Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national identities

Lucian N. Leustean*

Aston University, Birmingham, UK

This article analyses the relationship between Balkan national identities and the region’sdominant religion: Eastern Orthodox Christianity. After examining the concept of‘symphonia’ between Orthodoxy and politics that developed during the ByzantineEmpire, this article argues that the political myths that have emerged from Orthodoxyare the most potent in the Balkan mythical imaginary. Political myths have a directimpact on contemporary politics developing a threefold structure: the sacralisation ofpolitics; the perception of the nation as a divine manifestation; and, the construction ofa divine realm on earth.

Keywords: Eastern Orthodox Christianity; symphonia; mythical imaginary; Balkans;Bulgaria; Macedonia; Greece; Romania; Serbia

Introduction

The political evolution of modern nation-states in the Balkans has been intrinsically linkedto the powerful force of the mythical imaginary. Myths that combine religion and politicshave been milestones in the creation of national identity as political leaders have employedreligion in forging an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983; Judah, 2000; Mertus, 1999;Perica, 2002). Predominantly Orthodox states in the Balkans created similar myths becausethe region shares the same religious doctrinal elements despite differing politicalevolutions. Comprehending the religious and political background could address whysome myths have emerged in a particular territorial and temporal location; how have mythsbeen influenced by religion and politics, and which myths remain the most powerful withinthe nation.

The literature on the nation-building process addresses a broad taxonomy of myths(Smith, 1986, p. 192; Mojzes, 1994, p. 18; Schopflin, 1997; Kostø, 2005); however, it lacksan investigation of the impact on mythical construction of the dominant religion in theBalkans: Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Myths are powerful elements that connect thepast with the present. Their influence extends from the mere hic et nunc to a supernaturalreality offering legitimacy and power to religious and political actors. From the vast arrayof myths, political myths are the most dynamic. According to Henry Tudor (1972, p. 138),they tell ‘the story of a political society that existed or was created in the past and whichmust now be restored or preserved’; and, from this perspective, they lie at the intersectionof the religious and political realms.

Eastern Orthodox Christianity has developed an intrinsic relationship with politicalmyths, emphasising the mystical dimension of everyday life, which is seen as a permanentbattle between good and evil, spirit and flesh. According to Orthodoxy, the constant return

*Email: l.leustean@aston.ac.uk

National IdentitiesVol. 10, No. 4, December 2008, 421!432

ISSN 1460-8944 print/ISSN 1469-9907 online

# 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14608940802519045

http://www.informaworld.com

to Christ ! the founder of religion and the political model of imitation for the faithful ! isat the core of the evolution of the nation. Religious leaders have claimed that the Church isthe founder of the nation and indissolubly connected with its political evolution. Analysisof both the theological concept of the nation and the political potency of Orthodoxyprovides the framework of the evolution of political myths. According to the Church’sview, in order to find the right way to rule the people, religious and political leaders shouldimitate the kingdom of God by transforming their societies into a pre-figuration of Christ’scommunion (Ware, 1997).

The sacralisation of time and the resurrection of memorial historical periods in thepresent are the main characteristics of the Balkan mythical imaginary transcendingreligion and politics. Orthodox churches argue that only their form of Christianity elevatestheir societies to a spiritual dimension and that history provided the best example ofcollaboration between religious and political realms, reaching its apogee during theByzantine Empire. Reference to the spiritual and political glory of Byzantium is thestarting point for analysing political myths in the Balkans. In the evolution of their nation-states, political and religious leaders have made reference to this period as the example fortheir communities to follow. In this way, they affirmed that the nation-building process wassupported by divine intervention and that history gave them the authority to lead themasses.

