MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME90Docket: Cum-18-58Argued: September11,2018Decided: June6,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andMEAD,GORMAN,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Dissent: HJELM,ALEXANDER,andJABAR,JJ.

PACKGEN,INC.v.

BERNSTEIN,SHUR,SAWYER&NELSON,P.A.HUMPHREY,J.

[¶1] In Maine, with exceptions not applicable to this appeal, the

Legislature has spoken—a civil action against an attorney for professional

negligence, malpractice, or breach of contract for legal services “shall be

commencedwithin6yearsafterthecauseofactionaccrues,”14M.R.S.§752

(2018),1 and the causeof action accrueson “thedateof the actoromission

givingrisetotheinjury,notfromthediscoveryofthe[attorney]malpractice,

negligenceorbreachofcontract.”14M.R.S.§753-B(2018).2Thequestionwe

1Section752identifiesthoseexceptionsas“actionsonajudgmentordecreeofanycourtofrecord

oftheUnitedStates,orofanystate,orofajusticeofthepeaceinthisState,andexceptasotherwisespeciallyprovided.”14M.R.S.§752(2018).

2Section753-Bprovidesthatonlyinactionsallegingprofessionalnegligence“intherenderingofarealestatetitleopinion”and“inthedraftingofalastwillandtestamentthathasbeenofferedfor

2

address in this appeal is whether the court-made doctrines of continuing

representationandcontinuingnegligenceshouldapplyinthedeterminationof

thedateonwhichacauseofactionforlegalmalpracticeaccruesundersection

753-B.

[¶2] Packgen, Inc., appeals from a judgment entered by the Superior

Court(CumberlandCounty,Warren,J.)grantingthemotionofBernstein,Shur,

Sawyer & Nelson, P.A. (Bernstein Shur), to dismiss Packgen’s complaint for

legalmalpracticebecausePackgen’sclaimisbarredbyMaine’ssix-yearstatutes

oflimitationsforcivilactions,14M.R.S.§752,andattorneymalpracticeactions,

14M.R.S. §753-B. Packgen argues that its claim is not barred because the

doctrinesofcontinuingrepresentation3andcontinuingnegligence4operateto

bring the date of the act or omission “giving rise to [its] injury”—Bernstein

Shur’s failure to serve a proper notice of claim or file a defective-products

probate,” the limitation period commences upon the discovery of the cause of action. 14M.R.S.§753-B(2)-(3)(2018).

3 “Thepremise [of thedoctrineofcontinuingrepresentation] is thatthecauseofactioninanattorney malpractice case should not accrue until the attorney’s representation concerning aparticulartransactionisterminated.”3RonaldE.Mallen,LegalMalpractice§23:44at543(2019ed.2019)(quotationmarksomitted).

4Underacontinuingnegligencetheory,thestatuteoflimitationsperioddoes“notbegintorununtilthedateofthelastactofnegligence”—thedateoflastinjury.SeeBakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,¶20,26A.3d806;seealsoDickeyv.Vermette,2008ME179,¶9,960A.2d1178;3J.D.Lee&BarryA.Lindahl,ModernTortLaw:LiabilityandLitigation§25:123,at25-242to-243(2ded.2002)(“Underthecontinuingtortdoctrine,ifthenegligenceinvolvesacontinuingtortinvolvingacontinuinginjury,thestatuteoflimitationsdoesnotbegintorununtilthewrongterminates.”).

3

complaint—within the statute of limitations. 14 M.R.S. § 753-B(1). In the

contextofactionsforattorneymalpractice,wedeclinetoadopteitherdoctrine

and affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint as untimely pursuant to

14M.R.S.§§752,753-B.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶3]ThefollowingfactsaredrawnfromPackgen’samendedcomplaint

andfromdocumentsattachedtoitwhoseauthenticity isnotchallenged. See

Andrewsv.SheepscotIslandCo.,2016ME68,¶8,138A.3d1197;seealsoMoody

v.StateLiquor&LotteryComm’n,2004ME20,¶11,843A.2d43.Weviewthe

facts alleged in the complaint as if they were admitted. See Andrews,

2016ME68,¶8,138A.3d1197.

A. UnderlyingFederalCase—Packgenv.Covalence

[¶4] In 2008, Packgen retained Bernstein Shur to prosecute a

defective-productsclaimagainstCovalenceSpecialtyCoatings,LLC,andBerry

PlasticsCorporation.

[¶5] OnMay 29, 2008, Bernstein Shur sent a letter to Covalence “to

provide noticeof [Packgen’s] claimagainstCovalence.”5 Although the letter

5Packgen’samendedcomplaint,fromwhichwedrawthesefacts,allegesonlythatBernsteinShur

sentthelettertoCovalence.ItisunclearfromthecomplaintwhetherBernsteinShuralsosentthelettertoBerryPlastics.

4

wassignedbyaBernsteinShurattorney,itdidnotsetforththecauseofaction

underoathasisrequiredby14M.R.S.§1602-B(5)(2018).BernsteinShurdid

notnoticethemissingoath,nordiditinformPackgenthata“propernoticeof

claim [was required] to start the accrual of prejudgment interest” or warn

Packgenof“theadverseconsequencesoffailingtoservesuchanotice”orthe

need to “promptly file suit . . . in order to protect Packgen’s prejudgment

interest rights.” In the three years that followed, Bernstein Shur “made no

attempt to servea valid noticeof claim that compliedwith section1602-B,”

“failedtofilesuitorotherwisediligentlypursuethecase,”and“failedtokeep

Packgenadequatelyinformedaboutthestatusofitscase.”

[¶6] In 2011, Packgen retained new counsel and sued Covalence and

BerryPlasticsintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMaine.On

November13,2015,ajuryrenderedaverdictinfavorofPackgenintheamount

of$7,206,646.30,plusinterestasallowedbylaw. Packgenfiledanamended

motion to alter or amend the judgment to allow post-judgment interest to

accrue from May 29, 2008, the date that Covalence purportedly received

BernsteinShur’sletteronbehalfofPackgen.

[¶7]OnDecember11,2015,whilethepartieswereawaitingthecourt’s

decisionontheamendedmotion,PackgenandBernsteinShur“enteredintoa

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tollingagreementpursuant towhichanyandall legaldefensesbasedon the

passageoftimeandanylimitationsperiodsapplicabletoanyclaimorcauseof

actionPackgenmaypossessagainst[BernsteinShur]arisingoutof[Bernstein

Shur’s] representation of Packgen on claims against [Covalence] and other

responsible parties . . . were tolled and would be deemed suspended from

runningasofDecember11,2015.”

[¶8]OnMarch7,2016,thefederalcourt(Torresen,J.)deniedPackgen’s

motion to alter or amend the judgment because Bernstein Shur’s letter to

Covalencefailedtocomplywiththeoathrequirementin14M.R.S.§1602-B(5)

andthereforedidnotconstituteavalidnoticeofclaim.Asaresult,Packgenwas

permitted to recoverprejudgment interestdatingonly from the filingof the

complaintin2011ratherthanfromMay29,2008,thedateonwhichBernstein

Shurservedtheunswornnotice.

