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PACIFIC AIR CAMPAIGN: WW II

INTRODUCTION

1. The use of air power for military purpose gained its due momentum during the Second World War. Therefore, the period witnessed a great number of air campaigns igniting the imagination of the surface force commanders. Actually, the effect of air power during this period made other services realised about the need of air power for successful prosecution of war. The dominating role of air power in the Pacific during WW-II deserves a special mention. Because, the evolution of air power to the military advantage was at the zenith in the Pacific war. The Pacific war was fought between Japan and the Allied power within the period of 1941 to 1945. At the heart of this campaign was to gain secured locations through air superiority for the operation of land based aircraft. The air superiority in turn paved the way for ground and naval operation. The first objective of the entire commander in the pacific war, whether ground sea, or air, whether American, Allied or Japanese, was to assure control of the air1. This campaign was also driven by geography, distance and requirement of logistics. The cumulative efforts of strategic bombing became prominent in this campaign, which ended with the dropping of atom bomb. All this analogies make it imperative for us to study about this campaign and draw appropriate lessons.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to analyze the major operations of the Pacific Campaign in light of the principles of war and the tenets of air power and draw appropriate lessons.

BACKGROUND

3. The seeds of World War Two that were long in germinating were planted in the mid 19th century. In hindsight, the reasons for the war were largely economic. The seizure or protection of spheres of influence, the maintenance of territorial integrity, the acquisition of raw materials as well as Asian markets for the commercial opportunities they presented were all reasons, which would eventually account for so much loss of life and national treasure.

4. Western nations, notably Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States, had for more than one hundred years prior to the outbreak of hostilities exhibited great interest in the commercial opportunities in China and other parts of Asia. These opportunities had attracted Western investment for the exploitation of raw materials for the manufacture of products not only for domestic consumption but also for export of finished goods back to the Orient. These opportunities were eyed

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covetously by Japan through what was to become known as the Greater Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

5. During this time, Japan’s real governance was with the military leaders and the Emperor and his people were just a front. Japan's governmental structure provided no effective civilian control of her Army and Navy. Because of this, Japan started expanding his empire at a rapid rate. In June 1941, they captured Indochina. Reacting to this the United States forced a complete embargo on Japan. The Japanese were compelled to look overseas for land and resources, largely for the raw materials like fuel, iron etc needed for their industrial growth and to sustain an increasing population. Without these, the Japanese felt their national survival was threatened. With this short-term objective, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was the part of a comprehensive plan for Greater Far East War. This plan was finally brought at Supreme War Council on 6 Sep 1941. As a long term objective, Japan intended to drive off Britain and America from Far East to establish an independent self-supporting entity.

STRATEGY

Japan’s Strategy

7. Despite the wide range of its military operations, Japan entered World War II with a simple strategy2 — it wished to fight a limited war. Japan’s two major objectives were:

a. To gain control of the resources of Southeast Asia and much of China.

b. To establish a sphere of influence over the islands and countries of Asia and the Pacific.

Allied Strategy

8. The Allied strategies were as follows:

a. In the event of war, Germany would have to be eliminated first, and that the role of Allies in the Pacific would, in large measure, be defensive3.

b. To hold the Malaya barrier by successful engagement of the Japanese fleet in the Central Pacific and lay the foundations for an eventual advance against Japan itself.

c. After the Pearl Harbour attack the Allied strategy was to defeat the Japanese empire and to destroy its capacity to resist without invading the home islands, thus avoiding the high cost in men and materiel of an invasion.

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d. To inflict heavy attrition on Japanese naval and air forces, the blockade on trade and aerial bombardment directed at Japan's Industrial bases.

e. To secure places by two prongs offensive drives across the central Pacific and the southwest Pacific by attaining control of the air through continuous air operation.

JAPANESE AIR CAMPAIGNS

Pearl Harbour

9. The US Navy’s power in the western Pacific was hinged at Pearl Harbour, which was a naval base with the latest and most powerful battleships on the Hawaiian Island of Oahu. Thus Pearl Harbour became an ideal target for Japanese attack. The warnings of a Japanese attack were sounded long before the actual attack. In Sep’1940 the Japanese diplomatic code ‘Purple’ had been broken by the US, about which President Roosevelt himself was aware. In Nov 1941 the American Intelligence and US Navy war warning stressed that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. But everyone was convinced that the target is Philippines, not an island 5,000 miles from Tokyo.

10. On 26 Nov 1941, the Japanese forces left the island “Kuril” and reached at a point 230 miles north of Pearl Harbour4. On 07 Dec 1941 Admiral Nagumo ordered over 350 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbour with a defensive patrol of 39 aircraft. A first wave of 183 torpedo planes, dive-bombers, level bombers and fighters took off and approached the coast of Oahu. A second wave of 171strike planes arrived at the target after about one hr. Within two hours they had crippled 18 battle ships, destroyed 285 aircraft and killed or injured about 3581 American personnel. But could not destroy a single US carrier, as none were at the harbour. Also the fuel dumps, ammo reserve, repair shops, dry docks and submarine pens had survived the attack.

11. On the other hand Japanese losses were only 29 aircraft, 5 midget submarines and about 100 personnel. The Japanese obtained a clear victory. over the mighty Americans and thereby made a classic example of air-naval battle in the history. However in the long run, the raid resulted in a limited success for the Japanese.

12. Analysis. The attack on Pearl Harbour had lasted barely three hours. In terms of air operations, it was a masterpiece of air-to-ground warfare. It was conducted at the very limit of what was then technically and operationally possible. It was an astonishing tactical victory. However the Japanese failed to exploit the tenets of air power to the full. Admiral Yamamoto left the decision to Admiral Nagumo. Who decided to set course back for home despite the request from commander Fucida to

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order a second attack for the left over targets and thereby “Centralized Command, Balance and Persistence” were overlooked. About the target information - it was a total failure on the part of Japanese intelligence; as such none of the carrier could be destroyed. On the other hand Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Surprise, Concentration of Force, Flexibility and Administration characterise the employment of air power in Pearl Harbour.

a. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. Admiral Yamamoto once decided to attack Pearl Harbour he was very rigid to it’s attainment. The plan was tested by the Naval war college in simulated attack twice, sand-table mock-up’s, shallow water of Kagoshima Bay were used for live training of Navy pilot’s for six months. To attack with appropriate torpedo’s the attack date was shifted from 17th Nov to 8th Dec. At one stage he threatened the supreme command “ He will resign if Pearl Harbour not attacked. Finally he attacked as planned.

b. Surprise. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a classic example of surprise. The Americans were caught totally unprepared. The time selection (Sunday morning – many of the crews were ashore on weekend liberty) and the secrecy (The selection of route – to approach Oahu by the north to avoid detection even by a neutral ship having radio on board. The fleet was informed of its mission at Kurile Island on 22 Nov)5 were the contributing factors due to which the Japanese could achieve surprise.

c. Concentration of Force. Japanese concentrated force of over 350 aircraft to launch the offensive. The combination of zero fighters, dive-bombers and level bombers were an example of ‘Force Package’, which acted as a force multiplier.

d. Flexibility. The flexibility, a primary strength of air power was markedly displayed in this operation. The zero fighters had its primary role to escort the bombers. As there was no resistance from the opponents they shifted from defender to attacker by attacking ground targets with guns.

e. Administration. Attacking pearl Harbour successfully with such a huge force some 5000 miles away from Japan called for a huge logistic support. Thus administration - important characteristics of air power was duly addressed at this campaign.

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Coral Sea

13. After a high tide of conquest from Dec 1941 to Apr 1942 a debate was taking place in the Imperial General Headquarters about what to do next. Admiral Nagano adopted a modified strategy of striking southwest and isolating Australia by capturing Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the Solomons. As the first step in the new plan Japan strengthened its bases in this area, especially in Rabaul. Meanwhile a larger Japanese force was assembled at Rabaul. It was supported by striking force with large carriers, which was moving south from the central pacific in order to enter the Coral Sea by the east. By May 4, a formidable naval force had been assembled, and the 11 transports6 set course for Port Moresby. Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet got this message as US crypto analysts had broken the Japanese naval code JN-25. After getting this information, Nimitz sent two carriers - the Lexington and Yorktown - to the Coral Sea to block the Japanese thrust.

14. Japan's campaign began with an invasion of the small island of Tulagi on 3 May. The U.S. struck back quickly with aircraft from the Yorktown. Japanese realised that U.S. carriers were nearby. At 0815 am on 7 May 1942, an American search aircraft reported enemy carriers. Admiral Fletcher ordered a strike. 53 aircraft attacked the ship and destroyed. They were successful in their mission and could sink a Japanese carrier. For the first time in history, a Japanese carrier had been sunk. The exposed Port Morseby invasion force turned round for Rabaul. At dawn, on 8 May Americans got their strike in first and made one of the Japanese carriers inoperative. The other one disappeared into a rain squall but managed to get off a counter-strike. Japanese could earn a better result as the American CAP aircrafts were refuelling on the deck. They had put one carrier out of action while the other one sunk.

15. Analysis. The Battle of the Coral Sea was a tactical draw. The Americans lost more ships while the Japanese lost more aircraft. But the Coral Sea was a strategic victory7 for the US. Japan lost her two large carriers (Shukaku & Shoho) that were required for the Midway operation. The invasion of Port Moresby was postponed indefinitely. Moreover, the interception of Japanese high-level command signals by the U.S. code-breakers was a technical victory. The battle of Coral Sea can be better analysed from the observance and non-observance of the following principle of wars:

a. Security. The breaking of the Japanese Naval codes JN-25 by the Americans compromised the security of the Japanese force. The Americans were thus aware of most of the Japanese war plans in the Coral Sea, and were able to foil the Japanese plans. The Japanese could not proceed with Operation and were instead led into a carrier battle unprepared.

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b. Concentration of Force. The Japanese were expanding beyond their basic war plans and weakening their defense perimeter by extending it too far from their strongest bases, leading to a negation of the principle of concentration of force.

 c. Economy of Effort. Due to wrong identification, Japanese could not judiciously employ their forces during engagements. Japanese sank the fleet tanker and a destroyer with a disproportionate amount of force thinking that they have got the US carriers. By tying down aircraft could have been used better.

 

Battle Of Midway

16. When Admiral Nagano advocated attack against Australia, Admiral Yamamoto warned of the dangers presented by the still intact US carrier. He planned to attack a dot on the map called Midway, a tiny atoll 1135 miles west-northwest of pearl Harbour and a vital forward airfields for the Americans. An attack on the western Aleutian Islands in the northern Pacific would be further bait designed to bring the US Navy to battle.

17. To achieve this, grand objective Yamamoto planned a big offensive consisting of 165 warships. Considering both (Lexington & Yorktown) the US carrier had been sunk in the Coral Sea Yamamoto planned an audacious division of force with multiple objective and diversionary targets in order to wrong foot the Americans. The fleet was divided as follows:

a. First to invade the Aleutian Islands with two light carriers, 1,200 miles north of Midway.

b. Then attack Midway using the four carriers at dawn on 4 June.

c. Then a force of two battleship, a light carrier and seven cruiser to drop 51000 troops ashore on Midway at dusk of 5 June.

d. Then the main body to move in and crush any survivors.

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18. Japanese started the campaign as per the above plan. At first light on 03 Jun 42 Japanese aircraft took off and attacked Aleutians. Nimitz Kept his nerve and did not respond to this attack. Waiting for the reconnaissance report of the expected main thrust, as they had intercepted and deciphered the high level Japanese Naval code. However, for the Japanese, the raid did little serious damage, as the Americans were ready for the attack. On report from a Midway–based PBY all serviceable aircraft were scrambled – so that not caught on ground like Pearl Harbour. They had two priorities- to deflect back the incoming attack and get through to strike back the carrier from where they were launched. However they were outgunned and out flown by the Japanese zeros. Nagumo was considering a second strike on Midway when U.S. bombers found his carriers. Within minutes three out of the four Japanese carriers were put out of action. This was the turning point in the pacific and this raid had serious long-term consequences for Japan. In one day, almost half of the Japanese Navy's carriers had been destroyed which consisted of 332 planes and 2,155 men. Many of the Japan's trained pilots were lost. These were losses which neither Japanese industry nor it’s air training programme could replace.

19. Analysis. Japanese were very much complacent on their victory. Japanese commander took it guaranteed that US carriers were destroyed in the Coral See and thereby no threat from US carrier. It was unbelievable to the Japanese that how their almost assured victory could be turned into a defeat by the enemy. The failure to appreciate following principles of war can be summarised as the cause of Japanese defeat: 

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The Japanese failed to pursue a single objective, which is of primary importance for the success of any campaign. Instead of concentrating their entire force on their main objective, the Midway Islands, they sent a part of their main forces to the Aleutian Islands for a diversionary action. In any case, without the success at Midway, the Aleutian operation lost its meaning. As such it can be said that the aim in this op was not correct.

b. Surprise. Element of surprise played havoc to the Japanese. They made the mistake of planning a major operation with blind belief on the element of surprise, when there was no necessity for doing so due to their vastly superior strength. They continued to do so by taking the surprise for granted, even after encountering early warnings about enemy’s presence.

c. Concentration of Force. Japanese planners made a most striking and fatal error in the way they dispersed their forces. Instead of concentrating what could easily have been the most formidable single naval task force ever seen, the Combined Fleet chose to scatter thereby reducing them in strength.

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Had the entire Japanese naval force been concentrated and hopeful in a night ship-to ship battle, it could have easily destroyed what the US Navy had sent.

d. Flexibility. The entire Japanese plan was based on the assumption that tactical surprise would be achieved and that enemy fleet reaction would not get underway until after the assault on Midway begun. This plan was therefore totally inflexible for the contingency of its compromise before the invasion had begun. Further, the combined fleet in its tactical plan strapped the carriers to a fixed schedule and to supporting mission for the invasion of Midway. Therefore, these carriers lost the flexibility of movement imperative for a successful fleet engagement, which resulted in their ultimate destruction.

THE ALLIED AIR OFFENSIVE

20. The Allied carried out two mutually supportive offensives. One from the Central Pacific Area by Admiral Nimitz (as per the ‘Navy’ plan) and the other from South West Pacific Area by General Mac Arthur (as per the ‘Army’ plan). Both ‘prongs’ of offensive required tremendous air support from aircraft carriers.

The Advance in the Central Pacific

21. In the central pacific, Nimitz’s plan was based on the island hopping technique. Thus, this ‘Navy’ plan would give a shorter route to the Japanese heartland by providing bases for very long range bombing of Japan mainland at an earlier stage. It would also avoid a series of protracted land campaigns under very difficult climatic and geographic conditions. Most important of all, Nimitz’s plan was to make the best use of air and sea power, areas in which the Allies were growing stronger in the Pacific every month.

22. US Navy’s Fifth Fleet made the necessary advancement in the Central Pacific. The Fleet had heavy carriers, including a new ‘Yorktown’ and ‘Lexington’, light carriers, Battleships, Destroyers, cruisers, Landing crafts etc. The Fleet was commanded by Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance. This Fifth Fleet used naval air power on a global scale, combining extraordinary mobility with tremendous hitting power.

23. Seize of Tarawa and Truk. It was necessary to capture these islands as a first step towards Tokyo because they were important Japanese sea-bases in the Central Pacific. On 20 Nov 1943 heavy air bombardment struck the British mandated Gilbert Islands. Because of strong Japanese fortification in Tarawa, only a direct hit by the bombs made it possible to crack them. After the casualties of 3000 US Marines, the island was overrun on 23 Nov 1943. Next were the Marshalls, 200 miles to the north west of Gilbert. After thunderous preliminary bombardment, the islands were secured by 04 Feb 44. On Truk, on 16 Feb 1944, heavy bombardment by allied

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forces followed by amphibious landing resulted in destroying 200 Japanese aircraft against 17 aircraft from allied. The operation ended on 22 Feb 1944.

24. The Great Marianas. At the end of Feb 44, Japanese had been forced to abandon their outer defensive line extending to the Bismarcks and withdraw to an inner line a thousand miles to the west, running from the Mariana to the Western New Guinea. The first Allied objective was to establishing airbases in Marianas, on the islands of Saipan and Guam. This would bring the Japanese home islands within the range of B–29 bombers. The second objective was to lure the combined fleet out of its improvised base in northeastern Borneo. Japanese objectives were to relieve Saipan, which was its Naval and administrative centre and destroy the allied invasion fleet. Japanese fleet consisted of 473 aircraft commanded by Vice Admiral Ozawa. The Allied fleet had 891 aircraft8. The Allied pilots were well experienced. On the contrary after the loss in Midway, Japan had all young pilots with less than 2 months of training. To offset this, Japanese took the initiative and approached from southwest direction. The allied radar, at a distance of approximately 150 miles detected the wave of Japanese aircraft. The Allied got enough time to deploy interceptors. Due to the early warning coupled with superior training, allies shot down 218 Japanese aircraft9. This air battle came to be known as ‘Great Mariana Turkey Shot’ and was a crushing defeat for the Japanese Navy’s air arm. Due to the poor communication, this information had not reached the Japanese high command and believing their raid to be a success, they launched another 49 aircraft as reinforcement. Most of these aircraft were shot down. The air battle extended to Guam, which involved finding out the remaining Japanese aircraft, which survived and fled to Guam. Having been defeated, Japanese were retreating with an intention to be back with superior forces. This opportunity was fully utilised by allies by sending 216 aircraft during the evening. Allies shot down 65 enemy aircraft with a loss of 20 aircraft. Various modified tactics were adopted to recover the fighters on carriers at night. Even then, 80 aircraft had to ditch in the sea but they were picked up promptly. It showed an effective search and rescue capability of Allies, which was totally missing in the Japanese side. Allied secured Saipan and Guam on 9 and 24 July 1944 respectively. At the end, Vice Admiral Ozawa retreated with only 35 ac with him, rest all were destroyed. The Allied total loss was 130 aircraft.

25. Analysis.

a. Maintenance of Aim. Both the sides had clear aim to secure the strategically important island. The Japanese could not maintain it because they were complacent of taking everything into granted success.

b. Co-ordination and Co-operation. The sound planning, close cooperation and co-ordinate operation of the Air Force and Navy was the biggest factor in achieving victory for the Allies. Their air superiority over the battle area and well co-ordinate employment of air power resulted in the

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decisive victory. For the Japanese, lack of co-operation and co-ordination was quite evident. The rear areas even failed to know the outcome of their first attack mission. Without prior knowledge of the outcome of battle they launched another raid and in the process lost their valuable air assets.

c. Concentration of Force. The application of concentration of force at right time was not carried out by the Japanese because of less number of aircraft and experienced pilots. This clearly indicated their lack of future planning. Japanese forces were outnumbered and allied had superior aircraft. d. Offensive Action. The American Commander took a very well calculated risk in destroying the Japanese retreating force. He knew that the night recovery will be very difficult, but still he pressed on with his attack and he could achieve his objective.

e. Offence-Defence Balance. Japanese lacked the right amount of offence–defence balance that caught them unaware in many cases, specially they kept few aircraft for the protection of their own carriers. This clearly showed their doctrinal weaknesses.

Advance From South West Pacific

26. General Mac Arthur had promised to the people of Philippine that he would return to their country. Mac Arthur’s offensive, as per the ‘Army plan’, was conducted in the Southwest Pacific. Mac Arthur believed that winning air superiority was the key to conduct effective army assault on Japan to win the war. His able air component commander Lt Gen Kenny played a key role in leading Mac Arthur to this conclusion. Mac Arthur along with Kenny started offensive from New Guinea. His plan was to capture New Guinea, the Philippines and then Okinawa for an air offensive on Japan.

27. Initial Measures Adopted by Lt Gen Kenny .

a. Reorganizing Air Forces. Kenney eliminated the ineffective manpower under his command. The previous ACC used to co-ordinate matter with the executives of Mac Arthur and the ATO was issued from the office of those executives. Kenney stopped such practice of meddling in Air Force issues by other, as he believed in one commander of air forces - centralized control, decentralized execution. Moreover, Kenney moved the organization more north, which resulted in unity of effort from the support forces. The organizational set-up, which was mixed by US and Australian forces and was extended over a wide area, which was really chaotic. Kenny decided to separate the Americans and the Australians. Also, he formed the Americans into a numbered Air Force of their own which he would command. Kenney gained approval to form 5th Air Force and established bomber and fighter

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squadrons and groups. The Allied Air Force headquarters remained as a mixed organization. It was mixed in terms of staffs and aircrews and Kenney acted as the JFACC.

b. Solving Logistic and Maintenance Problem. To overcome the complicated and time-consuming logistic method, Kenney made use of local resources. He had drop tanks made by the Australian sheet metal industry. He also allowed crews to go out and collect spare parts from salvage/crashed aircraft. Also, he took advantage of the ingenuity of the maintenance technicians. Kenney directed that all requisitions be supported regardless of paperwork requirements. Later on, Kenney moved the logistics depots in the north from where he could better support the combat units. Kenney directed the units with poor serviceability rates to stand down and to repair aircraft and associated equipment in order to mount a larger offensive than just a few planes.

