PALS Political Law

8/11/2019 PALS Political Law

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I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Constitution: effectivity, definition, nature and concepts

De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)

De Leon, whose term as Barangay Captain was to expire on June 7, 1988, was replaced as Captain by

Governor Esguerra under the Freedom Constitution, which granted the Governor the power to appoint

successors to local government posts until Feb. 25, 1987. However, the Supreme Court held that the

power no longer existed upon effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. In turn, the 1987 Constitution

became effective on Feb. 2, 1987, when the plebiscite was held, and not when the results were

announced.

1. Interpretation of the Constitution

Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003)

Francisco challenged the filing of a Second Impeachment Complaint within the same year against SC

Chief Justice Davide, Jr., on the ground that it was barred by Art. XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution

The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, and gave the following rules for the interpretation of the

Constitution:

1) Verba legiswhenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary

meaning except where technical terms are employed.2) Ratio legis et animathe words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the

intent of the framers.

3) Ut magis valeat quam pereatthe Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole.

2. Definition of State (to be related with PIL discussion)

CIR v. Campos Rueda (1971)

Campos Rueda died in Tangier, Morocco, an international zone in North Africa. The CIR assessed herestate for deficiency taxes. Ruedas defense was a tax treaty between Tangiers and the Philippines. The

Supreme Court held that Tangier was a state, defining such as a politically organized sovereign

community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its

territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a

nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its

government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international

personality.


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B. Parts

C. Amendments and revisions

In General (Art. XVII):

By Congress as Constituent Assembly

Gonzales v. Comelec (1967)

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for

the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be

held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held. Gonzales challenged the propriety

of the act.

The SC upheld RA 4913. Congress has legislative power which is plenary in nature but the power to

amend the Constitution is not included. The power to amend is within the constituent power of the

people. The Congress possesses constituent power as it is a delegation of the people of their constituentpower.

By Constitutional Convention

Imbong v. Comelec (1970)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act was enacted by Congress acting as a legislative body. Imbong

challenged its constitutionality. The SC upheld the act. The power to enact the implementing details of the

Constitutional Convention -- as opposed to the exclusive authority of Congress as a Constituent Assemblyto call for the ConCon -- is within the competency of Congress exercising its comprehensive legislative

power, as long as the statutory details do not clash with any specific provision in the Constitution.

Congress continued to exercise its legislative powers even if it was already the Constituent Assembly and

it did not abandon its legislative duties.

By Peoples Initiative

Santiago v. Comelec (1997)

Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation and

national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was

filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the constitutional

provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution (Article XVII 2) required implementing

legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack

could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its legislative authority

to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do

so under law.


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Completeness on its face

Lambino v. Comelec (2006)

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via peoples initiative. However, his petition didnot include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative did not meet the

requirements of the Constitution. An amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition only if the people sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments

To do otherwise would be deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there

should be both direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their signature to the petition.

Submission of Proposed Amendments

Must be made as a whole. No piecemeal submission allowed.

Tolentino v. Comelec (1971)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention ordered the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the

proposed amendment to lower the voting age without submitting the other amendments to the

Constitution for ratification. The SC held this to be unconstitutional.. The language of the 1973

Constitutions provision on amendments is clear on the matter of how many elections may be held to

ratify any amendments proposed by a constituent assembly or constitutional convention: one. It is

important that the parts of the Constitution must have harmony as an integrated whole. In order for a

plebiscite for the ratification of amendments to be validly held, it must provide voters not only sufficient

time but means for said voter to intelligently appraise the nature of the amendment per se as well as itsrelation to other parts of the Constitution with which it forms a whole.

D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions

1. Self-Executing

2. Non-Self-executing

E. General provisions


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II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. National territory

1. Archipelagic doctrine

B.

State immunityC. General principles and state policies

2. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism

3. Adherence to International Law

4. Supremacy of Civilian Authority

5. Government as protector of People & People as Defenders of the State

6. Separation of Church and State

7. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines

8. A just and dynamic social order

9.

Social justice

Calalang v. Williams (1940)

An ordinance was passed preventing animal-drawn vehicles from passing through certain thoroughfares

Calalang challenged the ordinance. The Supreme Court held that it was a valid exercise of police power, in

the interests of social justice.

Defining Social Justice, it is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the

humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its

rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. It is the promotion of thewelfare of all the people, the adoption by the government of measure calculated to insure economic

stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and

social equilibrium in the interrelations of the member of the community, constitutionally, through

adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers

underlying the existence of all governments. It is founded upon the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly

extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life consistent with the

fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all

persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

Labor

Agrarian and natural resources reform

Urban land reform and housing

Health


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Oposa v. Factoran (1993)

Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The Supreme Court,

recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their standing, held that the

right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II 16 of the Constitution. While it

is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not Bill of Rights, but it is not any lessimportant than any civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self-

preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from the inception of mankind. Thus, those

provisions are self-executing.

Women

Peoples organizations

Respect for human dignity and human rights

Education

Language

Science and technology

Arts and culture

The family

D. Separation of powers

E. Checks and balances

F. Delegation of powers

G. Forms of government

1. De jure v. De Facto

2. Presidential v. Parliamentary

3. Unitary v. Federal


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III.LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Who may exercise legislative powers

Congress

Delegation

To local governments

To the People through initiative and referendum

To the President under martial law rule or in a revolutionary government.

