-state governments have
undoubtedlyusedthismorefavourablecontexttopursuetheir internationalambitions,at
othertimestheyhavebeenlesswillinglythrustintoareasthatareoutsidetheirchosenframe
ofreference.However,thenaturallinkagesbetweenthesetwobroadcategoriesofchange
and transformation do not necessarily embody a causal relationship, or at the least any
causalityisnotasatisfactoryexplanationfortheentiretyofparadiplomaticactivity.
Therelationshipbetweenthe‘new’contextandopportunitiesfacingsub-stategovernments
andthewaysinwhichtheychoosetoreacttoitisonethathasnotbeenfullyproblematized
withintheparadiplomacyliterature.ThekeyexceptionstothisrulearetheworksofLecours
(2007;2002;2008;LecoursandMoreno,2001),whohasexplicitlyaddressedthequestionof
sub-stateagencyinthecontextofnationbuildingandtheroleofparadiplomacyinidentity-
construction,andKeating(1999),whoattemptedtocategorisethemotivationsregionshad
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inpursuinginternationalprofiles;political,culturalandeconomic.Therelativesideliningof
agencyisallthemoresurprisinggiventhatthevarietyofsub-statediplomacyisoneof its
defining features. According to Criekemans (2010b: 39) “researching regional sub-state
diplomacy is sometimes like comparing appleswithpears: they look and tastedifferent”.
Whilstsome- indeedmuch-ofthisvarietycanbeaccountedforbystructuraldifferences
withintheregionorstatelessnationitself,intermsofforeignaffairscapacitiesforexample,
thereisclearlyanothersidetotheparadiplomacystory.Asexploredintheprecedingchapter,
thewaysinwhichsub-stategovernmentschoosetoparticipateininternationalaffairsseems
todependnotjustonthequalitiesoftheregionitselfbutonthepoliticalchoicesmadebyits
government,which in turnare informedby thedynamicsofparty competitionand inter-
governmentalrelationswithintheregionandthewiderstateitsitsinside.
Thischapterlooksindetailatthewaysinwhichdifferentsub-stategovernmentsconstruct
their international agency. In particular, it employs the framework of Performativity to
investigatethediscrete‘performances’thattellbothexternalactorsanddomesticaudiences
howthesub-stategovernmentseesitself,itsregionorstatelessnation,andtheplacethatit
aspires to on the world stage. A Performativity framework attempts to go beyond fixed
classifications of actors and capabilities and instead look at the actual interactions taking
place,andthemessagesthattheseactionsconveytobothinternalandexternalaudiencesin
the process. In important ways, this perspective overcomes the challenge of analysing
paradiplomaticactivitiesinawaythattakesintoaccounttheoften-conflictualmessagessent
byitscomponentactors:sub-statepoliticiansandofficialsaswellasdiplomatsatthenational
levelandthosefrom‘receiving’statesandregions.Relatingbacktothemetaphorofasub-
state sovereignty game, here we are examining the moves in the game: how the game
manifestsonaday-to-daybasisandtheways inwhichsub-stategovernmentsareableto
positionthemselvesascredibleinternationalagents.
Paradiplomacyisindeedafield,andapractice,fullofcontradictions.Ontheonehand,we
are told that sub-state internationalism is ‘all about theeconomy’,anecessaryactivity to
maintainandsupportone’sdomesticpolicyplatform.Yet,ontheother,thepoliticalrhetoric
thatsurroundseventhemostmundaneactivityhasclearovertonesofmuchgrander,and
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more overtly ‘diplomatic’ ambitions. And again, this political rhetoric then dissipates into
surprisinglyamicableworkingarrangementsandrelationsonthepartofofficialsinsub-and
nation-stategovernments.Inturn,the‘official’or‘party’linefromnation-stategovernments
isalternatelyoneofnon-acknowledgementofparadiplomacyasamatterofanysignificance,
toonewherethepracticeinfringesuncomfortablyonnationalcompetencesandthecohesive
diplomaticidentityofthestate.Moreover,sub-stategovernmentsmayuseparadiplomacyto
gainpowervis-à-visthecentralstate,whilstatthesametimethecentralstatemayusetheir
regions’paradiplomacyasa typeof ‘backchannel’,bolsteringnational foreignpolicy.The
frameworkofPerformativityallowsustoinvestigatetheempiricalpracticeofparadiplomacy
inawaythatbringstheseinherenttensionsandcontradictionstolight,tellingamuchmore
nuanced-and,hopefully,accurate-storyintheprocess.
InadditiontoemployingaPerformativityframework,thischapteralsoexplorestheroleof
legitimacyinitsanalysisofsub-stateagencycreation.Whenengagingdirectlyininternational
politics, sub-state governments display a range of strategies aimed at legitimising their
internationalactivities.Indeed,legitimacyisacrucialpartofinternationalactornessinandof
itself. Some opt to ‘mimic’ state-like diplomacy (McConnell et al., 2012), whereas others
choosetooperatemoreinthemodeofanNGO,focussingmore-or-lessexclusivelyonone
issuearea.Thischoicemanifestsinthenatureoftherelationshipssoughtandmaintainedon
theinternationalstage,andthese‘positionings’inturnarticulatedifferentmessagesabout
the perceived status of the sub-state government itself, and the broader international
positionthattheyaspireto.The‘legitimacyquestion’isafurtherareathattheparadiplomacy
literaturehasyettoaddressinanydepth.Yet,therangeoflegitimatingstrategiesthatsub-
stategovernmentsemploytoenhancetheirclaimstointernationalagencyareprobingnot
just for the study of paradiplomacy, but also for the ‘bigger’ questions of International
Relations. Questions such as: who ‘counts’ as an international actor? What weight do
internationalnormsandlogicsofappropriatenesscarryintheprocessofagencycreation?
Howisagencydeniedorconditionedbytheactivitiesofstatesorotheractors?Whatisthe
relationshipbetweeninternalandexternallegitimacy?
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Despitetheoverlapofterminology:mimicry,sovereigntygamesandlegitimacy,thefocusof
thischapterisdistinctfromtheoneimmediatelyprecedingit.Here,ratherthanconcerning
ourselves with the motivations that sub-state governments have for conducting their
paradiplomacies,andthewaysinwhichtheconfigurationsoftheiruniquesovereigntygames
influencethesedrivingforces,thefocusisinsteadonhowtheseactorsmanagetoexecute
theirstrategiesontheglobalstage.Inotherwords,itinvestigatestheprecisemoveswithin
thesovereigntygamethatallowsub-stategovernmentstodevelopaninternationalprofile:
learningto‘walkthewalk’and‘talkthetalk’ofdiplomats.
This chapter progresses as follows. After a brief introduction to the framework of
Performativityandadiscussionofitsapplicabilitytoparadiplomaticstudies,thesubsequent
section uncovers the precise ways in which sub-state governments attempt to bring
legitimacytotheirinternationalroles,bothinternallyandexternally,specificallylookingto
the framework of ‘mimicry’ as a particularly useful legitimising strategy. Finally, three
exampleswillbeexploredwhichdemonstratetherolethatanindividualperformance,ora
set of performances, can have in securing this legitimacy, as well as the processes of
contestation that go with it: the establishment of Bavaria’s ‘grand’ new European
representation;thelaunchofthe‘WalesforAfrica’developmentassistanceprogrammeand
ScottishdiplomacysurroundingthearrivaloftwoChinesePandasinanEdinburghzoo.The
arguments put forward here build on the idea that ‘lessons from the margins’ can be
particularlyilluminating(McConnelletal.,2012;Hocking,1999).Bylookingatthereal-life,
day-to-daypracticesofdiplomacyascarriedoutbyamarginalandcontesteddiplomaticactor
wecanpotentially learnsomethingmoreaboutdiplomacyand internationalpoliticsmore
generally.These implicationswill thenbeaddressed ingreaterdetail inchaptersixof this
thesis.
ParadiplomacyasPerformance:AnIntroductoryNote
Theframework-orvocabulary-ofPerformativityhassociologicalrootsandmaintainsloose
EnglishSchoolandconstructivistassociations,atleastwithinitsapplicationstoIRresearch;
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thoughitstheoreticalunderpinningsarenotablyfluidandvaried,drawingonaparticularly
widerangeofsources(inaninternationalpoliticscontextseeNeumann,2003;McConnellet
al.,2012;Barry,2013;Ringmar,2012;Weber,1998;Bueger,2011).AccordingtoNeumann
(2003:341):“insteadofassumingasetoffunctionsandastatestructureandthendeducing
asetoftruthclaimsfromtheseassumptions,agrowingnumberofscholarshavebegunto
scrutinize how world politics are actually performed”. This shift in focus allows for the
heterogeneityofinternationalpolitics,and,cruciallyforthepurposesofthischapter,lends
itselftoanexplorationofthewaysinwhichinternational‘agents’becomeso.
ArecentworkshoponthisthemeexploredthePerformativityframeworkinmoredetail.In
the context of controversial, or perhaps unexpected, ‘performances’ from a variety of
marginalinternationalrelationsactors,fromfinancialmarketstoarmedrebels,theworkshop
askedaseriesofquestions.Dodifferentperformancescreatedifferentqualitiesofagency?
Howare‘self’and‘other’linkedinperformancesofagency?Canperformancesofagencyfail,
andifsowhataretheconsequences?Howisagencydenied,sabotagedorde-constructed?
Theexplicittaskoftheworkshopwasto“makevisibletheworkthatgoesintotheproduction
ofactorsininternationalpolitics”.73
Forparadiplomaticinvestigations,thesequestionsareallkey.Sub-stategovernmentswere
traditionallythoughtofasdomesticallyboundactors,yettheyareincreasinglylookingtothe
international sphere, attempting to establish themselves as legitimate actors in this new
context.Thereforethere isaclearanddefinedprocessofagency-creationtobeexplored.
Meanwhile, the ‘nested’ context thatparadiplomacynecessarily takesplacewithinmeans
thatmessagesaresimultaneouslybeingsentand receivedbyavarietyof relevantactors.
‘Performing’ international politics conveys meaning to external actors (in terms of the
capacitiesorrelevanceofsub-stategovernmentsaspolicymakers),todomesticaudiences
(intermsoftheimageportrayedoftheregionanditsinternationalstatus),andtothe‘host
state’ itself, perhaps challenging their competence in certain areas. A Performativity
73 ‘Performativity and International Politics’, workshop held at the Goethe University
Frankfurtonthe21st-22ndFebruary2014.Authorinattendance.
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frameworkfurtherlendsitselftoexploringingreaterdepththedynamicbetweenhost-state
and sub-state governments; in particular the ways that agency-creation may be policed,
constrainedorindeedfacilitatedbytheformer.
TheframeworkofPerformativityalsohasanaturalcongruencewiththeroleof‘mimicry’in
thelegitimationofsub-statediplomacy,whichitselfisaboutperformingandre-performing
narrativesofinternationalactorness,statesmanshipanddiplomacy(McConnelletal.,2012).
The extent to which the international performances of sub-state governments mimic or
otherwisethetraditionaldiscourseofstate-diplomacyperhapstellsussomethingbothabout
the discrete aims of that actor, andmore broadly about the pervasiveness of those pre-
existinginternationalnormsthemselves.
Thenewrulesofthegame
Totheextentthatparadiplomacyhasbecome‘normalised’(Cornago,2010)inthepasttwo
decades, this has not occurred in a vacuum. Much has been written about opportunity
structures provided by the processes of European integration and the related rise of
regionalismanddevolution,bothwithintheEUandbeyond(Hepburn,2007;Hepburn,2009;
Elias, 2008; Keating, 2008; Keating, 1999; Hepburn, 2008b; Carter and Pasquier, 2010;
Aldecoa and Keating, 1999b; Aldecoa and Keating, 1999a; Moore, 2008a; Bursens and
Deforche,2008).Butthereisperhapsalsoamessier,morecontestedstorytobetoldaround
theunbundlingofsub-stategovernmentsfromtheirdomesticpolicysettings.Authorssuch
as Buzan and Albert (2010: 333) and Schreuer (1993: 450) have highlighted thede facto
functionaldifferentiationintheinternationalsystemthathasarisenfromanewdiversityof
actorsentering intoarrangementswithoneanother.Bothof theseauthors -writing from
different disciplines and seventeen years apart - also argue that their respective fields,
international relations and international law, have failed to properly account for these
changes. For example, Schreuer (1993: 450) argues that the typical classification of such
agreements, specificallybetween sub-stategovernments, as “extra-legal andnotproperly
belongingtothesphereofinternationallaw”,is“probablymoretheexpressionofaninability
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tocometotermswiththisphenomenonthananadequatedescriptionofreality”.Perhapsa
caseofthediscipliningfunctionofstate-sovereigntydiscourses,activitiesfallingoutsidethese
parameters are - knowingly or otherwise - reclassified as non-diplomatic, extra-legal and,
therefore, largely inconsequential. Inthespecificcontextofsub-statediplomacy,Hocking
(1999:21)arguesthat:“manyofthetermscoinedduringthe1980stodescribe[sub-state
diplomacy]…suchasparadiplomacyorprotodiplomacy-aresuggestiveofasecond-orderset
ofactivities,pale imitationsof ‘real’diplomacy,andhelptodisguisethedistinctivenessof
whatisbeingexamined”.
Literatureonthis ‘newphenomenon’and its relationshiptothedisciplineof international
relations abounded for a period in the late 1980s - early 2000s, specifically in termsof a
disaggregation of concepts bundled up in the “Westphalian myth” or “Westphalian
syndrome”(Caporaso,2000).Severalauthorsquestionedthefield’sabilitytoconceptualise
suchachange,giventhepervasivenessofestablishednorms(Ruggie,1993;Caporaso,2000;
Albert et al., 2001). Specifically, Ruggie (1993: 140-143) argues that there is “an
extraordinarily impoverished mind-set at work”, one only able to “visualize long-term
challenges to the system of states only in terms of the entities that are institutionally
substitutableforthestate”.Hecontinuesthat:
Wearenotverygoodasadisciplineatstudyingthepossibilityoffundamentaldiscontinuity in the international system; that isaddressing thequestionofwhetherthemodernsystemofstatesmaybeyielding insome instancestopostmodernformsofconfiguringpoliticalspace.We lackevenanadequatevocabulary;andwhatwecannotdescribe,wecannotexplain(Ruggie,1993:143).
Theconsequenceofsuchaninabilitytoaccountforthesechallengestothenormsofabsolute
sovereignty, authority and territoriality is that certain areas of international activity are
‘down-graded’,andnotconsideredintermsoftheirpotentialimpactorsignificanceonthis
higher plane of international society. For Lapid, the International Relations discipline’s
“fascinationwithsovereignstatehoodhasgreatlydecreaseditsabilitytoconfrontissuesof
ethnicnationhoodandpoliticalotherhood”(Lapid,1996:10citedinShainandBarth,2003:
460). Forthepurposesofourdiscussion,asimilarargumentmaybemadeasitrelatesto
scantattentionpaidtoparadiplomaticactivityfromwithinthefieldofInternationalRelations.
164
Thoughhighlycontested,onecouldcertainlymaketheargumentthattheappropriationof
internationalpolicyspacebysub-stateunits,andinmanycasestheclaimstorepresentation
they make, has theoretical consequences for the discipline of International Relations. In
particular,thecompetingclaimsastowhocanauthoritatively‘speakforthepeople’,onthe
one hand, and theways inwhich the external identity of a statemay be altered by the
internationalactivitiesofitsconstituentunits,ontheother,wouldseemtobeacorepartof
whatRuggiedescribesasthe“unbundling”ofterritoriality,acentralconceptwhoseneglect
onthepartofinternationalrelationsscholarshetreatsasakinto“neverlookingattheground
oneiswalkingon”(1993:173).Indeed,byallowingsub-stategovernmentsaroleinexternal
affairs,limitedbycontextualandconstitutionalfactorsindifferentstates,boththestateand
sub-state governments may be conceived of entering into what Caporaso (2000: 4-5)
describesasa“sovereigntybargain”,oneofmanysuchbargainsthatmustgoun-accounted
forbecause“conceptssuchassovereigntyandterritorialityhavebeentreatedasiftheycould
takeontwopossiblevalues-presentorabsent,sovereignornotsovereign,territorialornon-
territorial”.Onceagain, the frameworkof sovereigntygames seemsparticularly apthere,
allowingustobetteraccountfortherangeofpossibilitiesregardingthedistributionofpower
andauthorityamongstdifferenttiersofgovernment.
However, as much as the language of Westphalian sovereignty might constrain the
explorationofempiricalshiftsinthepracticeofglobalpolitics,thelanguageoftransformation
and change may equally misrepresent the precise nature of these developments. In a
paradiplomaticcontext,Hocking(1999:20)contendsthat“iftherehasbeena‘powershift’
inworldpolitics,underpinnedbyneweconomic forcesandthegrowing influenceof ‘new
actors’ such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), it has been more subtle than
sometimessuggested,andmappingitisprovingtobeacontentiousexercise”.Intheoretical
terms,paradiplomaticactivities,therefore,canbecaughtbetweentheproverbialrockand
hard-place:appropriatedasevidenceofsystemicshifts inglobalpoliticsordismissedasa
largelyirrelevantprovincialpractice.Themorenuancedstorystrugglestobetold.Analysing
paradiplomacyinprocess,ratherthanevent,terms,inparticularthewaysinwhichitrelates
tothetrajectoryofsub-statenationalismand‘soft’nationbuilding,maybemoreilluminating.
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In sum, considering paradiplomacy as part of a messier, more contentious story of the
multiplicityofpoliticalagencyinthepost-coldwareraissomethingmorethan‘explainingit
away’asaconsequenceofthepre-determinedlogicsofglobalization,Europeanintegration
and regionalism. Such political agency on the part of sub-state governments, as we will
explorebelow, ispotentially transformative in itself: in theways that itchallenges -often
implicitly - the authority of other actors. The agreements, relationships and institutions
createdbysub-stateactorsaspartoftheirinteractionswithoneanotherdrawontypically
‘governmental’attributesandsourcesof legitimacy: representativeness,effectivenessand
territoriality.Ifthese,then,arethe‘newrulesofthegame’,thepoliticalagencyofcertain
sub-stategovernmentshas changed the structural context that all sub-stategovernments
now face in the international sphere. Is paradiplomatic activity thus informed by an
expectationthatthis iswhatsub-stategovernments ‘should’bedoing;muchasregions in
asymmetric states are ‘learning to catch thewave’ of constitutional reform and regional
autonomy(Hombrado,2011)?Theroleofinter-grouplearningandnormcreationamongst
sub-stategovernmentshasbeenlittlestudiedinaparadiplomacycontext,yetthereisclear
evidence of this sort of referencing from the actors themselves. For example, Bavaria
frequentlyusesitscontemporariestoconveymessagesaboutpreciselywhat‘type’ofactor
it is: it’s a ‘regional leader’, placed alongsideother economically advanced, constitutional
regions inaglobalnetworkof thatnomenclature, it’sanation “very similar toScotland”
(MinisterPresidentEberhardSinner,citedinHepburn,2008a:185),butnot“comparable”to
‘separatist’ Catalonia.74 The ‘new rules of the game’ thus both reflect the new-found
internationalagencyofsub-stategovernments,andthecontextthatsub-stategovernments,
asabroadercategoryofactor,findthemselveswithin.Consideringitfromthisperspective
perhapsprovidesamorecontested,overtlypoliticalandagencyfocussedaccountthanthose
ofglobalizationandregionalism,atleasttheformerofwhichhasatendencytotreatregions
themselvesaspassiveparticipantsintheprocess.Aperformativityframework,meanwhile,
allowsustomoreaccuratelyaccountfortheparadoxicalnatureofparadiplomacy:thepush
74 Interviewdata, SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial 2013.Hepburn citationof coursereferstoScotlandbeforetheSNP’sfirstminoritygovernmentin2007.
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andpulldynamicsthatseemtobeafeatureacrossallofourcasestudies.Paradiplomacyboth
challengesandreinforcesstate-leveldiplomacy.Looking indetailat theexact interactions
takingplace, freefromrigidassumptionsaboutwhatthesub-statetiercanandshouldbe
doingonaninternationalstage,allowsthesecontradictoryforcestocometothefore.
Afocusonthepoliticalagencyofsub-stategovernmentsisthereforeakeycontributionof
thischapter. Inordertoappropriateinternationalspace,sub-stategovernmentsmustfirst
make some sort of claim as to their international legitimacy. In other words, they must
convinceotheractorsoftheirvirtueontheglobal,ratherthanthelocal,stage.Thistaskisin
manywaysapriori-whatcomesnextistheday-to-daybusinessof‘walkingthewalk’and
‘talking the talk’ of an international actor. The concept of legitimacy as it relates to
international relations is addressed below. The utility or otherwise of mimicry as a
legitimating strategy will also be examined, before we move on to consider three short
examples - from each of our case studies - which demonstrate these aforementioned
processesofagencycreationandcontestation.
Speaking‘forthepeople’orspeaking‘likeastate’?ParadiplomacyandLegitimacy
AccordingtoMulligan(2006:349-350):“fewproblemsloomlargerinpoliticallife,inboththe
theoryandpracticeofgovernment,thanthosephrasedintermsof‘legitimacy’”.Assuch,he
continues,legitimacyhas“cometotheforeasa‘masterquestion’ofinternationalrelations”.
Itisatonceaconceptthat“seemstosignifysomecrucialandreasonablydiscretefeatureof
politicallife”,andyetatthesametimeishighlyelusive,alliedwitharangeof“conceptual
affiliates” from “legality to popular approval to moral appropriateness”. In other words,
despitetheinherentambiguityoftheterm,itisusedbyboththeoristsandpractitionersasif
thedefinitionisinsteadconcrete,compoundingthislackofclarity(Mulligan,2006:349-351).
