Paavola Abduction
-
Upload
carlo-cellucci -
Category
Documents
-
view
212 -
download
0
Transcript of Paavola Abduction
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
1/16
ABDUCTION AS A LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY OF DISCOVERY:
THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIES
Paper originally published in (2004) Foundations of Science 9(3), 267-283.
Published on the Commens site with the kind permission of the editors of the
journal.
Sami Paavola
University of Helsinki
E-mail: sami.paavola at helsinki.fi
Abstract: There are various "classical" arguments against abduction as a logic of
discovery, especially that 1) abduction is too weak a mode of inference to be of
any use, and 2) in basic formulation of abduction the hypothesis is already
presupposed to be known, so it is not the way hypotheses are discovered in the
first place. In this paper I argue, by bringing forth the idea of strategies, that
these counter-arguments are weaker than may appear. The concept of strategies
suggests, inter alia, that many inferential moves are taken into account at thesame time. This is especially important in abductive reasoning, which is
basically a very weak mode of inference. The importance of strategic thinkingcan already be seen in Charles S. Peirces early treatments of the topic, and N.
R. Hansons later writings on abduction although they did not use the concept of
"strategies." On the whole, I am arguing that the focus should be more on
methodological processes, and not only on validity considerations, which have
dominated the discussion about abduction.
Key words: abduction, logic of discovery, strategies, methodology
1. Basic Criticism against Abduction (as a Logic of Discovery)
Abductive inference arouses increasing interest and methodological discussion
in various fields. In the philosophical context abduction has, however, very often
been subjected to severe criticism (see e.g., Frankfurt, 1958; Nickles, 1980b;Kapitan, 1992). There are, so to speak, various "classical" counter-arguments
against abduction, especially if abduction is presented as a logic of discovery. A
basis for these counter-arguments is the widely held view that discovery is
something that cannot be treated by conceptual or philosophical means.
One basic way of formulating abduction is the one made already by Charles S.Peirce (See Peirce, CP 5.189; Hanson, 1972, 86):
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
2/16
The surprising fact, C, is observed; {268}
But if H [an explanatory hypothesis] were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true.
So abduction can be understood as a mode of inference where explanations aresearched for (anomalous or suprising) phenomena. But this kind of an inference
can be criticized because it is too permissive to be of much use. It seems to
permit inferences to all sorts of wild hypotheses (Frankfurt, 1958, 596; Nickles,
1980a, 24; Kapitan, 1992, 6). Peter Achinstein has presented various, often
cited, counter-examples in line with this criticism. For example, the hypothesis
that I will be paid one million dollars if this paper is published, would explain (if
it were true) why I am writing this paper. But still, there is no reason to think
that I am about to come a millionaire (unfortunately so!). Or another Achinstein
example: Let us suppose as an observed fact that I am happy about some news I
have just received. Then a hypothesis could be proposed that I have just received
the news that I have won the Nobel Prize in literature (because it is reasonable to
suppose that anyone who hears the news about the Nobel Prize winning is
happy). But here again, the fact that I am happy, should give no reason to
believe that I have won the Nobel Prize. So, from the mere fact that some
hypothesis H, if it was true, would explain the data, does not usually follow that
there is reason to think that that H is true (Achinstein, 1970, 92; 1971, 118;
1987, 413). It is to be noted that Achinstein does not take into account that thefact observed should somehow be 'surprising' (Is it surprising that I am writing
this paper? Is it surprising that I am happy? In what sense are these factssupposed to be surprising?). But still, Achinstein's argument appears to be
basically adequate. The problem with abduction is that its basic formula seems
to allow these kinds of inferences to all sorts of wild and crazy hypotheses.
Another basic criticism against abduction is that it cannot be a logic of discovery
because the hypothesis is already included (or supposed to be known) in the
premises (see above the second premise) (e.g., Frankfurt, 1958, 594; Nickles,1980a, 23; Hoffmann, 1999, 278-9). So it seems that the new idea is not a result
of abductive inference, and abduction can be at most a logic for preliminary
evaluation or appraisal of a hypothesis that {269} is already discovered by someother means (Schon, 1959, 501-2; Kapitan, 1992, 2). In this sense abduction is
often placed in that phase of activity which is carried out after original discovery
but before final justification (e.g., Nickles, 1980a, 18-22; Laudan, 1980, 174).