Sanidad v. Comelec (1976)

President Marcos, in exercise of his emergency powers, proposed amendments to the Constitution and

proposals to set up the machinery and procedures required for the ratification of his proposals by the

people. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad challenged the validity of the amendments, as the power to amend islegislative. The SC upheld the amendments, because the governmental powers in a crisis government are

more or less concentrated in the President. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of

martial law is a valid act. This is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent

assembly normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not

convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity

render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose

amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose constitutional

amendments.

Although the President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the

constitution, it is permissible to grant more powers to the President in times of emergency in the interest

of restoring normalcy.

Congress

The Senate

Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office

Dimaporo v. Mitra (1991)

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of ARMM Governor.

He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue as Representative, was not

able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as Representative again

It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the

period that an official actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the

certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution

when he was prevented from re-assuming his post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may

not be extended or shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may

be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the officer.


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population of at least

250, 000 shall have

one representative.

Approval by a

majority of the votes

cast in a plebiscite in

the political units

affected

Result LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT No legal personality

Purpose:

representation

LOCAL GOVT UNIT Political subdivision

Can discharge govt

functions

Has political and

economic effects on

inhabitants

Has own IRA; can

generate own

revenue

The Party List System

BANAT v. COMELEC (2009)

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate

questioned the proclamation of party-list representatives released by the COMELEC, as well as the

formula being used. BANATs claims were that the 2% threshold is invalid, andthat the 20% allotment to

party-list representatives is a mandatory requirement, not merely a ceiling.

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule

(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to

participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

The Supreme Court, granting the positions, laid down the following guidelines:

The Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters:

1. The 20% allocation---the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of

the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list

2. The 2% threshold---only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for

the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.

3. The three-seat limit--- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained

is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

4. Proportional representation---the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be

computed in proportion to their totalnumber of votes.

How to Allot Slots to Party List Representatives:

1. Find total number of Party List Representatives


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Following the Constitution, the total number of seats allocated to party list is in reference to the

seats for representatives of legislative districts. The combined number of all party-list congressmen

shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those

elected under the party-list. This ceiling is provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(2).

2ndlevel of analysis: Allocation of Seats for Party List Representatives

The allocation of party list seats was left to the wisdom of Legislature. Congress enacted RA 7941

(Party List System Act).

Sec. 11, RA 7941:

1. Parties should be ranked from highest to lowest based on the number of votes garnered.

2. Parties receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast shall be entitled to one seat.

3rdlevel of analysis: Allocation of Additional Seats

The Court departs from the Veterans procedure in allocating additional seats. 2% threshold in 2nd

round of allocation is declared unconstitutional. The 2% threshold set by Veterans in the 2nd round o

allocation of seats prevents filling of the seats allocated for party list. The number of additional seats to be

allocated is

[Maximum number of seats for party list] -[guaranteed seats].

In allocating additional seats, even the parties who did not garner 2% could be entitled to

additional seats.

Procedure in second round of seat allocation:

1. Correct formula in determining the number of additional seats:

[Number of votes received/total number of votes] x Remaining available seats

2. Seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely

distributed.

3. 3-seat cap is applied to determine to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list

candidate is entitled.

Participation of major political parties in Party list elections

Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the

party-list system. But, by a vote of 8-7, Court decides to continue with the ruling in Veterans, disallowing

major political parties from participating in the party list election.

NOTE: But in Atong Paglaum the Court laid down new guidelines on the participation of major

political parties as follows:


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ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (2013)

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (a) national parties or organizations

(b) regional parties or organizations, and (c) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to

represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list

system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party that field

candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its

sectoral wing.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in

well-defined political constituencies.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and

underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.

6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their

nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

Salaries

Philconsa v. Mathay (1966)

Philconsa challenged the appropriation of salaries of the members of Congress set out in the GAA for

1965-1966, which had been increased the year before (1964). The controversy came because the

Senators who took part in the approval of the law would be in office until 1969. The SC agreed with

Philconsa. The term mentioned in the provision refers to the term of the Congress as a whole. Members

of Congress who approved the increase will not have the salary increase.

Freedom from Arrest Article VI, Sec. 11

While Congress is in session (Art. VI, Sec. 15)

Martinez v. Morfe (1972)

An information was filed against Martinez for falsification of public documents, and 2 informations

Bautista for violations of the Revised Election Code. As members of the Constitutional Convention, they

invoked the protection of the Constitution against search and arrest against members of Congress.


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However, the SC held that Martinez and Bautista were not covered by the privilege. Parliamentary

immunity granted to the members of the legislature and the Constitutional Convention was never meant

to shield them from criminal liability, only to protect them from possible harassment. Any privileges

extended to the legislature should not harm the State. Immunity from arrest does not cover any

prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace. Here, petitioners are charged with felonies; hencethe immunity does not apply to them.

Speech and Debate

Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)

Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National

Defense. He caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines, alleging that there

were plans to hold a coup dtat. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang for damages due to the

Cabangbangs libellous statements. In response, Cabangbang invoked the parliamentary immunity from

suit.

The SC held that he was not entitled to the privileges. The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art

VI 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their

official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to

Congress in plenary session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills

introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of

Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does

not include acts not connected with the discharge of their office.


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Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions

a. From holding any other office or employment in Government during term without forfeiting seat

b. From appointment to any office which may have been created or its emoluments increased during his

term

c.