B. Packgen’sClaimAgainstBernsteinShur

[¶9]OnMay23,2017,PackgenfiledacomplaintagainstBernsteinShur

intheSuperiorCourtallegingthatthelawfirm’sfailuretosendanoticethat

compliedwiththerequirementsofsection1602-BcausedPackgentosustain

aneconomiclossintheamountof$2,510,293.84—thedifferencebetweenthe

prejudgment interest actually awarded by the federal court and the

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prejudgmentinterestthatwouldhavebeenawardedbutforBernsteinShur’s

negligence.

[¶10]BernsteinShurrespondedwithamotiontodismissthecomplaint

onthegroundsthatPackgen’sclaimswerebarredbythesix-yearstatutesof

limitationsforcivilactions,14M.R.S.§752,andattorneymalpracticeactions,

14M.R.S.§753-B.BernsteinShurarguedthattheactgivingrisetoPackgen’s

allegedinjury—thebasisforPackgen’scauseofactionagainstit—occurredon

May29,2008,thedatethedefectivenoticewassenttoCovalence,andtherefore

thestatuteoflimitationsexpiredonMay29,2014,threeyearsbeforePackgen

fileditscomplaint.

[¶11] Packgen then filed an amended complaint, asserting that the

December 2015 tolling agreement suspended the statute of limitations.

Bernstein Shur countered in an amendedmotion to dismiss that the tolling

agreement only saved claims that had not already expired. Bernstein Shur

argued that, because the letterwas sent onMay 29, 2008, the suit alleging

negligenceinthatletterwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitationsregardlessof

the tolling agreement, which only preserved claims accruing after

December11,2009,sixyearspriortothesigningoftheagreement.

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[¶12]Thecourtconcludedthatsection753-B(1)barredPackgen’sclaim

andgrantedBernsteinShur’smotiontodismisstheamendedcomplaint“asto

any claim for loss of prejudgment interest prior to the filing of [Packgen’s]

federalcomplaint.”

[¶13]ThecourtnotedthatPackgen“appear[ed]toarguethatitsclaimis

not limited to the lossofprejudgment interestbecauseof [BernsteinShur’s]

failure todiligentlypursue thecaseandkeepPackgen informedof itsstatus

constituted legal malpractice ‘which caused additional damage to Packgen.’

Packgen’samendedcomplaint,however, innowayspecifieswhatadditional

damageorlosseswereallegedlycausedby[BernsteinShur’s]lackofdiligence.”

(Citationomitted.)ThecourtgrantedPackgenleavetofileamotiontofilean

amended complaint if it alleged that BernsteinShur committedprofessional

negligence on or after December 11, 2009, that caused Packgen to incur

financial lossesotherthanthelossofprejudgmentinterest. Packgendidnot

filesuchamotion,andthecourtentereditsfinaljudgmentdismissingtheaction

onJanuary24,2018.

[¶14] The court rejected Packgen’s assertions that the doctrines of

continuingrepresentationandcontinuingnegligenceoperatetosaveitsclaim

fromBernsteinShur’sstatuteoflimitationsdefensebecauseitdeterminedthat

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such a result would contravene the Legislature’s intent in rejecting the

discovery rule and adopting the six year statute of limitations in 14 M.R.S.

§753-B(1).Packgentimelyappealed.M.R.App.P.2B(c).

II.DISCUSSION

[¶15]Packgenarguesthatthecourterredwhenitdismisseditsclaimas

untimely because the court limited its analysis to Bernstein Shur’s act of

sending the defective notice of claim to Covalence on May 29, 2008. It is

Packgen’s position that Bernstein Shur committed actionable, negligent

omissionseachdaythatitfailedtosendavalidnoticeortakeotheractionin

thecaseafterDecember11,2009.6

A. StandardofReview

[¶16]“Amotiontodismissteststhelegalsufficiencyofthecomplaint,”

InreWagePaymentLitig.,2000ME162,¶3,759A.2d217(quotationmarks

omitted),thematerialallegationsofwhich“mustbetakenasadmitted,”Moody,

2004ME20,¶7,843A.2d43(quotationmarksomitted);seealsoRamseyv.

BaxterTitleCo.,2012ME113,¶2,54A.3d710.Whenreviewingthegrantofa

motiontodismiss,“weexaminethecomplaintinthelightmostfavorabletothe

6 Packgen asserts that its claim against Bernstein Shur for negligent omissions after

December11,2009,waspreservedbytheparties’December11,2015,tollingagreement.

9

plaintiff to determinewhether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or

alleges facts thatwould entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal

theory.” InreWagePaymentLitig.,2000ME162,¶3,759A.2d217;seealso

McCormickv.Crane,2012ME20,¶5,37A.3d295.Adismissalisonlyproper

“whenitappearsbeyonddoubtthat[the]plaintiffisentitledtonoreliefunder

any set of facts that [it] might prove in support of [its] claim.” Moody,

2004ME20,¶7,843A.2d43(quotationmarksomitted).

B. StatuteofLimitations

[¶17] In this case, Packgen challenges the court’s interpretation and

applicationofthestatuteoflimitationsinattorneymalpracticecases.“Whether

a claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a legal question subject to

denovoreview.”EstateofWeatherbee,2014ME73,¶14,93A.3d248.“The

statuteoflimitationsisanaffirmativedefense.Unlessitisclearonthefaceof

thecomplaint that theaction isbarredby therelevantstatuteof limitations,

dismissal on limitations grounds is improper.” Jackson v. Borkowski,

627A.2d1010,1013(Me.1993)(citationomitted).

[¶18]Inalegalnegligenceormalpracticeaction,thesix-yearstatuteof

limitationsbeginstorunfromthedatethecauseofactionaccrues,14M.R.S.

§752—thatis,“fromthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrisetotheinjury,not

10

from the discovery of the [attorney] malpractice, negligence or breach of

contract,”id.§753-B(1).

[¶19]Ingeneral,“[w]econstruestatutesoflimitationsnarrowly.”White

v. McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen,Whitney & Toker, P.A., 2002ME 160, ¶ 8,

809A.2d622.“Whenastatutealreadydefinesaccrual. . .wearenotfreeto

re-definetheterm,”Muskv.Nelson,647A.2d1198,1201(Me.1994);however,

“[a]bsentlegislativedirection,thedecisionofwhenacauseofactionaccruesis

ajudicialfunction,”White,2002ME160,¶7,809A.2d622.

[¶20] “In interpretinga statute,oursinglegoal is togive effect to the

Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.” Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co.,

2014ME158,¶19,107A.3d621.Ingeneral,astatuteoflimitations“shouldbe

construedstrictlyinfavorofthebarwhichitwasintendedtocreate.”Harkness

v.Fitzgerald,1997ME207,¶5,701A.2d370(quotationmarksomitted);see

also Dickau, 2014 ME 158, ¶ 21, 107 A.3d 621 (“Among [the principles of

statutory construction] is the principle that we must interpret the plain

languagebytakingintoaccountthesubjectmatterandpurposesofthestatute,

andtheconsequencesofaparticularinterpretation.”).

[¶21] To determine that legislative intent, “we first look to the plain

languageoftheprovisionstodeterminetheirmeaning.”MainetodayMedia,Inc.

