Assignment # 1

Topic: Pak-India Long Term Relation

Submitted to MAAM RUBINA AZHAR

Submitted by Tayyab Husnain (0076)

Introduction India-Pakistan relations are characterized by the sharp hostility that has driven their relations since independence in 1947. One also notices the 'low' and 'high' in the cycle of hostility. There have been some years when relations were exceptionally unfriendly, as against others, signifying a relative lull. Interestingly, the 'low' in hostility denotes periods when Pakistan was less confident of its ability to challenge India militarily, as opposed to other times, when it felt more confident in doing so. Another pattern could be observed that is based on a time frame. Here, India-Pakistan relations may be categorized into two major periods: (a) prior to acquisition of nuclear capabilities; and (b) post acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. In both periods, the two countries have allowed military prowess or comparative military technological capabilities to underwrite the course of their relations. This fact is reflective of the nature of threat perception, their respective determination of national objectives and the domestic interplay of vested interests. In light of the above, the future of India-Pakistan relations depends on their respective assessment of the qualitative shift in the geopolitical and geo-strategic environment of the region. It is increasingly manifest over the years that a nuclear South Asia cannot afford a cycle of hostility. The two countries need to develop an understanding that can help normalize relations - a new equation that does not necessarily mean lowering the guard by one or the other, but to find ways where both could live peacefully, pursuing their independent national objectives. The question at this juncture, when both neighbours have entered into a peace process, is how these factors could be internalized by the two sides to allow the process to move forward. Indeed, the strength of both countries individually in the South Asian region lies in their ability to reconcile their differences and progress simultaneously without threatening each other. Whether their vested interests will allow such a positive outcome to materialize is an issue that is discussed in the following pages. This study is an attempt to understand the various factors that have shaped the course of India-Pakistan relations and how these relations are likely to unfold in the future.

Bilateral DisputesIndia-Pakistan rivalry and their threat perceptions have a physical manifestation in the form of the on-going Kashmir dispute and other boundary issues. Control of territory, in fact, is central to the bilateral hostility and competition with India. Since no other issue has gained the kind of salience that the Kashmir dispute has, its significance for Pakistan's policymakers needs to be understood. The dispute is considered vitally important to Pakistan's existence for a number of reasons. First, control of Indian occupied-Kashmir (IoK) is vital for Pakistan for ideological reasons, intertwined with the logic of Pakistan's existence itself. To quote Pakistan's President and Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf: '' Kashmir runs in our blood '' The partition of the sub-continent took place on a religious-ideological basis. The Muslims of India, under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, wanted a separate

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homeland, an idea opposed by the Indian Congress. The princely state of Kashmir was annexed by India in contravention of the agreed upon principles of partition. India denied the people of Kashmir the right to determine their political future, as promised in the UN resolutions of 1948-49, and as initially agreed by India. The popular perception in Pakistan is that given a fair chance, the Kashmiris would have opted to join Pakistan. Continued Indian control of Kashmir is viewed as a challenge to Pakistan's existence as a state and its ideology. On the other hand, any concession on the issue by New Delhi is seen as compromising India's status as a secular state. Second, the control of Kashmir is held as strategically important for Pakistan. The water resources and territorial security of Pakistan can be better ensured through controlling the entire disputed territory. Recent Indian statements hinting at stoppage of water to Pakistan tend to heighten the fears of India's intent and capacity to make life difficult for Pakistan. In fact, since the ten-month long troop mobilization in 2002, certain segments of the security elite have vociferously argued about New Delhi's intention to strangulate Pakistan by blocking the downstream flow of river waters. Water is an issue that allows the official threat perception to permeate into areas such as Sindh, where people are otherwise not too bothered by India. But the dominant view in Sindh is that the water crisis has less to do with India's negative manipulation of water sources and is more due to the attitude of Punjab. Since the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan has objected to the designs of India's upstream Salal Dam, Wullar Barrage and, lately, the Baglihar Dam, for threatening to alter the flow of river water in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Such issues strengthen the Pakistani establishment's resolve to question India's control of Kashmir. Kashmir has been central to the hostile relations between the two countries, often spilling over or getting channelized into other bilateral disputes, for instance, the battle over the Siachin glacier or the mini-war in Kargil in 1999. The fight for control over the controversial and undemarcated Siachin glacier started in 1984. The Glacier is 20,000 ft above sea-level and stretches over 1000 square miles (see Map). It had been left out from demarcation of the Ceasefire Line in 1949. The Indians argue that since the 1970s Pakistan had been making moves to occupy it. During the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Islamabad began to charge fees from scouting expeditions which would visit the glacier. As a result, this land mass was shown as falling into Pakistani territory in certain international maps. The Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in New Delhi claimed that through the occupation of the Siachin glacier, Pakistan could directly threaten Indian territory. Whether or not the Pakistani military could achieve such an objective, it has still been argued that in the early 1980s both the countries had their 'eye' on the glacier. According to a senior Pakistan Army officer, President Zia had ordered an occupation in 1983. It was the army which had relaxed, and as a result, they were caught in 1984 with 'their pants down' when the Indian troops moved in.Robert Wirsing, an American expert, is of the opinion that a delay in action was caused due to Pakistan's deeper involvement with Afghanistan at that time. The Pakistani establishment holds the view that India had wanted to threaten the Karakoram highway between itself and China. The only possible benefit that India could have by its action was to undermine the Pakistan-China border agreement. However, keeping in consideration the geographical and atmospheric hazards which

