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Proceeding of the International Conference on the
EU ENLARGEMENTTOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
Decemcer 15th
, 2005
AUDITORIUM
YTU Auditorium / Yildiz Campus
Yildiz - Besiktas
Edited by
Dr. Ozan ERZDEN
Joint Conference Series No.4
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)
Y.T.U Department of Political Science and International Relations
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system or transmitted in any from or by any means without the prior per-
mission from the Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV).
The findings interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication ar
entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV). Texts are as originally sub-
mitted.
Copyright
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)
Citation.
Dr. Ozan ERZDEN, Proceedings of the International Conference on the EU
Enlargement towards South-East Europe, December 15 th, Istanbul.
Istanbul: OBIV, 2005
Available FromFoundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)
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skdar - Istanbul
Tel : +90 (216) 553 41 58 - 495 91 88
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Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV).
Yildiz Technical University
Department of Political Science and International Relations
EU ENLARGEMENT
TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
December 15th, 2005
AUDITORIUM
YTU Auditorium / Yildiz CampusYildiz - Besiktas
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EU ENLARGEMENTTOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
December 15th, 2005
ProgrammeWelcome Addresses and Opening Remarks
10.00-10.10
Prof. Dr. Fulya ATACAN
(Head of DPSIR / YTU)
10.10-10.20
Ambassador Gner ZTEK
(Chairman of OBIV)
I.SESSION
ChairpersonProf.Dr. Haldun GLALP
(DPSIR / YTU)
10.30-12.30
11.15-11.30 Coffee Break
II.SESSION
Chairperson
Dr. Cengiz ARIN
(DPSIR / YTU)
14.30-17.00
15.30-15.45 Coffee Break
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I.SESSION
10.30-13.00
Chairperson
Prof.Dr. Haldun GLALP
(DPSIR / YTU)
South-East Europes Integration to Europe as a Problem of Physics:
Newton Mechanics vs. Quantum Mechanices
Dr.Ozan ERZDEN
(DPSIR / YTU)
Romanias Road to EU-Integration: Accession in 2007?
Dr. Anneli Ute GABANYI(German Institute for International and Security Affairs)
Being the Model Balkan Student? Exporting the EU to Bulgaria
Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI
(Lougborough University)
EUs step child:
Turkey as candidate country; Examples of double standards
Prof.Dr. Cengiz AKTAR
(Bahesehir University)
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II.SESSION
14.30-17.00
ChairpersonDr. Cengiz ARIN
(DPSIR / YTU)
Crotias long journey back to Europe, Challenges on the way to EU membership
Dr.Martin MAYER
(Advisor to the Commission Delegation Zagreb)
Challenges and Perspectives of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Accession to the European Union
Prof.Dr. Jovan TEOKAREVIC
(Belgrade University)
Constitutional Change and Resistance in EU Accession Process of TurkeyAssoc.Prof.Dr. Bertil Emrah DER
(University of Istanbul)
The Republic Of Macedonias
Way to The EU
Prof. Biljana GABER
(Ph.D.University St. Cyril and Methodius Skopje, R. Macedonia)
Perceptions of Europe in the Czech Republic and Albania:
A Comparative Look at Intellectual Discourse
Dr. Eno TRIMEV
(Albanian Institute for International Studies)
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CONTRIBUTORS
Dr.Ozan ERZDEN,
(DPSIR / YTU)...........................................................................................................
Dr. Anneli Ute GABANYI,
(German Institute for International and Security Affairs)..........................................
Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI,
(Lougborough University)...........................................................................................
Prof.Dr. Cengiz AKTAR,
(Bahesehir University) ..............................................................................................
Dr.Martin MAYER,
(Advisor to the Commission Delegation Zagreb)........................................................
Prof.Dr. Jovan TEOKAREVIC,
(Belgrade University).................................................................................................
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Bertil Emrah DER,
(University of Istanbul) ..............................................................................................
Prof.Biljana GABER,
(Ph.D.University St. Cyril and Methodius Skopje, R. Macedonias)............................
Dr. Eno TRIMEV,
(Albanian Institute for International Studies)...............................................................
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CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................................................................12
WELCOMING REMARKS, ..................................................................................................15
Prof. Dr. Fulya ATACAN...........................................................................................................
OPENING REMARKS , ........................................................................................................17
Gner ZTEK.......................................................................................................................
EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE BALKANS AS A PROBLEM OF PHYSICS: UANTUM
MECHANICS VS. NEWTONIAN MECHANICS, ..................................................................21
Dr.Ozan ERZDEN..................................................................................................................
ROMANIAS EU ACCESSION: 2007 OR 2008? OR: SHOULD ROMANIA PAY FOR SPILTEU MILK?, ............................................................................................................................29
Dr. Anneli Ute GABANYI...........................................................................................................
BEING THE MODEL BALKAN STUDENT? EXPORTING THE EU TO BULGARIA , ....... 39
Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI..........................................................................................................
LA DCISION DE CONFORMIT AUX CRITRES POLITIQUES DE COPENHAGUE:
VALUATION TECHNIQUE OU VOLONT POLITIQUE?,...............................................53
Prof.Dr.Cengiz AKTAR..............................................................................................................
CROATIAS LONG JOURNEY BACK TO EUROPE: CHALLENGES ON THE WAY TO EU
MEMBERSHIP, ....................................................................................................................61
Dr.Martin MAYER......................................................................................................................
BALKAN COUNTRIES AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION: IS THE PACE OF
RAPPROCHEMENT FROM 2005 SUSTAINABLE?, .............................................................71
Jovan TEOKAREVIC..........................................................................................................
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND RESISTANCE IN TURKEY'S EUROPEAN
UNION ACCESSION PROCESS , ....................................................................................................89
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Bertil Emrah DER......................................................................... ....
THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIAS WAY TO THE EU, ........................................................103
Prof.Biljana GABER.......................................................................................................
ALBANIAN AND CZECH VISUALIZATIONS OF EUROPE: THE ALBANIAN
COMMITMENT TO THE EUROPEAN IDEA, ....................................................................109
Eno TRIMEV..........................................................................................................................
CONTENTS
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WELCOMING REMARKS
Prof. Dr. Fulya ATACAN*
Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished guests:
It gives me great pleasure to be with you today to open the Conference on EUEnlargement towards South-East Europe. This Conference is the tangible outcome
of an initiative taken jointly by the Department of Political Science & International
Relations and the Foundation of Middle East and Balkan Studies. Dr. Ozan Erzden
worked very hard with Ambassador Gner ztek to ensure that the initiative took
shape.
I am delighted to see all participants here and thank you for accepting our invi-
tation.
On this occasion I would like to thank those from the Department who organized
this Conference. My gratitude goes to Dr. Erzden, Research Assistants Aye Kollu
and Yetkin Bakavak from the Department and to Ambassador ztek and his staff
from OBV for their efficiency.
Fondat ion for Middle Eas t and Balkan Studies 15
EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
December 15th, 2005 stanbul
*Prof Dr. Fulya ATACAN, YTU / DPSIR
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The EU has successfully grown from six to 25 members. Bulgaria and Romania
are expected to join in 2007 and Croatia will probably gain membership between
2008 and 2010. 2015-2020 is the projected time for Turkey's full membership. As
you know Turkey's EU membership has become a matter of major significance andconsiderable controversy in recent years.
It is clear that the EU has tended to enlarge along regional lines adding groups of
nearby nations. The EU is presently very interested in the integration of the Balkan
states, namely Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and
Albania. However France and the United Kingdom have shifted their positions
regarding these states. I am sure we will have an opportunity to discuss these mat-
ters in detail.
I hope that this will be an informative, inspiring and fruitful meeting for all those
who participate.