28. New Guinea Operations. Kenney went on the offensive by supporting the landing in the Solomon Islands as well as operations against Rabaul. His reconnaissance aircraft had been constantly looking for Japanese shipping that was hit at every feasible opportunity. He provided air support in the operation to capture Guadalcanal. He consulted with Mac Arthur about calling off the flying of all bombers, B-17s, B-25s, and B-26s until he could get enough of them in shape to put on a real show. Upon attaining the required serviceability rate, he sent the maximum number of B-17s from Port Moresby against the main Japanese airdrome at Vunakanau, just southeast of Rabaul. Kenny always favoured the idea that, the best and the cheapest place to destroy the enemy was on ground by airfield attack. The Japanese were caught by surprise with over 150 aircraft on the ground. The airfield attacks claimed 120 out of 150 Japanese aircraft positioned there. Also, Kenney's use of Parachute Bombs surprised the Japanese when they thought that para troopers were attacking and came out of cover to shoot at them as they landed. The effort against the New Guinea airdromes was continued until the Japanese airpower there was destroyed and the runways were so badly damaged that they even stopped filling up the holes. More so, the interdiction missions on Japanese supply lines severely restricted their mobility. Later on, Kenny neutralised the strong Japanese concentrations at Wewak, a big base of Japan, with outstanding tactical deception. Intelligence gathered by ULTRA10 confirmed strong Japanese build up there; but Wewak was beyond the range of Kenny’s fighter. To bring it with in the fighters ROA, he secretly built an airfield at Tsilli Tsilli, while 2 fake airfields were created close to Japanese positions using ground troops. This eventually diverted Japanese attacks; and when the Japanese detected the real airfield, it was too late to prevent the US surprise attack by 200 bombers that destroyed over 200 Japanese aircraft on ground11. The attack also killed many Japanese pilots and technicians, which had a long-term effect. It allowed Mac Arthur to establish a strong foothold for conducting future operations towards Philippines.

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29. Battle of Leyte Gulf/Recapturing Philippines. By the beginning of Oct 1944, the allied had captured a ring of islands such as Mindanao, Palaus, Ulithi etc, which were in excellent strategic positions for an attack on the Philippine. The objective was to cut off Japan from the resources of the Dutch East Indies and Malay. US Joint Chief of Staff ordered Nimitz and Mac Arthur to join their forces for a landing at Leyte on 20 Oct 44. The operation started with the airfield attacks on Luzon. The Task force-38 of Third Fleet struck Japanese aircraft, airfields and shipping in the Philippines. Preliminary to the Leyte operation, this task force with a concentration of more than 1,000 planes attacked Ryukyus, Formosa and the Philippines, exacting a large toll of Japanese air power12. B-29 strikes from China against air installations on Formosa supported this operation. The landing at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines was correctly assessed by the Japanese as their last opportunity, short of a defence of the Japanese home islands, to throw in all their available forces to check the Allies advance in a decisive engagement. Mac Arthur troops landed on Leyte Gulf on 20 Oct 1944. The defences at the beach were neutralised by a heavy bombardment. The Japanese were defeated due to lack of expected land-based air support and air reconnaissance. Without facing any strong obstacles, the allied forces marched towards Manila.

30. Capture of Okinawa. The main objective to capture this island was to have an advanced base for the final assault on southern Japan. The Japanese put all effort by fighting in the air along with ‘Kamikaze’ menace. The catastrophe and humiliation of the great Mariana turkey shot had depleted the Japanese Navy’s supply of trained aircrew and impressed on the survivors a sense of fatalism. The Japanese had begun to use land-based aircraft as humanly guided missiles. Between 06 April and 21 June 1945, about 1809 kamikaze sorties launched and lost 930 aircraft. The Japanese also used ‘Ohka’ piloted bomb for suicidal attacks. All the Kamikaze attack caused unprecedented Allied casualties. By the end of May 1945, the Japanese counter offensive was running down. The Japanese did not have enough resources left for suicidal attack at the Okinawa bridgehead13. After a number of attack and counter-attack, on 21 June the Allies captured Okinawa. However, it cost the Allies seven hundred sixty-three aircraft destroyed, thirty-six warships and landing crafts sunk and 368 damaged. Most of these damages were done by the kamikazes.

31. Analysis.

a. Unity of Command and Cohesion of the Unit. Kenney reorganized the air forces by separating the Americans and the Australians, which resulted in a more effective unity of command. This reorganization also simplified the command structure. Moreover, by listening to the troops, Kenney met their needs and fostered a cohesive unit.

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b. Use of Ground Forces To Achieve Air Superiority. The operations of neutralising the strong Japanese concentrations at Wewak signify that the ground forces can be used as an adjunct to gain air superiority. As Mac Arthur believed, once the air superiority is achieved, the other operations can go unchallenged.

c. Lack of Aim. The Japanese had a number of aircraft but lacked in skilled aircrew, which clearly underlines their inability to think in a long-term perspective. Though Kamikaze tactics could inflict heavy toll on the allied forces but fell short of achieving a clear aim. d. Airfield Attack. The cheapest and most effective way of destroying enemy aircraft is when those are on ground i.e. by airfield attack. Airfield attacks on Rabaul and Wewak by Allied forces has justified it.

e. Flexibility. The forces under Nimitz and Mac Arthur were operating for two-pronged war. Prior to the Leyte Gulf war, joining of Nimitz’s forces with that of Mac Arthur was a magnificent example of flexibility. On the other hand, insufficient knowledge of American intentions together with the insistence of the army that the Philippine should be defended at Luzon left too few aircraft for the decisive naval battle, which led to the ultimate Japanese defeat.

f. Concentration of Force. Dispersed forces, the difficulty of concentrating forces in right areas, insufficient intelligence on allied plans and a very limited strategic view accelerated the attrition and destruction of the Japanese forces.

g. Co-ordination and Co-operation. Good co-ordination and co-operation of the joint forces was very critical to the allied victory, though there were some problems earlier between the force commanders. This could be possible because of the good command and control structure under the able leadership of Gen Mac Arthur.

STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE

32. Strategy. The U.S political leaders wanted Japan’s unconditional surrender to the allied forces. But Japanese had been asking for preservation of monarchy. On 26 July 1945, the western powers issued a final warning and surrender demand to Japan. This contained various assurances, notably that Japan would not be economically ruined and that an occupation would be temporary. It was agreed in the U.S leadership that if the Japanese refused to accept the unconditional surrender the Atomic Bomb must be used.

33. The Atom Bomb Attack. On 25 July 1945 the Strategic Air Command in the Pacific was ordered to launch the atomic attacks as soon

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as weather allowed visual bombing after August 3. One of the scientists of nuclear weapon test committee, Stimson, opined that that the atom bomb should be used in a surprise attack on an important war installation surrounded by housing. A specially trained B-29 group14, with planes modified to carry the atom bomb. On the morning of August 6, a B-29 dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima with a power equivalent to 14,000 tons of TNT. On 9 July 1945 another B-29, being unable to hit Kokura, its primary target, dropped a plutonium bomb on Nagasaki. On August 15, Japan announced its surrender. But final arrangement for the surrender was signed on September 2, 1945, aboard the battleship Missouri, in Tokyo Bay, ending the Second World War. 34. Analysis. The allied strategic bombing to Japan demonstrated complete new dimensions of air power. Air power emerged as not a means to an end rather then the end by itself. Following are some of the major lessons that could be learnt from these air operations:

a. To carry out low-level day-night bombing, air superiority over the enemy air and fighter escort were required. This necessitates the allies to invade the strategically important Iwo Jima Island.

b. Upon invasion of the Iwo Jima Island and placing the air defence and escort fighter fighters there, the allied forces could gain air supremacy over Japan’s air homeland.

c. The Japanese could not maintain the optimum offence-defence balance in their home front. They lacked in providing required concentration of force in their heartland to counter the imminent stronger threat from the allied side.

d. Strong resistance against the allies strategic bombing clearly showed Japanese strong will power to survive.

e. The invention of nuclear bomb and simultaneous development of its carrier, the B-29 bomber added a completely new dimension of future war. Air power emerged as an end by itself, and not a means to an end.

f. Selection of right kind of target matched with the type of weapon paid good dividend to the allied forces.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Japanese Command and Control

35. In Japan, there was a complicated command structure involving several detached forces and the civilian government did not have a strong hold on her defence forces. There was no higher central control to coordinate efforts between

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the two forces. The Japanese did not have any separate Air Force. Their air element was grouped under the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. They also had inter-service rivalry, which often resulted the lack of synergy. Both of them wanted have maximum resources with tactical exclusiveness .As such, in many occasions they had failed to articulate well-coordinated operations. Japanese politicians and senior commanders failed to gauge the determination of the United States and Great Britain to fight the war in the Far East to a total and unambiguous victory.

36. Japanese command and control system was characterized with a strong centralized command but lack of decentralized execution. Admiral Yamamoto almost forced his decision to launch the attack on Pearl Harbour. Admiral Nagumo did not get the objectives of Pearl Harbour attack, as Admiral Yamamoto did not carry out the follow up attack, which was actually required. That was a major command and control failure. This failure to exploit the initial success at Pearl Harbour restricted the Japanese Navy’s achievement to a tactical victory rather than a longer-term strategic gain.

37. More over the command also failed to envisage the choosing of the right targets and to attain timely intelligence about the aircraft carriers before committing such a huge force. They showed remarkable insight in exploiting the Val dive-bombers capabilities to launch torpedo bombing. The most important Lack of insight of Japanese command was the absence of effective home defence thus they were unprepared to face the B-29s. Their vision of piecemeal employment of air power was proved useless. At the end of war, they had almost 9000 ac unused in main land, which signifies their centralized control and execution and piecemeal commitment.

Allied Command and Control

38. Distance and more than one nation involvement was the main problem faced by the Allied higher command. As air power has to be controlled centrally, a unified command under a Supreme Commander was proposed by General Marshall and backed by Roosevelt in the ARCADIA Conference. In January 1942, the allies formed of a joint American, British, Dutch and Australian Command (ABDACOM)15 under General Sir Archibald Wavell, the British commander in the Far East. However, this combined command structure was not very effective due to the strategic disputes thrown up by the competing national interests. They soon got over this problem by having the separate commanders looking after the two fronts in the pacific. Mac Arthur’s South Western Pacific Command was an inter-allied, inter-service command exercising operational and policy-making functions. The air element was grouped under Allied Air Force Commander George C Kenny who had the Royal Australian Air Force, Dutch Task Force 73 and US fifth Air Force under him. On the other hand Admiral Nimitz commanded the Central Pacific Command and the organization was mainly equipped with naval elements and air elements.

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Logically, the pacific was overwhelmingly a Naval structure, and Mac Arthur should have been under Nimitz. But inter service jealousy and Mac Arthur’s ego and prestige were such that the sensible solution was not followed. Though this may have had less effect on the course of war than has occasionally been claimed, but it was a wrong practice.

39. The Allied Command and Control system was characterized by a strong and effective command and control structure, which had a decentralized execution as its main theme. For example, Kenny enjoyed a decentralized execution and he reversed the conventional approach by using ground forces as a supporting element to achieve desired unity of purpose. Again, centralized control restricted him in diverting forces for Close Air Support missions to the Australian forces in New Guinea from Battlefield Air Interdiction. In central Pacific, the decentralized execution allowed air Commanders (Le May) the tactical flexibility and responsiveness while conducting raids from Mariana, with B-29s. However, the events in Pearl Harbor outlines lack of farsightedness of the US commanders. It also speaks their failure to exploit the capability of air power for air reconnaissance role as they maintained a fixed defensive posture. However, the US command responded brilliantly when the Kamikaze attacks were launched in Leyte and Okinawa. The command and control structure of the Allies also relied heavily on their good intelligence gathering and analysis network, though at the beginning this vital factor was not given its due importance. Under these circumstances their air power could work very well and it proved its worthies in the end.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

40. Technology can help in achieving surprise and alone can be sufficient to change the course of war. Japanese could not keep pace with the technological

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development with her enemy camp. This was due to a failure in their basic strategic vision. Although they began the war with a superior fighter like, the “Zeroes” and a more effective oxygen powered torpedoes, but they were unable to maintain such qualitative supremacy as the United States switched to a national war footing. Japan’s war economy was already stretched to a breaking point by its attempt to compete with the industrial capacity of the United States. This prompted them to concentrate upon the quantity rather than quality. In fields such as radio and radar the Japanese fell far short of the quantity, reliability and sophistication of the equipment issued to their forces. Japanese ocean going submarines, for example, lacked radar and were equipped with rudimentary sonar.

41. The allies though inferior in the initial stages, continued to develop their technological base with consistency and proved to be superior at the end. By 1943, several superior types of fine design aircraft were in mass production, notably the P-38 lightening, the P-47 Thunder Bolt and the P-51 Mustang. The twin engine P-38, the Navy’s F4U Corsair and F6F Hellcat proved excellent. The F4U Corsair was much faster than the Zero, had a better roll rate, and could dive away to safety when necessary. Corsair pilots established a very satisfactory kill ratio and helped turn the tide of war against the Japanese. Many heavy bombers, like, the B-17 Flying Fortress, the B-24 Liberator, and the B-29 Super Fortress were unmatched in ruggedness and ability to penetrate enemy defence. The transport planes, like, the C-47 and C–54 were two of the numerous category. To protect from anti-aircraft fire The US Air Force's A-10 Thunderbolt has a lot of armour - much of it titanium - and "survivability" features such as self-sealing fuel tanks and manual backup for the hydraulic controls.

42. New weapons for air warfare were developed notably rockets and primitive guided weapons. In July 1944 a new variation was introduced. Napalm was mixed in the field to fill up drop tanks carried by fighter- bombers. Napalm tank proved invaluable for burning off cover and camouflage hiding Japanese positions and attacking fortifications in the pacific island battles. In August 1944. Guided weapon, primitive forerunners of the “smart bombs” was used on a limited scale. Most successful was the Azon bomb, which could be steered by radio control to a limited extent to right or left. The Army and Navy tested a variety of radio controlled drone planes; A Navy drone, the TDM was used with some success against Japanese at Rabaul in 1944. By 1945 Americans could call upon helicopters for pilot rescue. The most dramatic development of the war was the atomic bomb and its successful drop through the strategic B-29 bomber over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which ultimately ended up the war.

LESSONS LEARNT

43. From the Pacific Campaign the following lessons are learnt:

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a. Gaining and maintaining the required degree of control of the air is key to any successful conduct of operation.

b. Geography is the keystone of strategy.

c. Ground forces could be used as an adjunct to air power.

d. Air power should be used in mass and not in piecemeal basis.

e. Air power to be effective when it is employed persistently.

f. Naval vessels are highly susceptible to air attacks while operating beyond friendly fighter cover.

g. Air and Naval power could be used to cover the flanks.

h. The cheapest way to destroy enemy’s air power is to attack them on ground.

J. Intelligence is vital for any successful operation.

k. Decentralized execution allows achieving responsiveness and tactical flexibility.

l. A correct offence-defence mix is required for a balance strategy.

m. Consideration of weather is a very important role during planning the mission.

n. The technological achievement can have a major impact on the warfare.

CONCLUSION

44. The Allies could retard Japanese advancement by achieving air superiority. At first local air superiority was gained, subsequently air supremacy over deep of Japanese dominated areas and homeland. The understanding of the tenets of air power by the Allies was their key to success. Though the Japanese could gain initial success by gaining local air superiority through surprise, swift offensive operations and better technology but they failed to maintain the control of air in the later part. The Allies turned the tide by concentration of air power in time and space by using the giant aircraft carriers and good planning. They could take the war to the Japan’s home islands. The Japanese could not correctly appreciate the characteristics of air power and could not build up an effective home defence. All the above factors coupled with the technological surprise of the atom bomb paved the way for the Allies to achieve desired victory.

End Notes

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1 Eugene M Emme, The impact of Air Power, P-294. 2 Growth of a Nation (1815-Present) Citizenship and American History.3 The United Strategic Bombing Survey.4 Christy Campbell, Air War Pacific (Crescent Book, New York 1991, P-28)5 Campbell. Opcit, P-29.6 John Winton, Air Power at Sea (Sidewick & Jackson, London, 1976) P-60.7 Campbell. Opcit, P-58.8 Campbell. Opcit, P-100.9 Winton. Opcit, P-551.10 ULTRA was a secret device to intercept and decrypted enemy radio communication. 11 Colonel John Warden, Air Campaign Planning for Combat, P-28.12 Winton. Opcit, P-161.13 Ibid, P-173.14 Campbell. Opcit, P-161.15 David Smurth waite, The Pacific war Atlas, P-46.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Alan J Levine, The Pacific War, Japan versus the Allies (Praeger, London, 1995).

2. R J Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (Europa Publications Ltd. 1980).

3. David Smurthwaite, The Pacific War Atlas 1941-1945 (Facts on File, 1995).

4. John Winton, Air Power at Sea 1939-45 (Sidwick & Jackson, 1976).

5. Christy Campbell, Air War Pacific, The Fight for Supremacy in the Far East: 1937 to

1945, (Crescent Books, 1990).

7. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War),

Washington, D.C. 1 July 1946.

8. Col John A Warden, The Air Campaign

9. Eugene M. Emme, The Impact of Air Power (The English Book Store, New Delhi,

1977).

Internet Website

10. http://www.histclo.hispeed.com

11. http://www.info.dfat.govt.au

12. http://www.stjohns.chs.org/

13. http:/www/worldwariihistory.info/wwii/turningpoint.html

14. http://www. Pacific War\coralsea.htm

15. http://www.battleofmiday.htm

16. http:/www/parlharbour.htm

AIR WAR IN THE PACIFIC

"In our victory over Japan, airpower was unquestionably decisive. That the planned invasion of the Japanese Home island was unnecessary is clear evidence that airpower

has evolved into a force in war co-equal with land and sea power, decisive in its own right and worthy of the faith of its prophets.”

- General Carl A. Tooey Spaatz

INTRODUCTION

1. The road to World War II in Asia and the Pacific was fundamentally independent of the European conflict. Only to loose tie of facing common enemy held the Axis powers together. The threat and the reality of war in Europe played a major role in creating opportunities for Japan, but perhaps not a decisive one. In 1940, when the Allied forces were engaged to defend the Germany’s blitzkrieg war, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of Japan’s Imperial Navy informed his government that if Japan went to war, he would run wild and win victory upon victory for the first six to twelve months against the Allied forces. But he had no expectation of success if the war continues after that. 2. On his advice Japan initiated the war in the Pacific on 7 December 1941, with a dramatic and shocking display of air power resulting a fatal blow to the US naval strength in the Pacific. The Pacific theatre was the largest of any in history, fought between Japan and the Allied, mainly with the United States of America from 1941 to 1945. In this Great War, airpower was linked closely with sea power and emphasis was given on aircraft carrier and naval aviation to a great extent. Unlike the previous wars, the outcome was decided largely by fighting in the air. Air power not only contributed to amphibious or land

operations but also attained the strategic effect by exerting direct pressure on the enemy’s capability and will to wage war. Therefore, the Pacific War offers a great scope for the airpower enthusiastics to understand its contributions and the lessons concerning air power.

3. Many isolated battles were fought in the Pacific theatre over a long duration. Therefore the scope of the paper will be limited to the major battles where air power played a decisive role for the outcome of the war.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to analyse the major operations of the Pacific War in light of the principles of war and the tenets of airpower and draw appropriate lessons.

BACKGROUND

5. Japan had profited from WW I, but during 1920s, her economy was relatively stagnant. By 1929, she faced grave financial and social crisis as she was lacking the raw materials for her rapid industrialization. As such, Japan planned a concept of a “New Order” in to a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” where not only China but Southeast Asia and some part of Australasia to brought under her control. Subsequently, Japan went for a radical solution by invading the mineral rich Manchuria In 1931. This aggression became a great concern to the world specially USA because of her interest in China.

Fig: Japanese Expansion Plan, 1941

6. In 1937, Japan launched an all out assault against China rising further tension with USA. To resist Japan, USA took measures to weaken their economy by freezing all Japanese assets in USA and imposed an almost total embargo. By Jul 1941, Japanese industrial survival was at stake due to the crisis of raw materials specially oil. Japan regarded this policy as an unfriendly act and was looking for some way out of this crisis. Only option left with Japan was to withdraw completely from China as demanded by USA or expand towards South West to secure new sources of oil and raw materials. Eventually Japan chose the second option and regarded the US Pacific fleet positioned at Pearl Harbour to be the greatest obstacle for their southward venture. As such, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour marking the beginning of the Pacific War.

