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Aircraft Stores Compatibility

AGARDOgraph 300 – XX Draft V 0.1

RTO SCI FT3

Wing Commander Malcolm G. Tutty, MEng, FIE(Aust), FRAeSAir Force Headquarters

RAAF Base Edinburgh, SA 5111Royal Australian Air Force and University of South Australia

Preliminary Draft for discussion and other National Input

AGARDograph 300-XX 1 - 1

AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY

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Aircraft Stores Compatibility

AGARDOgraph 300 – XX

RTO SCI FT3

Wing Commander Malcolm G. Tutty, MEng, FIE(Aust), FRAeSDirector Simulation, Trials & Ranges - Air Force Headquarters

RAAF Base Edinburgh, SA 5111Royal Australian Air Force and University of South Australia

[email protected]

We are in the midst of another technological revolution – an information age, a time of near-infinite connectedness.Information storage and retrieval … is the manifest purpose of the digital revolution.

Relationships in these systems are mutual: you influence your neighbours, and your neighbours influence you.All emergent systems are built of this kind of feedback, the two way connections that foster higher-level learning. …

But it is both the promise and the peril of swarm logic that the higher-level behaviour is almost impossible to predict in advance. Johnson (2001) pp 113, 120 & 233

Joint “Handoff”of DMPIs in the real world needs testing & practice in the Commands not just in the “M&S Space”Joint “Handoff”of DMPIs in the real world needs testing & practice in the Commands not just in the “M&S Space”Colonel Ross Roberts, USMC, Commander JFIITT, ITEA C4ISR Symposium, April 2008Colonel Ross Roberts, USMC, Commander JFIITT, ITEA C4ISR Symposium, April 2008

Figure 1 A classic F-111 Aardvark Strike Aircraft Stores Configuration


mailto:[email protected]


ABSTRACT

This AGARDOgragh provides an overview of the contemporary aircraft stores clearance and certification processes used to establish the extant of network-enabled aircraft stores compatibility.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In recent years there has been a revolutionary shift in the focus of the profession of arms. The shift has occurred away from the platform-centric or systems view popularised by the politi-cians and media as to how many tanks, planes and boats are needed for a defence force, to that of a capability management construct that is to be network-enabled, interoperable and end-effects based. This is being achieved by treating the military capabilities to implement those operational end-effects as more families of systems that need to be man-aged across the whole life cycle. We are today in the middle of this transforma-tion. In the aerospace domain, air power is, in the main, derived from ‘aircraft’1

and ‘stores’ (ie. weapons – such as the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb shown at Figure 2 to the right, fuel tanks, and countermeasure dispensibles)2 being integrated and establish-ing the extent of the aircraft stores compatibility for the carriage and release operating limitations of the aircraft stores configurations such as that shown at Figure 1 - which is absolutely key to achieving such combat capabilities and effectiveness against the enemy.

1.2 The level of interoperability of aircraft and stores is vital to any nation state being able to fly and fight with other elements of their defence forces and their allies. This AGARDOgraph has as its central premise the notion that future joint coalition based defence forces will inevitably have key operational and support systems network enabled with sensor and engagement platforms connected to it. Therefore, a key question being asked by most nation states is how soon can we make the more operationally important parts of our joint forces ‘network enabled’ whilst retaining the level of interoperability between all these families of systems at acceptable levels of cost, schedule and performance. Standardised aircraft stores compatibility analysis and testing has been shown repeatedly to accelerate incorporation of these stores on existing aircraft platforms thereby enhancing an air forces warfighting capability, significantly improving the safety of it’s personnel and the timeliness of attaining operational readiness.

1.3 The article is primarily based on research undertaken by the author under Royal Australian Air Force sponsorship at the University of South Australia in cooperation with the NATO Research & Technology Organisation (RTO). Tutty (2005) addressed the current initiatives of the military and commercial standardisation organisations that will affect how future aerospace weapon systems will be integrated to achieve interoperability between joint, allied, and coalition forces and the approach being taken to ensure that aircraft stores configurations, such as that shown at Figure 2, are compatible for carriage and release.

1 Which includes: the air or space vehicles’ Data Management System, Navigation, Communication, data links, ground control station, electronic surveillance and warfare systems such as Radar, Electro-Optic / Infra-red, Acoustics, EW Self-Protection, etc and the Armament / Ordnance Stores Management / Fire Control Systems.

2 Note that the term aircraft store is actually much broader as it is any device intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension or release equipment, whether or not the device is intended for separation [ie. employment or jettison] from the aircraft.


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1.4 However, the task of certifying stores for carriage and separation from aircraft has always proven to be inherently exploratory, high risk and demanding in terms of lives, cost and time with much being learned over the decades of aerospace experimentation and flight testing. Despite the significant advances in analytical tools, Modelling and Simulation (M&S) and test techniques, the multitude of variables across the engineering and scientific disciplines ultimately relies on the test team to prove the operational suitability, airworthiness and effectiveness of the aircraft stores combinations in flight. Therefore this article draws on the detailed engineering provided in other articles on fixed and rotary wing aircraft, the air to air and surface missile design principles, good design principles of Lidwell et al (2005) and is written in conjunction, and is tightly coupled, with the AGARDOgraph 300-yy on Weapons Systems Testing.

1.5 Delimitation. This article intentionally addresses the current recommended practices used for determining the compatibility of non-nuclear stores.

1.6 As some readers may know, Australia does not currently indigenously design, develop or manufacture complete military aircraft or aerospace weapons systems, as such activities are conducted overseas by our many Allies. So why did an Australian get asked to write this article? Despite Lawrence Hargraves3 early research in aerospace and various concerted efforts in World War I and II to generate an indigenous aerospace design and manufacturing industry, much of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) aircraft stores compatibility / clearance work has been intentionally minimised in many areas by equipment and information being provided by the original operators of the aircraft who have previously certified weapons similar in type and role to those intended for use by the ADF. This national strategy also provided a basis for approving the aircraft stores clearances by analogy and limited testing when complete aircraft and its weapons systems were purchased from a single country such as the UK and the US for example. This situation changed significantly in the 1980’s with the ADF introducing air armament into all three Services that were not currently operated by the original aircraft operators or had not previously been cleared for use on other remotely similar aircraft4 by other competent military airworthiness authorities. 5

1.7 These imperatives required Australia to not only be self-reliant in undertaking aircraft stores compatibility in support of Flight Clearances and the certification of aircraft stores capabilit-ies, but to be actively engaged in ensuring that international standards and methods being used that are suitable to the ADF, the Australian environment6 and the levels of interop-erability (ie. common, interchangeable or compatible) identified with our allies and co-alition partners. Historically, this has been primarily conducted via active involvement in a number of international standardisation fora between the nations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the four US air forces. The primary one being that of the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC), The Technical Coopera-tion Program (TTCP) in science and technology, and now with the NATO Air Armament Panel (AAP) and RTO. The experience and successes with these international engagements and devel-3 In 1889, Hargarves invented the radial rotary engine, which became the standard engine for aircraft up until after WW1. He also

discovered the aerodynamic advantages of a curved wing and led the way to powered flight with his box-kite experiments at Stanwell Park, NSW.

4 The prime example is the RAAF becoming the sole operator of the unequalled F-111 Aardvark strike aircraft at Figure 1 since 1997 and the need to integrate standoff weapons to increase the aircraft’s survivability due to the prohibitive costs to retrospectively incorporate low observable technology.

5 Further details of the range of aircraft stores combinations being acquired by the ADF now and into the future are covered in detail at Tutty (2005) and the ADFs Defence Capability Plan 2009 at www.defence.gov.au/capability under Publications.

6 One should envisage Middle Eastern temperature extremes and conditions in Central Australia with high humidity thrown in as well for good measure in the Northern Territory of Australia.


http://www.defence.gov.au/capability


opments with network-enabled weapons such as described at Figure 2 is clearly why the author was asked to contribute several articles.

Figure 3. Network-enabled effects-based operations grids

2.0 BACKGROUNDIf you are thoroughly conversant with tactics, you will recognise the enemy’s intentions and have many opportunities to win.

Miyamoto Musashi, Samurai Swordsman

2.1 The specialised discipline of aircraft stores compatibility using the latest scientific and en-gineering advances was born during the Vietnam era. At that time, combat aircraft conceived and purposely designed by the US for a nuclear attack mission against quantitatively superior Soviet Forces blundering through the Fulda Gap in central Europe resulted in a lot of the same aircraft be-ing used operationally for multiple fighter and attack roles using conventional weapon in numerous mixed loads or configurations in Vietnam. These mixed loads of aircraft stores configurations were anecdotely cleared by the air forces in the theatre of operations by trial and error (including the loss of aircraft) in determining safe carriage and employment envelopes and china graph marks on the windshield for aim point offsets in place of ballistic tables and todays computer generated shot cues!