Allow me to wish you every success in the Conference.
Thank you.
Prof. Dr. Fulya Atacan
EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe16
Fulya ATACAN
** *
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OPENING REMARKS
Gner ZTEK*
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen:
It is a pleasure for me to welcome you all to the Conference on EU Enlargement
towards South-East Europe, which is jointly organized by the Foundation for
Middle-East and Balkan Studies and Yildiz Technical University. We will discuss
different aspects of the enlargement process throughout the day.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new political geography of Europe has
emerged. The Iron Curtains artificial division of Europe ceased to exist and the
classical geographical terms Western, Central and Eastern Europe have resur-
faced. Within this context, the Balkans, which has played a significant role in
European and World history, has become an integral part of Europe. The political
center of gravity has begun to shift from Western Europe to Central and Eastern
Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies 17
EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
December 15th, 2005 Istanbul
*Ambasador (Rtd.), Director of Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies - OBV
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Europe.
The end of the Cold War had an important impact on the Balkans and on
Southeastern Europe. The countries involved were faced with important problemssuch as the transition from totalitarian regimes to democracy and from centralized,
state-ruled economies to free market economies with vast freedom and opportuni-
ties. However, due to a lack of democratic and political traditions, backgrounds and
proper infrastructure, these vast freedoms, particularly in the West Balkans,
inflamed national feelings and awakened old enmities leading to bloody clashes and
serious separatism.
Aggressive nationalistic raids beyond borders not only caused partition within
countries and the region, but they reached the dimension of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic
clashes resulted in the collapse of already fragile and weak economies based on out-
dated technologies. These economic difficulties forced masses to immigrate.
Presently, in most parts of the Balkan region, especially in the South-East Balkans,
security is almost assured.
The entire area faced an important challenge: the modernization and reorganiza-
tion of the state. What we are witnessing today is all the countries of the region try-
ing to complete transition of their political, social and economic structures in order
to build a democratic political system and a free market economy in multiethnic and
multicultural states. To develop a culture of region-wide reconciliation, good neigh-
borhood relations and close cooperation in all fields is a pre-condition for peace and
stability; there is no alternative.
The level of individual well-being and prosperity in the Balkan nations has a
direct impact on the security and stability of the region. In turn, as the region is an
important element in the overall security of the continent, stability and security in
Europe as a whole cannot be achieved and sustained if this part of the continent isdragged into economic and social turmoil.
EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe18
Gner ZTEK
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The enlargement process towards the South-East Balkans is a new, historic step
of great importance and is an encouragement to carry out the necessary political,
social and economic reforms to promote democracy, the rule of law, and to create azone of lasting peace, stability, prosperity and freedom. There is no doubt that the
more integrated Europe is the more effective and better equipped it becomes to over-
come conflicts. Thus the enlargement process is a two-way street beneficial to both
parties. However, the key element of success lies in the determination of the regions
countries to complete their programs of reforms and to meticulously commit them-
selves to respect for human rights and the protection of minorities.
It is high time for the Euro-Atlantic and European institutions to embrace the
region with a vision of projecting lasting peace, stability and prosperity and, at the
same time, to cultivate the diverse historical heritages as constitutive elements of
European culture and civilization. This will speed the process of democratization
and reform for the establishment of basic universal standards of human and minor-
ity rights in cultural, educational, linguistic and other fields.
For the first time in history, the Balkans, with its eastern and western regions, are
willingly getting together around Europe and Euro-Atlantic organizations with the
purpose of achieving more democracy, peace and stability. It is a chance not to be
missed for both parties.
The time is right for the word Balkans to be freed from its negative connota-
tions and to come to stand for such positive things as mutual respect and peace-
ful cohabitation. The various peoples of the region should spare no effort to avoid
the falling again into balkanization.
I am certain that this day in Istanbul will bring forth fruitful discussions and will
help us all to understand better the EU Enlargement towards South-East Europe andits consequences.
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OPENING REMARKS
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With these thoughts in mind, I wish you all every success in your deliberations.
Thank you for your attention.
EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe20
Gner ZTEK
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EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE BALKANS AS APROBLEM OF PHYSICS:
QUANTUM MECHANICS VS. NEWTONIANMECHANICS
Dr. Ozan ERZDEN*
Dear Participants,
In this, the first presentation of the conference, EU Enlargement towards the
Balkans, my main aim is to draw a conceptual framework concerning the issues
that my colleagues in two of todays consecutive panels will discuss in detail. While
doing so, I intend to take a multidisciplinary stance. As you know, political science
is a scientific branch that welcomes a multidisciplinary approach. In my presenta-
tion, I will test the limits of this multidisciplinary tolerance by drawing on one of the
basic scientific branches, physics. You, the participants, are the ones who will assess
my success or failure at this.
As you might already know, in physics the main principles of dynamics for large
Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies 21
* Department of Political Science & International Relations, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul
EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
December 15th, 2005 Istanbul
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objects, such as planets, and for atomic and sub-atomic particles differ from each
other. Within the terminology of political science, we can consider these two
domains as different entities governed by different legal systems. Big objects, in
their movements, obey Newtons laws of motion and laws of universal gravitation,while sub-atomic particles are governed by the laws of quantum physics. In princi-
ple, by applying Newtons laws, one gets precise results, meaning that as long as one
has enough data, one can precisely determine or calculate the current and future
position of an object. Quantum physics, on the other hand, is ruled by uncertainty.
Called the Uncertainty Principle, this notion means that the position and the veloc-
ity of an object cannot be simultaneously measured exactly, even in theory.
According to this principle, the very concepts of precise position and precise veloc-
ity together have no meaning in nature. Instead, only a series of probabilities may
indicate the possible results of an interaction between atomic and subatomic parti-
cles. Such a scientific concept, which requires uncertainty, is extremely strange for
minds shaped by the idea that science, especially applied sciences, brings exact
results. Hence, even the founder of Relativity Theory, Albert Einstein, furiously
objected to the uncertainty principle with the assertion that God does not play dice
with the universe.
So you do not think you mistakenly came to a conference on theoretical physics,
I will end my deliberations on Newtonian mechanics and quantum physics and I will
talk on the current relationship between the Balkans and the European Union (EU).
At this stage, I invite you to imagine the EU, especially the one of 15 states as it
was before May 2004, as a separate universe a universe that has its own laws that
determine with exactitude the results of physical and legal acts of objects and sub-
jects appertaining to that universe. Let us call these laws acquis communautaire
and add the Copenhagen Criteria to them. In this universe, everything, even sizes
applicable to agricultural products, is defined by treaties, regulations, directives or
decisions. Everything in this universe is conceived to ensure the greatest possible
stability.
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Now, let us look at the Balkans. Can we consider the Balkans a universe on its
own? My personal answer to this question is positive. Nevertheless, to avoid any
possible misunderstanding, I would like first to make clear what I understand by the
term Balkans. When I say Balkans, I do not mean a geographical entity in which
each community is the natural enemy of the neighbouring one. The term Balkan
that I use does not bear the pejorative meaning crystallized in the term of balkaniza-
tion. Neither do I intend to enter a polemic on whether those who Balkanized the
entire planet in the First and Second World Wars could reproach the peoples of the
Balkans. Deferring to Maria Todorovas valuable book Imagining the Balkans,
when I say Balkans, I mean both a geographical entity and a mental state that is
physically situated in Europe but considers itself (and is also considered) outside of
Europe. I think in this sense, one would not be greatly mistaken if one defines the
Balkans as a separate universe whose dynamics are governed by laws different from
the ones ruling the universe of Europe or, more concretely, the EU.
