Pakistan,s India Policy:Shift from Zia to Benazir

8/9/2019 Pakistan,s India Policy:Shift from Zia to Benazir

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PAKISTANS INDIA POLICY: SHIFT FROM ZIA TO BENAZIR

[India Quarterly, Vol. XLV. No.-1, Jan- Mar, 1989, pp 35-45]

PARMINDER S. BHOGAL*

In the words of Sajjad Hyder, an ex-Ambassador of Pakistan in India, The first

determinant of our foreign policy is safeguarding Pakistan from India.[1] Pakistans India

policy occupies a very significant role in Pakistans overall foreign policy. In other words,

Pakistans foreign policy mainly revolves around itsIndia policy, or is Indo centric. The majorreason behind such a trend is the historic background of Indo-Pak relations. It will be apt to say

that, In large measure, Pakistani feeling (and policy) towards India has been a continuation ofthe political struggle before partition.[2]Support to the idea of Pakistan among Indian Muslims

arose basically from the feeling of fear and insecurity both real and propagandised. The feeling

of insecurity was indeed vis--vis the majority Hindu community and their certain dominance

over India once it becomes free. This feeling aroused mistrust and hence misunderstanding and

this was strengthened by the psychological trauma resulting from the way the sub-continent

was divided between India and Pakistan. There was a complete emotional upset of all the people

in India and Pakistan because of this.[3] Such a Psychological condition has been a very strongfactor behind Pakistans India centric foreign policy. As a result, from the day Pakistan

emerged on the world map as a sovereign independent country, the main plank of Pakistansforeign policy has been to obtain a shield against a possible attack from India.[4] Thecalculations of Pakistans foreign policy-makers, in fact, revolve around the India factor;

Pakistans overriding concern vis--vis India, fear of its sheer size and size of all the army.[5]

There is a continuous feeling in Pakistan that India has not reconciled to the partition of 1947

and is bent upon destroying and dismembering it. Such a psyche is mainly the result of the

deliberate propaganda, which was sustained by the statements of some communal leaders in

India, as well as by misinterpreting the broad statements on the part of secular Indian leadership

like Jawaharlal Nehru. But such a feeling was aggravated after the creation of Bangladesh in

1971.Whatever may be the factors, People in Pakistan do widely believe in this. The leader of the

opposition in the Pakistan National Assembly, Mohammad Aslam Khattak remarked during a

debate:

There is a continuing feeling in Pakistan that India has not reconciled to the partition It is

fact that India never reconciled herself to the Partition of Pak-India sub-continent. They always

cherish this secret desire and dream that partition may be undone one day. The hostility of India

has been a nightmare fir the foreign policy-maker of this country.[6] (Pakistan National

Assembly Debates-1964).

Again, as Ambassador Sajjad Hyder puts the same fear in this way: To us in Pakistan thereason for this malaise is our perception that beneath a thin veneer, Indian leadership and a

sizeable segment of itsfollowing continue to regard the formation of Pakistan as an historicalerror forced on India, that given theopportunity they would like in some way to redress thesituation and that in their mind, the 1971 war supported this presumption [7]

Apart from the above aetiology there are a number of other factors also behind the evolution of

Pakistans foreign policy. These include, the psychological need for parity, interests of the

Ruling elites, the fear of being reduced to a satellite state of India and above all using the*Mr. Bhogal is a research scholar at the School of International studies, Jawaharlal Lal Nehru University-New Delhi.


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existing hostility of bilateral relations to justify and rationalize all kinds of foreign aid from all

sources as also to legitimize the creation and existence of Pakistan in the eyes of its own public

and the world at large.

Forty years have passed since then and several developments have taken place during these years

affecting Indo-Pak relations. Year 1971 was the watershed year in Pakistani history. Its Eastwing seceded to become an independent country. This tremendously affected the power balance

in the region and as a result several new developments took place in Indo-Pak relations.

