“One World, One Dream: PRC InternationalRelations and the 2008 Beijing Olympics”

A paper prepared for

The Annual Convention ofAmerican Association of Chinese Studies

Richmond, Virginia

Daniel C. Palm, Ph.D.Dept. of History and Political Science

Azusa Pacific UniversityAzusa, CA 91702-7000

dpalm@apu.edu(Do not copy or cite without permission)

Oct. 6, 20073:45-5:15 p.m.

With great fanfare, at 8 p.m. on August, 8, 2007, Tienanmen Square served as venue for

an enthusiastic celebration as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marked the one-year

countdown to the opening of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Featuring Jackie Chan, Yao

Ming, and International Olympic Committee President Jacques Rogge and joined by a

million more in Beijing and throughout the nation, the event offered a small preview of

the spectacle to begin one year hence.1 Press coverage outside PRC tended to include

pointed political references to a host of issues—from human rights, to press and internet

freedoms, Chinese labor practices, death penalty, Tibet, Taiwan, PRC economic ties with

Sudan, police detention of migrants, fair compensation for Beijing residents displaced by

Olympic construction—very likely offering a small preview of the extent to which

political questions relating to the PRC will also receive attention during the 2008 Games.2

Clearly, the world’s oldest and largest nation’s hosting of the Olympics will include

political controversies on a correspondingly large scale.

To observe that the modern Olympic Games are highly political in nature is a

truism to anyone not hopelessly idealistic about their purpose.3 Presently bringing

1 “China Starts Olympic Countdown in Spectacular Fashion,” AFP, August 7, 2007, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iWIa1DVrmy4RX7iz6GQP-sEUQAfA [Aug. 15, 2007].

2 For example, “One World, One Dream, One Big Human Rights Problem,” Der Spiegel Online International, Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,498873,00.html [Aug. 15, 2007]; “China Celebrates One-Year Olympics Countdown Amid Criticism on Human Rights, Press Freedom” VOA, Aug. 8, 2007 http://voanews.com/english/2007-08-08-voa7.cfm [Aug. 15, 2007], and “Politics Rule as Taiwan Cold-Shoulders the Countdown,” International Herald Tribune, Aug. 8, 2007 http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/08/asia/AS-OLY-Taiwan-Beijing-Countdown.php [Aug. 15, 2007], and Jim Yardley, “Beijing Olympics: Let the Politics Begin,” International Herald Tribune, Aug. 13, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/13/asia/letter.1-113324.php?page=1 [Aug. 15, 2007].

3 See Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999), and James Riordan and Arnd Kruger, The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century (London: E & F SPON, 1999).

together athletes from over 203 nations and political entities,4 the modern Olympics have

tended to be highly charged politically from the start. From Berlin in 1936 with Nazi

banners predominant,5 through the boycotts in response to the 1956 Soviet response to

the Hungarian uprising, to Americans Tommie Smith’s and John Carlos’ black power

salutes at Mexico City in 1968, Black September’s horrific assault at Munich in 1972, the

U.S. boycott of Moscow in 1980 and the Soviet boycott of Los Angeles four years later—

each Olympiad will remind even the most casual fan of international affairs and conflict

at least as much as a memorable athletic performance or contest.

More recently, in the good feelings that precede 2008, it is easy to forget the extent

to which political complications and U.S.-Chinese friction accompanied the 1996

Summer Olympics in Atlanta. The PRC had made a strong effort to host the 2000

Olympics, anticipating success after their 1990 success with the Asian Games. Failure in

that bid (Beijing suspected an American-led vote against for Barcelona) alongside vocal

criticism about Chinese human rights in the U.S. Congress led the PRC to threaten a

boycott until the last minute. Further controversy erupted concerning possible presence of

ROC officials at the Games, suspicion of doping by PRC swimmers publicly expressed in

U.S. media, Chinese criticism of facilities and food, and of the bomb attack in Centennial

Park. Tensions continued even after the Olympics closing ceremonies, with demands in

the New York Times from the PRC Foreign Ministry for apologies from NBC and

4 National Olympic Committees (NOCs) are maintained presently by ten non-independent nation-states including Puerto Rico, Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

5 On the multi-faceted politics of the 1936 Olympics see Arnd Kruger and William Murray, eds., The Nazi Olympics: Sport, Politics, and Appeasement in the 1930s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003).

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Olympics TV host Bob Costas, who had referenced human rights and doping allegations

during sports commentary.6

Politics and the 2008 Olympiad

A year before the Opening Ceremonies, the question is not whether Beijing will be

remembered for international or political issues, but simply which of the many candidate

issues will have placed its stamp on the occasion. The PRC, it is frequently said, views

the 2008 Olympiad as a chance to celebrate its newly gained prominence and its greater

interaction with the world economy. But the nature of the PRC regime, territorial/border

disputes and an increasing trade and military presence abroad each represent points of

international friction, meaning that despite the best efforts by IOC, the PRC government

and the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games (BOCOG) the 2008 Olympics will

be at least as “political” as its predecessors.