A number of eminent scholars from different branches of social science devel-
oped comprehensive analytic tools using theories such as network theories or social
communication theories to discover the laws governing Balkan politics and soci-
eties. Here, I am not going to repeat them in detail. Nevertheless, I will point out
some issues that are of interest to this conference since we are here to discuss the
rapprochementof these two universes.
From the political scientists point of view, the first issue to consider for all
Balkan societies is stability, in fact the lack of it. In the Balkans, the end of the Cold
War in the last decade of the twentieth century marked the beginning of a disinte-
gration process that brought back on the agenda, inter alia, the applicability of
some, so to say, nineteenth-century ideas on the role of states and borders. In the first
years of the new millennium, this disintegration process reached such an extent that
today nobody is able to say the exact number of states that exist in the region.
Todays political map of South Eastern Europe consists of a patchwork of sovereign
states, international protectorates, semi-sovereign sub-state entities or provinces,
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alongside fragile confederations or federation-like political formations. Thus, polit-
ical schemes defined on state structures dating from a century ago are less and less
applicable in the region.
Such a nebula of diversified categories of political organisation, however,
reflects unanimity when the aim is to gain access to an integrating political body,
namely the EU. It should be noted that, as I will elaborate later, this is not a single
direction interest. Although reluctance for the absorption of the whole Balkans with-
in the Union is growing in some EU member capital cities, the EUs central bodies
in Brussels are still eager to extend limits of the Union to the region. I sincerely
believe and I strongly hope that, despite recent discouraging declarations from the
French and United Kingdom governments, the EU Council summit in Brussels to be
held the day after this conference will send, by extending candidate status to
Macedonia as the European Commission recommended, a clear signal to the west-
ern Balkans that the promise of Europeanization is real.
The antagonism between disintegrating and integrating forces that plays a role
over political developments in the Balkans can be seen in the general methodologi-
cal lines that shape scholarly work that analyses post-Cold War developments in the
region. Up to the end of 1990s, the mushrooming literature on nation- and state-
building in the contemporary Balkans was overwhelmingly couched in the classical
theoretical schemes of transition to democracy and insisted on the pathological
character of nationalism in the region. The new trend in recent years is, however, to
emphasize the so-called crisis of statehood. In this framework, the capacity and
coherence of bureaucratic structures are analysed in depth. Such an approach
reflects the presupposition that lack of administrative capacity is one of the main
obstacles to socio-economic advancement, which is a view Brussels technocrats
largely share.
On the other hand, as the messenger of a brand new research paradigm, one
observes the emergence of more recent studies based on an alternative approach that
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questions the view that state building in the Balkans can be reduced to EU-guided
reform of public administration. In other words, this approach does not take it for
granted that perspective EU membership has been the main engine for the far-reach-
ing reform processes throughout the region over the past ten years that has put all
countries on track for membership. Nevertheless, even within this approach one can
note that the EU accession process or incentive is a factor in the analysis.
Thus, as policy level approaches and scholarly work point out, the relation
between these two distinct universes, i.e. the EU and the Balkans, is a highly asym-
metric one. One of the universes (the EU) openly tells the other (the Balkans) that
if it starts to apply the others laws of dynamics, they may merge. My colleagues
who are going to present papers today will discuss in detail what each Balkan state
has done and what remains to be done. Thus, I do not intent to discuss this subject
in my presentation. Nevertheless, I would like to discuss the basic assumption of this
approach, i.e. whether the EU as a dynamic universe is as predictable as it presents
itself to be. In other words, does the EU reflect the stability that it claims is ensured
in its ranks and that it requires potential newcomers to achieve?
Let us consider the EU, for a moment, as a stabile and predictable entity as far as
its inner structure is concerned. The external politics of the Union, however, has
never been a clearly defined line. This means, in exact terms, that the EU has never
had an external policy line of its own, except for its strong stand in support of the
International Criminal Court in the face of US attempts to undermine the very basis
of this institution. Instead, the national interests of the member states, and especial-
ly those of the strongest ones, still prevail. This failure was clearly seen first when
the EU (then the EC) was called to take control of the crisis that broke in former
Yugoslavia. The region, especially the countries that emerged from the former
Yugoslavia are still facing the enduring effects of this shock.
This lack of a well-defined external policy line affects, as witnessed in recent
years, the EUs enlargement policies, which are situated in the grey zone between
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the Unions external and internal affairs. As mentioned above, despite the European
Commissions efforts to keep the Unions position vis--vis the future enlargement
process as stable as possible, member states internal political concerns affect this
standpoint, causing unpredictability. The disturbances encountered at the Unionslast summit over the decision on the start of accession talks with Turkey and Croatia
are among the best examples of this instability. There are strong indications that the
EU member states will increasingly enrich the accession criteria for South East
European making their EU membership perspective more and more unforeseeable.
Finally yet importantly, the defeat of the EU draft constitution in referenda in
France and Holland make the inner integration of the new 25 / 27-strong Union far
less stable than it used to be. This blow to a more unified and better functioning
organisation is again a victory for national particularism over the supranationalism
embodied in the idea of a Union equipped with a constitution.
In the light of the above, I argue that the EU integration process is now much less
one-sided than before. The idea of a closed EU universe administered under the
principle of predictability and stability has proved itself for some time, especially
since the end of the Cold War, is a fiction. It is inconceivable that the EU will turn
this fiction into a reality by stopping its enlargement towards the Balkans. On the
other hand, it is also inconceivable that Europe will become Europe without one of
its components, namely the Balkans. Thus, the enlargement towards its South East
is the destiny of a Union claiming to be European.
Now let us for a moment again return to the world of physics. As I mentioned
before, physics currently treats big objects and small atomic particles as if they
belong to separate universes. Nevertheless, in reality these two different types of
material are part of the same universe, situated inseparably next to each other. Thus,
the major issue for current theoretical physics is to provide a unified theoretical
framework that encompasses laws of dynamics valid for both big and small objects.
Without it, it is impossible for physicists to explain the rules of dynamics for the
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whole universe.
In our universe of politics, maybe this task should be taken into consideration
seriously. Europe and the Balkans are not separate universes but inseparable parts of
the same political entity. Maybe it is high time for the EU to recover from the dream
that it is a strongly stable unit and to allow the Balkan states into its ranks to formu-
late together softer and more realistic ways of multicultural, democratic and peace-
ful cohabitation.
To make my standpoint clear, I emphasize that this is not a plea for the EU to
abolish all criteria for joining the Union. This does even not mean that the criteria
should not be scrutinised even more closely than before. It is completely under-
standable that the EU has learned some lessons from the last two rounds of enlarge-
ment. Nevertheless, those EU politicians who feel they were too lenient in giving
the green light to countries joining the Union should consider the fact that the unity
of Europe should be built up on basic principles considered universal and not on cal-
culations over petty issues such as the percentage of vote to be obtained in the fol-
lowing elections. What I would like to underline here is that the EU should behave
fairly and equitably towards both itself and future members by not demanding some-
thing that it does not itself possess. Finally, yet importantly, the EU must demon-
strate its trustworthiness by not renouncing its own words for the sake of internal
politics in some member states.
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ROMANIAS EU ACCESSION: 2007 OR 2008? OR:SHOULD ROMANIA PAY FOR SPILT EU MILK?
Anneli Ute GABANY*
In this presentation I will present a brief outline of Romanias road to EuropeanUnion integration starting from its privileged relations with European Community
member states up to the difficult conclusion of its accession negotiations in
December. The final part of this paper pleas for the EU to take a rational decision in
favour of Romanias accession in January 2007.
From Vanguard to Laggard in EU-Integration.
