OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT - … 1999, iolence broke out during the independence referendum in East...
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OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT
Transcript of OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT - … 1999, iolence broke out during the independence referendum in East...
OVERCOMINGVIOLENT CONFLICT
Kamanto Sunartowith Melina Nathan and Suprayoga Hadi
OVERCOMINGVIOLENT CONFLICT
Volume 2
PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ANALYSISIN NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ...............................................................................
Executi�e Summary ...............................................................................
1. Introduction and Background ...........................................................
1.1 Research Process ....................................................................
1.2. NTT Pro�incial O�er�iew ..........................................................
1.3 The Impact of East Timor’s Independence Referendum .............
2. Social Conflict in Nusa Tenggara Timur .............................................
2.1 Impact of East Timorese Refugees on Conflict in NTT ...............
2.2 Key Perpetrators of Violence ...................................................
2.2.1 East Timor related �iolence .........................................
2.2.2 The role of the security forces ....................................
3. Conflict Causes ...............................................................................
3.1 Economic Tensions .................................................................
3.2 Social and Political Tensions ...................................................
3.3 Identity Politics ......................................................................
3.4 Media .....................................................................................
4. Impacts of the Conflict ....................................................................
4.1 Local Economic De�elopment .................................................
4.2 Impact on Local Education and Health Ser�ices .......................
4.3 Go�ernance ............................................................................
5. Responses and Peace-building ........................................................
5.1 Responses by Go�ernment and UNDP .....................................
5.2 Issues Arising from Responses ...............................................
5.2.1 Lack of coordination between different programme dimensions .................................................................
5.2.2 Changing priorities in go�ernment policy on refugees ..
5.2.3 Inconsistent policies on settlement areas ...................
5.2.4 Need for standardisation of settlement acti�ities ........
5.2.5 Coordination among stakeholders ...............................
Publication of this book was made possible, in part, by the generous assistance of the Department for International De�elopment (DFID) of the United Kingdom. Additional assistance was pro�ided by the Bureau for Crisis Pre�ention and Reco�ery (BCPR).
Overcoming Violent Conflict: Volume 2, Peace and Development Analysis in Nusa Tenggara TimurFirst edition, 2005 © CPRU-UNDP, LabSosio and BAPPENAS
For further information contact:
Crisis Pre�ention and Reco�ery Unit (CPRU)United Nations De�elopment ProgrammeMenara Thamrin, 9th FloorJl. Thamrin No. 3Jakarta, Indonesia 10250
All rights reser�ed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrie�al system or transmittted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.
Copyright for the illustrations herein is held by the respecti�e artists.
Production Team:
Authors: Kamanto Sunarto with Melina Nathan and Suprayoga HadiEditor-in-Chief: Eugenia Piza-LopezSeries Editor: Melina Nathan Style Editor: Suzanne CharléProduction Coordinator: John H. McGlynnDesign and Layout: DesignLab
Printed in Jakarta, Indonesia, by Indonesia Printers.
Front and back co�er artwork: Detail of True Love by Mohamad Yusuf; aquatint etching, 17 x 13 cm., 2004.
ISBN: 979-99878-3-0
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5.2.6 Clear di�ision of responsibilities at all le�els of go�ernment ................................................................
5.2.7 The benefits of the participatory approach ..................
5.2.8 Insertion strategy .......................................................
5.2.9 The importance of district-le�el resettlement working groups ........................................................................
5.2.10 Accurate and updated data .........................................
5.2.11 Quality of location information ....................................
5.2.12 Matching mechanisms ................................................
5.2.13 Settlement standards for refugees ..............................
5.2.14 Capacity-building ........................................................
6. Conclusion: Peace Capacities and Vulnerabilities ..............................
6.1 Peace Vulnerabilities ...............................................................
6.2 Capacities for Peace ................................................................
6.2.1 Go�ernance .................................................................
6.2.2 Social welfare ............................................................
6.2.3 Local economic reco�ery .............................................
6.2.4 State and human security ...........................................
Annex 1. Institutional Affiliation of Informants Inter�iewed ..................
Annex 2. NTT Election Results, 1999 and 2004 ....................................
Annex 3. Data on Religious Functionaries in NTT (2002) .......................
Acronyms and Abbre�iations .................................................................
Bibliography .........................................................................................
Tables and FiguresTable 1 Physical O�er�iew of East Nusa Tenggarra Pro�ince (NTT) ......
Table 2 Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Figures for Human De�elopment Index (HDI) and Human Po�erty Index (HPI), 1999 and 2002 .............................................................
Table 3 Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), and Gender-related De�elopment Index (GDI), 1999 and 2002 ..............................
Table 4 Po�erty in Timor ....................................................................
Table 5 Lifetime Migration in NTT, 1980 and 1990 ..............................
Table 6 Displaced East Timorese in NTT, 6 June 2001 .........................
Table 7 East Timorese Displaced Persons in NTT, 31 December 2002 �ersus 28 June 2004 ...............................................................
Table 8 Number of Villages in West Timor where Crimes ha�e been Reported, by District/Municipality and Type of Crime ..............
Figure 1 Religious Affiliations in NTT ...................................................
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AcknowledgementsThis study, the second in a series of �olumes titled Overcoming Violent Conflict, results from the contributions of a large number of indi�iduals and institutions. Primary credit for the written material in this �olume goes to Kamanto Sunarto of LabSosio, the Department of Sociology of the Uni�ersity of Indonesia; Melina Nathan; of UNDP-Indonesia, wrote the sections on ‘Responses by Go�ernment and UNDP’ and ‘Issues Arising from Responses’. Suprayoga Hadi contributed the final section on ‘Capacities for Peace’.
The editorial board, whose members o�ersaw the writing, editing and production of this report consisted of the following indi�iduals: Eugenia Piza-Lopez of UNDP-Indonesia, editor-in-chief; Melina Nathan of UNDP-Indonesia, series editor; Suzanne Charlé, style editor; and John H. McGlynn, production coordinator. Additional credit goes to John Long of CPRU who edited earlier �ersions of the report.
This �olume benefited from the contributions and inputs of numerous indi�iduals and organisations in the field. These include the following: Y. Wasi Gede Puraka and Hendrik Bolitobi who ser�ed as research assistants during the author’s fieldwork in West Timor in July 2004; Stanis Tefa M., Regional Secretary’s Office, NTT Pro�ince; Gregorius Mau Bili, Deputy Head, Belu District; Ser�atius Lawang, NTT Pro�incial Legislator; Armindo Soarez, NTT Pro�incial Legislator; Blasius Manek, Belu District Legislator; Hendrik Therik, UN-OHCA, Kupang; Winston Pondo, CIS Timor, Kupang; Pater Paul N., Uni�ersitas Katolik Widya Mandira, Kupang; Pastor Daisy, Tuapukan; Sister Sesilia, Forum Peduli Perempuan Atambua; Sister Irndardis, Social and Economic De�elopment Programme, Atambua; Romo Paulus Nahak, Peace and Justice Committee, Atambua; Romo Leo Mali, Peace and Justice Commission Office, Kupang; and the non-go�ernmental organisations that pro�ided assistance and support, including CIS Timor, YPI, YASO, Yayasan SANLIMA, PIKUL, CRS, JRS and PIAR.
The report was peer-re�iewed by Patrick Sweeting of UNDP-Indonesia and Kusumo Adinugroho of UNDP-Indonesia and Suprayoga Hadi of BAPPENAS.
Publication of this �olume and the other �olumes in the Overcoming Violent Conflict series would not ha�e been possible without the the financial assistance of the Department for International De�elopment (DFID) of the United Kingdom and the Bureau for Crisis Pre�ention and Reco�ery (BCPR) of UNDP.
Mohamad Yusuf. True Love; linoleum-block, 18 X 11 cm, 2004.
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Executive Summary
In 1999, �iolence broke out during the independence referendum in East Timor and an estimated 270,000 East Timorese fled to the neighbouring Indonesian pro�ince of East Nusa Tenggara. This report examines the impact of that unprecedented refugee crisis on the region, the deficiencies of post-conflict management and the ongoing tensions between the displaced East Timorese and locals of West Timor.
This Peace De�elopment Analysis of West Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Pro�ince, focuses on forms of conflict between indigenous West Timorese and displaced East Timorese between 1999 and 2004. The objecti�es of the study were to in�estigate: the causes and impacts of these social tensions, the social capacities that can contribute toward peace and human de�elopment, and the �ulnerabilities of such social capacities. The research team conducted inter�iews and/or group discussions with informants from NTT pro�incial, district and local go�ernments, pro�incial and district legislati�e bodies, ci�il society organisations, the local media, displaced East Timorese residing both inside and outside camps, and West Timorese locals. Research took place in West Timor, in Kupang municipality, Kupang District and Belu District, from 7 July through 31 July 2004. Secondary data were collected prior to, during and after the fieldwork.
In the wake of the post-referendum �iolence, an estimated 55,388 East Timorese families entered West Timor. The influx of so many displaced East Timorese had a major impact on the local communities in which they settled. In particular, four districts and one municipality in West Timor, NTT Pro�ince faced numerous challenges in the field of human de�elopment because of the refugees.
The flight or deportation of East Timorese residents to West Timor was followed by �arious small-scale conflicts between locals and displaced East Timorese which tended to take place around camps for displaced East Timorese. The inter-group conflicts were triggered by a wide �ariety of factors, such as disputes o�er the utilization of communal land, the illegal appropriation or destruction of pri�ate and communal property and competition in traditional markets.
Informants stated that the presence of large numbers of displaced East Timorese together with the presence of army and police units near the West
Surya Wirawan. Keadilan sebuah Kunci (Justice if the Key); pencil drawing, 18.5 X 28 cm, 2000.
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Timor-Timor Leste border decreased many West Timorese’ sense of personal security.
The key actors in East Timor related �iolence and hostile acts committed in West Timor since 1999 ha�e been displaced pro-integrationist East Timorese who sought refuge in West Timor in 1999 following the referendum. The pro-Indonesian armed militia was formally disbanded in 1999 and surrendered large numbers of firearms and ammunition to the Indonesian authorities, but by no means all of their weapons.
Unrelated to the influx of East Timorese, acts of �iolence were also committed by members of regular army and police units pre�iously stationed in East Timor as well as by those stationed in West Timor.
The �ictims or targets of �iolence during the initial stages of the presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor consisted of other East Timorese, members of local/host communities, members of the Indonesian ci�il ser�ice, UN workers and others regarded as opponents, such as the foreign press. Following their exodus or forced deportation to West Timor, pro-independence East Timorese became targets of �iolence, including murder. The data in �arious reports show that the highest number of fatalities as a result of conflict in�ol�ing displaced East Timorese occurred between 1999 and 2000. The murder of three UNHCR staff in Atambua on 6 September 2000 by militia members led to the declaration of Security Phase V by the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), the e�acuation of all UN staff from West Timor, and the disruption of aid to the displaced East Timorese.
The main losers in the conflict were the displaced East Timorese who had to lea�e all their assets and most of their personal belongings in East Timor. While the subsequent formation of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste has put an end to the armed conflict in East Timor, reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and in Timor Leste has not been achie�ed. Prominent East and West Timorese caution that reconciliation is a necessary condition for peace in the region.
Many ongoing local conflicts stem from tensions between displaced East Timorese and West Timorese local communities due to different cultural backgrounds as well as resentment o�er disparities in assistance recei�ed and competition o�er scarce resources.
Informants stated that cultural differences based on ethnicity, religion and colonial experiences contributed to the social distance between the displaced
East Timorese and the indigenous West Timorese. The displaced East Timorese are Catholic, whereas in a number of areas in NTT the locals are predominantly Protestant.
Many West Timorese considered it incongruous that many East Timorese consider themsel�es Indonesian citizens while also wishing to return to East Timor. In reply, East Timorese camp residents noted that, despite the fact that they had been formally classified as Indonesian citizens, displaced East Timorese were often not regarded as members of the local community and were not afforded the same rights and obligations.
Many displaced East Timbres felt they had been used to obtain aid from domestic and o�erseas sources, and questioned the accountability and openness of the management of allocated funds. Displaced East Timorese camp residents also claimed that go�ernment agencies often discriminated against them in the pro�ision of public health and education.
While East Timorese employed by the state continue to recei�e their monthly salaries, many East Timorese who traditionally earned their li�ings as peasants or working in the informal sector ha�e no means of li�elihood in West Timor. This has placed additional economic burdens on host communities, as well as putting pressure on scarce local natural resources.
Pre�ailing methods of traditional land resource management were disturbed by the influx of East Timorese. The permanent settlement of displaced East Timorese in host communities has also compelled host communities to allocate some of their land, �oluntarily or otherwise, to the displaced East Timorese. Disputes o�er the management of, and access to, natural resources, such as land and water, are potential sources of conflict.
The presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor placed a burden on the region’s health and educational facilities. The exodus to West Timor disrupted the schooling of many East Timorese children. Although �arious arrangements e�entually led to an increase in the absorption capacity of local schools, camp residents inter�iewed state that many children still chose not to attend school, or dropped out.
At the outset, rates of infant mortality and malnutrition were high among the displaced. Many displaced East Timorese families were unable to access health ser�ices pro�ided by the go�ernment. Displaced East Timorese women had already suffered �arious forms of �iolence while in East Timor. Many displaced East Timorese women faced further problems in West Timor
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Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, a range of emergency programs ha�e been designed to mitigate the humanitarian problems resulting from the exodus from East Timor and to find durable solutions for East Timorese. Support for the e�acuation of displaced East Timorese to West Timor was followed by humanitarian aid in the form of access to emergency food aid, shelter, and health and educational facilities for displaced East Timorese, and aid in repatriating displaced persons who wished to return to East Timor.
The Indonesian go�ernment, NGOs and foreign and international donor agencies ha�e sought to address socio-economic inequality by declaring an end to the displaced persons status of the East Timorese, and by extending equal treatment to displaced East Timorese and locals. Programs ha�e also been initiated focusing on the economic empowerment of resettled residents, income-generation for camp residents, and �oluntary participation in international migration programs.
Peace-building initiati�es include the facilitation of meetings between residents in East Timorese camps and host communities as well as communities where they will be resettled. Cross-border �isits ha�e been set up to facilitate reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and Timor Leste residents. East Timorese ci�il ser�ice employees and military personnel formerly stationed in East Timor ha�e been relocated from camps and reassigned to units in their organizations within as well as outside West Timor, while former members of the militia ha�e been encouraged to pursue their interests through political means.
Despite conflict resolution and peace-building efforts by �arious agencies, the root causes of conflict between East Timorese camp residents and locals remain unresol�ed: the occupation by East Timorese of communal land and land owned by locals; competition for scare natural resources, and competition for jobs. The only �iable solutions—the relocation of displaced East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia or their repatriation to Timor Leste—ha�e progressed �ery slowly.
East Timorese are reluctant to take part in relocation and repatriation programs due to lack of jobs and inadequate ser�ices. Meanwhile, many camp residents still ha�e no sustainable li�elihoods; the discontinuation of assistance has exacerbated these difficulties, and the competition for scarce natural and social resources continues.
Humanitarian assistance for refugees has stoked the jealousy of locals, whereas durable solutions, such as the pro�ision of food aid for disad�antaged
families among locals, ha�e not been made a�ailable to displaced East Timorese li�ing in camps.
Past as well as present human rights �iolations by members of the state apparatus are also a main source of fear and uncertainty among the populace and a fundamental obstruction to peaceful de�elopment.
NGOs are acti�ely in�ol�ed in pro�iding information to camp residents, but the acti�ities are short-term and so not sustainable. Obser�ers suggest that inter�ention programs aimed at resol�ing the problem of the displaced East Timorese can only be effecti�ely implemented by changing the beha�iour and attitudes of their leaders The physical isolation of many camps, limited access to electronic and printed media due to po�erty and limited communication between locals and camp residents also hinder the flow of rele�ant information from the outside world.
