Tierney 1

Alysha Tierney

PLIR 3240

18 December 2010

Research Paper

Why Trash Matters

Introduction

In 2003, the United States engaged in a preventive war against Iraq to overthrow Saddam

Hussein’s regime. The Bush Administration believed that they were creating a better future for

Iraq by throwing off the yoke of Saddam. No longer would the Iraqis be subject to grave human

rights abuses or a harsh dictatorship. They would welcome democracy and find hope for a better

future. In Assassin’s Gate, George Packer describes the lack of a cohesive and viable post-

invasion plan. Phase IV is used to describe the post-invasion reconstruction of Iraq; however in

reality there was no coherent Phase IV. Packer describes the Bush Administration’s fixation on

the military plan as the major obstacle in “liberating” Iraq. Outdated information from exiles and

others led the administration to assume that the Iraqis would immediately pick up where the U.S.

left off and rebuild their nation1. Seven years has shown us that the major obstacle was not

toppling Saddam but rebuilding Iraq. The United States’ lack of foresight has created greater

threats to our security and an international fiasco.

Trash matters. If we had an operational Phase IV, it would have included a succinct way

to deal with Iraq trash, waste and sewage. Today, sewage runs through the streets and children

play amongst trash in this “liberated” country. At a glance, trash management may seem

inconsequential compared to the major problems that Iraq currently faces; however, great

resentment has arisen from the United States’ inability to provide even the most basic needs for

1 Packer, George. The Assassin’s Gate. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006. p. 147-8

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Iraq. In today’s world the “distinction between self-defense and humanitarian intervention may

become less clear”2. The insurgency in Iraq has stemmed from our lack of a reconstruction plan,

and this in turn has greatly reduced our security in the Middle East and the world. We cannot

think that simply showing force will bring security; we must have a plan and means to create

stability that will require humanitarian means. It is not too late to provide Iraq with a functioning

system of waste management, which will ultimately bolster our security. Providing Iraq with a

sewage system and trash collection will not solve all of our security issues we face in Iraq or the

Middle East, but it will lessen resentment of the West and not provide a breeding for potential

terrorists.

The goal of this paper is to illuminate the current, post-invasion and Baathist conditions

of trash and waste in Iraq. This will show our progress or lack thereof in the reconstruction of

Iraq. From this we will see the benefits of a comprehensive system of trash management while

discussing different solutions for it in the years to come. There are a lot of problems to tackle in

Iraq and with the cultivation of terrorism so I find it best to start at the most basic level: trash.

State of Iraq: Present Day

Iraq is not a small or trivial nation to say the least. Its population lingers around

28,945,657 persons and nearly 5.7 million of which live in Baghdad3. A nation of that size and a

growing population requires a functioning waste management system. However, countless

reports from Iraq have illustrated the dire waste and trash problem that Iraqis face on a daily

basis.

2 Keohane, Robert O. “The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’.” Dialogue-IO, Spring 2002. p 39

3 "Background Note: Iraq." U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action. U.S. Department of State, 17 09 2010. Web. 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm#profile>

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In Fallujah, a city with 580,000 residents4 still has not seen a functioning system since

2003. The US had promised to build a sewage treatment plant in 2004 for the city after it was in

ruins from the battles between the US and Sunni. Today only one house is currently connected

to the sewage system. “Continuing violence, design changes and the replacement of incompetent

contractors” has caused the project to be a debacle over the past six years and cost over $100

million5. Sewage runs through the streets of Fallujah affecting the residents’ health. Moreover,

the septic tanks the residents use are old and leak waste into the streets that end up seeping into

the Euphrates River. This pollutes the city’s drinking water since their main source of “clean

water” is the Euphrates6. The health of effects of this will be described later in greater detail.

For a nation that went in to liberate Iraq, we have left the cities that were hit the hardest by

fighting with the worst conditions that will impact the residents’ lives for years to come.