2.2 In the era of the US applying Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara’s operational ana-lysis and mass production techniques for non-nuclear armament he had brought from the motor in-dustry, the four US air forces suffered significant reliability problems with aircraft structures and the new electronic systems failing repeatedly with abysmal weapons accuracy and effectiveness compared to the promises and/or expectations of the ever-confident designers and contractors ap-plying traditional discipline based engineering. How did that come about?

2.3 At the beginning of World War II, 50% of bombs typically fell within three miles of there intended target during daylight and five miles from the target at night. By the end of the war, im-proved bombing techniques and the Norden Bomb sight for Allies helped reduce the circle of error to about 1,000 yards. This level of accuracy still required that a huge amount of aircraft lay down a ‘carpet’ of bombs destroying a whole square mile of a city just to be certain of hitting a single


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military target. Needless to say, collateral damage was often extremely high. By the Vietnam era, while the accuracy had increased from the World War II and the Korean War performance, tens of weapons were still required to “service” the desired mean point of impact (or DMPI). This meant repeated aircraft sorties into what was becoming a very hostile electronic warfare and surface to air environment with losses increasing commensurately. With the development of the nuclear bomb, accuracy had became much less important during the pre-Vietnam era. A single aircraft carrying a single gravity-released bomb in its weapon bay was capable of causing immense destruction to the enemy. As the Vietnam War progressed, these smaller jets took on a dual air-to-ground role as they were modified to engage the enemy in limited conventional wars with non-nuclear weapons. These fighters and bombers predominantly carried their stores externally, which causes a great number of problems for both captive carriage and weapon separation with bombing accuracy being a tertiary level consideration. The strategy of leaving it up to the operational forces to find unsatis-factory carriage and release may have worked up until Vietnam, but the high carriage and release airspeeds at or near Mach 1, when coupled with high delivery angles for unguided ordnance caused the loss of numerous crew members and aircraft. Aircraft performance was degraded not only by the weight of the store, but also by the drag, especially at high dynamic pressures. Flying qualities deteriorated due to the big changes in aerodynamic coefficients, aircraft centre of gravity, and moments of inertia. The weight and aerodynamic properties of wing-mounted stores also caused aeroelastic or flutter effects that seriously undermined mission capability and safety. The stores themselves suffered damage and structural failures due to the harsh transonic aerodynamic environment. Separations from these fighter/bombers were no longer from 1 g level flight, but of-ten from steep, high speed / transonic dives to try and improve the accuracy of the weapons which were having problems with aerodynamic stability during separation, which not only affected bal-listic accuracy, but in some cases resulted in damaging store-to-aircraft collisions.

2.4 In 1966, the US Air Force recognised that aircraft stores compatibility was a separate re-quirement and initiated a new program within the AF Research Laboratories called “SEEK EAGLE”. The goal of the SEEK EAGLE program was to define and undertake a formal process for aircraft stores certification. The SEEK EAGLE effort pion-eered the use of wind tunnel testing and analytical techniques to minimise and increase the safety of flight testing required for stores certification in the USAF. They also began to compile engineering data on stores and aircraft to aid in fu-ture certifications. The 1970’s saw the development of multiple ejector racks, which not only solved some of the separation problems (if they had dual ejector feet), but also allowed aircraft to carry more weapons. This decade also saw great advances in actually guiding weapons to their intended target. Air-to-air missiles were developed to home in on either radar or infrared energy while air-to-grounds bombs were de-signed to guide toward laser designator energy. These advances in ejector racks and guided muni-tions resulted in millions of possible aircraft stores combinations and mixed loads of weapons that required certification and challenged the test community to keep up with the flight clearance re-quirements. Finally in the 1980’s, the SEEK EAGLE effort had a direct impact on improving weapons accuracy by updating and verifying ballistic trajectory analysis methods, which sub-sequently led to the development of the first truly computerised weapon delivery which are now called the integrated mission planning systems using the same algorithms instead of different, sim-plified models.

2.5 It took until 1984, however, for a standard (see Brunson (2002) for contemporary views on what standards should be ie a "common and repeated use rule, guideline or characteristic for activ-



ities or their results aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context") to be agreed to by the all the four US air forces (the Marine Corps relies on the US Navy for its ac-quisition) as each undertook its own aircraft stores certification programs, often for the same air-craft and stores. Eventually Charles Epstein (CAPT, USN Rtd)7, serving in the USAF Armament Research Laboratory at Eglin AFB, FL, succeeded in having the minimum acceptable certification requirements and test methods guidance in MIL-HDBK-244 (1975), Guide to Aircraft Stores Com-patibility agreed to by all the Services and a tri-service standard published as MIL-STD-1763 (1984), Aircraft / Stores Certification Procedures. The publication of this document also coin-cided with the author starting his post-graduate career and was soon found to be the most compre-hensive and useful design and T&E framework available for a common understanding as to critical assumptions.

2.6 The end of the twentieth century brought with it improved weapon aerodynamics and propulsion systems that increased the standoff range of many weapons and enabled aircrew to em-ploy them from outside of the enemy’s lethal reach. Survivability was also enhanced by the re-volution of stealth technology, which has driven weapons back inside of internal weapon bays - just like they were during World War II. This time, however, the weapons must survive the pun-ishing 170 dB + aeroacoustic environment and high employment ejection forces required for em-ployment of stores from today’s high performance aircraft. However, during the US Secretary of Defence Bill Perry’s anti-standards crusade of the mid-1990’s the standard that brought us an un-precedented increase in effectiveness and interoperability in the 1991 Gulf War I required consid-erable NATO, ASCC and Australian input as well as a focus on ballistic accuracy verification and safe escape prior to being republished as MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998).

2.7 In countries such as Canada and Australia, the Services relied heavily on the previous stores certifications on specific aircraft. In the main, this served most nations well, provided the originating service included the aircraft stores configurations these nations required. The Israeli’s were probably the first to discover significant accuracy problems with the US F-4 and the F-16 air-craft with some weapons not actually used by the USAF during in-service training and/or real world operations. Therefore the accuracy figures were not being verified and it was not easy to retrospectively incorporate physics-based correction factors. This instigated a significant accur-acy verification program on F-4, F-16, F-111A/C/D/E/F/G, F-15E and a lot of other non-US air-crafts in the 1980’s when the aircraft computers were starting to be able to solve the weapon bal-listic equations in real time. However, whilst the accuracy of the ballistic solutions was improv-ing it was still relying on wind tunnel models with significant tolerances and fusion problems between the different models used for free-stream ballistic, near-field separations and in retrospect were still overly empirical in nature. Even today, stores separations and ballistic analyses is a high art form rather than a straight forward science driving the need for inexpensive guided air-to-ground weapons – a topic for another paper focusing on GPS-aided munitions for example.

2.8 Transformation. Today, rather than 50 different aircraft being sent on a mission to des-troy or service/negate a DMPI as was done in the early 1980’s, today’s shooter aircraft can simul-taneously hit as many targets as there weapons on the aircraft – this is what has caused the current tactical use of ‘kill boxes’ cited earlier wherein aircraft are launched with a mixed load of ord-nance without necessarily a primary/secondary target specifically being planned for in advance. 7

In fact, Charlie Epstein is the classic voice on the well-known, original ASC “Horror Movie” which sought to highlight lessons learned the hard way.


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This has fundamentally transformed intelligence and mission planning / munitions effectiveness assessments as we shall see – driving us toward the network focused warfighting model discussed.

3.0 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY

An undefined problem has an infinite number of solutions. Robert A. Humphrey

3.1 Systems Engineering. What is known as the systems engineering process is basically an iterative process of deriving/defining requirements at each level of the system, beginning at the top (the system level) and propagating those requirements through a series of steps which eventually leads to a preferred system concept, INCOSE SE Handbook (2000). Further iteration and design refinement leads successively to preliminary design, detail design, and finally, the approved design. At each successive level there are supporting, lower-level design iterations which are ne-cessary to gain confidence for the decisions taken. During each iteration, many concept alternat-ives are postulated, analysed, and evaluated in trade-off studies. Systems engineering is involved in all steps and leads during the Mission Analysis, Requirements Analysis, Concept Analysis, and Conceptual Design phases down into the subsystem level, and integrates many other activities in-cluding design, design changes and upgrades; Goals & Objectives for element iteration; customer feedback, and operational support. The basic engine for systems engineering is an iterative pro-cess that expands on the common sense strategy of:

understanding a problem before you attempt to solve it,

examining alternative solutions (do not jump to a "point design"), and

verify that the selected solution is correct before continuing the definition activities or proceeding to the next problem.