This means -- if the idea is followed -- that the old distinction between thecontext of discovery and the context of justification (see Reichenbach, 1938;
Nickles, 1980a) is not enough, and a third region is needed. The basic idea is
that this third area can be analysed by logical and conceptual means, although it
is not a matter of justification in proper sense yet. But the context of discovery
in genuine sense is still, according to this idea, something inexplicable, orpossibly a subject for empirical sciences but not for conceptual analysis.
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
3/16
2. The Meaning of Strategies in Abduction
I think that abduction can still be defended as a very promising candidate for a
logic of discovery if the meaning of strategies is taken into account. JaakkoHintikka has emphasized a distinction between two sorts of rules in reasoning
and logic (or in games in general): the definitory rules and the strategic rules.
Hintikka maintains that for the theory of logic and reasoning, especially at the
level of introductory textbooks and courses, the study of excellence of reasoning
is often forgotten, and the emphasis is on the avoidance of mistakes in reasoning
(e.g., Hintikka, 1999). According to him, students are not taught how to reason
well but to maintain their logical virtue (i.e., to avoid logical fallacies and to
learn what is and what is not admissible and valid). The focus has been on
definitory rules of logic, and strategic rules have largely been neglected. The
definitory rules tell what are valid rules in particular system of logic. By
analogy: the definitory rules of chess tell what one is allowed to do in chess
(how chessmen may be moved etc.). But by knowing only the definitory rules of
chess one cannot say that one plays chess well. Excellence in chess requires that
one master strategic rules extremely well. According to Hintikka, this same idea
applies to logic. No one is good in logic and reasoning by knowing only the
definitory rules of logic, but by mastering well the strategic rules.
Strategies have, however, been a quite neglected topic in philosophy of science.There are some exceptions. In the interrogative {270} approach to inquiry, the
meaning of strategies has been emphasized (Hintikka, 1985, 1989; Jung, 1996).But usually the merits of inference are assessed by investigating whether the
truth of the premises guarantees or makes probable the truth of the conclusion.
And this has also been the basic way of evaluating abduction.
Hintikka has emphasized strategic aspects also in relationship to abductive
inference: "the validity of an abductive inference is to be judged by strategic
principles rather than by definitory (move-by-move) rules" (Hintikka, 1998,513). Hintikka himself does not, however, treat abduction as a separate mode of
inference in his interrogative model of inquiry. In Hintikka's model the problem
of abduction is subsumed under a more general problem concerning the natureof ampliative reasoning in general. In Hintikka's model, abduction is closely
related to a question- answer step in the process of inquiry (ibid., 519-523).
I suggest that abduction as a separate mode of inference can also be defended by
taking strategies into account much more seriously than before (see alsoMagnani, 1999, 235- 236). But what does strategies mean in the area of
reasoning? Strategy is in itself a very complicated concept. Strategies are related
to goal-directed activity, where the ability to anticipate things, and to assess or
choose between different possibilities, are important (see e.g., Hintikka, 1989,
1999). One central point in strategic rules is that they cannot normally be judgedonly in relationship to particular moves, but the whole strategic situation must
be taken into account (see Hintikka, 1998, 513). This means that in strategies
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
4/16
more than one step or move can and must be taken into account at the same
time. I am not maintaining that this characterization does full justice to the
meaning of strategies in (abductive) inference, but it is surely one essential
point. And in abduction, strategies are especially important because it is
basically such a weak mode of inference. The force of abductive inference ismuch strengthened if one takes into account that the hypotheses are to be
searched for in relationship to various phenomena and background information
and not just in order to explain one, surprising phenomenon.
So if I am a researcher looking for a good explanatory hypothesis for some
anomalous phenomenon, I can (and must) try to constrain and guide my search
by taking into account that my explanation {271} must explain or at least be
consistent with, most other clues and information that I have available
concerning the subject matter. And I try to anticipate that my explanation has
some chance of survival in subsequent tests and assessments. Usually I must
also take into account that the proposed explanation should not be totally
unconvincing, or if it seems to be that, I should have a good further explanation
for why this explanation still deserves attention. So, I should have an
explanation for my explanation (see Thagard & Shelley, 1997). These are
strategic principles where more than one move can and should be taken into
account simultaneously.
In Achinstein's counterexamples, one important reason why those wild
hypotheses are not reasonable (it is to be noted that the term "reasonable" is justthe right one here) is that they do not fit well with other relevant information.