From personally appearing as counsel

d. From financial interest in any contract with, or in any franchise granted by the government during his

term

e. From intervening in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or

where he may be called upon to act on account of his office

Duties

f. Duty to Disclose

g.

Full disclosure of financial and business interests

h. Notify the House of potential conflict of interest from proposed legislation of which they are authors

Flores v. Drilon (1993)

The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 that allowed the Mayor of Olongapo City to be

appointed as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was challenged on the ground that it

violated the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other

government posts.

The SC agreed and declared the provisions unconstitutional. Art. IX-B 7 of the Constitution expresses

the policy against concentrating several public positions in one person, so that a public official may serve

full-time with dedication and efficiency. While the provision allows appointive officials to hold multiple

offices within limits, par. 1 for elective officials is more stringent in not allowing exceptions unless the

Constitution itself says so. While the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains

throughout his tenure/incumbency, the official may resign first from his elective post to cast off the

constitutionally-attached disqualifications. The respondent does not automatically forfeit his elective

office when he is appointed to another position.

Quorum and Voting Majorities

Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)

Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the Senate floor to formulate charges against then Senate

President Avelino. However, Avelino and his camp employed dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall

Taada from delivering his piece. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder


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Avelino banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his

followers.

The remaining members voted to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the

Senate. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate

President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippinesthe following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding

before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

On the issue of quorum, the SC held that as there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time

(including Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three

senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the

House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House.

There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House

the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of

the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum

Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at

least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about Quorum then

and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for

Cuenco, one against and one abstained

Discipline of Members

Osmea Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)

Congressman Osmea Jr made a privilege speech entitled, A Message to Garcia, in which he accused

Garcia of corruption. A Special Committee was formed through House Resolution 59, to investigate and

discipline Osmea. Osmea asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement

upon his parliamentary immunity through a petition for declaratory relief.

The SC denied his petition. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation

modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely

procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded

by the legislative body.

Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National

Internal Revenue Code. Arroyo et al., all members of the HOR, claimed that there was a violation of the

rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is

tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. They claimed that the passage of the bill was railroaded.


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The SC ruled that it did not have the power to inquire into allegations that Congress failed to comply with

its own rules while enacting a law when no constitutional provision or rights of private individuals were

violated. Within the limits of constitutional restraints, fundamental rights and a reasonable relation

between the means of proceeding and the intended results, all matters of methods for internal

procedures are open to the determination of the House and cannot be subject to judicial inquiry. There

was no grave abuse of discretion, only a matter of internal procedure.

Garcillano v. House Committees (2008)

A legislative inquiry was carried out regarding the Hello Garci tapes in relation to election fraud. The

propriety of the legislative inquiry was challenged based on the non-publication of the Senate rules of

procedure in accordance with Art. VI 21.

The SC struck down the proceedings for lack of publication of the rules. It would be an injustice if a citizen

is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of. It consists of publication either in the

Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law

shall only take effect 15 days after said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered

invalid since the provisions state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According

to RA 8792, an electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for

evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and

regulations.

The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a

continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every

Senate.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

Defensor-Santiago was preventively suspended by the SB for 90 days in accordance with RA 3019. She

assailed the SBs authority to do so, claiming contravention of Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) which provides for

suspension only for 60 days max.

The SC held that the SB had the authority to suspend Santiago. Suspension in Art VI, Sec. 16(3) is different

from preventive suspension under RA 3019, Sec. 13. Preventive suspension is not a penalty and thus is

not a suspension under the purview of the Constitution.

De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan (2002)

De Venecia, as House Speaker, was cited in contempt of court for not implementing the preventive

suspension by Sandiganbayan against one of the House Members. While the Supreme Court held the case

moot and academic, since the term of the member expired while the case was pending, further

differences between Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) and RA 3019, Sec. 13 were discussed, to wit:

o Art. VI, Sec. 16(3):


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House-imposed sanction

Penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in proceedings

or vindicate honor and integrity

o RA 3019, Sec. 13:

Prevent accused from influencing witnesses

Prevent tampering with documentary evidence Prevent committing further crimes while in office

Sessions

Regular Sessions

Special Session

Restrictions

Adjournment for more than 3 days

As to venue

Emergency Sessions

Vacancy in Pres/ VPres office

Ability of President to discharge powers and duties of office

Presidential proclamation of martial law or suspension of habeas

corpus

Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments

Powers of Congress

White Light v. City of Manila (2009)

The City of Manila issued an ordinance disallowing the operation of motels as well as offering quick-time

rates. White Light as well as various other motels challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.

The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance for being unconstitutional.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to

underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and

flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the

State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.

Agustin v. Edu (1979)

LOI 229 was issued by Pres. Marcos, recommending the enactment of local legislation for the installation

of road safety signs and devices. Upon constitutional challenge, the SC held there was no unlawful

delegation of police power.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of police power, there must be a standard which implies at the

very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down the fundamental

policy. The standard lays down the legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out boundaries, and specifies


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the public agency to apply it. With this standard, the executive or administrative agency designated to

carry out the legislative policy may promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

General Plenary Powers

Legislative Power

Substantive Limitations

Express Substantive LimitationsBill of Rights

Appropriations

Taxation (infra)

Public Money in a Special fund

Increase of appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice

and concurrence

Granting title of royalty or nobility

Implied Substantive Limitations

Delegation of legislative powers

Criterion of valid delegation

Abakada Guro v. Exec. Sec. (2005)

The grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT under certain circumstances was

challenged for being undue delegation of legislative power, as VAT was not mentioned in Art VI, Sec 28.