Pakistans foreign policy and India policy in particular experienced some changes. Eighteenyears have passed since then. Though we cannot say that the traditional hostility between the two

unfortunate brother nations.[8]has ended, yet it will have to be conceded that now for the past

few years there is greater understanding between them. Some of the mistrust and confusion hasbeen allayed and there have been sign of cooperation here and there. Though it is always

impossible to guess or to have premonitions about the future, nor is it advisable in the study of

international relational, yet certain developments and events show positive trends now and evenencourage us to think cautiously that we may be looking towards an era of cooperation,

overlooking, if not forgetting the erstwhile conflict and hostility.

A GENERAL FRAME-WORK

Soon after the sub-continent was divided, a fairly far-fetched opinion was expressed by

the first Governor General of Pakistan regarding future relationships between the two states. He

said I think that these two states of Pakistan and Hindustan, by virtue of contiguity and mutualinterests, will be friends in the sub-continent. They will go to each others rescue in case ofdanger and will say hands off to other nations. We shall have a Monroe Doctrine more solid

then Americas.[9]

But this bonhomie and goodwill was not to be the basis or the guiding principle of the mutualpolitics of India and Pakistan towards each other. On the contrary, historical factors, the nature of

partition, the internal weaknesses of Pakistan and the great power pulls in the region began to

guide the destinies of the two states. Therefore, the Pakistani elites soon began to be swayed by

such factors. As Mushtaq Ahmed remarked, He (Liaquat Ali khan) was deeply aware of thedesirability of concord with India also equally conscious of the desirability of attaining it.[10]As

a result Pakistan began to follow an India policy based upon conflict and countering, a policy of

congenital opposition towards India, so to say. And as the year passed by, it became a markedpoint on the part of the Pakistani elite to do and behave always in opposition to whatever India

wanted, proposed or did. It became their permanent motive to maintain conflict between the two

nations. It became a policy of total alienation and estrangement from the India in all respectsincluding economic, social and cultural. A policy of conflict on the part of Pakistan can be

ascertained from the following statement: The roots of confrontation between India and

Pakistan go deep down in to our history and have to until the cause of justice triumphs, no

matter how heavy the odds.[11]

Ambassador Sajjad Hyder very rightly observed when he wrote, Pakistans policy towardsIndia is mainly reactive.[12] This conflictual intention is again visible in a very pertinent

observation made by the late Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan. He remarked: Whatshould be the foreign policy of Pakistan toward India? I maintain, while wanting to live in peace

with India, we shall continue to lean against India till such time that resolution of these problems

has been found.[13]

Such a confrontational India policy was sought to be justified on the basis of the outstandingdisputes between India and Pakistan. As Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto said, Pakistan maintains the


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confrontation only to resolve the outstanding disputes [14] But what is the dispute and conflict?Does it end with the solution to the Kashmir and other boundary problems? To quote ZulfiqarAli Bhutto again: Our countries must ultimately live in peace, but only when conflict has beenresolved. Such peaceful co-existence however, remains out of question so long as India strives to

impose a cultural, religious and linguistic uniformity upon all its minorities.[15] This clearly

shows that the Indo-Pak conflict does not end with a solution to Kashmir and other boundaryissues.

Most observers attribute Pakistans India policy to its domestic compulsions and its desperate

search for identity and legitimacy both internal and external-for its coming in to existence.According to Selig H. Harrison: In Pakistan, the need for an external diversionary symbol tohold together a spiritless body politic, is if anything more conspicuous than India.[16] And this

external diversionary symbol could be best provided by none other then the perceived andpropagandised Indian threat both real and imaginary. Bhutto amply justified this factor when he

said in 1967: It has taken twenty years and two wars (with India) to establish the separate

identity of our state with its population of over a hundred and twenty million.[17] This is the

raison detre of Pakistans India policy. And therefore, India though a legitimate concern of

Pakistan, in view of long common border between two countries, acquired an exaggerated,

almost obsessive importance in determining the component and orientations of the newly

emerged state (Pakistan).[18]

This general frame-work of Pakistans India policy that I have attempted to establish is morerelevant to the 1947-71 phase. After this, the foreign policy of Pakistan experienced some

changes. Consequently the India policy was also re-oriented. There were some reasons behind

this and for the first time we find a faint sentiment of normalisation in Pakistans India policy.But the general content of this policy is equally relevant today as will be seen in the succeeding

arguments. It is in the light of this frame-work that I shall be trying to analyse this policy during

the period of Gen. Zia and the shift in it, if any, in the succeeding period, i.e., Benazirs on goingrule.