Displaced persons are slow to mo�e out of camps. Internal factors include: unwillingness to be relocated, e�en to another location within West Timor, if this in�ol�es separation from relati�es and friends and unwillingness to be resettled in areas outside West Timor. External factors include the close patronage bonds between displaced East Timorese and their leaders, negati�e information and disinformation about repatriation, resettlement and transmigration programs, the lack of arable land in West Timor and the go�ernment’s limited budget.
Peace Capacities identified by this assessment include increasing democratisation and decentralisation of power as well as the strengthening of ci�il society. Peace capacities also consist of peace-building initiati�es by go�ernment agencies, traditional/local leaders and NGOs. Acti�ities include the facilitation of meetings between both groups and the promotion of peace between students from both groups through the establishment of peace schools.
The local go�ernment has also begun to pro�ide ser�ices without distinguishing between former displaced persons and locals, thus enhancing inter-group relations and reducing an important risk to peace. Specific sectoral attention should focus on impro�ed go�ernance, deli�ery of basic ser�ices, economic reco�ery and empowerment of �ictims of conflict.
There are se�eral ways to increase the peace building capacity of the go�ernment, affirming its role as a dominant actor in a�erting potential conflict. One is to increase the go�ernment’s capacity to make refugee management policies that are sensiti�e to potential conflict.
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Village go�ernments are also important actors, and it is imperati�e to increase the capacity of and support for these go�ernments in their efforts to open forums for dialogue between refugees and the local community. It is also important to encourage refugee in�ol�ement in decision-making at the �illage le�el.
Finally, it is imperati�e that all stakeholders participate and be acti�ely in�ol�ed in the planning and implementation of peace and de�elopment programs. The emphasis in peace-building acti�ities should be on participatory, empowering bottom-up grassroots approaches.
There are a number of important steps to promote social welfare, among them impro�ing li�ing conditions and expanding employment opportunities (with the appropriate supporting infrastructures), so that unemployment or underemployment does not become a potential for conflict.
Understanding land issues, including ownership and usage, is central to promoting social welfare. The pattern of settlement insertion, in which refugees are settled in small numbers among the local community, could become a mechanism to reduce the ghettoisation of the refugees, which can lead to aggression if triggered.
Impro�ing refugees’ access to appropriate health care can be done by enabling community health centres (PUSKESMAS) to gi�e cheaper health care to refugees, and encouraging PUSKESMAS to be more proacti�e in their ser�ices. Health education specifically related to healthy li�ing would pro�ide a forum for dialogue between refugees and the local community, while simultaneously helping them to care for en�ironmental health; more paramedics need to be educated within refugee and local communities.
Refugees’ citizenship status must be affirmed so refugees can access go�ernment aid, including health care and education. The go�ernment needs to impro�e the schools, address the serious lack of teachers and pro�ide scholarships to student who need aid and ha�e Schools can be sites for new education and communication programs in peace-building skills and curricula that teaches multicultural education principles.
Special ser�ices should be pro�ided for women in exile, especially women who no longer ha�e husbands, both in relation to reproducti�e health and their �ulnerability to �iolence, as well as their access to and control of basic public facilities in all programs to ensure that women are not left behind in peace building efforts. Programs for ad�ocacy and support for �ictims of
�iolence – including domestic �iolence - need to be introduced. Programs for the empowerment of women are also recommended, especially regarding participation in formal schooling, small and medium enterprises, and in politics.
Economic empowerment should be aimed at both refugee and local communities. To enable equal access, there needs to be a more detailed assessment to determine the indicators for targeted beneficiaries and suitable forms of economic empowerment. Economic empowerment can also be coordinated with the border area accelerated de�elopment program.
The security context in West Timor can be influenced by the situation in Timor Leste. Indicators need to be de�eloped to anticipate insecurity or destabilization across the border as well as an early response system to minimize the impact in West Timor. Support needs to be pro�ided for human security programs, such as the empowerment of human rights watch (HRW) acti�ities and ad�ocacy programs, and the empowerment of organizations in�ol�ed in the performance of legal, health, psychological and economic support for �ictims of human rights �iolations.
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In 1999, �iolence broke out during the independence referendum in East Timor and an estimated 270,000 East Timorese fled to the neighbouring Indonesian pro�ince of East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tengara Timur, NTT). This report examines the causes, dynamics and impacts of conflict between these displaced East Timorese and the local population of West Timor.
Research ProcessThis Peace and De�elopment Analysis of West Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Pro�ince, focuses on forms of conflict between indigenous West Timorese and displaced East Timorese between 1999 and 2004. The objecti�es of the study were to in�estigate the causes and impacts of this conflict, the social capacities that can contribute toward peace and human de�elopment, and the �ulnerabilities of such social capacities.
The research team conducted inter�iews and/or group discussions with informants from NTT pro�incial, district
1.Introduction and Background
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Surya Wirawan. Berikan Cinta Pada Sesama (Show Love for Everyone) ; hardboard cut, 10 X 10 cm, 2003.
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and local go�ernments, pro�incial and district legislati�e bodies, ci�il society organisations, the local media, displaced East Timorese residing both inside and outside camps, and West Timorese locals. This research took place in West Timor, in Kupang municipality, Kupang District and Belu District, from 7 July through to 31 July 2004 (see Annex 1). A pro�incial workshop was conducted in Kupang on 29 July 2004. Participants included Kupang-based informants who ha�e pre�iously been inter�iewed and/or members of their affiliated organizations. Secondary data was also collected prior to, during and after the fieldwork.
NTT Provincial OverviewEast Nusa Tenggara Pro�ince, NTT, is di�ided into one municipality (the pro�incial capital of Kupang) and 14 districts: Alor, Belu, East Flores, East Sumba, Ende, Kupang, Lembata, Manggarai, Ngada, North Central Timor, Rote Ndao, Sikka, South Central Timor and West Sumba. These are comprised of 170 subdistricts, 2,207 desa (rural �illages) and 309 kelurahan (urban �illages). The total population of NTT in 2002 was 3,924,871, of which 39.42 percent li�e in West Timor. 1 There are 11 major local ethnic groups in NTT. 2 These are Alor, Ende, Larantuka, Manggarai, Ngada, Nge Reo, Rote, Sabu, Sikka, Solor and Sumba ethnic groups. The majority of NTT’s population is Catholic.
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Table 1 Physical Overview of East Nusa Teggara Province (NTT)
Location: 8-12 degrees South Latitude and 118-123 degrees East Latitude
Land area: 47,349.9 square kilometers (2.49 percent of Indonesia’s area)
Sea area: 200.000 square kilometers
Borders: Flores Sea (north), Indian Ocean (south), Democratic Republic of Timor
Leste (east), West Nusa Tenggara Pro�ince (west)
Number of islands: 566 islands (42 with inhabitants); largest islands: Flores, Sumba and Timor
A�erage temperature: 27.6°C
Source: Pro�incial Go�ernment of East Nusa Tenggara, Go�ernor of East Nusa Tenggara: ‘Humanitarian ser�ices in and with �arious limitations report’. Kupang, 2001.
Prior to the colonial period, the region of NTT was ruled by numerous indigenous and independent ethnic groups, which were continually competing and engaged in wars against one another. The roots of present-day competition for power, prestige and pri�ilege among major ethnic groups in the pro�ince can be seen in ri�alries of the pre-colonial and colonial eras. 3 During Dutch colonial rule NTT was part of the Sunda Ketjil (Lesser Sunda) region; later, in the 1950s, it was renamed Nusa Tenggara by the Indonesian Go�ernment and included the islands of Sumbawa, Lombok and Bali. According to Heather Sutherland, a Dutch historian and cultural anthropologist, Nusa Tenggara has ‘a long history of contact with the outside world. Foreign ships—Chinese, Ja�anese and Malay—had been trading in the area since the fifteenth century’.4
On 11 August 1958, through Law No. 64 5 Nusa Tenggara was di�ided into three distinct pro�inces: Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara), Bali and Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara). A. S. Pello, NTT pro�ince’s first go�ernor, inaugurated the new pro�ince of NTT on December 20, 1958.6
1.) The population breakdown in West Timor is: Belu: 343,777, Kupang District: 332,840, Kupang Municipality: 261,704, North Central Timor: 204,388, South Central Timor: 400,482. See BPS Statistics of Nusa Tenggara Timur Province, 2004, in http://ntt.bps.go.id/03.htm, http://ntt.bps.go.id/04.htm, http://ntt.bps.go.id/05.htm, http://ntt.bps.go.id/06.htm, http://ntt.bps.go.id/71.htm (accessed 20 July 2005).
2.) Informasi Dasar [Basic Information], in Pengolahan Data Elektronik, Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur [Electronic data processing, East Nusa Tenggara Provincial Government] (Kupang: Pemerintah Daerah Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2003) http://www.pemda-ntt.go.id (accessed 25 June 2004).
3.) Ibid. See also Clark E. Cunningham, ‘Soba: Sebuah Desa Atoni di Timor Barat’, in Masjarakat Desa di Indonesia Masa Ini [‘Soba: An Atoni �illage in West Timor’, in Village Communities in Contemporary Indonesia], ed. Koentjaraningrat (Jakarta: Jajasan Badan Penerbit FEUI, 1964, 225-252, and Andrew McWilliam, Path of Origin, Gates of Life: A Study of Place and Precedence in Southwest Timor (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 49-69.
4.) Heather Sutherland, preface in I Gede Parimartha, Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815-1915 [Trade and Politics in Nusa Tenggara 1815-1915] (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 2002).
5.) Lembaran Negara 1958/115 Tambahan Lembaran Negara No. 1649, Undang-undang tentang Pembentukan Daerah-daerah tingkat I Bali, Nusa Tenggara Barat dan Nusa Tenggara Timur (Law on the formation of the pro�inces of Bali, West Nusa Tenggara dan East Nusa Tenggara), 1958 (http://www.theceli.com/dokumen/produk/1958/uu64-1958.htm).
6.) ‘Gubernur NTT Sejak 1958’ [‘NTT Go�ernors Since 1958’] in Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
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In 1979 President Soeharto’s New Order go�ernment introduced Law No. 5 on �illage go�ernment, requiring the structure of all local go�ernments to be uniform; as a consequence, traditional political systems in NTT and elsewhere lost their power.7 Although the unseating of existing traditional local go�ernments soon led to �arious sociological and political problems, dissatisfaction with the law could not be �oiced openly until after the fall of the New Order go�ernment in 1998. In 1999, delegates to the Traditional Communities of the Indonesian Archipelago Congress (Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) criticised the marginalization of traditional communities brought about by three decades of New Order rule.8
The delegates, traditional leaders representing Timor, Rote and Flores claimed that �arious national laws allowed the go�ernment to usurp traditional rights to land and natural resources in the name of opening up the archipelago to the market economy. They pointed out that millions of hectares of traditional community land had been con�erted into concessions for large-scale extracti�e industrial enterprises without the permission of the communities. The NTT Traditional Communities charged that the standardization of agricultural patterns through the use of seed, industrial fertilizers and the monoculture system marginalized traditional agricultural patterns so important to communities.9
As a result of the nation-wide reform mo�ement that began in 1998, local go�ernment and local communities in NTT ha�e initiated the ‘re�i�al’ of adat (customary) law. This process has included the emergence of a local
mo�ement aimed at obtaining legal recognition for hak ulayat (communal land rights) and calls for the pro�incial go�ernment to scrap the Peraturan Daerah No. 8, 1972, a regional regulation which states that all customary land is under state control.
Elites from Rote, Sumba and Sabu, and more recently from Flores, ha�e dominated the social, economic and political dynamics of NTT, especially in the pro�incial capital Kupang.10
Ethnicity is closely related to religion. Most Catholic bishops, pastors, brothers and nuns as well as Islamic ulamas (religious leaders) are stationed in Flores, whereas most Protestant preachers, bible teachers and Sunday school teachers tend to be stationed in West Timor and Sumba (see Annex 3). Since religion in NTT is inextricably intertwined with ethnicity, ethnic ri�alry for control of strategic executi�e and legislati�e positions at the pro�incial le�el ine�itably contains undertones of religious ri�alry, especially between Catholics and Protestants. Ethnicity and religion ha�e always played an important role in the election and appointment of local public officials, and ethnic and religious issues are accentuated during local elections.
In the 2004 national elections, howe�er, NTT �oters tended to �ote for nationalist parties rather than religious parties. In 1999, during the nation’s first free and fair election since 1955, the dominant Functional Group Party (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar ) saw its support in NTT decline to 39.61 percent (in the 1997 elections, it had garnered as much as 94.94 percent). The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) garnered 39.04 percent. In the 2004 election for seats in the DPR, the Golkar Party and PDI-P remained the front-runners.
7.) Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa [Law No. 5, 1979 on �illage go�ernment], Lembaran Negara Tahun 1979 No. 56 Tambahan Lembaran Negara No. 3153.
8.) Masyarakat Adat Nusa Tenggara Timur. ‘Pernyataan Sikap Masyarakat Adat Nusa Tenggara Timur untuk Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara: Masyarakat adat NTT menggugat keadilan’. Siaran pers. [‘East Nusa Tenggara Adat Communities: Statement of the East Nusa Tenggara adat communities at the Congress of the Adat Communities of the Indonesian archipelago: The East Nusa Tenggara adat communities demand justice’. Press release] (Kupang, 12 March 12) http://www.mail-archi�e.com/[email protected]/msg00068.html (accessed 30 December 2004).
9.) Ibid.
10.) Indonesian Society for Social Transformation (INSIST) and Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). Sekolah Demokrasi : Strengthening Democratic Society in Indonesia 2004-2007. (Unpublished report, Yogyakarta, 2004).
6 7
When an estimated 270,000 East Timorese Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) entered West Timor in 1999, 12 many of them for an indefinite period, the four districts and one municipality in West Timor as well as NTT Pro�ince faced numerous challenges in the field of human
de�elopment. The NTT pro�incial go�ernment defined these challenges as ‘barriers to de�elopment’, including ‘high rates of po�erty, low educational le�els, low le�els of health’.13 The majority of the population of most �illages in the four districts in Timor work in agriculture: in Kupang district, all 187 �illages are predominantly agrarian; while between 96 and 97 of the �illages are agrarian in South Central Timor, North Central Timor and Belu.14
The Indonesia Human De�elopment Report 2001 and the Indonesia Human De�elopment Report 2004, a collaborati�e effort between Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS, National De�elopment Planning Agency), Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS, Central Statistics Bureau) and the United Nations De�elopment Programme (UNDP), contained national, pro�incial and district/municipal data on de�elopment, po�erty and gender disparity using indices applied by the UNDP to measure the state of human de�elopment in the world.15 These indices consist of the Human De�elopment Index (HDI), Human Po�erty Index (HPI), Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and Gender-related De�elopment Index (GDI). Using these indices, the BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP data show that NTT Pro�ince’s HDI, GEM and GDI scores in 1999 and 2002 were lower than the national a�erage scores, while the HPI score was higher (see Tables 2 and 3). The data re�eal disparities between districts in West Timor as well as an urban-rural di�ide. Kupang Municipality’s 1999 and 2002 HDI scores were higher than the national a�erage and its HPI scores are �ery low. South Central Timor District, on the other hand, has �ery poor HDI, HPI and GEM scores.
Although the majority of the population was either Catholic or Protestant (see Figure 1), religion did not play an important role in this election. The newly established Christian party, the Peace and Prosperity Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS) only recei�ed one seat, while the o�erwhelming majority of �oters supported nationalist parties. Golkar won fi�e seats, PDI-P three, while the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKPI), Enhancement of Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia, PPDI) and Pioneer Party (Partai Pelopor) each won one. For the results of the 1999 and 2004 elections, see Annex 2.11
Figure 1Religious affiliations in NTT
Catholic 55.49%
Protestant 34.46%
Muslim 9.07%
Other 0.88%
11.) See Komisi Pemilihan Umum. ‘Perhitungan Perolehan Kursi DPR-RI Pemilu 2004’ [‘General Elections Commission. Seats in the People’s Representati�e Council of the Republic of Indonesia obtained in the 2004 general elections’] http://www.kpu.go.id .