ForCollingwood(2006:439)“inaneraofglobalisation,discrepancieshaveemergedbetween
political ideas and the realities of the global distribution of power”. Relatedly, therefore,
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Collingwood argues that two particular questions result from such discrepancies: “the
questionofwhichactorsshouldexercisepowerattheinternationallevel”,and“whichrules
shouldgoverntheiraction”.Attheheartofsuchquestionsisthenotionthattheprocessesof
globalisation cited above “have given economic and political power to actors that are
insufficiently accountable to citizens”, in contrast to the “formal accountability” owed to
votersbydemocraticstates(Collingwood,2006:446).Debateaboundsastowhois,andwho
isnot,alegitimateactor,aswellastowhattherelationshipbetweeninternalandexternal
legitimacyoughttobe.Suchdiscussiontakesinissuesfromtheperceivedinternalillegitimacy
ofpostcolonialAfricanstates, lacking“affinitywithconstituent sub-stategroups” (Okafor,
2000:522),totheEuropeanUnion’srecentlyestablishedexternal legitimacy,craftedfrom
notionsofa“normative,value-driven”internationalpolicy”(Youngs,2004:415).
Thediplomacyof sub-stategovernments,however,poses slightlydifferentquestions.The
formallinkbetweenvotersandtheirdemocraticallyelectedgovernmentdoesexist,inexactly
thesamewayasbetweenastateanditscitizens.Thequestionisperhapsinsteadwhether
thislegitimacyextendstoareasbeyondtheir‘usual’andoverwhelminglydomesticspheres
of activity. If “’legitimate’ behaviour is rightful behaviour: undertaken by the appropriate
authority, in line with an agreed set of rules, and with appropriate or intended effects”
(Collingwood,2006:444),thenthechallengeforsub-stategovernmentsistomakeaclaimto
suchappropriatenessbothintheinternationalfieldsitenters,andintermsofthewaysin
which itoperates.Forparadiplomacy, therefore, the ‘legitimacyquestion’ is twofold.Sub-
state governments, particularly those representing stateless nations, covet legitimacy in
termsof representing their ‘people’; there canbe competitiveovertones to suchactions,
representing their people better, or more accurately, than the state. The Scottish voice
following the 2016 Brexit referendum arguably reflects a key example of this dynamic.
Additionally,sub-stategovernmentsattempttoestablishalegitimacytotheirinternational
activities,a‘right’toactintheglobalarena.Forsomesub-stateactors,therefore,practicing
diplomacyinawaythatmirrorsitsmostprestigiousform,inter-statediplomacy,isamethod
of achieving such legitimacy. This is both because of the axiomatic relationship between
diplomacy and representation (Sharp, 1999) and because of the role of diplomacy in
conferringlegitimacy,asadiscourseof“recognitionandauthority”(McConnelletal.,2012:
168
804).Thisisthecasenotonlywithinter-statediplomacy,thoughthismaybeapinnaclein
the regard, but also with other forms of diplomacy that appear ‘official’ in one form or
another.Inanothervein,thegroundingofparadiplomacyindomesticcompetences-orissue
areaswherethe‘rightness’ofsub-stateinvolvementistakenmore-or-lessforgranted-also
actsasasourceoflegitimacy,withsub-stategovernmentsappealingtotheirpositionatthe
‘receivingend’ofglobalgovernanceonavarietyofissues,fromtheenvironmenttoterrorism.
Makingsuchclaimstolegitimacy,for‘new’diplomaticactors,isperhapsmadeaneasiertask
bythediffusionofauthority(bothtowardstransnationalorganisations,ontheonehand,and
sub-stategroupsontheother)that-arguably-hasalreadytakenplace,leaving“redefined
criteriaofpolitical legitimacy” in itswake (Rosenau,1992:256). What, then,might these
redefinedcriteriaofpoliticallegitimacylooklike?Takingoneforthrightview,forGuibernau
(1996:59-62)thematterisinfactstraightforward,atleastasitappliestothe‘downward’
direction of travel: a legitimate state is one that corresponds to the nation, where an
illegitimatestateisonewhichiscomprisedofdifferentnations.Forthegroupofsub-state
governments representing ‘stateless nations’, this classification is clearly significant, and
indeedmuchoftheirmoreadvancedparadiplomaticactivityrepresentsaclearcontestfor
exactlywhichauthoritymostaccurately‘speaksforthepeople’ofthenationinquestion.The
roleofforeignpolicy,inparticularitsexclusionfrommostconstitutionalprovisionsforsub-
stateautonomy,eveninthecaseoffederations,iscrucialforGuibernau(2004:1254).Itis
this exclusion that precludes such sub-state nations from practising meaningful
independence, a sentiment that perhaps highlights the importance of paradiplomatic
practices-especiallyinthosecaseswhereastatelessnationemploysparticularlyadvanced
andambitiousstrategies-forthepurposesofmimickingtheforeignpolicyfunctionsofthe
state,andthevalueofthesymboliccapitalthatsuchstrategiescangenerate.Guibernausees
statelessnationsasaparticulartypeofpoliticalcommunity,onegrowinginsignificanceand
“able to capture and promote sentiments of loyalty, solidarity and community among
individualswho seem to have developed a growing need for identity” (Guibernau, 2004:
1255).
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However,evenifweaccepttheargumentthatsub-statepoliticalcommunities,particularly
those representing distinct nations, are ever-more salient and growing in significance,
establishinglegitimacyintheirinternationalendeavoursisaseparateprocess,onewhichis
beingsharedwithothernon-stateactorsoperatingattheinternationallevel.Indiplomatic
terms,theissueoflegitimacyisessential,representingthebasisforrecognitionoftheactors
involvedininternationalaffairsandthenconferredonindividualpoliticalactorsindiplomatic
negotiations (La Porte, 2012; McConnell et al., 2012). There is also perhaps a revealing
tautology in evidence here: in the international realm, the key source of legitimacy is
international recognition. Other forms of legitimacy exist, including democratic
representativeness-throughelectionsinthecaseofgovernments-orthe“delegation”of
thislegitimacytointernationalbodies(LaPorte,2012:450).Inthecaseofnon-sateactors,
legitimacy is granted - by the public and other political actors - on the basis of their
‘representativity’, or their “capacity to represent the public’s interests in deliberation
processes.” Here, La Porte is referring primarily to NGOs and other transnational
organisations,andthis‘representativity’correspondstothequantityorqualityofthecitizens
who share their ideas, values or initiatives” (La Porte, 2012: 454). In addition to these
representativequalities,theideaofeffectivenessasanalternatesourceoflegitimacyhasalso
been considered from the view of non-state actors (La Porte, 2012: 452); signified by
expertiseforNGOsandpolicy-networks(Sharp,1999:55),orbyeconomicprowessandthe
abilityto‘getthingsdone’inthecaseofcities(Acuto,2013;BulkeleyandSchroeder,2011;
Curtis,2011).
Fordirectlyelectedsub-stategovernments,abletodrawon‘representative’legitimacy,their
claimstoaroleoutwiththebordersofthestatearepremisedontwodistinctnarratives.The
firstisthat,“foreignaffairsarenotautonomous-theyarealwaysaboutsomething”(Hocking,
1986: 480). In other words, claims to legitimacy are based on a sub-state government’s
domesticcompetencesandthe‘necessary’internationalcomponentsorramificationsofsuch
domesticpowers.Accordingto‘BavariaintheWorld’,publishedbythestateGovernment,
“forahighlyadvancedstate likeBavaria,withadeeply rooted identity, it is impossible to
imagine a sound future development without it being embedded in an international
framework”(BayerischeStaatskanzlei,2010).Thesecondnarrativerestsontheroleofsub-
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stategovernments,aselectedofficialsoftheregionorstatelessnation,inrepresentingthe
specificinterestsofthatregionwheretheydifferfromthoseofthehost-stateatlarge.For
example,intheUK,newlydevolvedregionswereabletoparticipateinEUpolicyprocessesin
muchmoreformalisedandextensivewaysfollowingtheelectionofsub-stateauthoritiesin
1999,drawingona“newsourceoflegitimacy”(Bulmeretal.,2006:77).
Insum,legitimacyisaconceptthatiscentraltoparadiplomaticactivity:eitherbeingasserted
by a sub-state government, or indeed denied or challenged by other actors. Sub-state
governments draw on multiple, overlapping and occasionally contradictory sources of
legitimacyintheirinternationalengagements.Themostcompellingoftheseareoftentheir
representational qualities: as elected representatives of a clearly defined community or
locale. In some cases, and certainly in those of stateless nations, the claims of sub-state
governments can go a step further: to represent a distinct ‘people’. Clearly, these claims
overlapwiththosemadebyasovereignstate:representingthelargercommunityorterritory
withinwhichthesmallerunitresides.
The particularity of a sub-state government’s claim to legitimacy is therefore premised
preciselyontheirdifferencetothe‘host’state.Whetherintermsofeconomicprowess,or
high-techindustries-asintheparadiplomaticactivitiesofCalifornia,BeijingandBavaria;their
normativecredentials-as intheinternationalsustainabledevelopmentactivitiesofWales
andScotlandorthedemocracyassistanceprogrammesofBavaria;or indeedtheirrelative
deprivation or political or ethnic subjugation. Sub-state governments appeal both to
principles of national sovereignty and self-determination - the attributes or interests of a
‘people’ofaregionorstatelessnation-andtofunctionaldiscoursesofgeo-strategicposition,
territoryorproductivity.Bavariaisperhapsacase-in-pointofsuccessfullycombiningthese
twodiscourses.Theirdiplomaticactivityisbothsteepedinitshistoryandspecialstatusasa
‘Freistaat’(it’s‘reusablepast’touseHepburn’sterm(2008a::187)),andstrategicallyfocussed
aroundthenarrativeofitshigh-techindustry,abalancingactmanifestinthephrase‘laptop
undlederhosen’(Criekemans,2010b::41).Suchclaimstolegitimacyonthebasisofdifference
orparticularitycanbeidentifiedinsingularinstances,forexamplewhenaregionstandsto
bedisproportionallyaffectedbyanenvironmental issue,or indeed if itsposition leaves it
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particularlyvulnerabletoconflictorinternationalcrime.Domesticpoliticalconsiderationscan
alsotemporarilymobilisetheseclaims-the2014Scottishindependencereferendumbeinga
keyexamplehere.Moreover,thediscourseofparticularitymaybeanearconstanttheme
runningthroughasub-stategovernment’sinternationalagency,andtheclaimsitmakestoa
legitimatepresence.ThepremiseofmuchofQuebec’sparadiplomacy,forexample,isthatof
itscultural,linguisticandhistoricalparticularitywithintheCanadiancontext.Morebroadly,
however, we can point to a particularly prevalent - and arguably effective - legitimating
strategy for the international activitiesof sub-state governments:mimicry. This feature is
seenineachofourthreecasestudies,thoughinremarkablyvariedguises.
Lookingtolocatetheparticular‘unofficial’diplomaciesofthosenon-stateactorsthataspire
tosomeaspectsof‘stateness’,McConnelletal(2012:804)arguethatby“adaptingBhabha’s
notionofmimicrytodiplomaticdiscourse,itdemonstrateshownon-statediplomaciesdraw
on,mimicandinterveneintherealmofformalpoliticalactioninwayswhichbothpromote
‘official’ state diplomacy as an ideal and dilute its distinction from other, ‘unofficial’
diplomacies’”.Indoingso,theauthorsbothidentifythestrategiesusedbynon-stateactors
tolegitimisetheirinternationalactivities,andatthesametimeaccountforthecuriouseffects
thatsuchactivitieshaveonother,officialdiplomaticactors.Inthissecondregard,unofficial
diplomaciesareunderstoodasboth“resemblanceandmenace”(McConnelletal.,2012).By
mimicking symbolsof statehood -adorningmeetingsandconferenceswithnational flags,
designating‘foreignoffices’orministries-andre-performingnarrativesofstatesovereignty
throughattemptsto“imitateformalandofficialdiplomaticpractices”,non-stateactorsare
seenasbolsteringthevery internationalsystemthattheyalsochallenge.Yet,atthesame
time,theirverypresenceontheinternationalstage,andtheextenttowhichtheyareableto
claim a portion of the international legitimacy typically reserved for states, weakens the
state’smonopolyonsuchconcepts,andindeedchallengesthe“compositionandstatusofthe
interstatesystem”(McConnelletal.,2012:804).
ThecasesconsideredbyMcConnelletal.-theTibetanGovernmentinExile,theInternational
Christian Embassy in Jerusalem and Micropatrias (such as the Democratic Republic of
Bobalania-“selfdeclarednationsthatmimicandinmanywaysparodyestablishedsovereign
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nation-states”) - all constitute “remainders”, left over from the ‘legitimate’ international
system.Accordingtotheauthors,“itistheirexcessthatprovidestheconstitutiveoutsideto
thediplomatic realm. Evenas their existence threatens that system, the system relieson
themforrepresentationalforcetoreifysystematicnorms”.However,atthesametime,the
cases also “illustrate the representational power that can be tapped into through those
discoursesandpractices”(McConnelletal.,2012:811).Thesystemiceffectsofsuchunofficial
diplomaciesarethereforemoderated:mimicryrepresentsanimportanttoolorstrategyfor
non-stateactorswishingto‘tapinto’moreconventionalformsoflegitimacyandauthorityon
theworldstage,whileatthesametimefundamentallyrestatesandreaffirmstheprivileged
status of states as the preeminent actors in international relations. In other words, the
system-reinforcing effects of mimicry might account for the tepid ways in which
paradiplomaticactionisunderstoodtohavetransformedtherealmofdiplomacy:forhow
subversivecansuchactivitiesbe,ifmimicryisthesincerestformofflattery?Thefollowing
section considers the ‘mimicked’ performances of Scotland,Wales and Bavaria in detail,
highlighting theways inwhich theofficial and theunofficial interact and, in turn,help to
constituteoneanother.
I. ThecuriouscaseofScotland’sPandas
TheScottishGovernment’sincreasinglyconfidentparadiplomacycanperhapshelptoshed
important light on the relationship between official and unofficial diplomacies, and the
contest for legitimacy in representing ‘the people’ of Scotland. Indeed, one particular
performancecanillustratetheprocessofinternationalagencycreation-andcontestation-
quiteclearly.TheScottishindependencereferendum,andthelongcampaignleadinguptoit,
provedastrongcatalystinthedevelopmentofinternationalagency.Areasof‘high’politics-
thosetypically‘outofbounds’forsub-stategovernments-suchassecurityanddefencepolicy
-weresuddenlybroughtintothediscursivearenaoftheScottishGovernment,facedwiththe
prospectofScotlandassumingthemantleofstatehood.Institutionaldevelopmentsquickly
followed: a ‘DefencePolicyUnit’was soonestablished, aswas a newministerial post for
ExternalAffairsandInternationalDevelopment.Asaconsequence,Scottishministers-often
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controversially - entered into debates on aspects of theUKGovernment’s foreign policy,
claiming a legitimate voice in the ‘big questions’ facing the state as a whole, from the
recognitionofPalestinetointernationalaidpolicy.
TheScottishGovernmenthasmadenosecretof itsambition to strengthen relationswith
China.Since2006, theyhavepublishedtwo5-yearstrategiesdedicatedtodevelopingthis
relationship,citing-inthemostrecentstrategy-that:
The 2012-13 once in a decade transition in national leadership in Chinapresents every country with fresh challenges and opportunities forestablishingbroaderanddeeperlinkswithChina…TheScottishGovernmentiscommittedtodevelopingalong-termrelationshipwithChinabasedonsharedvalues,partnershipandtrust(ScottishGovernment,2012).
As part of this overall strategy, the Scottish Government outlines four guiding principles
underpinning “all of Scotland’s dealings with China and against which success will be
measured”:securingsustainableeconomicgrowth,respectforhumanrightsandtheruleof
law, understanding of culture and increasing Scotland’s influence (Scottish Government,
2012).
ItiswithinthiscontextthatthenarrativeemployedbytheScottishGovernmentfollowingthe
arrivaloftwoChineseGiantPandasinEdinburgh’sZoo,mustbeunderstood.ThatTianTian
and Yang Guang are now firmly ensconced on Scottish soil could not have escaped the
attentionofanyvisitortoEdinburghairportinDecember2011,orindeedforseveralyears
afterwards; life-sized cardboard cut-outs of the pairwere one of the first sights to greet
inboundpassengers. Itwaswith similar fanfare that the ScottishGovernment announced
their arrival, taking out a full-page advert in Scottish newspapers with the headline
‘CelebrationoflinksbetweenScotlandandChinaaspandasarriveinEdinburgh’.Thearticle
wentontostate:
Scotland’slinkswithChinagobackalongway-fromthe19thcentury,whentradingfirstbroughtteatoourshores,tothemoderndaywithScotspupilslearning Mandarin. Now, in a symbolic gesture of friendship between thecountries,andfollowingfiveyearsofpoliticalanddiplomatictalks,theChinesearegifting twogiantpandas to live in Scotland,under the custodianshipofEdinburghZoo…ThePandas’presenceisasignofastrengthenedalliancewithChina,andopensupnewopportunitiesintrade,cultureandeducationwith
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the world’s fastest growing economy. So as the countries’ relationshipcontinuestoflourish,it’sfittingthatthetraditionalScotssongAuldLandSyneiswidelyknowninChinaastheFriendshipSong.(ScottishGovernmentadvert,citedbyBBCScotland,2012).
Despitethefactthatthe‘pandadiplomacy’wasofficiallyconductedbetweentheChineseand
UKstates(withtheagreementbeingsignedbetweenthetwogovernmentsinLondonand
witnessedbyUKDeputyPrimeMinisterNickCleggandVicePremierofChinaLiKeqiang),
albeitwithacommercialagreementinplaceforthepandastobehousedatEdinburghzoo,
theScottishGovernmentattemptedtoappropriatethisaction.Theirclaimwasthatthe‘gift’
wasevidenceofthestronglinksbetweenthetwonations-ChinaandScotland-onemade
severaltimesinsubsequentcampaigns.Giventhatthepandas’arrivalinEdinburghcoincided
withahigh-profiletrademissiontoChinabyAlexSalmondandotherScottishofficials,the
appropriationofthe‘pandadiplomacy’appearedtobeareasonablyorchestratedattemptto
demonstrateScotland’sautonomousinternationalstanding,assomethingmorethan-and
distinctfrom-apartoftheUK.Indeed,duringhisvisittoChinaAlexSalmondisquotedas
stating, once again, that “The great gift of these giant pandas symbolises the great and
growing relationship between Scotland and China, which we will take further forward
tomorrowwhenVicePremierLiandImeetanddiscussScotlandandChina’sbusiness,cultural
anddiplomatic linkswhicharegrowingeverstrongertothebenefitofbothnations”(Alex
Salmond, cited by BBC Scotland, 2011). In all but name, this interactionmimicked - very
effectively-officialdiplomacybetweensovereignstates.
Infact,theaforementionedScottishGovernmentadvertwaslaterbannedbytheadvertising
standardsauthorityformisleadingthepublicaboutthecommercialnatureofthedeal;the
term‘gift’wasfoundtobemisleading(BBCScotland,2012).Meanwhile,theinterpretation
oftheUKForeignandCommonwealthOfficeandUKDeputyPrimeMinisterNickCleggwas
that thearrivalof thepandaswasa “reflectionof the strength”of their relationshipwith
China:“itshowsthatwecanco-operatecloselynotonlyoncommerce,butonabroadrange
of environmental and cultural issuesaswell”.AnFCOMinister added that “beingable to
welcomethesepandastodayistheculminationofmanyyearshardworkinboththeUKand
China…the loan symbolisesa strengtheningofour relationshipwithChina…Iamsure that
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thousandsofBritishpeoplewill enjoy visiting thepandas” (Press release,UKForeignand
CommonwealthOffice,2011).
Meanwhile, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK is quoted as stating that: “Pandas are a
Chinesenationaltreasure.Thishistoricalagreement isagift tothepeopleoftheUKfrom
China.Itwillrepresentanimportantsymbolofourfriendshipandwillbringourtwopeople
closer together” (Press release, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011). Friendship
between two peoples and two nations is a theme which runs through each of these
statements,yetitisclearthatthereissomediscrepancyintermsofexactlywhichtwopeoples
and two nations are linked by such friendship. How successful Scotland has been in its
attemptstoclaimadiplomaticrelationshipwithChinathroughthisperformanceremainsto
beseen.Thetussleover ‘ownership’of thepandadiplomacy -ahugely importantpartof
China’sforeignpolicy(Hartig,2013)-couldbeseenfromtheminutethatthetwopandas
toucheddownatEdinburghairport and is still beingplayedout. Scotland’s relationswith
Chinahavebecomeacornerstoneofitseconomicdevelopmentstrategy,andthesymbolof
thetwopandasisonethattheScottishGovernmentwaskeentocapitaliseupon.Indeed,as
paradiplomaticperformancesgo,thiswasremarkablyclear-cutinitsattempttosanctionits
ownlegitimacy.Fromreferencingsharedattributesofnationhoodthroughtoasophisticated
mimickingofofficial,high-levelbilateraldiplomacy,theScottishGovernmentwereableto
both make a claim for the rightness of its place as China’s partner - as the legitimate
interlocutorsfortheScottishpeople-andfortheappropriatenessofitsactivitiesindiplomatic
terms,inthewakeofits“fiveyearsofpoliticalanddiplomatictalks”(ScottishGovernment,
citedbyBBCScotland,2012).
Additionally,thisperformanceof‘pandadiplomacy’shouldbeseeninthepoliticalcontextat
thetime.Earlierintheyearthe2011ScottishParliamentelectionhaddeliveredthefirstSNP
majoritygovernment,indeedthefirstmajoritygovernmentaltogethersincetheParliament
itselfwasopened,afeatwidelylaudedinthecontextofamixed-memberelectoralsystem
designedtomakesucharesultimprobable(Cairney,2011:2).WithAlexSalmondreturning
as FirstMinister, a referendumonScottish independencewasnow firmlyon thepolitical
cards.TheEdinburghAgreement,anundertakingon thepartofboth theScottishandUK
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GovernmentstoensurethatareferendumonScottishindependencecouldtakeplace,was
signedonthe15thofOctober2012andfollowedmonthsofprotractednegotiationsbetween
the two governments. Therefore the timing of the pandas’ arrival takes on an added
significance:itfellduringaperiodinwhichtheSNP,withanewlystrengthenedmandate,was
positioningScotlandasapotentialstate-in-waiting.Demonstratingtheirabilitytonegotiate
withadominanteconomicactorsuchasChinawasacrucialcomponentinthistask,allowing
leadingpoliticianssuchasAlexSalmondtoplaytheroleofglobalstatesperson,‘mimic’high-
status,bilateraldiplomacyandcommunicatetheSNP’sambitionsforsovereignstatehoodto
audiencesinScotland,acrosstheUKandindeedglobally.