Normally no one would pay one million dollars for any academic paper(unfortunately again!), which rules out this hypothesis as strategically bad. And
there is no reason to think that I have won the Nobel Prize in literature - only
because I am happy - if this hypothesis does not fit at all with other information
concerning who I am and what I have done. Strategically, it would be bad
reasoning to suggest such implausible hypotheses, if there were no good further
reasons or backing for these. A strategically good hypothesis takes also intoaccount that there is an explanation for my explanation (or at least explanation
why there cannot be any further explanation). Why someone would pay me one
million dollars for this paper? Why would someone even suggest a Nobel Prizefor me? If there are no good answers for these questions, there is no point in
even suggesting these kinds of hypotheses at the first place. Achinstein himself
apparently notices the situation: normally we take the relevant background
information into account, and we require further evidence for some oddhypothesis in order to take it seriously (see Achinstein 1970, 92; 1971, 118;
1987, 416). But what Achinstein is missing is the idea that strategies are
involved here.
The strategic viewpoint does not, however, rule out the possibility of suggesting
implausible hypotheses altogether. It is, for example, possible to imagine such acourse of events, where the one million dollars hypothesis (or the Nobel Prize
hypothesis) is the correct one, because of some extraordinary circumstances.
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
5/16
Especially if {272} more conventional or plausible hypotheses have not worked
out, it might be a good strategy to try more implausible hypotheses. (In
Achinstein's one-million dollars example, if the situation were that, for some
reasons, it would be very surprising that I am giving this presentation, and other
explanations would not seem to work out, it would be a good candidatehypothesis to think that someone is paying me a lot of money for this.) What I
am arguing is that in strategies, the reasoner tries to anticipate the counter-
arguments, and to take into account all the relevant information, and this rules
out very "wild" hypotheses, except, when there is no other available, or
alternatively, when these are presented simply as "wild guesses".
I will now give further consideration to the criticism that abduction cannot be
the logic of discovery because the hypothesis or the idea is already presupposed
in the premises. To begin with, I am not maintaining that abductive inference is
an automatic means for making discoveries. I agree with N. R. Hanson, who
emphasized that abductive inference is rather a way of analysing conceptual
issues in discoveries rather than "a manual" or an algorithmic device for making
these discoveries (Hanson, 1961, 21-22). If abduction is to be considered as the
logic of discovery, the whole methodological process must be taken into
account; one must not just concentrate on the form of the argument. In this
sense, it is for example important to think how these "surprising facts" (see the
formulation of abduction above) operate as clues in the search for explanations
or hypotheses. From the point of view of the inquirer, the difficult part inabductive search might be to find fruitful premises. But this does not mean that
abduction cannot analyse properly the logical form of discoveries.Strategies are also involved here. Although the hypothesis is in the premises,
abduction can still be the logic of discovery because, as Peirce wrote (Peirce, CP
5.181):
"It is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before;
but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed ofputting together which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation."
How I interpret this idea from the strategic viewpoint is that a hypothesissuggested can in itself be something old and even well known. But the way in
which this hypothesis is seen to fit with this particular problem in question
{273} and with other relevant information (besides the one anomalous
phenomenon) is crucial. And it is also essential that there is a further explanationor clarification for this particular hypothesis. For example, the idea of evolution
was not new when Charles Darwin proposed it. It was widely admitted that it
would have been a good explanation for various phenomena, but the problem
was that there were no plausible explanations for how evolution operates more
specifically (and in fact there seemed to be lots of evidence which was againstthe evolutionary hypothesis). As Darwin later recollected his discovery and its
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
6/16
relationship to the known facts (Darwin in his autobiography: Barlow, 1958,
118-119):
"It was evident that such facts as these [various important observations that he
had made on the famous voyage of the Beagle], as well as many others, could beexplained on the supposition that species gradually become modified; and the
subject haunted me. But it was equally evident that neither the action of the
surrounding conditions, nor the will of the organisms (especially in the case of
plants), could account for the innumerable cases in which organisms of every
kind are beautifully adapted to their habits of life. I had always been much
struck by such adaptations, and until these could be explained it seemed to me
almost useless to endeavour to prove by indirect evidence that species have been
modified."