12.) UNHCR Global Report 2001: East Timor (Gene�a, 2001) 329-334. http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/�tx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3dafdd0215 (accessed 20 July 2005).
13.) ‘Permasalahan Pembangunan di Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘Problems of de�elopment in East Nusa Tenggara’] Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur (2003), op. cit.
14.) Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Propinsi NTT-BPS Propinsi NTT [Agency for the empowerment of �illage communities in NTT Pro�ince-Central Statistics Bureau of NTT Pro�ince.] Hasil Pengolahan Data dan Analisis Potensi Desa Nusa Tenggara Timur 2002 [Result of data processing and analysis of village potentials in East Nusa Tenggara, 2002] (Kupang, 2002).
15.) BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report 2001: Towards a new consensus: democracy and human development in Indonesia (Jakarta: BPS Statistics Indonesia-BAPPENAS-UNDP, 2001). BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Development Report 2004: Financing human development. Draft. (Jakarta: UNSFIR-BPS-LPEM-UI, 2004).
8 9
Table 2 Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Figures
for Human Development Index (HDI) and Human Poverty Index (HPI)1999 and 2002
Province/West Timor District/
Municipality
1999 2002
NTT Nation NTT Nation
HDI Rank HDI RankHDI HDI
NTT
Kupang
South Central Timor
North Central Timor
Belu
Kupang Municipality
NTT
Kupang
South Central Timor
North Central Timor
Belu
Kupang Municipality
60.4
57.0
49.2
53.7
51.8
66.6
HPI
29.5
32.2
35.1
34.7
30.5
16.7
24
266
290
281
285
80
Rank
21
247
264
259
212
36
64.3
HPI
25.2
60.3
56.9
57.7
59.5
58.3
70.9
HPI
28.9
27.5
29.7
24.6
27.3
14.4
28
328
325
312
318
53
Rank
24
231
261
174
227
29
65.8
HPI
22.7
Source: BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human De�elopment Report: Financing Human De�elopment, Jakarta, 2004.
BPS data on po�erty in NTT in 2004, quoted by Kompas, shows that between 10.55 percent and 37.38 percent of the population of four districts and one municipality in Timor li�e below the po�erty line (see Table 4).16
Referring to data in the UNDP Global Human De�elopment Report 2000, Gaspersz and Foenay obser�e that: ‘the income per capita of the population in NTT Pro�ince . . . is lower still than the income per capita of the population in the poorest state in the world (Sierra Leone).’17 Referring to the BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP 2001 Indonesia Human De�elopment Report they further obser�e that ‘income per capita in East Nusa Tenggara is the worst in Indonesia,’ and that South Central Timor district has the lowest income per capita in Indonesia.18
In assessing de�elopmental challenges, the pro�incial go�ernment has pointed to a number of incidents that ha�e had ad�erse societal and economic effects.19 These include the Kupang riots on 30 No�ember 1998 and the influx of displaced East Timorese during 1999. The large numbers of Asian and Middle Eastern illegal immigrants in NTT seeking entry to Australia, along with the East Timorese, compromise the pro�incial go�ernment’s ability to act. Their presence has major political, psychological and security implications, puts pressure on social ser�ices, and also attracts international concern, but the district and pro�incial go�ernments ha�e limited resources to deal with the problem.
Howe�er, a comparison of 1999 and 2002 data shows that a�erage HDI scores (and national rankings) in all areas of West Timor except Kupang District ha�e increased – an
indication of an o�erall increase in human de�elopment. HPI rankings ha�e decreased, except in Belu District. While the GEM scores of NTT pro�ince ha�e remained relati�ely constant, GEM scores in West Timor (except in Belu district) ha�e declined. GDI scores in NTT pro�ince ha�e also remained relati�ely constant – an indication that o�erall gender disparity in the pro�ince has remained constant. In West Timor, howe�er, no clear pattern emerged; in some districts GDI scores ha�e increased, while in others scores ha�e decreased.
16.) CAL. ‘Tujuh kabupaten di NTT terancam krisis pangan’ [‘Three districts in NTT threatened by crisis in food supply’], Kompas, March 3, 2005, 29.
17.) Vincent Gaspersz and Esthon Foenay, ‘Kinerja pendapatan ekonomi rakyat dan produkti�itas tenaga kerja di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘The income performance of the folk economy and labor producti�ity in East Nusa Tenggara Pro�ince’]. Jurnal Ekonomi Rakyat, II No. 8 (No�ember 2003) http://www.ekonomirakyat.org.
18.) BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report 2001, op. cit. 19.) Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
10 11
Because of NTT’s harsh natural conditions, many NTT locals are forced to migrate to, or seek employment in, other parts of Indonesia or Eastern Malaysia (Table 5).
Table 5Lifetime Migration of NTT 1980 and 1990
Type of Migrant 1980 1990
35.007
47.534
-12.527
46.310
99.442
-53.132
In migrants
Out migrants
Net migrants
Source: BPS. Statistics of Nusa Tenggara Timur: ‘Nusa Tenggara Timur in Figures’
The Impact of East Timor’s Independence ReferendumIn 1976, the Indonesian Go�ernment annexed the territory of East Timor (at that time a Portuguese colony), and integrated it into the Republic of Indonesia. The annexation of the pro�ince led to more than two decades of conflict between East Timorese pro-independence supporters and the Go�ernment of Indonesia. Casualty numbers �ary. Quoting a United Nations Economic and Social Council source, Tadjoeddin reports that between 1975 and 1980 an estimated 100,000 East Timorese were killed, and that between 1980 and 1984 another 100,000 were either killed or died from disease or star�ation.20 In one incident alone, in Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on 12 No�ember 1991, the Indonesian army fatally shot between 50 and 400 unarmed East Timorese, who were demonstrating against the killing of an East Timorese. The Indonesian authorities estimate a much lower figure, estimating fatalities in East Timor at
1.3
Table 3Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Figures
for Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 1999 and 2002
Province/West Timor District/
Municipality
1999 2002
NTT Nation NTT Nation
GEM Rank GEM RankGEM GEM
NTT
Kupang
South Central Timor
North Central Timor
Belu
Kupang Municipality
NTT
Kupang
South Central Timor
North Central Timor
Belu
Kupang Municipality
46.4
47.1
34.8
35.3
35.6
52.6
GDI
56.8
53.9
39.6
46.4
45.9
58.2
18
Rank
14
49.5
GDI
46.2
36.9
19.3
27.0
44.0
44.1
GDI
56.3
45.6
38.1
52.4
53.6
60.3
22
268
332
323
175
174
Rank
20
311
334
240
223
97
54.6
GDI
69.2
Source: BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP, Indonesia Human De�elopment Report: Financing Human De�elopment, Jakarta, 2004.
Table 4Poverty in Timor
District/MunicipalityPopulation
below poverty line(in 000s)
Poverty LineRupiah Per Capita Per Month
in IDR and USD
% of populationof district ormunicipality
Kupang District
South Central Timor District
North Central Timor District
Belu District
Kupang Municipality
109.0
149.5
62.7
70.4
27.8
32.68 %
37.38 %
30.65 %
20.51 %
10.65 %
96,416
96,207
104,810
97,100
112,962
$9.86
$9.84
$10.72
$9.93
$11.56
Source: Kompas, 3 March 2005, based on BPS data.
20.) Report by Bacre Waly Ndiaye for the UN ECOSOC, in United Nations, The United Nations and East Timor: Self-determination through popular consultation, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 2000, quoted in Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin. Anatomi Kekerasan Sosial dalam Konteks Transisi: Kasus Indonesia [The Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition: the Case of Indonesia] UNSFIR Working Papers Series No. 02/01-1 (Jakarta: April 2002), 52-54.
12 13
around 30,000.21 The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that between 100,000 and 250,000 East Timorese lost their li�es during this long-running conflict.22
On 27 January 1999, President B. J. Habibie surprised many when he announced that a referendum on independence would be held. On 5 May 1999, the go�ernment of Indonesia, the go�ernment of Portugal and the UN agreed in New York that the referendum would take place on 30 August 1999 and would be monitored by the United Nations.23 More than 78.5 percent of 432,287 registered East Timorese �oters chose independence o�er integration with Indonesia. (Voter turnout was an astounding 98 percent of registered �oters).24
As a result of the �ote, pro-integration militias, backed by members of the Indonesian security forces, rampaged across East Timor.25 In a news report on 11 September, CNN showed Pope John Paul II condemning the acts as ‘slaughter’, while a Vatican official claimed ‘genocide’.26
An estimated 1,000 East Timorese were killed in the �iolence following the �ote, according to UNTAET.27 The UNHCR estimates that more than 75 percent of the population was displaced and more than 70 percent of East Timor’s pri�ate housing, public buildings and utilities were destroyed. Some 200,000 persons were deported to West Timor and other areas in Indonesia.28
21.) Tadjoeddin. Anatomi Kekerasan Sosial dalam Konteks Transisi, ibid. 22.) Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook/ East Timor, http://www.cia.
go�/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tt.htm (accessed 22 July 2005).23.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur. Pelayanan Kemanusiaan, 37. 24.) Kirsty Sword Gusmao with Rowena Lennox, A Woman of Independence: A Strong
Love and the Birth of a New Nation (Sydney: MacMillan Australia Pte Ltd., 2003) 236.
25.) For a description of the scale of �iolence and destruction in East Timor in August and September 1999, see Chris Dolan, Judith Large and Naoke Obi, E�aluation of UNHCR’s repatriation and reintegration programme in East Timor,1999-2003 (Gene�a: UNHCR E�aluation and Policy Analysis Unit, February 2004) 11-13.
26.) CNN ‘U.N. Mission to Assess Bloodied East Timor Firsthand’ (11 September 1999) http://www-cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/southeast/9999/10/etimor04/ (accessed 14 July 2005).
27.) Tadjoeddin, op. cit., 53.
According to NTT Go�ernment data, by 19 October 1999 an estimated 55,388 East Timorese families had entered West Timor.29 The influx of so many displaced East Timorese was unprecedented in West Timor’s history, and had a major impact on the local communities in which they settled. On 6 June 2001 the Indonesian Go�ernment conducted a registration that shows that 96.72 percent of the estimated 284,148 displaced East Timorese were settled in West Timor 30 (see Table 6).
In the 6 June 2001 registration, 98.02 percent of 113,794 participating East Timorese displaced persons in NTT opted to stay in Indonesia and registered as Indonesian citizens.31 The Program on Humanitarian Policy and Research, howe�er, reported, “the UN and international humanitarian agencies claim these numbers are not accurate. International critics suggest that the results of such a count may ha�e been hampered by militia intimidation and discrepancies in the �oting procedure”.32
28.) UNHCR. Global Appeal 2000. The Timor Situation. East Timor. http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/�tx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e2ebc230 (accessed 20 July 2005). Kammen described the situation as follows: “Two days later this euphoria was shattered by the outbreak of massi�e �iolence. Thousands of non-Timorese fled the territory, most returning to their nati�e places in Indonesia. Hundreds of thousands of East Timorese were forcibly e�acuated across the border into Indonesian West Timor, while se�eral hundred thousands more fled into the hills”. Kammen, Douglas, ‘The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor’, in Benedict R.O’G. Anderson (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, second printing, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell South East Asia Program, 2002), 156-188.
29.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, 237 Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur. Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Timur: ‘Pelayanan Kemanusiaan dalam dan dengan pelbagai Keterbatasan: Pertanggungjawaban Publik Penanganan dan Pemanfaatan Dana Serta Bantuan Barang dalam rangka Penanganan Pengungsi Timor Timur’ [ ‘Humanitarian Ser�ices in and with Various Limitations: Public Accountability of the Handling and Utilization of Funds and Material Aid in the Handling of East Timorese Displaced Persons’], Tahun Anggaran 1999/2000-2001 [Fiscal Year 1999/2000-2001] (Kupang, 2001) 237.
30.) Belu District (61.42 percent), followed by Kupang District (19.24 percent), North Central Timor District (8.14 percent), Kupang Municipality (5.87 percent), and South Central Timor District (2.06 percent).
31.) Ibid., 74-75. 32.) Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research: ‘Building Human Security in
Indonesia, West Timor’ (Cambridge, MA : President and Fellows of Har�ard College, 28 December 2004) http://www.pre�entconflict.org/portal/main/maps_wtimor_refugees.php.
14 15
Many displaced East Timorese peasants now make a li�ing by labouring on community land owned by locals or land controlled by the Indonesian Go�ernment, which the East Timorese had pre�iously appropriated and cleared illegally, or by renting land from local landlords (crop sharing). Others are employed in the informal sector, including selling �egetables and animals (chicken, pigs, cows) in local markets, working as ojek (motorcycle taxi) dri�ers or urban labourers, or selling goods to Timor Leste through cross-border trade.
Many East Timorese who ha�e not been repatriated ha�e taken part in organized relocation programs through which they are integrated with locals, or ha�e left the camps �oluntarily for integrated neighbourhoods to li�e with relati�es or in rooms or houses leased by locals.33 Many East Timorese members of the Indonesian state apparatus
Source: Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur 2001, 75.
(the military, police and ci�il ser�ice) who continue to recei�e their monthly salaries and accompanying fringe benefits ha�e been reassigned and also li�e outside camps.
In West Timor the displaced East Timorese are a minority group whose numbers are dwindling.34 O�er the past fi�e years, many ha�e left NTT �ia organized relocation programs (resettlement and transmigration) as well as spontaneous migration; displaced East Timorese military personnel and ci�il ser�ants ha�e been reassigned to other locations and ser�ices, and still others ha�e been repatriated to Timor Leste. According to the UNHCR, by the end of 2001 an estimated 193,000 East Timorese had been repatriated,35 including 125,000 in 1999 and 50,000 in 2000.36 By 28 June 2004 the number of East Timorese displaced persons in NTT had declined to 14,185 persons or 7,094 household heads.37 (See Table 7). As of May 2005, 4,199 families still remained in camps or refugee-type accommodation.38
33.) Ibid. 34.) Ibid. 35.) UNHCR, Global Report 2001: East Timor http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/�tx/
publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3dafdd0215 (accessed 20 July 2005). 36.) UNHCR Global Report 2000: Timor Operation http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/
�tx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e23eb720 (accessed 22 July 2005).37.) Pro�incial Coordinating Unit for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees.
Report on the development of the handling of former East Timorese displaced persons in East Nusa Tenggara Province. The situation in 2004 (Satkorlak PBP NTT. Laporan Perkembangan Penanganan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur. Keadaan Tahun 2004). (Kupang, June 2004).
38.) Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat, Kantor Menko Kesra, ‘Koordinasi Kebijakan Penanganan Dan Pemberdayaan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur Di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘Coordinating Policy to Address and Empower Former East Timorese Refugees in NTT’], Bogor, 2005.
Table 6Displaced East Timorese in NTT, 6 June 2001
Island District/Municipality IDPs
174,528
54,666
23,124
16,669
2,805
3,012
1,714
1,371
876
716
706
560
194
163
284,148
West Timor
Alor
Flores
Lembata
Sumba
TOTAL
• Belu District
• Kupang District
• North Central Timor District
• Kupang Municipality
• South Central Timor
• Alor District
• Ende District
• Sikka District
• Manggarai District
• Ngada District
• East Flores District
• Lembata District
• East Sumba District
• West Sumba District
16 17
Tadjoeddin classifies NTT pro�ince between 1990 and 2001 as an intermediate conflict area in�ol�ing 14 incidents of �iolence, mostly communal in nature (96 percent), of which eight in�ol�ed at least one fatality.39 A total of 55 fatalities are recorded. In a presentation of their ongoing research on post-New Order local le�el conflict in Flores, Barron et al identify the following types of conflict in Flores: natural resource conflicts; administrati�e disputes; gender/sexual �iolence; and �igilante retribution.40
The PODES 2003 data quoted by Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan shows that 11.6 percent of the �illages and hamlets in NTT reported �arious cases of conflict, namely inter-group fights, fights between members of the
2.Social Conflict inNusa Tenggara Timur
Table 7East Timorese Displaced Persons in NTT31 December 2002 versus 28 June2004
Status of Displaced Persons HHIndividuals
Number in NTT Pro�ince as of December 31, 2002
Repatriated and relocated between January 1, 2003 and
June 28, 2004:
• Repatriated
• Resettled
• Transmigrated within NTT
• Transmigrated outside NTT
• Recei�ed aid for construction of home or
ha�e left camps
Remaining East Timorese displaced persons in NTT on
June 28, 2004:
28,097
588
11,041
532
211
1,540
14,185
9,805
147
2,111
97
48
308
7,094
Source: Satkorlak PBP NTT, June 2004.