II. VanguardWalesinCopenhagen&Lesotho
‘PeopleinWaleshavebighearts.Theybelonginasmallcountrybut,ohman,theyreallyhave
thekickofamule’.ArchbishopDesmondTutuonhisvisittoWales,October2012
The international performances of Wales, as a sub-state government, are not normally
directedat third states (aswe seeevidenceof inbothScotlandandBavaria), though the
branding of ‘Nato Wales’ held in Newport during 2015 arguably acts to mediate this
distinction.Predominantly,thefocusisonregiontoregionandmultilateral,network-based
engagement. Inthis ‘casestudywithinacasestudy’,therefore,we’ll lookattwodifferent
performances that speak to the same broad narrative. This narrative reflects the use of
domesticstatutoryinstrumentsanddevolvedauthorityoverissueswithaclear‘genesis’in
theNationalAssemblytoconsciouslybroadenthelimitedinternationalremitthatWaleshas
underthetermsoftheGovernmentofWalesAct2006. Waleshasprovedadeptatusing
thesedomestically-groundedinstrumentstolinktodominantliberal,internationaldiscourses
andtotie itself intoglobalprogrammesandstructures-forexampletheUN’sMillennium
DevelopmentGoalsorinternationalclimatechangefora.AclearattempttogroundWales’
internationalengagementsinterritorywhereithasaperceivedlegitimacy,derivedfromthe
devolvedresponsibilitiesthatthesub-stategovernmenthasatadomesticlevel,canbeseen
in itsparadiplomacy.Theseareasareconsciouslyexpanded;networkingopportunitiesare
seizedandtheprofile-raisingandnationbuildingadvantagesofsuchactivitiesarereaped.
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ThetwosetsofperformanceswewillconsiderarethoserelatingfirstlytoWales’involvement
intheNetworkofRegionalGovernmentsforSustainableDevelopment(nrg4SD)-asafounder
ofthegroupandthenactingasco-chairduringtheCopenhagenSummitonclimatechange-
and secondly theWales for Africa programme, the basis for its launch in 2006 and the
subsequent piece of legislation that builds on its novel legal framework, the 2015 Future
GenerationsAct.
Nrg4SDwasformedafteraworldsummitonsustainabledevelopment inJohannesburg in
2002.Waleswas a key foundingmemberof the group, chairing the session atwhich the
participants signedup to the ‘GautendDeclaration’,bringing thenetwork into fruition. In
RhodriMorgan’swords, ‘thiseventwouldnothave takenplacewithout the leadershipof
Walesandothercoreregions’(Royles,2012:173).AkeyperiodforWales’involvementinthe
networkcamepost2007whenJaneDavisonbecameMinisterforsustainability,environment
andhousing.Shethenbecameco-chairin2009,aperiodwhichplacedherintheinternational
spotlightleadinguptotheCopenhagenSummit.Duringthisperiodshewas‘highlyvisiblein
representing the network internationally’ (Royles, 2012: 175). Using a direct method of
influence, in the runup toCopenhagenshe“representedboth thenetworkandWalesat
severalhigh-profileevents”,andthenduringthesummititself:
ShemetanumberofseniorinternationalleadersandcounterpartsacrosstheUK, chaired UNDP and climate group side events and spoke at eventsorganised by the European Environment Agency and the United Nationsenvironmentprogramme.DayafterbeingelectedtheFirstMinisterofWales,CarwynJonessymbolicallyattendedtheclimateleader’ssummitarrangedbythe climate group and spoke at a UN HABITAT-sponsored side-event inCopenhagen(Royles,2012:175).
In one notable exchange, Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger praised ‘Welsh
effortstotackleclimatechange’,tellingJaneDavidsonandherofficialsto‘keepupthegood
work’.DavidsonwasattendingthereceptionattheCopenhagenSummit,hostedbyGovernor
Schwarzenegger,inhercapacityaschairofNrg4SDandastheWelshMinisterresponsiblefor
climatechange;anenhancedplatformwhichhadseenherdeliveranaddressto“political
leadersaroundtheworld”ontherolethatsub-nationalgovernmentcanplay ineffortsto
tackleclimatechange(BBCWales,2009).Alloftheseperformancesreflectthewaysinwhich
adomesticplatformorrationalewithinWales-inthiscasethestatutoryresponsibilityithas
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for sustainable development - can open international doors, providing an international
legitimacyandaplatformitwouldotherwiselack.
Undoubtedly, therehas been a high level ofministerial commitment to the issue areaof
sustainable development and to nrg4SD and these have been crucial to the international
rewardsthattheactivitieshaveborne:
WAG’s [the Welsh Assembly Government] strong political engagement innrgd4SDhasclearlybenefitedWalesinachievingahigherprofileandhasgivenan international platform for its sustainable development policies… morebroadly, WAG’s engagement has contributed to strengthening Walesinternational profile and branding. One interviewee explained ‘there areimmenseopportunitiesthathavebeenaffordedtothenetworkandthereforeto the regions/country of which the chair represents in terms of issues ofrepresentationandbeingabletohavethatregionalgovernmentdialogueonaworldstage(Royles,2012:176).
Essentially, this is a case where learning to walk the international walk, and talk the
internationaltalk,hascometoWalesthroughtheconsciousexpansionoftheir-relatively
narrow, in the context of our other two case studies - domestic remit. The Welsh
Government’sdiplomacysurroundingtheCopenhagenSummitportrayedthemessagethat
Wales-asaregionchargedwithimplementingclimatechangelegislationandcarryingthe
statutoryresponsibilityforsustainabledevelopment-deservedavoiceinnegotiationsaimed
at creating an international regulatory framework in this same issue area. By consciously
linkingthelocalandtheglobalelementsofthisdebate,theyhavehelpedtopositionregional
governmentsperseasalegitimateactorinthisfield.Initsothercapacityaschairofnrg4SD
during these negotiations,Waleswas afforded a higher profile and an official role in the
proceedings,allowinginteractionswithinternationalorganisationsandanaudiencewhichit
mayotherwisehavestruggledtoattract.
Thiscarefulgroundingofparadiplomacyinthedomesticobligationsofsub-stategovernance
is somethingwhichwe see frequently inWales. According to one seniormember of the
NationalAssemblyforWales,whetherornotanissueareahasagroundinginthelegislative
competenceofWalesiscrucial:
Clearly…themeatandpotatoesofforeignaffairsisastatelevelresponsibility.Buttheninthemindsoftheactorsthereisquitealotofroomforaninterest
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in foreign relations because politics is conducted in a global world, in aEuropeanworld,invariousstructures.SomeofwhichhaveverydirectlinkstoWales-Europeanregionalpolicyforexample-CAP,environmentincreasingly,there’slots.SothatdrawsusintotheEuropeandimension.Butthenclimatechange agendas draw you into activities, the UN. But it tends to be fairlyfunctional…towhatdoesrelatetodevolvedresponsibilities.75
Indeed,thesameintervieweegoesontoarguethatwhereanissuehasa“genesis” inthe
NationalAssembly,thisenablestheinternationaldimensionsoftheareatobetakenon,and
iswheresub-stateactivitiesareabletocontributemosteffectively.ThecontextofWales’
internationalperformancesarethereforekeytotheirperceivedlegitimacyandeffectiveness.
Foradifferentinterviewee:
Groupslikenrg4SD,organisationslikethatwhichhaveanEUbasebutwhicharetryingtointeractwithothergroupsacrosstheglobe,Isupposenasensearekindofpioneeringorganisations,andIguessit’sthekindofglobalclimatechangeinfrastructurewhichhavemadethatpossibleinthatsortofcontext.SoIthinktherehastobeacontextforthesesortsofthings.Ithinkinanidealworldyoumightbeabletosay‘well,regionscandoitforthemselves’,andyouknow.Ithinktherealityisthattherehastobeaninternationalcontextwhichisdrivenbysovereignstatesinorderforthesub-statestobeabletomakeameaningfulcontributionofthebackofthat.Andthat’smysenseofit.76
This same rationale - of Wales’ international legitimacy stemming from its devolved
competences-canbeseen,andarguablyhasbeenstretchedinamoredeliberatefashion,in
theWelshGovernment’s flagshipWales for Africa programme. AsWyn Jones and Royles
explain(WynJonesandRoyles,2012),thestatuarybasisforthisinitiativewasfarfromclear-
cut:
Given…thatinternationaldevelopmentisareservedmatter,theconstitutionalbasis for Assembly action required some innovative interpretation of itspowers.Consequently,lawyerswereinvolvedin‘wadingthroughlegislation’seekinggroundsonwhichWalesmightact.Theconceptof ‘mutualbenefit’becamecentral to justifyingWAG’sactions.BothWalesandthedevelopingworldweretobebeneficiaries(WAG2006,1).Theconcernwithconstitutionalproprietywashighlightedbythefactthatthe‘everyparticularactionthatwehavetakenundertheframeworkhasbeencheckedwithlawyers...thereisalegal paragraph attached to every submission sent to the FirstMinister toapprovethespendingofmoney’(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:260).
75WelshAssemblyMember,interview201376SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor,interview2013
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The performance of Wales in the field of international development is therefore one
grounded in a hard-fought appropriation of the issue area and a novel statutory basis of
mutual reciprocity. Broader themes also feed into Wales’ performances in this regard,
however:theimageofWalesasanoutwardlooking,tolerantnation,makingan‘identifiably
Welsh’contributiontointernationaldevelopment.Incelebrating10yearsoftheWalesfor
AfricaProgramme,aWelshGovernmentreportmakestheselinksratherclearly:
Waleshasalwaysbeenanoutwardlookingnation,keentoplayourpartintheworld.Tenyearsago,inkeepingwiththatoutwardlookingspirit,welaunchedourWalesforAfricaprogrammetoencouragemorepeople inWalestogetinvolvedwithdevelopmentwork inAfrica… thesepartnerships characterisetheWelsh approach to international development, where experiences andknowledgearesharedinaspiritofmutualrespectandreciprocity.Thisvibrant,civil-society based approach has seen friendships formed acrossWales andAfrica, as people work together practically, purposefully and meaningfullytowardsachievingtheUN’sSustainableDevelopmentGoalsSGDs.ThevisionoftheSDGsisthatofashared,sustainablydevelopedwordinwhichnooneisleft behind. The Welsh Government is committed to being a part of theresponsetoachievingthis(WelshGovernment,2016).
Notonly,therefore,areWales’performancesaspartofthisprogrammeaimedatbringing
forwardanovelapproachtointernationaldevelopment,buttheyalsoallowWalestotieitself
to broader international structures and discourses - such as the UN’s sustainable
development goals - enhancing its international legitimacy as it is seen to make an
‘identifiablyWelsh’contributiontothisissuearea(Government,2006),arguablyinafashion
whichisreadilyunderstoodandacceptedbyothermembersoftheinternationalcommunity.
ThemessagesWalessendsinthisregardarenotofasub-stategovernmentattemptingto
challengeorcircumventtheactivitiesofasovereignstate,butinsteadbringasmaller-scale,
practical, network-based approach to a global issue area.Once again, politicalwillwithin
Waleshasappearstohavebeenattheheartofthisprocess.Asoneintervieweeputsit:
WithWalesforAfricayoucouldperfectlywellargue,andpeopledofromtimetotime, ‘what’sthatgottodowithus’,we’renotanaidgivingbody’…so Isuppose,andactuallythattakesmetothesecondpointIwasgoingtomake,that’saverygoodexample,inthatwe’redrivenbyourownpowers,butwe’realsosortofdrivenbypolitical judgement,politicalwillandIthinkWalesforAfricaisagoodexampleofthat.Imean,Ithinkbasicallyit’sbecauseMinisters,
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thisGovernment,thepreviousGovernment,wanttodoit.BecausethereisapoliticalwillandpoliticalenthusiasmtohaveanengagementbetweenWalesasadevelopedcountryandotherpartsofAfricawhichareun-developedorless-developed.Andagainthough,interestinglyinthecaseofWalesforAfricaIthinkthatwasacasenotjustofpoliticalwillhere,butpoliticalwill incivicsociety,wherepeoplewerealreadydoingstuff.77
The ‘creative’ interpretationofWales’ devolutiondispensation to allow for theWales for
Africaprogramme(aidedtoalargedegreebytheprecedentsetbyScotlandinitsLesotho
programme),aswellasthemodelofreciprocityborneoutbythisparticularmodelhavealso
inspirednewlegislationinWales,explicitlyharnessingthefuturewellbeingofWelshcitizens
toa rangeofglobal issuesand thereforebringing them in to thediscursive foldofWelsh
politics:
WalesforAfrica’scontributiontotheSDGs[SustainableDevelopmentGoals]helpstofacilitateanidentifiablyWelshresponseoninternationalactionbasedaroundco-developmentinapartnershipapproach…inapioneeringpieceoflegislation, the Welsh Government’s Wellbeing of Future Generations Act(2015)commitsustoimprovingthesocial,economicandculturalwell-beingof Wales. Since its passing, public bodies in Wales are more focussed onhelping Wales demonstrate its commitment to the seven wellbeing goalsincludingGoal7-a‘GloballyResponsibleWales’(WelshGovernment,2016).
According to a director of Division for Sustainable Development in the Department of
EconomicandSocialAffairsattheUnitedNations:
TheWales Future Generations Act captures the spirit and essence of twodecadesofUnitedNationsworkintheareaofsustainabledevelopmentandservesasamodelforotherregionandcountries…wehopethatwhatWalesisdoingtodaytheworldwilldotomorrow.Action,morethanwords,isthehopeforourcurrentandfuturegenerations(WelshGovernment,2016).
In Wales, the international performances around climate change and sustainable
development do not typically attempt to mimic traditional state-state diplomacy or
discoursesinthewaysthatwefindevidenceofinScotland.Havingsaidthis,crucialtomany
oftheWelshparadiplomaticendeavoursexploredabove-andelsewhereinthisthesis–are
theprecedentsthatScotlandhassetinthesesameareas.WalesforAfricaispremised,toa
large extent, on Scotland’s international development programme in Lesotho. Indeed,
77Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor,2013
182
ScotlandalsobelongstomanyofthesamenetworksasWalesandhasasimilarfocusonareas
suchasclimatechangeandtheUN’sMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.Thedifferenceisthat
in addition to thesenetworkbased,multilateral activities, Scotlandalso engages inmuch
more ‘state-like’ endeavours which inevitably alter the ways in which its broader
paradiplomaticpresenceisinterpretedbyotheractors,inparticularlytheUKGovernment.
ReturningtoWales,intheabsenceofsomeofthemoreambitiousorcontroversialactivities
seen in both Scotland and Bavaria, theWelsh Government has been able to operate in
perhaps a more benign political context when it comes to paradiplomacy. Wales has
successfully draw upon on the legitimacy and the representational opportunities of both
broader regional networks - such as nrg4SD - and of international organisations and
structures, such as the UN, specifically in relation to its millennium development goals.
Notableinitsapproachhasbeenthepainstakinggroundingofinternationalprogrammeson
climate change and international development in domestic statutory authority and
legitimacy. It has also been seen to perform something ‘identifiably Welsh’ on the
international stage: the role it has executed is not one easily confusedwith a state, but
somethinginherentlysmallerscale.Incommittingtoanapproachofmutualreciprocity,both
intheWalesforAfricaprogrammeandundertheWalesFutureGenerationsAct,Wales is
harnessingthepowerofitssmallersize,thenecessitiesofgroundinginternationalaidinits
ownbenefit,abilitiesandcompetencesinordertocreateanapproachthatismorelikelyto
bewelcomedbytheinternationalcommunity-andtheUKGovernment-andatthesame
timeisarguablymorepurposefulandperhapseffectivethanalternativemodels(Anyimadu,
2011).
III. BavariainBrussels
PortrayingandharnessingthenotionofBavarianculturaldistinctivenesshasbeencrucialin
termsofgaining,andmaintaining,politicalpowerintheLand,andhasbeencentraltothe
successofthegoverningCSU(HepburnandHough,2012:93).Thishasobviousimplications
fortheinternationalactivitiesofBavaria,particularlywithinEurope;representingakeyarena
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for the performances of Bavaria as a strong, economically successful former sovereign,
groundedbyitsspecialhistoricalsignificanceandculturalidentity.Thereis,therefore,aclear
domesticpoliticalmotivationinperformingBavaria’sculturaldistinctivenessinternationally.
Indeed,inBavariawefindthatthe‘special’positionoftheFreistaat-inbothhistoricaland
economicterms-isfrequentlyreferencedaspartofitsclaimstolegitimacyininternational
arenas.AccordingtoBavarianMinisterEberhardSinner;“Bavariaisoneoftheoldeststates
inEurope…weareverydifferentfromtherestofGermany,weliketobeindependent.We
fightformorecompetencesandpowersfortheregions”(Hepburn,2008a:194).Thisclaimto
‘special significance’ is reflected in the attention paid by Bavarian officials to its ‘un-
hyphenated’ status; the image of Bavaria as a long-standing, unchanging presence in the
worldisakeypartofitsattemptstoappear‘state-like’,incontradistinctiontothe“cluttered
identity” of the “hyphenated states”, such as Baden-Württemberg or North-Rhine-
Westphalia.78Similarly,Bavariaisabletoemployitstreatymakingpowernotonly“tocreate
substantial content-based cooperation with other partners”, but also - importantly - “to
further‘build’and‘enhancetheinternational-legalrecognitionoftheregion’”as“aplayer
that should be taken seriously in the “international arena’” (Criekemans, 2010b: 45);
mimickingthetreaty-basedinternationalarrangementsmaintainedbystates.
Bavaria’srelationshipwiththeEuropeanUnionstandsoutamongstitssub-stategovernment
peers.Thereasonsforthisaretwofold.Firstly,Bavariahasaparticularlywell-resourcedand
impressiverepresentationintheheartofBrussels,marking itsstatusas ‘oneoftheoldest
statesinEurope’.However,atthesametime,thestate’sEuropeaninteractionsarestrongly
markedbyitseuroscepticism,withsubsidiaritylegislationandmonitoringbeingtheforemost
areas of its activity. This euro sceptic approach to EU politics has much to do with the
assessmentthatEuropeanpolicyisencroachinguponthenaturalterritoryofLändersuchas
Bavaria,‘hollowingout’theroletheypreviouslyoccupiedandleavinginsufficientroomfor
sub-stateinfluencewithinEuropeaninstitutions.Indeed,theroleoftheBavarianParliament’s
EUrepresentativeseemstobethedirectscrutinyandmonitoringofEuropeaninstitutions
78Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentOfficial2013
184
themselves, rather than keeping its own Bavarian Government in check.79 From the
scrupulouspracticeoftheEarlyWarningSystemtothecontinuedcritiquesofthesubsidiary
system,boththeBavarianParliamentanditsGovernmenttakeituponthemselvestobethe
activewatchdogsofsub-statecompetence,consideringitbotharightandadutytobethe
“criticalbutconstructivepartneroftheEU”.80
Setamongstthisbackdrop,theestablishmentofBavaria’scurrentBrusselsrepresentationin
2004canbeconsideredanimportantperformanceofits‘special’significanceinEurope,not
onlymimickingbutinfactoutshiningtheofficialrepresentationsofmember-states,including
itsownFederalGovernment. Thespecific context isalso importanthere.Theopeningof
independentLänderoffices inBrusselswas initially“highlycontroversial”,with“questions
raisedastotheirlegality”,undertheGermanConstitution.Indeed,theresponseoftheLänder
themselveswasto“workinitiallytofudgethebasisuponwhichtheirfirstEUofficeswere
built”(Moore,2006:196).ThebuildingofBavaria’scurrentrepresentationwasthereforea
clear signal both to the Federal Government, and to European institutions, of Bavaria’s
legitimatepresenceinEuropeanaffairs.AccordingtoMoore(2006:192):
ThenewBavarianEuropeanUnion(EU)representation,whichopenedattheend of September 2004, has set an important precedent among regionaloffices in Brussels. Paid for and lavishly renovated at a cost of almost E30million to the Bavarian taxpayer, the building cuts an impressive figure,sandwichedbetween the EuropeanParliament building in Brussels and thenewCommissionheadquarters.ThepresenceofBavariaintheEUisthussettobecomeonewhichwillbeevenmoredifficulttooverlook
Speakingofthenewrepresentation,aseniorBavarianparliamentaryofficialreasonedthat:
It’sgrand.It’shistoric….It’sanexclamationmarksayingwearehereinBrusselsandwearenotanywhere,we’renotinsomeofficebuilding-we’reinthisbigarea and we took this historic building so everyone who comes to theEuropean Parliament has to pass it. So this part of…the strategy, or themessage,tosay…wedosomethingreallyspecial.81
79Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial201380Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial201381Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial2013
185
Indeed,thismessageofBavarian‘specialness’amongstsub-stategovernmentsissomething
ofarecurringtheme.Accordingtoadifferentinterviewee,Bavaria’sabilitytointeractwith
sovereignstates-suchastheCzechRepublic-dependsuponthecalculationthatsuchactors
makeastoBavaria’sownstatus.Thedeterminationfollows,therefore,that“Bavariamight
notbesovereign”,butitssize,importanceandeconomicpower,meansthatthey“outweigh
perhaps8or9[memberstates]insidetheEuropeanUnion”.82
In light of this self-perception, the Bavarian representation in Brussels again looks to
represent a convincing performance of its power and status. Through mimicking, in an
elaboratefashion,theofficialrepresentationsofmemberstates,Bavariaisplacingitself-in
purelyvisualterms-inthisvery‘category’ofactor,distancingitselffromitssub-statepeers
intheprocess.GiventheimportanceoftheterritorialcleavagewithinBavarianpolitics,such
ademonstrationofstatusthusreflectsavarietyofmotivationsthatthesub-stategovernment
mayhaveforitsparadiplomacy.Byenhancingitsabilitytoinfluence,andultimatelyconstrain,
Europeanpolicy,aswellasmonitortheactivitiesofEuropeaninstitutions,Bavarialooksto
safeguarditsownareasofcompetence.Atthesametime,however,suchperformancessend
amessageof stature to the federalgovernment - reasserting its roleas ‘critical friend’ to
Berlin, as well as bolstering Bavarian identity and cultural distinctiveness. Critics of the
representationhavearguedthatit“harksbacktothedaysofKingLudwigII”,andbranded
theoffices“SchlossNeuwahnstein”-theturretedhilltopcastlebuiltfortheKingduringthe
19thcentury(Moore,2006:192).However,giventhecentralityoftheFreistaatnarrativeto
Bavaria’sparadiplomacy,andtheroleofits‘specialhistory’inunderstandingitsstatusboth
insideGermanyandbeyond,suchcriticismsseemtolosetheirpotency.Instead,theybecome
a rather apt caricature of Bavaria’s current international position: a self-assured, critical
partner of the Federal Republic, with a privileged international status stemming from its
uniquehistory,andfacilitatedbyitseconomicprowess.
82Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentOfficial2013
186
Conclusion
Simply by conducting even the most humdrum of paradiplomatic activities, sub-state
governmentsareengaged inbuildingtheir internationalagencies.Byreachingoutbeyond
theirdomesticremits,aprocessofagencycreationisunderway.Examiningthisprocessfrom
aperformativityperspectiveallowsusto“makevisibletheworkthatgoesintotheproduction
ofactorsininternationalpolitics”.83Ofcourse,withagencycreationcomescontestationand
theclosepolicingofboundaries:wehaveseenthismanifestinnumerousguisesaspartof
thecase-studiesabove.FromtheUKandScottishGovernment’stussleoverChina’sactof
‘Panda diplomacy’; to the slow acceptance and unspoken compromise over Bavaria’s
Europeanrepresentation,andindeedthestatusofallLand‘Vertung’;tothepainstakingand
‘creative’interpretationofthestatuebooksinWalesandScotlandtoallowalegalbasisof
mutualreciprocityintheirinternationalaidefforts.
ForMcConnelletal,paradiplomaticscholarshiphastraditionallyfocussedonthedescriptive,
ratherthantheanalytical,meaningthat“thesescholarsrarelyquestionthelegitimatingwork
thatdiplomacyaccomplishesorattendtotheperformativeaspectsofdiplomaticpractice”
(McConnelletal.,2012:806).Thischapterhassoughttoraisethoseveryquestions.Wehave
considered the various ways in which sub-state governments have attempted to secure
legitimacy through the nature of their diplomatic interactions: drawing on their
representational qualities;mimicking core features of official, bilateral diplomacy;making
explicit their position on the ‘front line’ of global governance. Key differences were also
identified in the range of performances we considered, both in terms of what form of
diplomacythesub-stategovernmentundertookandinthewaysthatthelegitimacyofthese
actionswasgrounded.InBavaria,wesawtheliteral‘trappingsofstatehood’mimickedina
highlyvisualfashionwiththestrategiclocationandscaleofitsBrusselsrepresentation.In
thiscase,Bavariadrewheavilyonitshistoryasasovereignanditseconomicprowessinorder
topositionitself-inageographicalsense-askintofullEUmemberstates,ratherthanother
83 The aimof the Performativity and International Politics’,workshopheld at theGoetheUniversityFrankfurtonthe21st-22ndFebruary2014.Authorinattendance.
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regions. InScotland,anactofbilateraldiplomacyactuallyexchanged - in ‘official’ terms -
between China and the UK was appropriated as evidence of a diplomatic relationship
betweenChinaanditself,asasub-stategovernment.Mimickingverycloselythediscourse
and procedures involved in official bilateral diplomacy, Scotland was performing an
international agency more closely resembling a small-state, rather than a sub-state
government.InWales,activitiesaroundclimatechangemitigationsawitadoptaprimarily
networkbased,region-to-regionapproach,drawingonthelegitimacyofitsdomesticremit
as a governmental actor at the implementation-end of global decision making on the
environment.Throughitspositionasco-chairofnrg4SDWelshMinistersgainedaccesstoa
rangeofinternationalorganisationsandahigh-level,globalaudience,conferringthisprofile
andlegitimacyonseparateperformancesinitsowncapacityasasub-stategovernment.In
its Wales for Africa programme and in the Future Generations Act of 2015, the Welsh
Governmenthaveconsciouslyexpandedtheirdomesticremittoencompassaninternational
andsustainabledevelopmentfunction,drawingbothonthesestatutoryrequirementsandon
dominant, liberal and international discourses - aligned to and associated with broader
programmes, suchas theUN’smillenniumdevelopmentgoals - toachieve legitimacyand
credibilityasanagentinthissphere.Itisimportanttonote,however,thattheseprocess-
tracingexercisesprovidedonly isolatedexamples. Theyare intendedtodemonstrate the
range of ways in which sub-state international agency is created and in which sub-state
governments seek legitimacy in these roles, rather than to ascribe a hard-and-fast set of
characteristicsabouteachofourcases.Indeed,Scotlandalsocontributestoclimatechange
foraandmaintainsaninternationaldevelopmentprogrammewithaverysimilarbasisandin
similarwaystoWales,aswellasexhibitingaperhapsmorecontentiousrangeofstate-like
mimickingactivities.
Ashighlightedattheoutsetofthischapter,itisdifficult,whenlookingattheinternational
agencies of sub-state governments, to avoid being subsumed by either of two - equally
unhelpful - arguments: that paradiplomacy is either system transforming or entirely
parochial,andinconsequential.Consideringingreaterdetailthree‘caseswithinacasestudy’
hashopefullyenabledustoseetheprocessesofagencycreationandcontestationwithsome
greater clarity; processes which lend evidence to neither of the extreme interpretations
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mentionedabove.Thesubsequentchapterwillreturntothecentralquestionunderpinning
this and the preceding chapters, which - at heart - has to do with the consequences of
paradiplomacy.Itattemptstooutlinetherangeofwaysinwhichthepracticematters,both
intheoreticalterms-forthedisciplinesofinternationalrelations,comparativepoliticsand
diplomaticstudies-andinamoreempiricalsense.
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Chapter6:Sub-stateDiplomacy:theGood,theBad,andtheUgly?
Introduction
Hybridityisnotanewconceptwithininternationalrelations(Hocking,1999;Hocking,1997;
Hocking, 1986) .With the proliferation of non-state actors associated with globalisation,
regionalintegrationandmultilateralism,notonlyisitatruismtosaythatthestateisnolonger
theonlyinternationallyrelevantactor,butalsothatthehostofotheractorsoperatingatthe
international level possess differing qualities and characteristics. The international
personalitiesoftheseentitiesareoftenhybridones:supranationalinstitutionscanactinways
previouslyreservedtostates,asanarbiterofinternationalforce,forexample,yetmaynot
poses the representational qualities of states themselves. International NGOs or citizens’
groupsmaylegitimatelyrepresenttheinterestsofconstituentgroupsoverlappingwiththose
of states; yet not have the diplomatic authority or institutional capacity to serve these
interestseffectively.Suchhybridityissignificantinthesensethatitopensupnewdiplomatic
space,presentingalternativepracticesthatoperateunderadifferent-perhapslessstringent
-setof‘rules’.Indeed,allowingforthissortofinternationaldifferentiationhastheoretical
consequences.AccordingtoSidaway(2003,p.174citedinMcConnelletal.,2012:811)“this
suggeststoothepossibilityofotheranalyticalframeworks…beyondthepresenceorabsence
of undifferentiated sovereign power, towards a contextual understanding of different
regimes,apparatus,expressionsandrepresentationsofsovereignty”.ForAdler-Nissenand
Gad,postcolonialmicro-polities“mimecertainaspectsofsovereignty”,appearing‘sovereign
butnotquite”.Thisproducesa“hybridisationwhichquestionssovereigntyasaneither/or
concept”(Adler-NissenandGad,2012:8).
Sub-state governments are a particular type of hybrid actor: able to represent a distinct
constituencythatoftenidentifies,inameaningfulway,withthatregion.Thisisparticularly
true in cases where the sub-state government represents a ‘stateless nation’, such as
Scotland,CataloniaorQuebec,butitisnotexclusivelyintheseinstancesthatregionalidentity
is salient. Indeed, in the context of increasing regional autonomy, and in the shadow of
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independencedebatesinScotland,FLändersandCatalonia,alongsidethemoreubiquitous
pressuresof‘glocalisation’(Hocking,1999),regionalorsub-stateidentityisanincreasingly
importantone.Notonlydosub-stategovernmentshavethis representationalquality,but
theyareabletocombineitwiththe‘official’resourcesofgovernment:Ministers,Parliaments,
CivilServantsandbudgets.Bothofthesefacetsoverlap,andsometimesdirectlychallenge,
theirequivalentsatcentralstatelevel:state‘national’identity,stateofficialsandsoon.The
hybridity of sub-state governments is therefore found in their ‘sovereignty bound’ yet
‘sovereignty free’ nature (Hocking, 1999); they carry out diplomatic activities often very
similartosmallerstates,yetcruciallylackexternalsovereigntyandautonomousdiplomatic
authority under international law.84 In turn, this raises questions over the status and
significanceoftheirdiplomacyasitrelatestootheractors.Inparticularcircumstances,sub-
stategovernmentscan‘speak’fortheentirestate(suchaswhenactingaspartofstate-wide
delegationsinEUfora)aswellasfortheregion,attimesinconcertwithstate-diplomacy,at
timesdirectlycontradictingit.
However,withveryfewexceptions,foreignpolicy-atleastinitsmoretraditionalsense-is
notwithintheofficialpurviewofsub-stategovernments.85Wherethereisarole,itisalimited
one:relatedtotheunavoidably‘international’aspectsofdomesticcompetences.Indeed,the
very concept of sub-state ‘paradiplomacy’ remains illogical for some: where national or
Federalgovernmentsaretaskedwithexternalrelationsandthe‘high’politicsofdiplomacy,
securityanddefence,theroleoftheregionallayeristomanagethelocal:schools,hospitals
andhousing.Theprincipleofsubsidiarity,wherebydecisionsaretobetakenatthelowest
appropriatelevel,enshrinedinEUtreatylaw,wouldalsoseemtolimitthe‘natural’abilities
84Somesub-state‘representations’abroad-includingWalesandScotland-canbegranteddiplomaticstatusthroughcooperationwiththehost-states,operatingthroughtheauthorityofthatstate.85 One key exception proving this rule is the case of Belgium, where bothWallonia andFlandershaveconstitutionalresponsibilityfortheirownforeignrelations.Additionally,theFaroeIslandsweregrantedtheabilitytoenterintoforeignrelationsbyaspecificActbetweentheautonomouscommunityandDenmarkin2005,arguablyasawaytoappeasedemandsforenhancedself-rule.
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of the sub-state tier in such fields.Certainly,UKopinionpolling repeatedlybearsout this
disassociationbetweentheregionalandtheglobalintermsofconstitutionalpreferences.86
Allofthis-thelackofconstitutionalandinstitutionalcompetence,theconceptualdissonance
andtheabsenceofpublicpressureforregionstoassumecontrolinthisdomain-rendersthe
actualscopeofsub-stateinternationalrelationsallthemoresurprising.Withoutsignificant
‘push’factors,itseems-astheprecedingchaptershavesoughttodemonstrate-thatmany
sub-stategovernmentsarenonethelesschoosingtodevelopinternationalagency.Sub-state
governmentsthusrepresentakeystudyinthewaysinwhichnewactorsareabletoenter
into international politics and become ‘diplomats’. As international entities, sub-state
governmentshavebothrespondedtoaseriesofnewopportunitystructures(providedforby
internalreorganisationwithinstates,aswellasnewinstitutionsandfinancialforcesatapan-
regionalorgloballevel(Lecours,2002))and-crucially-havedemonstratedaseemingdesire
toappropriatethisdomainfortheirownaims.
This chapter addresses, andultimately rejects, the arguments that sub-statediplomacy is
something inherentlyprogressive(‘democratising’ foreignpolicy),dangerous(undermining
thestateorencouragingrampantnationalism),orindeedinconsequential(‘provincialismwrit
large’). Instead, the central argument developed here is that, much like the diplomatic
behavioursofstates,paradiplomacycanindeedcontributetoglobalpoliticsallsortsofways
-bothwelcomeandunwelcomefromtheperspectiveofstates themselves.However, the
significanceofthepracticeextendsbeyondthispragmaticlevel.Sub-stategovernmentsare
able todoparticular ‘things’ in theirdiplomacy,byvirtueof theirhybridstatus.Sub-state
diplomacy looks and sounds very similar to that of states, yet they are not states. This
86 One recent survey into Welsh constitutional preferences found that only 15% ofrespondents thoughtthatNationalAssembly forWalesshouldhavecontrolof theareaofforeignaffairsanddefence,contrastingwithotherareaswherefurtherdevolutionhadbeensuggested,suchaspolicing(63%),renewableenergy(70%)andcourtsandcriminal justice(35%).BeaufortPublicOpinionSurveyonNonFiscalPowers,evidencetotheCommissiononDevolution in Waleshttp://commissionondevolutioninwales.independent.gov.uk/files/2013/08/Beaufort-Opinion-survey-on-Non-Fiscal-powers.pdf
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ambiguitycanresultinundoubtedly‘messy’scenariosandrequiresthatthephenomenonbe
problematizedinamuchfullersensewithininternationalrelationsanddiplomatictheory.In
doingso,thechapteracknowledgesthetaskoutlinedbyHocking(1999:18-21),inengaging
withthewaysinwhichsuchhybridcases“moveusbeyondprofitlessdebatesastowhoare
andwhoarenotsignificantactorsinworldpolitics”.
Internationalrelations‘alacarte’?
InWales, Scotland and Bavaria, the ‘spectre of the state’ both limits and informs much
paradiplomaticactivity.Forexample,whilsttheScottishGovernment’sinternationalrelations
areoftenlikenedtothoseofsimilarsizedsmallstates(particularlythosethatScotlandiskeen
toalign itselfwith intheScandinavian‘arcofprosperity’),whoalsotendtooperateniche
diplomaticstrategies,itisinfactthedevolvedstatusofScotland,anditsmembershipofthe
UK,thatrendersthecontextmarkedlydifferent.Ontheonehand,thiscontextnecessarily
limitsthetypeofdiplomaticactivitiespossible.Itexcludes,forexample,securityanddefence,
andasdiscussedinsubsequentsectionsofthischapter,thisisnotnecessarilytotheregion’s
detriment, often leaving their profile intactwhilst the sovereign state bears the brunt of
unpopulardecisionsordiplomaticfracas.Meanwhile,thisstatusmakesthearticulationofa
distinct international identity all the more important for sub-state governments, as it is
deemednecessarytodistinguishbetweendevolvedorregionallevelandnationalorfederal
positions, values and decisions. Normative diplomacy, focussing on international
development,climatechangeordemocracyassistance,forexample,thereforecomprisesa
significantelementWalesandScotland’sexternalactivities(asinBavariaalso).Ontheother
hand,however,sub-stateaccessbothtotheUK’sinternationalresourcesandreputation,but
also,thoughheavilycircumscribed,toitspolicy-makingmachinery,meansthatfornationsor
regions of their size, Scotland and Wales have greater potential for agenda-setting, as
opposedtoopinion-taking,oninternationalissues.InBavaria,meanwhile,thefactthatthe
dominant party, the CSU, also frequently - including in the present period - occupy a
significantpositioninFederalpolitics,owingtothecoalitiongoverningarrangements,also
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allowsforatwin-trackapproachtointernationalinfluence.Therefore,thoughthenumbers
ofareasinwhichsub-stategovernmentscanact‘autonomously’arelimited,theyareableto
draw upon a broader framework of both hard and soft power resource through their
membershipofthehoststateitself.
The essential characteristics of sub-state governments as diplomatic agents are therefore
informedbothbytheirambiguous,hybridstatus(asgovernmental,butnon-sovereignactors)
andtheroleofpowerrelations-fundamentallyasymmetric-betweenthesub-andnation
state (with sub-state diplomacy always taking place within this ‘spectre of the state’).
Together, these characteristics, and the international context facing sub-state diplomats,
combinetocreateauniqueoperationalspace,onequalitativelydifferentfromthatwithin
whichstatesoperate.
Sub-state governments undertake a range of activities thatmay appear largely similar in
composition to thoseundertakenby smaller states. These activity clusters includeborder
diplomacy,participationininternationalandmultilateralfora(suchaspreviouslymentioned
nrg4SD)andsolicitinginternationaltradeandinvestment(maintainingrepresentativeoffices
abroad). They often develop some element of niche or normative diplomatic strategy -
including‘normentrepreneurship’(Wigell,2013)-andtheyrelyheavilyonpublicdiplomacy
(Huijgh, 2010) to reach global audiences. Some aremoreor less explicitly geared around
achieving independence (sometimes termed proto-diplomatic strategies (Duchacek, 1990;
Soldatos,1990)),whilstthemajorityofregionshavenosuchimmediateaim.Instead,their
engagement in the international sphere does not appear to be a precursor for sovereign
statehood,and,indeed,theirhybridnature(Hocking,1999;1997)wouldseemtobeamore-
or-lesspermanentfeatureoftheinternationalsystem.
Atthesametime,thereremainimportantdifferencesbetweentheinternationalagenciesof
sub-andsmall-stategovernments.Sub-stategovernmentsarealmostuniversallyexcluded
fromadirectroleinareasof‘highpolitics’,inparticulardefenceandsecuritypolicy.Theylack
membership of most influential international organizations and typically have smaller
institutionalcapacitiesinthefieldofdiplomacyandinternationalaffairs.Thestatusofsub-
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state diplomacy is therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, many sub-state governments
conduct‘official’diplomaticrelationswithstatesthemselves,implyinganequalitythatbelies
theirdisparatelegalstatuses.Ontheotherhand,thebulkofsub-statediplomacytakesplace
ona region-region level - oftenwith the samepompand ceremony seenwith traditional
diplomacy,yetnotpossessingthesameweightassimilararrangementsbetweensovereign
states,whichwouldtakeprimacy.
Thepracticeofparadiplomacybystatelessnations,evenwheresecessionisnotthegoalof
governingparties,arguablymakesaclaimforthelegitimacyofaformofnationalor‘popular’
sovereignty:howstatesrespondtothisclaimrepresentsanequallyinterestingmarkerasto
thedominanceofsuchinternationalnorms.Attheveryleast,statelessnations,autonomous
regionsandunrecognisedstates(althoughinverydifferentways)all“questionthedirectlink
betweeninternalandexternalsovereignty”(Caspersen,2012::11).Isitpossible,asKrasner
argues(1999::4-5),foranentitytohavecertainsovereignvariantsbutnotothers,rendering
the concept of sovereignty neither static nor indivisible, nor absolute? If we accept this
distinction,wepotentiallyallowfor thehybrid-natureofstatelessnationsas international
actorstobemeaningfullyconceptualised.
Sub-state governments are able to occupy a unique operational space; one defined and
expandedprimarily-thoughnotexclusively-throughtheir interactionswithoneanother.
This space has particular qualities, being largely symbolic, non-statutory, only loosely
institutionalisedandhugelyvaried.Alongsidethehybridnatureofsub-statediplomacy,the
utilisation of this operational space, and development of a specific type of international
profile,hasaclearandonceagaindifferentiated linkwithprocessesofdomesticpolityor
nationbuilding-andismarkedbythenatureofrelationswiththehoststate.
The ambiguous status of sub-state governments as international actors allows them to
maintainaparticulartypeofinternationalprofile;donningadiplomatichatonlyincertain
circumstances. These actors are both free from the requirements (in terms of financial
resourcesandpoliticalcapital)ofhighpolitics,securityanddefenceand,atthesametime,
able to ‘skirt around’ controversial diplomatic issues under the cover of lacking such a
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responsibility.Takentoitsextremes,sub-stategovernmentsmightbeableto‘freeride’on
the foreignpolicy of their host-state, accentuating distinctivenesswhere this has positive
connotations(theCSU’ssuccessintransformingBavariaintoahigh-techeconomy,theSNP’s
anti-nuclearperspectiveorWales’interestininternationaldevelopmentorgenderequality),
yetdeferringtostate-widecompetencewhenadistinctprofilewouldnotbebeneficial.
TheScottishcontextofferssomeimportantinsightsintothepossibleadvantagesofthehybrid
international profiles maintained by sub-state governments. In numerous respects, the
internationalstandingofScotlandasadistinctnation isveryhigh. In recentsurveyof the
internationalreputationsof50nations,Scotlandrepresentedthesinglenon-sovereignnation
tobepolled inaglobalcohort, ranking15th in termsof recognition (ScottishGovernment
StrategicResearch,2012).Scotlandwas“scoredandrankedsimilarlyandoftenaheadofthe
othersmaller,highincome,liberaldemocraciesontheindex:Denmark,Finland,Irelandand
New Zealand”. Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, Scotland’s
strongestratingwasintheareaofgovernance,which“considerspublicopinionregardingthe
levelofnationalgovernmentcompetencyandfairness,aswellasitsperceivedcommitment
toglobal issues suchaspeace,povertyand theenvironment”. In the2012poll, Scotland
climbedto13thpositiononthisindicator,themostsignificantimprovementinperceptions
comingfromtheinternationalstage(ratherthanfromUKpanels):
Scotland’s reputation has improved for its endeavour to reduce globalpoverty, followed by its efforts in protecting the environment, andresponsibilityintheareasofglobalpeaceandsecurity(ScottishGovernmentStrategicResearch,2012).
Thatadevolvedgovernmentwithnoformalcompetenceinareasofglobalpeaceandsecurity
canbuild andmaintain sucha strong international reputation in theseareasof activity is
borderingontheextraordinary.Indeed,thisfeatcanberelatedtothefactthatmuchofthe
work that sub-state governments ‘do’ on the international stage is restricted to public
diplomacy(Huijgh,2010):areflectionofboththelimitedformalscopefordecisionmakingor
‘high’diplomacy,andthecomparativeadvantagethatnon-stateactorscandevelopinthis
regard.Thesuccessofsuch‘soft’enterprisesintheScottishcontextiscertainlyevidencedby
suchdata.