After examining the theoretical framework of Orthodoxy and politics in the Byzantineworld, this article investigates political myths in the predominantly Orthodox countries inthe Balkans ! namely Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Greece ! highlightingtheir significance for contemporary politics. This article does not propose to analyse allmyths in the Balkans or to provide a categorisation of myths, but to examine only thoseconnected with Orthodoxy and politics. I exclude from this analysis those Orthodoxchurches that are not autocephalous or those countries in which Orthodoxy is not thedominant religion ! namely Albania, Cyprus, Montenegro and Turkey.

Orthodoxy and symphonia

The relationship between church and state in Orthodoxy is characterised by the concept of‘symphonia’ (sym8vnıa) or the ‘system of co-reciprocity’ (aysthma synallhlıaw, lat.consonantia), a doctrine that developed in Byzantium. As John Meyendorff (1974, p. 283)states: ‘[T]he great dream of Byzantine civilisation was a universal Christian society,administrated by the emperor and spiritually guided by the church.’ According to thisvision, the Empire was considered the kingdom that would last forever, whose political andreligious domination would be without competitor on earth, as it was the reflection ofChrist’s kingdom. Both the church and the state should collaborate towards ‘achieving asublime destiny’ of the people under their jurisdiction (Papathomas, 1998, p. 705) and thereis no conflict between the means employed by church or state in promoting the welfare oftheir subjects. While there is a separation between the completely laic character of the stateand the religious status of the church, symphonia promotes equality and an intimaterelationship between these institutions ! however, with different priorities and methods ofoperating. The state is interested in its survival within a system of states and the projectionof its power in international politics. The church operates with religious methods leadingthe community towards the best way of achieving spiritual progress and salvation.

According to symphonia, both church and state use their own laws in order to promotetheir own purposes and there is no confusion between them. The state does not rule itselfaccording to church law nor vice versa. There is no interdependency nor is there

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a complete separation. In fact, the major problem of the concept of symphonia is that thedemarcation line between church and state remains unclear. For this reason, religiousleaders could achieve strong political roles in society and political leaders could influencethe church’s position. From this perspective, the ruler and the priest are the major politicaland, at the same time, religious, figures on earth.

Both the church hierarchy and the emperor had special status in the Byzantine Empire.The emperor was considered the thirteenth apostle or equal with the apostles (isapostolos)who fought for the right or ‘Orthodox’ faith, while the patriarch was in charge of ensuringthat the community was following the spiritual path towards salvation (Hussey, 2004). Thechurch-state relationship is influenced by the mutual cooperation between the emperor andthe patriarch on their respective paths to achieving their individual and their subjects’salvation. According to Orthodoxy, the emperor had a special place in the material andspiritual worlds as the chosen leader, ‘similar to God, who is over all, for he does not haveanyone higher than himself anywhere on earth’ (Pelikan, 1974, p. 168). As StevenRunciman (1933, p. 133) states:

The Church was a democratic institution. It was possible for any Orthodox Christian, howeverhumble his origin, to attain to the Patriarchal throne; merit was in theory the sole criterion.And in practice, except when an Emperor deliberately appointed a nonentity ! an action thatwas always unpopular ! the Patriarchs were of a very high level of ability.

The patriarch’s main attributions were related to the spiritual progress of his faithful,while the emperor regulated the life of the clergy, appointing the highest hierarchicalpositions and mediating conflicts between its clergy (Vasilev, 1980, p. 148). The history ofByzantium also offers examples of patriarchs who acted against imperial policy. Thus,patriarchs Photius, Germanus and Arsenius were deposed for defying the emperor whoattempted to interfere too much in ecclesiastical policy, while John Chrysostom lost hispatriarchal throne for censuring the morals of the Court (Runciman, 1933, p. 113). Fromthe fifth century, religious heresy was considered a state crime. Byzantium supported onlyone religion, Orthodoxy, and condemned its opponents, especially when they werepolitically dangerous for the stability of the empire, such as in the case of the Bogomilssect, which had its own concept of Christianity and preached disobedience to the stateorder (Runciman, 1933, p. 114).