On 14 December 2004, Romania was the last of the 10 Eastern and Central
European countries to conclude accession talks with the EU. This is paradoxical
considering that it had was the first Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(Comecon, or CMEA) country to engage in formalized trade cooperation with the
EU in the early 1970s after it had started reorienting its foreign policy towards
Western Europe and the US in the early 1960s. In 1974, Romania signed a prefer-
Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies 29
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ence agreement with the EC and, in 1980, it concluded a comprehensive agreement
on industrial products with the EC.
In 1982, under the impact of Polands political, economic and financial crisis,Romania defaulted on its hard currency debt with western financial institutions.
Constrained to repay its debt Romania, was forced to impose hard austerity meas-
ures on the population. Moreover, the EU stopped negotiations on a new trade agree-
ment with Romania. In 1990, Romania was the last former communist East
European country to establish diplomatic relations with the EU. In 1991, Bucharest
signed a trade and cooperation agreement and, in 1993, an association (Europe)
agreement with the EU. On 22 June 1995, Romania was the fourth former commu-
nist East European state to apply for EU membership.
In December 1997, at the European Councils Luxemburg summit, the EU grant-
ed Romania candidate status but did not include it in the group of countries with
which the EU started accession negotiations. It was only two years later, at the
Helsinki summit meeting in December 1999, that the EU decided to enter accessionnegotiations with all candidate countries, except for Turkey. However, no precise
date was fixed for Romanias (and Bulgarias) accession owing to these countries
reform backlog and because the current EU budget was insufficient to cope with the
integration of all candidate countries before 2007.
Romanias accession negotiations started on 15 February 2000. On 1 January
2002, visa restrictions for Romanian citizens to the Schengen space were lifted. In
December 2003, the European Council meeting in Brussels officially decided that
accession negotiations with Romania (and Bulgaria) were to end in 2004 and fixed
the date of accession of the two South European countries at 1 January 2007.
Difficult accession negotiations
However, accession negotiations turned out to be rather difficult, with Romania
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lagging behind Bulgaria in its efforts to close the 31 negotiation chapters. While
Bulgaria succeeded in closing negotiations at the June 2005 EU summit in Dublin,
Romania only succeeded on 14 December of the same year due to problems with
Chapters 3 (freedom of services), 21 (regional policy), 22 (environment), 6 (compe-tition) and 24 (justice and home affairs). The reasons for Romania lagging behind
were manifold: the size of the country, its bad reputation with the European
Commission owing to its perceived unreliability and, most importantly, Romanias
lack of support in the European Parliament. Romania fell victim to the power strug-
gle between the European Parliament and the European Commission, on the one
hand, and the partisan criticism of European Parliaments conservative and liberal
members of the performance of Romanias social democratic government, on the
other. An additional factor in the final stage of its accession negotiations was the
appointment of a new European Commission which was far more critical of
Romania than its predecessor. Pressed by countries such as Finland and Hungary,
which had long opposed the timely integration of Romania, the Commission did not
recommend the conclusion of negotiations with Bucharest. Eventually, a compro-
mise was found which imposed a severe monitoring process and an additional andparticularly harsh safeguard clause in the Romania (and Bulgaria) Accession Treaty,
which was signed on 25 April 2005. The Treaty contains three types of safeguard
clauses. A first set of three clauses that was included in prior accession treaties refers
to the post-accession period. Such clauses can be triggered during the first three
years after accession if a member state encounters difficulties adjusting to the EU
internal market or meeting EU standards in the field of justice and home affairs. The
decision on whether to revert to these clauses must be by unanimous vote of the
European Council.
When Bulgaria concluded accession talks with the EU in June 2004 the
Commission imposed an additional clause and, half a year later, also on Romania.
Other than the general post-accession clauses, this new clause refers to the period
leading up to accession. It stipulates that, if Bulgaria or Romania turns out to beunprepared for accession in one of several important fields, the European Council
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can propose a years delay on the accession date 1 January 2008 instead of 1
January 2007. This decision would be by unanimous voting of the European
Council.
Moreover, another so-called super-safeguard clause was introduced when
Romania belatedly concluded its accession negotiations and it applies to this coun-
try only. It stipulates that if Romania proves unready for accession in one or more of
eleven specifically outlined areas, the EC can delay Romanias accession by one
year through a qualified majority vote. These special problem areas are listed in the
additional protocol to the Accession Treaty: four of these special problem areas
belong to the Chapter on Competition, and seven to Justice and Home affairs, in par-
ticular to frontier security, the reform of the judiciary, and the fight against corrup-
tion and international crime. The problems confronting Romania in the field of bor-
der security are largely due to the length of Romanias frontiers and to the size of
financial and human resources needed to fulfil the Schengen Acquis. Out of the
2,508 km of Romanias external borders 1,457 km will form the future external
border of the EU after Romanias accession. This status will not change for quitesome time owing to the fact that neither the Federal Republic of Serbia and
Montenegro (to the South East) nor Ukraine and Moldova (to the North and East)
have a realistic chance of joining the EU in the near future, if at all. In order to abide
by European legislation on border management, Romania introduced visa for trav-
ellers from Russia, the Ukraine, and Serbia-Montenegro. The Schengen regulation
with regard to Moldova will be introduced once Romania actually joints the EU.
The struggle against corruption is a decisive criterion for measuring Romanias
ability to join the EU in 2007. In Romania, corruption is a structural problem result-
ing primarily from the weakness of the public administration and of the judiciary.
The European Commission expects Romania to enhance the struggle against corrup-
tion in general and high-level corruption in particular, to implement existing legisla-
tion in this field and to strengthen the independence of the anti-corruption adminis-tration. Romanian citizens display a high degree of awareness of corruption as the
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main impediment on their countrys road to accession. Once they have joined the
EU, they expect the EUs institutions to assist them in their struggle against corrupt
dignitaries at home. The issue of corruption played a decisive role during the 2004
parliamentary and presidential elections. However, after winning the presidentialelections and after forming the new government, the battle against corruption degen-
erated into a power struggle between the Prime Minister, Mr C?lin Popescu
T?riceanu, and the President, Mr Traian B?sescu, and their respective parties. While
the EU Commission appreciated Romanias progress on imposing European legal
standards, misusing the struggle against corruption poses a danger to Romanias
overall goal of joining the EU on 1 January 2007.
Eurofatigue Endangers Romanias Timely Accession
However, the main factor that threatens to delay Romanias accession for a year
is an external one. Following Romanias (and Bulgarias) signing of the Accession
Treaty in April 2005, the political climate in EU member states underwent a drastic
change. The public mood in the EU-25 was particularly affected by:
The failure in France and the Netherlands of the referenda on the
Constitutional Treaty
The temporary breakdown of negotiations on the European Unions
financial framework for 2007-2014, and
The unpopular decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey.
As a result, governments and parliaments in several EU member states consid-
ered giving in to this negative trend in popular opinion and paying tribute the low
degree of acceptance of Romania and Bulgarias EU membership by delaying these
countries accession for a year. The European Commission, which was to decide onthe Romania and Bulgaria safeguard clauses in its 25 October 2005 comprehensive
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Monitoring Report, postponed its recommendation to grant these two countries
another six months to fulfil their commitments. By doing so, the Commission was
able to maintain pressure on the Romanian (and Bulgarian) government by extend-
ing the period when EU conditionality still worked. The Commissions carrot-and-stick strategy is based on the continuation of a severe monitoring process on the one
hand and a more intense support of the Union through peer reviews, twinning proj-
ects, seminars, etc. The Commission pledged to issue its recommendation on
whether or not to delay Romanias accession in April or May 2006. The final deci-
sion was to be taken by the European Council during its June summit. Another mon-
itoring report should be published in the fall of 2006.