39.) Tadjoeddin, op.cit. Tadjoeddin defines Communal Riot Prone II (CRP II) as “a district/municipality with a fatality rate between 0.54 and 39.7 per 100,000 residents.” 36 and 82.
40.) Patrick Barron, Rachael Diprose and Joanne Sharpe, ‘Brokering Conflict: Understanding Local Le�el Conflict Pathways in Indonesia’. (Guest Lecture Presentation at the Uni�ersitas Indonesia, 12 May 2004).
18 19
community and the authorities, fights between students, inter-ethnic fights, and other disturbances in the field of security.41 The PODES data furthermore show that in 6.0 percent of the �illages and hamlets the conflict resulted in casualties and material damage, in 8.5 percent new conflict was reported, and 51.5 percent of the conflict reported was of a �iolent nature. In their study in the Manggarai and Sikka districts in Flores, Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan also found that cases of conflict tended to be under-reported by the �illage authorities. Kompas daily newspaper reported in June 2004 that Police Brigadier-General Edward Aritonang, the NTT regional police chief, regarded NTT as a conflict-prone region.42 Traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms not only �ary widely according to each ethnic culture but also are often at odds with Indonesian law. Aritonang cited conflicts within communities o�er land, marriages, gambling and other customary law disputes in Flores, Sumba and West Timor as creating further inter-ethnic, social and communal �iolence, which can often lead to fatalities. Consequently, he suggested that judges familiar with customary law be empowered to handle inter-ethnic conflict in the region.
Crime statistics collected at the �illage le�el in West Timor show that, in comparison with other crimes, torture or �iolence is reported by a relati�ely high number of rural and urban �illages (Table 8). They also report a high incidence of other crimes, such as rape and murder.
Table 8Number of Villages in West Timor where Crimes have been Reported,
by District/Municipality and Type of Crime
District/Municipality Theft Robbery Looting Torture/Violance
Arson Rape Drugs Murder Other Total
Kupang
South Central Timor
North Central Timor
Belu
Kupang Municipality
NTT Pro�ince
77
62
68
91
23
756
9
17
11
9
-
78
6
4
3
6
2
35
33 (43%)
9 (15% )
20 (29% )
21 (23% )
7 (30% )
187(25%)
12
12
6
11
-
118
5
5
7
5
5
56
-
1
1
-
4
10
13
3
4
12
4
86
3
-
2
2
-
39
187
215
159
168
45
2,550
Source: Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Propinsi NTT-Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi NTT, 2002.
Violence against women, including domestic �iolence, is reportedly rampant in NTT. Perempuan di Bawa(h) Laki-laki yang Kalah presents detailed reports of cases taking place before, during and after the 1999 forced deportation or flight to West Timor. Virtually all forms of �iolence are accounted for: murder, torture, abduction, assault, rape, adultery, extra-marital sex and sexual harassment.43 High rates of �iolence against women are detailed in an analysis of reports in Pos Kupang newspaper from January 1998 through December 1999 and a report by the Jaringan Kesehatan Perempuan Indonesia Timur, JKPIT (Eastern Indonesia Women’s Health Network).44 One NGO acti�ist from the Jaringan Perempuan Usaha Kecil, Jarpuk (Women’s Small Business Network) in Kupang argues that women face other obstacles as well: reports of domestic �iolence
41.) Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser and Menno Pradhan, ‘Local Conflict in Indonesia: Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns’. (Draft, lecture, Cornell Conference ‘75 Years of De�elopment Research’ Ithaca, New York, 7-9 May 2004).
42.) Kompas, 27 June 2004.
43.) Karen Campbell-Nelson, Karen et al. (eds.), Perempuan di Bawa(h) Laki-laki yang Kalah. Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan Timor Timur dalam Kamp Pengungsian di Timor Barat. [Women Beneath/Accompanying Defeated Males: Violence Against East Timorese Women in West Timorese Camps for Displaced Persons]. Research report. Kupang: Jaringan Kesehatan Perempuan Indonesia Timur–Yayasan Penguatan Institusi dan Kapasitas Lokal [Eastern Indonesia Women’s Health Network-Foundation for the strengthening of institutions and local capacity], 2001. See also Indonesian Society for Social Transformation (INSIST) and Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy (NIMD), Sekolah Demokrasi, op. cit.
44.) Komnas Perempuan, Peta Kekerasan: Pengalaman Perempuan Indonesia [Indonesian Commission for Women Map of Violence: The Experience of Indonesian Women] (Jakarta, 2002).
20 21
against women are not treated seriously by the authorities; girls are not gi�en equal educational opportunities; wi�es can not obtain bank loans without the consent of their husbands; the regional budget does not allocate sufficient funds for women’s health, and female candidates in the elections for legislators are put at a disad�antage because their names are often placed at the bottom of party lists.45
Violence against women is sometimes rooted in cultural traditions. The payment of belis (the dowry) by the bridegroom’s family to the bride’s family marks the transfer of ‘ownership’ of the bride to the bridegroom’s family, so that in cases of domestic �iolence a wife cannot return to her family. Among Catholics, because of the church’s ban on di�orce, a wife cannot lea�e her husband, e�en in cases of spousal abuse.
Impact of East Timorese Refugees on Conflict in NTTThe flight or deportation of East Timorese residents to West Timor was followed by �arious small-scale conflicts.46
Conflicts between locals and displaced East Timorese, which were widely reported in the mass media, tended to take place around camps for displaced East Timorese. The inter-group conflicts were triggered by a wide �ariety of factors, such as disputes o�er the utilization of communal land, the illegal appropriation or destruction of pri�ate and communal property, competition in traditional markets, disputes between ri�al gangs of thugs o�er the control of territory (which preceded the Atambua tragedy), disputes o�er the sexual harassment of girls (which led to assault and arson in Tuapukan), and disputes between East Timorese parents and West Timorese teachers o�er the academic achie�ement of East Timorese students (which
led to the destruction of a school). According to reports by the press and informants, the early stages of East Timorese exodus was accompanied by an increase in crime in West Timor.47
In a chronology of e�ents in its handling of East Timorese displaced persons in West Timor from 4 September 1999 through 2001, the NTT Pro�incial Go�ernment listed cases of conflict in�ol�ing East Timorese displaced persons. The report lists communal fights with local residents in Tuapukan (26-29 May 1999), the destruction of a UNHCR car in Tuapukan (16 June 2000), riots, communal fights and arson of local homes in Oesao, Tuapukan (1 through 3 July 2000), destruction of property, arson and looting in Noelbaki (27 July 2000), torture of three UNHCR staff in Naen (22 August 2000), the destruction of a go�ernment building and property, including official cars and computers, and the torture of four local reporters (30 August 2000). Riots in Webriamata and Atambua followed the murder of a militia commander by locals, resulting in the murder of se�en locals in Webriamata and three UNHCR staff in Atambua, the wounding of three ci�ilians (including a UNICEF physician and a Brazilian reporter), and the destruction of pri�ate and UNHCR and IOM property (6 September 2000).48
Informants stated that the presence of large numbers of displaced East Timorese, especially during the initial phases of the exodus, together with the presence of army and police units near the West Timor-Timor Leste border, decreased the feeling of personal security among many West Timorese citizens.49 Feelings of personal security were also undercut by manifest or latent ri�alry between members and units of the army and police.
2.1
45.) Inter�iew: Kebijakan Publik Belum Berpihak Pada Perempuan [Public Policy Is Not Yet Supporti�e of Women], Suara Kampung No. 4, May 2004, 11-13. (Note: When �oters �ote for a party rather than for a candidate the �otes obtained are allocated to candidates whose names are at the top of the party’s priority list, and the names of female candidates are often placed at the bottom of the list.)
46.) Campbell-Nelson et al., op. cit.
47.) See, for instance, Esthi Susanti, ‘East Timorese Refugees and Deportees Start to Use Violence, Terror to Sur�i�e’, Penguin Star, 28 February 2002.
48.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op. cit., 237-270. 49.) A number of informants pro�ided accounts about cases of extortion, confiscation
of personal property, non-payment of ser�ices rendered, assault, and sexual harassment as well as cross-border smuggling by members of the army. See also U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Reports for 2000, 2001 in http://www.humanrights-usa.et/reports/Indonesia.html .
22 23
In a paper, I.G.P. Antariksa discusses cases of �iolence committed by East Timorese displaced persons in Belu District between 9 September 1999 and 26 July 2003.50
Cases listed include fatal shootings and stabbings, physical assault, hostage-taking, �iolent rioting and demonstrations, fights between displaced persons residing in different camps, communal fights with locals, and the assault of Timor Leste residents who wandered into West Timor. Antariksa also lists cases of �iolence committed by locals against displaced persons, including assault and murder of East Timorese and the abduction of an East Timorese woman.
Key Perpetrators of Violence
The key actors in East Timor-related �iolence and hostile acts committed in West Timor since 1999 ha�e been displaced pro-integrationist East Timorese who sought refuge in West Timor in 1999 following the referendum on 30 August. These militias are composed of ordinary ci�ilians (mostly peasants); ci�ilian members of the armed militia; members of the Ci�il Ser�ice (Pegawai Negeri Sipil, PNS); and the Milsas, composed of ci�ilian members of the Ci�ilian Defence (Hansip), People’s Defence (Wanra) and People’s Security forces (Kamra), who were accorded formal military status outside formal channels in appreciation of their contribution to the Indonesian state.51 The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) based in London, reports that ‘in early 1999, militias comprised some 50,000 people’. Former child soldiers were found in the militia in camps in West Timor, and, in 2000, 130 displaced East Timorese children were abducted from camps by pro-Indonesian groups to be trained as anti-independence acti�ists.52
2.2.2The role of the security forces
2.3
The pro-Indonesian armed militia was formally disbanded in 1999 and surrendered large numbers of firearms and ammunition to the Indonesian authorities, Although the Indonesian authorities conducted regular raids, confiscating hidden firearms, informants belie�e that a large number of firearms remain unaccounted for and could be retrie�ed at any time.
Unrelated to the influx of East Timorese, acts of �iolence were also committed by members of regular army and police units pre�iously stationed in East Timor as well as by those stationed in West Timor. Based on reports in the local press and a local NGO newsletter, Campbell-Nelson et al. drew up a selected list of acts of �iolence against locals committed by army units stationed in East Timor. The cases, reported between 26 September 1999 and February 2000, include fatal shootings and stabbings, torture, rape, robbery, abduction, confiscation and destruction of pri�ate property, arson of pri�ate homes and rioting, as well as other criminal acts such as gambling.53
Some of the cases of brutality by security personnel in NTT highlighted by the media include the fatal shooting of fi�e demonstrators by police in Ruteng, Manggarai54 and accusations that members of the Indonesian security forces stationed on the West Timor-Timor Leste border raped local women. Some of these rapes reportedly led to unwanted pregnancies and the birth of children without legal status.55
Victims of ViolenceThe �ictims or targets of this �iolence (during the initial stages of the presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor) consisted of other East Timorese, members of local/host communities, members of the Indonesian ci�il ser�ice, UN workers and others regarded as opponents by the pro-integrationists, such as the foreign press. Following their forced deportation to West Timor, the pro-
2.2.1East Timor
related violence
2.2
50.) I.G.P. Antariksa, Peta Konflik di NTT: Kasus Kabupaten Belu, unpublished report, n.d.
51.) Sinta R. Dewi classified ci�ilian forces into the Wanra (Perlawanan Rakyat, People’s Resistance), Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih, Trained Populace), and Kamra (Keamanan Rakyat, People’s Security). Sinta R. Dewi, ‘Violence Against Women and War, The Use of Sexual Violence to Conduct a Co�ert War and to Construct Impunity for the Military: Indonesian Occupation in East Timor,’ unpublished report, n.d.
52.) Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2001, East Timor chapter, http://www.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/01junchild.htm (accessed January 25, 205).
53.) Campbell-Nelson et al., op.cit., 265-266. 54.) Ant-83,’ Mapolres Manggarai diserang, 3 tewas’ [‘Manggarai Police Headquarters
Attacked, Three Fatalities’] Suara Merdeka 11 March 2004. 55.) Suara Timor Lorosae, 1 March 2001.
24 25
independence East Timorese became targets of �iolence, including murder. The data in these reports show that the highest number of fatalities as a result of conflict in�ol�ing displaced East Timorese occurred in 1999 (six fatalities) and 2000 (16 fatalities, including three UNHCR staff and two UN peace-keeping forces) while four fatalities were reported from January through June 2003.56
The main losers in the conflict were the displaced East Timorese who had to lea�e all their assets and most of their personal belongings in East Timor without any prospect of being able to reclaim their lost property; and those who would like to return to East Timor but cannot or will not do so for fear of being brought to justice in Timor Leste for past crimes, for fear of becoming �ictims of �engeance, and/or because of concerns about finding work in East Timor. The murder of three UNHCR staff in Atambua on 6 September 2000 by militia members led to the declaration of Security Phase V by the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), the e�acuation of all UN staff from West Timor, and the disruption of aid to the displaced East Timorese.57
While the subsequent formation of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste has put an end to the armed conflict in East Timor, reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and in Timor Leste has not been achie�ed. Prominent East and West Timorese caution that reconciliation is a necessary condition for peace in the region. The �olatility of relations between Timor Leste residents and the East Timorese in Indonesia was
56.) Since some of these reports are limited in scope and do not include cases of abduction and murder of pro-independence East Timorese in West Timor mentioned in �arious other reports, the actual casualty list is probably much higher. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Refugee camps in W. Timor offer no refuge, displaced persons in E. Timor subject to attack, summary execution’, press release, September 1999, http://www.hrw/org/press/1999/sep/wtimor0910.htm . Also, Charmain Mohamed and Eric Umansky, ‘Report on East Timorese refugees in West Timor’, Tapol, the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, 11 No�ember 1999, http://tapol.gn.apc.org/r991111etwtre.htm.
57.) UNHCR The Refugee Agency. Global Report 2000 Gen�a http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/�tx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e2ebc230.
underscored by the murder of two female high school students, residents of an East Timorese camp in Belu District who went to Timor Leste to �isit their relati�es. This tragedy sparked demonstrations in Atambua by former East Timorese displaced persons in Belu District.58
58.) Jems de Fortuna, ‘Warga Atambua Demo Pembunuhan di Timor Leste’ [Atambua Residents Demonstrate Against Murder in Timor Leste’]. KORAN TEMPO, 8 February 2005.
27
Much of this �iolence stems from tensions between displaced East Timorese and West Timorese local communities, in areas where the displaced East Timorese settled or were placed by the authorities. The settlements for displaced East Timorese were built on publicly owned land or land owned by West Timorese religious organizations, communities and indi�iduals. According a NTT pro�incial study, most locals refuse to accept the displaced East Timorese because of problems related to land and because the displaced persons were percei�ed as unfriendly and disrupti�e.59
Local communities at first tolerated the presence of the displaced persons because they saw it as a temporary
3.Conflict Causes
59.) Satkorlak PBP Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Laporan Hasil Pelaksanaan Rapat E�aluasi Penanganan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur dan Pembahasan Program Tahun 2004 di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur [Report on the implementation of an e�aluation meeting on the handling of East Timorese former displaced persons and the discussion of the 2004 program in East Nusa Tenggara Pro�ince], Kupang, 2004.