The SC held that there was no undue delegation.

Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only the power to

ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law.

The criteria for valid delegation are that:

Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried

out or implemented by the delegate

Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and determinable to

which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions

Undue delegation of legislative power

Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)

By virtue of several PDs, 33 municipalities were created. Pelaez challenged the constitutionality of their

creation. The SC agreed with him, ruling that while the power to fix common boundaries of adjoining

municipalities to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction may be administrative in nature, the authority to

create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

The questioned statutes did not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power to fix details in

enforcing a law. They neither enunciated a policy to be implemented by the President nor gave a


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sufficiently precise standard to avoid the violation. The phrase as the public welfare may require is

so overbroad that it rests in the President a virtually unfettered discretion that is tantamount to a

delegation of legislative power. For the President to create municipalities will be for him to exercise the

power of control over local government units denied to him by the Constitution.

Proper delegation by express authority of the constitution

Delegation to the president to fix tariffs, rates, etc.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary (1992)

EO 475 (reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5% according to their

value, except for crude oil and other oil products which continue to have a 9% additional duty) and E.O.

478 (which laid a special duty on imported crude oil and oil products) were constitutionally challenged.

The SC upheld the validity of the EOs. Under Art. VI 24 of the Constitution, the enactment of

appropriation revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the legislative and not the executive

branch. Art. VI 28(2) allows Congress to authorize the President to fix within specific limits, among

others, tariff rates and other duties. There is explicit constitutional permission to allow the E.O.s to be

issued. The Tariff and Customs Code also laid down sufficiently determinate benefits for the valid

delegation of legislative power.

Delegation to the President in times of war or national emergency

Delegation to Local government

Delegation of power to carry out defined policy to prescribe standards

Rafael v. Embroidery Board (1967)

RA 3137 (creating an embroidery and apparel control and inspection board and providing for a speciaassessment to be levied upon all entities engaged in an amount to be fixed by the Board) was

constitutionally challenged for being an undue delegation of legislative power.

The SC upheld the law. Article XVI 4 (2) sets a reasonable basis under which the special assessment may

be imposed. The true distinction between delegation of power to legislate and conferring of authority as

to the execution of the law is that the former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the

latter, the authority as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

Osmea v. Orbos (1993)

PD 1956, which empowered the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or

impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price

Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was established to reimburse ailing oil companies in the event of

sudden price increases. The decree was challenged on the ground of undue delegation of legislative

powers to the ERB.


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The SC upheld the PD. The provision conferring authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on

petrol products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. The standard to

which the delegate of legislative authority has to conform may be implied from the policy and purpose of

the act, not only spelled out specifically. The challenged law sets forth a determinable standard that

governs the exercise of power granted to the ERB.

Promulgation of Internal Rules and RegulationsProhibition Against Passage of Irrepealable Laws

Procedural Limitations (see part on Legislative process for more detail)

Oversight

1. Congressional Scrutiny

2. Congressional Investigation

3. Legislative Supervision

Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22)

Legislative Investigations

Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)

A legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong

estates was undertaken. During the Senate investigation, one witness, Arnault, refused to reveal the

identity of the representative of the vendor to whom he delivered money, at the same time invoking his

constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution holding Arnault in

contempt and ordered him imprisoned in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned. Arnault

petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

The SC did not issue the writ. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of

the legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer

any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The question subject of the refusal for which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is

pertinent to the matter under inquiry. It is not necessary for the legislative to show that every question

addressed to a witness is material to any proposed legislation, but it is required that each question be

pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation before the Committee is within

legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness relates to the subject, obedience

to the process may be enforced by the Committee by imprisonment. The power to hold a non-member of

Congress in contempt is a power necessary to enable Congress to perform its function without

obstruction. Therefore, the Court finds no sound reason to limit such power which has already been

recognized as an appropriate auxiliary power of Congress.


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Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991)

A Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Investigation was commenced regarding Kokoy Romualdez

participation in various corporations put up by the Marcoses. The investigation was started based on a

privileged speech delivered by Sen. Enrile. Bengzon, called as a witness, challenged the propriety of the

investigation.The SC ruled that the investigation did not have a valid legislative purpose. Investigations must be in aid

of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure and must respect the rights of the

persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator Enriles privilege speech that prompted the

committee investigation contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a

possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction

of the courts rather than the legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee

to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an

encroachment into the exclusive domain of the court.

Senate v. Executive Secretary (2006)

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci

tapes surfaced, prompting the Senate to conduct public hearings to investigate the said anomalies. The

investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to

speak before the committee as resource persons. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect

immediately. EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the

judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. EO 464 was challenged for

contravening the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

The SC held that it did. Executive privilege is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers

and is one of the exemptions to the power of legislative inquiry. It exempts the executive from disclosing

information to the public, Congress and the courts. To determine the validity of a claim of privilege, the

question that must be asked is not only if the requested information falls within one of the traditional

privileges, but also if that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. Presumption inclines

heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

(Question hour vs. legislative inquiry)

On the validity of 1 of E.O. 464 (which applies specifically to heads of executive departments): the

required prior consent is grounded on Art. VI 22 or what is known as question hour. ConCom records

show that it was considered distinct from inquiries in aid of legislation. In question hour, attendance is

meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory

question period, it becomes a greater imperative to enforce Congress right to executive information in

the performance of its legislative function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department

heads can only exempt themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President

on whom the executive power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power


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is vested as a collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For 1, the requirement for Presidential

consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in

aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive privilege, there can be no

implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid oflegislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive privilege before an

official would be exempt from the investigation.