While the problems confronting the EU countries after the outbreak of the ratifi-
cation and budget crisis this summer are real, it is questionable whether imposing a
delay on Romanias accession would solve their internal problems. It is, however,
equally doubtful whether such a decision would be beneficial for Romania.
Opponents of Romanias accession in 2007 argue that a longer preparation time
would offer Romania more time to better prepare for the challenges of EU member-ship. However, in the light of the specific conditions outlined in the Accession
Treaty, this expectation will most certainly prove wrong. To put it bluntly: one-year
conditionality is no conditionality. Since accession as such has been agreed in the
Treaty, the EU lacks forceful means of further influencing the reform process in this
country beyond 2008. Therefore, any problem arising after accession could be bet-
ter addressed with Romania inside, and not outside, the EU.
However, delaying the accession date by a year could prove counterproductive
both for the EU and for Romania. The EU is increasingly interested in playing an
important role in the regional context and beyond. Moreover, by delaying
Romanias accession by one year just to calm certain national constituencies in the
EU represents a deviation from the EUs fundamental principles of solidarity and
equal treatment. Applying a different treatment to Romania (and Bulgaria) wouldnot enhance the image of the EU as a reliable value-based organization, considering
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that these two countries are part and parcel of the same wave of EU enlargement and
have explicitly been promised equal treatment with the ten other accession coun-
tries. This is why the EU should be particularly intent on projecting the image of an
organization whose foreign policy is predictable and reliable. Any indication of theEU reneging on its principles and promises will undoubtedly send negative signals
to regions such as the Western Balkans or the countries of the EU Eastern neighbour-
hood. Romanias geo-strategic importance as a missing link between the two arch-
es of instability cannot be overestimated. Stabilizing these areas, furthering democ-
racy, introducing good governance in these countries and drawing them closer to the
EU is a major strategic task serving the Ems best interest. All this should be con-
sidered when it comes to sacrificing the two South East European countries to pay
for the EU milk spilt this summer.
Delaying Romanias Accession to the EU Would Be Counterproductive
Those who argue appeasing disenchanted voters in the old EU member coun-
tries by delaying Romanias EU accession by a year would not hurt Romania arewrong. The contrary is true.
A delay in accession would be a severe blow for the Romanian pop-
ulation that, because of its West-European linguistic and cultural iden-
tity, has supported EU integration to a consistently high degree. The
Romanian people, hard pressed by a legacy of economic mismanage-
ment, would be severely demoralized.
Moreover, a delay in accession could stir domestic instability as it
would certainly be interpreted as a failure of government policy and
could even lead to its overthrow, with dire consequences for the coun-
trys reform efforts.
In the economic field, a years delay in accession would entail both
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direct and indirect economic losses for Romania. The direct losses
would amount to about euro2 billion in cash-flow facilities and pay-
ments from the EU structural fund. Romania would also incur indirect
economic losses that, according to an estimate by Vasile Pusca?,Romanias former chief EU negotiator, would be about euro10 billion.
Summing up, a number of questions arise:
Does the EU need to solve its complex crisis and improve its communication
strategy vis--vis its national constituencies? The answer is decidedly yes!
Will a delay in Romanias accession date solve these EU problems? The answer
is decidedly no!
No, it would be neither logical nor fair to change the rules of the game before the
current game with 12 participants is over.
No, it would not be fair for the EU to treat Romania with greater severity than
Bulgaria for the only reason that, for various reasons, Bulgaria enjoyed a better pub-
lic image in 2004 than Romania but was identified as the true problem candidate in
the October 2005 comprehensive monitoring report. Since the special safeguard
clause applicable exclusively to Romania allows for a delay whereas the simple
safeguard clause applicable to Bulgaria (and Romania) is practically impossible to
activate for procedural reasons, EU politicians would be well advised to allow for a
timely accession of the two South East European countries.
But: Yes, the EU should draw lessons from its inconsequent negotiation policy in
the case of the EU 12. Future enlargement rounds should abide to the criteria
(respect for conditionality and accession according to individual performance),
which the EU proclaimed but did not hitherto respect.
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And: Yes, the EU should go about consolidating its conceptual basis no matter in
what form.
Yes, the EU should quickly solve its budget crisis, and
Yes, the EU should engage in a long-term and large-scale effort at communicat-
ing EU ideals and policies to the national member constituencies. This will be in the
interest of the old and the new EU members and of Europe as a whole.
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BEING THE MODEL BALKAN STUDENT?
EXPORTING THE EU TO BULGARIA
Emilian KAVALSKI*
I am often asked where Europes ultimate borders lie. My answer is
that the map of Europe is defined in the mind, not just on the ground.
Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the
borders of Europe. Enlargement is a matter of extending the zone of
European values, the most fundamental of which are liberty and soli-
darity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
Olli Rehn (2005b: 2)
The words of Olli Rehn (especially in light of the October 2005 Luxemburg
European Council) seem to confirm the membership prospect (albeit distant) of cur-
rent and prospective candidates for EU-membership. It has also to be acknowledged
that Mr. Rehn is not merely the EU Commissioner on Enlargement, but de facto the
EUs Commissioner on the Balkans as all current and (possible) prospective candi-
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* Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI, Loughborough University
EU ENLARGEMENT TO WARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
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dates are from the region. In this context, Brussels has tended to give Bulgaria as an
example that is to be emulated by its neighbors. In fact, Mr. Rehns predecessor in
the Enlargement Office, Gunter Verheugen, set up the country as a model for the
Balkans, by declaring that Bulgaria is not part of the Balkan problems it is partof their solution! Hence, the EUs assistance is an investment in the future of the
country. Bulgaria is already starting to pay back for this support by developing the
foundations of a strong economy and a strong market, and also, one should not for-
get, by its political stability, which is a major factor for the stability of the Balkan
region.
In this context, this paper reviews the process and progress of Bulgarias bid for
EU-membership and also relates Sofias experience to that of the Balkans as a
whole. At the same time, it identifies some problems with the EUs strategy of
exporting the rules and practices of its zone of peace to the region. In particular, the
paper focuses on the persistence of the elite-society cleavage, which underwrites the
failure of successive governments to create the conditions for sustainable social,
political and economic transformation and development.
In order to illuminate its inferences, this paper briefly sketches the EUs agency
in the Balkans as a background for its involvement in Bulgaria and subsequently
reviews the export of its rules and standards to the country. Finally, this study looks
at some of the problems and prospects for the EU integration of Bulgaria, which
might be of relevance to candidates such as Turkey which are currently embark-
ing on the accession trail.
EU Approaches to the Balkans:
This paper makes two complementary claims as regards the EUs role: FIRST:
that the process of Bulgarias accession is intimately linked to the EUs approaches
to the Balkans; and SECOND: that the EUs role in the region altered qualitatively
as a result of the Kosovo crisis (Kavalski, 2005). As a report by the EU Institute for
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fairly successfully with the challenge of ethnic conflict after restoring the rights of
its large Turkish minority in the winter of 1989-90, its economic performance, how-
ever, was far more unconvincing. Successive governments failed to carry out criti-
cally important structural reforms to launch privatization, cut subsidies to loss-mak-ing enterprises, consolidate the ailing banking sector and stabilize the national cur-
rency. In this context, it can safely be claimed that in contrast to CEE states,
Bulgaria wasted the greater part of the 1990s as reforms lacked a sense of purpose
and nervous governments sought to spare the population the pain of restructuring but
instead condemned the majority of the people to a deterioration in living standards.