196
Partofthisrelativesuccess,however,canperhapsbeattributedtothelackofotherburdens
ofinternationalactornessthathavefallenonScottishactorsandScottishresourceswhenit
comestointernationalaffairsand,moreimportantly,foreignanddefencepolicy.Suchissues
wererecentlyforegroundedinthecontextoftheScottishindependencereferendum.Much
hadbeenmadeofScotland’sexternalreputationandhencethehypothetical international
standing of Scotland as an independent state. However, from the position of a devolved
nation, the ScottishGovernmenthasperhapsbeenable to give the illusion of far greater
international agency that it actually maintains. The Scottish Government has not been
required to invest significant resources in, for example, comprehensive diplomatic and
consular representation (instead Scottish officials are located in a smaller number of
strategically important locales,co-locatedwithUKmissions).Similarly, ithasbeenable to
benefitfromthehardpower,geo-politicalstrategicinfluenceandeconomicweightoftheUK,
inadditiontotheUK’sconsiderablesoft-powerresources.Indeed,thequestionofwhether
Scotlandcouldexpecttoachieveanetgaininforeignpolicyterms,inapost-independence
scenario,recurredtimeandagaininbothinHolyroodandWestminsterduringthecourseof
thereferendumcampaign(forexample:UKHouseofCommonsForeignAffairsCommittee,
2013;ScottishGovernment,2013b).87Maintainingtheillusionofparticipatoryrightswithout
theaccompanyingresponsibilitiesoffull-membershipoftheinternationalsystemcanmean
that sub-state governments, on occasion, are in an optimum position to achieve their
particular international ambitions. Under more benign circumstances, there would be
nothing‘bad’ordisconcertingaboutthisscenariofromastate’sperspective.However,inthe
contextofanincreasinglyfractiousrelationshipwiththeUKgovernment,Scotlandmaywell
be viewed as an unwelcome ‘free-rider’ on the UK’s diplomatic profile, by virtue of its
selectiveapproachtointernationalengagement.Thereverseofthisargument,however,can
perhapsbestbedisplayedbyScotland’scurrentpredicamentastheUKpreparestoleavethe
European Union; evidence of the hard, non-negotiable constraints that border the
operationalspacethatsub-stategovernmentsareabletooccupy.
87 These issues are raised in the report of the UK House of Commons Foreign AffairsCommittee:‘ForeignpolicyconsiderationsfortheUKandScotlandintheeventofScotlandbecominganindependentcountry’,May2013
197
Characterisingsub-statediplomacy
Ifwetakethehybridityofsub-stategovernments,andtheuniqueoperationalspacethatthey
occupy, as our starting point then the effects or implications of paradiplomacy can be
conceptualisedinnumerousways.Theabilitytopick-and-chooseinternationalrelationson
an‘alacarte’basis(albeitfromarestrictedmenu),couldbeconceivedofasatypeoffree-
riding,afairlypejorativeconceptthatnonethelesswoulddescribethosecaseswheresub-
statediplomacybecamecompetitivewith thatof thecentral state.Toexpand thecycling
metaphor,perhapsmoregenerously,sub-stategovernmentscouldbeseento‘free-wheel’in
thevacuum leftbehindstate-diplomacy:drawingonbroader state resourcesandpolitical
capitalbutinsulatedfromthesamelevelsofscrutinyandexpectation-nottomentionlegal
andconstitutionalobligations.Thispositionmightbeconceivedasareasonablyprivileged
one, and it certainly has an impact on the sorts of activities that sub-state governments
choosetoengagein.Theeffectsoftheseactivitiesforthebroaderdiplomaticsystem-aswell
asspecificactorswithin it - canmanifest inseveralways,andwewillbriefly survey them
below.Fromtheperspectiveofhoststates,paradiplomaticactivitiesmightbeperceivedas
largelybenign(theparadiplomacyof‘goodintentions’)orindeedhelpfultospecificforeign
policy aims or the international reputation of the state as a whole (value-added
paradiplomacy).However,othertypesofactivitymaybeperceivedasthreateningthehost-
state’s standing, principally in commercial terms, as sub-state and host-state diplomatic
strategies compete for finite resources (competitive paradiplomacy). Perhaps of greater
significanceforstates,andarguablytakingongeo-politicalimplications,arethoseinstances
where a sub-state government enters the ‘big leagues’ of diplomacy, through contesting,
undermining or befuddling key parts of the state’s foreign policy (paradiplomacy on the
‘fringes’ of high politics and the paradiplomacy of recognition). The ongoing fallout from
2016’s Brexit referendum in the UK is arguably a telling example of this dynamic. The
following sections of this chapter go on to explore these tentative categories of activity,
demonstrating the range of ways that paradiplomacy manifests, and the meaning or
significancesuchpracticesholdforavarietyofotheractors.Thediscussionaimstoilluminate
thepotentialcomplexityofcertaintypesofparadiplomaticactivity.
198
I. Paradiplomacyofgoodintentions
The unique operational space that sub-state governments occupy can be utilised for
normativegoods-includingtothebenefitofstatesthemselves,addinganothertooltothe
rangeofstrategiesavailablefordealingwithprotractedinternationalissues.Lookingbeyond
ourthreecasestudiestemporarily,theexampleoftheautonomousregionofÅland,whose
‘special arrangements’ vis-à-vis Finland have been regarded as a possible template for
resolvingethnicconflictinothersettings(Wigell,2013::67),isparticularlyillustrativehere.
Wigell’sstudyidentifiesÅlanditselfaspracticingnormentrepreneurship:utilisingitshistory
andspecial statusasanautonomousregionas its ‘internationalcard’,andadvocatingthe
‘Ålandexample’asamodelforinternationalconflictresolution.Suchnormentrepreneurship
hasitsrootsinboth“genuinelyaltruisticreasons”,and,importantly,inthenormativecapital
that such internationalactivitycangenerate forÅland -particularly in relation toFinland.
AccordingtoWigell(2013::77)“thenormativepowerÅlandgainsthroughthepromotionof
the Åland Example can thus be used to influence its domestic relationswith the Finnish
government”. Wigell then queries the seemingly conspicuous absence of the Finnish
government’s activities in promoting the Åland example, given its proactive use of norm
entrepreneurshipinotherdomains.Wigellarguesthatpartofthisreluctance(thoughthere
werealsoimportantfactorsrelatingtothebalanceofpowervis-à-visÅlanditself)topromote
thisdomesticexamplerelatestotheconcernofdiplomatsthat“promotingtheÅlandExample
may harm Finland’s diplomatic relations with certain states in which minority issues are
sensitive,suchasSpainorTurkey”(2013::82).ForÅlanditself,therearenosuchconstraints
ontheirinternationalactivities.Atthesametime,the‘specialstatus’and‘livedhistory’of
Ålandperhapsmakesitbetterplacedtofulfiltheroleofnormentrepreneursinthisdomain
thantheFinnishstate.
Indeed,normativediplomacyhasbecomeamainstayofmuchsub-stateparadiplomacy.As
discussedintheprecedingchapter,BothWalesandScotlandhavedesignatedinternational
developmentprogrammes(andScotlandhasrecentlyappointedaMinisterforInternational
Development)whichhavebeenlaudedfortheirnovelapproach,representinganadditional
modelofdevelopmentpremisedonreciprocityandmutualexchange.Thefeaturesofthis
199
‘model’wereinfactinformedbytherequirementbybothWalesandScotlandtojustifytheir
endeavoursundertheirresponsibilityforsustainabledevelopment-lacking,astheydo,any
formalcompetenceforinternationaldevelopment.However,thisunusualarrangementhas
provedparticularlybeneficialasamoretargetedapproachsupplementingtheactivitiesof
the UK state (Anyimadu, 2011). In this case, the unintended consequence of sub-state
governments’qualitiesandlimitations intheinternationalsphere isanenhancedrangeof
toolswithwhichtoaddressakeyglobalissue.Wherethereiscertainlyawelcomedegreeof
symboliccapitalgeneratedforWalesandScotlandthroughtheirinternationaldevelopment
activities,onecannotentirelydiscountthemoregenuinenormativeambitionsbehindthe
programmes.ForWynJonesandRoyles(2012:260)thereisnocontradictionbetweenthe
role that the ‘Wales for Africa’ programme plays in projecting - and promoting - welsh
internationalismandthe“genuinecommitmentofmanyAssemblyMemberstointernational
development”.
Normativeparadiplomacy inBavariaarguablyemerges from itsunique ‘burdenofhistory’
and is manifest in the special relationship it pursues with the Czech Republic. Relations
betweenthetwohavehistoricallybeenchallengedbythepost-warrelocationoftheSudeten
people, fromwhat is today theCzechRepublic, toBavaria. TheBavarianoffice inPrague,
openedin2014,representsacleardeparturefromitsotheroverseasoffices,whoselocations
are determined primarily by commercial rationales. According to the head of Bavaria’s
external relations department, Dr Paul Fischer, the representation “is quite special… for
historicalreasons,afterthewar,relationswithourneighbourstheCzechsweredifficult,itis
a great achievement tohave thatoffice and representation inPrague” (Fischer, 2015: 5).
Moreexplicitly,aseniorBavariangovernmentofficialcommentedthat,whenitcomestothe
‘specialrelationship’thatHorstSeehoferhasbuiltwiththeCzechRepublic,“considerations
suchasreallywhetheritisuseful,orpracticalarealsocompletedby[the]question‘isn’tthis
important now, symbolically?’88 In the Bavarian parliament, too, the idea of setting up a
Czech-Bavarian parliamentary assembly was “not with a particular economic interest” in
88Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013
200
mind,but rather tohave“good relations”with theirneighbours,where,at that time, the
relationshipwas“strained”.89
Indifferentways,therefore,allthreecasesdemonstratethenormativeambitionsthatcan
driveparadiplomacyintheabsenceofwhatmayregardedasa‘soundbusinesscase’.This
doesnotmeanthattheseactivitiesbringnobenefitintotheregionorstatelessnationitself;
there are potential gains to bemade both in reputational terms - which aid the ‘nation
branding’exercisesthatsub-stategovernmentsacrosstheboardareinvolvedin-andwith
regardstotheleveragethatthesub-stategovernmentholdsinaninter-governmentalsetting.
For the host-state, normative paradiplomatic activities on the part of their sub-state
governmentswouldseemtobeparticularlydifficulttoargueagainst;thismaygosomeway
towardsexplainingtheleewaygiventoScottishandWelshgovernmentsinconstructingthe
legal bases of their international development programmes. In another sense, however,
normative paradiplomatic activities sit - as other forms of sub-state diplomacy - on a
continuum.Arangeofdifferentfactorsandobjectivesmustfeedintodecisionsonwhereand
howto invest the limitedresources,bothdiplomaticallyand inmonetaryterms, thatsub-
stategovernmentshaveattheirdisposal.Therefore,isolatingnormativeambitionsoverand
aboveanationalorregionalinterestisnotalwaysstraightforward.Furthermore,thereare
certainlycases-suchastherecognitionbytheScottishParliamentandtheWelshAssembly
of the Armenian genocide - where normative objectives drive an activity that then has
unwelcome diplomatic ramifications for both the sub-state and nation-state government,
changingthecharacterandtheimplicationsoftheparadiplomacyitself.Nevertheless,much
aswiththediplomacyofnation-states,theparadiplomaticactivitiesofWales,Scotlandand
Bavariacannotalwaysbereducedtoinstrumentalism;normativelogicshaveaplaceindriving
anddeterminingsomeendeavoursand,inthecasesofWalesandScotland,havecometobe
adistinguishingfeatureoftheiroveralldiplomaticportfolios.
89interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial,2013
201
II. Value-addedparadiplomacy
Thatsub-stategovernmentshavetheirowninternationalagendas-limitedinscopethough
they tend to be - has not escaped the attention of national or ‘host state’ governments.
However, for the most part, in our three case studies, the activities of the sub-state
governmenthavebeenenabledandtoleratedtoperhapsasurprisingdegree.Atan‘official
to official’ level, there is an acceptance and an understanding of the role that sub-state
governmentsareseekingtoplayinternationally.AccordingtoaseniorWelshpolicyadvisor,
theUKGovernmentare“content,moreor less”whenWales involves itself in“thesortof
issuesforwhichwehaveresponsibilityinWales”.90Meanwhile,aseniorWelshGovernment
civil servant characterises theworking relationshipwith the FCOas good, “it justworks…
we’re not in touchwith themevery day,we take their advice if something innovative or
possibly confrontational comes up”.91 Sticking with the Welsh case, the area of climate
changeisonewhereitsinterestsfirmlycoincidewiththoseoftheUKgovernment,andthere
is evidenceof a collaborative approach to international climate policy that arguably adds
value to theUK’sownefforts. TheWelshGovernmentworked closelywith theUK in the
context of the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 2009 and gained UK Government
ministerial support to recognise the role that sub-stategovernmentshave in the“climate
changeagenda”(Royles,2011).WaleshasfrequentlyparticipatedinofficialUKdelegationsto
ClimateChangesummits(ashasScotland)-forexampleatCouncilofEnvironmentMinisters
meetingsleadinguptotheCopenhagensummitandmostrecentlytheParisSummitin2015
-recognisingtheroleofdevolvedgovernmentsinthispolicydomain.Inthisparticularissue
area,where-asinthecaseoftheUSFederalGovernmentanditsstates-differenttiersof
governmentoftenhaveconflicting interestswhen itcomestoclimatechange, in termsof
boththeeffectsandtheburdensofimplementationfelt,thereisarguablyclearvaluetobe
addedbythepresentationofaunitedfrontininternationalnegotiations,somethingwhich
hasprovedtothebenefitofboththeWelshandUKGovernments.
90Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentpolicyadvisor,2013.91Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentOfficial,2013
202
Morebroadly,ineachofourthreecasesthereisanargumenttobemadethatthedistinctive
nationalidentitiesperformedparadiplomaticallycanaddvaluetothediplomaticprofilesof
thehost-state.This logicplaysout in twodistinctways.Firstly, theattributesofsub-state
governmentsthatarepublicisedaspartofparadiplomatic‘profileraising’activitiescan-for
themostpart-beseento‘ruboff’onthestateasawhole,encouragingtourismorinvestment
thatisnotjustconfinedtooneregion.TheUKGovernment’spromotionofStDavid’sdayor
BurnsNight(hostingspecialeventsinoverseasEmbassiesandusingsocialmediatopublicise
Scottish andWelsh visitor attractions or exports)would seem to evidence this perceived
benefit. Secondly, with the normalisation of paradiplomatic activity, and the associated
ascendancyofcorrespondingnorms-oftherightsofregionstoparticipateininternational
affairswhereitcorrespondstoadomesticcompetence,andtheneedtoallowforminority
representation - the relationshipbetweenahost stateand its sub-stategovernmentshas
cometorepresentanimportantpartoftheirinternationalprofile,andhenceacomponent
of their ‘soft power’. This requirement was a key consideration in the UK Government’s
diplomacyinthemidstoftheScottishreferendumonindependence,whereitwasatpainsto
ensurethatitsoverseasstaffwerewellinformedandrespectfulofthediscussionsandwere
seentobeenablingthedemocraticfreewillofScottishvoters.Accordingtoareportcompiled
by the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, therewas an opportunity to “show a
peacefuldemocracyinaction”,inlightoftheinternationalinterestintheUKGovernment’s
approachtothereferendum(UKParliament'sForeignAffairsCommittee,2013:para74).In
contrast,Spain’shandlingofaproposedindependencereferenduminCatalonia,culminating
in“adefactostateofemergency”,“endingCatalanhomerule”weeksbeforethecontentious
votewasduetotakeplace(TheGuardian,2017)perhapsdemonstratesmostclearlytherisks
toahost-state’sinternationalreputation.
Thereare,ofcourse,subtletiestotheinteractionsofhost-stateandsub-stategovernments
whichmayrenderparadiplomacybeneficialtothecentralgovernmentatsometimes,and
less so at others. In Bavaria, this dynamic currently appears to be shifting. The CSU has
traditionallyplayedtheroleof‘badcop’totheFederalCoalitionGovernment’s‘goodcop’to
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themutualadvantageofbothgovernments.92ConservativevotersinFederalelectionshave
beenreassuredbytheCSU’smoreeuroscepticand‘rightwing’policies,oftenplayingout
most noticeably in its interactions with the EU and the ‘watchdog’ role it elects to play
amongstGermanLänderwhenitcomestotherightsofstatesandsubsidiarity,helpingto
keepthesevoterswithintheCSU/CDUblock.However,aswillbeexploredinasubsequent
section of this chapter, the recentmigration crisis and the CSU’s dim view of Chancellor
Merkel’s handling of it, have led to a marked shift in the relationship between the two
coalitionpartners,callingintoquestionthemutuallyadvantageous‘goodcop,badcop’game
theyhavepreviouslyplayed.
III. Competitiveparadiplomacy
The‘bad’ofparadiplomaticactivity is,ofcourse,nottoodissimilarfromthe‘bad’ofstate
leveldiplomacy.However,theseareperhapsoccasionswheretheabilityto‘pickandchoose’
international activitiesmanifests in a competitive relationshipwith the host-state. In this
mode,thesub-stategovernmentisabletominetheinternationaldomainforspecificbenefits
whilst deferring to the competence - and drawing on the resources - of the state-level
government.Theeffectsofthistypeofparadiplomacyarenotassumedtobedestabilising
fortheinternationalsystem;rathertheymaybeparticularlyunwelcomeorconcerningfrom
theperspectiveofstate-leveldiplomats.
TheWelshGovernment,forexample,maintainsparticularlycloselinkswiththeChongquing
MunicipalGovernment inChina; relations ithasbeenbetterable tocultivatewithout the
requirementtoengagewithmorecontroversialdiplomaticissuesaroundtheChinesestate.
ConcernsoverhumanrightsstandardsandthestatusoftheDalaiLamainevitablycomplicate,
andrendermorechallenging,UK-Chinarelations.TheWelshGovernment,however,isable
to extractmaximum economic and cultural benefits from their engagementwith various
Chinese Municipal governments, and avoid such matters of high-politics and diplomacy
entirely. The implications of this hybrid international profile are therefore that, in some
92Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial,2013
204
respects,relationswithsuchChineseregionsarestrongerwithWalesthantheyarewiththe
UK.93Indeed,thesameofficialwentontoelaboratethispointwithananecdoteaboutthe
UK calling on Wales to facilitate meetings with Chongquing officials. This has practical
implicationsfortheWelshGovernment:allowinganeaseofaccesstogovernmentofficials
andpolicymakersthatisanecessaryrequirementofmaintainingeconomiclinkageswithin
thehighlygovernmentalizedChinesecontext.
However, the framework that theWelshGovernment - and sub-state governmentsmore
generally-operatewithinis,ofcourse,qualitativelydifferentfromthatoftheUK(andother
state-levelgovernments).Foronething,theinternationalactivitiesofsub-stategovernment
arealmostentirelyunregulated.Beyondtheir lackofstatutoryunderpinning,activitiesare
notsubjecttoanywherenearthelevelofmediaandotherscrutinythattheactivitiesofstate-
level actors encounter, both domestically and at an international level. The role of
parliamentaryscrutinyinmonitoringdiplomaticactivitiesisakeyareaofcontrastinthecases
ofbothWalesandScotland-incomparisontotheirWestminstercounterparts.Therelatively
smallsizeofthesetwoinstitutions,theNationalAssemblyforWalesinparticular,andthe
lackofinternationalexpertiseintheirmembershiplimitthedegreeofmeaningfulscrutiny
thattheexternalrelationshipsmaintainedbydevolvedgovernmentsaresubjectto.Thefocus
ofthetwoparliamentarybodiesonlegislative-asopposedtoMinisterial-scrutinymeans
thatnon-legislative;quasi-diplomaticactivitiesareableto‘passundertheradar’.
Itdoesnotseemtobesolelyattheregionallevelthattherewardsofparadiplomaticaction
canbereaped.Theinternationalpresenceofsub-stategovernmentsalsoprovidesadditional
accesspointsforawholehostofotheractors:states,multi-nationalcompanies,NGOsand,
indeed, third regions. These nodal points have unique qualities, related to the recurring
themeofhybridity.Mostnotably, the ‘scale’of regionalgovernmentmeans that theyare
oftenabletoofferthirdpartiesahighlevelofaccesstothestructuresofgovernment,andin
particularMinisterial ‘face time’, that represents a greatly valued diplomatic commodity.
Indeed,theBavariangovernmenthasskilfullyusedtheirrelativesizeand‘approachability’in
93AsjudgedbyaseniorWelshGovernmentOfficial,interviewdata2013
205
theircommercialparadiplomacy,withtheservicesthatitisabletoprovideforinternational
investors and trade partners - by virtue of its reduced scale - being key elements of it
success.94Again,thereisnothinginherentlybadaboutthistypeofactivity;ratheritmaybe
perceivedasunhelpful -perhapsevenundermining - for thehost-state’sowncommercial
diplomacy,beingseeninovertlycompetitiveterms.
IV. Paradiplomacyonthefringesof‘highpolitics’
Despite the insistence, in all three of our cases, that economic rationales dominate
paradiplomacy, and foreignpolicy in its traditional sense is exclusively reserved to states,
once can find exceptions that question this overriding rule. Spanning a spectrum of
motivations - from the commercial, to inter-governmental relations and even normative
ambitions-instancesofactivitieswhich,intentionallyornot,fallatthefringesof‘highpolitics’
andclearlyhaveimplicationsfortheforeignpolicystrategiesofstates,canbefoundinboth
ourScottishandBavariancases.
In Bavaria, perhaps the most controversial example of what some commentators have
considereda ‘foreignpolicyon the side’under the leadershipofHorstSeehoferoccurred
recently. In the context of particularly tense relations between Berlin and Moscow -
heightenedbya ‘warofwords’overarapeallegationmadebyaRussian-Germanwoman
against a refugee - the CSU’s condemnation of ChancellorMerkel’s ‘open door’ refugee
policy, and thepresenceof EU sanctions againstRussia, theBavarian leadership’s visit to
Moscow in early February 2016 drew widespread criticism. The following extract from
GermanbroadcasterDeutscheWelledemonstratesthetoneofthereactionwithinGerman
presses:
SeldomhaverelationsbetweenBerlinandMoscowbeeninsuchapoorstateas they are now. Even Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Angela Merkel’s man fordiplomacy,cannotshiftopinionsintheRussiancapital.Andnow,inthemiddleof this diplomatic deep freeze, Horst Seehofer… will honour Kremlin bossVladimir Putin with a visit on Thursday. Seehofer, of all people - Merkel’s
94Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013
206
biggestrefugeepolicycritic.Amanthatlovestopolarize.Thewrongmaninthewrongplaceatthewrongtime?(DeutscheWelle,2016).