In Baghdad, the situation is not any better for the Iraqis. One journalist reported after

being in Iraq for years, he “cannot remember a recent day in Baghdad when there wasn’t a huge

amount of litter or debris blocking main streets in the capital.” The piles of garbage being so

large they frequently close that area to traffic7. There have been attempts to deal with Baghdad’s

trash problem, but all these attempts were largely unsuccessful. Yellow trash containers were

placed in a designated area on each block for disposal and pick-up in 2007. Most of these

containers were either vandalized or stolen8. Now empty lots that were supposed to be used for

housing now serve as makeshift landfills. The displaced families who lost their house in the

4 "Iraq: Seeping sewage hits Fallujah residents' health." IRIN 14 07 2010: Web. 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=89829>.

5 "Iraq: Seeping sewage hits Fallujah residents' health." IRIN 14 07 2010: Web. 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=89829>.

6 "Iraq: Seeping sewage hits Fallujah residents' health." IRIN 14 07 2010: Web. 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=89829>.

7 Naji, Zainbeb. “Baghdad’s Trash Problem.” The Wall Street Journal 8 09 2008: Web. 12 Dec 2010. <http://blogs.wsj.com/iraq/2008/09/08/baghdads-trash-problem/>.

8 Zaineb Naji and Dawood Salman. “Baghdad’s Trash Piles up.” Environmental News Service 6 07 2010: Web 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2010/2010-07-06-01.html>.

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fighting and the growing population now build their houses around garbage piles. Their children

play in the garbage and sift through it to make a living9. It is truly tragic to imagine these living

conditions. The U.S. promised so much to the Iraqi people and failed to deliver the most basic

needs. Our hopes of installing a democracy have long been proved to be near to impossible; we

must instead focus our efforts on supporting a nation to rebuild.

Qasim Dawood, from the parliament’s health and environmental committee, explained a

further problem concerning trash. Baghdad and Iraq lack “laws that prohibit the public from

littering and polluting.”10 The local government has failed to create such laws and implement

them to promote a healthy environment and a decent standard of living. As a personal aside, my

brother, Specialist Bradford Tierney, has continually complained about this problem while being

stationed in Baghdad. To illustrate, while the Iraqi police were escorting his squad they threw

trash out the car window. Upon realizing the Americans were following them, the Iraqi

policemen got out of their car; picked up the trash; neatly placed it on the side of the road; and

then gave the Americans the thumbs-up. Here we see a striking example of how there are no

laws to enforce littering, but also the police themselves litter. There is little knowledge of the

importance of proper waste disposal and no mechanism to allow Iraqis to properly dispose of

trash.

Though our combat mission in Iraq has ended, the effects of our invasion are visible

through the trash heaps that encircle houses and line the roads. The U.S. and the Iraqis together

must find a way to rebuild Iraq in Operation New Dawn. A great place to start would be

9 Naji, Zainbeb. “Baghdad’s Trash Problem.” The Wall Street Journal 8 09 2008: Web. 12 Dec 2010. <http://blogs.wsj.com/iraq/2008/09/08/baghdads-trash-problem/>.

10 Zaineb Naji and Dawood Salman. “Baghdad’s Trash Piles up.” Environmental News Service 6 07 2010: Web 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2010/2010-07-06-01.html>.

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instituting a comprehensive waste management system that has enforceable littering laws and a

regular pick-up system.

How Did We Get Here?

There have been many attempts since 2003 to “rebuild” Iraq, but those attempts have

proven to be largely ineffective. Before elaborating on what should be done about the current

garbage problem, we must find out why programs in the past have fallen short. An effective

system has not been successful due to violence, poor funding, corruption and a lack of foresight.