And likewise many details in Darwin's theory were not new, but the real
discovery and insight was that Darwin showed that these ideas really work in
this particular context. This is also how Howard Gruber has described Darwin's
famous Malthusian insight (Gruber, 1981, 42):
" his notebooks show that he had or almost had the same idea a number of
times before, during the fifteen months of deliberate effort leading up to the
moment in question. So the historic moment was in a sense a re-cognition ofwhat he already knew or almost knew."
So my point is, that the basic formula of abduction can still be an essential part
in the logic of discovery (even though the hypothesis is in the premises) if the
difficult part in discovery is the recognition that the hypothesis really is a viable
way of solving this particular problem and that the hypothesis works more
generally (and not only in relationship to one, particular anomalous
phenomenon).I am not maintaining that the importance of strategies in discovery means that in
(scientific) discovery the researchers always {274} have their hypotheses
already at their disposal and that the only problem would be to strategically see,somehow, a connection between moves in games of reasoning. Discovery means
that something new is brought (or abducted!) to the particular situation. But
strategies must be taken into account when "aha-experiences" or insights are
involved. An aha-experience means that the hypothesis (or the solution) inquestion fits with those constraints and clues that are involved in the problem
situation in question, i.e., the insight seems to take into account many counter-
arguments and moves in advance. It is not enough that the hypothesis explains
only some detached, anomalous phenomena (e.g., for Darwin the idea of
evolution and the Malthusian principle were important discoveries only whenthese ideas could be integrated to the larger argument concerning species, and
not as separate and unconnected explanations). It almost seems that the basis for
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
7/16
the aha-experience is a situation where, first, various constraints and hints
characterize the situation and then some solution seems to fit with these
constraints. And this outlining of constraints and hints is, I submit, closely
related to strategic thinking, at least in the sense I use 'strategies' here. A good
insight is also a good one strategically.I think that strategies are also involved when it is said that abductive inference
starts from anomalous or somewhat surprising phenomena. It might be asked,
why it is so often emphasized that abductive inference starts from surprising
phenomena (but cf. Hoffmann, 1999, 281)? It does not seem to affect to the
validity of inference if it starts from surprising or from non-surprising
phenomenon. I think that this is also a strategic rule, for the following reasons:
In difficult problems or in cases where something new is required, it is a good
strategy (or a worthwhile one) to start from anomalous facts or from little
details, and try with them to find a solution or a hypothesis. This is at least a
strategy that detectives (or detective novels) recommend (the connection
between abduction and the reasoning that detectives use is often noticed, see
e.g., Eco & Sebeok, 1988; Niiniluoto, 1999b). This is also how Francis Darwin
described how (his father) Charles Darwin worked (Darwin, 1892, 94-95):
"There was one quality of mind which seemed to be of special and extreme
advantage in leading him to make discoveries. It was the power of never letting
{275} exceptions pass unnoticed. Everybody notices a fact as an exception whenit is striking or frequent, but he had a special instinct for arresting an exception.
A point apparently slight and unconnected with his present work is passed overby many a man almost unconsciously with some half-considered explanation,
which is in fact no explanation. It was just these things that he seized on to make
a start from."
3. Strategies in Peirce's and Hanson's Treatment of Abduction: Methodeutic forAbduction
Charles Peirce's seminal writings concerning abduction already contained manystrategic insights, although he did not label them as such (Hintikka, 1998, 512-
6). Peirce made a distinction between three areas of logic: (Speculative)
Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic. Peirce characterized this "trivium" in various
ways during his long career, so it is not possible to interpret this distinction inexact terms or unequivocally (see e. g., Peirce, CP 1.559; CP 1.444; CP 2.93).
Especially the third area, Methodeutic, leaves room for various interpretations
(in many writings he called it e.g., "Speculative Rhetoric") (Liszka, 1996). In
Grammar the nature and meanings of signs are studied; in Critic arguments are
classified and the validity and the force of arguments are studied (see Peirce, CP1.191). Methodeutic, however, "studies the methods that ought to be pursued in
the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth." (ibid.), and
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
8/16
"the principles of the production of valuable courses of research and exposition."
(Peirce, EP2, 272).
In order to develop further the model of abductive inference, all these three
Peircean areas of logic (Grammar, Critic, Methodeutic) are salient. According to
Peirce, Critic is important in abduction although it is a very "weak" mode ofinference (Peirce, CP 5.188):
" abduction, although it is very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless
is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problematically or
conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly definite logical
form."