For several reasons, the PRC remains reluctant to permit criticism or questions from

either internal or external sources. First, developing nations, large and small, moving

toward greater international involvement have tended to view external discussion of

domestic affairs as unwarranted intrusion and interference. The PRC fits this pattern. This

is natural enough, as a transition toward greater international interaction requires

inevitably greater political transparency, and therefore potential risk to the regime.

Secondly, China remains a highly ideological one-party system, in which government

understands criticism as potentially hostile to its authority or at minimum destabilizing.

Opening China to bring thousands of outside spectators, athletes and media to China

means opening the nation’s one-party system to scrutiny from the outside, and the

Olympics must therefore be understood in the context of foreign policy.

6 Senn, 265-269.

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The PRC response to early criticism has been to argue that the Olympics is neutral

territory where references to politics--“politicizing the Olympics”--are out of bounds.7

For example, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun, speaking in April 2007, argued in a

press conference that any discussion of boycotts (about Chinese connections with Sudan)

or pressure connected to the Olympics emerge either from ignorance of Chinese policy or

“other motives.” In either case,

This is not in compliance with the internationally recognized nonpolitical principle of sports and runs counter to the Olympic spirit and the wishes of the people in the world. I believe that next year's Olympic Games in Beijing will be a successful and spectacular event that satisfies the people in the world.8

Similarly, in May, a Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman stated:

Recently, some organizations and individuals politicized the Olympic Games issue, making use of it to exert pressure on China. China expresses its resolute opposition. It goes against the Olympic spirit as well as the common aspiration of the people in the world. We are opposed to any attempt to politicize the Olympic Games.9

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Representative for Darfur Liu Guijin replied to

questions respecting Chinese connections with Sudan at the UN in September this way:

“The Olympic Games and Darfur are totally irrelevant. Non-politicization is one of the

fundamental principles of the Olympic Games, which is a great event to be hosted by

China for the people around the world . . .”10

7 At least one diplomat from the PRC in conversation with the IOC in the early 1950s held strongly to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, holding that politics is the determining factor in sports policies, a view opposite the IOC’s position then and now. Senn., 99.

8 Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Holds a Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Journalists on the Darfur Issue of Sudan, April 12, 2007 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t311008.htm [Aug. 14, 2007].

9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 15 May 2007” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t319836.htm [Aug. 14, 2007].

10 “China Opposes Linking Games to Darfur Issue,” Xinhua, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2007-09/12/content_6100457.htm [Sept. 14, 2007].

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But what exactly is “politicization”? The current Olympic Charter makes no use of

this word, but makes several references to “politics” or cognate forms in its 109 pages:

Discrimination of participants on the basis of politics, alongside race, religion, and

gender is banned (p. 9), as is political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes (p. 11).

IOC members take an oath to keep themselves free from political or commercial

influence (p. 28), and National Olympic Committees are required to resist pressures of

any kind, including political ones (p. 61). Most relevant to questions of free speech is

this: “No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in

any Olympic sites, venues or other areas” (p. 101). Speechmaking by political figures is

banned, and the host country’s head of state is limited to a simple scripted one-sentence

declaration opening the games.11

Criticism of a host government’s policies, however, as all parties know full well,

can hardly be limited by the letter of the Olympic Charter. Nor is it a simple matter to say

that hosting the Olympics offers the host immunity from criticism simply on Spirit of the

Olympics. Foundational political ideas emerge from conceptions of morality that differ,

sometimes widely, alongside the specific histories of nation-states. It is interesting to note

that the modern Olympics and the current Chinese regime come into being during the

same time frame, and share something of a common intellectual foundation, a foundation

nicely reflected in the 2008 Olympic motto “One World One Dream.” Consider the

modern Olympics’ founder, Frenchman Baron de Coubertin Pierre de Frédy (1863-1937).