The concept of ‘symphonia’ acquired a stronger dimension during the reign of theEmperor Justinian, who, in the systematisation of civil law, set out some aspects of therelationship between church and empire. Referring to the importance of Christianity,Justinian stated in his Edict to the People of Constantinople Concerning the Faith in 554:

We believe that the first and greatest blessing for all mankind is the confession of the Christianfaith, true and beyond reproach, to the end that it may be universally established and that allthe most holy priests of the whole globe may be joined together in unity and with one voicemay confess and preach the Orthodox Christian faith, and that every plea devised by hereticsmay be rendered null and avoid. (Ure, 1979, p. 122)

Furthermore, the classical text that indicates the boundaries of the priesthood andimperial offices is Justinian’s Sixth Novel in which he writes:

There are two major gifts which God has given unto men of His supernal clemency, thepriesthood and the imperial authority ! hierosyne and basileia; sacerdotium and imperium. Ofthese, the former is concerned with things divine; the latter presides over the human affairs andtakes care of them. Proceeding from the same source, both adorn human life. Nothing isgreater concern for the emperors as the dignity of the priesthood, so that priests may in theirturn pray to God for them. (Vassiliadis, 2003, p. 99)

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Justinian’s model was followed by his successors and became the tenet of the relationshipbetween Orthodoxy and government. His Novels were further developed in the ninthcentury in a document titled Epanagoge, most probably written by Patriarch Photius. Evenif this document was only a draft and was not officially adopted by the state, it was widelycirculated in Orthodox territories and influenced the development of further legislationoutside Byzantium, through the Middle Ages, to the creation of nation-states. Epanagogestates that: ‘The temporal power and the priesthood relate to each other as body and soul;they are necessary for state order just as body and soul are necessary in a living man. It isin their linkage and harmony that the well-being of a state lies’ (Vassiliadis, 2003, p. 99).

In Orthodoxy, the body of the church is understood differently from that in WesternEurope, where it is perceived as merely an ecclesiastical organisation within the state.According to Orthodoxy, the church includes ‘the whole body of the faithful, the ‘‘holycatholic church’’ of the Creed, or at least the faithful of his own persuasion’ (Runciman,1971, p. 14), and for this reason, the emperor was obliged to interfere in church life as hewas responsible for the salvation of his own subjects before God. This norm is valid evennowadays and explains how political leaders may act in Orthodox countries: the politicalruler may see his personal salvation according to the mission instituted by God, that ofruling a people on their paths to divinity.

Even if the Byzantine Empire disappeared from Europe’s map with the fall ofConstantinople on 26 May 1453, its religious and political legacy for Orthodox regions hasremained. As Henri Gregoire (1948, p. 127) states: ‘The Byzantine Church is the mostimportant of Byzantine survivals. The Empire has disappeared, but the Church remains.’Through its religious ceremonies and jurisdictional organisation, the Church has continuedto remind the faithful of the Byzantium model regarding the relationship between churchand state. Myths and religious and political symbols of liturgical ceremonials broughttogether the Orthodox people even if they were now subjects of other regimes. Thecommonwealth survived through the transformation of Orthodox churches into nationalchurches, which shared the same religious faith (Meyendorff, 1996). While in the Westernpart of Europe, the Roman Catholic Church and Reformed churches developed a differentreligious and political trajectory, Orthodoxy remained ‘eager to enter the state of grace, theright relationship to God, here and now’ (Runciman, 1933, p. 129). This aspectcharacterised the relationship between Orthodoxy and various political forms ofgovernment until modern times as, according to Church doctrine, any government istransitory while the kingdom of God is eternal.

The historical evolution of most Balkan states shows that politicians used Orthodoxybecause of its nationalist message in order to induce cohesion and gain support for theirpolitical programmes (Kitromilides, 1989; Leustean, 2007a). Looking back in history,Orthodoxy influenced the nation-building process as its hierarchy saw the possibility ofreviving the Byzantine dream of a Christian state. Thus, the relationship between churchand state presented in Justinian’s Novels and Photius’s Epanagoge has remained present inOrthodoxy’s attitude towards politics until today.