Domestically, this had the effect of portraying the EU (as well as the accession
process) in very abstract terms, polarizing public opinion on the issue along party
lines, and, ultimately introducing the possibility of experimenting with an indige-
nous Bulgarian way of reform. Yet, by the winter of 1996/97 as a result of gross
economic mismanagement and criminal privatization, the Bulgarian way had led
to hyperinflation and a visible slump in living standards (Dimitrov, 2001: 82). The
concomitant deterioration in almost all spheres of social, economic and political life
led to the removal of the then Socialist government and ushered in pro-reform-mind-
ed and clearly pro-EU politicians. The former Bulgarian President, Petar Stoyanov
insisted that:
most of the period between 1989 and 1997 we only had the pretence of
reform. We deluded ourselves that we could survive without great sac-
rifices, but things kept getting tougher and we got deeper and deeper
into debt. 1997 marked the turning point when we shed our illusions.
(Financial Times, 1997).
As a result of this shedding of illusions, Bulgaria adopted its first National
Strategy for Accession in March 1998 (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 84). It is
within this changing domestic environment that the Kosovo conflict occurred and
altered the EUs awareness of its own agency not only in Bulgaria, but also in the
Balkans as well. As the then Commissioner for External relations, Hans van der
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Broek (1999: 1) explained:
Over the last ten years, the Union has gone through many changes and
is reaching the third phase in its geopolitical re-definition. The first
stage was the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall, which led to German re-uni-
fication and the start of the enlargement process to the east. The second
phase came in 1992 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there-
by fundamentally changing the dynamics within the European conti-
nent. We are now entering the third phase, which is the stabilization of
the Balkans and their integration into the process of European Union
enlargement.
As already suggested, the 1999 developments in Kosovo gave a tangible per-
spective to the accession of Bulgaria. Despite its inclusion in the initiatives for CEE
states (under the PHARE programme), the country was not on the agenda for open-
ing accession negotiations according to the conclusions of the Vienna European
Council in December 1998 (00300/1/98). This decision was underwritten by the per-
ception that Bulgaria was too slow to conform to the accession criteria. However,
the volatility of the so-called Western Balkans underlined the need to recognize their
efforts in order to ensure the continued attractiveness of EU membership and sup-
port for the sanctions (and military campaign) against Serbia/Montenegro.
At first, this recognition came in the form of a very explicit Statement of the
EU on Bulgaria and Romania on 26 April 1999 (EIS). On the one hand, this
Statement noted the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria, two associate States, to
stability in the wider region. On the other, it recognized that this situation imposes
heavy burdens on these countries. Therefore, their governments are to be com-
mended for their positive responses by underlying the special relationship [the
EU] enjoys with Romania and Bulgaria.
The initial endorsement which followed was the establishment of an Instrument
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for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) on 21 June 1999. According to the
division of ISPA funds, Bulgaria was earmarked as the third largest beneficiary
nearly 11% (COM(2001)616: 9). Simultaneously, it was also granted access to
SAPARD (agricultural aid) funds. The next step, which the EU undertook was toupgrade the special relationship it had with Bulgaria, by noting its eligibility for
negotiations on membership. As Romano Prodi (1999) suggested at the time, this
softening of the Copenhagen criteria towards Bulgaria (and Romania) was intended
to prevent:
the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacri-
fices [from becoming] disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their
economic policies will begin to diverge and a historic opportunity will
have been lost perhaps forever. In the changed political landscape,
especially in the Balkan region, some countries may also let slip the
progress they have made towards democracy and human rights, and the
EU will have seriously failed the people of those countries.
This stance, in turn, allowed EU institutions to demand compliance from Sofias
elites. This process also underwrites the Europeanization of Bulgarian decision-
making. The regional significance of the country has been reflected in (and also sup-
ported by) the fact that since 2003 over 40% of all FDI in the Balkans has been in
Bulgaria (Focus, 2 April 2005).
The Post-1999 Europeanization of Bulgaria
An assessment of post-1999 conditioning of Bulgaria is best evidenced by com-
parison with the 1997 Opinion on Bulgaria. As the European Commission conclud-
ed, Bulgaria has neither transposed nor taken on the essential elements of the
acquis It is therefore uncertain whether Bulgaria will be in a position to assume
the obligations of membership in the medium term (DOC/97/11: 122). From this
perspective, Bulgarias achievement of the status of a candidate country two years
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later in December 1999, the accelerated completion of its negotiations with the EU
on 15 June 2004 and the signing of its Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005 underlie
the effectiveness of post-1999 instruments. The Foreign Minister Solomon Passi has
insisted this points to the countrys transition from a national Bulgaria to a
European Bulgaria, whose policy-practice reflects the values of peace and democra-
cy (Focus, 22 December 2004).
The two-main instruments of the EU-driven elite-socialisation of Bulgaria are
the Accession Partnership and the instruments for assistance: PHARE,
SAPARD and ISPA (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 83-84). The purpose of the
Accession Partnership, which the EU signed with Bulgaria on 10 December 1999,
was to provide Sofia with a number of policy instruments which will be used to
enhance the speed of [its] preparation for membership (EC, 1999a: 2). The prem-
ise of the EUs involvement was that the Bulgarian government had a weak capac-
ity to formulate and coordinate policy (EC, 1999b: 57).
In order to correct this, pre-accession assistance was increased. Whereas for the
1990-1999 period PHARE assistance has averaged 93 million per year (Dimitrova
and Dragneva, 2001: 83), from 2000 to 2004 Bulgarias allocation under PHARE
nearly doubled to 178 million annually (SEC(2004)1199: 7). Together with ISPA
and SAPARD, the EUs financial leverage in the country for the period 1999-2005
rang to the tune of 1.7 billion. The projection is that this sum would rise from 564
million in 2006 to some 1.6 billion by 2009 (EIS, 30 November 2005). As one
Bulgarian diplomat acknowledged, such assistance has encouraged Sofia to bring
its policy-making in line with EU-standards. Furthermore, the European
Commission declared in 2002 that Bulgaria IS a functioning market economy,
with economist remaining upbeat about the countrys macroeconomic record, cur-
rently projected to grow by 5% for the next four or five years.
Sofia has maintained throughout that its performance and compliance with EU
demands derives from the contractual nature of its relations with the EU. As the
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Deputy Foreign Minister, Gergana Grancharova has insisted the accelerated com-
pletion of the accession negotiations confirms that the assessment is premised on the
individual merits of each candidate country and not on the principle of group
enlargement (Focus, 17 June 2004). Such perceptions of the requirement of domes-tic congruence of Bulgarian elites have been confirmed by Olli Rehn, the
Commissioner on Enlargement who insisted that it is according to its own merits
that Bulgaria will be judged and I am convinced that it will win the qualification
match for the premier league of the Member States of the EU (Focus, 18 March
2005). Hence, policy-makers in Sofia have become increasingly worried that the
widening gap between Bulgaria and Romania might have a negative impact on the
countrys accession. In order to prevent a postponement scenario and having to wait
for Bucharest to catch up, Sofia has used every occasion to insist on the EUs
upholding the principle of differentiation.
The socializing impact of the EU has been facilitated by the lack of alternative
centers of normative attraction for Bulgaria. As Foreign Minister Passi emphatical-
ly declared: The European Union is our promised land! (Focus, 9 July 2003). The
former Head of the Bulgarian Mission to the EU, Antoinette Primatarova points that
this conviction derives from the fact that the EU has already proven that it can
deliver in terms of prosperity through enforcing the principles of democracy, rule of
law and a market economy (Open Society News, 2002: 7). Hence, Sofias
Europeanization has been ensured by the broad political support for EU accession
and as the Bulgarian Minister of European Affairs maintains there is no political
formation, which would be opposed to the countrys entry into the EU (Focus, 23
January 2004). Thus, one commentator insisted that the case of Bulgaria indicates
that the EU is capable of increasing the prospect of economic development by mak-
ing the countries attractive for foreign investment, while binding the decision-mak-
ing to a system of politics that awards domestic democratic practice, by eschewing
illiberal political sentiments (Bojkov, 2004: 511). Such inference, however should
not blind one to the problems accompanying Sofias conditioning by Brussels.