While no disciple of Marx himself, he was strongly attracted to the philosophies of

history and moral/political progress that serve as the broad intellectual foundation for

11 Olympic Charter, Sept. 1, 2004. http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf [Aug. 17, 2007].

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Marxist, and later Maoist, thought. One of his best remembered statements, posted

prominently at the International Olympic Committee (IOC) website, is “Olympism tends

to bring together as in a beam of light, all those moral principles which promote human

perfection.”12 His biographer, cultural anthropologist John J. MacAloon, writes that the

mature Coubertin objected to the idea of original sin prominent in Roman Catholicism,

holding a more optimistic view of human nature and envisioning religion’s replacement

by a secular “cult of humanity in its present life.”13 With respect to international affairs,

this meant that international conflict could be ended, that one could in time achieve an

era, in Immanuel Kant’s terminology, of “perpetual peace.” International sport, he

thought, might serve as a means to lessening international tensions, even to the extent of

replacing conflict on the battlefield with competition on the playing fields and running

track. Governance of an international Olympics “could and ought to stand outside of

political and governmental interference,” and would be accomplished by “non-

ideological” institutions then coming into existence in Britain and France.14 The

Olympics’ emphasis on sport as a means toward human moral and social progress, and

for the sake of peace as the highest good, makes it an easy fit with socialist and

communist thought, expanded by Mao and later PRC ideology, which argues that real

peace, and authentic democracy for that matter,15 only come into existence once

capitalism and liberal/bourgeois politics are ultimately and finally defeated.

12 The International Olympic Academy, “The Olympic Movement,” http://www.ioa.org.gr/the_olympic_movement.htm [Aug. 14, 2007].

13 As quoted in John J. MacAloon, This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 90.

14 Ibid.15 See the 2005 PRC State Council White Paper on Democracy at

http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/democracy.html.

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Chinese participation in the modern Olympic games--coinciding as it does with

China’s emergence from the Qing Dynasty, through civil war and invasion and the

present questions relating to Tibet, Taiwan, and human rights, culminating in Beijing--

offer multiple opportunities to consider Chinese international relations and foreign policy

during the 20th and 21st century. It offers as well the means for students and scholars of

comparative politics to consider Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political philosophy

and changes in doctrine that inform national policy. Chinese participation in the first

modern Olympic contests was invited by Coubertin via the French Embassy in China but

the invitations were not accepted, the particular events and even the idea of western-style

international athletic competition being little known or understood in Beijing. During the

early decades of the 20th century, China cooperated in founding the Far Eastern Games,

with Wang Zhengyan selected as the first Chinese IOC member in 1922, and Chinese

Olympic participation beginning with the 1932 Los Angeles and 1936 Berlin

Olympiads.16 The post-1949 conflict between the PCR and ROC over Olympic

participation would become the best-known and hardest fought continuing struggle in

modern Olympic history. Due to the IOC’s recognition of ROC, the PRC boycotted the

Games from 1958 through 1979. At this point, IOC President Lord Killanin, who favored

PRC participation over Taiwan, authorized a vote by mail among IOC members, which

vote was won by the PRC. But Killanin’s successor, Don Juan Antonio Samaranch,

devised a solution tolerable to both sides, the Nagoya Resolution or “Olympic Formula,”

under which Taiwan athletes would march and compete as “Chinese Taipei.” Thus the

16 “China and the Olympic Movement,” Getting Ready for the Games—Beijing 2008, China.org, Jan. 5, 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/english/null/116819.htm [Aug. 1, 2007].

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1984 Olympics at Los Angeles for the first time featured athletes from both the PRC and

ROC.17

The 2008 Beijing Olympics represent, for their part, rich territory for students and

scholars of Chinese politics. In what follows we consider several points of controversy

that have been connected one way or another to the 2008 Beijing Olympic motto, “One

World, One Dream,” and directions they may take prior to August 2008. While the

themes of harmony, peace, unity, and agreement on ideals appear prominently with

respect to each, the politics--that is to say, the disharmony, disunity and disagreement--of

the issues will remain prominent, and the months leading to the opening ceremonies are

likely to include significant points of friction between Beijing and its guests on matters of

policy. This will most visibly be the case with respect to three politically sensitive

regions, Tibet, Taiwan, and Darfur in Sudan.

“One World, One Dream”: A Political Statement?

Since 1988, each Olympic host city has adopted a slogan.18 For Beijing, with its

strong Confucian tradition of aphorisms, easily adapted by Mao and his successors during

the Communist Party era, one might expect that few things could be easier. The slogan

chosen for 2008, “One World, One Dream,” 同一个世界，同一个梦想 , is intriguing in

several respects. In English, with its clear idealist, progressive overtones and suggestion

17 Richard Pound, Inside the Olympics: A Behind the Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the Glory of the Games (John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 130-132. See also “Los Angeles 1932: China’s First Olympic Games,” Chinaorbit.com http://www.chinaorbit.com/2008-olympics-china/olympic-games-history.html [Aug. 2, 2007].

18 Recent examples: Seoul 1988: Harmony and Progress; Barcelona 1992: Friends Forever; Atlanta 1996: The Celebration of the Century; Sydney 2000: Share the Spirit; Salt Lake City Winter Olympics 2002: Light the Fire Within; Athens 2004: Welcome Home.