ZIAS INDIA POLICY

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had realized and initiated the process of environment building,necessary for normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. Several steps had been

taken in this direction during his days; after the historic Shimla pact, a number of other

agreements trade, shipping, cultural exchange and travel had been reached. And, a people topeople level interaction began. Though he kept up a strong anti-India propaganda, mainly

because of his domestic compulsion, he successfully made efforts for normalization.

With the advent of Gen. Zia, this process came to an abrupt halt. When in 1978 a tradedelegation from India arrived in Islamabad to review the trade agreement signed in 1975, the

government of Pakistan declined to renew this treaty. And the Pakistan government by an order

restricted all trade with India only at the government levels. [19] Similarly, the Pakistan

government declined to open land routes (other than Wagah) as stipulated in the visa and travel

agreement of 1974.Anti-India propaganda was whipped up, especially on the so-called wrongful stand of

India on Afghanistan. The much famous peace offensive on India also need to be discussedhere. Gen. Zia adopted the policy of covert war with India. It meant a war on all fronts, barring

the actual battlefront. The peace offensive was another strategic move in this regard. Pakistan

offered a No war Pact; India instead of accepting it, offered a broader peace treaty which

unfortunately impinged upon the sovereignty of Pakistan directly. Pakistani objections were

mainly to Indias insistence that Pakistan should make a unilateral declaration not to concede any


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base to any foreign power on its territory. This gave Pakistan a clear cut leverage over India anda propaganda tirade followed. This was indeed a diplomatic success to be rejoiced at by Pakistan.No doubt, the Pakistan Ambassador in India was right when he said: For the first time in ourhistory of relations with India, we have been able to force India to take a defensive posture in

diplomacy.[20]

Pakistan also meddled in Indias internal ethnic problems. The government if India hasbeen accusing Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism in Punjab.

At the newly formed forum of SAARC also, Zia maintained hostile postures and was

successful in lobbying against India on several issues including the Indian intervention in SriLanka after the July 1987 Accord.

The hall-mark of Zias India policy was a perpetually hostile confrontation but always short

of an open war. But the December1987 adventure was too close and the two countries almostcame to the brink of an actual war.

The Zia era in Pakistan saw the emergence of another new issue between two countries.

This was the Siachin glacier issue. A limited war has been going on between two countries onthis issue, with considerable losses to both sides. This has further complicated the relations

between the two countries.

Thus looking at the whole eleven years span of the Zia era in Pakistan we can safely infer

that Pakistans India policy during this period was a bundle of contradictions; contradictions in

proclamations and practices. It was a rather a hawkish policy phrased in some of the mostdeceptive words and presented in an enchanting manner. As a result it is often claimed that themilitary government in Pakistan after taking power in that country has made a special new

demarche in extending a hand of friendship to India and has endeavored to accelerate the

process of normalization of relations with us. The facts however speak otherwise.[21]Accordingto one observer he produced an absolutely brilliant India policy. Seek peace on the battlefield.

Step up the ideological war. Whip up a climate in which the sun of friendship was kept blazingby sweetrhetoric. And in the shadow of that sun arm and give sanctuary to those forces withinIndia which could fight for theocracy. Do not use the Pakistani Army to try and break up India

for three very good reasons. First, because it could not, even if it wanted to. Second it wasneeded to run things at home. Third, there was a far cheaper way of achieving the same aim-

make Indians fight themselves.[22]

His personal brilliance and finesse apart, such an Indiapolicy was highly detrimental for the betterment of Indo-Pak as also for the maintenance of

peace in the region. It was rightly observed by the Indian press after his tragic end in the air crash

on 17 August 1988. Indo-Pak relations reached their nadir during his rule.[23]

An ultra-rightist dominance in Pakistan has always thrived upon its hostility towards India.