OBJECTIVES AND AIR STRATEGY

Japanese Objectives and Strategy

7. Japanese objective was to establish their domination in the region by establishing a defensive perimeter quickly. They estimated that they could seize Southeast Asia and thereby overcome the effect of sanctions imposed upon them. Consequently, the Japanese needed to make sure that the Allied military presence in the Pacific would not be capable of interfering with their southward expedition. Keeping the objectives in mind, Japan took extreme offensive strategy depending on the use of airpower. However, the absence of a correct offence-defence balance characterizes Japanese air strategy.

Allied Objectives and Strategy

8. Before Japans attack on Pearl Harbour, Allied had no significant strategy against Japan. To counter the Japanese aggression, Allied objective was to disrupt the sea supply line to Japan and to launch an all out offensive against them to make sure that they accept an unconditional surrender. Keeping these objectives in mind, the Allied primarily pursued an offensive air strategy to take the war to the Japanese mainland and carry out strategic bombing against Japan’s industrial bases. Therefore, except for the initial period of the war the Allied primarily pursued an offensive air strategy.

JAPANESE AIR CAMPAIGNS

General

9. In accordance with their objectives, Japanese Army was given the primary responsibility for invading Luzon (Philippines), Malaya, Sumatra and Burma while Japanese Navy was tasked to attack on Pearl Harbour and to launch operations in the southern Philippines, northern New Guinea and out to the Gilbert Islands. The Japanese began their campaign on 07 Dec 41 by attacking US base at Pearl Harbour. At the same time, they attacked and captured Philippines and Malaya.

10. Following their initial successes, the Japanese planners decided for an expansion beyond the planned perimeter which led them to encounter with the USA in the Coral Sea and Midway. Attack on Pearl Harbour

11. The Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the hub of the US Navy’s power with the latest and most powerful battleships. Thus, Pearl Harbour became an ideal target for Japanese attack. The attack on Pearl Harbour was only possible by the reach of the airpower. The attack was fixed to begin at 8 a.m. Honolulu time, 07 Dec 1941. 12. Air Operation. Before dawn on 07 Dec 41, the Japanese Task Force of six carriers accompanied by two battleships carrying 432 aircraft reached a position 230 miles due north of Pearl Harbour. The attack was planned in two waves. The first wave of 183 aircraft was launched from the carriers just before 0600 AM. The wave comprised of 49 level bombers, 51 dive bombers, 40 torpedo bombers and 43 Zero fighters. Their targets were the airfields, Battle ships and airborne fighters. The Americans were caught by total surprise. Japanese aircraft appeared on the US radarscope on Oahu's north coast. Ironically, it was misinterpreted as an expected incoming flight of B-17s from the mainland. 13. After 45 min, a second wave of 171 aircraft followed the first strike. Escorted by 36 Zeros, 81 dive bombers attacked ships again, while 54 level bombers attacked the army air bases. The second wave met anti aircraft fire and some aircraft got airborne and gave little resistance. Within 02 hours, the Japanese crippled 18 battle ships, destroyed 285 aircraft and killed or injured about 3581 American personnel. On the other hand, Japan lost only 29 aircraft, 06 submarines and about 100 lives.

Fig: Attack on Pearl Harbour.

14. Analysis. It was an astonishing tactical victory for the Japanese. Additionally, the attack had strategic effect in drawing the US into the war, determined to bring about down fall of the Japanese. Air operation in Pearl Harbour is characterized by the following:

a. Surprise. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a classic example of surprise. It was achieved by selection of the day, time, direction of attack and overall the secrecy of the operation.

b. Concentration of Force. The Japanese used over 432 aircraft from six

carriers to launch the offensive. It was a massive concentration of force in time and space considering the distance from mainland Japan.

c. Flexibility. The Zeros were primarily tasked to escort the bombers but finding no opponent in the air, they were engaged on ground attack role demonstrating the flexibility of air power.

d. Persistence. Despite the request of some officers, Admiral Nagumo made a decision to call off the operation after the second attack. They left the huge fuel tanks, submarine pens, ship repair facilities and the most important target - the 04 aircraft carriers intact, which was a major error and they had to pay very badly in subsequent battles.

e. Security. Despite detecting the incoming Japanese raids 132 miles away, the US controllers failed to identify the threat. This failure of assessment gave the Japanese air superiority over Pearl Harbour.

Attack on the Philippines

15. Background. The Japanese Southern Expeditionary forces planned their attacks on Malay Peninsula, Philippines, Singapore and South Pacific Islands to have a stronghold in the region. That would also provide them an opening of new source of industrial raw materials. More so, Allied strongest military concentration was present in the Philippines which Japanese wanted to eliminate at the onset.

Fig: Japanese Attack on the Philippines.

16. Air Operation. Operation against Philippines began as the battleships in Pearl Harbour were still blazing on 08 Dec 41. To neutralize the US air power in the Philippines, successive airfield attacks were carried out from Japanese bomber bases in Formosa. The first wave of attack comprising 144 bombers escorted by 108 Zeros crippled the US

air element on ground and in the air. The air battle on the first day ended with destruction of half of the USFEAF’s strength. Succeeding attacks by the Zeros reduced the US control of the air and the Japanese took control of Manila on 02 Jan 42.

17. Analysis. Following are the analysis with regard to the air operations in the Philippines:

a. Concentration of Force. Flying from Formosa, 32 IJAAF heavy bombers and 192 naval aircraft of 11th Air fleet were concentrated for their assault on the Philippines.

b. Offensive Action. Japanese air action destroyed the USFEAF and seized control of the skies over the Philippines which supported the seaborne invasion and capturing the island.

c. Reach. The newly built Zero fighters with an extended combat radius of 600 nm gave the Japanese the ability to launch their mission from Formosa with fighter escort right up to Philippines. The reach of the air power again demonstrated its ability to carry out such operation.

d. Command and Control. Attack on the Philippines occurred nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbour. Despite that nine hour warning, the Philippines based US commander’s indecision, combined with poor military judgment and slackness in command structure, led to the destruction of half of air force on the ground.

Battle of Coral Sea

18. Background. The success in Pearl Harbour and the Philippines came in half the time and with far few looses that had been expected. This left the Japan’s leaders in a dilemma about what to do next. Japan eventually decided to extend her perimeter southeast, cutting the sea lanes between Australia and America. The first step of the operation was to capture Port Moresby, a key Allied base on the South coast of New Guinea.

19. Air Operation. Japanese campaign began on 03 May 42 with the invasion of Tulagi which was occupied without opposition. By 04 May 42, the Japanese assembled a formidable naval force in Rabaul and set course for Port Moresby with two carriers; ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU. Admiral Nimitz, Commander of US Navy Pacific theatre, was aware of the Japanese advance by the use of code-breakers. To meet the advancing Japanese, he sent a task force including the carriers LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN to the Coral Sea under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher.

20. For 3 days carriers on both sides evaded detection in spite of the attempts by the search plane. On the morning of 07 May 42, a Japanese search pilot reported sighting a US carrier and cruiser. Dozens of bombers were launched from SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU

but they found the small destroyer and an oiler which were sunk. Thirty minutes later, aircraft from the LEXINGTON sighted the carrier SHOHO. All out aerial attack with 93 aircraft were launched from LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN and SHOHO was sunk. For the first time in history, a Japanese carrier had been sunk.

21. On the next day both sides launched reconnaissance sorties in search of the enemy. At 0722 hours the Americans spotted the Japanese Carrier Strike Force. At the same time, the Japanese aircrafts also picked-up the American carriers. Admiral Fletcher ordered an all-out strike by deploying 82 aircraft. SHOKAKU was seriously damaged and she left the battle while ZUIKAKU escaped into weather. On the other hand, Japanese sent 69 aircraft to attack the US fleets. The YORKTOWN was damaged forcing her back to Pearl Harbour. The LEXINGTON sustained torpedoes and bomb hits. Ultimately she became the first American carrier to be sunk also.

22. Analysis. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first in naval history in which the opposing ships never fired a shot at each other. The whole action was fought by aircraft. It is usually regarded as a tactical victory for the Japanese as LEXINGTON was far more valuable ship than SHOHO. But it was a strategic victory for the US as the invasion of Port Moresby was foiled. Moreover, ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU were unavailable for the next and far more crucial Battle to Midway. The Japanese also lost too many aircraft and skilled pilots, whose loss immensely contributed in the following battles. Following important aspects also emerged from this operation:

a. Maintenance of Aim. Japan deviated from their initial aim and decided to invade Port Moresby beyond their defensive perimeter which created contradiction among the commanders.

b. Intelligence. Intelligence played an important role as the Americans could decode the Japanese naval coded messages enabling them to figure out the Japanese intentions.

c. Balance. Both the forces sorted to offensive posture leaving inadequate fighters to defend their carriers. As a result, the carriers of both the sides were vulnerable to air attacks.d. Weather. Weather played a remarkable role in the Battle. The Japanese successfully exploited weather by manoeuvring their carriers to remain under the cloud cover to escape aerial attacks.

Battle of Midway

23. Background. Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet advocated luring the US carrier fleet into action and destroying it in a final devastating battle as a prelude to a bargaining peace. He planned a major offensive with 165 ships to attack Midway, a tiny island located 1135 miles West-northwest of Pearl Harbour. First a diversionary attack was planned on the Aleutian Islands in the northern Pacific to bring the US Navy in to battle and then attack Midway using four carriers.

24. Air Operations. Admiral Yamamoto sent 02 light carriers to the Aleutians Islands, 1,200 miles north of Midway, to serve as a distraction. Then his main carrier force, consisting of 04 large carriers, advanced to capture Midway. Admiral Nimitz again could read the Japanese intentions with the help of code breakers and positioned 03 carriers north of Midway.

Fig: The Approach to Midway.

25. On 03 Jun 42, US patrol aircraft sighted the Japanese invasion force, and aircraft from Midway attacked them without much effect. At 0530 hrs on 04 Jun, a Midway-based plane again spotted the Japanese Carrier Force. Shortly afterward, the Japanese carriers launched a large strike with 108 aircraft against Midway. The US carriers had closed within striking distance of the Japanese force and launched their aircraft. Midway’s own bombers took off to hit the Japanese carriers while fighters took off to defend the island. But they were no match for Zeros and 17 out of 25 US fighters were shot down. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their raid did little serious damage as most of the US bombers had already left Midway for attacking the Japanese Carrier Force. These US bombers were badly shot up by the Japanese Carrier Force and they could not hit a single Japanese ship.

26. But the attack by the Midway’s US bombers convinced Nagumo of the need for a second strike on the island. However, that meant the aircraft ready with torpedoes, had to be rearmed with bombs. When the task was half done, a Japanese search plane reported spotting the US carriers nearby. Nagumo again ordered the aircraft to be rearmed with torpedoes. But he decided to wait so that the aircraft returning from Midway could recover and fighters could be refueled for escorting the attacking force. For Nagumo, this decision

of delay proved fatal.

27. US aircraft launched earlier failed to sight Japanese carriers as Nagumo changed course causing many of the aircraft to ditch or divert to Midway. When they found the carriers, attacks were carried out by torpedo bombers but Zeros shoot down 35 out of 41 aircraft, and not a single Japanese ship was hit. But they provided the perfect decoy as the Zeros were drawn down to low level allowing the dive bombers from ENTERPRISE and YORKTOWN to attack from high level. They found the carriers when it was crowded with aircraft rearmed and ready for next launch. In 10 minutes, US dive bombers had turned the tide of the Pacific war, leaving three Japanese carriers AKAGI, KAGA and SORYU sunk. Only HIRYU escaped and launched two strikes with 40 aircraft which hit YORKTOWN and was finally sunk. Subsequently, HIRYU itself was hit by dive bombers from the ENTERPRISE and sunk. The invasion of Midway was abandoned, thus halting Japanese expansion across Asia Pacific.

28. Analysis. The battle of Midway was the worst naval defeat in Japanese history. In one day, almost half of the Japanese Navy’s carriers had been destroyed along with 275 aircraft and many of Japan’s prized pilots. The results of this battle had far reaching strategic effect as the balance of power tilted towards the American side. As such it was the turning point in the Pacific war. Japanese failure in the Battle of Midway can further be analyzed in terms of the factors like:

a. Security. The Japanese failed to secure their communication means allowing the Americans to know about their plan. Japanese intended to surprise the Americans but it acted in opposite way.

b. Concentration of Force. Japanese planner made the most striking error by dispersing their forces in an attempt to distract the Americans. Had the Japanese force been concentrated to take Midway, the result could have been very different.

c. Complacence. The Japanese were over confident regarding their victory. The commanders took guaranteed and underestimated their enemy causing a severe defeat in the battle.

d. Priority. Nagumo failed to launch the bombers in time and decided to wait till the recovery of returning aircraft. This failure to setting appropriate priority proved to be fatal for the outcome of the battle.

THE ALLIED AIR OFFENSIVEGeneral

29. In the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, the Allied foiled the Japanese advance. They then quickly went into offensive and set out for a two-pronged advance to take the war on the Japanese mainland. One was through the Southwest Pacific via the north coast of New Guinea to the Philippines led by General Mac Arthur and the other across the Central Pacific through the Marshalls to Okinawa led by Admiral Nimitz. Both pronged of

offensive required tremendous air support and it was the advance from Southwest Pacific that needed island hopping. After the Allied captured Marianas and Okinawa, concentrated long-range bombing offensive got underway. The Allied offensive ended in dropping two atom bombs over Japan resulting Japanese unconditional surrender. However, the first initiative by the Allied was the raid over mainland Japan carried out by Col James Doolittle on 18 Feb 42.

Doolittle Raid

30. The Raid. Col James Doolittle conducted the raids with sixteen B-25 aircraft from US carrier HORNET about 700 NM from Japan. The aircraft were armed with 500 lb demolition and incendiary bombs. Their targets were military and industrial facilities over Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe. Overall, fifteen aircraft could reach Japanese homeland and drop their bombs. However, while recovering, 15 of the aircraft had to be abandoned over China while only one could land at Soviet Union.

Fig: Doolittle Raid

31. Analysis. Militarily the raid was insignificant but the psychological effect was immense to the Allied forces. This was the first US air power projection on Japanese sky. The attack led to the following subsequent actions:

a. The raid had strategic consequence on Japanese thinking of expanding the defensive perimeter. Hence the planned invasion of the Midway quickly gained support.

b. The Japanese realized that they were not out of the reach of Allied air strike. It resulted assigning four fighter groups for strengthening their home land defences.

The Advance in the Central Pacific

32. Objectives. Allied considered that, a move through the Central Pacific would offer many advantages. It would be shorter and would outflank the Japanese in New Guinea. The Central Pacific islands were isolated and smaller in size requiring a limited force to defend. Moreover, capturing the islands would make the logistic supply to the southern Japanese forces difficult.

33. The campaign of Central Pacific took place in Micronesia, an area of the Pacific which contained over tiny 1000 islands dispersed in 4 main groups namely the Gilbert Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands and the Marianas. Nimitz decided to make the best use of air and sea power in the Central Pacific Campaign. The Allied forces objective was to capture Saipan and Guam of Mariana Islands from where Japan will come within the range of B-29 aircrafts.

Fig: Allied Lines of Advance 1942-1945

34. Capture of Tarawa. Tarawa is located at the Gilbert Islands. It was necessary to capture these islands as a first step towards Tokyo because they were important Japanese sea-bases in the Central Pacific. On 20 Nov 43 heavy air bombardment struck the Gilbert Islands. The heavily defended Tarawa was captured on 23 Nov 43 at the cost of 3000 US Marines.

35. Fall of Marshalls. Taking lessons from the Gilbert operations, the US navy and marines fought the battles at the Marshall Islands. On 29 Jan 44, the Americans bypassed the outer ring of the Marshall Islands to strike at Kwajalein at its centre. Two American divisions were committed, with heavy and accurate naval gunfire and air support. On 17 Feb 44, heavy bombardment by Allied forces followed by amphibious landing resulted in destroying 250 Japanese aircraft against 25 aircraft from Allied. The line of communication to Rabaul was cut successfully and the operation ended on 22 Feb 44.

36. Capture of The Great Marianas. The Allied objective was to establish airbases in Marianas. This would bring the Japanese home islands within the range of B–29 bombers. Moreover, the Allied wanted to lure the combined fleet out of its improvised base in North-eastern Borneo. On the other hand, Japanese objectives were to protect Saipan, which was her naval command and control centre and destroy the Allied invasion fleet.

Japanese fleet consisted of 473 aircraft and the Allied fleet had 891 aircraft. The Allied pilots were well experienced but Japan had all young pilots after the loss in Midway. The battle started with the Japanese strike comprising 326 aircraft attacking in four waves. The US radar detected the Japanese aircraft and each waves were intercepted resulting the lose of 240 Japanese aircraft compared to only 21 of Allied. Japanese aircraft were shot down so rapidly and in such a number that the engagement is known as ‘Great Mariana Turkey Shot’. The Japanese high command believing their raid to be a success launched another 49 aircraft as reinforcement. Most of these aircraft were also shot down.

37. While the Japanese were retreating, the Allied launched a strike of 226 aircraft which sank the carrier HIYO and two oilers. But 99 Allied aircraft were lost during the operation and while recovery due to shortage of fuel. Allied secured Saipan and Guam on 9 and 24 Jul 44 respectively and Japan main land came within the range of B-29 aircraft. Immediately after the fall of Marianas, the US started her strategic air offensive against Japan. Later, Nimitz also took the control of Iwo Jima in Feb 45.

38. Analysis.

a. Maintenance of Aim. US had the clear aim to reach Mariana to bring main land Japan within their striking range. The Allied made all out effort to achieve that aim.

b. Coordination and Cooperation. The sound planning, close cooperation and coordinated operation was the important factor in achieving victory for the Allied. For the Japanese, lack of coordination was quite evident as without knowing the outcome of the first attack, they launched another raid and lost valuable air assets.

c. Concentration of Force. Japanese failed to concentrate their force at right time because of less number of aircraft and experienced pilots.

d. Security. The Japanese overstretched their deployment as such they failed to secure their vital supply routes.

e. Versatility. B-29s were used to support the amphibious operation, strategic bombing against main land Japan and also for mining Japanese water for maritime blockade. This multi purpose use of B-29s demonstrated the versatility of air power.

Advance from South West Pacific

39. Objective. One of the main objectives of attacking from south west was to break the “Bismarck Barrier” and to recapture Philippines. General Mac Arthur, commander of the Southwest Pacific area, came to the conclusion that his operation had to have air superiority for their successful army assault. His air component commander Lt Gen Kenney played a key role in leading Mac Arthur to this conclusion. Mac Arthur along with Kenney started offensive from New Guinea. His plan was to capture New Guinea, the Philippines and then Okinawa for an air offensive attack on Japan.

40. Air Operations at Guadalcanal. The Allied offensive was launched on 07 Aug 1942 to capture the island of Guadalcanal to seize the air bases from where they could launch air operations. Kenney identified the problems of the Fifth Air Force, out of 517

Allied aircraft, just 150 were operational. Only with carefully prepared B-17s were sent to Rabaul for gaining control of the air. He always favoured the idea that, the best and the cheapest place to destroy the enemy was on ground. The Japanese were caught by surprise when the airfield attacks claimed 120 out of 150 aircraft at Rabaul. Thereafter, the Allied force bypassed the Japanese strong hold of Rabaul and reached Admiralty Islands on Feb 1944.

41. On the other hand the ground troops proceeded to Buna of new Guinea from Port Moresby in Jan 1943. They continued with their offensive through Lae, Madang and finally reached Admiralty Islands on Feb 44. Subsequently Kenney planned to neutralise the strong Japanese concentrations at Wewak but the airfield was beyond the range of his fighters. To bring it within the fighters ROA, he secretly built Henderson airfield, while two fake airfields were also constructed close to the Japanese positions using ground troops. This eventually diverted Japanese attacks. When the Japanese detected the real airfield, it was too late to prevent the US surprise attack by 200 bombers that destroyed over 200 Japanese aircraft on ground. The Americans reached the tip of the New Guinea on 30 Jul 1944 and on 15 Sep they landed on the small weakly defended Indonesian Island of Morotai. The Americans were now in a position to conduct future operations towards Philippines.

42. Recapturing Philippines. The objective of recapturing Philippines was to prevent Japan from obtaining the resources of Dutch East Indies and Malay. Allied targets were Japanese aircraft, airfields and shipping in the Philippines. The operation started with the airfield attacks on Luzon. Japanese correctly assessed the Leyte Gulf operation as their last opportunity. They knew loosing this battle means surrender; as such they engaged all their available forces to counter the Allied advance. Mac Arthur’s troops landed on Leyte Gulf on 20 Oct 44 at the cost of over 44,000 Allied casualties. Poor reconnaissance and lack of land-based air support caused the Japanese defeat. Later, the Allied forces landed at south of Manila on 31 Jan 45 without facing any strong obstacles.