In Assassin’s Gate by George Packer and in Bob Woodward’s Plan of Attack11, we see

how the policymaker’s misperceptions about the current state of Iraq and their flimsy Phase IV

led to a grave miscalculation. Basing their knowledge of the then current state of Iraq (2001-

2003) off old intelligence and outdated exiles, led them to view Iraq as the same country it was

in the 1980s. They could swiftly strike Iraq and depose Saddam, assuming the next day the

Iraqis would go about business as usual. Thus, what they called “Phase IV” was largely

unplanned, incomprehensive and incomplete. After the invasion, the function of the Office of

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA), later the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA), was to provide a provisional governmental structure and management until a new Iraqi

government could take over. CPA exacerbated Iraqi’s floundering infrastructure by firing all the

Baathists in the government and mismanaging funding. Here the administration failed to

acknowledge Iraq was not the bustling and booming nation it was in the 1980s, but rather a

country devastated by war and a floundering economy. The administration failed to heed

Secretary of State Powell’s warning, “You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million

people…you will own all their hopes, aspirations and problems”12. The Bush Administration fell

11 The info from this section is broadly taken from Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. and Packer, George. The Assassin’s Gate. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006.12 Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Page 150

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short in realizing Iraq had years of infrastructural baggage that could not be fixed with

Wolfowitz’s ill-considered Phase IV.

The U.S. military and organizations such as USAID post-invasion did try to institute

some reforms to create a functioning waste management system. Together the military and

USAID worked to refurbish existing water and sewage treatment plants and install new

functioning ones. After 2003’s invasion, nationwide they “restored or provided new water

treatment to over 2.3 million Iraqis and sewage treatment to over 5.1 million”13. Some of these

programs were successful but over the years violence, corruption, poor management and poor

funding hindered the functioning of these reforms.

An article14 that follows the story of U.S. Army Captain Tom Deierlein and his civil

affairs unit, illustrates the great importance of garbage collecting and the great danger of it. The

goal of Captain Deierlein’s unit was to provide security and many times dealing with Baghdad’s

garbage issue. The article written in 2006, remarks that about 500 garbage collectors had been

killed by hidden bombs or being shot at by insurgents so as not to take away their ability to hide

future bombs. Captain Deierlein explains the paradox, “If we didn’t pick up the garbage, then al-

Qaida would put explosives in the garbage to kill us…and if the streets are full of trash the Iraqi

people are going to be upset and blame us…everything is linked.” Captain Deierlein was later

shot in the leg trying to provide security to several garbage collectors. The military and USAID

had made great strides in dealing with waste management in Iraq; however, their efforts were

undermined by the lack of security in many cases. Iraq’s conditions today are a testament to how

13 “Assistance for Iraq: Water and Sanitation.” USAID 04 19 2007: Web 13 Dec 2010. <http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/watsan.html>.

14 All the information in this paragraph is taken from Coffey, Laura T. “Charity Begins at War: Part 4: In the End, It All Comes Back to Garbage.” MSNBC 07 19 2007: Web 13 Dec 2010. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19441097/ns/us_news-giving/>.

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Iraq’s issues of security, trash, insurgency and the planning of the Bush administration are tightly

linked.

Trash under Saddam

We must take a further step backward from 2003 and see what life was like under

Saddam. Here we see a vexed image of the trash situation: the wealthy had access to trash

collectors while the poor lived in their own waste. For the wealthy or upper-class residents of

Iraq, our failure to provide a functioning trash and waste system makes the U.S., in some

respects, worse governors than Saddam. For those that never had functioning systems, we are no

better than Saddam.

One resident of Baghdad expresses his frustration, “My wish is to see Baghdad clean

again as in the 1980s and even 1990s. Garbage collectors and street cleaners worked day and

night…there were big dumps in every neighborhood where people could put garbage in instead

of throwing it in the street like now…it (Baghdad) was one of the most beautiful cities in the

world.”15 Great frustration and resentment are felt by many Iraqis since the U.S. has stopped the

functioning of everyday life for them and have trashed their homeland. This follows the old

phrase: at least under the old administration the trains ran on time. Here, at least under Saddam

the trash collectors ran on time.

