OUTLINE - The KTH Innovative Centre for Embedded Systems€¦ · ... Electromagnetic compatibility....

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COMPANY UNCLASSIFIED | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | NOT CLASSIFIEDMats Bäckström | IEEE/ICES workshop on EMC for complex systems, KTH, Stockholm, 31 August 2016

Dr. Mats Bäckström, Technical Fellow ElectromagneticEffects, Saab AeronauticsAdj. professor, Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan (KTH)

Electromagnetic threats against themodern society

IEEE/ICES workshop on EMC for complex systems. KTH, Stockholm, 31August 2016.

This document and the information contained herein is the property of Saab ABand must not be used, disclosed or altered without Saab AB prior written consent.

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OUTLINE

• Definitions

• EMC areas (military aircraft)

• High Power Microwaves (HPM). Threat, effects and protection.

• Electromagnetic threats against critical infrastructure. IntentionalEMI (IEMI).

• IEMI studies in Sweden (examples).

• Conclusions

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EMC: Electromagnetic compatibility.

EMI: Electromagnetic interference

Ø Unintentional EMI. Taken care of by legislation and regulations. Example:

• EU-directive (CE-marking)

• EMC directives for civil aircraft issued by aviation authorities. There arespecific EMC requirements for civil aircraft due to their dependence onsafety critical equipment. These requirements are much more severe (up toseveral kV/m) than for other civil systems/equipment.

Ø Intentional EMI. Sometimes called “electromagnetic terrorism”.

• Requirements and/or guidelines are given for military systems.

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DEFINITIONS


ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS AREAS(From A Military Aircraft Perspective)

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Ø Lightning

ØHIRF (radio- and radar transmitters)

ØHPM (High Power Microwaves)

ØHEMP (Nuclear EMP)

ØEMC/EMI (Interference between equipment)

ØESD (Electrostatic discharges)

ØAntenna to antenna coupling

ØCompromising emanations

ØHealth effects of exposure to electromagneticfields (EMF)

Ø Ignition of fuel by EM radiation.

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FREQUENCY CONTENT OF HIGH POWERELECTROMAGNETIC (HPEM) THREATS

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From IEC 61000-2-13


HPM (HIGH POWER MICROWAVES)

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Ryssland: Ranets – E (500 MW )

Ryssland: Astrofizika-Omega ( >GW)

USA: CHAMP

USA: Jolt (UWB)

Tyskland: Car stop system (UWB)

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HPM SUSCEPTIBILITY INVESTIGATIONS IN SWEDEN(Swedish Industry, FOI, FMV; 1993 -)

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• Aircraft, UAV, Missiles

• Tactical Radio Link

• Army Radio

• Cars

• Computers

• Telecom Stations

• GPS, WLAN, Cameras, ….

• Low Noise amplifiers, Limiters, …..


HPM EFFECTS

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• Interference during irradiation (mayresult in catastrophic event!).

• Interference resulting in remainingfailure. Restart needed.

• Latent damage (physical degradationmay cause later failure).

• Permanent physical damage (repairneeded).

HPM-FieldStrength

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HPM ATTACK SCENARIOS

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Front-door coupling• To antennas, sensors etc.

• Optimal coupling: in-band

• Interference (in-band) at very largedistances.

• Damage at large distances (if not protectedby limiters)

• Protection: transient protectors, filters, ..

Back-door coupling• Penetration through holes, joints etc.

• Optimal attack frequency at approx. 1 – 3 GHz

• Interference < 10’s km

• Damage < km

• Protection: shielding, filtering, ..


FRONT-DOOR COUPLING – EXAMPLE: VULNERABILITY OF GPS

Military & Aerospace, 25 September 2015:

• Navigation and guidance experts at three U.S. military contractors are developing militarypositioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) technology with the performance of the GlobalPositioning System (GPS), but which operates independently of the GPS satellite navigationsystem.

• The goal … is to provide warfighters with GPS-like positioning, navigation, and timing capabilitiesin contested environments where GPS performance is degraded or unavailable due to electronicjamming, electro-magnetic pulse weapons, ..

gpsworld.com, 3 May 2016:

• South Korea will award a contract this month to secure technology required to build an eLoransystem as an alternative to GPS, …The latest jamming campaign from the North began on March31… the jamming lasted nearly a week and affected signal reception of more than 1,000 aircraftand 700 ships, with the jamming originating from five locations along the border, ...

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COUNTRIES DEVELOPING HPM-WEAPONS

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Prof. Edl Schamiloglu, University of New Mexico. Presented vid Extreme Electromagnetics – The TripleThreat to Infrastructure, IET, London, 14 January 2013


EM THREATS AGAINST THE MODERN SOCIETY (I)

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•Jammers (disruption of radiocommunication, GPS etc.).Easy to buy:

q Intentional EMI:

• High Power Microwaves:

• Pulse injection on signal- or powercables:

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EM THREATS AGAINST THE MODERN SOCIETY (II)

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q Solar storms:q High Altitude (Nuclear) EMP:

Corona mass ejection (picture from NASA)


HIGH ALTITUDE EMP (HEMP)From US Commission Report, 2004.