The area of Grammar should also be developed further in order to better
understand the nature of abductive inference. For example, the special role of
iconic and perceptual elements in abductive inference is, I think, part of
Grammar (see Peirce, CP, 2.96; Shelley, 1996; Thagard and Shelley, 1997). But
what is important from the {276} point of view of this paper is that, in abductive
inference, the role of Methodeutic can be seen as especially significant because,
in Peirce's words, "Of the different classes of arguments, abductions are the only
ones in which after they have been admitted to be just, it still remains to inquire
whether they are advantageous." (Peirce, HP, 1035)
I maintain that according to the Peircean distinction of these three areas of logic,strategies would belong to Methodeutic. Methodeutic studies the process of
inquiry and the way in which inquiry is carried on, and strategies are part of it.As Peirce in his time emphasized Methodeutic in reasoning, Hintikka, in recent
decades has emphasized the need for strategic rules and study of fruitful
methods of logical reasoning.
There are also other concepts and ideas in Peirces writings (besides
Methodeutic) where the issue of strategies comes to the fore. Hintikka has
suggested that in Peirce's concept of habit "there lurks a strategic rule tryingto get out" (Hintikka, 1998, 515). Peirce also emphasized the notion of "the
economy of research," which is very closely related to strategic principles
(Peirce, CP 7.220). According to Peirce various sorts of "economical" (broadlyinterpreted) factors should guide the choice of the hypotheses, for example,
caution, which takes into account what will happen if the hypothesis suggested
does not work out. One example of this economical caution is the game of
twenty questions where the idea is to guess what object someone is thinking bymaking good questions (ibid.). Only such questions are allowed as can be
answered by Yes or No (this limitation makes the game intriguing; there would
be no game if you were allowed to ask the object thought of right away). The
success in this game is based on skilful questions that break up the search area
most efficiently. I think it is quite clear that this is the same as saying that thesuccess is based on good strategies.
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
9/16
Peirce himself often maintained that we humans must have some sort of an
instinct that guides our guesses (see e.g., Peirce, CP 2.753; CP 5.172-4). Peirce's
argument was that a human could not arrive at his or her theories by pure
chance. There are an infinite number of theories that could be suggested if there
is nothing that helps us. According to Peirce our abductive guesses are nottotally {277} haphazard or blind because we have an instinct for making these
guesses. But this explanation raises several questions. Is there any evidence that
we humans have this kind of a guessing instinct? How would it operate? There
is some plausibility to the Peircean idea that evolution has moulded us to guess
such hypotheses about physical and psychical life, which have been important
for our survival. But how could this guessing instinct help humans to discover
modern scientific theories which are often counter-intuitive and against a
common sense way of understanding things? Peirce himself admitted that this
instinct explanation is not very plausible when one considers the genesis of very
complicated theories by which we "penetrate further and further from the
surface of nature" (Peirce, CP 7.508; see also Peirce, CP 7.606). It is also
problematic to combine this instinct explanation with the idea that abduction is a
third mode of inference. It seems that if the crucial element in abduction is the
guessing instinct there is not much room for abductive reasoning. There are
various suggestions how instinct and inference can be combined in a Peircean
scheme (e.g., Fann, 1970; Anderson, 1987) but still it is a quite problematic how
this combining could satisfactorily be done.Nicholas Rescher has suggested that Peirce's "somewhat mysterious" capacity of
instinct should be replaced by a methodology of inquiry (Rescher, 1995, 321-3;Hoffmann, 1999, 297). The idea is that scientific inquiry and discovery is not
blind because methods and methodology give rational principles that guide the
processes of inquiry. Methods themselves, according to Rescher, have emerged
through evolutionary trial-and-error process. I am not trying to evaluate
Rescher's solution comprehensively, but I think that Rescher is making a very
important point here. Scientists need not start from scratch because methods andmethodologies that have proven to be successful are guiding inquiry. But it
seems that Rescher's solution cannot be the whole story. If methods and
methodology are supposedly reached by trial-and-error, are we not facing againthe same problem that was supposed to be solved (this is one version of the
classical Meno paradox)? Are these methods found by pure chance in
evolutionary way? Is this possible? And if so, is there some kind of an
agreement what these successful methods nowadays are? If they guide scientificinquiry in contrast {278} to instincts, should we not know them explicitly? And
even if we could characterize these methodologies in general terms, is there any
guarantee that they work in particular cases?