On the flipside, garbage and waste systems only functioned properly under Saddam if

you had the money to tip. The garbage collectors were paid a dollar a day by Saddam and earned

most of their money through tips from the wealthy16. Garbage quickly piled up in the poorer

areas that could not afford to tip the collectors. One article explains, “This filth left no room for 15 Zaineb Naji and Dawood Salman. “Baghdad’s Trash Piles up.” Environmental News Service 6 07 2010:

Web 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2010/2010-07-06-01.html>.16 Voelkel, Tyson. “Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-up

View.” The Interagency Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles. Eds. Joseph R Cerami, Jay W Boggs. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Dec 2007. Page 524.

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children to play sports, but plenty of room for disease, crime and poverty—the perfect recruiting

grounds for insurgents.”17 When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, the soldiers came across piles

over seven feet high of garbage and standards of living in the poorer sections that the

policymakers could not have imagined.

Why Should We Care?

Trash seems like an inconsequential matter compared to the larger problems that Iraq

faces. Yet, as we have seen trash is a basic problem that is widespread throughout much of the

country that fosters great discontent and resentment. The reasons we should care about

instituting a proper waste management system are many: security to our troops, not creating a

breeding ground for insurgents or terrorists, a symbol of change, and for environmental and

health reasons.

Part of our course has focused on what factors cultivate terrorism, as with Afghanistan

we can see that great poverty and low standards of living bred bitterness against the affluent

Western nations. They saw the West, especially the U.S., as using their homeland for resources

and political ploys that left their homeland utterly devastated. Providing a manageable waste

system will be one factor that will reduce the factors that foster terrorism and discontent.

Focusing on military force will not stamp out terrorism alone, we must balance it with

humanitarian aid to stop it from growing18. No longer will children sift through trash piles for

goodies they can sell, instead they could be playing soccer in a clean field. No longer will Iraqis

look out their windows to see sewage and rubbish lining the streets, thinking it is just another

17 Voelkel, Tyson. “Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-up View.” The Interagency Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles. Eds. Joseph R Cerami, Jay W Boggs. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Dec 2007. Page 524.

18 Keohane, Robert. “The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics and the Liberalism of Fear.” Dialogue-IO, Spring 2002. Page 39.

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way the U.S. has thrown around its weight. It will be a visible and tangible thing the U.S. has

provided for Iraq.

Additionally, cleaning up the trash that lines the streets and yards will make planting an

improvised explosive device (IED) more difficult. 60% of American combat casualties in Iraq

have been the result of IEDs, roadside or car bombs; this number totals around 3000 casualties19.

As mentioned earlier, insurgents utilize the garbage piles and garbage that is left at the sides of

roads to hide IEDs. New technology has greatly aided in detecting these devices, but it is still a

major issue today. There is a likely chance, we will see insurgents targeting garbage collectors

again in the future (see How Did We Get Here? p. 6), but now that security has improved from

what it was in 2006 this might become a more manageable problem. In the longer run, it is too

risky for Iraqis and our nearly 50,000 non-combat troops to not have conditions that lessen the

number of IEDs.

Creating a functioning waste management system, too, can be a symbol of the change the

U.S. has brought to Iraq. Many of the poorer areas of Baghdad and Iraq in general did not have

reliable trash collectors if they could not tip. A functioning system will become a symbol of how

the U.S. has improved Iraq by deposing Saddam. Moreover, it will show the character of the

new government and this is crucial for the public’s acceptance of the new regime. A study

shows,

19 Wilson, Clay. “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures.” CRS Report for Congress, 08 28 2007.

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public infrastructure-water, sewers, transportation, and health care—is a key

determinant of satisfaction in al-Anbar [a region in Iraq]. The better the infrastructure,

the more likely residents are to be satisfied with life and to trust public authorities. The

poorer the condition of such facilities and services, the greater level of public

dissatisfaction with the government, which the population holds responsible for

maintaining and providing those facilities and services.20

The public has a great stake in proper facilities and its satisfaction is a key factor in the

legitimacy of the new government. Furthermore, working in collaboration with Iraqis, the U.S.

can show that it is not just a staggering elephant that throws its weight around; rather, showing it

is a power that has foresight and dedication. Again, this will not solve all of our problems and

completely eradicate the anti-Western sentiment but it is a place to start.