Mohamad Yusuf. Sama Makan Kenyang (Full Stomachs for All); etching, 18 x 12.5 cm.
28 29
solution to a humanitarian problem. The plight of the East Timorese e�en elicited generosity on the part of locals. Gradually, howe�er, attitudes began to change after the sur�i�al strategies employed by the East Timorese began to interfere with the li�elihoods of locals. For a �ariety of reasons, many East Timorese did not take part in relocation and repatriation programs but instead remained in the camps. According to NGO informants in Atambua, attitudes toward the East Timorese were also negati�ely affected by the murder of three UNHCR staff by members of the East Timorese militia.
Economic TensionsThe issue of economic inequality between displaced East Timorese and local host communities came to light during the initial stages of the exodus into West Timor. Before the East Timorese settled in camps, locals often shared their homes and food, although the locals themsel�es had little. When the displaced East Timorese started recei�ing emergency aid from national as well as international sources, locals became jealous when aid—specifically food and shelter – was not made a�ailable to them. The term orang miskin yang harus menolong orang susah—‘the poor who ha�e to help the needy’—was used in one go�ernment document.60 A go�ernment official also used a similar phrase during an inter�iew.
In inter�iews, NGO informants reported cases in which, soon after their displacement, East Timorese in West Timor profited by selling food they had recei�ed from �arious donor agencies. Informants also mentioned cases in which displaced East Timorese registered their names with multiple donor agencies operating in �arious locations to obtain as much aid as possible.
The go�ernment e�entually declared that after 31 December 2002 the displaced East Timorese who opted to become Indonesian citizens would no longer be regarded
3.1
as displaced persons but would be treated as other Indonesian citizens. Once they became citizens, assistance such as food and water aid was gradually withdrawn. Aid programs were subsequently redesigned to benefit both former displaced East Timorese and the locals equally. Since 1 January 2003 the UNHCR has also ceased to regard the East Timorese in West Timor as refugees and has consequently ceased its in�ol�ement in West Timor, including its repatriation assistance.61 The UN OCHA is also phasing out its acti�ities in Indonesia.
Displaced East Timorese inter�iewed in camps expressed frustration, disappointment and anger at what they percei�ed to be unjust treatment and neglect by the Indonesian Go�ernment, despite the fact that (according to them) they had risked their li�es to defend the ‘Red and White Flag’ of the Republic. West Timorese informants, as well as some displaced East Timorese, said the East Timorese had not come to West Timor �oluntarily, but had been forced to lea�e East Timor and subsequently been transported to West Timor while their houses were burned and their personal property looted.
There were also tensions among �arious groups of displaced East Timorese. Displaced East Timorese who did not take part in certain go�ernment-sponsored relocation programs complained that they were cut off from some forms of aid that were made a�ailable to those who chose to relocate.62 Economic inequality also appeared to be linked to power hierarchies within camps of displaced East Timorese. Those with power had an ability to control access and distribution of aid from donor agencies (deciding who got what and in what quantities), sometimes e�en misappropriating the aid.
60.) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op. cit. 36.
61.) See: JRS Dispatches No. 124, January 10, 2003: ‘East Timorese no longer regarded as refugees by UNHCR’, http://www.jrs.net/dispatch/disp.php?lang=it&dispId=dp0301124en (accessed 20 January 2005).
62.) Ibid. The go�ernment’s policy explicitly states that empowerment aid is made a�ailable to displaced persons and locals who ha�e settled in resettlement facilities made a�ailable by the go�ernment. Go�ernment data show that empowerment aid distributed includes items such as rice, cattle, clothing, medicine, hand tractors, water installations and typewriters.
30 31
Social and Political TensionsThere were some social and political tensions between the displaced and host communities. Informants stated that cultural differences based on ethnicity, religion and colonial experiences contributed to the social distance between the displaced East Timorese and the indigenous West Timorese.
Many West Timorese considered it incongruous that many East Timorese consider themsel�es Indonesian citizens while also wishing to return to East Timor. In reply, East Timorese camp residents noted that, despite the fact that they had been formally classified as Indonesian citizens, displaced East Timorese were often not regarded as members of the local community and were not afforded the same rights and obligations. For example, although they were allowed to take part in national elections, they could not �ote in local elections for �illage head. Unlike local residents, they were exempt from land and building tax.
Such acts of exclusion, practiced by many in the host communities, were probably based on fear that the extension of equal communal rights to their displaced East Timorese neighbours would ine�itably lead to major shifts in the religious, ethnic, economic, social and political balance within the host communities. Most West Timorese were reluctant to risk the possibility of becoming a minority group within their own communities. They continued to regard the presence of their displaced East Timorese neighbours as temporary, and expected them e�entually to mo�e on to new locations.
Informants from go�ernment and other agencies state that, due to NTT’s limited natural resources, the go�ernment would like to close the camps and relocate the East Timorese to areas outside West Timor. West Timorese �iewed displaced East Timorese as rude, domineering, �iolent, possessi�e and manipulati�e.63 An informant used the phrase mentalitas Porto (‘Portuguese mentality’), referring to the attitudes of displaced East Timorese.64 A shared perception among many West
Timorese informants is that the displaced East Timorese ha�e recei�ed special treatment from the go�ernment. One prominent West Timorese informant �oiced his opinion that “they ha�e been spoiled for 24 years.” Some claimed that, during its occupation of East Timor, the Indonesian Go�ernment poured in disproportionate funding in order to de�elop East Timor’s infrastructure, and that, in comparison with pre�ailing policies outside East Timor, East Timorese ci�il ser�ants and military personnel were gi�en preferential treatment in the form of exemptions from formal recruitment requirements and relati�ely higher remuneration. Repeated demands for go�ernment aid by displaced East Timorese were often percei�ed by locals to be a manifestation of the past pampering they had recei�ed from the go�ernment.
According to a NTT pro�incial go�ernment document, “the dependence of the displaced persons on their prominent leaders and their political elite is �ery high.”65
Those who ha�e worked closely with displaced East Timorese ha�e noted a form of social stratification within camps. The upper layer is usually occupied by camp coordinators, who control access to the camp by outsiders, as well as controlling goods, ser�ices and information from outside. This upper layer normally consists of members of the Indonesian army, the militia, and the ci�il ser�ice (PNS), and their extended families.66 The lower layer consists of peasants. Relations between camp
3.2
63.) For a detailed description of attitudes and patterns of interaction between East Timorese displaced persons and locals in the Noelbaki �illage, Central Kupang subdistrict, Kupang District, see Patje O. Tasuib, ‘Interaksi Sosial antara Pengungsi Timor Timur dengan Masyarakat Lokal: Studi Komparatif di Desa Noelbaki, Kecamatan Kupang Tengah, Kabupaten Kupang’, [‘Social interaction between East Timorese displaced persons and the local community: a comparati�e study in Noelbaki �illage, Central Kupang subdistrict, Kupang District’] Skripsi Sarjana Sosiologi Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Uni�ersitas Nusa Cendana, Sarjana thesis in sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Nusa Cendana Uni�ersity), Kupang, 2004.
64.) It is interesting to note that in the past a certain group in Timor was referred to as “black Portuguese.” See I Gede Parimartha, Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815-1915, 2002, op. cit.
65.) Satkorlak PBP Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2004, op. cit..66.) This was before the go�ernment introduced a policy of reassignment, through
which members of the army, police and ci�il ser�ice li�ing in camps were relocated and assigned new positions in their organizations.
32 33
residents and their leaders are �iewed as paternalistic. Camp leaders often communicate with the outside world on behalf of camp residents. Ci�il society acti�ists say decisions about important issues such as participation in go�ernment-sponsored repatriation are made collecti�ely, not indi�idually. As an example of social pressures, one NGO acti�ist who worked in a camp described an incident in which a number of residents had agreed to be repatriated to Timor Leste but did not show up on the day of departure.
Camp residents also obey their ketua adat (traditional chief ). When asked about his willingness to be resettled on Sumba Island, for instance, a camp resident in Tuapukan said, ‘It depends on the power-holder, on the ketua adat. If the ketua adat has gi�en his agreement and has arranged the coordination, and it is agreed upon, then, okay, we will all go there. But we do not go o�er there just because the go�ernment has constructed [settlements]’. Gambling and the production, sale and consumption of alcoholic be�erages are reportedly pre�alent in some camps. (Pre�iously, the possession of firearms was common.)67
These practices ha�e exacerbated negati�e stereotypes of the displaced East Timorese. Some displaced East Timorese ha�e also been suspected of misappropriating aid from donors. Locals in the Kupang District complain that displaced East Timorese families ha�e more children than West Timorese families, and are belie�ed to be either ignorant of, or indifferent to, family planning programs. This perception, e�en if it is based on reality, should be related to cultural differences because most East Timorese, being Catholics, do not use birth control. Locals are concerned that this percei�ed imbalance might tip the already precarious ethnic and religious balance in the neighbourhoods to fa�our the East Timorese.
Displaced East Timorese who were inter�iewed also held a number of grie�ances. Many felt they had been used to obtain aid from domestic and o�erseas sources, and questioned the accountability and openness of
the management of allocated funds, as well as the appropriateness of certain aid projects. An informant in Kupang reported that a Ministry of Health research project to in�estigate the state of their mental health was greeted with hostility because the displaced persons felt that their sanity was being questioned.
In inter�iews, displaced East Timorese camp residents also claimed that go�ernment agencies often discriminated against them. Informants and displaced East Timorese, for instance, reported cases of discrimination by health workers, although it was not clear whether the percei�ed discriminatory treatment was specifically directed against displaced East Timorese patients, or because health workers had a tendency to discriminate against patients from other ethnic groups, as obser�ed by NTT Go�ernor Piet A Tallo.68
Displaced East Timorese reported that they were not included in the go�ernment’s beras miskin, raskin (rice for the poor) program and were gi�en only temporary ID cards.69 A camp coordinator remarked that East Timorese encountered difficulties obtaining bank loans because of concerns that they might return to East Timor without repaying their loans. Local informants in Naibonat say that go�ernment support for the construction of basic housing is only a�ailable to applicants who can display a certificate of personal ownership of the plot of land on which the house is to be built—a condition few displaced East Timorese camp residents are able to satisfy. NTT go�ernment data shows, on the other hand, that from 2002 through 2004 they had pro�ided aid in the form of building materials to 2,259 household heads in Kupang and Kupang District, 308 of whom resided in camps.70
67.) See �arious newspaper reports quoted in Campbell-Nelson, Karen et al., op. cit. 217-242.
68.) See Pos Kupang, 28 July 2004. 69.) East Timorese residing in other areas outside NTT also encountered problems with
ID cards. See, for instance, Sinar Harapan, 3 June 2003, which reported that the East Timorese residing in Yogyakarta “ha�e lost their country of birth and are still being subjected to unfairness.”
70.) Satkorlak PBP NTT: Gubernur NTT: Laporan Perkembangan Penanganan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Keadaan Tahun 2004 [Progress report on the handling of former East Timorese displaced persons in East Nusa Tenggara Province, situation in 2004], Kupang, 2004.
34 35
Identity PoliticsReligious and cultural differences between displaced East Timorese and locals ha�e on occasion become obstacles to integration. The displaced East Timorese are Catholic, whereas in a number of areas in NTT the locals are predominantly Protestant. Informants report that religious differences ha�e been a problem in Central Timor, Kupang and Sumba. But cultural differences can also stand in the way of peaceful communication, e�en in areas where the majority of locals are Catholic.
The relationship between refugees and locals �aries from place to place. A number of West Timorese as well as East Timorese informants inter�iewed obser�ed that, o�er time, the groups tend to integrate. There are some reports of more cooperati�e interactions between the two groups, especially in integrated neighbourhoods.71 One go�ernment official obser�ed a strong relationship between displaced East Timorese and locals in Oecussi, where the displaced East Timorese work in crop-sharing arrangements within an integrated land management system. One local �illage organization facilitated a traditional signing ceremony by local hosts to formally accept the displaced East Timorese as members of the local community and hand o�er land use rights to them. A more integrated relationship was also found in Southern Central Timor.
Other informants obser�ed good inter-group relations in South Belu and in Ngada, Flores and in the eastern part of Kupang District. An NGO acti�ist stated that in one �illage his organization had facilitated a traditional (adat) signing ceremony. During the ceremony, witnessed by local go�ernment officials, the local police chief, and the pastor of the parish, a representati�e of the East Timorese
3.4
3.3
71.) Satkorlak PBP-NTT, Laporan Akhir, ‘Pendampingan Masyarakat dalam Rangka Pelaksanaan Resettlement. Timor Barat dan Kabupaten Sumba Barat Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur’ (Final report, ‘Support for communities in the implementation of resettlement, West Timor and West Sumba district’). Bantuan Kemanusiaan Pemerintah Jepang [Humanitarian aid from the Japanese go�ernment], Bidang Permukiman, Dinas Kimpraswil Prop., NTT-Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian kepada Masyarakat Uni�ersitas Katolik Widya Mandira, Kupang, 2004.
community formally accepted temporary land-use rights for residential and agricultural use and agreed to obey state, regional, local, customary and church laws, to honour the sanctity of traditional forest, and to return the land to the rightful owners without compensation when the loan expires or when they ha�e to mo�e elsewhere. To facilitate the integration of both groups, the go�ernment has adopted a relocation policy it refers to as the pola sisipan (insertion pattern), by which the East Timorese are placed in new settlements where they are integrated with locals.
Intermarriage between members of the two groups has also begun to occur. Howe�er, locals and NGO acti�ists say cultural factors, such as religious differences and the size of the dowry that displaced East Timorese brides often demand from the families of the bridegroom, pre�ent inter-group marriages from occurring more frequently. Patje O. Tasuib’s study in Noelbaki Village for his Sarjana degree found that locals as well as East Timorese tended to reject inter-group marriages.72
MediaSome of the daily newspapers in NTT are affiliated with national newspapers, while others are regional or local publications. One regional daily newspaper, Pos Kupang, is part of the Jakarta-based Kompas group. Its staff says that it is cautious and responsible in its reporting of issues relating to displaced East Timorese, for fear of stirring up conflict. It also states that it has a policy of not printing the names of ethnic or religious groups when reporting on conflict, and tries to elicit comments from influential people it regards as potential actors in the resolution of conflict. The chief editor of Pos Kupang is, howe�er, facing libel charges after publishing a report alleging the in�ol�ement of police officers in smuggling sugar from East Timor.73
Another regional daily newspaper, Timor Ekspres, is affiliated to the Jawa Pos group.
72.) Patje O. Tasuib, Interaksi Sosial antara Pengungsi Timor Timur dengan Masyarakat Lokal, 2004.
73.) The Jakarta Post, October 29, 2004.
37
Local Economic Development The majority of the population in the four districts in Timor works in agriculture.74 While East Timorese employed by the state (the military, police, ci�il ser�ants) continue to recei�e their monthly salaries, many East Timorese who traditionally earned their li�ings as peasants or working in the informal sector, had no means of li�elihood in West Timor. This placed additional economic burdens on host communities, as well as putting pressure on scarce local natural resources.
Pre�ailing methods of traditional land resource management were disturbed by the influx of East Timorese because traditional communal land, including forests, was forcibly appropriated and utilized without regard
4.Impacts of the Conflict
4.1
74.) Kupang District: in all 187 �illages; South Central Timor: 97 percent of 215 �illages; North Central Timor: 96 percent of 159; Belu: 96 percent of 168. See Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Propinsi NTT-BPS Propinsi NTT, Hasil Pengolahan Data dan Analisis Potensi Desa Nusa Tenggara Timur 2002, Kupang, 2002.