Internationalcommentatorsfurtherpickeduponthepotentiallydestabilisingimplicationsof
thevisitforChancellorMerkel’sforeignpolicy.AccordingtotheBBC’sInsideEuropeblog,the
visit “coulddomore toundermine thanboost theBerlinGovernment”; itwas - formany
Germanpoliticians“asteptoofar”(BBCNewsblog'InsideEurope',2016).Meanwhile,the
IrishTimescitesthevisitascausing“alarmandannoyanceinBerlin”,takingplacewhilethe
“timingisdelicate”,andtheWallStreetJournaltermsthemovea“provocationoftheGerman
Chancellor”, the agenda covering topics where he has clashed with Merkel previously -
migrationandsanctionsagainstRussia(TheIrishTimes,2016;TheWallStreetJournal,2016).
Reuters reports theCSU’sdefence that the trip isprimarilymotivatedbygood relations -
especiallyintrade-betweenBavariaandRussia,butarguesthatcriticsarenotreassured.The
articlecitesRoderichKiesewetter,aforeignpolicyspokesmanfor‘Merkel’sconservativesin
Parliament’asstating“SeehoferhasclearlypositionedhimselfagainsttheChancellorinthe
debateonrefugees-Ireallyhopehedoesn’tgoonthistrip”,andNielsAnnen,seniormember
of the Social Democrats,Merkel’s junior coalition partner commenting “Foreign policy is
madeinBerlin,notinMunich”(ReutersUK,2016).
The trip itself was organised by the mayor of Moscow, a typical arrangement for the
internationalvisitsofregionalleadersandonewhichwouldordinarilyhavecloakedthetrip
inthelegitimacyofregionalinterests.However,inthiscase,thevisitclearlyspoketoother
motivations. Intergovernmental relationswere transparently atplay;Bavaria,owing to its
geographicalposition,hasbeenatthefrontlineofChancellorMerkel’srefugeepolicyandits
CSUgovernmenthavebeenhighlycriticalofthepolicyandofMerkel’shandlingofthecrisis.
Indeed,BavarianleaderSeehoferarguedinSeptemberthat:“thesituationinSyriacouldnot
be brought under controlwithout Putin’s help” (DeustcheWelle, 2016). The level of this
personalcriticismofChancellorMerkel’sleadershipseemstogowellbeyondthe‘goodcop,
bad cop’ game that Bavaria plays with the Federal Government, the mutual advantage
arguablyerodedinthiscase.95 Indeed,thereisalsoatransparentcongruenceofinterests
95Interview,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013.
207
betweenRussiaandBavariathatstandsincontrasttothepolicyofBerlin:bothgovernments
wanttoseeanendtoEUsanctionsthatarehamperingthesignificant levelsoftradethat
havepreviouslyexistedbetweenthem,tradeespecially importanttoBavaria’sagricultural
sector.ChancellorMerkel,meanwhile,hasinsistedthattheissueofsanctionsshouldnotbe
discussed until “the cease-fire agreed between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian
troopsisrespected”(ReutersUK,2016).
Therefore, in thisparticularcase, the ‘domestic’concernsofBavaria - toendthe influxof
refugeesandtoincreaseagriculturalexports-havebeentransposedontoaninternational
contextwherekeyforeignpolicyconsiderations,forbothRussiaandGermany-indeedthe
EU-areatplay.DeutscheWellearguesthat“theCSU’sbrandofforeignpolicyhasalwayshad
somethinguniqueabout it”andthatHorstSeehofer“seeshimself inthistradition”.What
marksthechangehere,thearticlecontinues,isthat,whereSeehofer’s“foreignjaunts”were
previously about theeconomic interestsofBavaria, the “floodof refugeeshas givennew
arguments to the Bavarian’s foreign policy ambitions. Since refugees began arriving in
GermanyviaBavaria,thestate’sdomesticpolicieshavebecomefederallyandinternationally
relevant.Thatisanovelty”(DeutscheWelle,2016).
Indeed, the transcript of themeeting betweenHorst Seehofer and President Putin - one
arrangedwiththeassistanceofSeehofer’spredecessor,EdmundStoiber-showsveryclearly
thattheambitionsoftheBavariangovernmentinthisinstancegowellbeyondthedomestic,
andthatthevisitisinterpretedbybothleadersaspartofabroaderactofrapprochement.To
begin with, the meeting is grounded in Bavarian-Russian economic relations, and the
‘friendship’ between the two governments, referencing the ‘legendary’ 2006 meeting
betweenPutinandStoiber,wheretheRussianPresident“plannedtostayforanhour,but
endedupstayinguntilmidnight”.However, thecontentof thediscussionsquickly turn to
foreignpolicy,asthefollowingextract-fromHorstSeehofer-demonstrates:
WehavecomeherefromthefreestateofBavaria,whichtraditionallyhasveryintensivetieswithRussia,andwewanttomaintaintheseties.Bavariaispartofthefederalgovernment.Wearepartofthegovernmentcoalition,andwethinkitisourduty,thedutyofourheartsandsouls,toputabitmoretrustbackintoourrelations.Wethinkthisisessentialintoday’ssituation,lookingatwhatishappeningintheworld.Iamverypleasedthatyousaidtodaythat
208
wearenotcominghereasplotters.Neverintherun-uptoanyofmypreviousvisits to other countries, have I heard as much untruthful and inaccurateinformationasIhavethistime.Whatismostimportantforusistodeepenourrelations,aboveall,orcourse,oureconomicrelations,butthisisnotouronlygoal.Ithinkweneedtodothesameinculturetoo,andinscience.Thesearethingswewilldiscusstoo.Intoday’sglobalisedworld,weinBavaria,withourpopulationof13million,areverymuchaware,ofcourse,ofwhatishappeningeveryday inourworld,whether inSyriaor inUkraine,whetherrefugeesorcrime.Andwebelievethatonlybyactingtogether,andnot inconflictwitheachother,canwesolvetheseproblems. In thisdesire,weseeknot toactagainstourfederalgovernment,buttogetherwithit,andweactnotagainstRussia,buthopetoworktogetherwithRussia(PresidentPutin,2016).
PresidentPutinthenresponds:
Asforvariousrumours,thisisinevitable,butwebothsharegreatresponsibilityformaintainingjobsandcontinuingculturalties,andweknowyourattitudeand your desire to do everything possible to normalise relations betweenRussiaandEuropeandRussiaandGermany.Wearecertainlygratefultoyouforthis(PresidentPutin,2016).
Interpretingthesignificanceofthisexchangeinforeignpolicytermsrequiresustorecallthe
uniquestatusoftheCSUbothinBavariaitselfandwithintheFederalRepublic.Thecurrent
FederalGovernmentcoalition,andthelong-standingalliancebetweentheCSUandtheCSU
give both current and previous Bavarian leaders an international platform that goeswell
beyond that offered to otherGerman Länder.Horst Seehofer’s senior role in the Federal
Governmentmeansthatthirdparties“knowthat,orarebeingtoldbydiplomats,thatheis
probably…numbertwoorthree inGermanpolitics.AndthatChancellorMerkelcannotdo
anythingwithouthisconsent.Andthisissomethingofcoursethatweighsin”.96However,it
isequallyimportanttorecallthatthisvisittoMoscowwasnotundertakenbyHostSeehofer
asarepresentativeoftheFederalGovernment,butratherasthePrimeMinisterofBavaria.
ThevisitwasarrangedbytheMayorofMoscowandexplainedintermsofBavaria’simportant
relationshipwithRussia-onegroundedinmutualtrade.Thatthemeetinghadsignificance
beyond Bavaria’s regional interests, nonetheless, was made explicit in President Putin’s
referencetotheeffortsofHorstSeehoferto“normaliserelationsbetweenRussiaandEurope,
RussiaandGermany”.Thecontentoftheexchangewasthereforeoneofforeignpolicy,ina
tonewhichcontradictedthepreviouspronouncementsofChancellorMerkelandostensibly
96Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013
209
wasatoddswithcurrentFederalGovernmentpolicy.HorstSeehofermetwithChancellor
Merkelaheadofthevisit,andwillhavereceivedbriefingsonthediplomaticpolicyofGermany
inrelationtoRussiaandthekeyforeignpolicyissueslikelytobediscussed.However,having
been‘backedintoacorner’bytheBavarianleadership-onechallengingChancellorMerkel
onmultiplefrontsoverthisperiod-thelevelofcontrolthattheFederalGovernmentinfact
maintainedoverthisexchangeappearstohavebeencompromised.
It is in this manifestation - where contentious aspects of the host state or Federal
government’sforeignpolicyappeartohavebeenchallengedorunderminedbyoneofitssub-
stategovernments-thattheimplicationsofparadiplomacypotentiallytakeonageo-political
significance.InUK,asimilarsituationarosewhenaSNPdelegation,includingMPsandMSPs,
led by former Scottish First Minister and current SNP foreign affairs spokesman in
WestminsterAlexSalmond,visitedIranduringDecember2015,shortlybeforetheliftingof
sanctionswhich followed an agreement between the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK, China,
RussiaandtheUSA)andIranonanucleardeal.Thoughthisagreementwasreachedonthe
14thJuly2015,sanctionswereonlyliftedoncetheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyhad
verifiedthatIranhadcompletedallthenecessarystepstoreach‘implementationday’,on
the16thJanuary2016.ThevisitfollowedincrementalandtentativeimprovementsintheUK’s
relationshipwithIran:aUKEmbassywasreopenedinTehraninlateAugust2015,withPhillip
Hammondattendingtheopeningceremony,thefirstBritishForeignSecretarytovisitthecity
since2003.TheSNP’svisitwasarranged-andfunded-bytheIranianParliament.
Nestedwithin inaclear,andarguablycompelling,businesscase forScottish-Iraniantrade
following the lifting of sanctions, there was also a nascent foreign policymessage being
conveyedbythedelegation.AccordingtoAlexSalmond:
The international agreement with Iran and rapprochement with theWestwhich has accompanied it, is the single most positive development ininternationalrelationsoverthepastyearandthemostimportantdiplomaticachievement of the Obama administration. Now that Iran has taken thesestepsforwardtoreturntotheinternationalcommunity,manycountrieshavebeenpursuingtheprospectofanewmarketplacefortheirgoodsandanewtradingpartner.ItisvitalthatScotlandisnotleftbehindasoutkeystrengths,particularlyineducation,agriculturaltechnology,oilandgasandfinance,arepreciselywhatIranwillfindusefulafter25yearsofsanctions…byestablishing
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adialoguebasedonthesoundScottishprincipleofenlightenedself-interest,wearebuildingapartnershipthatwillservebothcountrieswellforthefuture(AlexSalmond,citedinHeraldScotland,2015b).
Meanwhile,anotherdelegateonthetrip,BillKiddMSP,theSNP’schiefwhipatHolyroodwho
alsoco-chairsaparliamentarygroupfornuclearnon-proliferationanddisarmament,states:
“Scotland has a world-wide reputation, both civically and politically, foroppositiontothecontinuedexistenceofnuclearweaponsbothathomeandinternationally and the Scottish Government is both in favour of a nuclearweaponsconventionandofUNGeneralSecretaryBanKiMoon’sFive-Point-Planforaworldfreefromnuclearweapons…Iran’sre-emergenceontheworldstageasafullinternationalpartnerinthedebateonnucleardisarmamentcanonlyenhancetheprospectsofachievingthatgoal,whichistheaimofthegreatmajorityofnationsandpeoplesacross theglobe” (BillKidd,cited inHeraldScotland,2015b).
The visit to Iran entailed meetings with “the full range of government ministers and
parliamentarians at the highest level, including foreign affairs minister Dr Zarif and the
speakeroftheparliamentDrAliLarijani”,aswellassecuringagreementforanexchangeof
full trade delegations in the spring of 2016 (Alex Salmond, cited in BBC News, 2015).
AccordingtoSNPMPTasminaAhmed-Sheikh,thedelegationhadraisedtheissueofhuman
rightsduringthevisit:
OfhugeimportanceisDrZarif’sreplytoAlexSalmondthatIranispreparedtodiscuss the issue of human rights in an even-handed way with Europeancountries. This included constructive discussion including the use of capitalpunishmentfordrugtrafficking.Thispointstorealprogressbecomingpossibleonavexedissueandisavindicationofourpolicyofengagementanddialogueinsteadofconfrontationandhectoring(TasminaAhmed-Sheikh,citedinBBCNews,2015).
AccordingtoanIraniannewsagency,Tasnim,AlexSalmondfurthertoldthespeakerofthe
Iranian Parliament that Scotland’s “ruling party has always been against the decisions
Westerners make against Iran and believes these decisions, which have caused many
problems for Iran aswell as other countries, are fundamentallywrong” (Herald Scotland,
2015b).AreportcompliedbytheSNPdelegationfollowingthevisitwassubmittedtoScottish
Ministersandlaterreleasedunderfreedomofinformationlaws.ThereportarguedthatIran
‘recognisesScotlandasseparatetotherestoftheUnitedKingdom’,quotinganIranianvice-
ministeras tellingAlexSalmondthat“thedoor isnotopentoeverydelegation thatvisits
Iran”,but that thecountry iswilling toworkwithScotland.Meanwhile theheadof Iran’s
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parliamentarycommitteeonforeignpolicyissaidtohaverecognisedaconnectionbetween
IranandScotlandgoing“beyondeconomicties”(HeraldScotland,2016).
Demonstratingthe ‘foreignpolicy’contentofthisexchange,AlexSalmondtoldtheHerald
Scotland,onhisreturnfromIran,thatthetriphighlightedhowScotland‘canuseitspolitical
profiletocreateforeignpolicyinitiativesandopportunitiesthattheUKgovernmentwould
finddifficultyinaccessing’,andreferencedthewarmwelcomeScotlandreceived,enjoying
‘much more ministerial access than the recent UK Trade and Investment delegation to
Tehran’.AccordingtotheformerFirstMinister“oppositiontoWesternadventurisminthe
MiddleEast,abilateralstanceintradetalksandtheintenttoholdopendiscussionswithout
lecturingandheckling”areallareaswhereScotlandcan‘outplay’Westminsterwhenitcomes
toforeignpolicy(HeraldScotland,2015c).
TheUKGovernment’sreactiontothetripwasnotmadepublic,thoughseveralUKpoliticians
voiced opposition. Alistair Carmichael, the former Liberal Democrat Scottish Secretary
accused the SNPof ‘hollowingout’ the roleof theUKGovernment in Scottishpublic life.
Specifically,hearguedthat“buildingrelationswithacountrywhichhastherecenthistoryof
Iran isadelicateand finelynuancedbusinessandmanypeoplewillwonderwhetherAlex
Salmondisbest-placedtodoajoblikethat”(HeraldScotland,2015a).Meanwhileaformer
ScotlandOfficeminister, Labour’sGeorge Foulkes, interpreted the visit asAlex Salmond’s
attempt to usurp the role of foreign secretary: “it’s a very dangerous precedent really.
RelationsbetweenBritainandIranareimprovingbutarestillverydelicate.Forsomeonelike
Salmondtogocouldcreatetremendousproblems.It’sveryunwise”(HeraldScotland,2015a).
Despite the lack of official comment from the UK Government on the visit, an exchange
betweenAlexSalmondandPhillipHammond’sForeignOfficeisperhapsmoreindicativeof
theirpoliticalrelationship.AccordingtoaGuardianreport“AlexSalmondpaysforsupperin
Tehran-andtriggersconstitutionalcrisis”(TheGuardian,2016),theUKFCOsentamessage
totheScottishdelegation,whilstenroutetoTehran,explainingthattheywerenotentitled
toembassyhospitality.AccordingtoAlexSalmond,thiswas“quiteaseriousmatterbecause
itindicatesthedeeppoliticisationoftheForeignOfficeunderHammond…theForeignOffice
permanentunder-secretaryshouldbeputtinghisfootdowntomakeitclearitistheBritish
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ForeignOffice,nottheToryForeignOffice”.Fortheirpart,aspokeswomanfortheForeign
Officesaid“overseaspostsfollowclearguidanceonarrangementsforvisitingparties.Visiting
politiciansfromasinglepartyareofferedageneralpoliticalbriefing,butitisnottheroleof
overseaspoststoprovidehospitalityortoarrangemeetingsunlessitisforanofficialvisiton
hermajesty’sgovernmentbusiness”.Itis,however,worthpointingoutthatBritishembassy
officialswere included in talks during the visit, including on human rights, trade and the
nuclearpact,andthatthestaff‘ontheground’weresaidbyAlexSalmondtobehelpfuland
cooperative(TheGuardian,2016).
Atonelevelofanalysis,theSNPdelegationtoIranandthepoliticalrhetoricsurroundingit
representsa‘storminateacup’;AlexSalmond-knownforbeingaprovocativeandoutspoken
advocateofScotland’sindependentinternationalstanding-noisilymarkingouttheterritory
of his new role as the SNP’s foreign policy spokesman. It was, after all, not a Scottish
Government delegation, and thus the talks held were by their nature exploratory - no
memberof thedelegationwasauthorised tocommit theScottishGovernment to specific
policy.ThefactthattheScottishGovernmentitselfhasappearedreticenttocommentonthe
triporpublicallydiscussthecontentoftalkswouldindicatethattheyperhapsaretakinga
more cautiousapproach to the relationship.However,whenexamining theeffectsor the
implicationsofparadiplomaticactivity,thereisperhapsatouchofMarkTwain’s‘neverlet
thetruthgetinthewayofagoodstory’.Inotherwords,atageopoliticallevel,thefactthat
itwasnot the ScottishGovernment, but rather adelegationof SNPpoliticians fromboth
Westminster and Holyrood that were taking a forthright view on the future relationship
betweenScotlandandIran,onmajorareasofforeignpolicysuchasnuclearproliferationand
humanrights,andontheperceivedfailingsoftheUK,and‘thewest’moregenerally,may
bearlittlerelationonthelastingperception.
Therearealsoinstanceswheretheparadiplomaticactivitiesofasub-stategovernmenttouch
at the fringes of high-politics unintentionally, or where circumstances beyond the
government’scontroldrawthemintodebatesofatenoroutsideoftheir‘comfortzone’.At
theleast,thiscanbewhereasub-state’sforayintothe‘bigleagues’ofdiplomacycanbegin;
theinternationalspotlightthatasub-stategovernmentreceivescan,ofcourse,thenbeused
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tofurtherother,morecontentiousaims.Anotableexampleinthisregardistheinternational
diplomacy surrounding the release of AbdelbasetAl-Megrahi, on compassionate grounds,
from the Scottish prisonwhere he had been serving a sentence for his role in the 1988
Lockerbiebombings.Thecomplexitiesofthiscase(involvingtheUK,Scotland,theUSAand
Libya-aswellasbothcommercialandpoliticalsensitivities)meantthatmisinterpretation
andcontradictionwererifeinitsreporting,andassuchScotland’s‘diplomacy’surrounding
theinternationalramificationsofthedecisionwasprimarilyofadefensivetone.However,
accordingtoKenealy(2012a:555),asthecaseunfolded,“Scotland’sparadiplomacyshifted
fromastrategyofavoidancetooneusingthereleasetofurthertheideaofanindependent
Scotland.PresentingthereleaseinsuchawaywastobolstertheideaofScotlandasadistinct
entitywith its own set of values, laws and customs and possessing an ability to operate
autonomouslyontheinternationalstage”.
Kenealy characterises the decision as constituting a “two-level process: the British
Government’s behaviour was characterised by commercial interests; and the Scottish
Governments by calculated compassion” (2012a: 556). In sum, he argues that the
paradiplomaticelementofthecasestemsfromtheScottishGovernment’sdecisiontorelease
Al-Megrahioncompassionategrounds,asopposedtounderaprisonertransferagreement
(thepreferredapproachoftheUKGovernment).Hegoesonto isolatetheparadiplomatic
performancesofbothScottishjusticesecretaryKennyMacAskill(placing“aheavyemphasis
onScottishvaluesandidentity”)andAlexSalmond,who“advancedaseconddistinction.The
BritishgovernmenthadblendedjudicialandcommercialissuesintheirdealingswithLibya;
Scotlandhadactedproperlyandinaccordancewithdueprocess”(2012a:569-570).Kenealy
concludesthat:
Thenarrativesweretightlyconstructedandendlesslyrepeatedafteraugust2009.TheopportunitiesforMacAskillandSalmondtoexploittheal-MegrahisagawouldhavebeenunavailablehadAl-Megrahibeentransferred.ThePTA[prisonertransferagreement]narrativewouldhavehadtoincludeBritain,sothedecisionwouldhavelackedadistinctly“Scottish”tone.InthemarginleftbytheBritishgovernment’spursuitofitsnationalinterest,ScotlandfoundawaytoadvancetheideathatiscentraltoitsownnationalinterestasdefinedbytheSNP.WhetherScotland’scompassionwasconsciouslycalculatedoragenuinesenseofcompassionthatsimplycreatedapositiveby-productmight
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alwaysbeunknown.However,itwascertainlyawell-orchestratedandwell-executedpoliticalmove(Kenealy,2012a:570).
In this case, the ScottishGovernment’s ‘right’ tomake a legal decision on the release or
otherwiseofAl-Megrahioncompassionategroundswasunquestionable,indeedScotland’s
autonomous legal system is much older than its devolved parliament. Arguably, it
demonstratesthe‘unintended’internationalimplicationsofsub-statecompetences;proof-
ifanywasrequired-oftheeffectsofglobalizationandintermesticpolitics.ThattheScottish
Governmentinitiallyresistedownershipoftheissue-knowingtheentrenchedinterestson
eithersideofthedebate-furtherspeakstotheseunintendedconsequencesonthepartof
thesub-stategovernmentitself;‘drawingthemin’,lessthanwillingly,toanissuewherethe
national interests of theUSA, theUK and Libyawere all at stake.However, the eventual
coursestruckbytheScottishGovernmentisequallyillustrative;seizinganopportunitytoput
‘clearredwater’,toborrowfromWelshpoliticaldiscourse,betweenthepoliciesofScotland
andtheUK, forthebenefitofbothdomesticand internationalaudiences.Thisstrategyof
“calculatedcompassion”wasoutwiththecontrol-andpresumablytothedislike-oftheUK
Foreign Office. It was a situation both born from and reflective of a process of inter-
governmentalnegotiations,leadinguptoScotland’sdecision,thatdemonstrateda“lackof
willingness on the part of theUK government towork to the letter and the spirit of the
concordats [on international relations]” (Kenealy,2012b:61).As such, the caseevidences
boththefragilityoftheUK’ssystemofintergovernmentalrelations,‘bindinginhonour’only
(Kenealy,2012b:68)andthevalue tosub-stategovernmentsofan international stageon
whichtoperformitsowndistinctiveness.