3.2 The basic steps in the systems engineering process are: Define the System Objectives (User's Needs from the systems level Operational Concept

Documents (OCD) and subsystem level Concept of Operations (Conops));

Establish Performance Requirements (Requirements Analysis);

Establish the Functionality (Functional Analysis);

Evolve Design and Operations Concepts (Architecture Synthesis);

Select a Baseline (Through Cost/Benefit Trades);

Verify the Baseline Meets Requirements (User's Needs); and

Iterate the Process Through Lower Level Trades (Decomposition)

3.3 The context of systems engineering applied by ASCENG in support of major acquisitions, introduction into service and supporting in-service operations, is summarised in the systems engineering process at Appendix B and the top level overview of the functional flow block diagram (FFBD) at Appendix C. A useful way to conceptualise systems engineering using the approach recommended by ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) is to think of two systems - the product system and the producing system. The



product system is the system being developed - like introducing a new mission system or aircraft stores combination into service where you have a classic ‘system of systems’ hierarchy at work. On the other hand, the system that enables the developing is the producing system. It is mainly the ‘producing system’ that needs to be considered so as to ensure that the engineers provide ‘developed systems’ that work with other systems with no unacceptable "emergent properties" and can therefore certify the extant of this in design approval certificates. All ADF authorised engineering organisations with a stake in meeting the Operational Concept have a top-level engineering management system framework based on ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) (and MIL-STD-499B and MIL-STD-1521B (1985) prior to that8) and the consistent approaches of Blanchard and Fabrycky (1998) that can be easily tailored to the scope of the aircraft stores certification effort being proposed. Upon receiving any tasking, ASC organisations such as ASCENG, scope the range of technical and flying support expected and tailors the project planning activities according to the amount of expected work. It also conducts a Risk Assessment reviewing all the technical, cost and schedule criteria (developed from the software industry) using the criteria at Appendix D. The establishment of these business rules are vital to all the potential organisations involved being able to quickly scope out the level of support required in the timeframe and anticipated budget available. The ADF has been successfully halting projects in recent years when the allocated funds patently do not match the performance requested with the expected budget allocations and the level of (im)maturity of the contending systems.

3.4 The involvement by all parties, including representatives of the ultimate User, in the Conceptual / Functional Design Review will commit to an architecture (which may already exist hopefully and be properly systems engineered for an Operational Concept that is analogous to an existing ADF OCD/Conops), the Preliminary Design Review is the ‘design-to baseline’ where we commit to Configuration Item functionality and the Critical Design Review is our ‘build-to baseline’ that commits us to manufacture. Appendix B has been extremely useful over the year to ensure that all parties actually understand when some of the 'systems engineering products' actually need to be prepared, reviewed and approved. The degree of formality used in the design reviews and studies needs to be agreed in the project-specific Engineering Management Plans especially for all safety critical items (ie, anything with explosives in it and/or slim margins of safety in the structures), based on the experience levels and stability of the organisations involved in the subsystems and similar sized projects. Much is based on the trust between the organisations involved to keep the Operational Concept for the system and it’s associated measures of performance. If considerable personnel turnover is expected over the life of the projects implementation then more formality is usually needs to be put in place to address such risks9.

Significant Changes.

3.5 The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility includes an engineering review, called a 'Judgement of Significance' in Australia, by qualified ASC Design Engineers to determine what impact it will have on the following engineering disciplines for each aircraft stores combination required to determine if a ‘significant change’ as defined in MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998) (and summarised in Appendix A) is made to an aircraft stores configuration in the areas of:

Fit & Function iaw MIL-STD-1289D (2003);

Structural & Environmental iaw inter alia MIL-STD-8591 (2003) and MIL-STD-810F (2000);

8 INCOSE advice to the Systems Engineering Society of Australia (SESA) is that the enterprise level ANSI/EIA STD 632 progress as an ISO standard separate to ISO 15288 has been “slow”. A draft of the US DoD benchmarks for current systems engineering approaches and Technical Reviews, MIL-STD-499C and draft of MIL-STD-1521C respectively have been postulated by the USAF as replacements within the US DoD. Note that MIL-STD- 499B formed the basis for what is now ANSI/EIA STD 632 and MIL-STD-1521B is still used during almost all defence related reviews. Should such documents gain common acceptance again, it should be several years before they may be useable as a framework.

9 This in turn creates a conundrum wherein the extra rigour, if not properly supervised, reduces effectiveness in trying to achieve the efficiency! Their seems to be a trade-off curve between efficiency and effectiveness where one may be too efficient sacrificing your effectiveness and where too much rigid bureaucracy kills efficiency and also has a corresponding secondary effect of impacting effectiveness, since you are not improving the warfighting capability when nothing makes it to the field or it gets there after the war is over! Courtesy Colonel W.D. Hack (2009)


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Aeroelasticity;

Captive Compatibility, Flying Qualities & Performance;

Employment & Jettison; and

Ballistics and OFP Validation & Verification, Safe Escape & Danger Areas (Safety Templates).

3.6 This engineering review is most important for establishing such a degree of interoperabil-ity. Use of the ‘significant change’ criteria now gives the design engineers some tolerances that enable minor changes to be progress without the huge systemic and organisational overheads of traditional ‘point design’ engineering done without interchangeability and prior thinking in mind. Use of such methodologies clearly shows the maturity of any organization processes and leader-ship.

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Figure 4. An Aircraft Stores Configuration Operating Limitation

3.7 Depending on the maturity of the stores and/or aircraft, there are four separate compatibil-ity situations involved when authorisation of a store on an aircraft is required. The four situations, in order of increasing risk, are: Adding ‘old’ inservice stores to the authorised stores list of ‘old’ aircraft.

Adding ‘old’ stores to the authorised stores list of a ‘new’ aircraft.

Adding ‘new’10 stores to the authorised stores list of an ‘old’ aircraft11.

Adding ‘new’ or modified stores to the authorised stores list of ‘new’ or modified aircraft.

3.8 The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility will determine the operating limitations that will then be used by the aircrew in their Flight Manuals as shown at Figure 4 (which also happens to be that of 10 Or adding new aircraft stores configurations and/or expanding the flight operating envelope.11 It can also be argued that depending on the novelty / technology readiness level (TRL) of the ‘new’ aircraft or ‘new’ store -

that the second or third situation may actually need to be reversed. Store performance/integrity and unique (but undiscovered) aircraft characteristics/environment can increase/decrease the risks between these two scenarios. This may in fact be the case for any complex adaptive system and aircraft using active separation control techniques for example.



the aircraft stores configuration shown at Figure 2. The aircraft stores configurations and expected operating limitations are always included in any good OCD / Conops as they may not need to be the maximum that the aircraft and stores can achieve (ie. Parent pylon versus multiple ejector rack configurations typically will have different limits). For more mature aircraft and/or stores, and consequently those with less risk, the process is specifically tailored against the OCD / Conops such that only those phases required to be conducted to introduce the store into service need to be undertaken. For example, if all the aircraft stores configurations have been successfully demonstrated or certified by known T&E and airworthiness certification agencies to operating limits that satisfy the User’ s Operational Requirement, an aircraft stores combination could be introduced directly into service with minimal risk. While this strategy has been extremely successful in minimising the work with a specific aircraft stores configuration in an acquisition process that is platform-centric, it is less successful in the author’s view when viewed in the context of designing interchangeable stores on fewer platform types.

Figure 5 An Aircraft Stores Weapon Danger Area - for US air to ground ordnance training using a 99.99% Containment at 95% Confidence Level

3.9 Using the well established ‘significant change’ criteria and the maturity of the aircraft stores combination, engineering personnel can now integrate the operational requirements against the current Engineering Management Plans for key system segments and predict the sequence of organisational interactions necessary to optimise the schedule. This will enable the capability to be entered into service and minimise the programmatic risk whilst ensuring the required levels of operational suitability and effectiveness. Although, this is not formalised until after the Critical Design Review in an ASC Similarity Survey, experienced personnel realise that selecting more mature aircraft and stores is fundamental to minimising the risk to cost, schedule and performance and the amount of systems engineering required to make configuration management, drawings and publications are made available with the equipment. One key strategy for defence acquisition in future, is for smaller steps be taken in capability improvement through Pre-Planned Product Improvements and a spiral concept throughout the systems life to meet changing needs and OCDs, especially for avionic systems where computing power improvements clearly outstrip the timeliness of the traditional defence acquisition processes. However, such a strategy needs to be managed carefully as poor configuration management and logistics support may mean training, spares and Technical Orders lag the changes such that confusion reigns. When managed properly within the engineering and test communities incremental small changes introduce less risk in fielding new capabilities in a timely manner.


