Pan-awareness: Pan-awareness: Building a bridge between Building a bridge between panpsychism and Vedantapanpsychism and Vedanta

Anand Rangarajananand@cise.ufl.edu

Dept. of Computer & Information Science and Engineering

Univ. of Florida

OverviewOverview

Phenomenology – Meditative phenomenology

Pan-awareness ontology– Ontology of subjects– The combination problem

Topologies– Hierarchical frames

Conclusions

Meditative PhenomenologyMeditative Phenomenology

Mindfulness: Awareness completely focused at center of phenomenon.– One pointedness, no split mind.

Non-referential awareness: Awareness zooms out and is radically decentered.– Pure consciousness event (PCE), nirvikalpa samadhi.

Fundamental awareness/content distinction Hindu and Buddhist philosophical schools:

longstanding debate over interpretation.

Irritability

Prehension

Sensation

Perception

Emotion

Cognition

Visualization

Illumination

Awareness Content

Fundamental nature of awareness/content distinction (Aurobindo, 1985, Wilber, 2000)

Reductive ExplanationReductive Explanation

Logical supervenience reductive explanation

Almost everything is logically supervenient on the physical (Chalmers, JCS 2:3, 1995).

Exceptions are:– Experience– Physical laws– Indexicality

Panpsychism, dualism, idealism etc. cannot be summarily dismissed.

Why panpsychism?Why panpsychism?

“It’s logically possible”, - says Prof. Analytic Philosopher with a contemptuous tone

Marginal view but upheld by Leibniz, James, Whitehead, Russell, Hartshorne, Griffin, Fechner

Fundamental approach to consciousness problem Affinity with Vedanta, Vajrayana, Hua-Yen Recent resurgence – Seager, Strawson, Rosenberg

OntologyOntology

Agree with Strawson (JCS, 6:4, 1999): When awareness present, a subject exists.

When I am aware, I am. Fundamental level:

– Subjects.– Intersubjective exchange of content.

Awareness NOT cognitive. Reminiscent of pan proto-psychism.

RepresentationRepresentation

Subjects and intersubjectivenetwork modeled as directedgraph

Phenomenology rides on topology. Connection directions indicatepropagation of influence.

Issues of spacetime metric etc. set aside for now.

The Combination ProblemThe Combination Problem

How does phenomenology add up?– What about awareness of “mid-level subjects”

[James 1890, Seager - JCS 2:3]?– Intersubjective phenomenal content at mid-

level?

Quantum coherence etc. suggested as objective criteria.

Ontology of subjects as a way out?

William James on combination William James on combination problemproblem

“Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feeling were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge” (James, 1890)

Awareness and contentAwareness and content

James’ confusion between awareness and content

Subjects: Ontologization of awarenessFeelings don’t “add” up but what about

subjects?– Compound subjects (Whitehead, 1928).– Leverage “Atman = Brahman”?

Structure of awarenessStructure of awareness

One-pointedness mode Decentered mode

Phenomenological clue to combination problem

Bypass issue of existence of topology prior to phenomenology

Combination principle?Combination principle?

Awareness binds configuration of lower level subjects

Binding can range from one-pointed focus to a decentered zoomed out focus.

Binding is dynamic: Tacit spacetime assumptions [Rosenberg thesis, 1997].

Leads to a hierarchical topology of subjects

RepresentationRepresentationTopology connects higherlevel subject with lowerlevel subjects – possibilityspace [Rosenberg, 1997].

Momentary awareness – combination of lower-level subjects.

Bypass spacetime issues

Subject topologiesSubject topologies

“The Many become One and are increased by One”(Whitehead, 1928)

time

Subject topologies (contd.)Subject topologies (contd.)

“More is different” ( Philip Anderson, 1972)

Emergence model

Subject topologies (contd.)Subject topologies (contd.)

“The One and the Many create the Few”

Panpsychism and VedantaPanpsychism and Vedanta

Regardless of Advaita, Visistadvaita or Dvaita (Tattvavâda) orientation, Vedanta philosophies implicitly tell a combination story

All agree on the PAN aspect of awareness Main difference – ultimate nature of subjects –

irrelevant here. Potential meeting ground (Griffin and Smith, 1990).

ConclusionsConclusions

Awareness/Content distinction fundamentalWhen I am aware, I amAwareness all the way down: Pan-awarenessCombination problem for panpsychismCompound subjects but not compound objectsTopology of subjectsDifferent Vedantas can still play role

BibliographyBibliography1. Swami Sachidananda, The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, Integral Yoga Pub., 1990.2. Arthur Deikman, “I”=Awareness, JCS, 3:4, 1996.3. David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, Oxford Univ. Press, 1996.4. Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine, Lotus Press, 1985.5. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Free Press, 1928.6. Galen Strawson, The Self, JCS, 4:5-6, 1997.7. Gregg Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness in the Natural World, Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Indiana, 1997.8. Ken Wilber, Integral Psychology, Shambhala, 2000.9. David Ray Griffin and Huston Smith, Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology, SUNY Press, 1990.10. William James, Principles of Psychology, 1890, Dover, 1955.11. William Seager, Consciousness, Information and Panpsychism, JCS, 2:3, 1995.12. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford Univ. Press, 1988.13. Barry Dainton, The Gaze of Consciousness, JCS, 9:2, 2002.14. Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1969.15. Christian de Quincey, Radical Nature, Invisible Cities Press, 2002.

DiscussionDiscussion

When I am aware, I am. Combination problem: Clues from

phenomenology. Awareness operator - higher-level subjects. Distinction between ontology and representation. No a priori commitment to dual-aspect theory. Probabilistic hierarchical model with emergent

constraints.

PhenomenologyPhenomenology

Migraine headaches: Reliable and repeatable phenomena.

Two distinct modes of awareness:– Awareness concentrated at center of migraine.– Awareness detaches and is decentered.

Oscillation between modes.Loss of awareness.

IntersubjectivityIntersubjectivity

Hargens’s [JCS, 8:12 (2001)] taxonomy:– Intersubjectivity as spirit. Transcendental.– Intersubjectivity as context: Mesh.– Intersubjectivity as resonance:

1. Worldspace. Ontological: Empathy, Zelig.

2. Worldview: Epistemological: Culture.

– Intersubjectivity as relationship: It-It, I-It, I-I.

RepresentationRepresentation

Taking van Gulick’s [JCS, 8:9-10] distinction between ontology and representation seriously.

Different from most standard ontologies.

Ontology

SubjectsIntersubjectivityPhenomenal contentCompound subjectMomentary awareness

Representation

ObjectsRelationsPropertiesPart/whole relationProcesses