Because of the lack of popular legitimacy, the legitimacy of a hostile India does help along

with other similarly presumed induced and propagandised threats.[24] Apart from the domestic

reasons, Zia used the pretext of a hostile India to make the maximum out of the existing

international situation in this part of the world. This also helped him in successfully countering

the growing India influence in west Asia as also in proving his Islamic credentials both at homeand abroad.

BENAZIRS INDIA POLICY

The finest investment in improving Indo-Pak relations has been made by the people of

Pakistan through the process of 16 November.[25] Benazir has been in power now for five

months. And her coming to power was hailed not only in Pakistan but also equally warmly in

India. Since it was expected, on the basis of her earlier statements from time to time, that herarrival on the Pak scene would help improve bilateral relations between India and Pakistan,


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Speculations have been ripe since that day as to what would be her India policy. Will there be ashift from Gen. Zias beaten track, or the sub-continent will continue to be the Continent of

Circe? The shift was expected because Premier Benazir has always stressed not only the

improvement of ties but also of adding the dimension of friendship to these relations. This she

has cherished with a degree of sentiment, common and natural among the people of two nations.

She wrote: I symbolize a new generation, I had never been an Indian. I had been born inPakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart

in the bloody trauma of partition. Perhaps the people were hoping that a new generation could

avoid the hostility that had now led to three wars, burying the bitter past of our parents and grandparents, to live together as friends. And I certainly felt it possible as I walked the warm and

welcoming streets of Shimla. Did we have to be divided by walls of hatred or could we, like the

once warring countries of Europe come to terms with other.[26]

In India both views exist regarding the shift in Pakistans India policy. There are people whodont see much scope for a change. They argue so on the basis of the traditional nature of Indo-

Pak relations and Benazirs compulsions at home and her precarious condition vis a vis heropposition and armed forces combine. On the contrary, there are also people in all walks of life

who are optimistic. There optimism is based upon the following facts:

1. That there is a democratic government in Pakistan.2.

That there has been over a number of years an increasing feeling in the mind of bothpeople that relations be improved.

3. That the change in the overall international environment would be conducive toimprovement in relations.

4. That the Indian response towards Pakistan will now be more balanced andaccommodative.

What can be the degree of shift, if at all there is going to be one? Though to exaggerate

expectations may prove to be an illusion, to deny happy prospects is certainly to be depressive.

At best some change can be expected in the general environment in which the countries interact,

in the immediate future.[27]

Benazir Bhutto, it seems is picking up the threads, from where her late father, PremierZ.A. Bhutto was made to leave. She has already stated that wants the historic Shimla pact to be

the basis of relationship with India. She has dismissed the NO-WAR Pact authored by the lateGen. Zia, saying, We could not really understand its logic-How a simple NO-WAR Pact could

resolve the different issues between the two countries? We felt that the Shimla Agreement had a

legitimacy, and we must approach step by step the problem of resolving the issue to help build

the confidence as we emerge from one day to another.[28]She has already emphasized upon the need to improve the people to people relations.

As a result of such an approach, visa and travel facilities have been made easier. And according

to press reports, bilateral trade between the two countries has doubled in the first three monthsof the democratic government.

SAARC (South Asian Association for regional cooperation) has added a new dimension to

improving the Indo-Pak ties. Several programmes to be undertaken under the aegis of SAARC,

would positively improve Indo-Pak relations. These include the SAARC passport scheme, theholding of South Asian Cultural Festivals and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Programme.

(SAVE). [29] Thus India and Pakistan could now, under the auspices of SAARC, have the option

of taking all those steps which they otherwise could not because of their domestic politicalcompulsions.