43. Capture of Okinawa. The objective was to establish complete sea blockade and to have a forward base for the final assault on Japan. The great Mariana turkey shot depleted the Japanese trained aircrew. As such, they began to use land-based aircraft as humanly guided missiles known as “Kamikaze”. They also used ‘Ohka’ piloted bomb for suicidal attacks. All these caused unprecedented Allied casualties including loss of 763 aircraft and 36 warships. By the end of May 45, the Japanese counter offensive ability became very weak including Kamikaze. On 21 Jun 45 the Allied captured Okinawa.

44. Analysis.

a. Unity of Command. In the Southwest Pacific air assets were reorganised to achieve unity of command for the effective application of air power. Freedom to execute missions was delegated to the different under commands. On the contrary, Japanese Army and Navy controlled their own air arm separately resulting penny packets of air efforts.

b. Use of Ground Forces for Air Superiority. After deciding air superiority as the primary objective, Mac Arthur used his ground forces as an adjunct to air in

his quest for air superiority over the Japanese. The operations to neutralize the strong Japanese concentrations at Wewak signify that the ground forces can be used to gain air superiority.

c. Offensive Action. The Allied found that the cheapest and most effective way of destroying enemy aircraft is when those are on ground. Airfield attacks on Rabaul and Wewak by Allied forces were the examples.

d. Co-ordination. The forces under Nimitz and Mac Arthur were operating for two-pronged war. Prior to the battle of Leyte Gulf, joining of both the forces was a magnificent example of co-ordination.

e. Surprise. The mass air attacks on Rabaul as well as the innovative idea to neutralize Wewak utilizing a secretly prepared airfield at Henderson surprised the Japanese. On the other hand, Japanese Kamikaze tactics surprised the Allied.

f. Co-operation. Good co-operation between the ground and air forces was very critical for the Allied victory in the Southwest Pacific. It was possible because of the good command and control structure under the leadership of Gen Mac Arthur.

Strategic Air Offensive

45. The B-29 Campaign. The Strategic air offensive against Japan by B-29 began on 14 Jun 45. At first the new 20th Bomber Command was based in China. Later on all the bombers were shifted to Marianas to bring the entire Japan within the B-29s range. Initially the B-29s were used to attack the Japanese cities with incendiary bombs which achieved devastating effect in killing hundred of thousands of Japanese as well as in destroying major Japanese cities. B-29s also flew hundreds of mine laying sorties, planting more than 12,000 mines - which were estimated to have sunk 123 ships. Japanese did not give due importance to air defence. Their obsolete radars were ineffective to oppose the B-29 bombing campaign. Due to sustained strategic air offensive, the economic situation of Japan deteriorated and the production of aircraft was reduced. After four month of saturation bombing, Japan had hardly any target left worth attacking except Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Fig: Strategic Air Offensive Against Japan.

46. The Atom Bomb Attack. The Potsdam Declaration of 25 Jul 45 had warned the Japanese Government that if they did not surrender, Japan would face ‘prompt and utter destruction’. In replay the then Japanese Prime Minister Admiral Suzuki stated that Japan would ignore the declaration. This answer convinced and compelled US president Truman to use atomic bomb to make the Japanese Government surrender despite the ethical and humanitarian problem. Subsequently the Strategic Air Command in the Pacific was ordered to launch the atomic strike anytime after 03 Aug 45. On the morning of 06 Aug 45, a B-29 aircraft from Tinian Island dropped the first atom bomb on Hiroshima. On 09 Aug 45, the second one was dropped on Nagasaki. Ultimately, on 15 Aug 45, Japan announced its unconditional surrender ending the Second World War.

47. Analysis. The Allied strategic bombing to Japan demonstrated complete new dimensions of air power. Followings are some analysis:

a. Reach. The Allied utilized the reach of air power effectively. B-29s, from their new position at Mariana Islands, were able to attack any part of Japan.

b. Balance. Due to an all out offensive effort, Japanese ran short of aircraft and trained aircrew to defend their homeland. Failure to judge the proper offence-defence balance was one of the major factors for their defeat.

c. Persistence. Persistence bombing by the Allied over Japanese mainland crippled their industrial base from which they could not recover.

d. Air Defence. Japanese had poor air defence system, even though US lost 414 B-29s. This poor air defence system could not inflict maximum attrition to the Allied forces during the strategic campaign.

TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY

48. The type of targets and geography of the Pacific campaign demanded new methods and innovative tactics of airpower. These are:

a. Low-altitude and Skip Bombing. In the Pacific, initially bombers carried out attack from over 25,000 feet resulting poor accuracy. General Kenney applied Low-altitude and Skip Bombing tactics involving a bomb to be released at 2,000 and 200 feet respectively. The outcomes were proved to be effective.

b. Dive Bombing. This tactic was used by both the Allied and Japanese fighters to avert anti aircraft artillery guns and being intercepted by the enemy fighters.

c. The masthead attack. The masthead attack tactics was applied by the Fifth Air Force. The aircraft flew very low at high speed releasing her bomb very close to the Japanese ships increased the percentage of hits dramatically.

d. Kamikaze. After the Battle of Midway, Japan was facing acute shortage of skilled fighter pilots. As such they adopted the innovative Kamikaze tactic causing approximately eighty percent Allied losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific.

49. Pacific war necessities different technological innovations for both the sides. These were:

a. Zero Fighters. The Japanese began the war with a superior aircraft like the Zero fighter. The manoeuvrability, combat power and long range of the Zero came as a surprise to the Allied.

b. C ode Breaking System . The US invention of the signal code breaking system (Magic) had contributed immensely to the outcome of the war.

c. B-29 Super Fortress. In Mid 1944, US began to deploy the Boeing B-29 aircraft in the Pacific. It was mainly constructed keeping in mind about the requirement of attacking the mainland Japan. It could travel 6000 km and carry 10 tons of bombs. In Aug 45, B-29 became histories first atomic weapon delivery system.d. Atomic Bomb. The most dramatic development of the war was the atomic bomb, which was successful dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, air power emerged as an end by itself, and not a means to an end.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Japanese Command and Control

50. The Emperor of Japan, Hirohito was the Supreme Commander of the Imperial Armed Forces. The Prime Minister Tojo and the Chiefs of Staff of army and navy were under his command. The Japanese command and control structure is shown in Annex ‘A’. As per the structure, the prime Minister had no control over the Armed Forces.

51. The Emperor of Japan did not have any influence on the military decisions made by the individual forces. Moreover, there was no independent air force; both navy and army had their separate air arms with no co-operation. Therefore, the air assets were never employed under a centralized control.

52. There were major draw backs in the Japanese military chain of command. Admiral Yamamoto insisted upon his decision of invading Pearl Harbour despite opposition and other plan by the Naval General Staff and Admiral Nagumo.

53. There were other problems also like using the forces in penny packets, an absence of strategic vision, failure of timely reinforcement, not giving any importance to the intelligence gathering and analysis process and finally lack of foresight towards training and technological developments. All these adversely affected the Japanese command and control arrangement.

Allied Command and Control

54. In January 1942, the Allied formed a unified American, British, Dutch and Australian Command (ABDACOM) under General Wavell, the British Commander in the Far East.. However, this combined command structure was not very effective due to the strategic disputes of individual interests. However, it was dissolved leading to the geographical division of responsibility. In the Pacific, General Mac Arthur and Admiral Nimitz were given the responsibility of Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific respectively.

55. No one except Washington could issue orders to both commands in the Pacific. Logically, the Pacific was overwhelmingly a naval theatre where Mac Arthur should have been under the command of Nimitz. But inter service rivalry and Mac Arthur’s egos were such that the sensible solution was not followed. There was no unified command structure in the Pacific, but had two separate commands. In essence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Washington acted as overall Pacific Commander. The US Pacific Command Structure during Aug 45 is shown as Annex ‘B’.

LESSONS LEARNT

56. The lessons that could be learnt from this war are:

a. Geography is the keystone of strategy. The very nature of geography of the Pacific called for many innovative strategies including the decisive role of carrier based airpower.

b. Once aim is selected all effort must be concentrated for its attainment.

c. Control of the Air is a prerequisite to any land, sea and air operation.

d. Mass when combined with surprise gives the best result.

e. Air power has a global reach, which should be exploited, to the fullest extent.

f. Flexibility is a crucial attributes of air power. In the Pacific war, the flexible role of air power allowed both the sides to maintain their initiative.

g. Concentration of forces is essential to achieve the desired effect.

h. Air power should be used in mass and not in piecemeal basis.

j. Advanced intelligence is imperative in the successful conduct of any war.

k. Consideration of weather plays important role while planning the mission.

l. Offensive action on enemy’s vital area can have a far-reaching effect. Doolittle raid on Japan resulted more strategic effects than the physical destruction that it caused.

m. Centralize control allows to achieve the unity of command and decentralized execution allows tactical flexibility. General Kennys delegation of authority to his subordinate commanders in the Southwest Pacific is the example.

n. Air power needs to be employed persistently to be effective. The persistent bombing by B-29s from Mariana was the example.

p. Co-operation and co-ordination between air and surface forces can produce synergistic effect.

q. Technology can have a major impact on the warfare. Japanese Zero fighter, US B-29s and the atom bomb signifies that.

r. A correct offence-defence balance is essential for any war. Japanese weak air defence made them vulnerable and slowly degraded their offensive capability.

s. Setting appropriate priority is essential for success in any campaign. Mac Arthur prioritising air superiority for his campaign is the example.

t. The cheapest way to destroy enemy’s air power is to attack them on ground. Air field attacks on Philippines by the Japanese and at Wewak by the Allied are the examples.

u. Air power can be used for mutually supportive role to facilitate ground and naval operation.

v. The strategic bombing can form a powerful adjunct to the economic blockade.

w. Air power is not only a means to end but also an end in itself. The dropping of atomic bomb to end the war signifies that.

CONCLUSION

57. On the morning of 07 Dec 41, the war in the Pacific began with the Japanese attack on US Base at Pearl Harbour. Simultaneously, a carefully planned war was launched against key Allied positions in Philippines, Malay and China. The Allied could delay the Japanese advancement by achieving air superiority. At first local air superiority was gained, subsequently air supremacy over deep of Japanese dominated areas and homeland was achieved. The understanding of the tenets of air power by the Allied was their key to success. The Japanese could gain initial success by gaining local air superiority through surprise, swift offensive operations and better technology. But they failed to maintain the control of air in the later part. The Allied turned the tide by concentration of air power in time and space by using the aircraft carriers and good planning. They could take the war to the Japan’s home land. The Japanese could not correctly appreciate the characteristics of air power and could not build up an effective home defence. All the above factors coupled with the technological surprise of the atom bomb could change the course of the war. Thus the Allied powers have been able to achieve their desired victory followed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki episode in Aug 1945.

Annexes:

A. Japanese Command and Control Structure.

B. Allied Command and Control Structure.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Alan J Levine, The Pacific War-Japan Versus The Allied (London: Prager, 1995).2. Alan Stepens, The War in the Air 1914 -1994 (Alabama: Air University Press, 2001)3. Christy Campbell, Air War Pacific (New York: Crescent Books, 1990)4. David Smurthwaite, Pacific War Atlas 1941-1945 (London: Facts On File, 1995)5. Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography, (Brasseys’s)6. James A. Winnefeld & Dana J Johnson, Joint Air Operations (Rand: 1993)7. John A Warden, The Air Campaign Planning for Combat (Washington: Pergamon- Brassey’s, 1989)8. John Winton, War In The Pacific, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson,1978)9. Mathew K Rodman, A War of Their Own Bombers over the Southwest Pacific (Alabama: Air University Press, 2005)10. R. J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (London: Europa)

Journals/Periodicals

11. Jason B. Barlow, Inter service Rivalry in the Pacific (JFQ: Spring 1994)12. Summary Report, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Washington D.C. 01 July 1946)

Websites

13.http://www.users.bigpond.com/Pacificwar/gatheringstorm/Philippines/Japanattacks.html14.http://www.users.bigpond.com/Pacificwar/gatheringstorm/Philippines/Philoverview.html15. http://www.skylighters.org/ Great Quotations of World War II/Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto16. http://www.airwarfare.com/tactics/tactics_dive

THE PACIFIC AIR CAMPAIGN

INTRODUCTION

1. The road to World War II in Asia and Pacific was largely independent of the European conflict. Only the loose tie of facing common enemies held the axis power together. The threat and the reality of, war in Europe played a major role in creating opportunities for Japan, but perhaps not a decisive one. The Pacific War arose out of Japan’s attempt to conquer China and secure the domination of East and South-east Asia. The pacific phase of World War II was in many ways a unique struggle, with powerful effects. The theater of war was the largest of any in history. Unlike the previous wars, the outcome of the war was decided largely by fighting in the air and under the sea. Air power not only contributed to amphibious or land operations but also attained the strategic effect by exerting direct pressure on the enemy’s capability and will to wage war. Ironically, Americans played a major role in the modernization of Japan and thus helped make the war possible.

2. In 1940, when the Allied forces were engaged to defend the Germany’s blitzkrieg war, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of Japan’s Imperial Navy informed his government that if Japan went to war, he would run wild and win victory upon victory for the first six to twelve months against the Allied forces. But he had no expectation of success if the war continues after that. On his advice Japan initiated the war in the Pacific on 7 December 1941, with a dramatic and shocking display of air power resulting a fatal blow to the US naval strength in the Pacific.

3. The Pacific war was fought between Japan and the Allied power within the period of 1941 to 1945. At the heart of this campaign was to gain secured locations through air superiority for the operation of land based aircraft. This campaign was also driven by geography, distance and requirement of logistics. In this Great War, airpower was linked closely with sea power and emphasis was given on aircraft carrier and naval aviation to a great extent. Unlike the previous wars, the outcome was decided largely by fighting in the air. The cumulative efforts of strategic bombing became prominent in this campaign, which ended with the dropping of atom bomb. Therefore, the Pacific War offers a great scope for the airpower enthusiastic to understand its contributions and the lessons concerning air power.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to analyse the major air operations of the Pacific War in relation to the principles of war and characteristics of air power to derive appropriate lessons.

SCOPE

5. Many isolated battles were fought in the Pacific theatre over a long duration. Therefore the scope of the paper will be limited to the major battles where air power played a decisive role for the outcome of the war, which is as follows:

a. Background

b. Objective and Strategy for Air Campaign

c. General Outline of the war

d. Japanese Air Campaign:

(1) Attack on Pearl Harbour

(2) Attack on Philippines

(3) Battle of Coral Sea

(4) Battle of Midway

e. Allied Air Offensive:

(1) Doolittle Raid

(2) Advance from Central Pacific:

(a) Seize of Tarawa

(b) Fall of Marshalls

(c) Capture of Marianas

(3) Advance from South west Pacific:

(a) Invasion of Guadalcanal

(b) Attack on Wewak

(c) Philippine Campaign

(d) Capturing Okinawa

(4) Strategic Air Offensive

(a) B-29 campaign

(b) Atom Bomb Attack

f. Command and Control

g. Tactical Evolution

h. Impact of Technology

i. Lessons Learnt

BACKGROUND

6. In 1867, with the purchase of Alaska from Russia, with the annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines and Guam in 1898 and in 1914, with the establishment of Panama Canal, the USA emerged as a two-ocean power. Japan profited from her alliance with Britain during WW I, capturing the German positions in China and Germany’s pacific island colonies- the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall Islands. But during 1920s, the Japanese economy was relatively stagnant because of the great depression of the world. By 1929, Japan was facing great financial and social crisis by lacking the raw materials for modern industrialization, which led her to invade mineral-rich Manchuria in north-eastern China in 1931. Japanese incursion into Manchuria gave rise to the tensions between Japan and the USA, as a whole created a great concern for rest of the world.

7. In 1937, Japan declared an all out war against China, further escalating tensions with the USA.  To resist Japan, USA took measures to weaken their economy by freezing all Japanese financial assets in USA and imposed an economic embargo, which would ultimately curb her military power. Later the British and Dutch followed the lead of the US and by July 1941, Japan faced an almost total embargo on strategic imports including oil. The Japanese leaders were looking for some solution to their problem of raw material. Later they planned to capture the oil rich south-east region namely Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Burma. But the only obstacle to their plan was the US Pacific Fleet positioned at Pearl Harbour. Ultimately, Japan planned for attacking Pearl Harbour, which marked the beginning of the Pacific war. An overview of the Pacific theatre is shown as Annex A.

OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGY FOR AIR CAMPAIGN

Japanese Political Objective

8. Japan had the following political objectives:

a. Japanese main objective was to establish their strong foot holds in the region to ensure exploitation of oil and other raw materials much needed to overcome the problems faced by the embargo.

b. The Japanese had two options, either to give up their occupied lands or to go for war. The Japanese leaders were unwilling to give up their new empire and planned to capture the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Burma together with the Southeast region so that, they could extract minerals, raw materials and oil from those areas.

c. It was necessary for Japan to ensure that the Allied military presence in the Pacific would not hinder their southward expedition.

Japanese Strategy

9. Considering the political objectives, Japan adopted the following strategies:

a. The Great Britain was busy to protect her homeland where she was losing to Germany and Japan thought that the entire war-making potentials of Britain would spent in an effort to protect her home land. So, its threat was discarded.

b. In June 1941, Japan entered a peace pact with Russia and she also thought that Germany would eventually defeat Russia. This would free their forces tide down on the Manchurian front.

c. The United States, a democratic country, was facing serious threat elsewhere. So, she would not accept heavy losses while trying to dislodge the Japanese from their conquests.

d. The United States could be further weakened by an attack on Pearl Harbour, which was their only base in Pacific. Japan calculated that USA would require about 18 months to 2 years to rebuild its strength. During this time, Japan would strengthen its position by establishing forward airfields and bases in the South Pacific.

Allied Political Objective

10. Allied had the following political objectives:

a. To make Japan isolated to weaken its economy, which ultimately would curb her military power.

b. To put restrictions on the export to Japan of commodities and equipment that were potentially useful in war, the freezing of Japanese assets in the US and increasing aid to China.

c. Cut off the sea supply line to Japan and to launch an all out offensive against Japan to make sure that the Japanese accept an unconditional surrender.

Allied Strategy

11. Before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour, allied had no significant strategy against Japan. However, after attack on Pearl Harbour, United States war-planning groups had developed a course of action known as the “Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan”. The allied strategies can be summarised as follows:

a. To defeat the empire by destroying its capacity to resist without invading the homelands and thereby avoiding high cost in man and material of an invasion.

b. To carry out aerial bombardment at Japan’s industrial bases.

c. To inflict heavy attrition on Japan’s naval and air forces.

d. To carry out two mutually supportive offensives. One from Central Pacific Area led by Admiral Nimitz and the other from South West Pacific area led by General MacArthur. It should be noted that both offensives were oriented toward re-taking the Philippines for its numbers of forward air bases.

e. Pursued an offensive air strategy to take the war to the Japanese mainland and carry out strategic bombing against Japan’s industrial bases.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE WAR

12. In accordance with their strategy, the Japanese Army was given primary responsibility for conquering Philippines, Malaya, Sumatra and Burma. The Japanese Navy was assigned the primary responsibility for an attack on Pearl Harbour and then launching operations in the Philippines, Borneo, Celebes, Java, northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and out to the Gilbert Islands and Wake. The Japanese started the war 0n 07 Dec 1941 by carrying out a pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbour. At the same time Japanese attacked and captured Malaya and Philippines. Following the initial successes in these areas, Wake, Guam and Rabaul were occupied shortly thereafter. At the end of 4 months of war, they had carried out the substance of their initial program. The magnitude of these successes encouraged the Japanese planners to consider expansion beyond the original perimeter to south of the Bismarck Archipelago. This would have threatened America’s communications with Australia. Allies decided to hold Port Moresby and a line north of Espiritu Santo and the Fiji Islands. At the same time, Allies started giving a lot of importance to the intelligence. This helped them to counter Japan’s threat in the Coral Sea and Midway. This was the turning point in the pacific.

13. From here onwards, the Allies decided to go on the offensive and planned a two-pronged offensive. One was through the SouthWest Pacific via the north coast of New Guinea to the Philippines and the other across the Central Pacific through the Marshalls to Okinawa. Basically, the advance was for the purpose of projecting Allied Air Power to points which cut Japan's supply lines to the south and were within striking range of the Japanese home islands. These amphibious steps along the two principal lines of advance toward Japan were well timed and mutually supporting. After the liberation of the Philippines and the capture of Okinawa, oil imports into Japan were cut off, its industries had collapsed and it was only a matter of time before Japan would surrender. The long-range bombing offensive from the Marianas was initiated in November 1944. Japan had been critically wounded by military defeats, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The Naval aircraft, Army aircraft and B-29s operating from China and Marianas took part in the strategic bombing offensive. This offensive culminated in dropping of two atom bombs over Japan. At this stage Japan unconditionally surrendered to the allied forces.

JAPANESE AIR CAMPAIGNSAttack on Pearl Harbour

14. Objective. Objective of the air operation was to destroy the pacific fleet at the very start of hostilities.

15. Air Strategy. Air Strategy of this operation was as follows:

a. To achieve maximum destruction through surprise attack.

b. To launch two separate wave in two different route to avoid interference.

c. Made TOT 0740 to catch the Americans unprepared, as they were on the way to their office.