Surya Wirawan. Aku Adalah Saudaramu (I am your Brother); etching, 8.5 cm in diameter, 2001.
38 39
for existing local customs.75 En�ironmental damage was reported in Belu after the traditional forest in Wemer, regarded by local communities as communal property and by the go�ernment as protected forest, was cut down and turned into agricultural land.76 A Belu District forestry agency report states that the actions of former East Timorese residents and local residents resulted in the damage of more than 4,000 hectares of protected forest area.77 The permanent settlement of displaced East Timorese in host communities has also compelled host communities, including religious organizations, to allocate some of their land, �oluntarily or otherwise, to these displaced East Timorese. Disputes o�er the management of, and access to, natural resources, such as land and water, are potential sources of conflict.78 Inter-group relations in a number of locations are �olatile and described by informants in terms of bom waktu (time bomb), api di dalam sekam (fire in a haystack) and rumput kering (dry grass).
The impact of the presence of displaced East Timorese on the local and regional economy was also apparent in the formal sector. The go�ernment and a wide �ariety of donor agencies ha�e, o�er the years, allocated significant funds for programs and projects to assist displaced East Timorese.79 These funds ha�e been used, among other things, to construct settlements and other forms of infrastructure and to purchase consumer goods and agricultural tools for distribution. Funds were also allocated for related acti�ities: training and other forms of information-education-communication (IEC) acti�ities; the re-registration of displaced East Timorese; workshops,
4.2
seminars and research, and de�elopment acti�ities that benefit public, non-go�ernmental and pri�ate organizations, as well as local and regional businesses and industries.
Impact on Local Education and Health ServicesThe exodus to West Timor disrupted the schooling of many East Timorese children. When they settled, many had to put off their formal education because of a lack of educational facilities. Most existing schools did not ha�e the capacity to accept the large number of displaced East Timorese children. Consequently, sekolah tenda (tent schools) were established. Recently, attempts ha�e been made to close the tent schools and transfer the students to regular schools.80
Once in the public schools, the East Timorese faced the same chronic problems faced by low-income West Timorese: paying school fees, purchasing supplies and uniforms, and paying for public transportation fares.81
The presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor placed a burden on the region’s health and educational facilities.82 An NTT pro�incial go�ernment document cites a host of problems: ‘educational facilities in emergency schools in resettlement locations are in general �ery limited’, ‘health ser�ices from community health centres located near the camps are not optimal because of the frequent absence of physicians and the distance between community health centres and the camps/resettlement locations’, ‘limited medical staff for medical ser�ices in �arious camps’, and ‘malaria eradication efforts by the NTT pro�incial health ser�ice are not optimal’.83
75.) When the assessment team �isited a camp, the residents were carrying out land-clearing (membersihkan, to clean), stacking firewood which according to them could be sold for IDR90,000, (US$9) per truckload.
76.) Satkorlak PBP Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Timur: Laporan Hasil Pelaksanaan Rapat E�aluasi Penanganan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur dan Pembahasan Program Tahun 2004 di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
77.) Pos Kupang, 8 July 2004. 78.) Pos Kupang, 28 January 2003. 79.) For a breakdown of emergency aid recei�ed or allocated and expenditures made
from 1999 through 2001, see Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op. cit.
80.) Serah Terima Bangunan Sekolah SD GMIT dan SD Inpres di Tuapukan [Hando�er of East Indonesia Christian Church elementary school and Presidential Instruction elementary school buildings in Tuapukan]. In Jesuit Refugee Ser�ice Indonesia website, No. 42, 20 October 2003.
81.) Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit. 82.) For data on the health and education in NTT, see Pengolahan Data Elektronik
Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, ibid. 83.) Satkorlak PBP NTT: Gubernur NTT: Laporan 2004, op. cit.
40 41
At the outset, infant mortality and malnutrition was high among the displaced.84 Although �arious arrangements e�entually led to an increase in the absorption capacity of local schools, camp residents inter�iewed state that many children still chose not to attend school, or dropped out due to factors such as the distance between camps and existing schools, and the inability of many families to pay school fees. The same factors also accounted for the inability of many displaced East Timorese families to gain access to health ser�ices pro�ided by the rumah sakit daerah (regional hospitals), Puskesmas (pusat kesehatan masyarakat, community health centers), Polindes (polikinik desa, �illage clinics), Posyandu (pos pelayanan terpadu, integrated ser�ice stations) and Postu (pos pembantu, subordinate stations).
The enrolment of displaced East Timorese students significantly affected the ethnic, religious and age composition of schools. Se�eral local informants maintain that inter-group acti�ities are limited and conflict occasionally breaks out. There are also reports of parents transferring their children to other schools to a�oid extortion and physical assault by East Timorese students, reports that a school building was �andalized by East Timorese camp residents because many of their children did not pass the final examinations, and reports of a high drop-out rate among displaced East Timorese students.
Displaced East Timorese women had already suffered �arious forms of �iolence while in East Timor.85 Many displaced East Timorese women faced further problems in West Timor, as �ictims of domestic �iolence, sexual harassment, rape, in�ol�ement in commercial sex, and the disintegration of the family.86 It is also reported that widows are typically not regarded as the head of their households and therefore face more economic and social difficulties than other families.
4.3 GovernanceThere is no information on whether the conflict affected institutional capacity, transparency and accountability of public, corporate and ci�il society go�ernance. Informants reported that displaced East Timorese, the media and ci�il society organizations demanded transparency and accountability in the management of funds made a�ailable by national and international donor agencies. The media has frequently aired cases of public dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency and accountability of the management of funds for the displaced East Timorese. As in other areas of Indonesia, corruption, collusion and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotism, KKN) are endemic in NTT, and the reform mo�ement thus far has failed to impro�e the situation.87 During the assessment team’s stay in West Timor, cases of corruption in�ol�ing go�ernment officials, members of the legislature, as well as prominent figures in the pri�ate sector, were reported in the local media on an almost daily basis.
In a speech, NTT Go�ernor Piet A. Tallo warned that some people had turned po�erty into projects (memprojekkan kemiskinan) for their own benefit.88 Quoting Pos Kupang, Kompas reports that Indonesian Corruption Watch has classified the corruption rate in NTT as the sixth highest in Indonesia.89 For example, some NGOs, the NTT DPRD and East Timorese displaced persons ha�e all alleged the misappropriation of humanitarian aid from the Japanese go�ernment totalling IDR 53,123 billion.90
84.) See also Lela E. Madijah, ‘What could be worse than East Timorese refugee camps?’, The Jakarta Post Online Special, 23 No�ember 2000, http://www.thejakartapost.com/special.
85.) Sinta R. Dewi, ‘Violence Against Women and War’ op. cit.. 86.) See, for instance, Campbell-Nelson et al., op. cit.
87.) For a breakdown of emergency aid recei�ed or allocated and expenditures made from 1999 through 2001, see Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001.
88.) Pos Kupang, 21 July 2004, 5. 89.) Kompas, 18 No�ember 2004. 90.) Republika Online, 16 October 2003 and 17 October 2003.
43
Since the beginning of the conflict, a range of emergency programs ha�e been designed to mitigate the humanitarian problems resulting from the exodus from East Timor and to find durable solutions for East Timorese. The Indonesian Go�ernment, the NTT pro�incial and district go�ernments, and the military and police all worked on these programs, in cooperation with pri�ate, state-owned and regionally-owned enterprises, political parties, national, local and international ci�il society organizations, international and regional organizations, and foreign go�ernments. Support for the e�acuation of displaced East Timorese to West Timor was followed by humanitarian aid in the form of access to emergency food aid, shelter, and health and educational facilities for displaced East Timorese, and aid in repatriating displaced persons who wished to return to East Timor.
A UNHCR report e�aluating the repatriation program estimates that 90 percent of the East Timorese in West Timor—225,000 people-- had returned to Timor Leste
5.Responses and Peace-building
Mohamad Yusuf. Buruh Tani Ayahanda Kami (Farmers are our Parents); pen and ink on paper, 21.5 X 21.5 cm, 1998.
44 45
by May 2003.91 By 2002, 1,373 of 4,323 separated East Timorese children had been reunited with at least one parent.92 Other resettlement and transmigration programs helped East Timorese who wished to remain in Indonesia relocate throughout NTT and other pro�inces.
Many donor agencies ha�e been acti�ely in�ol�ed in pro�iding emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction ser�ices: the Australian Red Cross; Care International Indonesia (water and sanitation, income-generation and other li�elihood reco�ery); Catholic Relief Ser�ices; Christian Children’s Fund Indonesia (health-related children and youth infrastructure, rehabilitation and nutrition); CONCERN, Danish Refugee Council; Food and Agricultural Organization (refugees, agriculture and income-generation); International Organization for Migration; International Rescue Committee; OXFAM Australia; Sa�e the Children UK (health and education, children and youth); United Nations Children’s Fund (education); UNDP (multi-sector, local settlement programme); UNHCR and a number of West Timorese NGOs.93
Go�ernment agencies and ci�il society organizations ha�e initiated �arious peace-building programs to facilitate communication between displaced East Timorese and locals. West Timorese locals as well as East Timorese camp coordinators established links between the two communities. Language has been one of the focuses: It has been suggested, for instance, that terms such as warga baru (new residents) or warga lokal baru (new local residents) be used, rather than pengungsi (displaced persons) or eks pengungsi(former displaced persons), which ha�e come to be seen as derogatory. Se�eral informants, howe�er, say that the endea�our is not
supported by all locals—the warga lama (old residents)—an indication that distrust still exists.
Peace-building initiati�es also include the facilitation of meetings between residents in East Timorese camps and host communities. Similar meetings ha�e been set up between East Timorese and members of communities where they will be resettled.
Cross-border �isits (‘go and see �isit’ and ‘come and talk �isit’)94 ha�e been set up to facilitate reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and Timor Leste residents.95 A local NGO is participating in a Timor Leste Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As part of peace-building efforts, East Timorese ci�il ser�ice employees and military personnel formerly stationed in East Timor ha�e been relocated from camps and reassigned to units in their organizations within as well as outside West Timor, while former members of the militia ha�e been encouraged to pursue their interests through political means.
Responses by Government and UNDPIn the six years since the post-referendum �iolence, the national and NTT regional go�ernments in partnership with international donors, foreign and local NGOs ha�e worked consistently at getting East Timorese out of refugee camps and into more permanent housing. In 2002, the Indonesian Go�ernment formulated its official policy on resol�ing the East Timorese refugee problem by gi�ing all refugees the choice of three options: repatriation to Timor Leste; transmigration to settlements outside of NTT; or resettlement within NTT. The East Timorese were gi�en until 31 December 2002 to decide and since remaining in the camps was not an option, it was belie�ed that there would be no more refugee camps or refugees in 2003. Housing and relocation were handled by different go�ernment agencies such as the Department for Regional Settlement and Infrastructure, Department of Manpower
5.1
91.) See Dolan, Large and Obi, ‘E�aluation of UNHCR’s Repatriation and Reintegration Programme in East Timor, 1999-2003’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, E�aluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Gene�a, February 2004, www.unhcr.ch/epau.
92.) UNHCR The Refugee Agency. Global Report 2002, Gene�a, 348. 93.) Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Cambridge, MA: President
and Fellows of Har�ard College, 2001, in http://www.pre�entconflict.org/portal/main/maps_wtimor_refugees.php and the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia, 2003.
94.) ....95.) See UNHCR Global Report 2002,op. cit., p. 348.
46 47
and Transmigration, Department of Social Affairs and the military. The results of these efforts howe�er fell short of the original objecti�e:
1. From the beginning of the crisis until December 2002, 42, 063 households mo�ed out of the refugee camps into more permanent housing lea�ing a balance of 9,805 households in the camps.
2. In the financial year 2003, 2,397 households were rehoused lea�ing a balance of 7,408 households in the camps as of March 2004.
3. In the financial year 2004, a further 3,209 households were rehoused with the Department of Manpower and Transmigration resettling 1,530 households; the Department of Regional Settlement and Infrastructure pro�iding housing for 500 households and the Department of Social Affairs pro�iding housing assistance for 4,199 households.
4. As of May 2005, 4,199 families still remained in camps or refugee-type accommodation.96
The main problems encountered included insufficient socialisation of the options to the East Timorese refugees as well as adequate information on li�ing conditions in the new settlements and a begrudging acceptance or outright hostility from the local host communities. In light of the une�en progress, the Indonesian Go�ernment supported by UNDP decided to adopt a more participatory and sustainable approach towards resettlement that would factor in both the needs of the host community as well as the refugees. Host communities were recognised as the key to successful local settlement; settlement without the host community’s agreement or coerced agreement could be a cause for future �iolence.
The key characteristics of participatory local settlement include:
• Host communities and refugees are in�ited to participate in planning and implementation, assuring participation of women.
• Host communities and refugees reach agreement without coercion.
• Host communities participate in detailing the support they need to recei�e refugees.
• Refugees participate in decisions on settlement locations and on the support needed for a sustainable li�elihood.
• The needs of women and children are taken into account in the planning and implementation.
• Local go�ernment authorities are expected, with the support of UN agencies, to take the lead in the planning and implementation by appropriate agencies, including: go�ernment entities, NGOs, community organisations and pri�ate sector.
• The local settlement programme proposes two funds to support the settlement of refugees and the sustainable de�elopment of the host community. The Community De�elopment Fund will address the immediate impact at community le�el including settlement and �illage de�elopment support. The Area De�elopment Fund is aimed at promoting the economic and social ad�ancement of the area in which the refugees ha�e been resettled and to reduce potential jealousy among communities who benefit from the arri�al of refugees and communities that could not accept refugees and hence could not benefit from the Community De�elopment Fund.
As there was little field experience in the local settlement of refugees following this participatory and sustainable approach, a small-scale pilot project was established to coordinate mechanisms, build capacity and generate ‘lessons learned’ to scale up the programme. UNHCR and UNDP agreed to support the implementation of local settlement programme pilot and signed the first Exchange of Letter (EOL) in No�ember 2002. The EOL stipulated that 1,100 households would be settled by the end of 2003 with total budget allocated of US$1.2 million from the European Union (EU).
96.) Kemeterian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat, Kantor Menko Kesra, ‘Koordinasi Kebijakan Penanganan Dan Pemberdayaan Eks Pengungsi Timor Timur Di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur’ [‘Coordinating Policy to Address and Empower Former East Timorese Refugees in NTT’], Bogor, 2005.
48 49
This local settlement programme had two dimensions. UNDP in collaboration with the Department for Regional Settlement and Infrastructure (National le�el) assumed responsibility for the host community dimension. UNHCR and the implementing partners (NGOs) assumed responsibility for the refugee dimension, i.e. informing refugees about local settlement support, recording refugee aspirations, identifying refugees who would match a�ailable settlement opportunities, mo�ing refugees to new locations and pro�iding shelter and li�elihood support.
Due to constraints in the coordination among the different actors and the imperati�e of meeting the time limit on the use of EU funds, the target beneficiaries were drastically reduced, from 1,100 households to 550, then to 70 households at the end of 2003: 50 in West Sumba district and another 20 in West Timor. The budget allocation was accordingly reduced to US$270,631.
Issues Arising from ResponsesThe slow progress and numerous setbacks in resettling the East Timorese refugees both through con�entional methods as well as the inno�ati�e participatory local settlement approach has pro�ided many useful lessons that can be applied to the remaining East Timorese refugees as well as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in other parts of Indonesia.
The East Timorese Local Settlement pilot emphasised the importance of both the host community and refugees, howe�er both dimensions are inter-linked; the progress or steps taken by one dimension are highly dependent on the results of the other dimension’s acti�ities. Poor coordination and communication mechanisms between the two main programme components resulted in delays or, in some cases, the premature mo�ing of refugees before local communities had facilities to accommodate them. In future, the programme should ensure better coordination and clearly articulate the responsibilities and timelines for deli�ery by each participating agency.