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the militaries of both India and Pakistan might have faced in using the glacier to invade each other's territories, such claims appear dubious.In this respect the occupation of the glacier cannot be explained logically. The only rational explanation seems that the decisionmakers of both countries continue to be obsessed with military/territorial security. This is being done in an age when the definition of security has acquired multiple meanings. At best, the issue is an extension of the larger Kashmir issue. It was certainly Kashmir that prompted Islamabad to re-engage New Delhi militarily in 1999. This was done through militarily occupying certain strategic heights in the Drass-Kargil area along the Line of Control (LOC). The timing of the operation was indeed odd since it coincided with the Indian Premier Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan on the invitation of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and expectations were high regarding improvement of relations between the two states.

( http://thenetwork.org.pk/Resources/Magazines/PDF/12-8-2011-2-54-59-792-Indo-Pak%20Relations.pdf )

POLITICAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICYThe participants from both countries in this group, most of who were retired diplomats and military officials felt that disputes and differences between the two countries had created a serious LACK OF TRUST as one of the first key factors between the two countries affecting bilateral relations since they became independent in 1947. According to the participants, lack of trust is one of the main factors that has influenced the bilateral relationship and is responsible for recurrence of tensions. Given the three wars fought by them, the relationship is an accident prone because of which the two countries have come close to war on other occasions. The key factor which has bedeviled Pakistan India relations is the KASHMIR dispute. The participants felt Kashmir has been at the center of the conflict for the past 30 years, and could act as a flashpoint for both the countries anytime. Currently, India demands the issue to be resolved through bilateral negotiations to which both countries have agreed to the SIMLA agreement of 1972.The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in his 2014 visit to India to attend Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inaugural ceremony said that he intended to "pick up the threads" of the Lahore Declaration, referring to a pledge both countries made in 1999 to cooperate more closely to ease tensions in the light of the SIMLA agreement. However, Pakistan has been raising the Kashmir issue at the United Nations General Assembly to remind the global community of their commitment as per the relevant United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolutions of 1948 and 1949. Another factor which has become equally relevant in the bilateral relations is the post 9/11 scenario of TERRORISM. The participants highlighted the accusations often made in this regard from both sides. Examples of these are the 2001 attack on the parliament in New Delhi and the Mumbai attack in 2008 both allegedly carried out by militants based in Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistani participants brought up the issue of India allegedly insurrecting the insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan’s

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restive province where separatists are fighting the Pakistani state. Also, Pakistani participants said their country’s leadership has often accused India of supplying arms and funding to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who are resorting to terrorism because of Pakistan’s support to the US/NATO/ISAF in the Afghan war. Some elements of TTP are comprised of the Mujahideen, who were friendly to Pakistan and fought against the military occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union during the eighties. In this war, Pakistan was the conduit for military support extended by the United States of America, Saudi Arabia and other countries. These groups are not against Pakistan for supporting the US military intervention in Afghanistan and are called TTP. The participants felt that TERRORISM may have been a by-product of the above two factors, but after consultations among the group, they decided to include it as a separate factor.