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Of late, two issues have been greatly impinging upon Indo-Pak relations; the first beingIndian accusations regarding Pak aid and sympathy to the terrorists operating in Punjab, and thesecond, the Siachin Glacier issue. Of course both are Zia legacies. Regarding the first, Prime

minister Ms. Bhutto has assured the Indian Government that she would make maximum effort to

stop help to the terrorists. Though she has not been much successful in it, yet for this Ms Bhutto

need not be blamed. She is sincere when she says that playing the Sikh card would be disastrousfor Pakistan. Her problem is that the mischief mongering in Indian Punjab remains the exclusive

preserve of the ISI. Here the Indian government will have to exhibit patience and show restraint

considering her precarious condition Vis-a Vis the army and the opposition-ruled Punjab.The other issue is the Siachin Glacier. She has avoided any scathing attack on India

regarding this and has expressed a keen desire to resolve this issue through peaceful

negotiations under the Shimla Agreement. She notes with regret that this is the first everviolation of the Shimla pact by India. Here also a cooperative and a compromising Indian stand

would be helpful in resolving this complicated issue. Talks regarding this are expected to be

held in Islamabad some times this year.Thus, from all accounts the first months of Benazir Bhuttos rule are indeed encouraging.

There is indeed a noticeable shift in Pakistans India policy. The shift is manifested clearly intwo aspects. Severity of propaganda has gone down and measures for the restoration of

confidence and goodwill have been taken. Second, the importance of people relationship has

been recognized and preliminary steps have been taken in this regard, in this form of relaxed visaand travel facilities. The exchange of information material both through bilateral and SAARC

channels has been agreed to. And it has been decided to do more in this regard. However, much

will depend upon the stability of the democratic government. Any internal crisis, leading to thedestabilization of the government can obstruct this process of normalization. But given the state

of affairs now, we can look towards the scheduled meeting of the joint Indo-Pak commissions in

July 1989, with a degree of optimism, an expected visit by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto somethis year will also be a positive development in this regard.

APPRAISAL

The most significant development in Pakistans India policy, during Benazirs firstmonths in office, has been to return to the path from where it was deflected to a different course.

The very fact that Pakistan now has a democratic government has resulted in a relaxation of the

environment governing mutual ties of the two countries. A lot has been achieved in acomparatively short time. Trade has been fully restored and unnecessary embargoes put by the

Zia regime, as mentioned earlier, have been withdrawn.

Visa and travel facilities have been made more liberal with a promise to very soon domore in this regard. A return to the Shimla Pact has been declared. The significance of this lies

in the fact that the Shimla Pact was the result of mutual direct negotiations whereby it was

agreed to solve all pending issues on a bilateral level through mutual negotiations step by step.

The Shimla Pact also opened the way for talking confidence-building measure, including the

steady initiation of people to people relationship by various means. In a nutshell, the Shimlaagreement has an ideal mechanism to resolve even a case of a chronic conflict.

Another good development arising out of the enhanced confidence and good willbetween the two countries is its impact on SAARC. We can now expect greater development

and consensus within it. Pakistan it seems has decided to refrain from making the SAARC

forum into another platform for its unjustified anti Indian propaganda. The last meeting of

SAARC in Islamabad was held in an extremely cordial environment and there was a degree of


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consensus; as a result, several new measures to strengthen the South Asian fraternity wereapproved.

Another positive signal recently came when Pakistan made a very balanced and

restrained observation over the Indian intervention (on the request of President Gayoom) in the

Maldivian peril at the hands of the mercenaries.

The new regime in Pakistan, keeping its constraints in mind, seems to have decided,along with India, to use the forum of SAARC to understand take those measures, which it

otherwise would be unable to take owing to political compulsion at home. The SAARC passport

scheme, the SAARC cultural festival and information schemes augur well in this regard.And a few days ago, Prime Minister Benazir expressed her hope that India and Nepal

would peacefully sort out their present crisis. It is a great encouragement that unlike in the past,

Pakistan this time has refrained from taking undue advantage of this adverse situation betweenIndia Nepal.