5.2
5.2.1Lack of
coordination between different
programme dimensions
5.2.2Changing
priorities in government
policy on refugees
5.2.3Inconsistent
policies on settlement areas
While the Indonesian Go�ernment clearly articulated three options for East Timorese refugees, the priority settings for each option changed se�eral times, ad�ersely affecting the outcome of the local settlement pilot. For example, when the repatriation option was prioritised, the programme was not allowed to explicitly promote the option of resettlement.
Initially, local settlement programme policy stated that resettlement would only take place outside West Timor. Accordingly East Timorese refugees expressed an interest in relocating to West Sumba district. Howe�er when the Indonesian Go�ernment changed its policy and allowed resettlement within West Timor, nearly all refugees who had already registered for West Sumba backed out, preferring to remain in West Timor.
To pre�ent this from recurring, programme facilitators should ensure that decisions to relocate are made on the basis of genuine options, i.e. that refugees register because they are genuinely con�inced that they are mo�ing to �iable locations and not because they do not ha�e any other alternati�e.
The Indonesian Go�ernment’s policy on refugees is inconsistently implemented. This is apparent in the �ariety of settlement strategies created by different go�ernment agencies. For example, the Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure pro�ides shelter in the form of simple houses, which differ from the standards of the Department of Manpower and Transmigration; for its part, the Department for Social Affairs pro�ides building materials. Each sector has different unit costs which creates jealousy among the participants in the �arious programs.
Resettlement is a multi-stakeholder effort. The Departments for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure, Social Affairs and Manpower and Transmigration are all responsible for housing preparations. The Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure is also responsible
5.2.4Need for
standardisation of settlement
activities
5.2.5Coordination
among stakeholders
50 51
for the pro�ision of public facilities, i.e. water and sanitation, roads, bridges and the like. Social Affairs is responsible for food and li�ing allowances before and after the resettlement, while Manpower and Transmigration is responsible for the transportation of refugees from the camps to transit sites and resettlement locations.
In the East Timorese Local Settlement pilot, additional players such as the UNHCR and NGO implementing partners were in�ol�ed in helping the refugees while UNDP and the Department of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure dealt with the host communities’ needs through local NGOs. A lack of coordination and integration of indi�idual acti�ities at the beginning of the pilot led to conflicting agendas, duplication of work and unnecessary delays in project deli�ery.
In the pilot local settlement project, the National Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure assigned responsibility for coordinating the programme to the NTT Pro�incial Settlement and Regional Infrastructure department. The district go�ernment, which is ultimately responsible for the sustainability of the programme, was gi�en a minor role. To accelerate the settlement process and optimise results, the rele�ant pro�incial and district sectors should re�iew their responsibilities and allocate on the basis of the comparati�e ad�antage and respecti�e expertise of the different sectors and le�els of go�ernment. Maximising in�ol�ement of the district go�ernments will impro�e their commitment to assume responsibility for the sustainable de�elopment of the settlement locations, which in the past ha�e so frequently been neglected. At the national le�el, the Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure should play a monitoring role, pro�ide technical assistance and ensure the a�ailability of funds.
The success of the participatory approach in increasing the East Timorese refugees’ sense of belonging in their new home and the sense of responsibility of the host community towards new arri�als has con�inced the Indonesian Go�ernment that this is best approach in
5.2.6Clear division of responsibilities
at all levels of government
5.2.7The benefits of
the participatory approach
resettling refugees/IDPs. The establishment of district le�el resettlement working groups has pro�ed to be an effecti�e tool in enhancing participation of local go�ernment and ci�il society. In West Sumba District there was such high local ownership of the programme that the pro-acti�e district head (bupati) wrote to the go�ernor to authorise the transportation of refugees who had chosen to mo�e to West Sumba because the settlements were ready. The refugees arri�ed to a welcoming ceremony, officiated by the bupati and all the department heads and witnessed by the entire community, and were initiated as new members of the community.
In the past, the Indonesian Go�ernment has located new settlers in locations isolated from the host community. Such actions ha�e, in some cases, undercut social cohesion and created tensions between the host community and the settlers. In the East Timorese Local Settlement pilot, the new settlers ha�e been mixed with the local community. This insertion strategy accelerates integration between the new settlers and the host community.
Significant impro�ement in communication and coordination between the UNDP team and the West Sumba District Go�ernment occurred after the bupati established, by official decree, the Resettlement Working Group. The creation of a dedicated task force resulted in a new awareness on the specific roles and responsibilities of the working group and district go�ernment. The district go�ernment assumed the lead in implementing the local settlement pilot and became deeply in�ol�ed in all aspects of the programme, including becoming familiar with the programme’s approach, the implementation and coordination arrangements, and other responsibilities assigned to district agencies.
Go�ernment and NGO data on the number of East Timorese refugees in camps differ by wide margins and are not regularly updated in spite of the fact that the refugees are highly mobile. No systematic information is a�ailable regarding the number of refugees willing to settle
5.2.8Insertion strategy
5.2.9The importance of district-level
resettlement working groups
5.2.10Accurate and updated data
52 53
outside West Timor. In September 2003, the Indonesian Go�ernment conducted a registration of East Timorese refugees but did not publish the results. To impro�e the planning and identification of settlement opportunities, more systematic information is required on the number of refugees that may be willing to settle outside West Timor and the localities outside West Timor where the refugees would be willing to settle.
Updated information on refugees should be shared frequently by the �arious agencies and organisations, such as the police, the military, the Ministry of Home Affairs, SATKORLAK and NGOs. Information on refugees should be updated in order to support informed decision-making in the identification of settlement locations.
Information about location settlements in Sumba was facilitated by the Centre for IDP Ser�ices (CIS) and Jesuit Refugee Ser�ices (JRS), particularly through ‘go and see �isits’ (GSVs) by representati�es of interested refugees and ‘come and talk �isits’ (CTVs) by representati�es of host communities and as such, information reached a limited number of people. At the early stages of the pilot, the general population of refugees in the camps was not well-informed about settlement opportunities outside of West Timor. Information that was a�ailable was not well-packaged or e�enly circulated to the refugee population. In addition, questions/issues raised by the refugees were not properly answered or addressed. To gain a more fa�ourable response from refugees, all institutions concerned need to impro�e communication with the refugees and utilise �arious media such as community radio which has a broad reach.
At present, matching refugees are identified after a settlement opportunity has been found and community agreement has been established. If an insufficient number of refugees accept the settlement opportunity, the time and effort expended in establishing the community agreement goes to waste. Instead, processes to identify host communities and refugees who willing to participate should run in parallel, with intermediate milestones for
5.2.11Quality of location
information
5.2.12Matching
mechanisms
5.2.13Settlement
standards for refugees
each process that would support and accelerate the parallel process.
Communities agree that refugees require proper housing but express concern that their own housing could be of a much lower standard than the houses made a�ailable to refugees. Communities should be informed of the support that will be a�ailable to refugees, including the quality of housing. Compared to locally pre�ailing standards, refugee support may be percei�ed as excessi�e and become a source of jealousies, which could lead to tensions between the host community and the settlers. Potential host communities may not be interested in recei�ing refugees if the programme cannot adjust to local conditions. A similar rationale applies for access to water supply standards. If a standard of 100 metres is applied (distance walked to fetch drinking water), this would disqualify most of the settlement opportunities that local communities are able to offer. In the future, the programme should re�iew the standards for refugee support and formulate standards that permit adaptation to local conditions to ensure that support for refugees is percei�ed as proportional to the li�ing conditions of the host community.
The East Timorese Local Settlement pilot has not only benefited its direct beneficiaries such as refugees and impacted local communities in the settlement locations but has also contributed to building and strengthening the capacity of institutions and indi�iduals in�ol�ed such as the National Executing Agency (Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure), the District Go�ernment of West Sumba, the NGO implementing partners and the community committees in each location that managed the Community De�elopment Fund.
The slow and une�en progress in resettling the East Timorese refugees can also be attributed to the lack of capacity within Indonesia to address the needs of refugees/IDPs as well as host communities in a transparent, timely and coordinated manner. The lessons learned from these past responses will increase local and national capacities to address the remaining IDP/refugee households.
5.2.14Capacity-building
55
Peace VulnerabilitiesDespite conflict resolution and peace-building efforts by �arious agencies, the root causes of conflict between East Timorese camp residents and locals remain unresol�ed: the occupation by East Timorese of communal land and land owned by locals; competition for scarce natural resources, and competition for jobs. The only �iable solutions—the relocation of displaced East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia or their repatriation to Timor Leste—ha�e progressed �ery slowly due primarily to East Timorese still residing in camps who are unwilling to participate.
There are se�eral reasons why the displaced East Timorese are reluctant to take part in relocation and repatriation programs. Lack of jobs and li�elihood income sources is one; another is the spectre of inadequate ser�ices. Meanwhile, many camp residents still ha�e no sustainable li�elihoods and are dependent on aid, despite ha�ing li�ed in camps for fi�e years. The discontinuation of assistance has exacerbated these difficulties.
6.Conclusion: Peace Capacities and Vulnerabilities
6.1
Surya Wirawan. Seri Lagu Mentari (Sun Dance); linoleum-cut, 30 x 42 cm, 2002.
56 57
Impo�erished, many of the East Timorese camp residents continue to occupy land owned by local communities and indi�iduals. The locals, the majority of who are poor themsel�es, ha�e begun to demand the return of their land. Competition for scarce natural and social resources continues. Although inter-group social relations ha�e impro�ed o�er time, significant cultural differences—including religious differences—ha�e gi�en rise to stereotyping. This increases the risk of conflict.
Humanitarian assistance for refugees has stoked the jealousy of locals, whereas durable solutions, such as the pro�ision of food aid for disad�antaged families among locals (the rice for the poor program), ha�e not been made a�ailable to displaced East Timorese li�ing in camps. Disputes concerning the illegal occupation and utilization of pri�ate and communal land, water resources, as well as other forms of personal or community property, ha�e not been satisfactorily resol�ed. Consequently, there is a need for dialogue between IDPs and host communities of concern to build peace between displaced East Timorese and the local community and to resol�e inter-group problems.
All of these factors ha�e contributed to the creation of social distance between the two groups. On the one hand, percei�ed socio-economic inequalities in the past led to jealousy on the part of locals during the initial stages of the conflict. On the other hand, resentment is e�ident among displaced East Timorese o�er what they percei�e as discriminatory treatment, e�en after ha�ing opted for Indonesian citizenship. These conditions, if left unresol�ed, ha�e the potential to lead to open conflict between the two groups in the future.
Past as well as present human rights �iolations by members of the state apparatus are the main source of fear and uncertainty among the populace and a fundamental obstruction to peaceful de�elopment. In its capacities-�ulnerabilities analysis, the UN Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Indonesia 2003 has
listed three major problems in NTT, namely lack of essential ser�ices (particularly health related), informed and �oluntary choice, and integration/settlement of refugees.97
In camps and resettlement locations for displaced East Timorese, the UN team noted a lack of essential ser�ices, particularly health related. The discontinuation of water aid programs has led to hardship; in settlement areas located far from water sources, water is unfit for human consumption. Schooling and health facilities in camps are inferior to those pro�ided to neighbouring local communities. The assessment team also found that, because of po�erty, residents ha�e limited access to essential ser�ices such as transportation, basic medical ser�ices, prescription drugs, tuition, and the purchase of schoolbooks, equipment and uniforms. Camp residents report that long distances from schools and an inability to pay tuition fees ha�e caused many youngsters to drop out from school. Nonetheless, some camp youths ha�e successfully enrolled in uni�ersities.
According to the re�iew, NGOs are acti�ely in�ol�ed in pro�iding information to camp residents, but the acti�ities are short-term and so not sustainable. Some obser�ers, noting that camp leaders attempt to control information from the outside world, suggest that inter�ention programs aimed at resol�ing the problem of the displaced East Timorese can only be effecti�ely implemented by changing the beha�iour and attitudes of the camp leaders, as well as external influential figures. Other factors, such the physical isolation of many camps, limited access to electronic and printed media due to po�erty, and limited communication between locals and camp residents, also hinder the flow of rele�ant information from the outside world.
In keeping with the findings of this report, a 2003 UN document states “refugee children and some host communities [were] highly at risk of malnutrition and other
97.) UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia, New York and Gene�a, February 2003.
58 59
disease threats.”98 The discontinuation of humanitarian aid for displaced East Timorese has ad�ersely affected the human de�elopment of families li�ing in camps, especially those who ha�e yet to establish sustainable li�elihoods in West Timor. The assessment team has encountered families who, due to a lack of food, were forced to consume porridge made of the core of trees and drink unhygienic ground water carried from distant locations
The slow mo�ement of displaced persons out of camps is caused by a number of internal as well as external factors.99 Internal factors include: unwillingness to be relocated, e�en to another location within West Timor, if this in�ol�es separation from relati�es and friends and unwillingness to be resettled in areas outside West Timor. (During inter�iews the camp residents cited a number of reasons such as being too far from East Timor, their nati�e land, and from relati�es still li�ing in East Timor; their unwillingness to ‘cross the sea’, and their unwillingness ‘to become refugees once again’. The displaced people are unwilling to be repatriated due to their concern about the economic and political situation in Timor Leste. They particularly worry about the prospect of being tried for serious crimes and becoming targets for re�enge. The recent murder in Timor Leste of two female high school students from an East Timorese camp in Belu District has heightened such concerns.100
External factors associated with the slow exodus of displaced East Timorese include the close patronage bonds between displaced East Timorese and their camp leaders, as well as with other influential persons li�ing outside the camps, so that important indi�idual decisions are often not made independently but are subject to group control.
Another external factor is the amount of negati�e information and disinformation about repatriation, relocation, resettlement, and transmigration programs obtained through gossip, personal experiences, as well as personal accounts from people who took part in such programs but later decided to return to the West Timorese camps. Problems include a lack of transparency and accountability in the management of aid programs; and broken promises or percei�ed shortfalls between what had been explained and the realities later encountered, such as the absence of promised essential facilities or support in relocation or resettlement sites. Other important external factors include the lack of fertile land in West Timor and the go�ernment’s limited budget.
Capacities for PeacePeace Capacities identified by this assessment are the increase of autonomy and democracy in local politics and the strengthening of ci�il society’s role in society.
Peace Capacities also consist of peace-building initiati�es by go�ernment agencies, traditional and local leaders, and NGOs (including the facilitation of meetings between both groups and the promotion of peace among students from both groups through the establishment of peace schools.
The local go�ernment has also begun to pro�ide ser�ices without distinguishing between former displaced persons and locals, thus enhancing inter-group relations and reducing an important risk to peace. Increased consultation, ad�ocacy and capacity building acti�ities by local NGOs could also pro�ide a Capacity for Peace. Specific sectoral attention should focus on impro�ed go�ernance, deli�ery of basic ser�ices, economic reco�ery and empowerment of �ictims of conflict.
There are se�eral ways to increase the peace building capacity of the go�ernment, affirming its role as a dominant actor in a�erting potential conflict.
6.2
6.2.1Governance
98.) Ibid., 120. 99.) In its most likely scenario, the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia
estimates that “30-40 percent repatriate, 5 to10 percent settle off Timor and majority of remainder continue residence in camp communities.” Ibid., 123.
100.) Koran Tempo, ‘Warga Atambua demo pembunuhan di Timor Leste’ [‘Atambua residents demonstrate against murder in Timor Leste’], 8 February 2005.
60 61
One is to increase the government’s capacity to make refugee management policies that are sensitive to potential conflict. This would include:• Increasing the capacity to map existing and potential
conflicts; • Analysing the effects of policies on the aforementioned
(potential) conflict; • Understanding the principles, concepts and practices
of management policies that acti�ely contribute to peace building.