MILITARY AND SECURITY COOPERATIONThe factors that the participants came up with were similar to the ones in the previous focus area, but KASHMIR was the main factor as per their assessment. The participants felt Kashmir could act either as a major deterrent to a peace process or could lead to the end of conflict between the two nations. However, within the plausibility funnel –the participants felt that given the nuclear capabilities of the two countries, total war over KASHMIR was unlikely. At the same time, resolution of the Kashmir issue did not appear to be possible within the ten year time-frame. Here examples of terrorist attacks in Pakistan and India, alleged to have been planned on each other’s territory, were mentioned in the historical context. The variations within this factor ranged from a) strategic level triggers to b) enhance infiltration and translocation to c) low profile triggers, and d) over all control of terrorism. The third factor was PAKISTAN-INDIA TERRIRTORIAL DISPUTES. These include, firstly – SIR CREEK, which is a dispute relating to the un-demarcated boundary of the coast of both countries dividing Gujarat in India and Sindh Province in Pakistan – a water body that comes under disputed territory, and of which poor fishermen on both sides of the country are often victims. Secondly, the dispute over SIACHEN glacier located in the mountainous area of Himalayas. Both India and Pakistan claim sovereignty over the entire Siachen region and the dispute intensified in the eighties. Between 1984 and 1999, frequent skirmishes took place between India and Pakistan. However, more soldiers have died from the harsh weather conditions in the region than from combat. Both India and Pakistan continue to deploy thousands of troops in the vicinity of Siachen and attempts to demilitarize the region have been so far unsuccessful. Prior to 1984, neither country had any military forces in this area. Aside from the Indian and Pakistani military presence, the glacier region is unpopulated. India is the upper riparian in the flow of five rivers to Pakistan. The two countries signed the INDUS WATER TREATY in 1960 which was brokered by the World Bank. In this treaty, as a lower riparian Pakistan’s water sharing rights were protected. The implementation of the treaty has led to serious differences between the two countries and is responsible for increased tensions. On the positive side, the

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treaty remains intact despite many wars, although Pakistan continues to allege that that India uses more than its due share of water and at times, through the dams constructed is said to release more water that the river can regulate downstream. However, Government of India continues to refute this allegation. The final factor that affects Military And Security Cooperation is the Nuclear/Technological Advances. In this, the variations suggest that there could be a possibility of a) total arms race, b) nuclear arms race, c) conventional arms race and lastly d) arms control regime.

ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONSAccording to the participants, this key area carried the most promising outlook. There appeared to be a consensus that even if the progress was not possible in the previous two key areas, there was a degree of optimism with regard to improved economic and trade relations. The participants came up with four factors affecting it – a) Trade Policy, b) Transport Policy, c) Demand and Supply Dynamics, d) Administration of Borders. The variations include an idealistic outlook for having no borders, a) similar to the European Union (EU) model, or b) the situation remaining the same as it is today where by the countries remain in economic competition with each other. The participants in this group, which included those from the business community, pointed out that even with the recent violent border clashes, trade continued uninterrupted albeit on a low level, which reflects that despite the problematic nature of the relationship, money matters. According to data released in May 2014 by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry of Commerce and Industry India, the volume of bilateral trade recorded a net increase of $410 million from April 2013 to March 2014. Pakistan’s exports to India grew by 28% while Indian exports to Pakistan increased by 19%. Bilateral trade has increased to $2.4 billion, which may soar to $6 billion in the next two years if both countries agree to grant “most favored nation” (MFN) status to each other. Currently, most of the trade between India and Pakistan takes place via Dubai and its volume is estimated at over $4 billion. The Government of India has granted the MFN status to Pakistan whereas Pakistan has not returned the gesture. The Pakistani Government maintains that it will grant MFN status to India after the removal of Indian nontariff barriers which are a major inhibiting factor in the Pakistani export to India.