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of world unity and common aspirations, it is a title Baron de Coubertin would no doubt

have appreciated, and is reminiscent of a clause used by his admirer and successor, long-

time IOC President Avery Brundage, that “the world is one.”19

A press release in December 2004 from the Beijing Organizing Committee for the

Games (BOCOG) of the XXIX Olympiad invited submission of slogans, with the

Committee noting that a winning slogan would “reflect the themes” of the 2008

Olympiad, “namely ‘Green Olympics,’ ‘High-tech Olympics,’ and ‘People’s Olympics,’

and the universal values of the Olympic Movement as well.”20 Over 210,000 submissions

are reported to have been received during 2005, with the winning slogan unveiled in June

2005. University of Pennsylvania Professor of Chinese Language and Literature, Victor

H. Mair suspected that the particular characters used indicate that the English version was

produced first, with the Chinese translation following.21 The role of a consulting group,

China Click2 International Consulting, in constructing the slogan on the basis of e-mailed

survey responses would confirm this, and the slogan would be announced as both an

expression of Chinese culture, but also as an expression of common humanity, in June

2005 by BOCOG President and Beijing Mayor Liu Qi:

There was no one winner. ‘One World, One Dream,’ is an embodiment of the wisdom of hundreds of thousands of people . . . [and] conveys the lofty ideal of people in Beijing as well as in China to share the global community and civilization and to create a bright future hand in hand with people from the rest of

19 “The Olympic movement today is perhaps the greatest social force in the world. It is a revolt against twentieth century materialism—a devotion to the cause and not to the reward. It is a revolt against discrimination, racial, religious or political. It is a glorious living demonstration of that hopefully felicitous maxim ‘The world is one.’” Avery Brundage, The Olympic Movement (IOC 1984), reprinted in Ruben Acosta Hernandez, Managing Sports Organizations (Human Kinetics, 2002), 19.

20 “Beijing Seeks Olympic Slogan,” China Daily, Dec. 27, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/27/content_403705.htm [Aug. 3, 2007].

21 Victor H. Main, Remarks on the Slogan for the 2008 Beijing Olympics,” Pinyin.info http://www.pinyin.info/readings/beijing_olympics/slogan.html [Aug. 14, 2007].

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the world. . . . It expresses the firm belief of a great nation, with a long history of 5,000 years and on its way towards modernization, that is committed to peaceful development, a harmonious society and people’s happiness.22

The word “harmony” (和谐) was considered for the motto, but rejected, as

explained by Tsinghua University Journalism Professor Fan Jingyi: “Harmony has rich

meaning and classic Chinese characteristics . . . However, it lacks a modern dynamic and

the competitive spirit of sport. What’s more, due to the different cultural backgrounds of

people throughout the world, it is less powerful in Western cultures than it is in China.

Therefore we dropped the word from our final list.”23 The Professor might have

mentioned as well that the “building of a Harmonious Society” (和谐社会) serves as the

current ideological slogan for the PRC government, first announced at the February 2005

National People’s Congress, was further endorsed in October 2006,24 and has been used

frequently by Hu Jintao in speeches and writings and on banners throughout the Chinese

mainland.25 Indeed, the word may have suffered from over-exposure in the People’s

Republic since 2005, and the Wall St. Journal reports in September 2007 that Chinese

22 “One World, One Dream, Slogan of the 2008 Beijing Olympics,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, June 26, 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/zggk/zgly/t247664.htm [Aug. 14, 2007]. The same site described the selection process as follows “After the deadline, BOCOG invited experts in the Olympic studies, sociology, sports, culture and linguistics to evaluate, pre-select, preview all the submissions based on the pre-set standards and in line with the principles of equality and fairness. The finalized slogan is the outcome of collective wisdom.” The role of China Click2 International Consulting is explained in Lei Lei, “Capturing the Dream,” China Daily, June 27, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.net/english/doc/2005-06/27/content_454886.htm [Aug. 14, 2007].

23 “Capturing the Dream” China Economic.net, June 27, 2007 http://en.ce.cn/National/Government/200506/27/t20050627_4072718.shtml [Aug. 12, 2007].

24 “Interpreting a call for ‘Harmonious Society,” China Daily, March 8, 2003, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/08/content_422680.htm [Aug. 15, 2007], and “China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society,” Washington Post, Oct. 12, 2006, A18.

25 See, for example, “Building Harmonious Society CPC’s Top Task,” China Daily, Feb. 20, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/20/content_417718.htm [Aug. 12, 2007].