Village governments are also important actors, and it is imperative to increase the capacity of and support for these governments in their efforts to open forums for dialogue between refugees and the local community, through acti�ities which are rele�ant and ad�antageous to local needs and conditions. These acti�ities could centre on: hygiene and health education, sports acti�ities and economic re�i�al job creation). It is also important to encourage refugee in�ol�ement in decision-making at the �illage le�el, as well as in �illage and sub-�illage de�elopment meetings (musrenbang desa and musrenbang dusun), in particular in resettlement locations.
Finally, it is imperative that all stakeholders--the subjects of development endeavours as well as civil society organizations--participate and be actively involved in the planning and implementation of peace and de�elopment programs. The emphasis in peace-building acti�ities should be on participatory, empowering bottom-up grassroots approaches. There are a number of important steps that can promote social welfare.1. Support efforts to improve living conditions, including
appropriate housing and basic infrastructure and facilities. Impro�ement of settlements also needs to focus on ways in which the beneficiaries can make their li�elihoods (with the appropriate supporting infrastructures), so that unemployment or underemployment does not become a potential for conflict in the future.
6.2.2Social welfare
2. Understanding land issues, including ownership and usage, are central to promoting social welfare. As stated in this paper, they ha�e been central to tensions among refugees and the communities around them. The pattern of settlement insertion, in which refugees are settled in small numbers among the local community, could become a mechanism to reduce the ghettoisation of the refugees, which can lead to aggression if there is a trigger.
3. Improving refugees’ access to appropriate health care. This can be done by: • Enabling community health centers (PUSKESMAS)
to gi�e cheaper health care to refugees. Encouraging PUSKESMAS to be more proacti�e in their ser�ices, including regularly �isiting camps or resettlement locations when needed. This is important because many refugees are not used to being treated in PUSKESMAS; if they are not encouraged to do so, late treatment can be fatal.
• Attempts to resol�e administration of the citizenship of refugees, so that they can recei�e social security programs that will can help them to obtain appropriate health ser�ices.
• Facilitation of health education to produce paramedics within the refugee and local communities. Health education specifically related to healthy li�ing (hygiene education) would pro�ide a forum for dialogue between refugees and the local community, while simultaneously helping them to care for en�ironmental health (pre�entati�e action against disease).
4. Aid for education. Education aid can be gi�en through:• Impro�ements or pro�ision of educational
facilities.• Clarifying the citizenship status of refugees so
they can access aid pro�ided by the state to pay educational costs.
• Pro�iding scholarships to those who really need it and who ha�e academic ability.
• Urging the go�ernment to gi�e serious attention to the lack of teachers. In addition, there should
62 63
be support for peace-building programs include short-term support for information, education and communication programs in peace-building skills, and long-term support for the learning of multicultural education principles, such as respect for and appreciation of cultural di�ersity, in primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions. This could be integrated into the competency-based curricula introduced in 2004.
5. Rehabilitation or development of social infrastructure in locations where limitations in social infrastructure are a cause of conflict. Installation of infrastructure also needs to be accompanied by de�elopment of maintenance mechanisms which are utilized as forums of communication between the two communities, for example, the formation of the Water Committee for regulating the usage and maintenance of water facilities, whose members are from both communities.
6. Providing special services for women in exile, both in relation to reproducti�e health and their �ulnerability to �iolence, as well as their access to and control of basic public facilities. Particular attention should be paid to women who no longer ha�e husbands. This special attention is needed in all programs (cross-cutting) to ensure that women are not left behind in peace building efforts, as the principle of gender mainstreaming needs to be applied. Programs for ad�ocacy and support for �ictims of �iolence – including domestic �iolence--need to be introduced. Programs for the empowerment of women are also recommended, especially regarding participation in formal schooling, small and medium enterprises, and in politics, such as in the election of female national, regional as well as district/municipal legislators and in the presidential elections.
Poor economic conditions exacerbate conflict (i.e. fighting o�er employment). Economic empowerment should be aimed at both refugee and local communities, so that jealousies are not created and negati�e stigmas/stereotypes are a�oided. To enable equal access, there
6.2.3Local economic
recovery
6.2.4State and
human security
needs to be a more detailed assessment to determine the indicators for targeted beneficiaries and suitable forms of economic empowerment. Economic empowerment can also be coordinated with the border area accelerated de�elopment program, which focuses primarily on economic de�elopment.
Gi�en the large number of East Timorese refugees in West Timor who still communicate with friends and relati�es and obtain information about the conditions in Timor Leste, the security context in West Timor can be influenced by the situation in Timor Leste. As a result, indicators need to be de�eloped to anticipate insecurity or destabilization across the border as well as an early response system to minimize the impact in West Timor. In addition, support needs to be pro�ided for human security programs, such as the empowerment of human-rights-watch acti�ities and ad�ocacy programs, and the empowerment of organizations in�ol�ed in the performance of legal, health, psychological, and economic support for �ictims of human rights �iolations.
65
Provincial, district and village government officials• Officials, NTT Pro�incial Go�ernment, Kupang
Official, Belu District Government, Atambua • Official, �illage go�ernment, Belu District
• Official, �illage go�ernment, Kupang District
• Neighbourhood association functionaries, Kupang District
Provincial and district legislators• Member, NTT Pro�ince People’ Representati�e Council,
1999-2004 term, Kupang
• Member, NTT Pro�ince People’ Representati�e Council), 2004-2009 term, Kupang
• Member, Belu District People’ Representati�e Council, 1999-2004 term, Atambua
Civil Society Organizations• Functionary, CIS GAMKI-GMKI (Center for IDPs, Indonesian
Christian Youth Mo�ement-Indonesian Christian Student Organization), Kupang
• Functionary, CRS (Catholic Relief Ser�ices), Kupang
• Functionary, FPPA (Concern for Atambua Women Forum), Atambua Bishop’s Office
• Functionary, Justice and Peace Committee, Atambua Bishop’s Office
• Functionary, Justice and Peace Office, Kupang Archbishop’s Office
• Volunteers, JPI, Atambua
• Volunteer, JRS (Jesuit Relief Ser�ices), Atambua
• Functionary, PIAR (Information Center on People’s Adat), Kupang
• Functionary, PPSE (Socio-economic De�elopment Program), Atambua Bishop’s Office
• Functionary, Protestant Church, Kupang District
• Faculty member, Widya Mandira Catholic Uni�ersity, Kupang
• Functionary, YASO (Solidarity Foundation), Atambua
• Functionary, Yayasan Sanlima (Humanity Care Foundation), Kupang
Annex 1Institutional Affiliation of Informats Interviewed
No. Institution
2 inter�iews
1 inter�iew1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
Group discussion
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
2 inter�iews
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
2 inter�iews
1 inter�iew
1 inter�iew
1.
2.
3.
4.
Kelompok Rakyat Biasa, Damai di Hati, Damai di Bumi (Peace at Heart, Peace on Earth), silkscreen on paper, 60 x 45 cm, 2001
66 67
Camp residents• Camp coordinators, Atambua (2 camps)
• Female camp residents, Atambua
• Male camp residents, Atambua
• Female camp residents, Belu District
• Male camp residents, Belu District
• Female camp residents, Kupang District
• Male camp residents, Kupang District
The Press• Functionary, Radar Timor Newspaper, Kupang
• Functionaries, Pos Kupang Newspaper, Kupang
Other• Functionary, UN-OHCA, Kupang
Kupang-based organisations participating in Provincial Workshop• Functionaries/�olunteers, CIS, Sanlima, Widya Madira
Catholic Uni�ersity, YPI, PIKUL (Foundation for the Strengthening of Local Institutions and Capacity)
No. Institution
2 inter�iews
1 group discussion
1 group discussion
1 group discussion
1 group discussion
1 group discussion
1 group discussion
1 inter�iew
1 group discussion
1 inter�iew
1 group discussion
5.
6.
7.
8.
Ann
ex 2
NTT
Ele
ctio
n R
esul
ts, 1
999
and
2004
by n
umbe
r of
Vot
es, P
erce
ntag
e of
Ele
ctor
s an
d S
eats
Won
Elec
tion
Part
y d)
Gol
kar
PD
I/P
DI-
PD
emok
rat
PP
PPA
NO
ther
s e)
1999
Leg
isla
ti�e
Ele
ctio
ns a
)
Apr
il 20
04 L
egis
lati
�e E
lect
ions
July
200
4 Pr
esid
enti
al E
lect
ion
b)
Sep
tem
ber
2004
Ru
n-of
f c)
Vote
s:
Perc
enta
ge:
Vote
s:
Perc
enta
ge:
Sea
ts W
on:
Vote
s:
Perc
enta
ge:
Vote
s:
Perc
enta
ge:
609,
890
39.6
1%
1,04
5,15
7
51% 5
432,
823
20.0
6%
618,
899
39.0
4%
447,
710 3
1,34
4,11
6
62.3
1%
1,11
5,50
7
71.7
8%
--
54,1
92 1
312,
777
14.5
0%
438,
648
28.2
2%
41,3
27 0
8,75
7
00.4
0%
27,2
28 0
58,3
41
2.70
%
4
Not
es:
a)
Du
ring
the
199
9 Le
gisl
ati�
e el
ecti
ons
48 p
olit
ical
par
ties
�ie
d fo
r se
ats.
b)
In t
he Ju
ly 2
004
pres
iden
tial
ele
ctio
ns t
here
wer
e 2,
156,
814
�alid
�ot
es in
NTT
.c)
B
ecau
se in
the
July
200
4 pr
esid
enti
al e
lect
ion
no p
arty
ach
ie�e
d a
maj
orit
y, a
ru
n-of
f was
hel
d in
Sep
tem
ber
2004
.d)
R
epre
sent
ing
the
polit
ical
par
ties
as
pres
iden
tial
and
�ic
e pr
esid
enti
al c
andi
date
s w
ere,
res
pect
i�el
y: fo
r G
olka
r, W
iran
to a
nd S
alah
udd
in W
ahid
; fo
r PD
I-P,
Meg
awat
i Su
karn
opu
tri a
nd
Has
yim
Mu
zadi
; fo
r th
e D
emor
acti
c Pa
rty,
Su
silo
Bam
bang
Yu
dhoy
ono
and
Jusu
f Kal
la:
for
PPP,
Ham
zah
Haz
and
Agu
m G
um
elar
; fo
r PA
N, A
mie
n R
ais
and
Sis
won
o Yu
do H
uso
do.
e)
Oth
er p
arti
es in
clu
de P
KPI
, PPD
I, P
arta
i Pel
opor
and
PD
S.
So
urce
s: N
TT P
ro�i
nce.
Pro
�inc
ial E
lect
ion
Com
mit
tee.
Gen
eral
Ele
ctio
ns 1
999
(Pro
pins
i NTT
. Pan
itia
Pem
iliha
n D
aera
h Ti
ngka
t I,
Pem
iliha
n U
mu
m 1
999)
; G
ener
al E
lect
ions
Com
mis
sion
. 200
4 G
ener
al E
lect
ions
. Cal
cula
tion
of P
eopl
e’s
Rep
rese
ntat
i�e
Cou
ncil
seat
s: c
alcu
lati
on o
f sea
ts o
btai
ned
by p
olit
ical
par
ties
par
tici
pati
ng in
gen
eral
ele
ctio
ns fo
r m
embe
rshi
p in
the
Peo
ple’
s R
epre
sent
ati�
e C
ounc
il in
the
200
4 G
ener
al E
lect
ions
in N
TT-1
and
NTT
-2 e
lect
ion
dist
rict
s (K
PU:
PEM
ILU
200
4: P
erhi
tung
an P
erol
ehan
Ku
rsi D
PR:
perh
itu
ngan
per
oleh
an K
urs
i par
tai p
olit
ik
pese
rta
Pem
iliha
n U
mu
m A
nggo
ta D
ewan
Per
wak
ilan
Rak
yat
dala
m P
emili
han
Um
um
200
4 D
aera
h Pe
mili
han
NTT
-I, N
TT-I
I). G
ener
al E
lect
ion
Com
mis
sion
. Rec
apit
ula
tion
of t
he r
esu
lts
of �
ote
cou
ntin
g fo
r pa
irs
of P
resi
dent
ial a
nd V
ice
Pres
iden
tial
can
dida
tes.
Val
id �
otes
. Gen
eral
Ele
ctio
ns C
omm
issi
on, O
ctob
er 2
004.
(K
PU:
Rek
apit
ula
si H
asil
Perh
itu
ngan
Su
ara
unt
uk
pasa
ngan
ca
lon
pres
iden
dan
wak
il pr
esid
en, S
uar
a S
ah, 2
004;
KPU
Okt
ober
200
4).
68 69
Ann
ex 3
Dat
a on
Rel
igio
us F
unct
iona
ries
in N
TT (2
002)
Rel
igio
nCa
thol
icPr
otes
tant
Isla
mH
indu
Reg
ion
Bis
hops
Dis
tric
t/M
unic
ipal
ity
Prie
sts
Bro
ther
sN
uns
Prea
cher
sB
ible
Teac
hers
Sun
day
scho
olTe
ache
rsU
lam
as
Su
mba
Tim
or
Alo
r
Flor
es
Tota
l
Wes
t S
um
ba
East
Su
mba
Kupa
ng
Sou
th C
entr
al T
imor
Nor
th C
entr
al T
imor
Bel
u
Kupa
ng M
uni
cipa
lity
Alo
r
East
Flo
res
Sik
ka
Ende
Nga
da
Man
ggar
ai
1 - - - - 1 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 7
Pena
dita
40 6 18 9 30 53 60 3 89 99 51 55 77 590
11
- - - -
12 32
-
11 5 29 4 16 120
44
7 8 16 34 62
- 6
174 43 347 83 95
1,01
9
146
282
353
141 15 12 157
370 3 6 6 6 7
1,50
4
122
136
548
441 36 42 64 45 1 3 3 - 3
1,44
4
3,12
4
4,57
3
19,6
82
4,76
2 25 36
2,93
8
2,09
7 18 42 24 26 57
37,4
94
13 10 30 28 5 7 30 91 138
44 106 47 152
701
3 4 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 4 1 1 27
Sou
rce:
Pen
gola
han
Dat
a El
ektr
onik
Pem
erin
tah
Prop
insi
Nu
sa T
engg
ara
Tim
ur,
200
3
Acronyms and Abbreviations
BAPPEDA Regional De�elopment Planning Board
BAPPENAS National De�elopment Planning Board
BAKORNAS-PBP National Coordinating Board for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees
BPS Central Statistics Bureau
CIS Centre for Internally Displaced People Ser�ice
CSO Ci�il society organization
DPR People’s Representati�e Council
DPRD Regional People’s Representati�e Council
DPRD I Pro�incial People’s Representati�e Council
DPRD II District/Municipal People’s Representati�e Council
GEM Gender Empowerment Measure
GOLKAR Functional Group
HANSIP Ci�ilian Defence Force
HDI Human De�elopment Index
HPI Human Po�erty Index
JRS Jesuit Refugee Ser�ice
INSIST Indonesian Society for Social Transformation
KAMRA People’s Security Force
KIMPRAS-WIL Regional Settlement and Infrastructure
KPU General Election Commission
MPR People’s Consultati�e Assembly
NGO Non-go�ernment organization
NTT East Nusa Tenggara
PAN National Mandate Party
PDI-P Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PEMDA Regional Go�ernment
PNS Ci�il Ser�ice
PODES Village Potential
Poliandes Field Health Post
70 71
Posyandu Integrated Health Ser�ice
Puskesmas Primary Health Centre
Pustu Primary Health Unit
RATIH Trained Populace
RDTL Democratic Republic of Timor Leste
REPELITA Fi�e-Year De�elopment Plan
SATKOR-LAK PBP Pro�incial Coordinating Unit for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees
SATLAK PBP District Executing Unit for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees
TNI Indonesian National Army
UN United Nations
UN ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNDP United Nations De�elopment Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOHCA United Nations Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSECOORD United Nations Security Coordinator
UNSFIR United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Reco�ery
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor
UNTAS Uni Timor Aswain, Union of Timorese Heroes
WANRA People’s Resistance
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