V. Theparadiplomacyofrecognition
Sub-stategovernmentsaredrawnintorecognitiondebatesfromvariousangles.Ontheone
hand,manysub-stategovernmentspossesssimilar‘defacto’qualitiesofstatehoodtothose
seeking formal recognition as a sovereign state, despite not claiming such a mantle for
themselves.Assuchtheyarebothapointofcomparisonandreferenceforavarietyofactors
when determining whether or not to grant recognition for breakaway governments or
seceded states - particularly for those governments whose own states possess strong
independenceornationalistmovements.Ontheotherhand,somesub-stategovernmentsdo
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indeed seek sovereignty, and are therefore actively involved in the task of securing
international support for their secession from a host state, an activity termed
‘protodiplomacy’intheparadiplomaticliterature(Duchacek,1988a;1990).Additionally,as
hybrid entities whose own diplomacy spans a spectrum of ‘official-ness’, sub-state
governmentsareoftenatargetforunrecognisedstatesthemselves,whererecognitionmay
notcarrythefullweightofinternationallawbutinsteadenhanceclaimsofmoralauthority
orpoliticalappropriatenessandtieintobroadernarrativesoftheinternationalacceptanceof
theaspirantstateorregime.Lastly,intheirinternationalmodes,allsub-stategovernments
seekaformofrecognition:notgenerallyassovereigns,butaslegitimateinterlocutorsoftheir
constituentsandaseffective internationalagents intheirownright;stakingtheirclaimto
theirstatusasa‘player’intheiruniquesovereigntygame(Adler-NissenandGad,2012;Adler-
NissenandGad,2014;Adler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansen,2008).Forexample,Europe’s
‘stateless nations’ often seek a form of recognition from the European Union, yet not
necessarilyasafullyfledgedstate,ratherassomething‘more’thanaregion(Nagel,2004:
74). The ‘line’ between seeking this sort of recognition, and recognition thatmight be a
precursortostatehoodisnotonethatisalwaysclear-cut,andassuchcanrepresentanarea
ofconcernfornationalgovernments.
Unlikethefieldofinternationallaw-whichhaslongdebatedtheseissues-“recognition,asa
generaltopic,hasreceivedrelativelylittleattentioninIR”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:3).Andyet,the
authorcontinues:
Recognition, and non-recognition, is very important. Quite apart from itsimportantpolicyimplications,itisofcentralsignificanceforasubjectthattriesto understand how various actors interact with one another on theinternational stage. Recognition is not just about how states accept oneanother.Itisabouthowtheydefinetheentireinternationalsystem(2012:3).
AccordingtoKer-Lindsay,whilstweknowrelativelylittleaboutthesortsofstrategiesusedby
states attempting to prevent recognition, this belies its significance. Such significance
transcendsthesmallnumberofcaseswearefamiliarwithandbearspotentialrelevanceto
the “20-25 significant separatist movements” within Europe alone; “the coming decades
could see theemergenceofan independentScotland,Flanders,Greenland,Cataloniaand
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Basque Republic… indeed, the prospect of secessionist claims, albeit to wildly differing
degrees…loomsovermostcountries”(2012:5).
Though“strictlyspeaking,recognitionrefersonlytothepracticeofstates”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:
6),itisclearthatthatotheractors-intheirinteractionswithandpronouncementsonaspirant
orsecessioniststates-havearoletoplay.Indeed,Ker-Lindsaygoesontoarguethat:
There is also a far looser usage of the term ‘recognition’ that not onlyincorporatestheformallegalacceptanceofastatebyotherstates,butalsoincludes degrees of acknowledgement by states short of actual legalrecognition. Italsoextendstothe legitimacyconferredbymembershipofarangeororganizationsandparticipationininternationalactivitiesandevents.Again,thesetypesofactivities-especiallythosecarriedoutbyinternationalorganizationsandvarious sportingandculturalassociations -donot in factamount to recognition in its correct sense. Nevertheless, these acts areextremelyimportantintheirownright.Theyallservetostrengthenthestatusofthecontestedstateandcontributetosecuringorstabilizingitsplaceintheinternationalsystem(2012:6-7).
Thesewideracts,accordingtothesameauthor,“signalthataterritory is, insomewayor
another,understoodtobeadistinctpoliticalunitininternationalpolitics”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:
7).Indeed,forCasperson(2009:47-48),de-factostatescancreateeffectivestatehoodinthe
absenceofformalrecognition,“internalsovereigntyis,inotherwords,notruledoutbylack
of external sovereignty”. Returning to themultiple forms that recognition can take, Ker
Lindsay(2012:8)arguesthatthemostusefuldistinctiontobemadeiswithregardtoexpress
or implied recognition. Express recognition refers to situations whereby “a state openly
announces itsdecisiontorecognizethestate inquestion”.Meanwhile, incasesof implicit
recognition, “no formal announcement” is made, “but the situation is such that it can
reasonablybededucedthatrecognitionexists”.Inordertosignalsuchimplicitrecognition,a
statemightcarryoutarangeofactivities:sendinganofficialdelegationtoanindependence
ceremony, dispatching an “official reply” to communications from the territory seeking
recognition,“thatimplicitlyitexplicitlyacknowledgesitsacceptanceasastate”,concludinga
politicalordiplomaticbilateraltreatyorexchangingdiplomaticrepresentatives(Ker-Lindsay,
2012:9).
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In the activities of Wales and Scotland, we can find evidence of sub-state governments
engaginginactivitiesthatcouldamounttobothimpliedandexpressrecognition.Inlargepart
duetothesizeoftheSomaliDiasporawithinWales,theNationalAssemblyandtheWelsh
Governmenthavebeenkeytargetsforactivitiesdesignedtosecureinternationalrecognition
forSomaliland.Inperhapsthemostcontentious‘diplomatic’move-albeitnotonemadeby
theexecutivebranchofWales’Government-theNationalAssemblyforWalesextendedan
invitationtotheSomalilandgovernmenttoattendtheopeningoftheSeneddonthe3rdof
March2006,an initiative interpretedbytheSomalilandpressasofficialrecognitionofthe
break-awaygovernment’slegitimacy(TheSomalilandTimes,2006).Thedifferencebetween
theactivitiesofsub-stategovernments,ontheonehand,andsmallstategovernmentsonthe
othermaybeonethatisincreasinglydifficulttodiscernonaday-to-daylevel.However,under
international law, this distinction remains a pertinent one. The difference also has some
relevance in a more pragmatic sense: the Welsh Assembly’s reported ‘recognition’ of
Somalilanddoesnotcarrythesamediplomaticorlegalforceassimilaractionsbyasovereign
state.However,atapolitical level, this ‘unofficial’ recognitionmay indeedhaveaneffect,
albeitamoremutedone.Theambiguitysurroundingthestatusofsub-stategovernmentsis
compoundedbywidespread confusion regarding the architectureof devolvedor regional
government(suchasbetweentheNationalAssemblyforWalesasalegislature,andtheWelsh
Government as an executive) and the lack of a designated ‘foreign office’ from which
diplomaticmessagesaredirected.
Lessambiguously,inOctober2014theScottishExternalAffairsMinisterHumzaYousafwrote
totheForeignSecretaryPhillipHammondtoarguethattheUKshouldrecognisePalestineas
anindependentstate.AheadofavoteintheUKHouseofCommonsonthetopic-inwhicha
motion supporting recognitionwas carried, albeitwith the abstention ofUKGovernment
Ministers - the ScottishMinister also spokeof the ScottishGovernment’s support for the
upgrading of the Palestinian representation in the UK to embassy level “with immediate
effect”,andoftheirsupportforaseparatePalestinianconsulatetobeopenedinScotland.In
a press release from the Scottish Government, Humza Yousaf comments: “we firmly
encourage both Israel and Palestine to reach a sustainable, negotiated settlement under
internationallaw,whichhasatitsfoundationmutualrecognitionandthedeterminationto
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co-existpeacefully” (ScottishGovernment,2014a).For itspart, theUKGovernmentstates
that-whileitsgoalisindeedanegotiatedtwo-statesolution-itreservestherighttogrant
recognitionatatimeofitsownchoosing,whereitwouldbeofgreatestbenefittothepeace
process.AccordingtoMiddleEastMinisterTobiasEllwood,thetimingofanyrecognitionwas
critical; “you can after all only play this card once” (BBC News, 2014). Given the UK
government’sperceptionoftime-sensitivity inthisparticularcase,aswellasthereactions
thattheScottishpositiongeneratedinglobalpresses,itwouldindeedappearthatthisactof
- or ‘mimicking’ of - an express form of recognition had real foreign policy implications.
Though,liketheHouseofCommonsvote,theeffectsofsuchactivitiesare‘symbolic’,such
symbolism can be impactful, particularly where it builds towards a ‘critical mass’ of
internationalsupport.
TheactivitiesofbothWalesandScotlandinthetwoinstancesabovearguablyamounttowhat
Ker Lindsay described as helping to “strengthen the status of the contested state and
contributetosecuringorstabilizingitsplaceintheinternationalsystem”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:
7). From a post-structuralist perspective, diplomacy can be “productive of geopolitical
space”, and as such the activities of sub-state governments in the high-stakes game of
recognitioncanbeinterpretedassomethingofrealsignificance.Togetherwiththeactivities
ofother ‘outliers’of the international system, sub-stateparadiplomacycan illuminate the
“tensionbetweenformaldiplomaticpracticesandnon-stateactors”(McConnelletal.,2012:
806).
Conclusion:the‘fairweather’diplomats?
ForAdler-NissenandGad (2012:3),by“focussingonwhatappear tobemarginal sitesof
internationalrelations,weareabletoseemuchmoreheterogeneitythanIRtheoryusually
allowsaglimpseof”.Inthecaseofparadiplomacy,whetheronerecognisesgreatertruthin
thefree-ridingorfree-wheelingmetaphorsoutlinedabove,itisclearthatthelargedegreeof
flexibilitythatsub-stategovernmentspossessintheirdiplomaticactornessputsthematodds
withtheirstatecontemporaries.Inmanyways,thisflexibilitycanrepresentanadvantagein
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diplomaticterms:sub-stategovernmentsareabletodirecttheir(generallylimited)resources
towardsonly‘win-win’endeavours.Whencrisesoccurorhostilityarises,whensituationsare
intractable or relationships become difficult or embarrassing, or even simply where it
wouldn’tbepoliticallyexpedienttointervene,thesub-stategovernmentisabletodeferto
state-widecompetence.Ultimateresponsibilitydoesnotrestwiththeregion.Whenstate-
diplomacy is unattractive for any reason, sub-state governments can seek to distance
themselvesfromit-asthecaseofScotland’spronouncementsonoverseasaidexpenditure
demonstrates.Thisisnottosaythatallsub-stategovernmentsoperateinthisnarrowlyself-
interestedway,ratherthattheirambiguousstatuswouldallowthemtodosoinawaynot
easilyreplicatedbyotheractors.
Inasmuchasthere isnothing inherently ‘bad’aboutsub-statediplomacy,nordoesthere
seemtobeanythingparticularly‘good’aboutitfromanethicalordeontologicalpointofview.
‘Smaller’ isnotalwaysbetter, anda recent studyof SouthAfrican regionspresentsa key
challenge to the argument that paradiplomacy is necessarily either a democratizing or
developmentalforce(Nganje,2014).Indemocraticterms,thelackofscrutiny-fromregional
parliaments, localmedia, inter-partycompetition-ofparadiplomaticactivity,aidedbythe
fact that it tends to be relatively uncontroversial and often ‘unspectacular’ (Aldecoa and
Keating, 1999b: :19) in nature, is surely a concern for anyone concerned with ‘good
governance’.Indeed,couldmuchparadiplomaticactivitybereducedtoavanityexerciseon
thepart of regional politicians? Lesspejoratively, couldparadiplomacy really be all about
symbolism-withstate-levelactorsallowingsub-stategovernmentsto‘play’atforeignpolicy
as an appeasementmechanism? The case of Tatarstan arguably demonstrates that using
paradiplomacyasawaytomakecredibletheinternaldiscourseofsovereignty,whichinthis
casemayactuallybecentredaroundrationalisteconomicclaims, isacrediblestrategyfor
some sub-state governments (Albina, 2010: :123). Themeaning of such paradiplomacy is
thereforeonepremisedalmostentirelyarounddomesticconcerns-dosuchactivitiesreally
representachallengetothestate-centricdiplomaticsystem?
Infact,itwouldseemtobeinits‘uglier’manifestationsthatparadiplomacyraisesthemore
pertinent questions for diplomatic studies. This dynamic is one addressed in detail by
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MarciacqinthecontextoftheRepublikaSrpskaandBosniaHerzegovina(Marciacq,2015).
Here,theauthorargues,thecontestingofstate-levelauthoritybyasub-stategovernment
has different implications in the context of a ‘malfunctioning state” such as Bosnia and
Herzegovina,where‘lengthystate-buildingeffortshavenotalleviatedtheriskofinstability’.
The author continues that the development of the Republika Srpska’s paradiplomacy is
“driven by ethno-political competition, facilitated by state and sub-state actors’ mutual
disregard,andthatitbothechoesandamplifiesthesystemicmalfunctioningofBosniaand
Herzegovina”(Marciacq,2015:329).Itisnotautomaticallythecasethatsub-statediplomacy
infragilestatesaccentuatessuchfragility(viahollowingoutthefunctionsoftheemergentor
malfunctioningstate),ratherthevariableseemstobethewayinwhichsub-statediplomacy
develops,specificallywhetheritis“drivenbycooperationorcompetition”(Marciacq,2015:
343). The roleof sub-statediplomacy in fragile states is certainly anunderexploredone,
somethingthatMarciacqarguesisparticularlyunfortunate‘giventherelevanceofsub-state
diplomaticstudiestostate-buildingtheories”(2015:332).
Theambiguityofsub-stategovernment’sdiplomaticstatus-combinedwiththeirwillingness
toshareopinionsoncontroversialissues-hasapotentiallyerosiveeffectoncentralconcepts
andpracticesininternationalrelations,suchasrecognition.Atthesametime,asimilareffect
could arguably be seen on the unquestioned legitimacy of states as principal diplomatic
agents.Wherethesub-stategovernmentcanbeseentomoreaccuratelyrepresenta‘foreign
policy’positiononthepartof itsconstituents,thisbecomesaclearchallengeforthoseat
central-state level. In the context of increasingly salient regional and sub-state national
identity,thischallengewouldappeartobeaparticularlyimportantone.
221
Conclusion
Thisthesisusedparadiplomacyasa lensthroughwhichtoexaminetheconfluenceoftwo
separate forces: the efflorescence of regionalism and sub-state nationalism and the
diversificationandstratificationofdiplomaticpractice.CurrentpoliticaleventswithintheUK
and thewiderEuropeanneighbourhooddemonstratehowrelevant thispotential collision
remains. In Scotland, a resounding ‘no’ vote to theUK leaving the EU stood in clear and
uncomfortable contrast with the popular vote throughout the rest of the UK.What has
followed is a set of interrelated debates and political disagreementswhich, according to
McEwan, fundamentally expose “the difficulties in reconciling rival self-determination
claims”:
‘TheBrexitvotehasalsoraisedagaintheissueofScotland’splacewithintheUK, and for some justifies reconsideration of the decision the Scottishelectorate made to remain within the UK by rejecting independence in2014…… the ‘one nation’ nationalist rhetoric of theUKGovernment in theaftermathofthevoteisatoddswiththeplurinationalcharacteroftheUnitedKingdom’(McEwan,2017).
Scotland’smanydisagreementswiththeUKGovernmentoverthewayinwhichtheBrexit
resultistranslatedintopolicy,itsthwartedattemptstosecureasecondreferendumandits
formulationofalternativescenariosforScotland’s futurerelationshipwiththeEUhaveall
beencarriedoutortransposedontoaparadiplomaticplane.Here,theirdesiretorepresent
what they see as the legitimate interests of their nation, a distinct ‘people’ or political
communitythathasexpressedafirmdesiretoremainpartoftheEU,hascomeupagainst
somehardand–fornow,attheleast–immovableboundaries.TheUKGovernment’sview
hasbeenthatitis“thedecisionofthewholeoftheUKwhichmustberespected”,anditis
theirjobalonetonegotiatetheUK’sdeparturefromtheEU(McEwan,2017:66).Evenwhen
European leaders such as Jean-Claude Junker rushed to meet with Nicola Sturgeon
immediatelyfollowingthevote,admittingthatScotlandhad“wontherighttobeheardin
Brussels”,thiswasquicklyfollowedbyareminder:Junkerwouldnot“interfereinaninner
Britishprocess”(BBCNews,14thDecember2016).Thesehardbordersarethatofsovereignty,
oftheviewsofotherEUMemberStatesunwillingtosetaprecedentwithconsequencesin
their own neighbourhoods – such as Spain and France, both of whom opposed the EU
negatingpotentialmembershipforScotland(BBCNews,29thJune2016).However,thereisa
222
broaderfunctionthatparadiplomacyperhapsachievesinthiscontext.Byarticulatingthevery
separatenessofScotlandtotheUK,andinframingtheissueasoneofScotland’srighttoa
differentkindofself-determinationthantheonesoughtbytheUKGovernmentinextricating
itselffromtheEU,theScottishGovernmentreinforcesitssenseofnationhood,andmakesa
case for requiring additional political resources to adequately represent and govern ‘its
people’. In this context, paradiplomacy allows the imagining of the Scottish political
communitytobedefinedincontrasttotheinternationalobjectivesandprioritiesofother
actors, in this case theUKGovernment. For theUKGovernment, thismust represent an
unwelcome aspect of the ongoing debate. As Segura argues, sub-state governments can
presentaveryspecificchallengetostate-authority:
‘Sub-stateinternationalactionsformpartofthegrowingbodyoftransnationalrelationswhicharecharacteristicofthecontemporaryinternationalsystem,but states are especially wary of these due to their formal, symbolic andmaterial proximity to state-level foreign policy,which remains an exclusiverealm of state power. It is for this reason that sub-state governments,especially intheir initialphasesofprojection,havehadtoexertpressuretofindtheirplaceontheinternationalscene,andthisexplains,atleastinpart,thecontroversialdimensionoftheirinternationalaction’(GarciaSegura,2017:345-346)
The Brexit debate inevitably raises questions about both the nature and the location of
sovereignty in ways that perhaps blur and befuddle the objective lines of demarcation
betweentheUKasastateandScotlandasasub-stategovernment.AsMcEwanargues:
‘Theconceptof‘apeople’isoftensynonymouswith‘anation’asthebasisofsolidarityandlocusofsovereignty…butdeterminingwhoorwhatconstitutesanation, andwhodoesn’t, is no less ambiguous.Contrary to somebeliefs,nationsarenotprimordialcommunitiesbutaresociallyconstructedovertimeand,whilemanysharesomeculturalorlinguisticcharacteristic,migrationandcultural plurality make these insufficient criteria of nationhood. A sharednational identity and mutual sense of belonging – captured in BenedictAnderson’s (1991) celebrated definition of nations as ‘imagined politicalcommunities’ – overcomes the limitations of objective criteria’ (McEwan,2017:70).
WhilstScottishinterventions–diplomaticandinter-governmental–maynothavesecureda
‘specialdeal’forScotlandintheBrexitfallout,theymaysignalsomethingmoresignificant.
Indeed,thecontrastingself-determinationnarrativesinScotlandthewiderUKperhapsreflect
223
whatAwan-Scullyarguesistheincreasinglackofshareddebatesandsharedpoliticalchoices
acrosstheUKthatmightworktotieapoliticalcommunitytogether,giving itthesenseof
beinga‘coherentandunitednation’.Thenatureofthe‘electoralmenu’acrosstheUKhas
changed in fundamental ways: “voters in the UK’s four nations are increasingly being
presentedwithfundamentallydifferent,andlargelydisconnected,setsofpoliticalopinions”.
Thiselectoraldisunityhaspotentiallyprofoundimplicationsandis“deeplyproblematicfor
thelong-termunityandintegrityoftheUK”:
‘IntheabsenceofagenuinelyBritishpartypolitics,theBritishstatemayhavealimitedlifeexpectancyasacontinuingandunitedentity’(Awan-Scully,2018:5).
Whereparadiplomacyfitsintothisbigger,contemporarypicture,isintheabilityitgivesthose
sub-stategovernmentswhorepresentastatelessnationto‘speakthenation’internationally
andenhancetheirlegitimacyasarepresentativeoftheirdistinctpeople,whilstalsofurther
refiningandhighlightingthedistinctivenessoftheirnationasaseparatepoliticalcommunity,
byeitheraligningordistancingitselfinrelationtootheractors.Paradiplomacyfunctionsas
boththecauseandtheconsequenceofthisbiggershiftinthecharacterofsomeplurinational
states–suchastheUK.Sub-stateactorsareempoweredbyaninternationalvoicetoseek
andeffectchange,andtheyarerequiredtodevelopaninternationalvoiceasaresponseto
change.Inotherwords,paradiplomacybothprovidesthetoolkitforpoliticalmobilisation–
the ability to look and sound ‘state-like’, to seek inward investment, develop normative
programmesofassistanceorkinships–andreflectsandstrengthensanunderlyingforcethat
advances steadily in thedirectionof a greater role fornon-stateactors, specifically those
representingadistinctpoliticalcommunity.