The final reason I will discuss in this paper illuminating why we should care about Iraq

trash is for environmental and health concerns. From lack of access to proper means of

disposing waste, contractors (KBR) had created burn pits in which they disposed of plastics,

Styrofoam, metal scraps, medical waste and carcasses of animals21. This has caused hundreds of

those serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan to develop breathing problems and even cancer. The

practice of open-air burning has now been greatly restricted22; however, this practice shows how

the lack of a proper waste system has adversely affected even the health of our servicemen and

women. For the Iraqis who have to live amongst garbage and sewage, cases of food poisoning

and diarrhea have climbed. These conditions, if not dealt with properly, can create outbreaks of

20 Grant, Audra K. and Martin C. Libicki. “Assessing Living Conditions in Iraq’s Anbar Province in 2009.” RAND: National Defense Research Institute, 2001. Page 15.

21 Glod, Maria. “Alarms Sound Over Trash Fires in War Zones of Afghanistan, Iraq.” The Washington Post, Aug 6 2010.

22 Glod, Maria. “Alarms Sound Over Trash Fires in War Zones of Afghanistan, Iraq.” The Washington Post, Aug 6 2010.

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typhoid and cholera23. In Fallujah where sewage seeps into the Euphrates, the main source of

drinking water for the area, the residents became ill with “diarrhea, tuberculosis, typhoid and

other communicable diseases.”24 Approximately 10 to 15 percent of those at the local hospital

were being treated for diseases related to the poor water and sewage conditions25. These are truly

detestable conditions for our service members and the Iraqi people. These are the same Iraqi

people we freed from Saddam to give them a better life.

What Should Be Done?

We have entered a new phase in Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom has ended the use of

combat troops. Operation New Dawn promises to, with American help, turn over the

government and its function to the Iraqis. The garbage problem that Iraqis face will be one that

will be difficult and time consuming. However, if implemented properly waste collection and

processing can be a sustainable industry and create a great influx of jobs.

In accordance with Operation New Dawn, we should hire Iraqis and Iraqi contractors to

be in charge of running the new waste systems. Recycling plants, trash collection and other parts

of the industry can create a great amount of jobs. On the U.S. bases in the past few years, the

soldiers have begun recycling. “Many Iraqis have found employment opportunities, in part, due

to this effort”26. Iraqis are willing and capable of filling these positions. It provides them with

financial stability while bettering the environment. Moreover, we should not use our contractors

such as KBR to institute these reforms. We need to hire Iraqi contractors to perform these

functions with Iraqi employees. The Iraqi contractors know the local neighborhoods and how to 23 Zaineb Naji and Dawood Salman. “Baghdad’s Trash Piles up.” Environmental News Service 6 07 2010:

Web 12 Dec 2010. <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2010/2010-07-06-01.html>.24 "Iraq: Seeping sewage hits Fallujah residents' health." IRIN 14 07 2010: Web. 12 Dec 2010.

<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=89829>.25 "Iraq: Seeping sewage hits Fallujah residents' health." IRIN 14 07 2010: Web. 12 Dec 2010.

<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=89829>.26 Vaughn, Sgt. Frank. “Recycling Provides Jobs, Hope for Iraqis.” Operation New Dawn, 20 Feb. 2009.

<http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=25466&Itemid=128>.

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work with the local people better than the foreign contractors27. TF Gimlet describes this as, “a

win-win situation as the community will benefit from both the Iraqi contractors working in their

neighborhoods and the continued beautification of the streets of Baghdad.”28 Local contractors

seem to be wildly more efficient and knowledge at cleaning up the trash. However, we still must

be involved with the clean up by providing security for the trash collectors, along with training

the new Iraqi police in how to provide security to one day take over. This country belongs to the

Iraqis; we must give them the reins to take charge while maintaining a presence in overseeing the

reforms.

Two other elements that are vital to the cleanup are laws against littering and education.