Act as Board of Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections

Call special election for President and Vice-President

Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus and

declaration of martial law

Approve presidential amnesties

Confirm certain appointments

Cf. Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 18)

Concur in treaties (Senate)

Bayan v. Zamora (2000)

The VFA was challenged on the ground of Art. XVIII 25 on military bases in the Philippines.

The presence of U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines pursuant to the VFA is allowed under Art. XVIII 25

for 2 reasons:

1. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the U.S

since it was attested and duly certified by a U.S. government representative. That it was not submitted for

advice and consent of the U.S. Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international

agreement/treaty recognized by the U.S. since it is a matter of internal U.S. law, where the U.S. submits to

its Senate policymaking agreements for advice or consent, while those that further implement these

policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress within 60 days of ratification.

2. Joint R.P.-U.S. military exercises fall under the provisions of the earlier R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty

of 1951 that was signed and duly ratified with both countries senates concurring; the VFA is simply an

implementing agreement to the main Military Defense Treaty, so it was not necessary to submit it to the

U.S. Senate, but only to its Congress. This is why the U.S. certified it as a binding international agreement

(treaty) that substantially complies with Art. XVIII 25.


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Declaration of war and declaration of emergency powers

Be judge of presidents physical fitness

(16)Power of impeachment

(17)Amendment or revision of the Constitution (supra)

6. The legislative process

Requirement as to bills

As to title

Embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof

Lidasan v. Comelec (1967)

R.A. 4790 (An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur) was challengedfor falling short of the constitutional requirement that bills shall embrace 1 subject that must be

expressed in the title.

The SC ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress

can not conglomerate under 1 statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be

couched in language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the import of the single title.

Complying with the second directive is imperative since the Constitution does not require Congress to

read a bills entire text during deliberations. For H.B. 1247/R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its

introduction to its final approval in the House.

The test of the sufficiency of a title a bill is whether or not it is misleading. If the language is so uncertain

that an average person reading it is not informed of its purpose, or if it is misleading by referring to one

subject when another is embraced in the act or by omitting any indication of its real subject/scope, it is

misleading. It is not required that the title use language of such precision that it fully catalogues all its

contents and minute details, but that it serves its constitutional purpose of informing all interested

persons of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

Power of taxation and requirement as to tax laws

Lutz v. Araneta (1955)

Commonwealth Act 567 Section provided for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar

on a graduated basis, while section 3 levied on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to

cultivating sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration a tax equivalent to the difference between

the value of the consideration collected and the amount representing 12% of the assessed value of the

land. The Act was challenged on constitutional grounds.


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The SC upheld the Act. Commonwealth Act 567 was not purely an exercise of taxing power but was an

exercise of the police power, since tax was levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for

rehabilitating and stabilizing the threatened sugar industry. It is rational that the tax be taken from those

who will benefit when it is spent. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state is free to choose who to

tax.

Tan v. Del Rosario (1994)

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 7496 (Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme)

amending certain provisions of the NIRC and RR No. 2-936 promulgated by respondent pursuant to RA

7496.

The SC upheld the RA. The contention that RA 7496 goes against the constitutional requirement that

taxation be uniform and equitable ignores that such a system of income taxation where single

proprietorship and professionals be taxed differently from corporations and partnership had long been

the prevailing rule. Uniformity of taxation merely required that all subjects of objects of taxation

similarly situated were to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities and did not discount

classification as long as:

the standards are substantial making real differences;

the categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose;

the law applies, ceteris paribus, to both present and future conditions; and

the classification applies equally to the same class.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (infra, under Judiciary)

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (1994)

The Omnibus Investments Code gave the SC appellate jurisdiction over BOI decisions. The SC issued a

circular giving the CA that jurisdiction, on the ground that its appellate jurisdiction could not be increased

without its concurrence.

After the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress was now barred from increasing Supreme Courtsappellate jurisdiction without its concurrence. This was done in order to give the Court a measure of

control over the cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. The indiscriminate enactment of legislation

enlarging the Courts appellate jurisdiction could unnecessarily burden the Court and undermine its

essential function of expounding the law in profound national aspect.

D. Legislative veto


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IV.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath

Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications

Presidential Immunity

In Re: Bermudez (1986)

Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief on whether the provisions of the Freedom Constitution

referred to the incumbent President or the previously-elected president.

The Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding first that it referred to the incumbent president, and

secondly that a suit cannot be brought against the incumbent President. The petition for declaratory

relief was essentially a suit against President Aquino, and Bermudez had no standing to file it.

Soliven v. Makasiar (1988)

Soliven was sued by Pres. Aquino for libel. Soliven alleged that because the President is immune from

suit, neither can she file a suit.

The SC disagreed. The immunity may be invoked ONLY by the holder of the office. Nothing prevents the

President (and only the President) from waiving the privilege and submitting to court's jurisdiction.