The intentionof this thesiswas to examineparadiplomatic activity in away that resisted
treatingitsmoreambitious,developedelementsasmereaberrations.Instead,thosetypesof
activities,andtheuniquepoliticalcontextsthatinform,driveandmediatethemwereatthe
centreoftheanalysis.Anattemptwasmadetolookatparadiplomacyitselfinasystematic
andwholesaleway,askingaseriesofquitesimplequestionsrelatedtothecolloquial‘what’,
‘how’,‘why’and‘so,what?’.Oneaimwastodefinesomecommonalitiestotheactivitiesthat
sub-stategovernmentswereengagedininternationally.Anotherwastogiveamoreovertly
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politicalaccountofthemotivationsthatsub-stategovernmentshadforventuringoutonto
the world stage and to explain the ways in which they went on to construct a form of
internationalagencyandlegitimacy.Sequentially,thethesisthensoughttoprobetherange
ofpossiblewaysinwhichdifferenttypesofparadiplomaticbehavioursmightbeinterpreted
and perceived by other actors in the international system, and to begin the process of
categorisingthisvarietyofactivities.
Therewerealsoexploratorystepstakentowardssignpostinganewtheoreticalapproachto
paradiplomacy that might allow a move away from the descriptive accounts that have
dominatedtheliterature(McConnelletal.,2012:806).PartOneofthethesis,ChaptersOne
andTwo,setoutthisstall;arguingthatparadiplomacyhadbecometoocloselyassociated
withtherelatedconceptofmulti-levelgovernance,disguisingsomeofthemorenoveland
perhapschallengingfeaturesofparadiplomacyitself.Itcalledforamorethoroughgrounding
of paradiplomacy within the field of international relations, allowing an actor-focussed
explorationof the practices and characteristics of sub-state governments as international
agents.Thispartofthethesis introducedthereadertoanalternativesetofconceptsthat
wereusedinthesubstantiveanalysistofollow,principally:sovereigntygames,mimicryand
performativity.Theprincipalcontributionsmadetotheliteratureofparadiplomacyinthese
sectionsrelatedtoafairlyradicallyreorientationofthetheoreticalframeworktowardsthe
disciplineofInternationalRelationsandspecificallytoalargelyconstructivistapproachwith
someimportantelementsofpracticetheory(Neumann,2002;BuegerandGadinger,2018).
PartTwoofthethesisaddressedasetofbroadlysequentialresearchquestions,attempting
toteaseouttheparadoxesseeminglyinherentinparadiplomaticactivity.InChapterThree
weexaminedthelegalandconstitutionalbasisofparadiplomacyineachofourcasestudies
andsawthatthiswassubstantiallyvaried,somethingborneoutinotherstudies:“researching
regionalsub-statediplomacyissometimeslikecomparingappleswithpears:theylookand
taste different” (Criekemans, 2010b: 39) . A key distinction between our cases was the
provisionmadeintheUK’sMemorandumofUnderstandingforbothScotlandandWalesto
‘optin’totheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations,andtoreceiveofficialdiplomatic
status, through operating out of the UK Government’s own diplomatic missions. Under
225
Germany’sBasicLawtherewasnosimilarprovisionandallofBavaria’sdiplomaticrelations
were‘unofficial’andnotpartytotheconvention.Bavaria,foritspart,hasothercapabilities
lackinginbothScotlandandWales,notablytheabilitytomakeinternationaltreaties,though
thereisstillsomedebateabouttheextentandinterpretationofthesepowers.Evidentacross
allthreecaseswasadegreeofcompromiseandpragmatismwhichoftenshapedthenature
of overseas representation. From Scotland’s willingness to co-locatewith UKmissions to
Bavaria’sincremental‘stretching’ofitsrepresentationalanddiplomaticfunctions,throughto
theconsciousexpansionofScotlandandWales’remitforsustainabledevelopmenttoallow
for their respective African international aid programmes. This investigation also
demonstratedtheextenttowhichindividualcircumstancesandvariedpoliticalandhistoric
contextsinformedtheparadiplomaticstrategiesusedbyeachofourthreecasestudies,and
indeedthepartnerstargeted:WalesandPatagonia,BavariaandtheCzechRepublic,Scotland
andtheNordicregion.Waleswasseentofocusmoreorlessexclusivelyontargetingother
regionsand indeed regionalnetworkswhereasbothScotlandandBavariaexpanded their
activitiestoincludethirdstates,aidedbyfactorssuchastheeconomicweightofBavariaand
thesuccessfulnationbrandingeffortsofScotland.
InChapterFourweexploredtheconundrumthateconomicmotivations,thoughundoubtedly
crucialtomuchparadiplomaticactivity,couldnotaloneexplainthevariedwaysinwhichit
wasmanifest-ornarrated-ineachofourcasestudies.Whilethe‘economicargument’may
help to ground paradiplomacy in a perceived legitimacy and overcome its “aura of
inappropriateness”(Hocking,1999:36),thenatureofsub-stateactivitiesdemonstratedthat
therewerefurtherpiecesofthispuzzletobeuncovered.Reflectingonthepoliticalcontexts
ofeachofourcasestudies, itbecameapparentthatthecurrencyofmuchparadiplomatic
activitywas,infact,sovereignty.Whatwastakingplace,therefore,couldbeinterpretedas
partofwhatAddler-NissenandGadterma‘sovereigntygame’:theback-and-forthofasub-
andcentralstategovernmentasitrelatestotheir‘relationalsubjectivity’(Adler-Nissenand
Gad, 2014; Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2012). Given that paradiplomacy entails a sub-state
government touching on a key area of activity typically reserved for states, there is a
referencebeingmadetosovereignty-evenifitremainsimplicit-andtothelegitimacyofa
sub-stategovernment’sparticipationinsuchafield.
226
Variousaccountsofparadiplomacyhavehoned-inontheconceptualcategoriesofstateless
nationsandnation-building,oftenmaking thedistinctionbetweenparadiplomacyand the
morecontentious‘protodiplomacy’,ortheexternalactivitiesofa‘stateinwaiting’(Duchacek,
1990; Duchacek, 1988b). Though there is indeed an important interplay between these
forces,theanalysispresentedheresawthismanifestinginperhapslesslinearordirectional
terms.Whenviewedthroughthelensofasovereigntygamewecanseethevaluethatsimply
beingacceptedasaplayerinthegameitself,regardlessofanyfixedconstitutionalorpolitical
end-point,has for sub-stategovernments. Indeed, theanalysispresented inChapterFour
argues that this conception of a game, playing on the associations and meanings of
sovereignty,mighthelptoexplainthebroadlysimilarwaysinwhichparadiplomacywasbeing
conducted across cases whose governing parties held markedly different views on their
constitutionalteleology.Thoughtheconfigurationsofeachofthesovereigntygamesinour
case studies did differ, at heart they were all about the recognition of the sub-state
government as aplayer in its owngame. There appears tobe a commonattempt touse
paradiplomacytomakeastatementaboutrelativepowerandauthority.
In Chapter Fivewe questioned the process of international agency creation, employing a
performativity framework to understand the ways in which sub-state governments have
sought legitimacy and credibility as international actors. These processes are not
unchallenged, indeedcontestationandnegotiationwerehighlyvisible in relation to these
attemptsatagencycreation:fromtheUKandScottishGovernments’tussleoverthePanda
diplomacy, to the slow acceptance of Bavaria’s European office and its ‘representation’
function.Thechapterexploredthewaysinwhichlegitimacyhasbeensought:throughsub-
stategovernmentsdrawingheavilyontheirrepresentationalqualities,throughmimickingthe
discourse and symbols of states and through appealing to dominant liberal international
norms.
InChapterSix,weconsideredthecharacteristicsthatsub-stategovernmentsseemtoshare
whenoperatingasinternationalagents.Theyoccupyaninternationaloperationalspacethat
is largelynon-statutory and is very loosely institutionalised, nor is it subject to significant
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levels of scrutiny. In possessing an ability, yet no corresponding obligation, to act
internationally, sub-state governmentsmight be seen to ‘free-ride’ on the foreign policy
competencesoftheirstates.Examplesofthistypeofbehaviour,oratleaststrongprecedents
forit,emergedfromsomeoftheinterviewsconductedaspartofthisresearch.Theabilityof
devolved governments in the UK to ‘pass under the radar’ and refuse to be drawn on
contentiousforeignpolicyissueshasmeantthatrelationshipswithrelatedorrelevantparties
wereleftunscathed.However,suchinstancesremainisolated.Instead,amoreaccurateway
toconceiveofthisselectivitywhenitcomestointernationalrelationsisthatofasub-state
government ‘free-wheeling’ in thespacebehind thehigh-politicsof inter-statediplomacy.
Thispotentiallyallowsthemtodevelopnichediplomaticstrategiesornovelinstruments,such
asthereciprocalapproachtointernationalaidshowcasedbyScotlandandWales(Anyimadu,
2011)or the focuson technicaldevelopmentassistance inCentralandEasternEuropeby
Bavaria. It also allows sub-state governments to focus on those areas or relationships of
greatestbenefittothem,whetherthatisineconomic,political,culturalorotherterms.The
chapteridentifiedarangeofscenariosorcategoriesofactivitythataimedtodemonstrate
thevarietyofwaysinwhichparadiplomacymayimpactuponorbeperceivedbyotheractors:
the paradiplomacy of good intentions, value-added or competitive paradiplomacy,
paradiplomacyonthefringesofhighpoliticsandtheparadiplomacyofrecognition.Eachof
thesecategoriesistentativeandwouldbenefitfromrefinementinthecontextofadditional
datafromabroaderrangeofcase-studies.However,theyareintendedforourpurposesasa
blunt tool to enumerate and identify the potential complexity of paradiplomacy as a
‘normalised’featureofglobalpolitics.
Inpullingtogetherthevariousthreadsoutlinedabove,wereturntoAdler-NissenandGad’s
argumentthattheunassumingborderlandsofInternationalRelationsispreciselytheareain
whichtoseetheheterogeneityofthefield,and‘enquiryatthemargins’isanimportantway
to develop International Relations theory(Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2012: 3). Expanding the
‘analyticalgaze’ofdiplomacyallowsustoincorporatetheselessonsfromthemarginsinto
ourunderstandingsofsomeofthemostfundamentalquestionsof internationalrelations:
“legitimacy, recognition, statecraft and sovereignty” (McConnell et al., 2012: 804). Rather
than assuming a set of capabilities that sub-state governments have internationally, this
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thesisinsteadprobedtheactualpracticesoftheseactors,andindoingsoilluminatedarange
ofwaysinwhichparadiplomacyinteractswithandchallengesthetraditionallyhierarchical
rolesofstateandsub-stategovernment.
Amongseveralthingsthatthisthesisdidnotdo,however,twoareparticularlyimportantto
note.Thefirstoftheserelatestothetimeperiodduringwhichdatawascollected,whichhas
meantthatthechangesandchallengesresultingfromtheUK’sreferendumonleavingthe
EuropeanUnionin2016havefallenoutsideofthescopeofthisresearch.Theperiodfollowing
thisreferendum,andthewaysinwhichthe‘Brexitquestion’hasunfoldedinbothScotland
andWales has broughtmany of the latent tensions noted in this thesis to the fore, and
undoubtedly in other ways would have added important data and insight to the study.
Nonetheless,thesedevelopmentshavearguablyshoneabrighterlightontheparadiplomatic
practicesoftheUK’sdevolvedregionsandmayhelptocatalysefurtherresearchinthisarea.
Indeed, the themes explored in the course of this study, and the tentative framework
introduced for amoreactor-centred theoryofparadiplomacymayprovideaplatform for
understandingthe‘Brexit’fallout.
Secondly,initsfocusonthemoredevelopedaspectsofparadiplomacy,thoseconverselyless
developedactivitieshavenotfeaturedheavilyinthisaccount.Thoughattemptshavebeen
madetodrawcomparisonsonthetone,contentandrelativelevelsofresourcedirectedat
differentaspectsofparadiplomacyfromourthreecasestudies,thereisnodetailedanalyses
of,forexample,theeconomicorcommercialparadiplomacythatBavaria,WalesandScotland
allconduct,oroftheroutineinteractionsofthesegovernmentswiththestructuresofthe
EuropeanUnion.This is for tworeasons.Ontheonehand,such interactionsareprecisely
wherepreviousresearchhasbeendirected,andusingmuchbiggerpoolsofdatathanthis
projecthadaccess to.Ontheotherhand, the fact that thiswasacomparativestudythat
lookedtounderstandthe‘biggerpicture’ofparadiplomacyandattemptedtodiscernsome
commonfeaturestoparadiplomaticinteractionsinthecasesofsub-statenationsmeantthat
timeandresourceswerestrictlylimited.Prioritywasthereforegiventothoseareaswhere
theclarityofanoverwhelmingeconomicorfunctionalbusinesscasewaslackingand,assuch,
othermotivationsweremoreevidentlyondisplay.
229
Furtherareasweresimplybeyondthescopeoftheresearchprojectunderpinningthisthesis.
Thereactionstoandperceptionsofparadiplomacyonthepartofcentral-stateofficialsand
politicianswouldhavebeen fascinating to investigate througha seriesofelite-interviews;
telling the other side of our ‘sovereignty games’ story. The broader question of how
paradiplomacy is understoodby actors other than the sub-state government itself seems
enduringlyrelevantandwasonlyaddressedpartially in thisstudy.One immediatearea in
whichthismightbeprobedisthroughananalysisofconsularrepresentationwithinregions,
reflectingonthevaluethatexternalpartiesseeintheirrelationshipswithsub-stateactors.
TheattractivenessofMunichandEdinburgh(thoughnotCardiff,afurthersharpcontrastin
theperceptionsofeachofourcases)aslocationsforconsularrepresentationwasremarked
upon at several points during this study and indicates, once again, the ways in which
international agency helps to constitute the self-perception of the region or sub-state
government itself.Morebroadly, future research in this areamayusefully probe the link
between stateless nationalism and the sorts of advanced paradiplomatic interactions
uncovered in this thesis, using the categories of activity identified here to highlight any
differencesor similarities in the sortsofparadiplomacy thatother sub-stategovernments
carryout,particularlythat–comparativelyverylargegrouping–ofsub-statelocaleswitha
regionalidentitystoppingshortofsub-statenationalism.Inotherwords,dothefindingsin
thisthesis–relatedtoasmallsub-setofregions–alsohaveimplicationsforamuchlarger
group,andthusrepresentamoresignificantandpersuasivephenomenon?
In concluding this thesis,we return briefly to two common themeswhich have emerged
stronglythroughouttheanalysispresentedabove.Thefirstofthesethemesrelatestothe
factthat,asever,contextisking.Paradiplomaticactivitiesarebytheirnaturemulti-locational.
Sub-stategovernmentsarenestedwithinabroaderstatestructureandmust insomeway
transcendorbypassthatstructureandforgedirectrelationshipswithotheractors:regions,
organisations or third states. The political context, therefore, does not only include that
withintheregion,butalsothatofthestateandtherelationshipbetweendifferenttiersof
government. The diplomacy of sub-state governments does not occur in a vacuum: the
spectreofthestateloomslarge.Similarly,theuniquepoliticalcontextfacingeachofthesub-
230
stategovernmentsfeaturedinthisanalysishasbeenkeynotonlyintermsofthemotivations
behindparadiplomacy,butalsotothewaysinwhichthisparadiplomacyhasbeenreceived
byotheractors.
Itisperhapssurprising,giventhepoliticaldifferencesseeninBavaria,ScotlandandWales,
that the nature of their paradiplomatic activities, the images that they cultivate
internationallyandtheinstitutionalarrangementsunderpinningtheirexternalpresenceare
allrathersimilar.Certainly,thereareareaswhereScotlandandBavariagobeyondthesorts
ofactivitiesconductedbyWales,inparticularwhenitcomestotargetingnationstatesrather
thanthirdregions.Thereareundoubtedlythematicdifferences,too.Butthemoreinteresting
markerisinsteadthedifferingwaysthattheseoftenbroadlysimilarbehavioursareperceived.
InScotland,forexample,reactionsfromboththeUKGovernmentandotherScottishandUK-
widepoliticalpartiestodiplomacyonIran,India,thereleaseofAbdelbasetal-Megrahi,the
Palestinianquestionandnumerousotherissuesarealwaysrefractedthroughtheprismof
Scottishindependence,andaresubjecttothepoliticalfaultlinesandsuspicionsthatexistin
thiscontext.ContrastedwithBavaria,whoseeconomicclouthasaffordedithigh-levelnation-
stateaccess(includingwiththoseofavastlydifferentsizeandstandingtoitself,suchasIndia),
thereisamarkeddifferenceinthewaythatsuchactivitiesareperceived.Aidedbyadegree
ofparty-politicalcongruenceintheFederalandBavariangovernmentsandarecenthistory,
andstrongpoliticalnarrative,ofco-operationalfederalism,Bavariahasbeenabletopursue
itsparadiplomacyinaverydifferentclimatethanthatfacingScotland.
Theimportanceofterritorialcleavages,themechanismsofintergovernmentalrelationsand
themoregeneraltenorofrelationsbetweendifferentlevelsofgovernmentwasreaffirmed
timeandagaininthecourseofthisresearchproject.IntheUK,forexample,theperceived
challengetothedevolvedgovernments’scopetoconductparadiplomacywasnotacaseof
party-political incongruence across a left-right axis, but rather in terms of the territorial
cleavagesatplay;“whoeverisinpoweratWestminsterandWhitehall,itisstillWestminster
andWhitehall… in the international context, that’s the more important division, it’s the
231
divisionbetweendifferenttiersofgovernment”.97Thedegreetowhichtheuniquepolitical
contextineachofourcasestudieshasimpactedthewaysinwhichtheirparadiplomacyis
understood isperhapstobeexpected. Inmanyways,andcontrarytothe impressionthat
paradiplomaticactorsoftengive,paradiplomacyisapoliticallychargedactivity.Tensionsare
almostboundtoariseinthisfieldbecausetheareaitself-diplomaticrepresentation,foreign
affairs, international relations, however one frames it - touches so closely on a key state
prerogative.
Thisbringsustothesecondoverarchingthemethatwewillconcludewith:theparadoxical
nature of paradiplomacy. On the one hand, we can understand paradiplomacy as a
sovereigntygamethatdrawsonfundamentaltenetsofpowerandauthorityandisaboutthe
relativepositionofthesub-stategovernmentvis-a-visits‘host’state.Evenintheabsenceof
anydesire to fundamentally recast thestate- sub-state relationship, thegamecanstillbe
played:with the ‘endpoint’being theveryconstitutionof thesub-stategovernmentasa
legitimate player in the game itself (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008; Adler-
Nissen andGad, 2014; Adler-Nissen andGad, 2012). In this understanding, the sub-state
governmentperformsitsinternationalagencytobothdomesticandinternationalaudiences,
indoingsoextendingtheir‘territorialreach’(FergusonandMansbach,1996)andmakingan,
oftenimplicit,referencetosovereignty-drawingonthemeanings,associationsandsymbols
ofbothdiplomacyandstatehood(McConnelletal.,2012;McConnell,2016).
On the other hand, however, the day-to-day realities of paradiplomacy are often
‘unspectacular’innature(AldecoaandKeating,1999a:19),andonlyinisolatedincidentsdo
we see tensions flare in away that reflects the underlying dynamics of contestation and
appropriationthathavebeenidentified.Similarly,whilethemimicryofstate-likediplomacy
bysub-stategovernmentspunctuatesthemonopolythatstatesholdinthisdomain,thefact
thatparadiplomacylooksandsoundssoremarkablysimilartothediplomacyofstatesalso
actstoreinforcethissamedominance.Sub-stategovernmentsbecomeboth“resemblance
97Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentofficial,2013.
232
andmenace”; they (non-stateactors)both “elevate ‘official’ statediplomacyas ideal and
diluteitsdistinctionfromother,‘unofficial’diplomacies”(McConnelletal.,2012:811):
Thesespacesofdiplomaticmimicrycanbeimaginedasremaindersleftoverand left behind as the ‘legitimate’ international space is continuallyconstituted. It is their excess that provides the constitutive outside to thediplomaticrealm.Evenastheirexistencethreatensthatsystem,thesystemreliesonthemforrepresentationalforcetoreifysystemicnorms(McConnelletal.,2012:811).
Is paradiplomacy, therefore, just something and nothing? One factor pointing towards a
differentexplanationisthepolitical‘doublespeak’thataboundsinthisterritory.Whilemany
of theaccountsgivenbygovernmentalofficials,aspartof the researchunderpinning this
thesis, pointed to the generally benign and workmanlike context surrounding their
paradiplomaticendeavours,wemustremembertoquestionthesourceofsuchaccounts.As
washighlightedbytheunwillingnessofScottishofficialstodiscussparadiplomacyaspartof
this project, both civil servants and politiciansmaywell bemindful of the nature of the
impressionsthattheygive,preciselybecauseofthepotentialforthistobesuchapolitically
sensitivearea,one“socloselyarticulatedtosovereigntythatitisconsideredtheprerogative
ofthesovereign”(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:16).Thesubjectmatterwetouchuponwhen
discussing paradiplomacy is one that inherently chafes at the boundaries of sub-state
authority,andthereforewemusttriangulatethestorieswearetoldindifferentcontexts.
Theconceptualdissonanceofparadiplomacy:thedifficultywehaveinreconcilingactswhich
lookandsoundliketheyareconductedbystates,butyetarenotbeingconductedbystates
atall,pointstothefactthatsomethinginterestingisindeedhappeninginthisdomain.Itis
happeningatthemarginsofinternationalrelations,yetitlendsinsight,providesparameters
andgivesindicationsofthedirectionoftravelintermsofmuch‘bigger’questions.Weare
perhapsbestledbacktoKrasner’sclassificationsofsovereignty’smanyvariants:international
legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence
sovereignty,eachwiththeirownrulesandlogicsofappropriateness(Krasner,1999).Inthe
variedactivitiesofsub-stategovernments,wearguablyfindsomeoftheseelements,orat
leastprecedentsforthem.Certainly,theuniquecharacteristicsofsub-stategovernmentsas
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diplomaticactors-‘sovereigntyboundyetsovereigntyfree’(Hocking,1999)-presentanew,
incremental,setofchallengesforIRtheory. Inabroadersensetheyalsopointtothevast
heterogeneityofinternationalrelations,andofthemultitudeofrelationshipsthatexistand
persistoutsideofthe‘Westphalianstraightjacket’(BuzanandLittle,2001:-25;Adler-Nissen
andGad,2014:14).
234
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