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Problems: Elite-Society Cleavage
The paradox of the Bulgarian post-communist transition seems to be that on the
one hand it has succeeded to introduce relatively stable political institutions, which,
however, have not been able to address central popular concerns. An explanation for
such development can be found in the EU approach to the country, which aims to
condition Bulgarias decision-making practice, but so far has failed to spill over into
societal attitudes. As a result, the values promoted by the EU in elite policy-making
still remain abstract concepts rather than tangible points of reference for the major-
ity of Bulgarian citizens. The bottom line is the different premise for evaluating post-
communist developments: (a) accession priorities and macroeconomic stability for
the elites; and (b) the rising insecurity and decline in economic well-being for the
majority of citizens.
This point is important as it underscores a phenomenon, which affects the
Europeanization not only of Bulgaria, but the entire Balkan region a normative
elite-society cleavage. Its existence stems from the very logic of the post-1999
accession conditionality. As indicated, the EU targets state-elites with the aim of
institutionalizing a framework of policy-making. The objective of such elite-social-
ization is to promote congruence between Sofias decision-makers and Brussels. At
the same time, the expectation on behalf of the EU is that such elite-socialization
around promoted practices will trickle down to the publics as well. Such a dynamic
is premised on the history of Euro-Atlantic integration, itself. However, this study
contends that the prevailing emphasis on elite-socialization leads to the institution-
alization of a normative elite-society cleavage. Thus, the Bulgarian civil service for
instance has more experience of the EU than other sections of society (Primatarova,
2005: 1). Although in the short- to medium-term such a phenomenon is not likely to
have any negative effects on the Europeanization of the country, its persistence in
the long-term can (potentially) have detrimental effects on the establishment of
path-dependent policy-making.
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The essence of this normative divergence is that Sofias political elites are mov-
ing in the direction of justifying their decision-making according to a rationale out
of step with that of society at large. Gallagher (2005: 188) reasons that the condi-
tioning of communist times and the fact that the democratic era has resulted in fail-ing living standards for most citizens has instilled a powerful distrust of politics. In
this respect, Bulgarian decision-makers increasingly perceive their policy-making
reality from the context of Brussels demands, while the overwhelming majority of
society perceives their environment from the framework of their surrounding cir-
cumstances characterized by insecurity and dissatisfaction with their conditions of
existence. The low income level, low living standards and high unemployment rep-
resent the main points of concern. Bulgaria underwent historical changes during the
1990s, yet the political and economic transformations proved to be very slow and
did not yield the result the population had hoped for. The macroeconomic growth of
the recent period has not been sufficient to narrow the income gap between Bulgaria
and the EU member states. Average per capita income in Bulgaria is still low, stand-
ing at 25% of the EU average (in purchasing power terms) or around 2,200. At the
same time only 15% of all households in the country have an adequate income to
cover the costs and needs sufficient to ensure their living standards. Thus, the evo-
cation of closer ties with the EU is reflected in the popular dissatisfaction with the
deteriorating conditions of existence.
Such persistent elite-society cleavage poses some issues for the path-depend-
ence of the Europeanization process. As Karl Deutsch (1953: 171-72) maintains,
populations which perceive that they lack direct participation in the decision-mak-
ing process, often fall prey to mobilization by opportune leaders or rabble-rousers.
For instance, the government of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov lost the June 2001 elec-
tions because of its emphasis on compliance with EU-conditions rather than domes-
tic pressures. Thus, despite saving Bulgaria from economic disaster, Kostovs gov-
ernment which The Economist(22 November 2003) called the most successful
reformist government Southeastern Europe had seen fell victim to its inability to
involve the society at large in the transformation process (Barany, 2002: 149). In this
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respect, the arrival of the former king on the Bulgarian political horizon in 2001, the
emergence at the 2005 parliamentary elections of the freshly-formed neo-fascist
front Attack as the fourth largest political formation (out of seven) to be represent-
ed in the National Assembly (Focus, 27 June 2005) are instances of these sugges-
tions. As already suggested such normative discrepancy between societies and elites
is not expected to impede the export of the EU-rules to Bulgaria in the short- to
medium-term. However, its persistence in the long-term can pose problems for the
institutionalization of the European zone of peace not only in Bulgaria, but also in
the Balkans. Therefore, in a recent analysis, Freedom House classified Bulgarias
political institutionalization of its democratic process as far from consolidated.
Perhaps rather harshly, but not too far off the mark, Freedom Houses survey insists
that on this reckoning, the country is closer to the levels of democratization in states
like Serbia or Albania than Hungary or Poland.
CONCLUSION
This paper claims that Bulgarias Europeanisation has been plagued by the
unwillingness of governing elites in the beginning of the transition to pay the short-
term political cost of domestic transformation. They committed to democratic insti-
tutions but undertook only partial economic reforms. The societal demand for socio-
economic change was very weak and failed to produce stable reformist majorities
during parliamentary elections. As a result, partial reforms and abuse of office for
narrow political and personal gains became commonplace. The reform gaps provid-
ed ample opportunities for clientelism and corruption which proved more difficult
to displace in the later transition years than to reform the socialist-era institutions in
the early 1990s
The issue that Bulgaria is facing now is no longer related to the dilemma enter
or not. Instead the problem is that EU-membership is not treated as a process but
as an aim in itself. The conclusion from the process of Sofia Europeanization is that
the main strategy for conducting social and economic policy in Bulgaria has been
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primarily based on entering the EUand not on achieving best economic perform-
ance and consensus-politics of social responsibility. This is because there is a firm
perception that transition ends with integration into the EU. What has emerged is
the conviction that membership seals the process of transition to democracy and amarket economy. It is this perspective that the aim justifies the means that makes
problematic (mainly politically) a possible postponement of the accession process
(even if the General Safeguard Clause the Accession Treaty has to be signed by all
25 Member States, and so far none of the big MS (apart from Italy) have done that).
On the positive side, there are already Bulgarian commentators who insist that
although politically detrimental, a postponement of accession might have a positive
impact on the economy, not least in terms of getting ready for the pressures of the
common market. Also, others have pointed out that the longer Bulgaria waits, the
more the EU will be reshaped by the demands of the countries that joined in 2004.
Each year will make it a more diverse and broadminded club, in which Bulgaria and
other prospective members such as Turkey should feel more at home.
At any rate, the case of Bulgaria is a possible model for a fairly successful
accession process. Yet in terms of emulation, it sets a number of practices that
should be avoided mainly, the sidelining of public concerns and also the presenta-
tion of the accession process as an aim in itself. In this context, perhaps Bulgaria fol-
lows the suggestion of the 1961 Nobel literature laureate, Ivo Andric that in the
Balkans the expected does happen, but more often than not it happens in unexpect-
ed ways.
According to the 2001 census, 4.6% (about 350,000) identified themselves as
Roma and 9.4% (about 750,000) as of Turkish origin. Still the economic problems
faced by the Turkish minority are along the societal division line and do not coin-
cide with ethnic affiliation. Furthermore, the MRF has somewhat purposefully tried
to ostracize the members of the Turkish minority by keeping them marginalized in
agricultural occupational patterns and preventing altering the local economy.
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This paper is a modification of a larger project that should be published in a
book form by the end of 2006 by I.B.Tauris. My claim there is that the EU (as well
as NATO) involvement in the Balkans is not so much about the promotion of
democracy, market practices, etc. but that it is about the promotion of order, in par-
ticular one defined by peaceful international interactions. Hence, conditioning of
domestic practices (i.e. congruence) aims at impacting the processes of foreign-pol-
icy-making by creating more transparent and predictable patterns of decision-taking.