11

v.State,2013ME100,¶6,82A.3d104. “Weseektodiscernfromtheplain

languageofthestatutetherealpurposeofthelegislation,avoidingresultsthat

areabsurd,inconsistent,unreasonable,orillogical.Ifthestatutorylanguageis

clearandunambiguous,weconstrue thestatute inaccordancewith itsplain

meaning in the contextof thewhole statutory scheme.” Harrington v.State,

2014 ME 88, ¶ 5, 96 A.3d 696 (alteration, citation, and quotation marks

omitted).“Iftheplainlanguageofastatuteisambiguous—thatis,susceptible

ofdifferentmeanings—wewillthengoontoconsiderthestatute’smeaningin

lightofitslegislativehistoryandotherindiciaoflegislativeintent.”Mainetoday

Media,Inc.,2013ME100,¶6,82A.3d104.

1. TheOccurrenceRule

[¶22]Title14M.R.S.§753-Bprovidestheaccrualdateforactionsagainst

attorneysasfollows:

Inactionsallegingprofessionalnegligence,malpractice,orbreachofcontractfor legalservicebya licensedattorney, thestatuteoflimitationsstartstorunfromthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrise to the injury, not from the discovery of the malpractice,negligenceorbreachofcontract,exceptasprovidedinthissectionorasthestatuteoflimitationsmaybesuspendedbyotherlaws.

12

By its plain language, section 753-B unambiguously divests itself of the

discoveryruleinattorneymalpracticecasesinallbuttwocircumstancesnot

applicablehere7and,instead,adoptsanoccurrencerule.14M.R.S.§753-B.

[¶23]Underthediscoveryrule,thestatuteoflimitationsistolleduntil

theinjuredpartyknowsorshouldknowoftheharmcaused.See3RonaldE.

Mallen,LegalMalpractice§23:54at604(2019ed.2019).Incontrast,under

theoccurrencerule,thestatuteoflimitationsbeginstorunonthedateofthe

“occurrenceoftheessentialfactsthatformthecauseofaction”—i.e.,thedate

oftheactoromissiongivingrisetotheinjury.Seeid.§23:22at446-50.Asa

practicalmatter, because the clockbegins to runon the date that the actor

omission giving rise to the injury occurred, under the occurrence rule, the

statuteoflimitationscouldbegintorunbeforeaninjuredpartybecomesaware

ofitsinjury.Id.§23:22at454.

[¶24] Packgen argues that our analysis regarding negligence or

malpracticeactionsagainstattorneysshouldnotbelimitedtothestricturesof

the occurrence rule and urges us to adopt the doctrines of continuing

representationandcontinuingnegligence,whichwouldsaveitsclaimagainst

BernsteinShurfromdismissalresultingfromthestatuteoflimitations.

7Seesupran.2.

13

2. TheContinuingRepresentationDoctrine

[¶25] The doctrine of continuing representation has been adopted in

somestates.Inthosestates,thedoctrineisapplied“onlywherethereareclear

indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship

between the client and the attorney.” Smithv.Stacy, 482 S.E.2d 115, 121

(W.Va.1996)(quotationmarksomitted).Thisdoctrineis“designedtotollthe

statute of limitations during the continuation of the attorney/client

relationship. . .untiltheprofessionalrelationshipterminateswithrespectto

the matter underlying the malpractice action.” Id. at 120. The continuing

representationdoctrinewasoriginallyusedinmedicalmalpracticecasesand

applied in legal malpractice litigation as “a direct reaction to the illogical

requirement of the occurrence rule, which compels clients to sue their

attorneysthoughtherelationshipcontinues,andtherehasnotbeenandmay

never be any injury.” 3Ronald E.Mallen, LegalMalpractice §23:44 at 543.

Relyingonthisreasoning,Packgenassertsthatweshouldadoptthecontinuing

representationdoctrineinlegalmalpracticecasesandclaimsithadanongoing,

continuous,developing,anddependentrelationshipwithBernsteinShur.

[¶26]Althoughwehavenothadtheopportunitytodeterminewhether

the continuing representation doctrine has a place in attorney malpractice

14

litigation,8wehavehadoccasiontoreviewtheuseofthisdoctrineinthecontext

of medical malpractice claims. See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179,

960A.2d1178.InDickey,werejectedtheapplicationofthecontinuingcourse

of treatment doctrine—as it is called in medical malpractice litigation—

pursuanttowhichthestatuteof limitationswouldnotbegintorununtil the

endof thedoctor-patientrelationship. Id.¶7. Weobserved that,when the

Legislatureset“athree-yearperiodoflimitations,declaringthatthecauseof

actionaccruesonthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrisetotheinjuryand

carvingoutaspecificexceptionforforeignobjects,theLegislatureeffectively

declinedtoadoptthecontinuingcourseoftreatmentdoctrine.”Id.(quotation

marksomitted).Applyingthecontinuouscourseoftreatmentdoctrinetosave

the plaintiff’s claim would have required “imposing a judicially-created

exceptionthatiscontrarytotheplainmeaningof[thestatuteoflimitations].”

Id.;seealsoDashav.Me.Med.Ctr.,665A.2d993,996(Me.1995).

[¶27] The legislativehistoryofsection753-Bsimilarlyproscribesour

abilitytodefinewhenalegalnegligenceormalpracticecauseofactionaccrues.

8InNevinv.UnionTr.Co.,1999ME47,¶37,726A.2d694,wedeclinedtodeterminewhetherthe

continuingrepresentationdoctrinecouldeverapplyinlegalmalpracticecasesbecausetheplaintiffs“stipulatedawayanysuchclaimsbywaivingclaimsregardinganyrepresentation”intheunexpiredlimitationsperiod.

15

TheLegislatureclearlydefinedtheaccrualdateforactionsforlegalmalpractice

whenitfirstadoptedtheoccurrencerule,seeP.L.1985,ch.804,§2(effective

Aug.1,1988)(codifiedat14M.R.S.§753-A(Supp.1988)).9Thischangetothe

legalmalpracticestatuteoflimitationswaspartofasubstantialoverhaultothe

lawsrelatingtoprofessionalliabilitygenerally,andwasprimarilyaneffortto

respondtothehighcostofliabilityinsuranceformedicalpractitioners.SeeL.D.

2400 (112thLegis. 1986). Theoccurrence rule “comportswith a legislative

intent to limit stale claims against attorneys” and the “policy of repose

mandatedbytheLegislature.”White,2002ME160,¶8,809A.2d622.When

the Legislature enacted the statute of limitations for actions involving

attorneys, itarticulatedthatthis law“expandsthecurrent ‘discoveryrule’ in

actions...byextendingittomalpracticeactionsinvolvingwillsaswellastitle

searches.The‘discoveryrule’willnotapplyinanyotherattorneymalpractice

actions.”L.D.2400,StatementofFact(112thLegis.1986)(emphasisadded);

seealsoNevinv.UnionTr.Co.,1999ME47,¶¶31,34-35,726A.2d694.This

Legislativeactionrevealsanintentnotonlytoproviderepose,buttostartthe

statutory clock at the earliest possible moment—when the act or omission

9Title14M.R.S.§753-Ahassincebeenrepealedandreplacedby14M.R.S.§753-B(2018).See

P.L.2001,ch.114,§§1-2(effectiveSept.21,2001).

16

causingtheinjuryoccurs. TheLegislaturecouldhavechosentoadoptarule

thattriggeredtherunningofthestatuteoflimitationswhentheclientbecame

aware of his or her injury, but it did not. Instead, it determined that the

limitationsperiodbeginswhentheactoromissiongivingrisetothecauseof

actionoccurs.14M.R.S.§753-B.ThissuggeststhattheLegislatureintended

forlegalmalpracticeclaimstobeginandberesolvedwithoutdelay.