What I have tried to argue has some similarities to Rescher's solution. There is
no need to abandon the idea that we humans might have some abilities that canbe called "instincts" and which help us when we are trying to discover
something new. But these abductive instincts cannot be the fundamental basis
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
10/16
for abductive inference. In order to understand abductive reasoning better, the
focus should be more on methodological processes. But unlike Rescher, I don't
think that the most important feature of methodology is that it is moulded by
evolutionary process.
The focus on strategies means that inquiry is seen as a kind of a problem solvingprocess where the inquirer uses the best inquiry strategies possible. The use of
strategies explains why inquiry is not purely blind, even when something new is
discovered. The inquirer must try to take into account all the information that is
relevant to his or her subject area. Strategically, and from the point of view of
the inquirer, it would be bad reasoning to suggest very "wild" hypotheses, or
hypotheses based on pure chance; it is wise to take into account existing
knowledge. It is true that new (especially revolutionary) discoveries often mean
that some parts of this existing knowledge must be abandoned. But even then the
inquirer must be able to combine the new ideas with existing knowledge or
constraints, (or to be able to show that the existing knowledge is in some ways
inadequate). These constraints can be negative, in a sense that they inhibit new
ideas, but they can also be positive in suggesting methods, theories, information
and so on which must be taken into account and which might give clues how to
solve the problems in question. This idea is similar to the role of "normal
science" or "paradigms" in Thomas Kuhns famous model of scientific growth
(Kuhn, 1970). Paradigms are not automatic ways of solving problems, but they
give good suggestions for how to conduct inquiry. This is the reason whyinquiry does not always have to start from scratch. Kuhn does not extend the
idea to revolutionary situations where paradigms themselves change. But evenin revolutionary situations, existing knowledge constrains and guides the search
for new information and discoveries. {279}
I think that Norwood Russell Hansons old ideas concerning abduction should
also be seen from a strategic angle. Hanson was already a proponent of the idea
of the logic of discovery in the 1950s and 1960s when these subjects were not
popular in philosophy of science (Hanson, 1961, 1972). Hanson's formulationshave been criticized as inadequate for the logic of discovery (see e.g., Nickles,
1980b). My suggestion is that this criticism has been concerned more with the
validity of abduction (with "Critic" in Peircean terms), and Hanson himself wasmore interested in abduction as a part of methodological processes of inquiry
(i.e., Methodeutic). Hanson explicitly criticized the "logic of the finished
research reports;" he put the emphasis on processes of discovery and maintained
that these processes can be analysed by conceptual means (Hanson, 1961, 20-22).
In his writings concerning abduction, Hanson distinguished three ingredients in
"the logic of discovery" (Hanson, 1965, 47-65). It is reasoning which
"1) proceeds retroductively, from an anomaly to2) the delineation of a kind of explanatory H which
3) fits into an organized pattern of concepts." (ibid., 50)
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
11/16
I think that these points can be seen as strategic principles although Hanson
himself did not develop these ideas explicitly in this way. The starting point in
anomalies (point 1) can be seen as a strategic principle (see the end of chapter 2.
above). Hanson also pointed out that abduction does not mean that someparticular hypothesis is found straight away. An important phase in the process
of discovery might be that the type of the solution is delineated before the
solution is acquired (point 2) (Hanson, 1961; Niiniluoto, 1999a, S440-1). This is
strategic thinking: the constraints and hints that help in hypothesis finding are
taken into account. And the goal in abductive inference (at least in most cases) is
to find an overall pattern into which all evidence and clues fit (point 3), and this
phase especially requires that various inferential moves be put together skilfully
and by taking various clues and constraints into account (a paradigmatic case is
detective stories, but this is in itself a very general model). {280}
4. Conclusion: A Logic and Methodology of Discovery
Various approaches in the philosophy of science nowadays emphasize the need
to find a model for inquiry that is not strictly logical, at least in the "old" sense
(i.e., in the sense that formal logic has been usually understood in the last
century) but one that is not purely relativistic or historicistic either (see e.g.,Pera, 1994; Jung, 1996; Thagard, 2000; Aliseda, 2001). This need arises
especially from an aim to understand processes of discovery and knowledgeformation and not just finished products (Sintonen, 1996; Aliseda 1997).