16. Air Operation. Admiral Takijiro Onishi, the Chief of Staff of 11 th Air Fleet were instructed to carry out feasibility study of the attack. He, along with his Staff Commander Minoru Genda stipulated that only possibility of gaining success was by maintaining complete secrecy. Japanese Force Package was a constituted with two Battleships, six Aircraft Carriers, two heavy and one light Cruisers, nine destroyers, three submarines and eight tankers. As per the plan, Japanese forces, under the command of Vice-Admiral Nagumo, left Kuril Island at 0600 on 26 Nov 41. To achieve surprise, they chose the route via north so that they were not being detected. At 500 miles north of Oahu the task force fuelled at sea on 6 and 7 Dec screened by a dense low cloud. On 7th Dec at 0600 hrs Japanese intelligence could not trace American aircraft carriers. But still Japan persisted on their plan and went on with the attack. The first wave was launched with 183 aircraft of various types of bombers along with the superb Zero fighters from a position 230 miles north of Pearl Harbour. At 0702, an Army mobile radar set at Opana reported the incoming planes which was misinterpreted by the Army Aircraft Warning Service Information Centre as a scheduled flight of B-17 coming from the main land California. Thus, the attack could achieve complete surprise with devastating effects. A second wave of 170 aircraft arrived after 45 minutes. Within 02 hours, the Japanese crippled 18 battle ships, destroyed 285 aircraft and killed or injured about 3581 American personnel. On the other hand, Japan lost only 29 aircraft, 06 submarines and about 100 lives. But the Pacific Fleet’s priceless fuel and ammunition reserves, repair stocks, dry docks and submarines pens and more importantly four careers were untouched. Despite the request for mounting the second attack, Admiral Nagumo ordered his task force to set course for home thinking of retaliation from the American Career and Land-base aircraft. This failure to exploit the initial success at Pearl Harbour restricted the Japanese achievement to a tactical victory what could have been a long term strategic gain. The map projecting Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour is shown as Annex B.

17. Analysis. Although it was an astonishing tactical victory for the Japanese but in political terms Pearl Harbour was a disaster for them. Winston Churchill rightly understood that after the attack United States would fight it his side, for that he said: “So we have won

after all! Hitler’s faith was sealed. Mussolini’s faith was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to powder. All that rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force.” The revisionist historians argued that as Roosevelt was not getting the support of American First Committee, 800,000 members strong, to engage in war. So there exists a kind of conspiracy to take United States into the war by provoking Japanese surprise attack. But American military planners never thought that Japanese could reach to Hawaii. Japanese Air Offensive in Pearl Harbour is characterized by the following:

a. Surprise. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a classic example of achieving surprise. Japan could successfully deny information to the Americans. They were able to keep total plan secret. Even they choose such route to obscure them from any kind of detection. Americans never expected any attack from the north of Hawaii. Again at the time of attack, selected by the Japanese, the Americans were on the way to there office. Thus, Americans were totally caught unprepared. So denying information, choosing an unexpected approach route, fuelling under cloud cover, and selection of the TOT was the core factors in achieving surprise.

b. Concentration of Force. Japan could successfully concentrate forces on Pearl Harbour. They employed their superior Kate and Val dive bombers for attack role and Zero Fighters for escorting. They rightly identified Pacific Fleet positioned at Pearl Harbour as COG and employed over 350 aircraft for air offensive, which was a perfect match for the target. The time frame was perfect for the attack, as at that time Americans were preparing to come to office. So concentration of superior force against Americans at decisive time and place was the key to success.

c. Reach. Air vehicles can project military forces over great distance. This was well proved when Japanese war planes launched air attack on Pearl Harbour from a distance of 230 nm and safely returned to there carriers. That was a unique projection of air power’s strength. Because of the reach of air power, Japanese carriers could remain much away from the target and achieved surprise.

d. Versatility. Versatility, one of the most important characteristics of air power, was exploited effectively on pearl harbour. Japanese employed the Zero fighters’ primarily for escorting the bombers. Ones the attack force reached over Pearl Harbour uninterrupted, Zeros successfully conducted ground offensive against the targets. This was the classic example of Airpower’s Versatility.

e. Intelligence. Intelligence plays a vital role when it is produced in right time. Admiral Nagumo was informed about the absence of US carriers in Pearl Harbour, but that was too late. By that time he was too close to the target (230 miles north of Pearl Harbour). He had no time to delay the attack as there would be possibility of being detected, weather would turn bad and element of surprise would be lost. In time intelligence would give him chance to re-decide his plan. So due to poor intelligence Japanese could not destroy the Priceless US Pacific Fleet carriers,

Lexington and Yorkshire, which played decisive role for US in subsequent battles.

f. Persistence. Persistency offers less reaction time to the enemy and thereby provides opportunity to destroy the enemy’s war potentials completely. Admiral Nagumo failed to anticipate the need for sustained attack. Despite having the initial success and having reached so close to Pearl Harbour with enormous fire power capability and having gained complete air superiority after the destruction of Pacific Fleet, Japanese could not capitalise on it and destroy the remaining high value targets.

18. Assumptions. Through the above discussion following assumption can be made about the objective that Japanese commanders wanted to achieve:

a. Japanese wanted to give a decisive blow by a surprise attack and compel them to come for a negotiation.

b. Though Japanese intelligence could not trace American aircraft carriers still they persisted on their plan. This was because they wanted to paralyse the US Pacific Fleet before they invade Philippine in the same date which we will discuss subsequently.

Attack on the Philippines

19. Objective. The Japanese objective was to capture the Philippines to have a new source of industrial raw materials and also to gain a stronghold in the region.

20. Air Strategy. Considering the above objective Japanese had the following air strategy:

a. To concentrate maximum force to neutralise Allied strength.

b. To gain control of the air to facilitate the amphibious landing.

21. Air Operation. Japanese plan was to first neutralize the Allied air power in the Philippines, gain control of the air and then carry out the amphibious landing. It is to be mentioned here that Japanese Army Air Corps fighters had only 350 miles of combat radius whereas distance from Formosa to Manila was 550 miles. So Zero’s engines were modified to increase their combat radius to escort the bombers up to Manila from Formosa. This was a technological surprise to the allied force. On 08 Dec 41 Japanese launched about 500 bombers and Zero fighters from Formosa base. The planned TOT was shifted due to dense fog over Formosa. As the attack was carried out just after few hours of attack on Pearl Harbour, the allied force was expected to be alert for any Japanese air raid. But still the Japanese could successfully cripple the US air element in the Philippines by destroying 160 aircraft including B-17s. Finally Japan captured Manila on 02 Jan 42. The map showing Japanese attack on Philippines is shown as Annex C.

22. Analysis. Following factors warrant especial mention with regard to the air operation in the Philippines:

a. Co-ordination. Cooperation entails the co-ordination of all activities to achieve the maximum combined effort. Japanese displayed beautiful co-ordinated effort by the air and ground forces in this campaign. Following the air attacks by the Japanese air elements, ground forces moved in to capture the island.

b. Offensive Action. Offensive Action is the chief means to influence the out-come of an operation. Japanese took the initiative to carry out offensive action in the Philippines. Within few hours they crippled the US air elements and gained con-trol of the air which paved the way for the ground forces to invade the islands. It would be impossible for Japanese to invade Philippines without suppressing the Americans air power.

c. Control of The Air. Control of the air is essential to deny enemy to inflict damage to the friendly forces. Japanese Air offensive could successfully gain de-sired degree of control of the air to allow friendly land forces unhindered amphibious landing. This ultimately contributed to the capture of Philippine.

d. Concentration of Force. Japanese realised the need to destroy the American air power at their base. For that they employed most of the superior fighters in this operation. They used over 500 aircraft to launch the Air Offensive and achieved complete destruction of B-17s and other air defence aircraft at their bases. It was a well planned concentration of force in time and space which allowed the successful amphibious landing of ground troops.

Battle of Coral Sea

23. Objective. Objective of this operation was to capture Port Moresby and cut American line of supply with Australia.

24. Air Strategy. Keeping above objective in mind Japanese adopted the following strategy:

a. Employ superior carrier force in the south-west pacific to create deterrence.

b. To maneuver both their carriers under the cloud cover to evade US air attacks.

c. To launch massive air attack on the Allied carrier fleet.

25. Air Operation. Japanese campaign began on 03 May 42 with the invasion of Tulagi. By 04 May 42, the Japanese assembled a formidable naval force in Rabaul and set course for Port Moresby with two fleet carriers; the Zuikaku and Shokaku under the

command of Vice-Admiral Takagi. Admiral Nimitz, Commander of US Navy Pacific theatre, was aware of the Japanese advance, since US code-breakers deciphered the Japanese naval code. He promptly sent 02 carriers, Lexington and Yorktown, to the Coral Sea under the command of Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch and Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher respectively. On 07 May 42 Takagi was reported about the presence of US carrier some 200 miles south. He launched a major attack by a total of 78 aircraft including bombers and Zero Fighters and destroyed a tanker Neosho (which was thought to be a US Carrier) and a destroyer Sims. Fletcher also launched major attack against Japanese support group thinking as main force. Small little battle continued throughout the day and both side suffered minor losses. On 08 May at 0722 hours, spotting the Japanese Carrier Strike Force, Fletcher ordered an attack by deploying 82 aircraft. Zuikaku managed to escape a counter strike taking the advantage of a rainsquall but Shokaku got badly damaged and left the battle front. On the other hand, the Japanese also launched aerial attacks against the US Fleet with 69 aircraft. US carrier Lexington was sunk and Yorktown got damaged and returned to Pearl Harbour. Both side suffered heavy losses because of inexperience crew. The map of the Battle of Coral Sea is shown as Annex D.

26. Analysis. The Battle of Coral Sea was the first ever career-vs-career battle in the history of warfare in which no one knew how best to use them. In this battle both side suffered heavy losses but neither side could attain a comprehensive victory. However, the Allies foiled the Japanese invasion of Port Moresby and hence considered a strategic defeat for the Japanese. The battle of Coral Sea can be better analysed from the observance and non-observance of the following principle of wars:

a. Security. A degree of security by information denial is essential to all operation. Japanese successfully secured their plan of attacking Pearl Harbour but this time they failed to secure their information. With invention of ‘Magic’ – the decoding device, American achieved access to the Japanese secret plans. Ultimately, Japanese could not proceed with operation and were instead led into a carrier battle unprepared. Japanese failed to maintain the secrecy of information in successive battles too and paid heavily.

b. Sensitivity to Weather. Bad weather remains as a prime limitation of Air Power. The Japanese successfully exploited air power’s sensitivity to weather. They maneuvered both the carriers under the cloud cover to evade US air attacks. Thus, they were successful is saving ‘Juikaku’ and subsequently number of air offensive missions were carried out from this carrier.

c. Offence-Defence Balance. It is pertinent make a balance between offensive and defensive action to win a battle. But in Battle of Coral Sea, both the forces resorted to offensive posture leaving inadequate fighters to defend their carriers. As a result, the carriers of both the sides were vulnerable to air attacks and suffered heavy losses and ultimately the battle turned into a Tactical Draw.

d. Economy of Effort. The air power weapons systems need to be matched to the task. But, due to wrong identification, Japanese used massive force for destroying

the fleet tanker thinking that it was a US career. On the other hand US launched major attack against Japanese support group assuming as the main force. This was completely a wasteful expenditure of effort.

27. Ones again Japanese failed to attain their objective. Had they be able to seize Port Moresby, US would loose the gateway to New Guinea and Australia and that could have had really depressing effect on United States. On the other hand success in defending Port Moresby with relatively untrained force had boosted the moral of United States.

Battle of Midway

28. Objective. Capture Midway and establish control in the central pacific.

29. Air Strategy. In persuasion of the objective Japanese had the following air strategy:

a. Make diversionary move towards the Aleutian Island to confuse the allied force.

b. Concentrate massive force to inflict maximum attrition to Allied force.

30. Air Operations. When Admiral Nagano advocated attack against Australia, Admiral Yamamoto warned of the dangers presented by the still intact US carrier. He planned to attack Midway with a diversionary attack on Aleutian Island, 200 miles north of Midway. The main carrier force, consisting of 04 large carriers, advanced to capture Midway. But this time US was fully prepared and they learned about the Japanese plan by using ‘Magic’ (Communication code breaking system) thus they positioned 03 carriers north of Midway much before. On 03 Jun 42, US patrol aircraft sighted the Japanese invasion force and US fighter engaged them from Midway without much effect. On 04 Jun 42, the first wave of US torpedo aircraft attacked the Japanese carriers. The Japanese fought back with all they had. They used up valuable ammunition and fuel, and sent their air cover out to fight leaving the fleet unprotected. Much to their shock, a follow-up wave of Wildcats and Dauntless dive-bombers then arrived. By the end of the day, the Japanese lost all 04 carriers. The map of the Battle of Midway is shown as Annex E.

31. Analysis. The result of this battle had far reaching strategic effect. The Japanese plan of capturing Midway was abandoned, thus halting Japanese expansion across Asia Pacific. Japanese failure in the Battle of Midway can further be analyzed in terms of the following factors:

a. Surprise. Surprise remains a key principle throughout War in Pacific. Japanese achieved success by denying information during the attack on Pearl Harbour but this time elements of surprise achieved by US ‘Magic’ played havoc to the Japanese. Nimitz successfully surprised the Japanese by a vigorous attack with the help of carrier-based air power and inflicted heavy damage though the US force was inferior in quality and quantity. So surprise action can achieve results out of all

proportion to the effort expanded.

b. Concentration of Force. It is pertinent to concentrate forces to attain goal. Japan successfully did that in all previous encounters but failed to do so where it was most necessary. Japanese planner made the most devastating error by dispersing their forces with an unsuccessful attempt to distract the Americans. Had the Japanese force been concentrated to take Midway, the result could have been very different. Thus concentration of forces in decisive time and place remains as an important tool to commander.

c. Security and Intelligence. Failure to secure intelligence by Japanese and success in attaining the useful intelligence has a profound impact on the out come of the war. Nimitz came to know Nagumo’s battle plan due to Japanese failure to secure their communication system and were well prepared with his own plan. On the other hand, Admiral Nagumo concentrated sufficient forces but could not capitalize them because of not knowing the enemy’s presence.

Causes of Japanese Set Back

32. Japan was superior in quality and quantity of their war plans. She had comparatively fast and heavily armed and more sophisticated aircraft carriers. Again Japan had the initiative and initial success. But still as the war progressed, they started shrinking in quality, moral courage and strength because of the following:

a. They always had the intention of containing Americans, not to defeat them. For that they never stretched out to their full capacity and exploited the opportunities.

b. Japanese were inferior in terms of intelligence gathering. Americans exploited their superior intelligence technology to the fullest and could achieve the success. Even in the present day warfare, intelligence is seen to play a forefront role.

c. Japan failed to maintain good co-operation with Germany where she could have expected some support from Germany. Had they be able to form an ally, they could be much stronger than they were as individual. Present days multinational force concept indicates the need for the formation of ally.

ALLIED AIR OFFENSIVE

33. Japanese Strategy. Since losing the Philippines meant the loss of all oil and other supplies from Southeast Asia, the Japanese decided to protect the Leyte Gulf in the Philippines.

34. Allied Strategy . The allied offensive was a series of island-hopping jungle campaigns, revolving around the capture or construction of airfields. Aircraft careers were

scarce, so the range of land-based fighters limited the length of the amphibious jumps. They planned to go into offensive and set out for a two-pronged advance to take the war on the Japanese mainland. One was through the Southwest Pacific via the north coast of New Guinea to the Philippines led by General Mac Arthur and the other across the Central Pacific through the Marshalls to Okinawa led by Admiral Nimitz. Both pronged of offensive required tremendous air support. After the Allied captured Marianas and Okinawa, they concentrated long-range bombing offensive. The Allied offensive ended by dropping of two atom bombs over Japan resulting Japanese unconditional surrender. However, the first initiative by the Allied was the raid over mainland Japan carried out by Col James Doolittle on 18 April 1942 which is widely known as Doolittle Raid.

Doolittle Raid

35. The Raid. Col James Doolittle conducted the raids with sixteen B-25 aircraft from US carrier HORNET about 700 NM from Japan. The aircraft were armed with 500 lb demolition and incendiary bombs. Their targets were oil storage depot, factories, generating plants, military buildings over Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Yokohama and Yokosuka. The premature take off and failure to properly coordinate preparations with China caused the loss of every plane except one that flew to Siberia. Air power’s capability of reach was projected during the Doolittle Raid as shown in Annex F.

36. Analysis. The Doolittle raid was insignificant but raised Allied morale, which had tremendous psychological effect. This was precedence of projecting air power on Japanese sky by US for the first time. The attack led to the following subsequent actions:

a. The raid had strategic impact on Japanese, which compelled them to expand their defensive perimeter.

b. Realizing that Japan was well within the reach of Allied air strike, Japanese committed their fighter groups to defend the mainland that would have been better used else where.

Advance from Central Pacific

37. Objective. The Allied forces objective was to capture Saipan and Guam of Mariana Islands from where Japan would come within the range of land based strike aircraft. Allied Lines of Advance from the Central Pacific is shown as Annex G.

38. Air Strategy. Considering the above objective Allied had the following air strategy:

a. To outflank the Japanese in New Guinea through best exploitation of land based strike aircraft considering it to be the shortest way.

b. To advance in a step-by-step approach with individual islands providing the steps. As one step was occupied it could be converted into a base which would

support the next step forward.

c. Capturing the islands would make the logistic supply to the southern Japanese forces difficult. To do so, Nimitz decided to make the best use of air and sea power in the Central Pacific Campaign.

39. Seize of Tarawa. Tarawa is located at the Gilbert Islands. It was necessary to capture these islands as a first step towards Tokyo because they were important Japanese sea-bases in the Central Pacific. On 20 Nov 43 heavy air bombardment struck the Gilbert Islands. The heavily defended Tarawa was captured on 23 Nov 43 at the cost of 3300 US Marines.

40. Fall of Marshalls. Taking lessons from the Gilbert operations, the US navy and marines fought the battles at the Marshall Islands. On 29 Jan 44, the Americans bypassed the outer ring of the Marshall Islands to strike at Kwajalein at its centre. Two American divisions were committed, with heavy and accurate naval gunfire and air support. Truk was not only the reputed centre of Japanese naval strength but was also the base from which air reinforcements could have been flown into the Marshalls. The American carrier strike on Truk on 17 February 1944 was one of the most effective strategic air operations of the war achieving complete surprise. Heavy bombardment by Allied forces followed by amphibious landing resulted in destroying 250 Japanese aircraft against 25 aircraft from Allied. The line of communication to Rabaul was cut successfully and the operation ended on 22 Feb 44.

41. Capture of the Marianas. The Mariana islands had a tremendous strategic value for the larger islands of the group – Guam, Saipan and Tinian – offered bases from which B-29s could bomb Japan. More importantly they were the Japan’s line of communications. The allied Task Force 58 commanded by Admiral Spruance sailed for invading the Marianas. Spruanc’s counterpart in these islands was Jisaburo Ozawa with nine carrier fleet against allied fifteen and half the planes, 473 to 956 of allied. To offset this, Japanese took the initiative. On the morning of June 19, 1944 Ozawa launched his attack approaching from south-west direction. American flying boat spotted the carrier at 1:15 a.m. Four waves of planes struck Task Force 58 during the late morning and afternoon. They were intercepted, and the result was a total disaster for the Japanese; the Americans called it the “Marianas Turkey Shoot.” It was one of the biggest air battles in the war, and one of the most one-sided. Only a single bomb hit one of the American battleships and that was the only real damage to the Task Force 58. Japan lost 243 planes against the allied loss of only 31.

Advance from South West Pacific

42. Objective. The objective of the advance was to seize bases from where air force could extend the bomb line. Allied Lines of Advance from the Southwest Pacific is shown as Annex H.

43. Air Strategy. Considering the above objective Allied had the following air strategy:

a. To defend vital military areas to prevent the Japanese advance, and to mount air offensives against enemy forces.

b. To proceed from south-west Pacific up the north coast of New Guinea to the Philippines and then to Okinawa for an air offensive on Japan.

c. MacArthur delegated full authority on his able air component commander Lieutenant General Kenny for air superiority over the areas of operation.