Clinton v. Jones (1997)

Pres. Clinton was charged with sexual harassment by Paula Jones for acts done while he was Governor of

Arkansas. The SC held that the sitting president can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions

not related to his official duties as President, and before his term commenced.

Presidential Privileges

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (2008)

Neri, along with other officers, was invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee regarding

the NBN-ZTE project. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Ner

refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)

whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him toprioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other

hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is

privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate v. Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for

contempt.

The SC upheld the invocation of privilege. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by

compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.


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The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications

privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the

power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter

into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized

in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational

proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos

Cabinet. And,

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege

and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Aside from these, other executive privileges include:

1. Deliberative process privilege

2. Military or State Secrets

3. Identity of government informers in some circumstances

4. Information related to pending investigations

5. Foreign relations

AKBAYAN v. Aquino (2008)

AKBAYAN and the other petitioners filed a petition asking for the government to release the records of

the negotiations leading up to the JPEPA.

The SC denied the petition. While there was indeed a right to information on matters of public concern,

this was only on a case by case basis. The validity of executive privilege depends on ground invoked to

justify it and context in which it is made. The privileged status of a privileged document rests not on the

need to protect national security but on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate

candidly among themselves if people will find out what they talk about anyway. Here, the negotiations of

the JPEPA falls under the diplomatic negotiations privilege.

Prohibition from holding other appointments

Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office

CLU v. Executive Secretary, supra. (1991)

Dela Cruz v. COA (2001)

The payment of salaries to ex-officio members of the NHA Board who were in the Cabinet, or their

alternates, was denied by the COA. The propriety of that COA decision was challenged.


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The SC upheld the decision. However, while it was correct to rule that the payment of compensation was

not allowed, the prohibition against multiple offices was not interpreted to apply to posts of executive

officials in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law as required by the primary function of their office

and without additional compensation. The term ex-officio referred to authority derived from officia

character, not merely conferred upon the individual character but rather annexed to the official position

However, since the position is an actual and legal part of the principal office, it followed that the officialconcerned had no right to receive additional compensation for services in the same position since the

services were already paid for by the compensation attached to the principal office.

Powers and Functions of the President

Executive Power

Power to execute laws

Ople v. Torres (1998)

AO 308 was issued, adopting a national computerized identification system. Ople challenged the AOs

constitutionality.

The SC struck down the AO. Executive power to enforce and administer the laws into practical separation

is vested in the President. As Chief Executive, the President is also granted administrative power over

bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative

power is concerned with the work applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper

constitutional organs. However, the administrative order should be issued in relation to specific aspects

in the administrative operation of the government. It should not impair citizens rights and privileges or

impose a duty on them, and must not substitute for general policy-making that Congress enact as laws.

Power of Appointment

In general

Sarmiento v. Mison (1987)

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the

Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed

the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

The SC upheld the appointment. Positions to be filled by the President by appointment are divided into 4

groups:

1) heads of executive department, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the

armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments

are vested in him in the Constitution,

2) all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law,


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3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, &

4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone

Only the first group is appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The

Customs commissioner was not one of those within the first group.

Manalo v. Sistoza (1999)

Sistoza questioned the constitutionality and legality of the appointments by former Pres. Corazon Aquino

of senior officers of the PNP, who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director

without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.

The SC upheld the appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the CA and

require confirmation of appointments to other positions not within the Constitution. The PNP is separate

from the AFP. It is different from and independent of the AFP. Its military ranks are not similar to the

AFP, thus directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of

presidential appointees requiring CA confirmation

b. Commission on Appointments confirmation

c. Midnight Appointments

d. Power of removal

Power of Control and Supervision

a. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

b.

Control over Executive departments and offices

Lacson-Magallanes Co. v. Pao (1967)

Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao; he later ceded his rights to

LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands

denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to

the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC challenged the decision

of the Executive Secretary as an undue delegation of power.

The SC did not agree. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his

control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. Implicit

is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In

this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a

department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes

upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means the

power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the

performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.


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The Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not

command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the

multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary

unit which assists the President.

Buklod ng Manggagawang EIIB v. Executive Secretary (2000)

President Corazon Aquino created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily

conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year

2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of

EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force

Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through

the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the

said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the President has no power to abolish a public office, as that

is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to

security of tenure.

The SC upheld the reorganization. As a general rule, the power to abolish an office is lodged with the

legislative. However, the Presidents power of control may justify his deactivating the functions of a

particular office or certain laws may grant him the broad continuing authority to carry out reorganization

measures for reasons of economy and productivity.

c. Supervision of Local Governments and Autonomous Regions

Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)

President Ramos issued AO 372 The Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998, which

required LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% for their authorized regular appropriations of non-

personal services. Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372 reducing

to 5% the amount of the internal revenues allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. The

constitutionality of the directive to withhold 10% of this IRA is challenged for being in contravention of

Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing the

automatic release of its share in the national income revenue.

The SC upheld Section 1, which directed the LGUs to reduce expenditures, as being part of the Presidents

supervision over local government. Supervision is meant to oversee, while control meant to power to

alter what a subordinate has done and substitute ones judgment. The Chief Executive wields no more

authority than that of checking whether local government were performing their duties as provided by

Constitution and statutes. But LGUs continue to be agents of the national government.


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However, Section 4, which withheld 5% of the IRA from LGUs was struck down for being

unconstitutional. It is a basic feature of local government autonomy that their share of the IRA should be

automatically released.