Philosophy of science and logic have for long concentrated on analysing the
structure of finished products, e.g., what is an explanation, and not processes of
inquiry, e.g., how good explanations are searched for and found (Aliseda, 2001).
There have been some notable exceptions, e.g., N. R. Hanson, but usually these
processes were literally defined to be something that cannot be analysed byconceptual means, or by philosophical models.
Thomas Nickles has made a distinction between "heuristic appraisal" and
"epistemic appraisal" in methodology (Nickles, 1989). Epistemic appraisal is thestandard way of doing things in the philosophy of science. It is a retrospective,
justificatory assessment of scientific results. Heuristic appraisal means that the
promisingness, or fertility of scientific proposals or problems is being assessed.
It can be maintained that this is at least as important, if not more important thanepistemic appraisal. Nowadays heuristical aspects are often emphasized when
rationality of discovery is searched for (Jung, 1996; Magnani, 1999, 235-236;
Aliseda, 2001).
The "friends of discovery" have for long emphasized that the concept of
rationality must be broadened if the context of discovery is to be taken intoaccount (Nickles, 1980b). There is a new opportunity for this broadening when
new conceptual means are developed, i.e., conceptual means that try to capture
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
12/16
processes of inquiry and discovery (see e.g., Hintikka, 1985, 1998; Sintonen,
1996; Jung, 1996; Aliseda, 1997, 2001). The basic point is that even though old
models of formal and symbolic logic are not adequate, it is possible to develop
new formal models and tools that are more appropriate for this (see also
Thagard, 2000). In this sense there is no need to leave "the context of discovery"only to psychologists {281} or to empirical scientists, for there are also
conceptual and logical issues involved here.
The point in this paper has been that the logical apparatus should be broadened
at least in two dimensions from the "standard" way. Deductive logic is not
enough, and the model of abductive inference is especially needed in order to
understand the processes of discovery. But abduction in itself is not enough.
Besides validity considerations (which are in themselves important in abduction)
there is the art of using (abductive) reasoning. This concerns the area of
"Methodeutic" (in Peircean terms); an area especially important in abductive
reasoning. It seems that this is in some sense a return to a pre-Fregean sense of
logic, where the boundaries between logic and methodology are quite vague
(Aliseda, 2001); boundaries between logic and psychology must also be drawn
anew (see Thagard, 2000). In any case, this shift to focus more on processes of
inquiry necessitates a re-consideration of abductive strategies.
References
Achinstein, P., 1970, Inference to scientific laws, in: Stuwer, R. H., ed.,Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5: 87-111.
Achinstein, P., 1971, Law and Explanation. An Essay in The Philosophy of
Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Achinstein, P., 1987, Scientific discovery and Maxwell's kinetic theory,Philosophy of Science 54: 409-434.
Aliseda, A., 1997, Seeking Explanations: Abduction in Logic, Philosophy ofScience and Artificial Intelligence. Institute for Logic, Language, and
Computation, Dissertation Series, University of Amsterdam, Holland.
Aliseda, A., 2001, A place for logic in scientific methodology: a secondopportunity?, a paper presented at the Model-Based Reasoning: Scientific
Discovery, Technological Innovation, Values Conference, Pavia, Italy, May 17-
19, 2001.
Anderson, D. R., 1987, Creativity and the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce. MartinusNijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
13/16
Barlow, N., ed., 1958, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882, with
original omissions restored, Collins, St James's Place, London.
Darwin, F., 1892, Reminiscences of my father's everyday life, in: F. Darwin, ed.,
Charles Darwin: His Life Told in an Autobiographical Chapter, and in aSelected Series of His Published Letters, John Murray, Albemarle Street,
London, pp. 66-103.
Eco, U. and Sebeok, T. A., eds., 1988, The Sign of Three. Dupin, Holmes,
Peirce, Indiana University Press, USA.
{282}
Fann, K. T., 1970, Peirces Theory of Abduction. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
Frankfurt, H. G., 1958, Peirce's account of inquiry, The Journal of Philosophy
55(14): 588-592.
Gruber, H. E., 1981, On the relation between 'aha experiences' and the
construction of ideas, History of Science 19: 41-59.
Hanson, N. R., 1961, Is there a logic of scientific discovery, in: Feigl, H. and
Maxwell, G., eds., 1961, Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, Holt,Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York.