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3.10 The success of such a strategy to establish clear baselines with tolerances for ‘significant changes’ to control the update and amendment of extant ASC Engineering Data Packages and the associated ASC Flight Clearances, is fundamental to the order of magnitude increase in new aircraft stores combination being cleared as a result of the decision to update aircraft Operational Flight Programs (OFP) and the acquisition of ADF unique aircraft stores configurations. During this process it is important to ensure adequate integration between aircraft and store Authorised Engineering Organisations is undertaken by the acquirers, to ensure a whole of system approach is maintained and Acquirer short sightedness is tempered appropriately to support the sustainment phase. This will ensure that either the aircraft or weapon sub-systems are not traded off or compromised without input from all key parties – ie the Operational User and logistics infrastructure in addition to the engineer and tester. If it is required, the ASC authority will independently conduct such reviews if not planned in the ADF Project Design Acceptance Strategy already to ensure the whole of systems approach is maintained throughout the life-cycle.

Figure 6 ASC Risk Assessment Model Outcomes - using Tutty (2005)

3.11 As engineered systems became more complicated/complex including a multitude of software and personnel interactions, the engineering disciplines and organisations involved sometimes became fragmented and specialised in Conops (or Checklists management) to cope with this increasing complexity. Some organisations focused on the optimisation of their products and have lost sight of the overall system. Each organisation perceived that their part must be optimal, using their own disciplinary criteria, and may fail to recognise that all parts of a system do not have to be optimal for the system to perform optimally. This inability to recognise that system requirements can differ from disciplinary requirements is a constant problem in major systems developments. The systems engineering process can be viewed as a major effort in communication and management of complex teams of experts that lack a common paradigm and a common language. Two of the vital tools that a systems engineer doing aircraft stores compatibility needs therefore, is to be able to conduct appropriate:

Risk management of all the constituent elements of the system. Experimentation & systems modelling at the necessary level of fidelity across the broad range of

engineering and programmatic disciplines – this will be addressed further at AGARDOgraph 300- yy.


80 Questions of 80 answered.

VII. Development Process adopted75.0%

VI. Method of Monitoring55.6%

V. Method of forecasting71.4%

IV. Staff involved in the Project90.0%

III. Complexity of Clearance Exercise67.2%

II. ASCENG Resources75.0%

I. Product Requirements66.7%

Overall69.4%P-3 / FOSOW & LWT Nov 2005

Results for task:

Results of Task Risk Assessment

VII. Acquisition System Development Process Adopted16.7%

VI. Method of Acquisition

System Monitoring22.2%

V. Method of Acquisition Forecasting7.1%

IV. Acquisition Staff Involved in the Project20.0%

III. Complexity of Engineering Exercise35.7%

II. External to Engineering Resources12.5%

I. Product Requirements10.0%

Overall21.3%

Results for task: AP-3C / MU90 Apr 2007

Results of Task Risk Assessment

Team TacticsMission

Theatre

Network Enabled

Campaign

EngagementIndividual Tactics

Teams of Teams Tactics

“Organisations” of Teams Tactics

Representation of Operations


3.12 Not only are these tools vital to the ultimate systems performance and safety in its use but they are two of the most commonly misused terms12 and sources of ‘activity traps’13 if used inappropriately or in the place of positive management and active decision making for the system, its subsystems and for the super-system that it belongs to. Appendix D is also extensively used iaw MIL-STD-822, by the ADF for air armament system safety (and Weapons Danger Areas such as shown at Figure 5), aviation risk management and capability development assessments. Figure 6 shows results of two different risk assessments using the methodology discussed at Tutty (2005) and Say-Wei Foo and Arumugam Muruganantham (2000) which have also been successfully used by Australian industry in the two studies held 18 months apart. The method includes recognition of resources, trained personnel, the complexity of the exercise, the maturity of the acquisition staff, prior engineering and testing results, method of acquisition and the system development process used in the time allocated. The initial assessment was for a stand-off missile and a light weight torpedo to be integrated in less than 24 months onto the AP-3C and the second one was for just the light weight torpedo in a realistic time scale. The figure shows that the methodology used clearly shows the significance of the time imperative to actually achieve such a capability rather than just the focus normally taken on just the technical systems equipment itself.

Figure 7 Knowledge abstraction of network enabled and the military representation of operations - graphic is courtesy Farrier, Appla & Chadwick (2004).

4.0 AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY PROCESS

4.1 Until the mid 1990’s, Australia, like almost all other western nations at this time, certified aircraft stores configurations based on the aircraft platform at the 'Engagement' or subsystem level of the representation at Figure 7. MIL-STD-1763, in particular, was very specific in tying aircraft stores certification to the promulgation of the appropriate Technical Orders etc, but the actual process relied on a Flight Clearance Recommendation (for T&E) or a Certification Recommendation (for service/fleet release) being issued by an organisation undertaking the aircraft stores compatibility assessment and little, or no,

12 Probably even more so than systems engineering itself!13 Scientists and Engineers caught up doing ‘busy’ work and not knowing when enough is actually enough. Usually because of risk

aversion, poor experience or their inherent personality traits.


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formal paperwork from the airworthiness or operational authority. In Australia, this was slightly different with the airworthiness organisation issuing what was called at the time an “Aircraft Stores Clearance Certificate”. This document was originally based on an Aircraft Research & Development Unit (ARDU) Test Report and a very long checklist of engineering issues that required over 50 signatures from each of the engineering discipline specialists; a sign-off process that took normally six to twelve months, unless the operational authority personally intervened with the Senior Logistics Engineer Officer (SLENGO) responsible for the engineering checklist! A very interesting ‘process’ as the more operationally relevant aircraft stores configurations with far greater risks, gave the engineers little to no time to do any engineering before the SLENGO wanted to know why he hadn’t signed the ‘certificate’. Anecdotally, the UK system, from which the old Australian one was indubitably drawn, is still like this. The impact of Ground Test Equipment and Mission Planning Equipment was reviewed, but as quite distinct systems that were always the responsibility of separate organisations, they were simply a check box that had in reality a human interface before flying the particular configuration. With today’s integrated systems that are being updated significantly every six to twelve months at least, such a process would clearly be untenable with no chance of self-synchronisation and thus would be a clear safety risk as it would fail to draw the correct implications from other safety critical systems.

4.2 Australia changed the thrust of this so-called and quite immature ‘process’ in the early 1990’s as part of the development of the technical and operational airworthiness systems embodied now in AAP 7001.053 (2003)14 and AAP 7001.054 (2003)15. They retained the need to certify a baseline for an aircraft store, but separated the Flight Clearance (ie, the aircraft stores compatibility done by ASCENG) and the “certification” of the capability by the Technical and Operational Acceptance as well as the ILS agencies embodied at the platform or Mission level for the representation at Figure 7.

4.3 An overview of the integrated methods by which endorsed operational requirements for an aircraft stores capability are satisfied and the relationship with aircraft stores compatibility is provided in AAP 7001.067 (2004) in the form of a functional flow block diagram and framework for a project involving certification of a ‘new’16 stores capability on a ‘new’ aircraft diagrams (as shown at Appendix C). The flowcharts of Appendix C are then specifically tailored to suit the risk mitigation strategy and the maturity of the aircraft stores combination being acquired so that analyses and review of existing technical information prevents any duplication of ground qualification or flight tests by the ADF to meet ADF airworthiness and Type Certification needs iaw DI(G) OPS 2-2 (2001) and safety and design criteria of the following: AS/NZ 4360 (2000), DI(AF) OPS 1-19 (2002), AAP 7001.053 (2003), AAP 7001.054 (2003), Leveson (2002), MIL-STD-882C (2002), DEF (AUST) 5679 (1992), MIL-A-8591H (1995), MIL-STD-1289D (2002), RTCA DO-178B (1992), RTCA DO-254 (2000), SAE ARP 4754 (1996-11) and SAE ARP 4761 (1996-12).

4.4 However, to ‘certify’ something we need to clearly establish a ‘certification basis’, ie at least an Operational Concept we need to address. The principle elements of ADF airworthiness and the technical regulation processes at the top level are:

• the selection of a design standard – such as DEF-STAN 00-970 and MIL-HDBK-1763 being cited as such;

• determination of the certification basis;

• preparation of a Certification Data Package (CDP);

• an evaluation of the CDP against the certification basis;

14 US = MIL-STD-516B, UK=XXX, CA=XXX15 US = J????????, UK= DEFSTAN 970-00, CA=XXX16 In the context of this article a ‘new’ store or aircraft constitutes one that

the ADF has had no previous design disclosure for or has not operated inservice or one that has undergone significant modification.