Military Powers

IBP v. Zamora (2000)

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution, President Estrada

in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the

proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the

deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

The SC upheld deployment of the Marines. Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested

in the Presidents wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was

grave abuse of discretion

Here, the deployment of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian

law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is

appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the

Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render

logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military

authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP

does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious

incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Article XVI, Sec. 5(4) of theConstitution.

Lansang v. Garcia (1971)

Two hand grenades were thrown at a Liberal Party caucus in 1971, killing 8. Pres. Marcos issued PP 889

which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail

the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al. were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for

interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al. questioned the validity of the suspension of the privilege of

the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites

The SC found that there was valid basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The requirements for such a suspension are:

1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof

2. Public safety requires the suspension.

Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how small it is

The absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.


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Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (2004)

On July 27, 2003, the Oakwood mutiny took place. Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 47 declaring a

"state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to suppress the rebellion. By that evening,

soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of

rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proclamation No. 435.

The SC upheld the declaration of a state of rebellion. Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public

safety are not required for calling out the armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a

state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out

of the armed forces is not the same as a declaration of martial law.

Gudani v. Senga (2006)

The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the

surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department

including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFPChief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al. from

appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared

before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were

relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle

of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected to Court Martial proceedings for

willfully violating an order of a superior officer.

The SC upheld EO 464. The President as Commander-in-Chief has absolute authority over persons and

actions of the members of the armed forces. Significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected in

the military. Preventing military officers from testifying before Congress springs from Commander-in-Chief powers, not executive privilege.

David v. Arroyo (2006)

As a result of the events of EDSA II, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, declaring a state of national

emergency, invoking Article VII, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued

General Order No. 5 directing the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress

and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Article II, Sec. 4 of the same, citing elements of the extreme

left and right being in alliance to bring down the President. A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via

PP1021.

Randy David and the petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution

have been violated, thus the case at hand.

In relation to the validity of the declaration of a state of national emergency, the SC ruled that as there is

no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under General Order No. 5 who has the

discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Thus, the due process clause

has been violated and that portion of General Order No. 5 is unconstitutional.


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Pardoning Power

a. Nature and limitations

b. Forms of Executive Clemency

Diplomatic Powers

a. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans

b. Deportation of undesirable aliens

Residual Powers

Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)

Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino. She

invoked her rights to travel and abode.

The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the

Presidents residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor

judicial has to be executive. The President's residual power is for protecting people's general welfare,preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even

the Resolution proposed in the House urging the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition

of this power. Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and

protect general welfare.

Powers relating to appropriation Measures

Delegated powers

Veto power

C. Rules on Succession

a. Constructive Resignation

b. The Vice President

c. Right of Succession and Membership in Cabinet

Estrada v. Desierto (2001)

After the events of EDSA II, whereby President Estrada left Malacaang and Gloria Arroyo was sworn in

as President, Estrada filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the Ombudsman from proceeding with any

cases against him and to declare him to still be the incumbent president.


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The SC denied the petition, holding that Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of

resignation were present, namely:

1. Intent

2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate, listening

to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power, declaringhis intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency, etc.)

As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution. Neither was

there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he

would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and

so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.


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V.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Concepts

Judicial Power.

Ynot v. IAC (1987)

EO 626-A banned the killing and intra-province transport of carabao and carabeef. Ynot was caught in

violation of EO 626-A as he was transporting 6 carabaos. He went to trial court seeking to declare EO

626-A unconstitutional. The Trial Court ruled that they cannot answer questions of constitutionality.

However, the SC ruled that it could. All courts in the hierarchy can exercise both judicial power and

judicial review, subject to later review by the SC (Sec. 5 (2) (a))

Judicial Review

a. Definition, nature, principles

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

As outgoing President, John Adams, appointed judges, including Marbury, to positions as justices of the

peace, in Marburys case in the District of Columbia,, with the concurrence of the Senate. However, the

commissions were never served upon the offices, so Marbury was never able to carry out his duties. He

appealed to the SC for a writ of mandamus to compel State Secretary James Madison to appoint him as a

judge.

1. Marbury has a right to the commission. Presidential commission has three stages --- nomination

appointment, and commission. When the President signs the commission, it creates a vested right.

2. Marbury has a relief for his right. Because withholding the commission would be violative of the

vested right, there must be a remedy.

3. The most appropriate relief in this case is a writ of mandamus. According to the Constitution, the SC

can only have appellate jurisdiction over writs of mandamus. However, the law that Adams signed

gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction. Therefore, there was a dispute over which one should befollowed. The Constitution is the paramount law, and it is the judiciary that decides questions of

constitutionality. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicialdepartment to say what is

law. Using this reasoning, the court held that it was the Constitution that must prevail, and so they

could not award the writ of mandamus.


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1.

Requisites of judicial review

a.

Actual case or controversy

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.

o An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, and opposite legal claims

susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of

parties having adverse legal interest"; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific

relief.

o A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of

supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value

Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

o Ripeness entails that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either

branch before a court may come into the picture. The questioned acts should have alreadybeen carried out

o Exception to the mootness rule: Court will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first,there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is

involved;

third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles

to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;

fourth,the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Operative fact doctrine

Moot Questions

Gonzales v. Narvasa (2000)

Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of

the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential

consultants, advisers and assistants. The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to

study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of

implementing them.