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“EMP is one of a small number ofthreats that can hold our society atrisk of catastrophic consequences.”

“A determined adversary canachieve an EMP attack capabilitywithout having a high level ofsophistication“

“The primary avenues forcatastrophic damage … are throughour electric power infrastructureand thence into ourtelecommunications, energy, andother infrastructures”

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CARRINGTON-CLASS CME NARROWLY MISSES EARTH

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o On July 23, 2012, a plasma cloud or "CME" rocketed away from the sun as fastas 3000 km/s, more than four times faster than a typical eruption. The storm torethrough Earth orbit, but fortunately Earth wasn't there. Researchers have beenanalyzing the data ever since, and they have concluded that the storm was oneof the strongest in recorded history. "It might have been stronger than theCarrington Event itself," says Baker.

o "If it had hit, we would still be picking up the pieces," says Daniel Baker of theUniversity of Colorado

o The Carrington Event of Sept. 1859 was a series of powerful CMEs that hitEarth head-on, sparking Northern Lights as far south as Tahiti. A similar stormtoday could have a catastrophic effect on modern power grids andtelecommunication networks. According to a study by the National Academy ofSciences, the total economic impact could exceed $2 trillion or 20 times greaterthan the costs of a Hurricane Katrina. Multi-ton transformers fried by such astorm could take years to repair and impact national security.

o Had the eruption occurred just one week earlier, the blast site would have beenfacing Earth, rather than off to the side, so it was a relatively narrow escape.

http://phys.org/, May 5, 2014


INTENTIONAL EMI. DEFINITION

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§ “Intentional malicious generation of electromagneticenergy introducing noise or signals into electricaland electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing ordamaging these systems for terrorist or criminalpurposes” *)

o Most civilian systems, especially wireless systems, arevulnerable to electromagnetic interference (EMI).

o Autonomous systems with (safety) critical functions needto be carefully protected.

o IEMI threat levels are not managed by civilian EMCdirectives

* from URSI General Assembly, Toronto 1999

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INTENTIONALEMI

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Possible targets:• Power networks• Telecom systems• Railway systems• Financial systems• Computer networks• Medical care• Industrial plants• Radio/television

networks• Traffic systems• Food and water supply• ………..

Accomplished by:• Terrorists• Criminals• Hooligans• Competitors• Disgruntled employees• Protestors• Adversary military/special forces• …


INTENTIONAL EMI. WHAT IS PROTECTED?

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• Formal civil requirements on IEMI protection are not frequent.• Legal EMC requirements (CE marking etc.) are not sufficient.

However:§ Aircraft (also civil) are well-protected against lightning and HIRF

(High Intensity Radiated Fields), and by that also rather wellprotected against IEMI.

§ Unprotected equipment may still have a decent protection due to itsinstallation, e.g. if it is remotely located with respect to theperpetrator.

• Modern militarysystems are wellprotected:

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FIRST CAR TEST IN SWEDEN IN LATE 1994

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Main results:• Effects most prominent at low frequencies• Upset, i.e. the engine stopped, from 500 V/m• Permanent damage from 15 kV/m (L-band) and 24 kV/m (S-

band)• Permanent damage also with the engine turned off

The following equipment were permanently damaged:• 10 engine control units• Relays• Speedometer• Revolution counter• Burglar alarm• Video camera• Number plates (crackled)• Reflectors (Lichtenberg patterns)

From: M Bäckström, "HPM Testing of a Car a Representative Example of the Susceptibility of Civil Systems", 13thInternational Zurich Symposium and Technical Exhibition on Electromagnetic Compatibility, February 16 - 18, 1999.


EXAMPLES OF (CIVILIAN) IEMI PROJECTS IN SWEDEN

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Research on railwayvulnerability – specialfocus on GSM-R as a vitalpart of the European RailTraffic Management System(ERTMS). (National project,2005 – 2007)

Research on vulnerability oncontrol equipment at power substations. (EU-project 2008 – 2010).

Recent project at KTH:Protection against electromagnetic risks –intentional electromagnetic interference.• Water and food supply, telecom, computer

centers, …• Co-operation between researchers from EMC

and the security research areas• Make use of the wealthy experience from

protection of military systems.1 M€, 2013 – 2015. Financed by: SwedishContingencies Agency (MSB), Swedish FortificationsAgency and Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS)

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EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: INTERNET OF THINGS

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• Smart grids• Autonomous cars• E-health• ……..


INTENTIONAL EMI. CONCLUSIONS

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• Our use of electronic and wireless-based systems, also for highlyimportant and safety critical functions, is rapidly increasing.

• A failure due to e.g. electromagnetic interference may lead tosevere or even catastrophic consequences.

• Thus, these systems should be designed to be able to withstandeven improbable unintentional electromagnetic disturbances as wellas intentional EMI attacks.

• On the “technical” level, the threat can, to a large extent, bemitigated using existing procedures and methods, largely developedfor protection of military systems.

• Methodologies for risk analysis adapted for IEMI scenarios areneeded to define society’s most critical systems

OUTLINE - The KTH Innovative Centre for Embedded Systems€¦ · ... Electromagnetic compatibility....

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