[¶28] Further, as reasoned inDickey, and correctly recognizedby the

trialcourt in thiscase, applying thedoctrineofcontinuingrepresentation in

attorney negligence or malpractice actions would be tantamount to

resurrecting the discovery rule, which is clearly foreclosed by the plain

languageofsection753-B.2008ME179,¶7,960A.2d1178.Adoptionofthe

continuing representation doctrinewould defer accrual of a cause of action

until the attorney-client relationship is terminated, potentially tolling the

statuteoflimitationsthroughyearsoftrialandappellatereview,whichwould

contradict the “policy of repose mandated by the Legislature.” White,

2002ME160,¶8,809A.2d622.

[¶29] The Legislature has provided a specific six-year period of

limitationssubjecttotwonarrowexceptions.14M.R.S.§753-B(2)-(3).Weare

notfreetocarveoutadditionalexceptionstosection753-Bandthereforedo

17

not do so here. SeeNevin, 1999ME47, ¶ 34, 726A.2d 694. (“[W]hen the

Legislature provides for enumerated exceptions to its definition, those

exceptions implicitly deny the availability of any other.” (alteration and

quotationmarksomitted)). While itmayseemuncomfortable topotentially

requirethataclient,inordertopreserveitsclaim,sueitsattorneybeforethe

relationship has been severed, the Legislature clearly determined that the

limitationsperiodinlegalmalpracticecasesbeginstorunonthedateoftheact

or omission giving rise to the injury, not the date of the termination of the

attorney-clientrelationship.

C. ContinuingNegligenceDoctrine

[¶30] Alternatively, Packgen urges that we apply the continuing

negligencedoctrinetoitslegalmalpracticeclaimasweappliedthedoctrineto

amedicalmalpracticeclaiminBakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,¶29,26A.3d806.

Underthecontinuingnegligenttreatmentdoctrine,thelimitationsperioddoes

notbegintorun“untilthedateofthelastactofnegligence.”Id.¶20.InBaker,

we examined the plain language of 24 M.R.S. §2902 (2018)—the medical

malpracticestatuteoflimitations—andrelied,inpart,ontheruleofstatutory

18

constructionin1M.R.S.§71(9)(2018),10todeterminethatitwasconsonant

withtheplainmeaningofthestatute“todefinetheterm‘actoromission’as

usedinsection2902asreferringtoeitherasingleactoromission,oraseriesof

related acts or omissions that proximately cause a harm.” 2011 ME 91,

¶¶27-28,26A.3d806(emphasisadded).Asaresult,weheld,

pursuant to section 2902, a plaintiff may bring a single actionalleging continuing negligent treatment that arises from two ormorerelatedactsoromissionsbyasinglehealthcareproviderorpractitioner where each act or omission deviated from theapplicable standard of care and, to at least some demonstrabledegree,proximatelycausedtheharmcomplainedof,aslongasatleastoneoftheallegednegligentactsoromissionsoccurredwithinthreeyearsofthenoticeofclaim.

Id.¶29.

[¶31]PackgenurgesthatthisreasoninginBakershouldalsobeapplied

to claimsof legalmalpracticeunder section753-BbecauseBernsteinShur’s

ongoingfailuretosendapropernoticeofclaim,incombinationwithitsfailure

tofilesuitandadequatelyadvisePackgenuptothedateoftheterminationof

its representation in2011,proximately caused the lossof the fullamountof

prejudgmentinteresttowhichPackgenwasentitled.Seeid.¶¶24-25.Inother

words, Packgen asserts that its cause of action was preserved because the

10“Wordsofthesingularnumbermayincludetheplural;andwordsofthepluralnumbermay

includethesingular.”1M.R.S.§71(9)(2018).

19

limitations period did not begin to run until Bernstein Shur allegedly

committed its lastnegligentomission. However,Baker doesnot control the

applicationofthecontinuingnegligencedoctrineinlegalmalpracticeactions.

[¶32]InBaker,aprimarycarephysicianperformedsixannualtestsona

patient’s prostate, only two of which fell within the applicable statute of

limitations. Id.¶3-4. Thephysicianfailedtoreferthepatienttoaspecialist

afterthreeofthetests,eventhoughtheresultswereabnormalandtheneedfor

furthertestingwasindicated.Id.Asaresult,thepatient’sprostatecancerwas

notdetecteduntilafteritspreadconsiderablyandhistreatmentoptionswere

substantiallylimited.Id.Becausetheharmwascausedbyacontinuingcourse

ofnegligenttreatment,thepatientwaspermittedtobringacauseofactionon

thebasisofeachoftheoccasionsonwhichthephysicianfailedtoadheretothe

standardofcare,eventhoughonlytwoofthoseactsoromissionsfellwithinthe

limitationsperiod.Id.¶¶3,29.

[¶33]UnlikethecontinuingcourseofnegligenttreatmentinBaker,the

negligencePackgenallegesarisesfromasingleact:BernsteinShur’sfailureto

sendapropernoticeofclaimonMay29,2008.Here,thenegligentactionwas

singular—an isolated mistake severable from the remainder of Bernstein

Shur’s representation of Packgen—and substantially dissimilar from the

20

ongoing treatment and annual testing in Baker. We understand Packgen’s

argumentthatBernsteinShurcommittedanewnegligentomissioneachdayit

failed to provide a proper notice of claim or seek another remedy after

May29,2008;however,wewere clear inBaker thatwhere it is “reasonably

probablethatoneactoromissioninaseriesofactsoromissionswasthesole

proximatecauseof the injurycomplainedof,acauseof actionwouldaccrue

fromthedateofthatactoromission,andnotfromthedatesofanysubsequent

actsoromissions.”Id.¶24.Inthiscase,itisreasonablyprobablethattheharm

PackgencomplainsofoccurredasaresultofBernsteinShur’sallegedfailureto

meettheoathrequirementsforthenoticeofclaimonMay29,2008.Assuch,

thecontinuingnegligencedoctrineisinappropriateinthiscase.

[¶34]Moreover,theapplicabilityofthecontinuingnegligencedoctrine

to the medical malpractice statute of limitations was based firmly “on the

language and authority of the Health Security Act,” to which there are no

analogousprovisionsintheattorneymalpracticecontext. Id.¶30.InBaker,

weanchoredourholdingontwodefinitionsparticulartotheHealthSecurity

Act:“actionforprofessionalnegligence”and“professionalnegligence.”Id.¶22

(citing24M.R.S.§2502(6)-(7)(2018)). Thesedefinitionsprovidedthebasis

forourholdingthattheactoromissionthattriggersthestatuteoflimitations

21

couldbeacombinationofseveralrelatedactsoromissions,includingactsor

omissionsoutsidethestatuteoflimitations.Thedefinitionsrelevanttotitle24

specificallyauthorizetheuseofmultipleactsoromissionstomakeoutaclaim

ofprofessionalnegligence; therefore, itwas logical forus toconclude in the

medical malpractice context that the precipitating event for a medical

malpracticeclaimcouldbeaseriesofrelatedevents,thecombinationofwhich

proximatelycausedthepatient’s injury. Id.;seealso24M.R.S.§2502(6)-(7).