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LA DCISION DE CONFORMIT AUXCRITRES POLITIQUES DE COPENHAGUE:
VALUATION TECHNIQUE OU VOLONTPOLITIQUE?
Dr. Cengiz AKTAR*
Comment fonctionne le processus dcisionnel de l'Union europenne concernant
les tapes de la pr-adhsion des pays candidats et en particulier l'tape dcisive de
l'ouverture des ngociations? Nous savons que c'est sur la foi de l'avis et la
recommendation de la Commission europenne que les dirigeants politiques de
l'Union prennent les dcisions, entre autres, d'ouvrir les ngociations d'adhsion
avec les pays candidats. Aprs avoir brivement voqu les conditions dans lesquelles l'actuel systme s'est mis en branle nous voudrions nous interroger sur le
poids de l'valuation technique et de la recommendation faites par la Commission
pour l'ouverture des ngociations. Nous voudrions savoir s'il existe des repers
objectifs qui s'appliquent chaque candidat pour ce qui est de la conformit ces
mmes critres. Ceci, afin de comprendre la logique des dcisions prises par les
dirigeants politiques des 15.
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* Cengiz AKTAR, Universite de Bahesehir
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Contrairement aux critres conomiques qui sont aisment quantifiables les
critres politiques semblent, aprs tout, tre sans limites; tout comme la dmocratie.
"Open ended" on dirait en anglais. En d'autres termes, il n'existe pas vraiment un
acquis communautaire politique, comme il en existe un pour l'agriculture ou pour lamonnaie unique, part une dfinition trs large de la conditionnalit politique. Mais
du coup, ces critres ne deviennent-ils pas extensibles souhait? Peut-on dsigner
objectivement un optimum acceptable pour accorder le satisfecit en matire de
conformit? Ou au contraire n'y a t-il pas lieu de penser que la dcision en matire
de conformit politique pour l'ouverture des ngociations est, ceteris paribus,
purement et simplement politique et non point technique?
Afin d'tayer notre propos nous allons nous baser sur des exemples concrets en
rapport avec les processus de pr-adhsion de la Bulgarie, la Lettonie, la Rpublique
Tchque et de la Roumanie. Nous allons, dans le mme but, voquer le sort des
communauts tziganes vivant dans les pays candidats.
Voyons d'abord comment le systme s'est mis en place.
Lorsque l'on a dcid en dcembre 1997 Luxembourg que les six premiers
candidats pouvaient entamer la phase des ngociations, la Commission tait en
quelque sorte prise au dpourvu. En effet ni Bruxelles ni dans les squelletiques
reprsentations dans les pays concerns, les structures en place ne rpondaient aux
besoins, qu'il s'agisse de la conceptualisation ou d'appui technique. C'est au fil des
annes que s'est forme la mcanique de la pr-adhsion et il ne serait pas exagr
d'affirmer qu'on a souvent avanc par ttonnement.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Les critres de Copenhague
"L'adhsion requiert de la part du pays candidat qu'il ait des institutions stables
garantissant la dmocratie, la primaut du droit, les droits de l'homme, le respect desminorits et leur protection, l'existence d'une conomie de march viable ainsi que
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la capacit de faire face la pression concurrentielle et aux forces du march
l'intrieur de l'Union. L'adhsion prsuppose la capacit du pays candidat en
assumer les obligations, et notamment souscrire aux objectifs de l'union politique,
conomique et montaire."
C'est que, lorsque les services de la Commission ont t rendus responsables des
divers aspects de la phase prparatoire pour les candidats, ils n'avaient comme
repre que l'nonc des critres de Copenhague et les vagues d'largissement
passes des annes 70,80 et 90 ne correspondaient pas ce que l'on se prparait
mettre en place. Ceci ni en termes politiques ni en matire technique.
Les services de la Commission n'avaient pas vraiment l'habitude de mener des
oprations de cette envergure l' tranger, tant du point de vue diplomatique que du
point de vue technique ; on manquait d'exprience pour faire du 'capacity building'
et du 'institution building' sur des sujets aussi varis que les tlcommunications, la
pche en haute mer, les droits des minorits ou encore l'environnement. En fait il
n'existait simplement pas de mmoire institutionnelle pour aider comprendre lesdonnes politiques, conomiques et sociales des pays candidats et ainsi de pouvoir
agir en fonction de ces donnes.
C'est dans un tel environnement que les structures se sont tablies et une certaine
mcanique s'est mise en route. Et videmment, dans la longue squence qui va de la
cration du G-24 (du nom des 24 pays membres de l'OCDE) tabli au sein de la
Commission au tout dbut des annes 1990 pour soutenir les rformes dans les pays
ex-communistes au sommet d'Acropole du 16 avril 2003 qui a consacr l'adhsion
des 10 premiers membres parmi les candidats en place, les degrs de prparation des
pays ont considrablement vari. Alors que l'Hongrie et la Pologne par exemple, ont
fait la connaissance des mcanismes europens ds le dbut des annes 1990, la
Lithuanie et la Bulgarie n'ont vraiment commenc leur appentissage qu'en 1999, c-
-d presque 10 ans plus tard. Or la Lithuanie va devenir membre en mme temps quela Pologne. C'est que les 15 ont dcid de donner un coup d'acclrateur au
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processus d'largissement partir de 1999, anne qui va srement rester dans les
annales.
La Commission clarifie et arrte sa position sur sa stratgie d'adhsion et lasoumet au Conseil d'Helsinki de dcembre 1999 qui l'entrine. Voil comment elle
voyait les choses en octobre 1999 dans son Document d'ensemble (pp.28-30): "la
Commission estime que le moment est venu d'insuffler une nouvelle dynamique au
processus d'largissement et de donner un signal fort de sa dtermination le faire
avancer aussi rapidement que possible, ce qui renforcera la confiance des pays
candidats dans leurs perspectives d'adhsion. C'est pourquoi la Commission propose
l'adoption d'une stratgie d'ouverture et de conduite des ngociations d'adhsion qui
garantisse que celles-ci progressent paralllement l'tat de prparation des pays
candidats l'adhsion."
Elle passe dans ces termes en revue les diverses options:
"(a) poursuivre strictement dans la ligne adopte par les Conseils europens deLuxembourg et de Cologne, savoir de ne recommander l'ouverture de ngociations
qu'avec les pays ayant suffisamment progress dans leur prparation l'adhsion
pour tre en mesure de satisfaire moyenne chance aux conditions auxquelles elle
est surbordonne. Cette formule a l'avantage de maintenir la mthodologie objective
tablie par le Conseil europen, applique un certain nombre des candidats actuels
et garantissant que chacun des pays invits entamer des ngociations ait atteint le
mme niveau minimal de prparation;
(b) recommander l'ouverture de ngociations avec tous les pays qui satisfont aux
critres politiques de Copenhague. Cette option a l'avantage de reconnatre la
ncessit, largement ressentie, d'imprimer un nouvel lan au processus
d'largissement, compte tenu des mutations spectaculaires que subit le paysage
politique europen par suite principalement de la crise de la rgion des Balkans.Cette crise a soulign la contribution fondamentale que le modle d'intgration
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europen a apporte et doit continuer d'apporter pour garantir la paix et la prosprit
en Europe.L'ouverture des ngociations avec tous les pays candidats qui satisfont
aux critres politiques de Copenhague, associe l'laboration d'une stratgie
renforce l'gard d'autres pays europens donnerait un signal puissant de ladtermination de l'UE de faire face ses responsabilits, dans la ligne de la
dclaration du Conseil europen de dc