• preparation of a case for the issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC);

• preparation of a case for the issue of a Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) for each airframe subject to the AMTC;

• formal release to service; and

• regular review of the certification status.

4.5 Every Australian State aircraft now receives an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) from the Airworthiness Authority based on a recommendation of an Airworthiness Board (AwB) review of the Type Record. Once an AMTC17 is granted for the aircraft type all subsequent modifications requiring Major Changes18 to the Aircraft Type will need to be granted a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)19by an Airworthiness Board. Minor Changes20

modifications and Deviations will be approved by the DAR. So the current aircraft configuration at any point of time should be thought of as the AMTC + STC + Modification + Deviation.

5.0 RECOMMENDED AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY PRACTICEReducing the time to evaluation of a system almost always leads to lower costs, greater flexibility for change, improved overall

performance, and less risk. When the prototype approach for system development is used, ultimate production of the system must be considered throughout the

design and evaluation phase. “Kelly” Johnson (1989). American Aerospace Guru21

5.1 Initiation of Operational Needs. Any ADF Unit or Element seeking an aircraft stores capability, for either a new aircraft stores configuration, an expanded carriage or employment operating limitations, is able to do so by raising an Operational Concept Document (OCD) iaw the DCDM (2006) 22 and the AIAA G-043-199223. This is shown at Appendices B, C and D with respect to the resulting systems engineering activities and the typical capability system life cycle timeline currently expected by the acquisition system for a major new capability respectively.

5.2 Such requests are recommended for approval and prioritisation in the ADF by the appropriate Force Elements Group (ie Air Combat, Surveillance and Response, Army Aviation, Naval Aviation, Aerospace Operational Support, etc) and Commands (ie the HQs for Air, Maritime & Land Commands), and endorsed by Director General Aerospace Development24 through the normal chain of command25.

17 IAW AAP 7001.053 (2002) Reg 2.5.4 - The Design Acceptance Representative (DAR – Aircraft CENGR) shall apply to the TAR for a Type Certification Recommendation where a new AMTC is needed when the design changes to an aircraft type are so extensive that the aircraft requires a substantially complete investigation of compliance.

18 See DI(G) OPS 2-2 and AAP 7001.053 (2002) Reg 2.5.3 – Major Changes are those that:• Introduce a new capability, or significantly vary an existing capability• Design changes to the Type Design have an appreciable affect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability,

operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product.19 IAW AAP 7001.053 (2002) Reg 2.5.5 - For Major changes to an aircraft Type Design not great enough to require an new

AMTC, the DAR shall provide Design Acceptance Certification and apply to the TAR for an STC Recommendation.20 IAW AAP 7001.053 (2002) the DAR is to assume that all changes to the Type Design that are not Major are

therefore Minor!21 ‘Kelly’ Johnson was responsible for the P-38, U-2, SR-71, so reading his book CITED here is an imperative for all

budding aerospace engineers - it has wonderful insights at Chapter 16 as to why he and Lockheed were so successful in those days with such a diversity of aircraft. Similarly King (2001) makes for essential reading for any proactive engineer, regardless of discipline.

22 US = CJCS 3170.01, UK=XXX, CA=XXX23 There is an important principle to be noted here in citing American

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (1992) for preparing an OCD. The OCDs prepared for Major aircraft acquisitions (ie over $AUD 20 M) may not have sufficient granularity for the air armament being proposed to identify the details required. OCDs for Major aircraft acquisitions will typically refer to subordinate subsystem OCDs that will include the specific air armament needs.

24 If a significantly enhanced capabilities are being sought in the view of higher HQs.

25 US = XXXX, UK=XXX, CA=XXX


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5.3 The request for a new or enhanced/modified aircraft stores capability then results in the Acquisition Authority performing a ‘Requirements Analyses’ as per ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and the INCOSE SE Handbook (2006). These requirements are included in the detailed Operational Concept Document and/or Conops covering such information so as to establish the specific essential and desirable aircraft stores configurations, operating limits26 and the associated Critical Operational and/or Technical Issues and Measures Of Effectiveness required for the capability being sought. Further information may be required than that indicated to justify specific acquisition requirements, however, AAP 7001.067 (2004) 27 identifies those issues that historically have substantially affected the airworthiness and the operational suitability, effectiveness and preparedness of the proposed aircraft stores capability. Should particular information not be available, then the introduction of the capability into service may be delayed depending on the cost implications associated with the level of capability being sought.

5.4 Even at the early stages of certifying a capability the various agencies (ie the Users, defence science, stores SPO, flight test, ASC agency, etc) should be actively engaged by the Originator to assist in trade-off studies as described in more detail in AAP 7001.067 (2004). ASCENG formally addresses this trade-off by providing assistance in the preparation of the Operational Requirements Document and by preparing a Provisional ASC Similarity Survey28 for the Originator and User of the proposed OCD/Conops. The Provisional ASC Similarity Survey provides an assessment of the certification basis and airworthiness impact in a format that ensures all necessary issues required for the ASC Similarity Survey and ASC Flight Clearance are addressed as early as practical to reduce the overall cost, schedule and performance risks to the Commonwealth and Contractor. Note that the Provisional ASC Similarity Survey does not constitute design certification (from a formal engineering perspective), as it need not be based on full design disclosure of the actual aircraft or store that is introduced into service. During the early stages of developing aircraft and weapons, limited technical information may be finalised depending on the maturity of the aircraft and/or stores. However, the technical information that is available is used by ASCENG to ensure that the capability certification process is tailored and based on the risk management strategy and the maturity of the aircraft stores combination and the approved Operational Requirement. This has repeatedly ensured that the total cost of the certification effort is minimised and that a qualitative edge over our potential adversaries is established.

5.5 All ADF aircraft stores certification is based on having an approved Stores / Explosive Ordnance (EO) Design Certificate, a Safety Case covering the Safety & Suitability for Service (S 3) for the EO, an ASCENG Flight Clearance and an ILS Plan. All certified aircraft stores configurations are reviewed and re-issued/amended when a ‘significant change’, as defined at AAP 7001.053 / MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998), is made to an aircraft stores configuration.

5.6 The functional flow block diagram (FFBD) summarised at Appendix C identifies the interactions necessary from all activities to achieve an operationally sustainable aircraft stores capability to meet the endorsed Operational Concept. The efficient progress of the Aircraft Stores Certification effort, be it for the purpose of a concept demonstration, an OT&E or for combat operations, relies on the appropriate agencies undertaking the action(s) required of their organisation and proactively communicating progress and intentions when necessary. These activities are documented in a number of organisations processes that have been repeatedly accredited against ISO 9000 (2000)29 for their suitability as a quality management system. All ADF and supporting contractors involved in aerospace engineering activities are required by the regulations in AAP 7001.053 (2003) to meet and be independently accredited against the latest ISO 9001 (2000) standard for quality management. ASCENG provides detailed systems engineering support to 26 See Figure 1 for an example of an operating envelope respectively

showing the carriage and employment limits that will eventually be promulgated in the Aircraft Flight Manual or Dash 1 during Aircraft Stores Certification.

27 US = CJCS 3170.01, UK=XXX, CA=XXX28 A document summarising the technical review of the aircraft and store documentation to determine if sufficient engineering

and test data is available to support an ASCENG Flight Clearance by similarity or analogy. If insufficient technical information is available or the data does not support a clearance to the limits requested in the ASC Operational Requirement then the Similarity Survey shall identify the information and testing necessary. The format and content of a Similarity Survey is the same as for an ASC Flight Clearance.

29 See Brunson (2002) for a more complete explanation of the ISO agencies and what “ISO” means.



the acquisition during Requirements Elicitation/Definition, Concept/Functional Design Review, Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review during the ADF’s Systems Engineering & Test Requirements Determination phases, as shown graphically at Appendices B and C) to reduce risk.

5.7 ADF capability management and fiscal processes are being reviewed against Capability Maturity Models such as CMMi (2000) at the ‘Level 3: Defined’ level as a minima. Verifying that the effectiveness of the aircraft stores capability meets the approved OCD is primarily the responsibility of the appropriate User with funding and resources provided by the DMO. Before an Aircraft Stores Capability is certified for particular aircraft stores configurations is accepted for use by a User, the FEG certifies that safety, engineering, operational, configuration management and logistic support processes, and all training requirements for all personnel involved have been satisfied. The Aircraft Stores Certification addresses all these issues in a single document for the User Commanders endorsement. The identification of acceptable ILS arrangements to meet preparedness requirements is the responsibility of the cognisant aircraft and store System Program Offices involved. It should be noted that the Aircraft Stores Certification declares the User Commander and Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives acceptance that the ILS Plan committing to the capability is adequate to satisfy the effectiveness and preparedness (ie readiness and sustainability) criteria in the OCD. This is most appropriate as it is the User Commander who approves the OCD which should have established the need in the first place.