Thissamelogicdoesnotapplytoclaimsforattorneymalpracticepursuantto

14M.R.S.§753-B.

[¶35] There are no congruent definitions in title 14, generally, or in

chapter 205, specifically. Without similar authorizing language onwhich to

draw,we are unable to conclude that the continuing negligence doctrine is

applicabletoclaimsforlegalmalpractice.Moreover,consideringtheparticular

language and history of section 753-B, it is clear that the application of the

continuing negligence doctrine is foreclosed by the Legislature’s intent to

providetimelyreposetoclaimsagainstattorneys,asdiscussedabove.White,

2002ME160,¶8,809A.2d622.Whileitcanbesaidthatsection753-B,like

any statute of limitations, provides an arbitrary cutoff afterwhich a client’s

22

claimagainsthisattorneyisnolongerviable,thiswasadeliberatechoicethe

Legislaturemade,andwemustdefertoit.

III.CONCLUSION

[¶36] Given the legislative history underpinning the adoption of the

occurrenceruleinsection752,theplainlanguageofsection753-Bregarding

actionsagainstattorneys, and thestrictconstructionweapply tostatutesof

limitations,weconcludethattheLegislatureintendedtolimittheaccrualofa

causeofactionforattorneynegligenceormalpracticetothe“actoromission

givingrisetotheinjury”—thatis,theattorney’ssingularactoromissionthat

proximatelycaused theharmto theclient,14M.R.S.§753-B,andnot to the

attorney’songoingfailuretocorrectthatsingularactoromission.Inthiscase,

theactgivingrisetoPackgen’sallegedinjuryoccurredonMay29,2008,and

Packgen’s claim expired on May 29, 2014, six years after the service of the

defectivenoticeletter,anditisnowtimebarred,14M.R.S.§§752,753-B.We

musteffectuatetheLegislature’slanguageandwemaynotholdotherwise.See

Myrickv.James,444A.2d987,992(Me.1982)(“Thatwhichwemaynotdois

tochangesucharuleorpolicyoncetheLegislaturehasspecificallytakenthat

ruleorpolicyoutofthearenaofthejudicialprerogative....”).

23

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed.

HJELM,J.,withwhomALEXANDERandJABAR,JJ.,join,dissenting. [¶37] For two fundamental reasons, I disagree with the Court’s

conclusionthatPackgen,Inc.’sclaimforprofessionalnegligence,filedagainst

its formerattorneys,Bernstein,Shur,Sawyer&Nelson,P.A., isbarredbythe

statuteoflimitations.First,inmyview,thecomplaintsufficientlyallegesthat

somenegligentomissionsoccurredwithintheperiodoflimitations,andsothat

part of Packgen’s claim should survive for that reason alone. Second, the

doctrineofcontinuingnegligence,whichwehaveadopted incases involving

medicalnegligence,shouldbeappliedtoclaimsoflegalmalpracticeand,atthis

very early phase of the case, entitles Packgen to pursue the entirety of its

negligenceclaim.Forthesereasons,Irespectfullydissent.

[¶38]ThenarrowissuepresentedhereisthelegalviabilityofPackgen’s

claim as pleaded in its amended complaint. The criterion for assessing the

adequacyofapleadingisfamiliarandgenerous.Forpurposesofthisanalysis,

wetaketheallegationstobetrueand“examinethecomplaintinthelightmost

favorabletotheplaintifftodeterminewhetheritsetsforthelementsofacause

24

ofactionor alleges facts thatwouldentitle theplaintiff toreliefpursuant to

somelegaltheory.” Argereowv.Weisberg,2018ME140,¶2,195A.3d1210

(quotationmarksomitted).BecauseMaineisanotice-pleadingjurisdiction,the

levelofscrutinyusedtoassessthesufficiencyofapleadingis“forgiving.”Howe

v.MMGIns.Co.,2014ME78,¶9,95A.3d79(quotationmarksomitted).The

statuteoflimitations—anaffirmativedefense—isthesolebasisforBernstein

Shur’smotiontodismissPackgen’scomplaint,sodismissalisproperonlyif“it

isclearonthefaceofthecomplaint”thattheclaimistime-barred.Jacksonv.

Borkowski,627A.2d1010,1013(Me.1993).

[¶39]TherelevantfactsandchronologyofeventsasallegedinPackgen’s

amendedcomplaintarenotcomplicated.PackgenretainedBernsteinShurin

2008“toprosecuteitslegalclaims”arisingfromacommercialdispute.Inlate

Mayof2008,BernsteinShursenttheprospectivedefendantanoticeofclaim,

buttheformofthenoticewasinsufficienttotriggertheaccrualofprejudgment

interest,see14M.R.S.§1602-B(5)(2018).Then,overthecourseofthenext

threeyears,BernsteinShurcontinuously“failedtofilesuit,”failedtoservethe

prospectivedefendantwithapropernoticeofclaim,andfailedto“otherwise

diligentlypursuethecase[,]whichcausedadditionaldamagetoPackgen.”In

2011,PackgenterminateditsrelationshipwithBernsteinShurand“retained

25

newcounsel[,]whopromptlybroughtsuitonPackgen’sbehalf,”resultingina

substantialmoneyjudgmentforPackgen.

[¶40] Packgen and Bernstein Shur entered into a tolling agreement,

which,asofDecember11,2015,stoppedtheclockthatwoulddeterminethe

timelinessofanyclaimthatPackgenmightlaterassertagainstBernsteinShur.

And,infact,inMayof2017,Packgencommencedthisaction.Because,asthe

parties agree,Packgen’sclaimagainstBernsteinShur issubject toasix-year

periodoflimitations,see14M.R.S.§752(2018),thetollingagreementrenders

as timely any partofPackgen’s claim that accruedonor afterDecember11,

2009.

[¶41]Theinterpretationandapplicationoftwointerrelatedstatutesare

integraltothisappeal. Thefirststatute,14M.R.S.§752,appliesbroadlyand

provides,

Allcivilactionsshallbecommencedwithin6yearsafterthecauseofactionaccruesandnotafterwards,exceptactionsonajudgmentordecreeofanycourtofrecordoftheUnitedStates,orofanystate,orofa justiceof thepeace in thisState,andexceptasotherwisespeciallyprovided.

The second, 14 M.R.S. § 753-B (2018), applies specifically to actions

commencedagainstattorneysandstates,

Inactionsallegingprofessionalnegligence,malpracticeorbreachofcontractfor legalservicebya licensedattorney, thestatuteof

26

limitationsstartstorunfromthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrise to the injury, not from the discovery of the malpractice,negligenceorbreachofcontract,exceptasprovidedinthissectionorasthestatuteoflimitationsmaybesuspendedbyotherlaws.

[¶42] The facial reach of the six-year limitation period created by

section752 covers some, but not all, of the time that Bernstein Shur

representedPackgen,whichwasfrom2008into2011.Thus,inexaminingthe

timelinessofPackgen’sclaims,therearetwodifferentperiodstobeconsidered:

(1)theperiodbeginningDecember11,2009,whichisthesix-yearperiodthat

ended with the effective date of the parties’ tolling agreement; and (2) the

period that predates December 11, 2009. Because the legal considerations

differasbetweenthesetwotimeframes,Iaddressthemseparately.