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web monitors are on the lookout for use of the word by Chinese bloggers as a sarcastic

reference to President Hu Jintao.26

Nevertheless, an “official interpretation” of the motto offered by BOCOG and

published in China Daily provided a more detailed exposition of the ideas that underlie

“One World One Dream.” This document’s authors felt no reluctance to use the word

“harmony” in their discussion, perhaps an indication of political necessity, and indeed

deployed it frequently, especially in one of the document’s four paragraphs:

While “Harmony of Man with Nature” and “Peace Enjoys Priority” are the philosophies and ideals of the Chinese people since ancient times in their pursuit of the harmony between Man and Nature and the harmony among people, building up a harmonious society and achieving harmonious development are the dream and aspirations of ours. It is our belief that peace and progress, harmonious development, living in amity, cooperation and mutual benefit, and enjoying a happy life are the common ideals of the people throughout the world.

The final point, suggesting agreement of all peoples on common ideals, of oneness

and unity, is even more prominent in the brief document as a whole. The motto is said to

emphasize the “universal values” of the Olympic spirit, among which are Unity,

Friendship, Progress, Harmony, Participation and Dream. The theme of a common

direction for humankind appears frequently in Party literature and pronouncements. The

official interpretation closes by emphasizing unity by way of an etymological note: “In

Chinese, the word ‘tongyi’, which means ‘the same’, is used for the English word ‘One’.

It highlights the theme of ‘the whole Mankind lives in the same world and seeks for the

same dream and ideal’.” 27

26 “No Bloggers in China, Please,” Wall St. Journal, Sept. 14, 2007 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118971637019026752.html?mod=opinion_main_europe_asia [Sept. 14, 2007].

27 “One World, One Dream” Aug 14, 2007 http://en.beijing2008.com/17/74/article212027417.shtml [Aug. 14, 2007].

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In this light, “One World One Dream” turns out to be a perfect slogan for Beijing.

Veteran Olympics communications strategist George Hirthler is quoted by China Daily,

observing that it “suggests something profound and leaves room for broad

interpretations.”28 Without question, it can appear to be all things to all people: pleasing

to the ear, calling to mind athletic aspirations to glory, and generally idealistic and

hopeful about the future. At the same time, it nicely echoes Party doctrine about the

common aspirations of humankind toward a new society without politics—one in which

the discord, the noise, the disagreement and even chaos that can mark pre-communist

bourgeois politics is erased.

Especially during 2007 as the countdown to August 2008 begins the Olympic

slogan has attracted high-profile criticism, and not only from conservative American

websites wary of China’s recently more assertive international posture. The Beijing motto

received the attention of Tibetan nationalists and five American supporters, who

displayed their own revision of the slogan, “One World, One Dream, Free Tibet 2008” at

the Mt. Everest (Tibetan: Mt. Qomolangma) base camp in April 2007. The action resulted

in their arrest and brief detention, with protests filed at the U.S. Embassy by the Chinese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The display coincided with Chinese climbers moving

forward with planning for the multi-nation Olympic Torch Relay in July and August

2008, to include its ascent to the summit. The International Herald Tribune would note in

its story about the protesters’ release, “Taking the Olympic torch to the top of the 8,850-

meter (29,035-foot) Mount Everest (Mt. Qomolangma) is seen by some as a way for

Beijing to underscore its claims to Tibet, and is expected to be one of the relay’s

28 Beijing Unveils New Olympic Slogan, China Daily, June 28, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627_192446.html [Aug. 12, 2007].

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highlights.”29 Two months later Xinhua News Agency announced construction of a

highway to the 17,000 foot base-camp at Mount Everest, “so as to ease the path of those

bearing the Olympic torch.” The article notes that the road would find post-Olympics

utility as a means to accommodate the tourists and mountaineers, an idea that has not sat

well with environmentalists.30 Roads in the lightly populated Tibet-Nepal-India border

areas carry special political significance as de facto claims to sovereignty. They carry

strategic significance as well: Armies, after all, like civilian traffic travel more efficiently

on roads. Chinese construction of the Aksai Chin Road through northern Kashmir regions

in 1960, and the Beijing-Lhasa rail project completed in 2006 are understood in Beijing,

New Dehli, and Islamabad as not simply conveniences for travelers but as strategically

significant accomplishments. In this instance, the Times of India took a much less

optimistic view of the mountain access, noting that the Mount Everest road was

“generating muted security anxieties in New Dehli,” indicated long-term planning and

secrecy (BOCOG having apparently been kept unaware of the effort until its

announcement), and was understood by Indian government officials as “meant to rub in

Chinese President Hu Jintao’s Tibet policy that is designed to hasten the plateau’s

integration with the mainland.”31

29 “Chinese expels 5 Americans who staged anti-Olympic protest on Mount Everest,” International Herald Tribune, April 26, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/27/asia/AS-GEN-China-Tibet-Torch-Relay.php [Aug. 14, 2007].