5.8 One of the complications for achieving a network-enabled capable force is how to baseline your existing peacetime force structure (with limited to no networked communications) against future proposals using senior staff that only understand hard copy orders via their chain of command! One of the major cultural changes needed in most of, if not all, defence forces is the challenge in moving from such hardcopies to a network-centric wartime mindset within the chain of command when young Generation Y staff who want to look up the material when needed on his laptop/palm device and get the training when he needs it.

5.9 This has implications for multi-country aircraft and weapon platforms such as the F-16 and F-35 JSF when unique country aircraft stores configurations are certified by country X or Y being recognised in the “master” aircraft flight manual and the certification seamlessly accepted by other nations as being acceptable to them. To address this situation, it is planned to develop a STANAG to replace MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998), so that the NATO countries that care about interoperability can experiment with and prove when they have achieved it such that such configurations are ac-cepted by all nations.

6.0 COMPLEXITY & FUTURE NETWORK ENABLED OPERATIONSThe tenets of network centric operations are:

1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing.2. Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness.

3. Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

Alberts & Hayes (2007)

The C4ISR Paradigm of Command, Control, Communications and Computers for ISR is now already heading to

C2, Cooperate and Collaborate for ISR

ITEA C4ISR Symposium, April 2008

6.1 The term ‘system’ is, however, highly overused, with it being casually applied to everything from a Home Entertainment System, to the affairs of government of a nation (System of Government) and to the planets orbiting the Sun (Solar System). Added to the mix is the use of adjectives for ‘systems’ such as ‘simple’, ‘complicated’30 (presumably those that aren’t ‘simple’) and ‘complex’31 often without a definition 30 Used to describe an intricate system with many components that each perform specific, usually highly specialised, functions

and are designed for operation as part of a larger system: they are not intended to operate as separate, autonomous systems.31 One not describable by a single rule. Structure exists on many scales whose characteristics are not reducible to only one

level of description. Systems that exhibit unexpected features not contained within their specification. Systems with multiple ob-


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or description of what is meant. Truly complex systems are fundamentally different to complicated systems. Complicated systems (such as aircraft, ships and vehicles) may usually today be reduced to their parts for both design and analysis purposes so that their behaviour and even any emergent properties can be predicted to a high degree of certainty and confidence. Complexity Science32 is the emerging field potentially providing some better insights into the fundamental principles and theory for complex engineered systems and their patterns of behaviour frequently using anti-reductionist ways of thinking. It is suggested by DSTO at Moon (2007) that the salient features of systems displaying complex behaviours include: Interactions that are non-linear and include feedback loops. They are open systems where there is a net flow of flux (energy, matter or information) across the

system boundaries; although specific boundaries may be difficult to determine and depend on the perspective of the observer.

There can be nesting where component systems are themselves complex systems. The component systems may be connected so as to a form small-world network with a multiplicity of connections.

Complex systems display emergent phenomena33 and have ‘memory’ in the sense that prior states influence present states (formally they are said to exhibit hysteresis).

6.2 Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are special cases of complex systems that are designed to have the capacity to change and ‘learn’ from experience. Today they are often a form of systems containing many autonomous agents who self-organize in a coevolutionary way to optimise their separate values. Complex systems often use networks that may be seen as being configured for an overall purpose. They would, ideally, be designed to provide versatility, robustness and potential for growth (ie scalable 34) rather than optimised for narrow functionality. The extensive research will need to address the experimentation of aerospace mission systems35 in the joint aerospace environment – which does mean addressing the concerns of Gartska (2000), Kopp (2004), Tutty (2005), and Moon et al (2006) by interfacing and cooperating 36 with land and maritime environments.

6.3 The weapons systems ground & flight test methods discussed at AGARDOgraph 300-yy will there be fundamental to validating and verifying whether the proposed joint systems architectures being developed today will actually work in the hands of all our warfighters.

7.0 CONCLUSIONS

7.1 This article has drawn on the numerous scientific and engineering aeronautical, structural, electrical, information and so on disciplines discussed in detail elsewhere in the encyclopaedia to provide a comprehensive overview of the contemporary aircraft stores clearance and certification processes used to establish the extant of current and future network-enabled aircraft stores compatibility.

jectives. See http://www.calresco.org/glossary.htm as of 21 Aug 2007.32 The study of the rules governing emergence, the constraints affecting self-organisation and general system dynamics in

nonlinear adaptive interacting systems. The study of the collective behaviour of macroscopic collections of interacting units that are endowed with the potential to evolve in time.

33 Those behaviours, features or functionalities that pertain to the network in its totality and cannot be attributed to individual elements. They may be patterns of behaviour, structural features or functionalities arising from the connection of the elements into a network and the subsequent interaction of those elements. Peer-to-peer networking on the Internet is an example of such an emergent phenomenon.

34 The property of a system or network which indicates its propensity to be readily enlarged, physically or functionally. The term is used in telecommunications and software engineering to indicate whether a system’s performance can be increased in proportion to the capacity added.

35 Which includes: the air or space vehicles’ Data Management System, Navigation, Communication, data links, ground control station, electronic surveillance and warfare systems such as Radar, Electro-Optic / Infra-red, Acoustics, EW Self-Protection, etc and (obviously) the Armament/Ordnance Stores Management / Fire Control Systems.

36 The idea that two agents can increase both their fitnesses by mutual help rather than by competition. This assumes that resources adequate for both exist, or are created by the interaction, and relates to synergy and 'compositional evolution'.


http://www.calresco.org/glossary.htm


7.2 Aircraft stores compatibility as a discipline has always addressed the safe and effective carriage and release of aircraft stores and now addresses the end to end functionality and accuracy of the supplied weapons system to ensure the operational suitability and effectiveness of the increasingly network enabled weapons.

7.3 While the engineering and scientific disciplines will always remain important, the functionality associated with network enabling and information management will fundamentally drive the interoperability of future joint defence force aerospace operations. ...

Figure 8 F-22 employing an AIM-9M Sidewinder Missile

8.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY / REFERENCES

AAP 7001.053, 2003, Technical Airworthiness Management Manual, RAAF, Commonwealth of Australia (CoA), Canberra, Australia.

AAP 7001.054, 2003, Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual, RAAF, CoA, Canberra, Aus-tralia.

AAP 7001.067, 2004, ADF Air Armament Manual, draft, RAAF, CoA, Canberra, Australia

AIAA G-043-1992, Guide for the Preparation on Operational Concept Documents; American Institute for Aeronautic & Astronautics, Washington, USA.

ALWI-2, 2004, Final Report, Follow-up Study, Aircraft, Launcher & Weapon Interoperability (ALWI-2), NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG), Air Group 2 on Air Weapons, NATO Industrial Advisory Group, 7 April 2004.


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ANSI/EIA STD 632, 1999, Process for Engineering a System, American National Standards Institute / Electronic Industries Association, Washington, USA.

AS/NZ 4360, 2000, Risk Management, CoA, Canberra, Australia.

Blanchard, S.B. & Fabrycky, W.J. 1998, Systems Engineering & Analysis, 3rd Ed, Prentice Hall International Inc, USA.

CJCS 3170.01D, 2004, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 March 2004 [Online, accessed 15 January 2005]. URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/directive_index.htm

Brunson, N, et al, 2002, A World of Standards, Oxford University Press, UK.

CMMi, 2000, Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability Matur-ity Model Integration (CMMI) for Systems Engineering Product & Process Development, Con-tinuous Representation

DCDM, 2006, Defence Capability Development Manual, Canberra, Australia. See www.defence.gov.au/capability under Publications.

DEF (AUST) 5679, 1992, Procurement of Computer-Based Safety Critical Systems, Department of Defence, Canberra, Australia.

DEF STAN 00-970, 1999, Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft, UK Defence Standardisation Agency, UK.

DI(G) OPS 2-2, 2001, Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management, Department of Defence, Canberra, Australia.

DI(AF) OPS 1-19, 2002, Aviation Risk Management, DoD, Canberra, Australia.