A. AllegationsofNegligenceOccurringOnandAfterDecember11,2009

[¶43]AsInoteabove,Packgenallegesthatthroughouttheentirecourse

of Bernstein Shur’s representation of its interests, which extended until

sometime in 2011—and includes more than one year within the period of

limitations prescribed in section 752—the firm was negligent in several

differentways. Packgen’sclaim includesallegations,notonly thatBernstein

Shurwasnegligentbyissuingthestatutorilydefectivenoticeofclaim,butalso

thatthefirmnegligentlyfailedtofilesuitonPackgen’sunderlyingcommercial

claim,which alsowould have triggered the accrual of prejudgment interest

27

arising fromthatclaim. Thus, although theCourt focusesexclusivelyon the

BernsteinShur’sallegedlynegligentactofissuingadeficientnoticeofclaimin

Mayof2008,thereismoretoPackgen’sclaim.

[¶44]AlthoughBernsteinShur’sissuanceofthedefectivenoticeofclaim

is a single allegedlynegligentactwith anascertainabledate,11 the failure to

commenceanactionaltogetherisanallegedlynegligentomission—something

thatneverhappenedatall.Andfromtheallegationscontainedintheamended

complaint, it isnotpossible to assignadatecertain toanevent thatdidnot

occur; that omission is temporally indeterminate within the period when

Bernstein Shur represented Packgen. In other words, for purposes of

determining whether the amended complaint is time-barred on its face,

Packgen’sallegation thatBernsteinShurcommitted legalmalpracticebynot

filingsuitdoesnotinevitablyleadtotheconclusionthattheallegednegligence

associatedwith thatomissionnecessarily falls entirelyoutside theperiodof

11 BecausetheCourtshouldapplythedoctrineofcontinuingnegligenceinassessingthefacial

viabilityofPackgen’scomplaint,thedateofthedefectivenoticemaynotbethedatewhenPackgen’scauseofaction itselfaccrued. For thereasons Idiscuss later in thisdissent, thatwillneed tobedeterminedonthebasisofanevidentiarypresentationsuchassummaryjudgmentmotionpractice.But even if—as the Court holds today—the doctrine of continuing negligence is unavailable, theamendedcomplaintisstillnotuntimelyonitsfacebecause,asIexplaininthetext,itisimpossibletoassignadateoutsideoftheperiodoflimitationstoanegligentomissionintheformoffailingtofilesuit. Thismeansthereisnoneedtoconsiderwhether,asalegalmatter,BernsteinShurcouldbefoundliableforitsfailure,continuingpastDecember11,2009,tocorrectitsallegedlynegligentactofissuingthedefectivenoticeofclaiminMayof2008.

28

limitations. The bones of Packgen’s amended complaint are sufficient to

encompassanassertion,whichcouldonlybefleshedoutduringtheevidentiary

phasesofthecase,thatBernsteinShur,intheexerciseofduecare,shouldhave

commencedtheactioninthecommercialcaseonorafterDecember11,2009.

BasedonthisaspectofPackgen’sclaimalone,itsamendedcomplaintwasnot

faciallyuntimely.

[¶45]Ialsonotethatthetrialcourt’sorderdismissingthecomplaintwas

actuallyprovisional.WhileconcludingthatPackgen’sclaimwasoutsideofthe

periodof limitations,thecourtgavePackgenanopportunitytoseekleaveto

further amend its amended complaint to allege damages other than those

allegedly caused by the defective notice of claim sent in 2008. Although

Packgendidnotfileanysuchmotion,theabsenceofanysupplementalfilingby

Packgen is inconsequential. In its amended complaint, Packgenhadalready

alleged a sufficient basis—the failure to file suit, for example—on which

BernsteinShurcouldbedeterminedliablebasedonnegligentactsoromissions

occurringdirectlywithinthesix-yearlimitationsperiod.Therefore,thecourt

erredbyrequiringPackgentodosomethingmorethanithadalreadydonein

ordertoavoiddismissalofitscomplaint.

29

[¶46] Because Packgen’s amended complaint alleges negligence that

occurredwithinthelimitationsperiod,whichrunsforwardfromDecember11,

2009,IconcludethatthecourterredbydismissingthatportionofPackgen’s

claim.

B. AllegationsofNegligenceOccurringBeforeDecember11,2009

[¶47]IncontrasttoPackgen’sclaimfornegligencethatoccurredonor

afterDecember11,2009, its claim fornegligent actsoromissionsoccurring

beforethatdateistime-barredpursuanttosection752unlessanappropriate

legalmechanismbringsthatpartofPackgen’sclaimbackwithintheperiodof

limitations.Packgenassertsthattwosuchlegaltheoriesprecludethedismissal

of those older aspects of its claim against Bernstein Shur: continuing

representationandcontinuingnegligence.12

[¶48]IagreewiththeCourt’sconclusionthatthemerecontinuationof

anattorney’srepresentationofaclientonanongoingmatterextendingintothe

12 Thereareother legaldoctrines thatcansaveanotherwisestaleclaim fromdismissal. For

example, incertainlimitedcircumstances,apartymaybeestoppedaltogether fromassertingthestatuteoflimitationsasadefense,seeDashav.MaineMed.Ctr.,665A.2d993,995(Me.1995),andaperiod of limitationsmay run, not for an absolute length of time beginning with the actionableconduct,butfromthemomenttheinjuredpartyactuallyorconstructivelydiscoversthewrongfulconduct,see,e.g.,14M.R.S.§753-B(2)-(3)(2018)(creatingadiscoveryruleapplicabletothestatuteoflimitationsgoverningcertaintypesofactionsagainstattorneys);24M.R.S.§2902(2018)(creatingadiscoveryruleforthelimitationperiodinclaimsofforeign-objectsurgicalmalpractice).Packgenhasnotsoughttoinvokeanyofthosedoctrineshere.

30

limitationsperioddoesnotprecludethestatuteoflimitationsfrombarringa

claim based on a negligent act or omission that occurred outside of the

limitation period. See Court’s Opinion at ¶¶ 25-29. We have reached that

conclusioninthecontextofamedicalmalpracticeclaim,seeDickeyv.Vermette,

2008ME179,¶¶4-8,960A.2d1178;seealsoBakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,

¶¶18-19, 26 A.3d 806, and the same analysis applies to legal malpractice

claims. In Dickey, we explained that the “act or omission” phraseology

containedin24M.R.S.§2902(2018),13whichisthestatuteoflimitationsfor

actions against health care providers and practitioners, does not permit

time-barredclaimstobecometimelysimplybecauseofanongoingprofessional

relationship between the medical provider and the patient. 2008ME 179,

¶¶7-8, 960 A.2d 1178. That statutory language is identical to the “act or

omission”languagecontainedinsection753-B,whichapplieshere.Therefore,

our analysis in Dickey is fatal to Packgen’s argument that Bernstein Shur’s

representationofitsinterestsintheunderlyingmatterwithinsixyearsofthe

commencement of this action, by itself, precludes dismissal of the action as

untimely.

13 Title24M.R.S.§2902wasamendedafterourdecisioninDickey,seeP.L.2013,ch.329,§2

(effectiveOct.9,2013),butnotinanymannerthataffectsmyanalysis.

31

[¶49]IpartwayswiththeCourt,however,whenitconcludesthatthis

casedoesnotallowfortheapplicationofadoctrinethatis,ineffect,asubsidiary

of the continuing representation theory—namely, the continuing negligence

doctrine.