30 “China to Build Highway on World’s Tallest Mountain,” China View, June 18, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/18/content_6259691.htm [Aug. 14, 2007].

31 “India in a Fix as China Plans Road to Everest,” The Times of India, June 20, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/China/India_in_a_fix_as_China_plans_road_to_Everest/articleshow/2134972.cms [Aug. 14, 2007], and “Activists Decry Chinese Road to Mt. Everest,” June 20, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/China/Activists_decry_Chinese_road_to_Mt_Everest/articleshow/2135076.cms [Aug. 14, 2007].

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Chinese reaction to the protests would become more forceful later in 2007. Another

high-profile display of the “Free Tibet” slogan appeared at the Great Wall itself on

August 7, 2007, during the Countdown celebration in Beijing, courtesy of Students for a

Free Tibet (SFT).32 The six involved in this incident--one Briton, two Canadians, and

three Americans—each were detained for two days after which they were deported.

About their effort, Canadian Sam Price was optimistic:

I feel we accomplished our objective, which was to put Tibet in the spotlight and put the attention of the world upon the leadership in Beijing. . . . If the Chinese Communist Party wants to be treated as an equal on the world stage, it must act accordingly. Our objective was to call them out and say, look, the International Olympic Committee has demanded that you improve your human rights record, environmental standards, freedom of the press, et cetera. That was a condition for receiving the privilege of hosting the Olympics, and it hasn’t happened. Other groups, like Reporters Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have stated clearly that conditions have not improved.33

As vexing for Beijing--if thus far presenting a lower profile problem—ethnic

Tibetan athletes filed a request in August 2007 with the IOC to send their own athletes to

Beijing in 2008, their hopes perhaps raised by the fact that Taiwan and Hong Kong do the

same. While their bid has virtually no chance for success, an eye-catching web presence

that includes an on-line game to liberate “Yingsel” the Tibetan Rangzen antelope

sponsored by SFT can be expected to attract some limited international media attention in

the months ahead. But a decade has passed since Hollywood studios and stars—Richard

Gere, Harrison Ford, Oliver Stone, and Brad Pitt in particular—sparred with Beijing over

32 “Tibet asks to send its own team to Beijing” New Zealand Herald, Aug. 8, 2007 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/2/story.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10456423 [Aug. 12, 2007].“Bay Area Activists Arrested in China,” Oakland Tribune, April 26, 2007 http://www.insidebayarea.com/search/ci_5754712?IADID=Search-www.insidebayarea.com-www.insidebayarea.com [Aug. 12, 2007]; “Foreign Activists Held in China,” BBC Aug. 7, 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6934295.stm [Aug. 12, 2007].

33 “One World, One Dream: I Was Detained for Tibet,” Orato, Aug. 20 2007, http://www.orato.com/node/3297 [Aug. 15, 2007].

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the region via production of several films, alongside their personal and impassioned

involvement.34 At present Beijing may correctly expect the energies of potential

protestors for Tibetan independence to have peaked several years ago, and it will be

difficult for its advocates to revive the issue to the same intensity level in 2008, the more

so with heightened security in Beijing and close police monitoring of SFT members.

A third high-profile critique of Chinese policies to have attached itself to the

Olympic motto concerns Sudan. The Chinese presence throughout Africa received in

2006-07 extensive media attention, and Chinese business relations (Sinopec and Petro-

China) with Sudan’s government became a matter of significant public attention. The

U.S. House of Representatives National Security Subcommittee held Hearings on the

issue in June 2007.35 Actress Mia Farrow, Smith College English Professor Eric Reeves

and New York political activist Jill Savitt have mixed hardball rhetoric with impassioned

appeals to Beijing to pressure Khartoum to end support for janjaweed militias active in

the western Sudan. In March 2007 Ms. Farrow referred in an article published in The

Wall Street Journal to the “Genocide Olympics” followed by the June 2007 launching of

the “Olympic Dream for Darfur” campaign.36 The website of this group announces at the

outset that it advocates not a boycott of the Games, but aims

to utilize the fact that China is the host of the Olympics to draw attention to China’s complicity in the Darfur crisis, and to urge China to use its

34 Dana Kennedy, “Can Hollywood Save Tibet?” Entertainment Weekly, Oct. 3, 1997, http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,289679,00.html [Aug. 12, 2007], and Ed Douglas, “Hollywood Invades Tibet,” The Indian Express, June 7, 1997, http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19970607/15850643.html [Aug. 14, 2007].

35 “Darfur and the Olympics: An International Call to Action,” http://www.house.gov/tierney/press/darfurhearing06072007.shtml [Aug. 16, 2007].

36 Danna Harman, “Activists Press China with ‘Genocide Olympics’ Label,” Christian Science Monitor, June 26, 2007 http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0626/p13s01-woaf.htm [Aug. 14, 2007].

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influence with the Sudanese regime to allow a robust civilian protection force into the western region of Sudan. China is in a unique position to do so: as Sudan’s strongest political and economic partner, as well as the host of the Olympics.37

No diplomatic tone, however, in what follows: “Bring the Olympic Dream to Darfur,” its

authors warn, “or we will bring Darfur to the Olympics.”38

About China’s ability to improve human rights observance in Darfur, former UN

Representative John Bolton has said that “China is susceptible of embarrassment on this

point,” noting that pressure through the UN and 2008 Olympics is having an effect, if

nowhere near the level its critics would like to see, in changing Chinese behavior in

Africa.39 Events in August and early September would seem to have confirmed Bolton’s

prediction. The PRC has pledged to participate in the forthcoming United Nations

African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in the form of a unit of 315 PLA engineers

which will deploy in October 2007. Chinese Envoy Liu Guijing visited the U.S. to

explain Beijing’s position on Darfur to U.S. and U.N. officials, as well as a skeptical

entertainment community.40 His public remarks were far from apologetic, amounting to a

spirited defense of Chinese actions in the region. Olympic Dream for Darfur activist

Professor Reeves saw some reason to be hopeful in the Chinese response, noting that

“Chinese attention to Darfur issues has skyrocketed since the beginning of our

37 “Not a Boycott,” Dream for Darfur, http://www.dreamfordarfur.org/TheCampaign/NotaBoycott/tabid/194/Default.aspx [Aug. 12, 2007].

38 Ibid.39 “China Envoy Responds to Critics of Darfur Policies” NPR, Sept. 7, 2007

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14248796 [Sept. 10, 2007].40 “China’s Envoy on Darfur visits U.S. to Explain Beijing Policy, Meet Showbiz Critics,”

International Herald Tribune, Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/06/asia/AS-GEN-China-Darfur.php [Sept. 10, 2007].

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campaign.”41 Reeves has lately directed his fire in the public prints on an unlikely pair,

President Bush and Steven Spielberg, condemning both for their cooperation with

Beijing.42 The tactic is likely to resonate well with some American activists. But Beijing

will be able to continue to point to its support for UNAMID and the so far effective tactic

of blaming those who would politicize the Olympics.

Summing up these regional criticisms, alongside those focused on detentions of

journalists, internet users and human rights activists, the August 10, 2007 Washington

Post noted that far from liberalizing policies as some had expected, the PRC government

had been using the approaching Olympics as pretext for even more aggressive policies,

prompting complaints from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the

Committee to Protect Journalists. PRC government actions were “tarnishing the

Olympics,” the paper editorialized, concluding by suggesting a change in the Olympic

motto to “One World, One Dream, Universal Human Rights.”43 The editorial appeared

three days after IOC President Jacque Rogge had published an op-ed hoping to calm the

troubled waters, scaling back expectations respecting human rights issues in China:

It is natural for human rights and other organizations to place their causes in the spotlight that the Beijing Olympic Games is casting on China, and to draw attention to reforms they advocate. However, the Games can only be a catalyst for change and not a panacea. Any expectations that the International Olympic Committee should apply pressure on the Chinese government beyond what is necessary for Games preparations are

41 As quoted in “China’s Gold Medal Spin Doctors,” Business Week, Aug. 17, 2007 http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2007/gb20070817_739602.htm [Aug. 20, 2007].

42 Eric Reeves, “Genocide Games,” The New Republic, Sept. 14, 2007 http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=w070910&s=reeves091407 [Sept. 16, 2007].

43 “One World, One Dream” Washington Post, Aug. 10, 2007, A12, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/09/AR2007080902009.html [Aug. 15, 2007].

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misplaced, especially concerning sovereign matters the IOC is not qualified to judge.44

The Torch Relay

The first Olympic torch relay was devised for the Berlin Olympics of 1936 and was

overtly and infamously political in character.45 The relay has become standard in the

years since, and as announced in April 2007 is remarkable in scope. Not only will the

relay reach the world’s highest peak, if all goes as planned, but will reach more countries,

and travel far further—137,000 km/85,000 miles--than any previous relay. Consistent

with the Olympics’ explicit progressivism, Lenovo, the Chinese company contracted to

manage the torch relay, invites torchbearer nominees to apply who are “New Thinkers”

defined as people who “find creative solutions to bring about global change.” Applicants

are asked to write a 50-word essay explaining “What makes you a New Thinker for a

New World?” 46

The international politics of the Olympic torch relay, noted above with respect to