Donnelly, J.J., 2000, Best Value Solutions: A Systems Engineering Perspective, SESA 2001, © Lockheed Martin Corporation

Farrier, A SQNLDR, Appla, D & Chadwick, J. 2004, As Easy as ABC, ADF Experimentation Symposium, Defence Science & Technology Organisation, June 2004

Garstka, J.J. 2000, Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory, Joint Staff Directorate for C4 Systems, US DoD, Washington, USA [Online, accessed 10 May 2004]. URL: http://www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/dec00/feature.htm

Hayes Dr R.E., Alberts, Dr D.S. 2002, Experimentation; Code of Best Practice, Command and Control Research Program, [Online, accessed 1 September 2006]. URL: http://www.dodccrp.org

INCOSE SE Handbook, 2000, Systems Engineering Handbook, International Council for Systems Engineering, Version 2.0 Edited by R.B. Wray, Seattle, WA, USA

INCOSE SE Handbook, 2006, Systems Engineering Handbook, International Council for Systems Engineering, Version 3, Seattle, WA, USA

ISO 9001, 2004, Quality Management, ISO, 2004


http://www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/dec00/feature.htm

http://www.defence.gov.au/capability

http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/directive_index.htm


ISO/IEC 12207, 1995, Software Life Cycle Processes, ISO and the International Electro-technical Commission [Online, accessed 15 December 2004]. See URL: h ttp://www.12207.com/

ISO/IEC 15288, 2002, System Life Processes, International Organization for Standardization and the IEC [Online, accessed 15 December 2004]. See URL: http://www.15288.com/

Kelly, Clarence L, 1989, More than my share of it all, Chapter 16, “Kelly” Johnson with Maggie Smith, Smithsonian Books, 1989, ISBN 0-87474-564-0

Johnson, Dr S, 2001, Emergence – The connected lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, Scribner, New York, New York.

King, W.J., 2001, The Unwritten Laws of Engineering, edited by James Skakoon, ISBN 0 7918 01624.

Kopp, Dr C. 2004, Myths, Facts and the RAAF Force Structure, Air Power Analysis 2004, 19 November 2004, See URL: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2004-04.html

Leveson, N.G., 2002, System Safety Engineering: Back To The Future, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2002.

Lidwell, L. Holden K., Butler, J., 2005, Universal Principles of Design: 100 ways to Enhance Useability, Influence Perception, Increase Appeal, Make Better Design Decisions, and Teach through Design , Rockport Publishing Inc, Massachusetts, USA, ISBN 1-59253-007-9

MIL-HDBK-244A, 1990, Guide to Aircraft Stores Compatibility, US Department of Defence (DoD), USA, dated 6 April 1990.

MIL-HDBK-1763, 1998, Aircraft Stores Compatibility, Design and Test Requirements, US DoD, USA

MIL-STD-499B, 1994, Systems Engineering, US Department of Defence (DoD), USA Draft 6 May 1994.

MIL-STD-810F, 2000, Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests, US DoD, USA.

MIL-STD-882C, 2002, Standard Practice for System Safety, US DoD, USA.

MIL-STD-1521B, 1985, [US] Technical Reviews And Audits For Systems, Equipments, And Computer Software Distribution, , US DoD, USA. dated 4 June 1985.

MIL-STD-1553B, 1996, Interface Standard for Interface Digital Time Division/Command Response Multiplex Data Bus, , US DoD, 15 January 1996, Notice 4

MIL-STD-1760D, 2004, Interface Standard for Aircraft/Store Interconnection System, US Depart-ment of Defence, 2004

MIL-STD-3014, 2004, Mission Data Exchange Format, US DoD, USA. [Online, accessed 21 July 2004], See URL: http://mil-std-3014.navy.mil

Moon, T Dr, 2007, private correspondence


http://mil-std-3014.navy.mil/

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http://www.12207.com/

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Moon, T., Smith J., & Cook, Prof S., 2006, Technology Readiness & Technical Risk Assessment for the Australian Defence Organisation, SETE 2006 Conference Paper, Brisbane, Australia

RTCA DO-178B, 1992, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Washington, USA.

RTCA DO-254, 2000, Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Washington, USA.

SAE ARP 4754, 1996-11, Aerospace Recommended Practice - Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems, Society of Automotive Engineers Inc, USA.

SAE ARP 4761, 1996-12, Aerospace Recommended Practice - Guidelines & Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems & Equipment, Society of Automotive Engineers Inc, USA

STANMAN , 2002, ADF Standardisation Manual, DoD, Canberra, Australia.

Say-Wei Foo and Arumugam Muruganantham, 2000, Software Risk Assessment Model, National University of Singapore, IEEE International Conference on Management, 2000

Stephenson, J, 1991, System Safety, Van Nostrand Reinhold, NY, NY.

Tutty, M.G., 2005, Australian Aircraft Stores Capabilities in a Network Enabled World, University of South Australia, 31 January 2005

9.0 KEY WORDS

Air armament, aircraft stores compatibility, aeroacoustics, aeroelastic, aircraft flutter, aircraft loads, aircraft stores certification, armament system software changes, ballistics, captive flight profile, carriage and release, carrier suitability, electromagnetic effects, hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance, employment, jettison, environmental testing, fit and function, flying qualities, weapon integration, operational flight program, safe escape, static ejection, store mass properties, store separation, structural integrity, vibration and endurance, wind tunnel, human factors, systems engineering, risk management, validation and verification.

10.0 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author joined the RAAF as an engineering cadet in 1980 and has served in the Air Force and Australian Public Service in a multitude of engineering and test roles including an exchange tour with the 3246 Test Wing / TY until the Gulf War OT&E I, then as Director ASCENG for over 800 aircraft stores combinations for over 20 aircraft types that have serviced so many DIMPIs / targets it is now best described conservatively by the power law: P>x =x – PetaDIMPI’s Serviced, and the Director of the worlds largest land-based Woomera Test Range prior to joining the dark side for an outstanding time as Chief Engineer for Maritime Patrol and Force Applications, Tenix Defence Aerospace for the AP-3C Orion $1Billion upgrade and was in the Active Reserve as the Red Weapons Analyst, Defence Intelligence Organisation. In 2008, he was invited to rejoin the RAAF as Director Trials & Range Management, AFHQ. He has a Bachelor of Electronic Engineering with Distinction from RMIT and a Masters in Systems Engineering from the University of South Australia. He is doing a PhD in his spare time. He was Listed in Who’s Who in the World for Science & Engineering in 2003, and has been a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society and the Institution of Engineers (Australia) since 2002. His interests include: his family, reading, shooting, flying,



the study of haute couture and aesthetics, golf, travel, drinking good red, bourbon and beer, and investigating novel applications of air power.


11.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The AGARDograph is dedicated to the unequalled contribution that Charlie Epstein, Captain, USN and US Civil Service Rtd, has made in the application of science and engineering to en-abling the revolution in aircraft stores combat effectiveness and the implications that has now had to the application of all Allied air power.Kevin Christensen, qtp, LtCol USAF, SETP

William D. Hack, MEng, Colonel, USAF, ASC SME

Ron Haack, qtp, WGCDR RAAF Rtd, QANTAS Captain

Al Piranian, NAVAIR, USN, ASC and air armament standardization SME

Ben Shirley, AFSEO, USAF, ASC SME

Neal Siegel, NAVAIR, USN, ASC & T&E SME

Mark Washusen, qfte, WGCDR, CO ASCENG, RAAF

Tom Milhous, USN Rtd, USN, air armament SME

Mac Robertson, CENGR BAESystems / Tenix / ADO

Robert Arnold, Technical Advisor, 46 Test Wing / Armament Center, Eglin AFB FL

Tracy White, AMOG Consulting, systems safety engineering SME

UK

CA

Other Nations

ANNEXES:

A. Definitions and Acronyms

B. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Systems Engineering Reviews

C. ASC FFBD Top Level

D. Air Armament Risk Matrix

A first-rate theory predicts, a second-rate theory forbids and a third-rate theory explains after the event

Alex Kitiagorodski

FT3-01 1 - 25


ANNEX A: DEFINITIONS & ACRONYMS

ADF. Australian Defence Force

Aircraft. Man made machines that fly. This includes fixed and rotary wing aircraft/aeroplanes both inhabited and uninhabited.

Aircraft Store. Any device intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension and release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft.

Aircraft stores certification. An engineering, operational and logistics activity that results in the documentation by the Technical and Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives that specified aircraft stores configuration(s) are operationally suitable, effective and that the preparedness status of the established integrated logistics support meets the endorsed Operational Requirement for the aircraft stores capability. Formal approval for authorisation and Release to Service of an aircraft stores configuration is accomplished through publication of appropriate technical orders and manuals and the provision of training in use of the systems.

Aircraft Stores Compatibility. The ability of each element of specified aircraft stores configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical, aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of each other under specified ground and flight conditions [at the Engagement or subsystem level].

Aircraft Stores Configuration. An aircraft stores configuration refers to an aerospace platform, incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific suspension equipment and aircraft store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft stores configuration also includes any downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an authorised employment or jettison sequence(s).

Aircraft Stores Clearance. Primarily a systems engineering activity used in most NATO countries to formally document in a Flight Clearance, or similar document, the extent of aircraft stores compatibility within specified ground and flight operating envelopes determined by the Technical Airworthiness Authority.

Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance. A document issued by the Technical Airworthiness Authority that explicitly defines the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare, load, carry, employ and/or jettison specific aircraft stores configurations within specified ground and flight operating envelopes. This document is a mandatory basis required by most NATO nations for release to service of the aircraft stores configurations. DI(G) OPS 02-2 Paragraph 39 states “Before any aircraft stores configuration may be flown, an aircraft stores compatibility [flight] clearance, authorised by the ADF TAR (or delegate) is required. The OAA is responsible for developing operational procedures and revising training programs to integrate the store in to the operating system.” The ADF TAR has delegated the responsibility for approval of ASCENG Flight Clearances to Director ASCENG at AOSG iaw AAP 7001.053 Regulation 1 Annex A and Regulation 3.5.9.

Aircraft & Stores Compatibility Engineering Data Package (ASCEDP). A document that, for specified aircraft stores combination, documents all stores and aircraft CEDPs covering all engineering and operational aspects relevant to aircraft stores compatibility iaw MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998) as a source for production of technical orders. An ASCEDP is requested for all State aircraft stores combinations.

Analogy. A form of reasoning in which similarities are inferred from a similarity of two or more things in certain particulars. Analogy plays a significant role in problem solving, decision making, perception, memory skills, creativity, explanation, emotion, and communication. It is both the cognitive process of



transferring information from a particular subject (the analogue or source) to another particular subject (the target), and a linguistic expression corresponding to such a process. In a narrower sense, analogy is an inference or an argument from one particular to another particular, as opposed to deduction, induction and/or abduction where at least one of the premises or the conclusion is general. The word analogy can also refer to the relation between the source and the target themselves, which is often, though not necessarily, a similarity, as in the biological notion of analogy. Wikipedia (2009)

Armament. Force equipped for war, military weapons and equipment, process of equipping for war. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964)

ASC. Aircraft Stores Compatibility

ASCENG. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Squadron. The Royal Australian Air Force agency responsible for airworthiness and suitability standards, planning, conducting, approving and supporting operations for all ADF State aircraft stores configurations.

Avionic architecture. An avionic architecture describes the form, fit, function, and interface characteristics of the hardware and software elements that characterise the airborne mission system.

BKPM. Bad Karma per minute.

Capability. Ability to implement power. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964); a quality that enables the achievement of an outcome. ADF

Certification. The end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a product, against predefined requirements and standards, to the satisfaction of the certificating authority… DI(G) OPS 02-2 and AAP 7001.053 (2003). The act of issuing a certificate that provides assurance that an entity, including product, service or organisation, complies with a stated specification, standard or other equipment… DI(G) LOG 08-15.

Certification Basis. The set of standards which define the criteria against which the design of aircraft or aircraft-related equipment, or changes to that design, are assessed to determine their airworthiness…..AAP 7001.053 (2003). DI(G) OPS 02-2 refers to AAP 7001.054 for a similar definition.

Commonality. A state achieved when groups of individuals, organisations or nations use the same doctrine, procedures and equipment. AAP 6

Compatibility. The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions. The capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference; or capable of orderly efficient integration with other elements in a system. Concise Macquarie Dictionary (1988)

Concept. n. a thought, idea, or notion, often one deriving from a generalised mental operation. Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1988)

Conops. Concept of Operations

DMO. Defence Material Organisation - responsible for the ADF's acquisition and sustainment.

DMPI. Desired mean point of impact – a euphemism traditionally called a target.



Effects-Based Operations. Coordinated sets of actions [in the cognitive domain] directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, foes, neutral in peace, crisis and war. Smith (2002) The ap-plication of military and non-military capabilities to realise specific and desired strategic and op-erational outcomes in peace, tension, conflict and post conflict situations. Ryan & Callan (2003)

Function. A task, action, or activity expressed as a verb-noun combination (eg Brake Function: stop vehicle) to achieve a defined outcome. Electronic Industries Association (1999)

Functional Requirement. A statement that identifies what a product or process must accomplish to produce required behaviour and/or results. Electronic Industries Association (1999)

Integration. The merger or combining of two or more lower-level elements into a functioning and unified higher-level element with the functional and physical interfaces satisfied.

Interchangeability. The ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil the same requirements. A condition which exists when two or more items possess such functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and durability, and are capable of being exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of adjoining items, except for adjustment, and without selection for fit and performance. NATO AAP 6

Interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. The three levels of standardisation for interoperability as used by the NATO are: Common, Interchangeable and Compatible.

ITEA. International T&E Association

Network Enabled Operations. A network-centric force has the capability to share and exchange information among the geographically distributed elements of the force: sensors, regardless of platform; shooters, regardless of service; and decision makers and supporting organizations, regardless of location. In short, a network-centric force is an interoperable force, a force that has global access to assured information whenever and wherever needed” 37. Gartska (2000)

OCD. Operational Concept Document.

Operational Effectiveness. The degree of mission accomplishment of a system when used by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational employment of the system, considering organisation, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat, including countermeasures.

OFP. Operational Flight Program

Operational Suitability. The degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in field use considering availability, compatibility, transportability, interoperability, reliability, peacetime training and wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, human factors, logistics supportability, documentation, and training requirements.

RAAF. Royal Australian Air Force

RTO. NATO's Research & Technology Organisation

37 Garstka (2000) notes that ‘a force with these capabilities is not known to currently exist in any of the US Military services or in the armed forces any our Allied or Coalition partners.’ Which is still true today.



Standard. A description of a process, material, or product meant for repeated use in one of more applications covering: materials, processes, products and services. STANMAN (2002)

System. A combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes. A system may be considered as a product or as the services it provides. In practice, the interpretation of its meaning is frequently clarified by the use of an associative noun, e.g. aircraft system. Alternatively the word system may be substituted simply by a context dependent synonym, e.g. aircraft, though this may then obscure a system principles perspective…..ISO 15288. An integrated set of elements to accomplish a defined objective. These include hardware, software, firmware, people, information, techniques, facilities, services, and other support elements.

Systems engineering. Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while considering the complete problem, e.g.:

Conceptualisation Cost & Schedule

Performance & Design Training & Support

Test Operations

Manufacturing Disposal

Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a team effort forming a structured development process that proceeds from concept to production to operation. Systems Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user needs.

Significant Change. A significant change to either an aircraft or store form, fit, function and qualification limits, requiring reassessment of aircraft/stores compatibility is caused by the following criteria:

a. Any change to the external aerodynamic shape of the aircraft or store that may affect physical fit, performance, flying qualities and/or separation characteristics.

b. Any change in basic aircraft or store structural characteristics, including the addition/deletion of any antennae, vents, drains, probes or ducts that may affect the store in any way.

c. Any change to the aeroelastic or wing mass distribution characteristics of the aircraft.

d. Any change in the aircraft Basic Weight Configuration that affects the carriage and employment of a store or stores combination.

e. A 12.7mm (0.5") or greater change in store C of G (excluding any allowable tolerances).

f. A 5% or greater change in store weight.

g. A 10% or greater change in store pitch, roll or yaw moments.

h. Any change in functional concept, including weapon delivery mode changes.



i. Any degradation in the Electromagnetic Radiation environment affecting the electromagnetic compatibility of the aircraft/store configurations.

j. Any degradation in the HERO characteristics of the aircraft or store.

k. Any change in electrical/electronic connector characteristics or their location.

l. Any change in store suspension lug location.

m. Any change in arming wire or lanyard routing.

n. Any change in aircraft or stores fuze safing, arming design or Hazard Classification Code.

o. Any change in aircraft or stores environmental qualification or tolerance.

p. Any change in aircraft thrust or stores ballistic and/or propulsion characteristics.

q. Any change in stores explosive fill or casing affecting blast performance or store fragmentation patterns.

r. Any change in aircraft or store OFP software or SMS changes that affects the operation, employment or accuracy of the store.

s. Any change to the aircraft, store or Safe Escape Manoeuvres that causes an increase in the Minimum Safe Release Height or Weapon Danger Area/Zones (Safety Template) during employment of the store.

t. New nomenclature for either aircraft or store.

u. Individual changes that do not necessarily make a significant change which, when considered cumulatively, result in a significant deviation from the design specification of the presently certified aircraft and/or store are considered to constitute a significant change. The term ‘aircraft’ also includes the aircraft Stores Suspension Equipment. AAP 7001.053 (2003)

T&E. Test & Evaluation. See Chapter 8.7.10 eae 544.

Technical Integrity. An items fitnesss for service, safety and compliance with regulations for environmental protection…..DI(G) LOG 08-15.

TTP. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

Similarity. State of being similar, a point of resemblance.

Uni SA. University of South Australia

V&V. Validation & Verification


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