We must educate the Iraqis about how improper waste disposal is detrimental to not only the

environment but also to the health of others. It is possible and absolutely critical to educate the

Iraqis now, fifty percent of the population is under 20 years of age29 and this is an opportune time

to instill such education. In turn laws must be passed that create fines and regulations regarding

trash disposal. However, this can only be truly effective if we have police and administrators

than can enforce the new laws. Educating the public and officials will help deter littering and

improper disposal, but a functioning police force is still needed to implement and legitimize

these regulations.

Where will the trash go and how will it be sustainable? Other countries in the Middle

East have seen rapid development and have faced a great problem with what to do with all the

27 “MND-B engineers clear the way for contractors to take over trash pickup.” Operation New Dawn, 17 Nov. 2008. <http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press-releases/mnd-b-engineers-clear-the-way-for-contractors-to-take-over-trash-pickup>.

28 “MND-B engineers clear the way for contractors to take over trash pickup.” Operation New Dawn, 17 Nov. 2008. <http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press-releases/mnd-b-engineers-clear-the-way-for-contractors-to-take-over-trash-pickup>.

29 Vaughn, Sgt. Frank. “Recycling Provides Jobs, Hope for Iraqis.” Operation New Dawn, 20 Feb. 2009. <http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=25466&Itemid=128>.

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waste. Some nations such as Dubai30 have found effective and sustainable waste management

systems. Iraq can model their new systems after those in Dubai. Dubai has commissioned

contractors from the private sector to develop incinerators for medical waste and recycling

plants. Moreover, old computers and other electronics when discarded are refurbished and

donated to schools and charities instead of sitting in a landfill. Waste is placed in underground

landfills and compacted which allows space for future residential and commercial developments.

Finally, street cleaning and trash collection is community based. This harkens to the idea of

using employees from those communities since they know how to interact with them and what

they need. Aspects of this program must be tailored to Iraq’s specific needs, but a general view

of effective trash programs can be found in cases such as Dubai.

Conclusion

Our past policies in Iraq have failed and our future policies must take a more nuanced

view of the issues. We cannot think that merely showing military muscle will bring stability to

Iraq. We must try to root out what fuels the insurgents and general discontent. Dealing with

Iraq’s trash problem could be one facet that helps create legitimacy for the government and

making it stable. Saddam and the United States have failed to provide Iraqis with sufficient

standards of living in regards to waste management, but Operation New Dawn provides new

hope. It is not too late to hire Iraqi contractors and workers to clean up their neighborhoods with

help of the U.S. Too much is at stake if the U.S. is to ignore the sewage and garbage that run

through the streets of Iraq. The Iraqis, the soldiers, our reputation and the future security of

America all have a stake in cleaning up Iraq.

30 The information concerning Dubai’s waste management system is taken from “Dubai Municipallity’s sustainable waste management intiative.” CLEAN Middle East, Issue #11, Vol: 2. <http://www.cleanmiddleeast.ae/articles/199/dubai-municipality-rsquo-s-sustainable-waste-management-initiatives.html>.

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“Assistance for Iraq: Water and Sanitation.” USAID 04 19 2007: Web 13 Dec 2010.

<http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/watsan.html>.

"Background Note: Iraq." U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action. U.S. Department of

State, 17 09 2010. Web. 12 Dec 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm#profile>

Coffey, Laura T. “Charity Begins at War: Part 4: In the End, It All Comes Back to Garbage.”

MSNBC 07 19 2007: Web 13 Dec 2010.

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19441097/ns/us_news-giving/>.

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in 2009.” RAND: National Defense Research Institute, 2001.

Glod, Maria. “Alarms Sound Over Trash Fires in War Zones of Afghanistan, Iraq.” The

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"Iraq: Seeping sewage hits Fallujah residents' health." IRIN 14 07 2010: Web. 12 Dec 2010.

<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=89829>.

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the ‘Liberalism of Fear’.” Dialogue-IO, Spring 2002.

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