The SC held that the petition was moot and academic. As the questioned commission had been dissolved

it was impossible to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. The Court could no longer enjoin a body

that no longer existed from acting. Any ruling regarding the matter would simply be in the nature of an

advisory opinion and definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.

Political Question Doctrine


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Avelino v. Cuenco, supra, under Internal Government of Congress: Quorum

The court did not have jurisdiction over the petition. Due to the separation of powers, the political nature

of the controversy and the Constitution giving the Senate the power to elect its own President, the

judiciary cannot interfere with or take over the matter. The remedy lies with the Senate and not with theCourt.

Miranda v. Aguirre (1999)

RA 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component

city. RA 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. In 1998, RA 8528 amended RA No.

7720 to the effect that the City of Santiago was downgraded from an independent component city to a

component city. Miranda, et al., assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to

submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

On the threshold issue of whether or not the case involved a political question, the Court upheld its

jurisdiction. Questions of whether laws passed by Congress complied with the requirements of the

constitution posed a question only the Court could decide.

A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which under the

constitution were

1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or

2) in regard to which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the legislative/executive

branch of government.

Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a particular measure

Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its legality or constitutionality could be

determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or

omission violative of such right and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.

Safeguards of Judicial Independence

a. Fiscal autonomy Art. VIII, Sec. 3

i. appropriations shall not be reduced below the amount appropriated for the

previous year

ii. Appropriations will be automatically and regularly released.

b. Report on the judiciary Art. VIII, Sec. 16

c. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary Art. VIII, Sec. 3


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Judicial Restraint

Appointments to the Judiciary

Supreme Court

En banc and division cases

Procedural Rule-makingAdministrative Supervision over Lower Courts

Maceda v. Vasquez (1993)

Bonifacio Maceda falsified his certificate of service saying he had submitted the decisions for all his civil

and criminal cases, when he had not submitted anything. His clerk reported him to the Ombudsman.

The Court ruled that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the matter. Judges are liable under theSupreme Court, not the Ombudsman. Only the SC can oversee judges compliance with the law and take

proper administrative action.

In re Demetria (2001)

Judge Demetria had been trying to intercede on behalf of drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. The Supreme Court

ruled that the evidence against Demetria proved her guilty. However, it is up to the SC to implement the

proper administrative actions.

Original and Appellate Jurisdiction

VI.CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure Independence of Commissions

Macalintal v. COMELEC(2003)

The constitutionality of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) was challenged. The

controversial provisions were:o Sec 5: allowed immigrants to register by executing affidavit expressing intent to return

Constitutional. Does not violate Art. V, Sec. 1 (Residency Rule). Rather, it

enfranchises Filipinos abroad domiciled in the Philippines.

o Sec 18.5: empowered COMELEC to proclaim winning candidates

Unconstitutional. Violates Art. VII, Sec. 4; winning candidates for President and VP

are to be proclaimed by Congress.

o Sec 25: allowed Congress, through oversight committee, to review, revise, amend and

approve IRR of COMELEC.


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Unconstitutional. Violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, on COMELEC independence. Congress

may not intrude into the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory

powers.

Brillantes v. Yorac (1990)

Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Brillantes challenged Yoracs appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987

Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or

designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

The SC agreed. The appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the independence

of ConCom from the executive department.

Powers and Functions of Each Commission

Prohibited Offices and Interests

Flores v. Drilon, supra.

i. Standardization of pay and ban on double compensation

ii. Ban on partisan political activities

iii. Removal or suspension only for a cause

iv. Right to self-organization

v. Right to strike: Government employees, including members of the CSC, do not have

the right to strike.

Jurisdiction of each Constitutional Commission

Tan v. COMELEC (2003)

Tan was designated by COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in Davao for the May

1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic

Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed Congressman

of 2ndDist. Davao.

Alterado filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation, including an administrative

charge against the Board of Canvassers and Tan for Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence,

and Acts Inimical to the Service, before the COMELEC.

On petition for review, the SC upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over the administrative case

COMELECs authority under Article IX, Sec. 2(6-8) of 1987 Constitution is all-encompassing when it

comes to election matters. The administrative case is related to the performance of his duties as Election

canvasser, not as a City Prosecutor. COMELECs mandate includes the authority to exercise direct and


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immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of

any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to

perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.

Daza v. Singson (1989)

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the

lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew

the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber

elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who

was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement on the ground that the LDPs reorganization

was not permanent and stable.

The SC disagreed. The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the

Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political organization in a

democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional election was never laid down in

jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its representation in the

CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely temporary alliances or factional

divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the political

alignments of its members.

Guingona v. Gonzales (1992)

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the Senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-

NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To fulfil the requirement that each party must have arepresentatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political

party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The result of the computation under that formula was

that 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-

PDP-LABAN would be part of the COA. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from

their party; he rounded 7.5 up to 8; and decided that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the

same party in the CoA. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged

that the compromise is against proportional representation.

The SC agreed that the proposed membership was unconstitutional. The proposed scheme does not

comply with the requirement that 12 senators be elected on the basis of proportional representation of

the political parties in the Senate; to disturb the resulting fractional membership of political parties in the

CoA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation

since it gave the LDP an added member by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political

party, which is deprived of representation.

Instea

PALS Political Law

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Transcript of PALS Political Law