Panel Discussion: Hostile Action-Based Drill Initiative NRC Region I/FEMA Regions I, II, III Joint...

Panel Discussion:Hostile Action-Based Drill

Initiative

NRC Region I/FEMA Regions I, II, IIIJoint Scheduling Conference

December 10, 2008

Sue Perkins-GrewFacilitator

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Panel Members

Steve Mannix, Exelon

Jon Christiansen, NJ Emergency Management

Mike McCoppin, NRC NSIR

Jacques Singleton, FEMA HQ

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative

Year- End Summary– Experiential presentations: Exelon, New Jersey OEM

Lessons Learned Themes– NEI– NRC– FEMA

Focus Areas for 2009– NEI– NRC– FEMA– 2009 Workshop

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative 2008 Year-end Summary

23 drills conducted

Lessons Learned submitted to NEI for most

– over 75 entries

HAB drill protocol evolved– NEI Scenario Review

– Scenario “challenge/inquiry” between NRC/NEI/FEMA/licensee

– Post-drill conference call with NRC

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative Experiences

Fleet Perspective – Exelon

– Steve Mannix

Offsite Perspective – NJ Office of Emergency Management

– Jon Christiansen

NEI 06-04Phase III InitiativeExelon Fleet Experience

Steve MannixExelon Nuclear

Emergency Preparedness

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Be Clear About Purpose

Primary Objective: No Unplanned Events

“Embrace” the NEI 06-04 (Rev 1) Guidance and keep an “eye”on the NUREG-0654 Objectives; begin to prepare for the integration of HAB and REP in evaluation space

Leverage this opportunity; walk away better prepared; develop and sustain important ORO relationships

• No Injuries • No Security Events

• No Operational Events • No Weapons Events

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Understand the Differences

The tabletop is your exercise dress rehearsal

The exercise sequence of events and flow of information will be different

The scenario development team composition will be different

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Planning and Preparation

Stakeholder engagementStart well in advanceIncident Commander engagement

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Achieving Success

Preparing your exercise control materials

Preparing your exercise control team and participants

Performing as if it were a real event

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Maintaining Control

This can turn into a “production”Know when “enough ORO

participation is enough”Be ready to drive your timeline

and planned exercise missions

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For additional information or todiscuss these lessons learned and others please contact:

Steve Mannix

Exelon Emergency Preparedness

Hostile Action Exercise Specialist

[email protected]

610-765-5590 (office)

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative Experiences

Offsite Perspective – NJ Office of Emergency Management

– Jon Christiansen

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OYSTER CREEK

Hostile Action Based Drill

September 9, 2008

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The September 9, 2008 Hostile Action-based Drill (HABD) was the first exercise in New Jersey of the Terrorism Procedure for the nuclear power plants. This Drill posed unique challenges to the New Jersey State Police and the Office of Emergency Management and was successfully demonstrated despite the unfamiliarity of the participants with the Procedure.

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The Drill initiated at 1700 from the State Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC) with call to Duty Trooper describing a credible threat to the plant.

At 1721, following additional calls from ROIC to the Duty Trooper and OEM Command Staff activates the State EOC.

At 1730, the Licensee declared an Unusual Event.

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At 1730, Incident Command Post (ICP) established at the plant.

ROIC notifies Ocean County at 1738 and the BNE at 1739.

At 1741, the Licensee declares a Site Area Emergency also reports of explosions and gunfire reported from the ICP.

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At 1745, Licensee reports the loss of all offsite power.

At 1749, the Licensee declares a General Emergency (GE).

The Governor declares a “State of Emergency” at 1750.

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At 1753, the Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF) declaring the GE is verified.

By 1804, the Command Staff reviewed the potential Protective Actions carefully weighing the publics safety and response to the terrorist event.

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At 1820, the Commanding Officer decided that since no offsite release was in progress Sheltering in Place for all Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) in the zero to five mile radius was the prudent course of action.

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The public was alerted by sirens at 1828 to tune into the Emergency Alert System.

A message instructing the public to shelter in place was aired at 1833.

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The HABD encompassed the integration of multiple offsite response organizations responding to the incident at an Incident Command Post (ICP) on the power plant property with the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) managing a traditional response to a classified event at the plant.

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The State EOC provided adequate and timely resource support to the ICP in addition to managing implementation of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP).

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Cons: The nature of HABD restricts the number

active participants to the key-hole municipalities and designated responders.