Hanson, N. R., 1965, Notes toward a logic of discovery, in: Bernstein, R. J. ed.
Perspectives on Peirce, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven and London, pp. 42-65.
Hanson, N. R., 1972, Patterns of Discovery, University Press, Cambridge, first
printed 1958.
Hintikka, J., 1985, True and false logic of scientific discovery, Communication
& Cognition 18(1/2): 3-14.
Hintikka, J., 1989, The role of logic in argumentation, Monist 72: 3 - 24.
Hintikka, J., 1998, What is abduction? The fundamental problem of
contemporary epistemology, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34/3:503-533.
Hintikka, J., 1999, Is logic the key to all good reasoning?, in Hintikka, J., 1999,
Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery, Jaakko Hintikka Selected
Papers, Volume 5, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
14/16
Hoffmann, M., 1999, Problems with Peirce's concept of abduction, Foundations
of Science 4: 271-305.
Jung, S., 1996, The Logic of Discovery. An Interrogative Approach to Scientific
Inquiry, American University Studies, Series V, Philosophy, Vol. 168, PeterLang, New York.
Kapitan, T., 1992, Peirce and the autonomy of abductive reasoning, Erkenntnis
37: 1 26.
Kuhn, T. S., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second edition,
enlarged, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Laudan, L., 1980, Why was the logic of discovery abandoned, in: Nickles, T.,
ed., 1980, Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality, D.Reidel Publishing
Company, Dordrecht, pp. 173-183.
Liszka, J. J., 1996, A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders
Peirce, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.
Magnani, L., 1999. Model-based creative abduction, in: Magnani, L.,
Nersessian, N. J. & Thagard, P., eds., 1999, Model-Based Reasoning inScientific Discovery, Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers, New York.
Nickles, T., 1980a, Introductory essay: scientific discovery and the future of
philosophy of science, in: Nickles, T., ed., 1980, Scientific Discovery, Logic,
and Rationality, D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht.
Nickles, T., ed., 1980b, Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality, D.Reidel
Publishing Company, Dordrecht.
Nickles, T., 1989, Heuristical appraisal: a proposal, Social Epistemology 3(3):
175 188.
{283}
Niiniluoto, I., 1999a, Defending abduction, Philosophy of Science 66: S436-
S451.
Niiniluoto, I., 1999b, Abduction and geometrical analysis. Notes on Charles S.
Peirce and Edgar Allan Poe, in: Magnani, L., Nersessian, N. J. & Thagard, P.,
eds., 1999, Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer Academic /
Plenum Publishers, New York.
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
15/16
Peirce, C., S., (CP), 1931-1958, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
vols. 1 6, Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., eds.; vols. 7-8, Burks, A. W., ed.,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Peirce, C., S., (HP), 1985, Historical Perspectives on Peirces Logic of Science.A History of Science, 2 vols., edited by Carolyn Eisele, Mouton Publishers,
Berlin.
Peirce, C., S., (EP2), 1992-1998, The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical
Writings, vol. 2 1893-1913, the Peirce Edition Project, ed., Indiana University
Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.
Pera, M., 1994, The Discourses of Science, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Reichenbach, H., 1938, Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the
Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.
Rescher, N., 1995, Peirce on abduction, plausibility, and the efficiency of
scientific inquiry, in N. Rescher, 1995, Essays in the History of Philosophy,
Aldershot, Avebury.
Schon, D., 1959, Comment on mr. Hanson's "The logic of discovery", TheJournal of Philosophy, 56(11): 500-503.
Shelley, C., 1996, Visual abductive reasoning in archeology, Philosophy of
Science, 63: 278-301.
Sintonen, M., 1996, Structuralism and the interrogative model of inquiry, in:Balzer, W., and Moulines, C. U., eds., 1996, Structuralist Theory of Science.
Focal Issues, New Results, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York.
Thagard, P., 2000, Coherence in Thought and Action, A Bradford Book, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Thagard, P. and Shelley, C., 1997, Abductive reasoning: logic, visual thinking,and coherence, in: M.L. Dalla Chiara, K. Doets, D. Mundici, and J. van
Bentham, eds., Logic and Scientific Methods, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 413- 427,
on-line: http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/%7FAbductive.html.
| Top |
-
8/14/2019 Paavola Abduction
16/16
About Commens The Metaphysical Club Papers Home Page About
Peirce Research Resources Links