[¶50] As the Court correctly describes, the continuing negligence

doctrinepreventsthelimitationsclockfrombeginningtotickuntilthedateof

the last negligent occurrence that proximately causes injury. See Court’s

Opinion¶2n.4;seealsoBaker,2011ME91,¶20,26A.3d806.14Thedoctrine

is a framework for viewing a series of actionable acts or omissions as an

integratedwholethatmaybepursuedinasinglecauseofaction.Solongasthe

lastinthatseriesiswithintheperiodoflimitations,aclaimbasedontheentire

incorporatedbodyofnegligentactsoromissionsisdeemedtobetimely.See

Bakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,¶25,26A.3d806(“Insuchcases,thecauseof

action‘accrues’forthepurposesofthe...limitationsperiodonthedateofthe

last act or omission . . . that contributed to the proximate causation of the

patient’sharm.”).

14 Becausethedoctrineofcontinuingnegligenceisawaytodeterminewhenacauseofaction

accrues—thatis,thetimewhenthelimitationsclockstarts—itdoesnotimplicatenotionsoftolling,whichwouldmeanstoppingalimitationsclockthatwasalreadyticking.Seealsosupran.12.Becauseofthisimportantanalyticaldistinction,wemayhavebeenlessthanpreciseintheway,evenrecently,we have characterized the continuing negligence doctrine. See York Cty. v. PropertyInfo Corp.,2019ME12,¶24,200A.3d803.

32

[¶51] Wehaveendorsed the applicationof the continuing negligence

doctrineinmedicalnegligencecases.15Insuchactions,theplaintiffisentitled

to

bringasingleactionallegingcontinuingnegligenttreatmentthatarisesfromtwoormorerelatedactsoromissionsbyasinglehealthcareproviderorpractitionerwhereeachactoromissiondeviatedfrom the applicable standard of care and, to at least somedemonstrabledegree,proximatelycausedtheharmcomplainedof,as long as at least one of the alleged negligent acts or omissionsoccurredwithinthreeyearsofthenoticeofclaim.16

Baker,2011ME91,¶29,26A.3d806(emphasisadded).Inotherwords,where

at least one negligent act or omission that demonstrably and proximately

contributed to theharmoccurredwithin theperiodof limitations,butother

related acts or omissions occurred outside the period of limitations, the

entiretyoftheclaimmaybeprosecuted.

[¶52] Our adoption of the continuing negligence doctrine in Baker

resulted from two separate analytical strands. The first draws on an

examination of statutes that are specific to medical negligence claims. In

15 We did so notwithstanding the general principle that a statute of limitations “should be

construedstrictlyinfavorofthebarwhichitwasintendedtocreate.”Harknessv.Fitzgerald,1997ME207,¶5,701A.2d370(quotationmarksomitted).AsisdemonstratedbytheveryoutcomeinBaker,thatprincipleofstatutoryconstructiondoesnotbyitselfforecloseadoptionofthecontinuingnegligenceprinciple.

16Baker’sclaimwasgovernedbyathree-yearperiodoflimitations.See24M.R.S.§2902.Here,theapplicablestatuteoflimitationsissixyears.See14M.R.S.§752.

33

particular, we noted that 24 M.R.S. § 2902—the statute of limitations for

“actions for professional negligence” against medical providers and

practitioners—identifies the event giving rise to the claim as an “act or

omission”butthattheHealthSecurityAct,ofwhichsection2902isapart,does

not define the term. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 22, 26 A.3d 806. Elsewhere,

however, the Act defines “professional negligence” as encompassing the

pluralized“actsoromissions.” 24M.R.S.§2502(7)(A)-(B)(2018). Partlyon

thatbasis,weconcludedthatthesestatutesreflectalegislativerecognitionthat

asinglecauseofactioncanarisefrommultipleactsoromissionsthatcontribute

toanoverallharm.Baker,2011ME91,¶¶23,29,26A.3d806.Thisrecognition

in turn supports the application of the continuing negligence doctrine. Id.

¶¶23-24.But,becausethisportionofthediscussioninBakerrestsonstatutory

provisionsthatdonotextendtoorhaveanalogouscounterpartsinthestatutes

thatgovernlegalmalpracticeclaims,Packgendoesnotbenefitfromit.

[¶53]Thatisnottruewithrespecttothesecondreasonwhyweadopted

theprincipleofcontinuingnegligenceinBaker. Oursecondlineofreasoning

drawsonbothrulesofstatutoryconstructionandonjurisprudentialprinciples

thatareofmoreuniversalapplicationandpersuasivelyextendtothisactionfor

legalmalpractice.Seeid.¶27.

34

[¶54] Theconstructionofthephrase“actoromission”wasat issuein

Baker, just as it is here. As we discussed in that case, the Legislature has

explicitlystatedthat“[w]ordsofthesingularnumbermayincludetheplural,”

1 M.R.S. §71(9) (2018), so the use of “act or omission”—presented in the

singular—insection2902cannotproperlybelimitedtoeachindividualactor

omission.Baker,2011ME91,¶¶27-28,26A.3d806.Rather,asweconcluded,

section2902’s“plainmeaning”—thegoldstandardofstatutoryconstruction,

seeSchwartzv.UnemploymentIns.Comm’n,2006ME41,¶15,895A.2d96517—

encompassesmultipleactsandomissions.Baker,2011ME91,¶28,26A.3d

806.Thisconstructionaccommodatesthelegalprinciplethat“asinglecauseof

actionmayarisefrommultipleactsoromissionsevenifeachindependentact

oromission,viewedinisolationfromtheotheractsoromissions,constitutes

an independent deviation from the applicable standard of care.” Id. ¶ 24.

Correspondingly,thisconstructionavoidscreatingaseparatecauseofaction

based on each and every negligent act or omission arising from an ongoing

17InSchwartz,westatedthat“[t]hecardinalruleofstatutoryconstructionisthatwhenthewords

of the Legislature are clear, they are to be given their plain meaning and further judicialinterpretation is not necessary.” Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2006 ME 41, ¶ 15,895A.2d965(quotationmarksomitted).

35

professional relationship, which could be—or would need to be—pursued

throughsplinteredclaims.Id.¶¶25-26.

[¶55] This part ofBaker’s analysis, which is sufficient to support its

holding,18carriesoverseamlesslytoPackgen’slegalmalpracticeclaimagainst

BernsteinShurandthestatutesthatapplyhere.Thisistruewithboththeclose

examination inBaker of thewords in the phrase “act or omission” and our

broaderdiscussioninthatcaseofprinciplesgoverningthewaycausesofaction

areproperlyframed.