44. Invasion of Guadalcanal. The island was a key point to protect Japan's major base at Rabaul, threatening Allied supply and communication lines, and establishing a staging area for possible future offensives. Capturing it would allow it to be used as a starting point to isolate the Japanese base at Rabaul. The Battle of Guadalcanal started from 07 August 1942 with the landing by US Marines. They captured the undetected airfield which the Japanese were constructing and completed it. JNAF strength at Rabaul reduced to 100 from a total of 200 after this battle with 36 shot down at the end of January 1943 as they tried to cover the evacuation of Japanese forces from Solomon Islands. American authorities declared Guadalcanal secured on 09 February, 1943, after more than six months of combat. In this battle, the Allies lost 615 aircraft and 29 ships on the other hand the Japanese lost 683 aircraft and 38 ships. Throughout this battle, the Allied forces received continuous supply of nearly 2200 tons of rations, vehicles and medium artillery delivered by air. Japanese plans for further offensives in South and Southwest Pacific were stopped. They became clearly defensive.

45. Attack on Wewak. Kenny always favoured the idea that, the best and the cheapest place to destroy the enemy was on ground by airfield attack. The Japanese were caught by surprise with over 150 aircraft on the ground, out of which 120 were destroyed. The effectiveness of low level attacks on airfield was much improved by the use of parachute-retarded fragmentation bombs. More so, the interdiction missions on Japanese supply lines severely restricted their mobility. During September 1943, In the midst of the operation, the Americans broke the Japanese Army’s codes. Based on this intelligence Kenny secretly built an airfield at Tsilli Tsilli, while 2 fake airfields were created close to Japanese positions at Wewak using ground troops. This eventually diverted Japanese attacks; and when the Japanese detected the real airfield, it was too late to prevent the US surprise attack by 200 bombers that destroyed about 175 Japanese aircraft on ground. Only 22 American planes were lost and the Japanese could not interfere with the next Allied move.

46. Philippine Campaign. For subsequent operations, the Americans chose to capture the Philippines as adjudicated by President Franklin Roosevelt which lay across the supply lines to Japan. The plan was complex and aggressive ignoring Japan's strategic immobility due to lack of oil. The Task force-38 of Third Fleet struck Japanese aircraft, airfields and shipping in the Philippines. MacArthur’s troops landed on Leyte Gulf on 20 Oct 1944. Few Japanese air attacks occurred up to 24 October, but on that day half of the total 396 aircraft of JNAF and JAAF approached the beach-head only to suffer 66 shot

down. Meanwhile the Japanese Fleet was detected and attacked by 150 Allied bomber sorties, but with discouraging results. Although the monster Japanese battleship ‘Mushashi’ was sunk, only one other ship was forced to turn back. Five battleships and seven heavy cruisers continued while the air battle went on elsewhere and the naval battle resolved by conventional ship versus ship combat in Surigao Strait. Ultimately, the Japanese were defeated due to lack of expected land-based air support and air reconnaissance. The invasion of Leyte Gulf and recapture of Philippines allowed the Allied force to cut off any supply from Southeast Asia including oil. Ultimately after the loss of Philippines, the Allied closed in on inner defence of Japan. The Battle of Leyte Gulf destroyed Japanese naval power and opened the way for the advance to the Okinawa.

47. Kamikazes. In the fall of 1944, the Japanese recognized the ineffectiveness of the usual form of the air attack. The Naval air Command suggested using conventional planes as suicide weapons. The Japanese provided another tactical surprise during this battle that is the ‘Kamikazes’. The first Carrier victim of this ‘Kamikaze’ was the large escort carrier ‘Santee’, hit by a ‘Zero’ which dived through the flight deck and set her on fire. It is believed that 2525 Navy and 1388 Army fliers died in the suicide attacks; they sank fifty seven ships and damaged hundreds. The Japanese, however, vastly overestimated the losses caused by all the suicide weapons.

48. Capturing Okinawa. The capture of Okinawa would give the Americans complete control of the East China Sea and complete the blockade of Japan. It was wanted mainly as a forward base for an invasion of Japan. Code-named Operation ICEBURG, the invasion of Okinawa began on April 1st, 1945, when 60,000 troops (two marine and two army divisions) landed with little opposition. The battle proceeded in four phases. Although the first three phases encountered only mild opposition, the final phase proved extremely difficult because the Japanese were deep underground and naval gunfire support was ineffective. The fleet lost 763 aircraft. The total American casualties in the operation numbered more than 12,000 killed and 36,000 wounded. This invasion of Okinawa fully justified with the overall strategy of the Allied Force.

Analysis

49. Several important principles of war and characteristics of air power were observed during the Allied air offensive, which is discussed below:

a. Coordination and Cooperation. Lack of coordination was quite evident during the battle of Marianas where Japanese launched another raid and lost valuable air assets without knowing the outcome of first attack. On the other hand, sound planning, close cooperation and coordinated operation were the important factors in achieving victory for the Allied. It was significant during the fall of Marshalls where the Allied air bombardment was followed by the amphibious landing of the US Marines.

b. Concentration of Force. Having understood the importance of capturing the Marianas, the Allies concentrated 15 carriers along with 956 aircraft against

Japanese 9 carriers and 437 aircraft. Because of the tremendous loss of Japanese aircraft and trained pilots in Lette Gulf, they could not concentrate required amount of force at Marianas. Although the Japanese took the initiative at the beginning but they could not continue due to overwhelming concentration of force by the Allies, thus they lost the battle.

c. Security. The Japanese wide spread deployment caused them to fail in securing their vital supply routes as well as the airfields under their control. This facilitated the Allies to capture the airfields at Guadalcanal, Wewak and Truk without much of resistance from the Japanese ground forces.

d. Use of Ground Forces To Achieve Air Superiority. Gen Mac Arthur believed, once the air superiority is achieved, the other operations can go unchallenged. The operations of neutralising the strong Japanese concentrations at Wewak and Guadalcanal signify that the ground forces contributed greatly to gain air superiority.

e. Lack of Aim. Though Kamikaze tactics could inflict heavy toll on the allied forces but fell short of achieving a clear aim. This was proved in the battle of Leyte Gulf where many aircraft were committed for Kamikaze without any fruitful result but those aircraft as well as the pilots could have been preserved for Okinawa campaign.

f. Airfield Attack. The cheapest and most effective way of destroying enemy aircraft is when those are on ground i.e. by airfield attack. Airfield attacks on Rabaul and Wewak by Allied forces has justified it.

g. Versatility. B-29s were used to support amphibious operation while securing Mariana. After that, it was used for bombing on Japanese home islands. B-29s were also used to mine Japanese water for maritime blockade. The multi purpose use of B-29s demonstrated the versatility of air power.

Strategic Air Offensive

50. B-29 Campaign. So far in the Pacific campaign, air power was used in support of land or naval operation. The B-29 campaign was marked for the first major sustained use of air power in the Pacific Campaign with its independent role. The initial strategic air offensive by B-29s from China could reach only a small portion of southern Japan up to Nagasaki. Subsequently, all the bombers were shifted to the Marianas and the bomb line could be extended to cover almost the entire Japan. The strategic air offensive against Japan began on June 14, 1944 in a small scale. The main air offensive campaign started in late November 1944 by 21st Bomber Command, based in Marianas. Initial attacks were on Japan’s steel industry and aircraft plants form high altitude but results were poor. Later on Curtis Lemay changed the strategy and started incendiary area attacks from low altitude at nights. On March 10, 1945 Lemay sent 334 bombers to attack Tokyo. It was the start of an air campaign that was incredibly destructed sixteen square miles of built-up

area and quarter of Tokyo’s building. A series of attacks on Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe caused tremendous destruction. In June, 1945 a new wing of B-29 arrived with an accurate new radar bombing system. This Eagle wing began night attacks on Japanese oil industry. Only fifteen attacks were needed to reduce the industry to ruins. The gigantic fires destroyed much of the remaining stocks of food, clothing and medicine. B-29s also flew hundreds of mine laying sorties in the waters around Japan that estimated to have sunk 123 ships. By the end of war, sixty-six cities had been hit, and forty-two were more than 50 per cent destroyed. The bombers wrecked what was left of Japan’s war production. By July, 1945 industrial out put reduced to 40 per cent compare to 1944. With an air capability that had already been destroyed, Japanese air defence was ineffective to oppose the B-29 bombing campaign.

51. Atom Bomb Attack. On July 25, the strategic air command in the Pacific was ordered to lunch the atomic attack as soon as weather allowed after August 3, 1945. On August 6, 1945, the first atom bomb named Little Boy was dropped by B-29 over Hiroshima. This uranium bomb was equivalent to 14000 tons of TNT and caused 70,000 immediate deaths. Second one was a plutonium bomb named Fat Man, dropped on Nagasaki on August 9 and killed at least 40,000 people. The use of atomic bomb was one of the most controversial aspects of WW-II. On August10, President Truman ruled that no more bombs should be used until further notice. On August 15, Japan announced its surrender. The formal surrender was signed on September 2, aboard the battle ship Missouri in Tokyo bay, ending the Second World War. The map of Allied Strategic Air Offensive is shown as Annex J.

52. Analysis. The following analysis can be made:

a. Air Power as Shock Action. The shock of aerial bombardment induced panic on Japanese population and destroyed their morale to continue the war.

b. Effect on Target Population. A comprehensive bombing strategy can have profound effect on civilian morale and divert the opponent’s military effort away from offensive operation to home defence.

c. Reach. The Allies could utilize the reach of air power effectively. B-29s, from their new position at Mariana, were able to burn and destroy any part of Japan, which no one could believe possible before the attack took place.

d. Offence-Defence Balance. Due to an all out offensive effort at the beginning, the Japanese ran short of trained aircrew to defend their motherland. This poor air defence system could not inflict maximum attrition to the Allied forces during the strategic campaign causing a humiliating defeat for them.

e. Persistence.Persistent bombing by the Allied over Japanese mainland crippled their industrial base from which they could not recover.

f. Air Power Can Achieve an End State. Dropping of atom bombs on the Japanese soil and the effect there after proved that air power can bring a decisive end to a conflict.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Japanese C2

53. There was no separate Air Force in Japan during WW-II. Army and Navy had own Air arms virtually with no cooperation. Therefore, the air assets were never employed under a centralized control. On many occasions, it resulted in failure to adequately coordinate the operations as well. Admiral Yamamoto was the commander of the Japanese combined fleet. Emperor was the supreme head of the Army and Navy Air arms. By Imperial ordinance, it had been decreed that the posts of Minister of War and Minister of Marine shall be held only by generals and admirals. Thus a Government cannot be formed unless officers are available and willing to fill these posts.

54. There was a Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals to assist the emperor during peace time. The Emperor of Japan did not have any influence on the military decisions made by the individual forces. Besides there was a Supreme War Council consisted of Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs. During War, the Supreme War Council was to form an Imperial Headquarters which was under the supreme direction of the Emperor.

The Allied C2

55. Allied command was activated on 15 January 1942 under Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavel. It was named American, British, Dutch and Australian Command (ABDACOM). This combined command structure was not very effective due to the strategic disputes of individual interests. However, it was dissolved leading to the geographical division of responsibility. In the Pacific, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were given the responsibility of Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific respectively.

56. In March 1942, General MacArthur took command of new ‘South West Pacific Theatre’ and Admiral Chester Nimitz assumed command of the Central Pacific Fleet. The air element was grouped under Allied Force Commander George C Kenny who had the Royal Australian Air Force, Dutch Task Force73 and US fifth Air Force under him. There was no unified command structure in the Pacific, but had two separate commands.

Analysis

57. Japanese Strengths and Weaknesses. Japan’s governmental structure provided no effective civilian control of her Army and Navy for obtaining effective coordination between the services. Military policy was inconsistent with the foreign policy of the cabinet. The Japanese Army and Navy tending to make their own foreign policy in accordance with their individual aims, capabilities and requirement. One of Japan’s greatest military weaknesses was the bitter rivalry between the Army and the Navy. Japanese Army was

traditionally a stronghold of the Coshu clan while the Navy was traditionally dominated by the rival Satsuma clan. During the war bureaucratic rivalry between her Army and Navy impeded coordinated strategic and tactical planning, the proper employment of her air power, the development of adequate logistics and the efficient utilization of her economic resources. The existence of joint or combined organizations as the Supreme War Council, The Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the Imperial Headquarters served mainly to hide the fact that real unity, integration and coordination were conspicuously lacking. It was almost as if the war was fought by two uneasy and distrustful allies rather than sister services of a single nation. In fact within the whole spectrum of Japanese air campaign they didn’t have any strength in their complicated command and control structure.

58. Allied Strengths and Weaknesses. Logically, the pacific was overwhelmingly a naval theatre and MacAurther should have been under Nimitz but inter service jealousies and MacAurther’s ego and prestige were such that the sensible solution was not followed. However this rivalry was a weakness on the Allied part but it had less effect on the courses of the war. Due to democracy in USA and civilian control over the military, each theatre commander used the air, ground and sea forces assigned to him as an integrated or coordinated team. Coordination and compromise among theatre commanders was largely achieved in all major respects. This centralized control and decentralized execution was the strength of the Allied command and control structure. The lessons of the Pacific war strongly support that form of organization which provides unity of command, capable of clear and effective decision at the top, strengthens civilian control and thus provides integration of military policy with foreign and domestic policy. This favours a high degree of coordination in planning, intelligence, and research and development.

TACTICAL EVOLUTION

59. Pacific war had the varied nature of targets and geography which caused the development of new methods and innovative tactics of airpower by the both participants:

a. Low Level Skip Bombing. General Kenney introduced the low-level ‘Skip Bombing’ to sink ships and obtained parachute fragmentation bombs for low-level strikes on the land targets.

b. Dive Bombing and Thatch Wave. Allied pilots were instructed that they could shake a Zero off their tail with a split-S to the right. Likewise, the recommended attack procedure was a diving attack followed by a sharp turn to the right. The US Navy developed cooperative tactics such as the Thatch Wave that took advantage of the better radio communications gear carried by Allied fighters.

c. Kamikaze. Admiral Takaziro Ohnishi, the neval air commander in the Philippines, recognizing the ineffectiveness of their usual forms of attack, suggested for suicidal attack. It was well known as Kamikaze Tactics which proved quite effective in the final phase of the pacific war.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

Japan

60. Japan entered the war with better arsenal than the allied force but could not keep pace with the technological development in course of time. The Yamato was the largest and most powerful battle ship in the world at that time. Japanese carriers lacked catapults and were somewhat lacking in underwater protection, but otherwise the equal of their American counterparts. Japanese cruisers and destroyers were lacking in antiaircraft protection, but were armed with the deadly long lance torpedo, which was far superior to anything in the allied arsenals.

61. Japanese aircraft shocked the West when they were first encountered. The Zero fighters were faster, more maneuverable, and had a longer range than most Western aircraft of 1941. However, the Zero had a number of weaknesses that become evident only after several months of combat. It lacked self-sealing fuel tanks and making it a firetrap. The zero required an overhaul every 150 hours of flight time but Japanese often stretched this to 200 hours or more with unhappy results. The Zero’s armament was better in paper than in practice. Besides, the Zero was equipped with a poor radio that was often removed by its pilot to save weight. Japanese bombers were long-ranged, but vulnerable, and Japan never created a true strategic bomber. But Japanese light attack aircraft, such as the Kate and the Val, wrought havoc on Allied shipping.

62. Japans biggest edge at the start of the war was not quantity or even quality of weapons, but the superb preparation and training of its solders, sailors and airmen. Japans subsequent military decline can be traced to the loss of its best warriors, and the failure to train adequate replacements, in the long battles of attrition.

Allied

63. New weapons for air warfare were developed during Pacific Campaign. Notably napalm, rockets, primitive guided weapons, smart bombs, radar guided glider bomb. A Navy drone, the TDM was used with some success against the Japanese at Rabaul in 1944. The most dramatic development of the war was the atomic bomb; but this affected only the end of the war.

64. The US invention of the signal code breaking system (Magic) had contributed immensely to the outcome of the war. In Mid 1944, US began to deploy the Boeing B-29 aircraft in the Pacific. It was mainly constructed keeping in mind about the requirement of attacking the mainland Japan. It could travel 6000 km and carry 10 tons of bombs.

65. Radar was a war-winning advantage for the Allies in the Pacific. Though not unknown to the Japanese, the Allies were far ahead in both theory and practice and remained so throughout the war. Another breakthrough was the radar proximity fuse, Known as the VT fuse at that time. Both the Japanese and Allies developed radar countermeasures during the war, but Japan radar counter measures trailed behind those of the Allies. Electronic superiority over the Japanese was a key to the effectiveness of

American submarine and antisubmarine operations and powerfully affected air warfare.

LESSONS LEARNT

66. The following lessons can be derived from the Pacific Air Campaign:

a. Control of the Air. Gaining and maintaining the required degree of control of the air is crucial for any successful air, sea or land operation. In the initial part of the war, the Japanese took the advantage from the control of air while the Allies capitalized from the same at the later part of the war. In Philippines, the Americans Far East Air Force’s strength was cut in half by the first day of the war and the Japanese could secure their control of the air, which resulted in a very successful invasion of Philippines by their land forces.The same fact was proved by the allied forces for carrying out strategic offensive bombing over Japan during the last phase of the war.

b. Surprise. Mass attack when combined with surprise gives the best result. Attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese is a unique example of surprise.

c. Persistent Attack. Air power needs to be employed persistently to achieve effective result. Due to lack of persistent attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese, the USA could rebuild her forces soon. On the other hand, relentless bombing by B-29s from Mariana and Okinawa compelled the Japanese to surrender.

d. Reach. Americans perceived no threat at Pearl Herbour. Japanese thought their mainland was very secure. Both were proved wrong and had to pay the price. The air war in the Pacific once again proved the fact that to air power no target is invincible.

e. Security and Intelligence. Security and intelligence are crucial for any successful operation. Due to intelligence failure, Allies got a surprise at Pearl Harbour. Conversely, in the Battle of Coral Sea and Midway the Japanese paid a great price owing to their failure to maintain the secrecy about the forthcoming operation.

f. Concentration of Force. Air power should be used in mass at decisive time and place and not in piecemeal basis. Japanese success in Pearl Harbour and Allies success in Wewak are the examples of concentration of force.

g. Centralized Command and Decentralized Execution. Centralized command allows achieving the unity of purpose. Again, decentralized execution allows achieving responsiveness and tactical flexibility. For example, General Mac Arther had the centralized command over the Southwest Pacific Theatre. But he gave full authority to his air component commander General Kenny for achieving air superiority. Therefore, General Kenny delegated authority to his subordinate commanders in the Southwest Pacific by which the Allies achieved the air

superiority that complemented to the ground invasion. h. Offence-Defence Balance. A correct offence-defence mix is required for a balanced strategy. The Japanese failed to maintain an effective defence, which made their homeland vulnerable and gradually squeezed their offensive capacity. j. Offensive Actions . Offensive action on enemy’s centre of gravity can have a far-reaching effect. Doolittle raid on Japanese mainland resulted in gaining strategic effect more than the physical destruction that it caused.

k. Co-opeartion and Co-ordination. Co-operation and co-ordination between air and surface forces can produce synergistic effect. Mac Arthur’s South West Pacific offensive proved that, as he used the ground forces to seize the bases from where the air forces could extend their bomb line. On the other hand, the Japanese Army and Navy fought almost independently in an uncoordinated manner which caused them to loose the islands in Southwest pacific.

l. Flexibility. Flexibility, a primary strength of air power, was significant in many occasions during this campaign. The Zero fighters had its primary role to escort the bombers. As there was no resistance from the opponents during the raid on Pearl Harbour, they shifted from defender to attacker role. m. Technology. Technology can have a major impact on the warfare. Japanese Zero fighters, US B-29s, JN-25 Magic and atom bomb signify that.

n. Priority. Setting appropriate priority is essential for success in any campaign. Mac Arthur’s prioritizing air superiority for his campaign in Southwest Pacific is the example.

p. Airfield Attack. The cheapest way to destroy enemy’s air power is to attack them on ground. Air field attacks on Philippines by the Japanese and at Wewak by the Allied are the examples.

q. Sustainability. Reinforcement of logistics is a must for any sustained operation. Japanese could not ensure sustained operation in Wewak and Philippines due to less logistic reinforcement, hence they were beaten.

r. Versatility. B-29s were used to support amphibious operation while securing Mariana. After that, it was used for bombing on Japanese home islands. B-29s were also used to mine Japanese water for maritime blockade. The multi purpose use of B-29s demonstrated the versatility of air power.

s. Air Defence. The importance of having a strong air defence network was evident through out the Pacific Air Campaign. The Japanese took a great toll of the American forces in the Philippines. On the other hand due to the lack of sufficiently strong air defence coverage, Japanese had to accept a devastating defeat when

the Allies started bombing over their homeland.

t. Air Power can Produce Strategic Effect. The unique characteristics of air power can influence strategic decisions. Attack on Pearl Harbour brought the US in to the war, on the other hand Doolittle raid on Japanese homeland compelled the Japanese to engage their fighters for home defence. u. Air Power can Achieve an End State. Air power is not only a means to end but also an end in itself. Japanese unconditional surrender following the dropping of atom bombs on the Japanese soil proved that air power itself can bring an end to any conflict.