There is thus goodwill; but this is not the end. Indeed, a lot is yet to be achieved before the

shift in Pakistans India policy is clearly manifested and sustained over a period of time. It willdepend upon a number of factors a part from those directly concerned with India and Pakistan.

However, the trend so far has been encouraging and whatever we have achieved in the form of

mutual understanding to shun confrontation and return to normalcy is very very significant. To

quote Wiston Churchill, this is not the end; it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is,

perhaps, the end of the beginning.

REFERENCES

1. Sajjad Hyder, forign policy of Pakistan (Lahore, 1987),p.1492. Keith callard, Pakistan: A Political study (Karachi, 1968),p,173. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches of Pandit Jawaharalal Nehru. Publications division, Government of India, (new

Delhi), 1958,p 257.4. G.W. Chowdhury, Pakistan: relations with India (Meerut, 1971),p.2575. W. Howard Wriggins, The Balancing process in Pakistans foreign policy, in Lawrence Ziring, etc (Ed.)

Pakistan : Long view (Durham, 1977),p,3036. Quoted by S.S Bindra, Determinants of Pakistans foreign policy (New Delhi, 1988), p.223.7. Sajjad Hyder, n. 1, pp. 74-75.8. Parminder S. Bhogal, Indian security environment in the 1990s: The south Asian factor. A paper submitted to

the UGC National Seminar on Indiassecurity environment in the 1990s at the department of defense studies,Punjabi university, Patiala, 30, 31 March 1989.

9. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Speeches and writings of MR. Jinnah. Vol. II, Government of Pakistan Publications,Lahore, 1950, p.363.

10. Mushtaq Ahmed, Pakistans foreign policy (Karachi, 1968), p. 103.11. Z.A Bhutto, Myth of Independence (Karachi, 1969), p. 187.12. Sajjad Hyder, n. 1, p.74.13. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Soldier and statesmen (Karachi, 1968), p.156.14. Z.A. Bhutto, n. 11, p.177.15. Ibid. 178.16. Selig H. Harrison Quoted by M. Shanker in Pakistanis Foreign Policy, Mainstream (New Delhi) Vol. XIX,

No.40, June 1981, p.6.

17. Z.A Bhutto, n. 11,p. 180.18. M. Shanker, PakistansForeign Policy, Mainstream, Vol. XIX, No. 40, June 1981, p.6. 19. K.D Sharma, Address to Delhi study Circle on the State of Indo-Pak Relations. Also in Mainstream, Vol. XXIII,

No.24, February 1985, p.7.

20. Humayun Khan, then Ambassador of Pakistan in India, in an informal personal interview to the author in May1988.

21. K.D. Sharma, n. 19.22. M.J Akbar, Power struggle Begins, Times of India Sunday review (New Delhi), 4 September 1988.23. Times of India, 18 August 1988.24. Parminder S. Bhogal, n, 8.25. V.R. Krishna Iyer, Pakistan: General Not Generals Mainstream, Vol. XXVII, No.14, p.35.26. Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East (London, 1988), p.55.


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27. This view was expressed by Shafkat Kakakhal, Minister Political (then acting Ambassador, of Pakistan in NewDelhi, India) during an informal interview with the author soon after Gen.Zias tragic Air accident. He was of theview that while it would be premature to say anything until a new government in Pakistan came to power, achange in the environment in which the two countries interacted could be expected. It would however dependmuch upon the Indian response to the new government in Pakistan, as well as regional developments around it.

28. Benazir Bhutto in an interview to M.J Akbar, Telegraph (Calcutta), 14 December 1988.29. Text of SAARC joint communiqu, issued in Islamabad on 31 December 1988, as Published in (Karachi), 1

January 1989.

Pakistan,s India Policy:Shift from Zia to Benazir

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