Minimal requirement for Accident Assessment and Field Monitoring.

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Training value diminishes when the initial flurry of activity is followed by prolonged voids in events.

In order to meet the requirements of State Law three exercises had to be conducted:

August 13, 2008 evaluating the State EOC, Accident Assessment, and Public Information

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September 9, 2008 exercising the Terrorism Procedure evaluating Lacey Township, and Ocean Township.

September 23, 2008 evaluating Ocean County EOC and the fifteen municipalities not participating on September 9, 2008.

Additional training of evaluators, scenario required, and an artificial exercise environment.

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Pros: Staff at the State EOC were challenged

by the rapid succession of events and the training value was appreciated.

The State EOC focused on the RERP aspects of the event.

Staff at the State EOC provided timely and effective support to the Incident Command Post.

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Command Staff displayed exceptional initiative in developing the Protective Action Decision.

Command Staff carefully weighed information destined for press releases.

The BNE staff at the State EOC provided key insights on the event and displayed thorough knowledge of plant systems.

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Excellent interface between the State EOC and the Incident Command post.

No apparent interoperability issues from responders in the field.

Staff at each facility displayed flexibility and ingenuity when faced with an event outside the strictures of the RERP Plan.

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Conclusion:

The merits of the HABD warrant its inclusion into the REP Program.

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative Lessons Learned Themes

NEI Industry Lessons Learned

NRC Observations and Perspective

FEMA Observations and Perspective

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Guideline not followed Critiques not inclusive of 06-04

Demonstration Criteria Security involvement in planning and

implementation Challenges in the JIC: development,

approval, and release of public information ICP readiness, logistics, & integration Sharing of Lessons Learned

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NRC Observations and Perspective

– Mike McCoppin

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FEMA Observations and Perspective

– Jacques Singleton

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Phase III Drill Observations and Challenges

Jacques Singleton,

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Branch

Technological Hazards Division

Federal Emergency Management Agency

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Incident Command System

Establishing/Transitioning Incident Command

Coordination with traditional REP elements/facilities

Protective Action Decisions

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Communications

Information Flow

Release of Public Information

Control of Incident-Specific Information

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Integration

Integration of OROs into onsite response

Just-in-time Training for ORO responders

Mutual Aid for Traditional ORO response activities

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative 2009 Focus Areas - NEI

Continue HAB Coordination Activities– Close gaps in performance

– Determine whether objectives were met

– Sustaining performance prior to evaluation

Rulemaking & FEMA REP Program Manual Proposed Changes (3/09)

Revise NEI 06-04:– Include lessons learned

– Compliment proposed rulemaking/REP Program changes

– More specific guidance on tabletops

– RIS 2008-08 elements of clarification

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative 2009 Focus Areas - NRC

NRC Expectations of licensees

– Mike McCoppin

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative 2009 Focus Areas - FEMA

How can OROs best prepare for the future

– Jacques Singleton

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FEMA Focus Areas for 2009

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FEMA Expectations for HAB Drills

Extent of Play

Limited Scope of HAB Drills Integration of non-traditional responders (e.g., FBI)

Preparing for Future Evaluations

Highlight potential gaps in plans and procedures Identify needed training areas

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Moving Forward: Draft REP Program Manual Publication

Alignment with NRC Rulemaking/Guidance

Document Crosswalk FEMA/NRC working groups

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Hostile Action Based Drill Initiative 2009 Focus Areas

National REP Conference

Norfolk, VA

Hostile Action Based Drill Workshop

April 23, 2009

1:00 – 5:00pm

Presented by NEI, NRC, & FEMA

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Hostile Action Based Drill WorkshopApril 23, 2009

Open Forum

Focus Areas for improved performance:

– Scenarios and Conduct of T/T and Drills

– PAR Decision Making

– Integration of the Incident Command System

– Challenges in Prompt Dissemination of Public Information

More information to follow…..

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Questions?

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CONTACT INFORMATION

Sue Perkins-Grew, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)603.773.7278

[email protected]

Steve Mannix, Exelon610.765.5590

[email protected]

Jon Christiansen, NJ State Police609.963.6900, ext. 6725

[email protected]

Michael McCoppin, NRC NSIR301.415.2737

[email protected]

Jacques Singleton, FEMA703.605.4215

[email protected]

Panel Discussion: Hostile Action-Based Drill Initiative NRC Region I/FEMA Regions I, II, III Joint...

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