67. Future Implications. Almost the whole spectrum of the principles of war, role and utilization of air power and the need for joint ness has been highlighted so far. There are some important points, which have emerged from this study, should be remembered for any future conflict. They are as follows:

a. A joint force doctrine is a must to achieve synergy among all the available forces.

b. Technological advancement of own forces should be done considering the same of enemy forces. Timely and accurate intelligence is the prerequisite for this.

c. Force structuring should be done according to the strategic goal.

d. Joint ness of the services is a must which should be achieved through realistic joint training in peacetime. This will ensure better coordination and cooperation amongst the services during war time.

e. Air power can be best utilized only by an airman.

CONCLUSION

68. On the morning of December 7, 1941, the Second World War in the Pacific was begun with an attack by Japanese naval aviation against the American held island of Oahu, Hawaii and its main port, Pearl Harbor. Within hours of this dawn attack, a meticulously planned campaign was launched against key American and British forces in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya and China, the ultimate goal of which was Japanese control of eastern Asia and the western Pacific, including the priceless natural resources of the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese government believed that once these regions were firmly under their control, the Allies, and especially the United States, would sue for peace rather than fight a bloody war in distant lands.

69. The Japanese however, did not anticipate the angry backlash which arose as a result of their use of force at Pearl Harbor, and a negotiated settlement of the type envisioned in 1941 became impossible. Following the attack on Pearl Harbour, the

Americans were desperate to strike back at the Japanese. Consequently, a daring one-way raid against Japan was executed, which is popularly known as ‘DooLittle raid’. Though the damage by the bombing was minor, it surely convinced the Japanese high command to advance into the central and southwest Pacific to strengthen their defensive parameter. This led to the encounters in the Coral Sea and Midway. In the Battle of Coral Sea, the Allies successfully foiled the Japanese invasion of Post Morseby. Subsequently, in the Battle of Midway much of Japan’s naval aviation had been destroyed, which immediately forced Japan on the defensive and thus the Battle of Midway has been rightly hailed as the turning point of the Pacific war.

70. Getting success in the Coral Sea and Midway, the Allies decided to go on the offensive. A persistent two-pronged offensive across the central and south west Pacific steadily pushed the Japanese back. By mid 1944, the backbone of Japanese Pacific defence was broken when Marshalls Islands and the Marianas were seized. Subsequently, Okinawa, the last island before Japan, was also captured. After the capture of Mariana and Okinawa, systematic long-range bombing offensive over Japan got underway. The twin specters of nuclear bombardment over Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced Imperial intervention and the end of war. Projection of power, mainly through air power, was the key concept of this campaign. The use of air power resulted in the defeat of Japan without an invasion and it indicated that, in a future war, ultimate defeat or victory could be determined by air battles.

AIR WAR IN THE PACIFIC : WORLD WAR-II

"In our victory over Japan, airpower was unquestionably decisive. That the planned invasion of the Japanese home island was unnecessary, is clear evidence that airpower has evolved into a force in war co-equal with land and sea power, decisive in its own right and worthy of the faith of its prophets.”

- General Carl A. Tooey Spaatz

INTRODUCTION

1. The war between the USA and its allies against the Japanese Empire was a titanic struggle, which in its course destroyed the mighty, seemingly invincible, modern military power of Japan. The campaigns were waged on a massive scale, across the inhospitable surroundings of the Pacific and finally ended by the dropping of atom bombs, a decision which altered the destiny of the whole world.

2. The first battle, the attack on Pearl Harbour was simple: surprise attack on an unprepared base, with catastrophic losses to the defenders and negligible losses to the attackers. The attack was immediately responded by the USA by bombing the Japanese mainland. This was a blow to the Japanese complacency that sky over Japan was unreachable. These events were followed by massive Japanese effort for acquiring new islands, both eastwards and southwards resulting in high profile wars like Battle of Coral Sea and Battle Midway. But Japanese under estimated the Allied strength. Allied force fought back in Battle of Coral Sea and swung the war in their favour in the Battle of Midway. The events after that are actually the success stories of Allied in the Pacific. They closed in by a two pronged offensive through Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific and brought the Japanese to their knees by taking the war in Japanese main lands. The application of Island Hopping Technique in order to secure bases and increasing emphasis on aerial bombing is important features of this stage.

3. Both the Japanese offensive and the Allied response were more dependent on the use of air power than that of European Theatre. For the Japanese, air power made up for naval inferiority and provided a flexible and versatile weapon with which to defend the projected ‘Southern Region’ of conquest. For the Allied, aircraft formed a vital first line of defence in a weakly defended area; when that line had been breached it provided both the means to return to the offensive and a means of communication in its own right. In the Pacific, air power was linked closely with sea power. The emphasis that both the Japanese and USA navies had relied on the aircraft carrier and marine aviation in the 1930s were fully justified by the events of this war. This concentration on the strategic use of aircraft, called for achieving the air supremacy as an essential prelude. Japan’s inability to maintain the supremacy form the early 1942, and the Allied capability to build up massive and diversified air power before resources from the European Theatre could be diverted, led to the final defeat of Japan through blockade and destruction from the air. Technical inferiority, man power shortage, comparative industrial backwardness and economic blockade continually undermined the effectiveness of the Japanese air power. But defeat came from the fact that from the outset Japanese strategy had been a gamble for which resources were tremendously inadequate.

4. Many isolated battles were fought in the Pacific Theatre over a long duration. However, the scope of this paper will be limited to the major battles where air power played a decisive role for the outcome of the war.

AIM

5. The aim of this paper is to analyse the utilization of air power in the Pacific Theatre of World War – II and draw appropriate lessons.

BACKGROUND

6. Long before the World War-II, the Empire of Japan embarked on a rapid economic, political, and military expansion to achieve parity with the USA and European countries in terms of power. The expansion demanded more resources than Japan had. For acquiring resources, Japan had to look outwards. Japan's expansionist policy directly caused war with neighbouring countries, which in turn caused diplomatic reactions, trade restrictions and deteriorating relation with USA. The relation between Japan and USA further declined, once Japan launched an all out assault against China. A total embargo was imposed on Japan to paralyze her economy, which restricted her from strategic imports including oil. By July 1941, Japanese industrial survival was at stake due to the crisis of raw materials. As such Japan was looking, desperately, for some way out of this crisis. Options left with Japan were either to withdraw completely from China as demanded by USA or expand towards southwest to secure new sources of oil and raw materials. Eventually Japan chose to expand. As such, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour marking the beginning of the Pacific War. The general map of Pacific Campaign is shown at Annex ‘A’.

OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGY

Japanese Objective and Strategy

7. Political Objective. Due to the total embargo Japan got blocked with the supply of oil and raw materials. As such, Japanese political objective for this war was to continue their southward expansion and establish domination in the region which would ensure supply of raw material.

8. Military Objective. Japanese military objective was to establish a defensive perimeter quickly in the Eastern and Central Pacific by nullifying the probability of USA intervening into Japan’s imperialist ambition.

9. Military Strategy. USA, through their strongholds at Central and Eastern Pacific, was dominating the region. They also had tie with Australia which was a matter of great tension for Japan. Therefore, Japanese military strategy was to eliminate the US military power in the Pacific by capturing the key US strongholds.

Allied Objective and Strategy

10. Political Objective. Before the Pearl Harbour attack the Allied, apparently, did not have any political objective for war but wanted to contain Japanese expansion through blockade and economic restrictions. However, with the progression of war, defeat of Japan emerged to be the Allied political objective.

11. Military Objective. Allied initial military objective was to defend its strongholds in the Pacific. Later their objective was to secure suitable land bases close to Japan to take the battle on Japanese homeland.

12. Military Strategy. Before the war, Allied military strategy was to deter any chances of Japanese aggression through power projection. However, during the initial Japanese offensive, the Allied strategy was to fight defending battle. Later they adopted the strategy to carry out two pronged mutually supportive offensive, one from Central Pacific and the other from Southwest Pacific to capture grounds close to Japanese homeland from where she would be able to conduct strategic bombing over Japan.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Japanese Command and Control

13. The Emperor of Japan, Hirohito, was the Supreme Commander of the Imperial Armed Forces. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, and Chiefs of Staff of both Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were under his command. There was no independent air force; both army and navy had their separate air arms with poor cooperation. Ironically, neither the Emperor nor the Prime Minister had any influence on the military decisions made by the individual forces.

14. There were major drawbacks in the Japanese military chain of command. Japanese lack of foresight, use of forces in penny packets, failure to ensure timely reinforcement and poor intelligence probably led them to lose the war.

Allied Command and Control

15. In January 1942, the Allied formed a unified American, British, Dutch and Australian Command (ABDACOM) under General Wavell, a British Commander in the Far East. However, this combined command structure was not very effective due to the strategic disputes of individual nations. As such, ABDACOM was dissolved leading to the geographical division of responsibility. USA with sufficient air and naval assets formed two separate commands as follows:

a. Southwest Pacific Command. General MacArthur was given the overall command of the Allied in Southwest Pacific. General George C Kenny, by commanding a group of Royal Australian Air Force, Dutch Task Force-73 and US Army Air Force, acted as his Air Component Commander.

b. Central Pacific Command. Admiral Nimitz was exercising dual command as Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPac) for US naval forces and Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA) for US and Allied air, land, and sea forces during World War II.

16. Intra-Command Controversy. The commands in the Pacific aroused lot of conflict between US commanders. The relation between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz was not very easy. After the Allies had isolated Rabaul in 1943, Nimitz was in favour of invading Formosa for onward operation in the Pacific whereas MacArthur opined for a move to Luzon through Philippines. The controversy continued for significant period of time. Finally Washington gave decision in MacArthur’s favour.

JAPANESE INITIAL OFFENSIVE

17. On 07 December 1941, the Japanese began their offensive campaign with the attack on US base at Pearl Harbour. Within next four days, the Imperial Japanese Navy captured Southern Philippines, Northern New Guinea and Gilbert Islands, whereas the Imperial Japanese Army captured Luzon, Sumatra and Burma.

Attack on Pearl Harbour

18. Pearl Harbour, in Hawaiian Island, was the strongest US naval base in the Pacific which housed the US Pacific Fleet. As such it became the ideal target for Japanese surprise attack. The Japanese described the presence of the US fleet as “A dagger pointed at our throat and must be destroyed”. The ultimate aim of this attack, as planned by Admiral Yamamato and conducted by Admiral Nagomo, was to protect their advance into Malaya and Dutch East Indies. This attack brought the USA into World War II. A map of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour is shown at Annex ‘B’.

19. Air Operation. Japanese task force, consisting six carriers, two battleships, three cruisers and nine destroyers, reached 230 miles to the north of Pearl Harbour by dawn of 07 December 1941. The first wave of 183 aircraft, led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, took off from the carriers before 6 am and attacked the airfields and battle ships. Though, US radar on Oahu's north coast detected the raid, but misinterpreted as an expected incoming flight of B-17s from the mainland. Once the attack had commenced, neither a single US gun fired nor a single fighter took off. The Americans were caught by total surprise. After 45 minutes, the second wave of 171 aircrafts, led by Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki, attacked ships and army air bases with little resistance. Within 02 hours, the Japanese crippled 18 battle ships, destroyed 285 aircraft and killed or injured about 3500 US personnel. On the other hand, Japan lost only 29 aircraft, 06 submarines and about 100 lives.

20. Consequence. Gaining the initial breakthrough, the Japanese continued their planned invasion towards southeast. The US, being surprised totally, had no option but to declare war against Japan.

21. Analysis. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a brilliant surprise by the Japanese, but it failed to yield desired success in the long run. It was an unfinished job as the Japanese failed to destroy the most important target i.e. four US carriers that would cripple US air power in the Pacific. They also failed to destroy the dockyard and fuel supply depot which allowed US to continue operation in the region. As such, air power was exploited

both in favour and against its tenets.

a. Reach. Japanese exploited the reach of air power by launching massive airstrike thousands of miles away from Japan.

b. Surprise. This attack was a classic example of surprise which was achieved by careful selection of the day, time, and direction of attack and above all the secrecy of the operation. The wrong interpretation by the radar controller added to this element.

c. Concentration of Force. The combination of zero fighters, dive bombers and level bombers in large number forming a ‘Force Package’ yielded massive damage to the US assets.

d. Flexibility. The Zero fighters, primarily tasked to escort the bombers, engaged ground targets once they found no opponent in the air.

e. Persistence. Though Commander Fucida urged for a third wave for the leftover targets, Admiral Nagumo called off the operation. The decision of not continuing the attack proved to be fatal as the Japanese left their most important targets intact.

f. Security. Japan utilized its planted spies at Hawaii successfully while planning the attack. On the other hand, though US deciphered Japanese diplomatic and naval communication network, but failed to gather intelligence on the ensuing attack on Pearl Harbour.

Attack on Philippines

22. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbour, Japanese Southern Expeditionary Forces comprising the Army Air Force and Naval Air Arm attacked Malay Peninsula, Philippines, Singapore and South Pacific Islands with the aim of:

a. Preventing the use of the Philippines as an advance base of operations by US forces.

b. Acquiring staging areas and supply bases to enhance operations against the Dutch East Indies.

c. Secure the lines of communication between occupied areas in the south and the Japanese Home Islands.

23. Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma and Vice Admiral Ibo Takahashi was the Japanese commander, whereas General MacArthur was the US Commander in this battle.

24. Air Operation. To neutralise the US air power in the Philippines, Japanese bombers based in Formosa, carried out successive airfield attacks. The first wave of attack, comprising 144 bombers, escorted by 108 Zeros, crippled the US air element on ground and in the air and subsequent attack followed. A map of Japanese attack on Philippines is given as Annex ‘C’.

25. Consequence. The air battle over Philippines on the first day of attack ended with a complete Japanese victory with destruction of half of the US Army Air Force’s strength in the Far East against only three Zeros.

26. Analysis.

a. Security . Despite nine hours warning US commander’s failure in deciding, coupled with poor military judgment and slackness in command structure, led to the destruction of half of her aircraft on ground.

b. Concentration of Force. Flying from Formosa, 32 Japanese heavy bombers and 192 naval aircraft were concentrated for their assault on the Philippines which achieved success out of all proportions.

c. Surprise. The Zeros with extended combat radius of 600 nm gave the Japanese air power reach for their mission from Formosa which was technological surprise to the US.

d. Synergy. The synergistic efforts carried out jointly by the Japanese Army Air Force and Naval Air Wing elements helped the ground forces to capture the island. The application of the same can be found in today’s Joint Warfare concept.

ALLIED RESPONSE : THE DOOLITTLE RAID

27. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to retaliate. As a result 16 B-25 bombers, led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle, conducted raids over Japanese mainland with an aim to show the Japanese that their homeland was not also invincible.

28. The Air Raid. At 0820 hours on 18 April 1942, 16 US Army Air Forces B-25 aircraft, armed with 500 lb demolition and incendiary bombs, took off from USS HORNET positioned 650 miles east of Japan. The aircraft took off about 170 miles short of planned take off position due to their early detection by Japanese picket boat. These aircraft bombed the military and industrial facilities over Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe. On recovery, due to shortage of fuel and bad weather, 15 aircraft crash landed or were abandoned over China while only one landed in Soviet Union. The map of Doolittle Raid is shown at Annex ‘D’.

29. Consequence. The raid was insignificant militarily but provided a serious blow to Japanese psyche. Japanese never expected to see US aircraft in their sky. As such, it influenced the Japanese plan of expanding the defensive perimeter in the Central Pacific and the invasion plan of the Midway quickly gained support. It also resulted in assigning four fighter groups for strengthening Japanese homeland defences which meant less trouble for the Allied in subsequent battle.

30. Analysis.

a. Surprise. The Doolittle Raid was an audacious plan which caught the Japanese by surprise and forced them to rethink their defensive perimeter.

b. Synergy. The aircraft of US Army air force and Carrier of US Navy was used for the raid for the first time.

c. Reach. Reach of air power, backed up by aircraft carrier, made it possible to get US bombers into Japanese sky.

SUBSEQUENT JAPANESE OFFENSIVE

Battle of Coral Sea

31. Having conquered nearly all of Southeast Asia in just a few months, Japan was at the apex of its power. But, the Doolittle Raid forced the Japanese to extend their planned defensive perimeter. As such, Japan decided to capture Tulagi at Solomon Islands and Port Moresby of New Guinea which was the last Allied base between Japan and Australia. This set the ground for the Battle of Coral Sea. Through this battle Japan also wanted to cut the sea line of communication and supply between the US and Australia.

32. The Battle. Prior to the Battle of Coral Sea, the Japanese captured Tulagi by 3 May 1942 and continued advance on Port Moresby. Admiral Nimitz, being aware of the Japanese advance, detailed a task force consisting carriers Lexington and the Yorktown under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher. They were tasked to pound the occupied Tulagi and counter the Port Moresby invasion. The task force then placed itself carefully between the two Japanese fleets advancing from south of the Solomon. The map of Battle of Coral Sea is shown at Annex ‘E’.

a. On 7 May 1942, dozens of Japanese bombers were launched but failed to find the Allied forces. However, Japanese carrier SHOHO was sighted and destroyed by an attack of 93 aircraft. However, at the late afternoon, due to bad weather, the Japanese pilots lost their way and attempted to land on allied carriers. In the process, they lost 20 aircraft, out of 27, mostly crashed into the sea.

b. On the next day, Allied launched 82 aircraft which damaged carrier SHOKAKU. However, ZUIKAKU escaped into weather. On the other hand,

Japanese launched 69 aircraft to attack the US fleets which damaged YORKTOWN forcing her return to Pearl Harbour; whereas the LEXINGTON was sunk. The Japanese lost most of their aircraft to the Allied combat air patrol. The Battle of Coral Sea came to an end without any clear victory to any party.

33. Consequence. The Battle of Coral Sea was a tactical success for the Japanese as they could destroy a big US carrier LEXINGTON with the loss of a much smaller carrier SHUHO. But it was a strategic victory for the US as Japanese invasion was foiled and for the first time in history any Japanese carrier was destroyed which boosted the Allied morale. The Japanese loss of two carriers, many aircraft and skilled pilots affected the following battles, specially the Battle of Midway.

34. Analysis.

a. Security. Japanese failed to keep their communication secured which cost them tremendously.

b. Balance. Both the forces resorted to offensive posture leaving inadequate fighters to defend their carriers. As a result, the carriers of both the sides suffered attrition.

c. Weather. Weather played a remarkable role in this battle where Japanese lost many aircraft due to bad weather.

Battle of Midway

35. After the battle of Coral Sea, Japan decided to eliminate America's remaining carrier forces in the Central Pacific to establish an outer defensive perimeter. As such, Admiral Yamamoto planned a major offensive with 165 ships to attack Midway, a tiny island West-Northwest of Pearl Harbour.

36. The Battle. Prior to the battle, Admiral Yamamoto sent two light carriers to the Aleutians Islands, 1,200 miles north of Midway. For invasion of Midway Yamamoto had three main groups consisting four big carriers, a battle fleet, and an invasion force. Admiral Nimitz, being aware of Japanese intentions, positioned three carriers north of Midway for an ambush instead of direct engagement. The map of Battle of Midway is shown at Annex ‘F’.

a. On 3rd June, Allied bombers from Midway attacked the Japanese invasion fleet with little success. On 4th June, Nagumo launched 100 aircraft, against the island with considerable success. Simultaneously Allied bombers made several attacks on the Japanese with minimal effect. As the Japanese were re-arming their aircraft with bombs for a second strike, a Japanese search plane spotted the US carriers nearby. Nagumo ordered re-arming the aircraft with torpedoes, but took the fatal decision to wait until the previous raid recovered. In the mean time Allied torpedo bombers attacked the Japanese carriers, but Zeros shot down 35 out of 41

aircraft. In this process Zeros were drawn down to low level allowing the dive-bombers to attack from high level and destroying three of the Japanese carriers i.e. AKAGI, KAGA and SORYU; only HIRYU escaped. As such, in 10 minutes, the tide of the Pacific war turned against Japan.

b. Over the following two days successive strikes were launched against Japanese force and HIRYU was sunk. On 7th June, YORKTOWN was sunk by Japanese submarine I-168. Eventually, the invasion of Midway was abandoned and Japanese expansion across Asia Pacific was stopped.

37. Consequence. Japan was badly defeated by losing its four carriers. These results had far reaching strategic effect as the balance of power tilted towards the Allied. As such, the Allied could consider taking the offensive for the first time in the in Pacific War. Thus, the Battle of Midway is called ‘The Turning Point’ of the Pacific war.

38. Analysis.

a. Security. Allied were numerically inferior to Japanese, but knowing the Japanese plan well ahead, through code breaker, gave them an upper hand, which significantly contributed to their victory.

b. Concentration of Force. Japan dedicated four of its six carriers thinking that USA was having only two carriers. Japanese also made serious mistake keeping her three forces far away from each other.

c. Priority. Nagumo failed to launch the bombers in time and decided to wait till the recovery of returning aircraft. This failure of setting appropriate priority cost him the battle.

ALLIED OFFENSIVE

39. The Battle of Midway gave the Allied a much needed break. It allowed them the scope to adopt offensive posture for the first time. At this phase the Allied first captured Guadalcanal and then fought a series of battles in two prongs to advance to a position from where they could bomb Japan. Air power was extensively used by both the forces to their advantage. Once the Allied captured Marianas and Okinawa, concentrated long-range bombing offensive got underway which ended by dropping two atom bombs over Japan. The allied prongs of advance were:

a. Across the Central Pacific through the Marshalls to Okinawa.

b. Through the Southwest Pacific via the north coast of New Guinea to the Philippines and then to Okinawa.

ADVANCE FROM THE CENTRAL PACIFIC

40. Advance from the Central Pacific started from Micronesia, an area in the Pacific containing over 1000 tiny islands, dispersed in four main groups namely the Gilbert, the Marshall, the Caroline and the Marianas. The Allied objective in this advance was to capture Saipan, Tinian and Guam of Mariana Islands from where Japan would come within the range of B-29 bombers. However, prior to this advance Admiral Nimitz assassinated Admiral Yamamoto in air on his way to Bougainville on 18 April 1943 through an aerial operation code named “Operation Vengeance’. This event had considerable impact on Japanese command and control structure in the subsequent battle. The map of Allied Advance from Central Pacific is shown at Annex ‘G’. This advance was essential for:

a. Setting up forward air bases capable of supporting operations across the mid-Pacific and the Philippines.

b. Outflanking the Japanese forces in New Guinea and making the logistic supply to southern Japanese forces difficult.

Fall of Gilbert Islands

41. As Marianas were heavily defended by the Japanese, land-based bombers were required to soften the defences. The nearest islands capable of supporting such an effort were the Marshal Islands, which in turn asked for overtaking Japanese garrison at Makin and naval base on Tarawa Atoll, in the Gilbert Islands. Thus, to launch an invasion of the Marianas, the battles had to start far to the east, at Tarawa.

42. The Battle. On 20 November 1943, under the code named ‘Galvanic’, Allied dive bombers from the carriers flew continuously to destroy enemy positions, in conjunction with fleet fire on the islands. Allied troops invaded Makin Island at ease on the same day, but suffered heavy casualties to capture Tarawa while trying to penetrate through the enemy defences. Finally, Tarawa was secured on 23 November 1943.

43. Consequence. Once Tarawa Atoll was captured, Allied concentrated towards Marshal Islands. The heavy casualty suffered in capturing such tiny islands, with ten time’s numerical superiority, sparked off a storm of protest in the USA.

44. Analysis. During this battle Air power, in coordination with naval and amphibious forces, was used to soften high value targets. This amplifies the synergistic effect of air power and the importance of joint operations in the battle.

Fall of Marshalls

45. After the fall of Tarawa, allies concentrated B-24 bombing on the remaining air base at Miles Island and on Marshall Islands. This was essential for their northern venture. Finally, Allied navy and marines took Marshal Islands under the code name ‘Flintlock’.

46. The Battle.

a. Battle of Kwajalein . Taking lessons from the Gilbert operations the Allied bypassed the outer ring of the Marshall Islands and struck Kwajalein Atoll at its centre on 29 January 1944. Two American divisions were committed, with heavy naval gunfire and air support from both carrier born and land based aircraft. The atoll was finally taken by the Allied on 6 February.

b. Battle of Eniwetok. Under the codename ‘Catchpole’ the Allied ships and aircraft started heavy bombardment on Eniwetok Atoll on 17 February 1944. Amphibious landing followed. After a fierce fighting, the island was captured on 23 February.

47. Consequence. For the Allied, these battles represented both the next step in its island hopping march to Japan and a significant moral victory because it was the first time the Allied penetrated the "outer ring" of the Japanese Pacific sphere. For the Japanese, these represented the failure of their beach-line defence, which forced them to rearrange their subsequent defences in depth.

48. Analysis. Expecting the Allied to attack the outermost islands first, most of the Japanese defences were stationed to the east and south. The Allied adopted a policy of bypassing some Japanese island strongholds and letting them "wither on the vine", cut off from supplies and troop reinforcements.

Isolation of Truk

49. Truk, in the Caroline Islands, was a major Japanese naval and airbase with its bombers ranging till Marshalls. It was a significant source of support for Japanese garrisons located throughout the central and south Pacific. As such, it was imperative for the Allied to nullify Truk as a prelude to subsequent operations, especially Marshalls. However, considering the defence, Allied planned to break the Japanese linkage in Central Pacific by isolating Truk.

50. The Battle. The Allied forces attacked Truk on 17 February 1944, under the code name ‘Operation Hailstone’. The attack involved a combination of aircraft, ships, and submarines over two days. This took the Japanese completely by surprise as they had been expecting a land invasion. In this attack over 250 Japanese aircraft, awaiting assembly, were destroyed. Though, the Japanese later relocated about 100 of their remaining aircraft from Rabaul, they too, were destroyed by Allied aircraft. Truk was kept isolated by Allied forces as they continued their advance towards Japan.

51. Consequence. The Allied forces were successful in cutting off, the Japanese forces on Truk. As such, Japanese forces across Central Pacific islands ran low on supplies and faced starvation before surrendering.

52. Analysis. Capturing Truk was not a necessity for the Allied in their northern venture but isolating it was, by which Allied could avoid unnecessary casualties. This was sort of effect base operation where air power was the major player.

Capture of Marianas

53. Capturing Marianas, the Japanese naval command and control centre, was the long term aim of the Allied. They aimed to capture the islands to establish airbases from where they would bring Japanese home lands within the range of B–29 bombers. Through these battles they also wanted to lure the combined fleet out of North-Eastern Borneo.

54. Battle of Saipan. The Allied ships started bombing Saipan on 13 June 1944 and the landing of troops began on 15th. The Allied aircrafts conducted intensive raid on Saipan. Japanese, without much of her aircrafts left, failed to stop the invasion. After a fierce fight the Saipan was finally captured on 9th July.

55. Battle of the Philippine Sea.

a. On 18 June 1944, search planes from Admiral Ozawa's fleet discovered the American fleet. Despite his numerical superiority and range advantage, Ozawa planned not to carry out any surprise attack, considering his pilots inability at night. This fatal decision allowed the Allied to acquire his positions, intention and timetable. Allied, in advance, launched a strike against Guam to pin down the Japanese aircraft and airfields to deprive Ozawa from any support from Guam.b. On 19 June, the Japanese ultimately launched the air attack in four waves. During this single day’s attack Allied shot down 429 Japanese planes and destroyed carrier SHOKAKU against 29 own aircraft loses. This battle was commonly known as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot". This event marked the end of mighty Japanese naval air power. Coming events would force Japan to rely on the guns of its battleships and cruisers.

c. The Allied launched a strike of 226 aircraft, on the retreating Japanese, and sunk carrier HIYO, damaged ZUIKAKU, JUNYO, CHIYODA and battleship HARUNA. Though, Allied lost 99 aircrafts while attempting night landings and fuel shortage, this was marked as one of the most effective attacks against enemy ships in the entire war.

56. Battle of Guam. On 21 July 1944, Allied landed on Guam with the support of friendly bombers. After a fierce fight, they secured Guam on 8th August.

57. Battle of Tinian. On 24 July Allied troops landed on Tinian Island with coordinated support from air strikes and naval bombardment. Allied used their first napalm bomb in this battle. Ultimately Tinian was secured on 1 August.

58. Consequence. Shortly after the capture of Marianas, the Allied started regular raids over Japan. Here, they also foiled Japanese attempt to launch all out offensive at Philippines. As a result of fall of Saipan, Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo resigned.

59. Analysis. Allied were successful in attaining their ultimate objective. They did it through coordinated way and utilized the air power very effectively.

Battle of Iwo Jima

60. The Battle. On 16 February 1945, Allied forces commenced a three-day air and gun assault on Iwo Jima with unprecedented ferocity. On 19th, Allied troops landed on the island under codename ‘Operation Detachment’ with continuous air support. The island was secured on 26 March 1945 after suffering 25,000 casualties. Allied objectives were to neutralize threats to its bombers and shipping and use its airfields for fighter escort and emergency bomber landings. Expecting a defeat Japanese objective was to cause maximum attrition to the invaders, so as to reconsider an invasion of the Japanese main land.

61. Command and Control. Lieutenant General Holland Smith and Admiral Raymond Spruance led the Allied where General Kuribayashi led the Japanese.

62. Consequence. Though the Iwo Jima was captured, it was the only US Marine battle where the American casualties exceeded the Japanese.

63. Analysis. Following the apparently unnecessary capture of Iwo Jima, as some opines, only few fighter escort missions were ever flown, which was a misuse of economy of effort.

Analysis of Advance from Central Pacific

64. a. Coordination and Cooperation. The lack of coordination was quite evident on the Japanese side as without knowing the outcome of the preceding attack, they launched subsequent attacks and lost valuable air assets.

b. Security. The Japanese overstretched their deployment as such they failed to secure their vital supply routes.

c. Versatility. B-29s were used to support the amphibious operation, mining Japanese water and strategic bombing against mainland of Japan. This multipurpose use of B-29s demonstrated the versatility of air power.

d. Intelligence. Japanese failed to secure their communications and had to pay almost all the battles for their single reluctance about intelligence.

ADVANCE FROM SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

65. MacArthur along with Kenney started offensive from New Guinea. His plan was to capture New Guinea, the Philippines and Okinawa for an air offensive attack on Japan. The objective of attacking from southwest was to break the “Bismarck Barrier” and to recapture Philippines. General MacArthur was forced by his air commander General Kenney to be offensive to continue faster operation by island hoping technique. In this plan

the ground forces would occupy the land position under the cover of air superiority. Commander of the Southwest Pacific came to the conclusion that his operation had to have air superiority for their successful army assault. A map of Allied Advance from Southwest Pacific is shown at Annex ‘H’.

Battle of Guadalcanal and Operation in Wewak

66. Immediately, after the battle of Midway the Guadalcanal became one of the important strategic areas for both the Japanese and the Allied. The Allied planned to launch offensive to occupy the island with an aim to increase their land bases in the southwest Pacific. This would allow them to contain the Japanese and isolate important Japanese base at Rabaul. On the other hand, the Japanese objective was to continue their dominance in the region and disrupt the supply routes between USA and Australia. 67. The Battle. On 7 August 1942, Allied forces initiated landing in Guadalcanal, Tulagi and surrounding islands of Solomons. The Allied occupied the island including Henderson Airfield, which was under construction. The Japanese made several attempts to retake Island but failed. Finally, after a six month long conflict the Japanese evacuated the island on 7 February 1943. To bring Wewak within the range of Kenny’s fighters, the Allied secretly build airfield in Tsilli Tsilli. Two other fake airfields were also constructed to fool the Japanese. The Japanese being deceived attacked on the fake airfields and got surprised.

68. Consequence. The battle of Guadalcanal was the first major offensive launched by Allied forces. The ground forces took active part in achieving air superiority by capturing airfields.

69. Analysis. These battles marked the beginning of the transition by Allied forces from defensive operations to the offensive ones. It marked the first significant strategic combined arms victory by Allied forces in the Pacific theatre.

Battle of Leyte Gulf

70. The Allied commenced the invasion of Leyte in order to cut off Japan from her Southeast Asian colonies and impede the supply of oil. To seize Leyte, the Allied gathered 200000 men, 3000 aircraft and 100 ships. The armada signalled the fulfilment of General MacArthur’s pledge to return to Philippines. The Japanese gathered all their remaining major naval forces under Admiral Toyoda for the battle they called ‘Sho”, means victory.

71. The Battle. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also known as the "Second Battle of the Philippine Sea" that took place in October 1944, was the largest naval engagement of World War II. The battle was also remarkable for its overwhelming display of air power. MacArthur and Nimitz successfully combined their huge forces in Leyte. On 10 October 1944, Halsey’s carriers began a sustained attack against Japanese bases from the Ryukyus to the northern Philippines. In an unprecedented and overwhelming display of airpower Halsey sent as many as 1000 planes at a time. In less than a week the Japanese lost three carriers and 600 aircraft. The engagement proved so disastrous for the Japanese Navy that they never again sailed in battle at such a large force.

72. Consequence. The losses in this battle almost ended the hope for the Japanese to have any further resistance in future battle for homeland defence.

73. Analysis. Japanese losses were largely attributed to their over reliance on obsolete aircraft, inexperienced aircrews and lack of cooperation between the naval commanders. On the contrary the US Navy's new aircraft, experienced pilots, and radar guided combat air patrols made their success easier.Capture of Okinawa

74. Okinawa was the last hurdle for the Allied and last defence for the Japanese. The main objective to capture this island was to have a forward base for the final assault on Japan. It would also give the Allied complete control of the East China Sea and full blockade of Japan. The Japanese objective was to conserve the air strength until the enemy landing was underway and then destroy them over water.

75. The Battle. The US Army and Marines launched operation against Okinawa on 1 April 1945 under the code name “Iceberg”. The Japanese conducted desperate counteroffensive, the Kamikaze, with more than 350 aircraft and boats against Allied ships and ground forces. Consequently, on 8th April the Allied aircraft were launched to destroy the Kamikaze bases in Japan. Till the end about 1,900 Kamikaze struck Allied forces at Okinawa and sunk 25 ships and damaged 198. Finally Japan ran short of resources to continue suicidal attack at Okinawa. On 22 June 1945 the Allied secured Okinawa.

76. Consequence. After the capture of Okinawa the Japanese mainland came within the reach of the Allied bombers.

77. Analysis. In this battle the Japanese evolved the tactics of kamikaze attacks both by aircraft and boats. The Allied used air power consistently in concert with the surface forces.

Analysis of Offensive Through Southwest Pacific

78. The war in the Southwest Pacific draws following events for analysis:

a. Centralized Command and Decentralized Execution. In the Southwest Pacific, Allied achieved unity of command while applying air power. All air arms of Allied Navy and Marine were placed under the control of General Kenney, thus the concept of today’s JFACC (Joint Forces Air Component Commander) came into being. On the contrary, Japanese Army and Navy controlled their own air arms separately resulting in utilization of air efforts in penny packets.

b. Synergy. The Allied used ground troops to seize airfields, which contributed greatly in gaining the control of the air.

c. Surprise. The mass air raids on Leyte as well as Kenney’s innovative idea to neutralize Wewak Island, utilizing a secretly prepared airfield, surprised the Japanese. On the Japanese side, the Kamikaze tactics surprised the Allies with a heavy toll.d. Coordination. Prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, joining of the forces of Nimitz and MacArthur was a magnificent example of coordination. On the other hand lack of coordination between the Japanese forces was prominent; especially in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY

79. The type of targets and environment of the Pacific campaign demanded new methods and innovative tactics. Few of them were:

a. Low Altitude and Skip Bombing. Initially bombers carried out attack from over 25,000 feet resulting poor accuracy. General Kenney adopted Low Altitude and Skip Bombing tactics where bombers bombed at 2,000 and 200 feet respectively. The outcomes were proved to be decisive.

b. Dive Bombing. This tactic was used by both the Allied and Japanese fighters to avert anti aircraft artillery guns and interception by the enemy fighters.

c. Masthead Attack. The masthead attack tactics was applied by the Fifth Army Air Force. The aircraft flew very low at high speed releasing its bomb very close to the Japanese ships. This increased the percentage of hits dramatically.

d. Kamikaze. After the Battle of Midway, Japan was facing acute shortage of skilled fighter pilots. As such they adopted the desperate Kamikaze tactics using unskilled pilots to commit suicidal attacks on Allied targets. This caused approximately 80 percent of Allied losses in the final phase of the war.

80. Both Japanese and Allied adopted new technologies in Pacific War. Few of them were:

a. Zero Fighters. The Japanese began the war with a superior aircraft like the Zero fighter. The manoeuvrability, combat power and long range of the Zero came as a surprise to the Allied.

b. C ode Breaking System . The US invention of the signal code breaking system (Magic) had contributed immensely to the outcome of the war.

c. B-29 Super Fortress. In Mid 1944, US began to deploy the Boeing B-29 aircraft in the Pacific. It was constructed mainly keeping in mind the requirement of attacking the mainland of Japan. In August 1945, B-29 became the first atomic weapon delivery platform of the history.

d. Atomic Bomb. The most dramatic development of the war was the atomic bomb, the brutal use of which over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killed millions of innocent people of Japan.

LESSONS LEARNT

81. The following lessons could be learnt from Pacific War:

a. Intelligence. Advanced intelligence is imperative for the success in war. Japan exploited it before the attack on Pearl Harbour with mixed results. Japan failed to attain intelligence on the presence of most important target i.e. the US Pacific carriers. They also failed to plan any attack on oil depots. Though US intelligence failed on Pearl Harbour attack, they exploited the newly invented Code Breaker successfully in subsequent battles which changed the outcome of the battle tremendously.

b. Surprise. Concentration combined with surprise gives the best result. The devastating attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese is a unique example of that.

c. Control of the Air. For a decisive victory control of the air is a must. Control of the air paved the way for dropping the Atom Bomb over Japan that led to the unconditional Japanese surrender.

d. Persistent Attack. During Pearl Harbour attack, though Commander Fuchida urged for a third wave for the leftover targets, Admiral Nagumo called off the operation. It was a fatal decision as the Japanese left their most important targets intact.

e. Synergy. Joint operation plays a vital role to create synergistic effect. The effort by Japanese army and navy was not coordinated at all. Whereas, the allies could synergistically utilise all the forces available to them, this helped them to take the edge over Japanese. This concept is still true for present day operation.

f. Centralized Command and Decentralized Execution. Centralized command allows achieving the unity of command and decentralized execution allows tactical flexibility. Delegation of authority to control combined air arms to General Kenney in the Southwest Pacific is the best example.

g. Reach. US perceived no threat at Pearl Harbour and Japanese thought their mainland was very secure. Both were proved wrong at a high price. The air war in the Pacific once again proved that, to air power no target is invincible.

h. Offence Defence Balance. A correct offence defence balance is essential for any war. Japanese weak air defence made them vulnerable and slowly degraded their offensive capability.

j. Technology. Technology can have a major impact on the warfare and can help to achieve surprise. Absence of radar on Japanese fleet, the Zero fighter, US B-29s and atom bombs signifies that.

k. Complacency. The Japanese thought themselves the most formidable and invincible power in the world. Their pilots were skilled enough, technology was sophisticated to face and win against any adversary in the world. The complacency ultimately led the Japanese to lose the war in a humiliating fashion.

l. Security. Airpower can be used effectively for effect base operation. The assassination of Yamamoto signifies that. This isolated incident had considerable impact on Japanese command and control structure in the subsequent battle.

CONCLUSION

82. On 7 December 1941, the World War II took a global shape with the attack on Pearl Harbour. Immediately after this attack, Japan launched a thoughtfully crafted attack against key American and British forces in the Pacific. They aimed at gaining control of Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific, including the priceless natural resources of the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese government believed that once these regions were firmly under their control, the Allied, especially the US, would sue for peace rather than fight a bloody war in distant lands.

83. The Japanese however, did not anticipate the angry retaliation of Pearl Harbour attack within a short time. They rather envisioned a negotiated settlement, by 1941, which was ultimately proved to be a day-dream. Following the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Americans were desperate to strike back at the Japanese. Immediately a dare-devil raid, popularly known as ‘Doolittle Raid’, was conducted against Japan. Though the damage by the bombing was insignificant, it convinced the Japanese high command to advance across the central and southwest Pacific to strengthen their defensive parameter. This led to the battles in the Coral Sea and Midway. In the Battle of Coral Sea, the Allies successfully halted the Japanese invasion of Post Moresby. Subsequently, in the Battle of Midway much of Japan’s naval aviation had been destroyed, which immediately forced Japanese to adapt a defensive posture. Thus the Battle of Midway has been rightly called as the ‘Turning Point’ of the Pacific war.

84. Following the success in the Coral Sea and Midway, the Allies decided to go on the offensive. Japanese were steadily pushed back by the two-pronged offensive across the central and southwest Pacific. By mid 1944, the backbone of Japanese Pacific defence was broken when Marshalls Islands and the Marianas were seized. Subsequently, Okinawa, the last island before Japan was also taken by the allies. After the capture of Mariana and Okinawa, systematic long-range bombing offensive over Japan got underway. Projection of power, mainly through air power, was the key concept of this war. The use of air power resulted in the defeat of Japan without the invasion of mainland. Therefore, it is reiterated that in future wars air power would be the deciding factor of defeat or victory.

Annexes:

A. General Map of Pacific Campaign.

B. Map of Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbour.

C. Map of Japanese Attack on Philippines.

D. Map of Doolittle Raid.

E. Map of Battle of Coral Sea.

F. Map of Battle of Midway.

G. Map of Allied Advance from Central Pacific.

H. Map of Allied Advance from Southwest Pacific.