[¶56] First, as to the statutory language itself,Title14, section753-B

containslanguagedefiningtheeventgivingrisetoPackgen’sclaim—an“actor

omission”—that is identical to the language in 24 M.RS. § 2902, which we

analyzed in Baker. There, we applied the rule of statutory construction

providingthatawordinastatutepresentedinthesingularalsoincludesthe

plural,1M.R.S.§71(9),aprincipleofconstructionthatspanstheentiretyof

18TheCourtrejectstheapplicabilityofBakertosection753-Bbyreadingouropinioninthatcase

narrowlytosaythatitistheHealthSecurityActthatallowsasingleclaimtobebasedonmultipleactsoromissions.Court’sOpinion¶¶33,34.Although—asIhavediscussedinthetext—BakerrestsinpartonananalysisofprovisionscontainedintheHealthSecurityActthatarenotapplicablehere,BakeralsomakesclearthatourrationaleforadoptingthecontinuingnegligencedoctrineisnotaslimitedastheCourtsuggestshere.2011ME91,¶¶26-27,26A.3d806(statingthat“ourreadingofthe statutemust be squaredwith all applicable rules of statutory construction” (emphasis added)(quotation marks omitted)). And beyond this, as I explain in the text, much of the conceptualreasoning thatwarrantsapplicationof thecontinuingnegligencedoctrine tomedicalmalpracticecasesapplieswithequalpersuasivenesstothecaseatbar.

36

Maine’sstatutorycodeandinformsourconstructionofsection753-Bjustas

muchasitdidourconstructionof24M.R.S.§2902.Therefore,section753-B

mustbereadtoencompassmultipleactsoromissionstotheextentthatsuch

multiplerelatedoccurrencesmaygiverisetoasinglecauseofaction.

[¶57]Second,andmorebroadly,theconceptualobservationswemade

inBakerapplywithequalforceinthepresentcontext.Asasubstantivelegal

principle,multipleactsoromissionsthatcompriseindividualdeviationsfrom

thestandardofcarecancombinetoproximatelycauseadiscreteharmandgive

risetoasinglecauseofaction.Baker,2011ME91,¶24,26A.3d806.Relatedly,

aplaintiff shouldnotbe required to litigate those separatenegligent actsor

omissionsinapiecemealmanner.Seeid.¶25.Theseprinciplesapplydirectly

toclaimsforlegalmalpracticeeverybitasmuchastheydotoclaimsformedical

negligence.

[¶58] All of this—the dry process of statutory interpretation and a

conceptual consideration of the nature of a professional negligence claim—

demonstrates that, for many of the same reasons we stated in Baker, the

principle of continuing negligence is readily accommodated by sections 752

and 753-B in this legalmalpractice action. Iwould therefore applyBaker’s

conclusiontothiscaseand—toparaphrasethelanguageinBaker—holdthat,

37

when a single cause of action arises from an attorney’s multiple acts or

omissions while representing a client, and when the combination of those

multiple acts or omissions proximately causes the alleged injury, the single

resultingcauseof actionaccrueson thedateof the last actoromission that

contributedtotheallegedinjury,becausethatiswhentheallegednegligenceis

complete.SeeBaker,2011ME91,¶24,26A.3d806.

[¶59] This statement of the continuing negligence doctrine also

illuminatesitslimitingprinciple—thattheclaimwillbetime-barredifthelast

of the negligent acts or omissions that demonstrably and proximately

contributed to the injury occurred outside of the period of limitations.19

Consequently,ifthecaseweretoproceedonremand,asIbelieveitshould,in

order for Packgen to recover for negligent acts or omissions that occurred

beforeDecember11,2009,Packgenwouldberequiredtodemonstratethatat

least one negligent act or omission that occurred on or after

December11,2009, demonstrably and proximately contributed to the harm

alsocausedbythoseearlierrelatedactsoromissions.

19 This limitationwas illustrated inDickey v. Vermette, whichwe decided beforeBaker. See

2008ME179,960A.2d1178.InDickey,weconcludedthatthatcasedidnotpresenttheoccasionforustodecidewhethertoadoptthedoctrineofcontinuingnegligencebecausetheplaintiffsstipulatedthat they had not sustained any injury from any act or omission occurringwithin the period oflimitations.Id.¶9.Therefore,aclaimforanyandallactionablenegligencefullyaccruedoutsideofthelimitationsperiod,andadoptionofthedoctrinewouldhavebeenunavailingfortheplaintiffs.

38

[¶60]Basedontheamendedcomplaintaloneandwithoutthebenefitof

a record, theCourt iswilling to jump to the conclusion thatPackgenwill be

unabletopresentanyevidencesufficienttomeetthisrequirement.SeeCourt’s

Opinion¶33.There,theCourtstatesthatPackgen’sclaimarosefromasingle

act,namely,thedefectivenoticeofclaimsentin2008,andthatitis“reasonably

probable”thatPackgen’sinjuryisattributableentirelytothatact.Id.¶33.This

isaninappropriatelynarrowreadingoftheamendedcomplaint,whichalleges

negligencethatcontinuedthroughouttheperiodofrepresentation,from2008

into2011.Asisdemonstratedbytheuseofthephrase“reasonablyprobable,”

theCourt’sassertionembodiesafactualassessmentthatiswhollyoutofplace

in theproceduralcontextwhere thiscasenowstands.20 Packgen’sability to

presentevidencetodefeatBernsteinShur’slimitationsdefenseremainstobe

seen—itissomethingthatisimpossibletodetermineuntilafterPackgenhas

20 The Court’s reliance onBaker to reach that conclusion is similarlymisplaced because the

judgmentappealedinBakerwasasummaryjudgment, issuedonthebasisofadevelopedfactualrecord.See2011ME91,¶1,26A.3d806.Here,thereisnorecordonwhichtodrawthefact-basedconclusionsthattheCourtreachesinitsopinion.SeeBeanv.Cummings,2008ME18,¶7,939A.2d676(statingthatadismissalpursuanttoM.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6)isappropriateonly“whenitappearsbeyonddoubtthataplaintiffisentitledtonoreliefunderanysetoffactsthathemightproveinsupportofhisclaim”(emphasisadded));Houdev.Millett,2001ME183,¶11,787A.2d757(statingthat“[t]hequestionofwhetheradefendant’sactsoromissionsweretheproximatecauseofaplaintiff’sinjuriesisgenerallyaquestionoffact....”).

39

theopportunitytopresentevidencethatwillputsubstanceonthebonesofits

amendedcomplaint.

C. Conclusion

[¶61]Fornow,theonlyquestionbeforeusiswhethertheallegationsin

Packgen’samendedcomplaintmakeclear that theclaim is time-barred. See

Jackson,627A.2dat1013.Inmyview,theamendedcomplaintwithstandsthat

facial review, particularly given the “forgiving” notice-pleading standard by

whichthesufficiencyofacomplaintisreviewed,seeHowe,2014ME78,¶9,95

A.3d79.Packgenhasallegednegligencewithintheperiodoflimitationsitself,

throughsometimein2011whenPackgenterminateditsrelationshipwiththe

firm.Further,forpurposesofthepresentpleadingstageofthecase,pursuant

to the continuing negligence doctrine the allegations of Bernstein Shur’s

negligentactsoromissionsoccurringbeforeDecember11,2009,canproperly

betreatedasanintegratedpartofaclaimthatdidnotaccrueuntilonorafter

December 11, 2009—within the period of limitations. Accordingly, Iwould

vacatethejudgmentandremandforthetrialcourtproceedingstocontinue.

40

PhillipE.Johnson,Esq.(orally),Johnson,Webbert&Young,LLP,Augusta,forappellantPackgen,Inc.GeorgeT.Dilworth,Esq. (orally), and JeanaM.McCormick, Esq.,DrummondWoodsum,Portland,forappelleeBernstein,Shur,Sawyer&Nelson,P.A.CumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2017-208FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY