Ottoman Military Organization(Up to 1800)

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Ottoman militaryorganization (up to 1800)GABOR AGOSTON

The Ottoman Turks, who emerged in

western Asia Minor in the late thirteenth

century, built one of the longest-lived

empires in history, a multi-ethnic state that

influenced the lives of millions in Europe

and Asia for six centuries until the empires

demise in World War I. In addition to its

pragmatic policies and flexible governance,

the Ottoman military played a crucial role

in the expansion of Ottoman realms. The

Ottomans were among the first to create a

standing military force, the Janissary corps,

which was established as early as the late

fourteenth century. Until the late seven-

teenth century, the army and logistical sys-

tem proved superior to those of their

European and Asian rivals. However, eco-

nomic and social upheavals in the empire

in the seventeenth century, together withthe growing military threat of the Ottomans

foes, Austria and especially Russia from the

mid-eighteenth century onward, resulted in

major changes in the Ottoman military

forces and their financing.

THE EARLY OTTOMAN MILITARY

In the early years of the Ottoman state, thebulk of the Ottoman army consisted of the

rulers military entourage, the cavalry

troops of Turkoman tribes that had joined

forces with the Ottomans, and those

peasants who had been called up as soldiers

for military campaigns. The members of the

military entourage, known as kul (slave)

and noker (companion, client, retainer),

were the forerunners of the sultans salaried

troops. The Turkoman cavalrymen received

a share of military spoils and were granted

the right to settle on conquered lands.

In return, they had to provide men-at-

arms in proportion to the amount of bene-

fice in their possession. Later they became

the fief-based provincial cavalry, or timar-

holding sipahis, whose remuneration was

secured through military fiefs (timar). The

bulk of the early Ottoman forces under

Osman (?1324?), the founder of the

dynasty, consisted of mounted archers and

excelled in raids and ambushes rather than

formal battles and sieges. However, by the

reign of Orhan (13241362) and Murad I

(13621389), the Ottoman military had

been transformed from the rulers raidingforces into a disciplined army, and was capa-

ble of conducting campaigns and sieges.

In the fourteenth century, young volun-

teer peasants were recruited for the infantry

yaya (footman) and cavalry musellem

(exemptee) corps. Paid by the ruler during

campaigns, they returned to their villages

after campaigns and were exempted from

certain taxes in lieu of their military service.

Under Murad I the salaried palace horse-men, known as sipahis, gradually replaced

the musellems, whereas the azab infantry

archers and the more famous Janissaries

took the yayas place in the army. As a con-

sequence, the yayas and musellems became

auxiliary forces, transporting weapons and

ammunition and building and repairing

roads and bridges during campaigns.

The azabswere a kind of peasant militia

composed originally of unmarried youngmen fit for war, who were levied from the

taxpaying subjects. In the late fifteenth and

early sixteenth centuries, some twenty to

thirty reaya households were responsible

for equipping and sending one fighting

azab soldier to campaigns. Armed with

bows and swords, infantry azabs were

expendable conscripts who fought in the

first rows of the Ottoman battle formation,

in front of the cannons and Janissaries.

While their number was significant in the

fifteenth century (20,000 at the conquest of

The Encyclopedia of War, First Edition. Edited by Gordon Martel.

2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Constantinople in 1453, and 40,000 in the

1473 campaign against the Akkoyunlu

Turkoman Confederation in eastern

Anatolia), the Janissaries gradually over-

took their role, relegating them to garrison

service. Azabs also served as archers and

later musketeers on ships; they guarded

the coastline and ports and worked in the

imperial naval arsenal and the many ship-

yards throughout the empire. Paid from the

imperial treasury, the number of marine

azabs decreased from 2,279 in the mid-

sixteenth century to 239 in 1694.

THE STANDING ARMY

Established in the 1370s, the Janissaries, or

new troops (Turkish yeni ceri), served

initially as the sultans elite guard and com-

prised only a few hundred men. At first the

sultan used prisoners of war to create his

own independent military guard. Later, in

the 1380s, the child levy or collection(devshirme) was introduced to recruit new

soldiers. Under this system, Christian boys

between 8 and 20 years old, and preferably

between 12 and 14 years of age, were peri-

odically taken at varying rates, usually one

boy from forty households.

A group of 100200 boys, called the

flock, was collected and a detailed register

was compiled, containing each boys name

and physical description. The flock thentraveled on foot to the capital. Those who

did not escape or perish during the long

journey were inspected on arrival, circum-

cised, and converted to Islam. The smartest

were singled out for education in the

empires elite Palace School. The rest were

hired out to Turkish farmers for seven to

eight years, learning the rudiments of the

Turkish language and Islamic customs.

After these years the boys joined the ranks

of Janissary novices. They lived in their own

barracks under strict military discipline,

and in addition to their military training

they served as a cheap workforce for public

building projects or worked in the sultans

gardens, the imperial dockyards in Istanbul

and Gallipoli, or in the imperial cannon

foundry. After several years of such service

they became Janissaries or joined the corps

of gunners, gun carriage drivers, bombar-

diers, and armorers. The levies occurred

haphazardly in the fifteenth century, and

more regularly in the sixteenth century,

when the frequent wars often decimated

the ranks of the Janissaries. By the end

of that century, however, the ranks ofthe Janissaries were filled with sons of Jan-

issaries and thus the child levy became

unnecessary.

With the broadening of the pool of

recruitment, the initial guard was soon

transformed into the rulers elite household

infantry, numbering about 2,000 men by the

Battle of Kosovo (1389), 5,000 men in the

mid-fifteenth century, and about 10,000 men

by the end of Mehmed IIs reign in 1481. TheJanissaries remained about 10,00012,000

strong until the end of the sixteenth century.

The bulk of the Ottoman army, however,

remained cavalry. Until the beginning of the

sixteenth century the freelance light cavalry

aknc raiders remained militarily signifi-

cant. In 1475, Mehmed II mobilized 6,000

such raiders, whereas Suleiman I

(r. 15201566) brought 20,000 of them to

his 1521 campaign against Hungary. Alongwith the standing infantry forces, the

sultans also paid six cavalry units whose

number doubled between 1527 and 1567,

from 5,088 men to 11,251.

An even larger cavalry force was

maintained through the timar military

fiefs. In return for the right to collect reve-

nues from his assigned villages, the Otto-

man provincial cavalryman had to provide

for his arms (short sword, bows), armor

(helmet and chain mail), and horse, and

to report for military service along with

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his armed retainers when called upon by the

sultan. The number of armed retainers that

the provincial cavalryman had to keep, arm,

and bring with him on campaigns increased

proportionately with the income from his

fief; the more income he had, the more

soldiers he was obliged to provide. In

order to keep track of the number of fief-

holding cavalrymen and their obligations,

the Ottomans introduced various survey

registers, perhaps as early as the reign of

Bayezid I. During campaigns, muster rolls

were checked against these registers in order

to determine whether all the cavalrymenreported for military duty and brought the

required number of retainers and equip-

ment. If the cavalryman did not report for

service or failed to bring with him the

required number of retainers, he lost his

military fief, which was then assigned to

someone else.

The timar fiefs and the related bureau-

cratic surveillance system provided the Otto-

man sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenthcenturies with a standing provincial cavalry

army of 50,00080,000 strong, while reliev-

ing the central Ottoman bureaucracy of the

burden of revenue-raising and paying mili-

tary salaries. The system also proved instru-

mental in administering the provinces,

maintaining law and order, and protecting

the taxpaying subjects from abuses on the

part of their landlords. Provincial and dis-

trict governors, also remunerated throughthese military fiefs, served as military com-

manders of the cavalry forces of their respec-

tive provinces and districts, as well as heads

of the provincial administration, which was

charged, among other duties, with collecting

taxes and maintaining law and order. The

frequent rotation of governors and their sur-

veillance by Muslim judges, sent by the cen-

tral government, prevented the emergence of

independent local strong men in the prov-

inces and proved an efficient way to maintain

and mobilize large forces until the end of the

sixteenth century. For major sultan-led cam-

paigns, Mehmed II, Selim I (r. 15121520),

and Suleiman I could and did mobilize

70,000 80,000 men or more, including the

standing units, the provincial cavalry paid

through military fiefs and vassals, thus

greatly outnumbering their opponents.

Based on Ottoman treasury accounts, the

paper numbers of the Ottoman salaried

troops are summarized in Table 1.

As we shall see later, the paper figures in

Table 1 are often inflated, especially from

the late seventeenth century onward, and

the size of deployable and deployed centraltroops was considerably smaller. However,

they reflected one important trend, the

increase of salaried troops, which took

place in the Ottoman military as a response

to the new challenges that the Ottomans

faced when fighting against their Habsburg

and Romanov enemies.

WEAPONRY, ARMS INDUSTRY,AND LOGISTICS

The bulk of the Ottoman army (infantry

azabs, cavalry timariots, and akncs) used

swords and bows. The Ottomans adopted

firearms in the latter part of the fourteenth

century, and established a separate artillery

corps as part of the sultans standing

army in the early fifteenth century, well

before their European opponents. Initially,the Janissaries were equipped with their

formidable recurved bow, saber, shield,

and light coat of mail, while other units

used crossbows, javelins, and war-axes.

Under Murad II (r. 14211444, 1446

1451), they began to use matchlock arque-

buses, called tufekin Ottoman sources. The

fact that fortress inventories of the mid-

fifteenth century listed tufeksalongside can-

nons (top) suggests that by this time the

tufek had evolved into hand-held firearms

of the arquebus type. By the mid-sixteenth

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century most Janissaries carried firearms.

Murad III (r. 15741595) equipped his

Janissaries with the more advanced match-lock musket, although flintlock muskets

with the Spanish miquelet-lock were also

manufactured in the empire from the late

sixteenth century. The Janissaries were fir-

ing their weapons row-by-row from the

early sixteenth century, but it seems that

they started to use volley fire of the West

European type only in the 1590s.

The Ottomans also established cannon

foundries and gunpowder works throughout

their empire. Major foundries operated

along the Adriatic (Avlonya and Prevesa),

in Hungary (Buda and Temesvar), the

Balkans (Rudnik, Semendire, Iskenderiye,

Novaberda, Praviste, and Belgrade), Anatolia(Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Birecik, Mardin, and

Van), Iraq (Baghdad and Basra), and Egypt

(Cairo). The center of cannon casting, how-

ever, was the Imperial Cannon Foundry

in Istanbul, which was established by

Mehmed II after the capture of the city. It

was one of the first arsenals in late medieval

Europe that was built, operated, and

financed by a central government, at a time

when most of Europes monarchs acquired

their cannons from smaller artisan work-

shops. The Istanbul foundry could easily

Table 1 The paper number of central salaried troops

Date Janissary Artillery Cavalry Total

15141515 10,156 1,171 5,316 16,643

15271528 7,886 2,163 5,088 15,13715671568 12,798 2,671 11,044 26,513

1574 13,599 2,034 6,047 21,680

1609 37,627 7,966 14,869 60,462

1652 55,151 7,246 20,479 82,876

1654 51,047 6,905 19,844 77,796

16601661 55,151 7,246 ? ?

16611662 54,222 6,497 15,248 75,967

16651666 20,467 ? ? ?

16661667 47,233 ? ? ?

16691670 39,470 8,014 14,07061,554

16941695 78,798 21,824 13,395 114,017

16961697 69,620 14,726 15,217 99,563

16981699 67,729 15,470 13,447 96,646

17001701 42,119 11,485 13,043 66,647

17011702 39,925 10,893 12,999 63,817

17021703 40,139 10,010 12,976 63,125

17041705 52,642 11,851 17,133 81,626

17101711 43,562 5,510 15,625 64,697

1712 36,383

17231724 24,403

17271728 24,73317281729 24,803

17291730 98,723

17611762 49,708

17751776 61,239

Source: Genc and Ozvar (2006), vol. 1: 237238; Agoston (2010): 116, 128129.

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multiply its capacity before and during

major wars, casting several hundreds of

cannon before the campaign season.

In addition to the Istanbul gunpowder

works, the Ottomans produced gunpowder

in their provincial centers, including Cairo,

Baghdad, Aleppo, and Yemen in the

Arab provinces; Buda, Esztergom, Pecs,

Temesvar, Belgrade, Salonica, and Gallipoli

in the European provinces; as well as Izmir,

Bor, Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Oltu, and Van in

Asia Minor. These works met the demand

of the army, navy, and garrisons well into

the eighteenth century. However, inthe 1770s diminishing production forced

Istanbul to import substantial quantities of

powder from Europe. At the end of the

eighteenth century, the new Azadl gun-

powder works in Istanbul, modernized

with French assistance, were again able to

manufacture sufficient quantities of

gunpowder of a much better quality.

Despite allegations to the contrary in

the literature, the Ottomans managed tokeep pace with Europe regarding weapons

technology. More importantly, their mili-

tary-industrial complex in the capital,

supplemented by smaller provincial cannon

foundries and gunpowder workshops,

enabled the Ottomans to establish long-

lasting firepower superiority in eastern and

central Europe, the Mediterranean, and the

Middle East. While factors such as numerical

superiority, cavalry charge, and betterlogistics and tactics were important in

the Ottoman victories at Chaldiran (1514),

Marj-i Dabiq (1516), Raydaniyya (1517),

and Mohacs (1526) against the Safavids,

Mamluks, and Hungarians respectively,

Ottoman firepower superiority played a cru-

cial role in all these field battles. In siege

warfare, Ottoman firepower superiority

remained the Ottomans strength through-

out the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The Ottomans also had a well-oiled finan-

cial and bureaucratic apparatus, as well as

advanced provisioning, supply, and logistical

systems. The Ottoman treasury closed most

years with surplus up until the 1590s. They

had a sophisticated road network, partly

inherited from Roman and Byzantine

times, and elaborate and well-functioning

courier and relay systems, the stations of

which were also used as grain-storage depots.

Roads, mountain passes, and bridges were

repaired before the campaigns, and substan-

tial quantities of wheat, barley, flour, and

biscuit were stored in the depots along the

campaign routes. The mobilization, storage,

and distribution of food supplies to the fight-ing army remained the strength of the

Ottomans until about the mid eighteenth

century, positively affecting discipline and

moral. Owing to their supply and logistical

system, Ottoman soldiers were usually better

fed than their opponents. However, during

the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 17681774, the

Ottoman supply system seems to have

collapsed, contributing to the Ottomans

disastrous defeat.Ottoman firepower superiority, combined

with numerical and logistical superiority,

proved to be crucial in mounting a continu-

ous pressure on Europe. Attempts to match

Ottoman firepower prompted a series of

European countermeasures. These included

modernization of fortress systems (the intro-

duction of the star fort or trace italienneinto

central and eastern Europe); changing the

cavalryinfantry ratio; improving the train-ing and tactics of field armies; increasing the

quality and production output of arma-

ments industries; and modernizing state

administration and finances. While all

these were part of a larger phenomenon,

often referred to as the European military

revolution, and were undoubtedly fostered

by the frequency of interstate violence

within Europe, in eastern and central

Europe it was Ottoman military superiority

that constituted the greatest challenge and

required adequate countermeasures.

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THE NAVY

Under Mehmed II and Bayezid II

(r. 14811512), the Ottomans acquired the

common naval technology of the Mediterra-

nean, adopting the oared galley as their prin-

cipal vessel. The usual Ottoman galley

carried a single mast with a lateen sail and

had 2426 banks of oars on both sides, with

three oarsmen to a bench, all pulling separate

oars until the mid sixteenth century. From

the 1560s, following their Mediterranean

rivals, the Ottomans too adopted the al

scaloccio system, by which all oarsmen onthe same bench pulled a single oar. This

arrangement helped to increase the number

of oarsmen. Ottoman galleys usually carried

a center-line cannon and two smaller

flanking culverins. However, impressed by

the Venetian galeasses, which played an

important role in the Christians victory at

the Battle of Lepanto, the Ottomans were

quick to imitate these large and heavily

armed galleys that could fire broadsides, asopposed to the traditional galleys, which

had guns only on the prow. During the

rebuilding of their fleet, destroyed at

Lepanto, the Ottoman shipyards in Sinop

and Istanbul constructed some four or five

galeasses. These vessels could carry as many

as 24 guns and fire them from the stern, bow,

and sides. Although the Ottomans allies in

the Barbary states started to use warships of

the Atlantic type from the early seventeenthcentury and the Algerine war vessels carried

as many as 30 to 50 guns and 250350 men

by the last third of the century, the Ottomans

were slow to adapt to the shipbuilding revo-

lution. Recognizing the superiority of the

Venetian sailing galleons during their attack

on Crete in 1645, the Ottomans tried to

imitate the Venetians. However, due to the

inexperience of their crew, several of these

new galleons were either captured or

destroyed by the Venetians in the mid-

1650s. In 1662, Istanbul temporarily

suspended the building of galleons and

returned to the production of galleys. It was

only after 1682 that the galleons became

standard warships in the Ottoman navy. Of

the ten galleons built in 1682, four carried

60 bronze guns, and six 80 guns. From the

beginning of the eighteenth century some of

the three-decker and larger galleons

carried as many as 112 and 130 guns. In

17351740 the Ottoman navy consisted of

33 ships, of which 27 were three- and two-

decker ships of the line and six smaller vessels

of the fifth rank. The next phase of the

modernization of the Ottoman navy tookplace under Selim III, as part of the sultans

military reforms.

The size of the Ottoman navy was already

impressive under Mehmed II, who employed

380 galleys in his naval expeditions against

the Genoese-administered Crimean port

town of Caffa in 1475. During the 1499

1503 OttomanVenetian War, Bayezid II

considerably strengthened the navy, order-

ing the construction of no fewer than 250galleys in late 1500 alone. The reorganiza-

tion of the Ottoman navy under Bayezid II

transformed the originally land-based

empire into a formidable naval power.

The navy was instrumental in halting

Portuguese expansion in the Red Sea and

the Persian Gulf and in the Ottoman con-

quest of Mamluk Egypt in 15161517.

Appointing the famed corsair Hayreddin

Barbarossa grand admiral of the Ottomannavy (1533) and co-opting the corsairs of

the Barbary states of Algiers and Tunis was

a smart and economically efficient way to

further strengthen the Ottoman navy and

to project Ottoman military and political

power as far as Algiers and Tunis.

The Mediterranean fleet under the com-

mand of the grand admiral was the core of

the Ottoman navy. Operating indepen-

dently of this main fleet were smaller squad-

rons under the command of the captain of

Kavala, who patrolled the northern Aegean;

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the district governors of Lesbos and Rhodes,

the latter commanding the sea routes

between Egypt and Istanbul; the admiral of

Egypt, who controlled both the Egyptian

fleet based in Alexandria and the Suez

fleet; and the captain of Yemen, who

guarded the entry to the Red Sea. In addi-

tion, smaller flotillas operated on the

Danube, Tigris, and Euphrates. The fighting

power of such flotillas was impressive.

On the Shatt al-Arab in 16981699, there

were 60 frigates with 70 soldiers aboard

each ship, which meant a fighting force of

4,200 troops.Gelibolu, the first naval arsenal,

remained an important shipyard for the

construction and repair of Ottoman ships.

Nevertheless, by the beginning of the

sixteenth century the Istanbul Naval Arsenal

on the shore of the Golden Horn, inherited

from the Genoese of Galata and expanded

under Selim I, had become the principal

center of Ottoman shipbuilding and main-

tenance. In the 1550s, 250 ships could beconstructed and/or repaired there at a time.

In addition to Gelibolu and Istanbul, there

were shipyards at Izmit on the Sea of

Marmara, at Sinop and Samsun on the

Black Sea, at Suez in the Red Sea, and at

Birecik and Basra on the Euphrates and the

Shatt al-Arab, respectively. If one includes

the smaller shipyards, the number of

sixteenth-century Ottoman shipbuilding

sites is close to 70.

IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH, MILITARY

TRANSFORMATION, AND REFORM

By the late sixteenth century the Ottoman

army reached the limits of its operational

capabilities. Power relations on all fronts

were more balanced, wars lasted longer, and

they required commitments in fighting men,

weaponry, supplies, and money at scales

previously unseen. Moreover, during the

Hungarian wars of 15931606, the Ottomans

faced increased firepower from the musket-

bearing Habsburg infantry, whose ratio to

the cavalry in certain units reached 75 per-

cent. The Ottomans strove to counterbalance

this in two ways: by substantially increasing

the number of musket-bearing Janissaries

(see Table 1), and by recruiting musketeers

from the subject population. The latter were

disbanded after the campaign seasons in

order to ease the burden on the treasury.

These disbanded soldiers often turned

into bandits and contributed to the late

sixteenth- and early seventeenth-centuryuprisings.

The swelling of the ranks of the Janissaries

also had several negative consequences. The

child levy system lapsed, and with it the old

methods of training and drill also weakened,

resulting in deteriorating discipline and

skills. Prebends were turned into crown

lands so that the treasury could pay the grow-

ing number of salaried troops. However,

with the decline of the timar system, Istan-bul lost its control over the provinces and its

ability to maintain law and order through

their provincial cavalry commanded by the

sultans governors and other officers. These

functions were increasingly fulfilled by

semi-independent local strongmen, who

were then appointed as governors, for the

state needed their private armies against

Austria and Russia. For instance, traditional

timariot cavalry forces comprised less than12 percent of the 86,884 troops mobilized

for the 16971698 Hungarian campaign. At

the same time, the household troops of

governors and non-timariot provincial

troops together accounted for more than

32 percent of the mobilized army. It was

only with the help of such private and pro-

vincial troops that the Ottomans could

still mobilize an army whose infantry-to-

cavalry ratio (57:43) was comparable to

that of Istanbuls Habsburg and Romanov

rivals.

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Since the state still lacked the funds to

pay its swelling troops, the Janissaries were

allowed to engage in trade and craftsman-

ship. It is hardly surprising, thus, that in the

mid seventeenth century some 30 percent of

the Janissaries were pensioners or guards,

not fit for active military service. Some 30 to

60 percent of the Janissaries performed gar-

rison duties. Thus only a fraction of the

Janissaries (17 to 30 percent at the turn of

the seventeenth century) participated in

campaigns.

By the end of the seventeenth century,

the Ottomans European opponents hadestablished their own standing armies that

were comparable in size to that of the

Ottomans. While revenues of the European

fiscal-military states increased sharply in

the seventeenth and especially in the eigh-

teenth centuries, the Ottoman central gov-

ernments share of the redistribution of

revenues shrank from 58 percent in the

1520s to 24 percent in the 1660s, and the

Ottoman states revenues increased by only10 percent in the eighteenth century.

Whereas in the middle of the century the

revenues of Russia and the Ottoman

Empire measured in tons of silver were still

comparable, by 1796 St. Petersburgs reve-

nues were almost ten times greater than

those of Istanbul. In addition to such fiscal

imbalance of power between the two

empires, Russia also had a conscription sys-

tem, which resulted in much larger armies.European troops in general were of higher

quality, enjoyed an efficient supply system,

better command, and professional military

bureaucracy.

The eighteenth century thus witnessed

experimentation with other forms of recruit-

ments and military systems ranging from

militias to state-contracted formations, lead-

ing to the New Order (Nizam-i Cedid)

Army of Sultan Selim III (r. 17891807).

Launched in the aftermath of the Russo-

Ottoman War of 17871792, the military

and associated financial and administrative

reforms of Selim III resulted in a new, dis-

ciplined, European-style army equipped

with up-to-date weaponry and dressed in

modern uniforms. Financed from an inde-

pendent treasury, the new army was 23,000

strong by 1807, when opposition mounted

by an alliance of the Janissaries and the

religious establishment forced Selim III

to disband it and abdicate.

SEE ALSO: Austro-Ottoman War

(17361739); Janissaries; Lepanto, Battle of

(1571); Military Revolution, the (15601660);Muscovy, military rise of (14601730); Otto-

man conquests; Ottoman military organization

(18001918); Peter I of Russia (the Great)

(16721725); Russo-Turkish Wars (pre-1878);

Selim I (the Grim) (14651520); Suleiman I

(the Magnificent) (14941566).

REFERENCES

Agoston, G. (2010) Empires and Warfare in East-

Central Europe, 15501750: The Ottoman

Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation.

In Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Eds.), European

Warfare, 13501750. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, pp. 110134.

Genc, M. and Ozvar, E. (Eds.) (2006) Osmanl

Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Butceler, 2 vols. Istanbul:

Osmanl Bankas Arsiv ve Arastrma Merkezi.

FURTHER READING

Agoston, G. (2005) Guns for the Sultan: Military

Power and the Weapons Industry in the

Ottoman Empire. New York: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press.

Aksan, V. H. (2007) Ottoman Wars 1700

1870: An Empire Besieged. Harlow: Longman/

Pearson.Borekci, G. (2006) A Contribution to the Military

Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley

Fire during the Long OttomanHabsburg War

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of 15931606 and the Problem of Origins, Acta

Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae,

59 (4): 407438.

Bostan, I. (2005) Kurekli ve Yelkenli Osmanl

Gemileri. Uskudar, Istanbul: Bilge.Heywood, C. (2002) Writing Ottoman History:

Documents and Interpretations. Aldershot:

Ashgate.

Heywood, C. (2006) Whats in a Name? Some Alge-

rine Fleet Lists (16861714) from British Libraries

and Archives, Maghreb Review, 31 (12):

103128.

Imber, C. (1996) The Navy of Suleyman the

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