( http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/pakistan/11370.pdf )

Nuclear PolicyIndia initiated its nuclear weapon programme in the South Asian region early on in 1958, whereas Pakistan began its nuclear pursuit in 1972. Pakistan and India both declared themselves nuclear weapons states in 1998. These nuclear tests helped Pakistan restore strategic balance in the region. These nuclear tests also helped in the achievement of deterrence in the region, which worked, somehow,

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during the Kargil conflict as well as the 2002-2003 military stand-off. To enhance confidence between the two countries, Pakistan and India released a joint statement on the issue of nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in 2004.The process of nuclear CBMs between the two countries is not new. This process was in place before the nuclear tests of 1998. Similar confidence-building agreements were signed in 1999, 2004 and 2012.

The following challenges to the deterrence stability posed by India were mentioned :i. India’s cold start doctrine of 2004 which aims at exploiting the

perceived gap below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.

ii. Differentiated nuclear learning, doctrinal mismatch between the two countries.

iii. The anti-ballistic missile system, India’s defense research and development organization as well as the growing conventional asymmetry between Pakistan and India.

iv. Whereas India’s defence allocation budget is around 38.5 billion dollars, Pakistan’s defence budget allocation is just around six billion dollars.

There has been a difference of approach on Pakistan and India’s part on the concept of maintaining strategic stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s approach on this issue has been to promote over-arching concept of encompassing nuclear restraint and conventional balance. India’s approach, on the other hand, has been to explore new areas to introduce restrains on the use of nuclear weapons and looking to reverse the lowering of nuclear threshold based on seeking official communication on

nuclear doctrines and taking a morally high position on global nuclear disarmament.

Kashmir The people of Kashmir do not have high expectations with regard to the upcoming elections in India and Kashmir. They believe there will be no change in India’s policies. The dispute of Kashmir will continue to pose a threat to the stability of South Asia if it remains unresolved. The policy-makers in Pakistan should take Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan as the guiding principle, as far as the policy on Kashmir is concerned. A development in the form of a local Kashmiri narrative on the dispute of Kashmir has been observed in the past three or four years. A rapid increase in the number of local Kashmiri youth involved in the dispute of Kashmir

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has been seen since 2008. These highly educated youth have been able to bring the dispute of Kashmir to the forefront in the world media. A soft image of Kashmir needs to be developed. Pakistan can help in this regard if credible people of the

country lend support to the dispute of Kashmir.

Water In order to avoid any future conflicts over the dispute of Kashmir, Pakistan and India need to maintain their agreements and comply with the rulings of the International Court of Justice and the International Laws of Seas.

Major Points1. Pakistan, while adhering to its traditional stance over the dispute of Kashmir, should continue its demand for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute under the UN resolution. There is a need to convince India to achieve an early resolution of Kashmir through political and diplomatic means which is acceptable to all stake-holders.

2. Pakistan and India should both reduce the heavy baggage of conflict and territorial disputes by enhancing bilateral cooperation in all possible fields.

3. Bilateral trade between the two countries can prove to be an effective tool in order to increase mutual dependency for sustainable and stable bilateral relations.

4. Pakistan and India can work together to achieve economic benefits from the Central Asian markets as well. By utilizing Pakistan’s strategic location and India’s influence in that region, both countries will be able to achieve economic prosperity.

5. The resolution of core disputes like Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek will not only strengthen peace between the two countries but will also help reduce the existing level of distrust.

6. India should respect human rights inside Kashmir, and Pakistan needs to effectively highlight the cruel laws currently being enforced in the Indian-Occupied Kashmir. Indian policies in the region need to change.

7. The two countries can work together and build a road-map based on non-kinetic means to combat extremism.

8. The best guarantee to establish peace between Pakistan and India is if both countries invest in joint infrastructural projects in the energy and other sectors. This way, both will have a stake in the other’s stability and would further propel them to adopt a peaceful posture in their policies regarding each other.

9. There is a dire need to establish nuclear transparency in order to establish trust between the two countries.

10. All stake-holders in Pakistan need to be on the same page as far as relations and the peace process with India is concerned.

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11. Pakistan needs to internally educate and prepare its nation on core disputes with India.

( http://cpakgulf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Pakistan-india-Relations.pdf )

References

1: http://thenetwork.org.pk/Resources/Magazines/PDF/12-8-2011-2-54-59-792-Indo-Pak%20Relations.pdf

2: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/pakistan/11370.pdf

3: http://cpakgulf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Pakistan-india- Relations.pdf

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