Tibet, are present as well with respect to Darfur and Taiwan. The originally announced

torch route includes one stop in Africa, namely Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Olympic 44 Jacques Rogge, “A catalyst, not a cure,” International Herald Tribune, August 7, 2007

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/07/opinion/edrogge.php. 45 The idea of a torch relay to light the Olympic flame was first employed in 1936 for the

Berlin Olympics, and the event was used to political ends by the Nazi Party at several points along the 3075 kilometer route. Historian Arnd Kruger writes, “The torch run was broadcast live by a German radio team, which reported only on the friendly sights and sounds and gave the image that everybody was happy about the coming Olympic Games in Berlin. As the torch relay was under German rather than IOC jurisdiction, the ceremonies could be used for unabashed Nazi ceremonies.” Arnd Kruger, “Germany: the Propaganda Machine,” in Arnd Kruger and William Murray, eds., The Nazi Olympics, 33. Posters printed of the Olympic torch route were condemned in Finland because German authorities had altered Finland’s national borders in the poster. Ibid., 152.

46 Lenovo Home Page, http://shop.lenovo.com/ISS_Static/merchandising/US/sitelets/olympic_torch/torchbearer_call/?cid=us_olyoly_olt1797 [Aug. 12, 2007].

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Dream for Darfur campaign in response has launched a rival torch relay to commence in

August 2007, to be carried through seven regions or countries that have experienced

“previous genocides and mass atrocity,” namely, Darfur, Rwanda, Armenia, Bosnia,

Germany, Cambodia, and PRC. It is safe to assume that while the PRC has ignored this

alternate relay as of mid-September, it will at some point find it necessary to publicly

condemn the connection ODD is attempting to make. One can anticipate that the

alternative torch runners themselves, when they attempt to enter the People’s Republic,

will be denied access as an unreasonable attempt to politicize. Digital cameras and cell

phones virtually guarantee that footage of their attempt will be online within minutes.

By contrast, extensive attention within China and without has been given to the

Olympic Torch relay’s possible route through Taiwan, and negotiations continue in

September 2007. IOC regulations, as noted above, prohibit propaganda from the torch

route, but what of the route itself? Is it possible for the particular nations and locations

included, and the specific order of nations visited, to serve political ends? The

announcement of the torch route on April 25, 2007 was not received well in Taipei, and

was rejected by the Taiwan Olympic Committee within hours. Associated Press coverage

attempted an even-handed explanation, noting that

Beijing and Taiwan hoped to use the torch relay to bolster political agendas: for Beijing, that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory, and for Taiwan that it is independent. To that end, Taiwan wanted to participate as part of the international route — with the torch entering and departing the island via nations other than China. China would like the island run to be part of the domestic route. In an attempt at compromise, Beijing Olympic organizers said the torch would pass from Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh City to Taipei, and then to Hong Kong and Macau, both of which are Chinese-controlled.47

47 Stephen Wade, “Taiwan rejects China's torch relay plans” USA Today, April 26, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/summer/2007-04-26-china-torch-taiwan-tibet_N.htm

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Disputes about verbal agreements between Beijing and Taipei would follow,

including a September dispute as to whether new conditions—no display of the ROC flag

during the torch’s presence on the island—had or had not been added by Beijing. PRC

Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council spokesman Li Weiyi expressed the hope that

“the Taiwan authority can take into account the true expectations of the people that the

Olympic torch can be carried across the Taiwan Straits and stop creating barriers driven

by politics.”48 Logistically, it will be difficult if not impossible to prevent some media

present on Taiwan from recording and airing footage that includes the Olympic torch in

the same frame with the ROC flag unless the route is brief and closely stage-managed.

If anything is certain, it is that the politics of the Olympic torch route will become

increasingly prominent in the months ahead. Media attention and analysis of the very

political details will be impossible to control outside Chinese borders, and the PRC

Ministry of Foreign Affairs can expect correspondingly greater attention to Tibet, Sudan

and Taiwan from media, and less satisfaction with the PRC “no politicization” argument.

If there is good news for the PRC, it lies in the likely successful efforts its constabulary

are making to prevent high profile controversy. For some that lack of significant discord

will be understood as a political virtue; for others limitations on protest and ability to

speak freely, leaving aside acts of violence or terror, may well itself be the political

legacy of the Olympics—that the emphasis on harmony, unity and world peace, of “One

World One Dream” in Beijing comes to be understood outside China as coming at the

cost of individual civil rights and liberties. An opportunity for Beijing, on the other hand,

48 “Chinese mainland denies new condition for Olympic torch re lay in Taiwan” Xinhua, Sept. 12, 2007 [Sept. 12, 2007].

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to handle protest and political disagreement with discretion and tolerance, will be a clear

legacy option as well.

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