The mythical composition of the Balkans

The church and the state are only temporary organs through which Christ, as the supremeruler, communicates with his faithful and leads the nation towards salvation. The politicalcreation of state structures is perceived by Orthodoxy as a sinful act in the history ofhumanity. According to Orthodoxy, in his creation of the material world God did notinstitute any political organisation. People founded political institutions for their own

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material, rather than spiritual, progress. For this reason, in the Church’s view, politicalleaders have to collaborate with the church in order to ensure their salvation and that ofthe nation (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000). The national mythology of Orthodox countries inthe Balkans has at its core the promotion of a paradisiacal world towards which thefaithful aspires in a comparable manner to that in the Byzantium world. From thisperspective, Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and, recently, Macedonians perceivethemselves as continuators of a great past in which the church played the main role inproviding the salvation of the dead, the living and unborn members of the nation. Bycontinually returning to historical elements that had sacred resonance, religious andpolitical leaders found the examples to follow and upon which to model their societies. Thepresence of Church hierarchs together with political leaders at the most important politicalevents induce the idea that both spiritual and lay authorities work together in Orthodoxsocieties for the welfare of the people. However, while the mythologies of these countriesremind their nations of previous glory, political myths presuppose an actualisation of theprevious order in current political affairs. An examination of the national mythologies ofOrthodox countries in the Balkans reveals common elements across the region derivedfrom the employment of political myths.

The sacralisation of politics

The first structural element of political myths within the Orthodox world is the perceptionof the political realm as sacred. Political leaders, seen by the Church as chosen by God,have profane and divine attributes. This sacralisation of politics produces comparablereverberations across Balkan national mythologies.

In Romania, after the creation of the state in 1859, political and religious leaderspromoted those national heroes that had both religious and political significance andappealed to the body of the nation. Figures from the Middle Ages, such as Mircea the Old(1349!1418), Stephen the Great (1457!1504) and Michael the Brave (1558!1601), wereconsidered predecessors and protectors of the new Romanian state and of the national soul(Boia, 2001). The Orthodox Church acquired the position of the ‘mother’ of the people, asthe one who had supported the creation and survival of the Romanian nation throughoutcenturies. Following the principle of symphonia, members of the Church hierarchy wereoffered political positions in Parliament, while the state dominated the Churchtransforming it into a state institution which served its political interests. Despite shortperiods of unstable relations, this pattern of close contact between the top hierarchy of theChurch and politicians has remained dominant until contemporary times.

Recently, in embracing democracy after the fall of communism, Romanians claimedthat they suffered in the past not because of the decisions of their political leaders, butbecause the leadership suppressed religion and destroyed churches and monasteries. TheOrthodox Church extensively used this myth in supporting the creation of a new statebased on stronger religious values. Romania did not have a complete rupture with itscommunist past and the political authorities ensured that their positions remained largelyuntouched (Corduneanu, 2003). All official polls indicate that for over 80% of thepopulation the Church is the most trusted institution alongside the army, while democraticbodies such as Parliament or the President acquire less then 40% of votes.

Political myths acquired a stronger nationalist shape when the Romanian OrthodoxChurch canonised heroic figures from national history. Despite historical controversiesover his personal life, Stephen the Great was canonised in 1992, while the nationalistposition of the Church was constantly defended by the political authorities. Thus, in 2004,

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President Ion Iliescu brought the sword of Stephen the Great to Bucharest for a few daysfrom the Topkapi Museum in Istanbul in a gesture that showed the support of the politicalclass; and, in 2006 in a public national debate over who was the most important person inRomanian history, the majority of people voted for Stephen the Great, especially becauseof his combination of religion and politics.

The use of political myths has been clearly evident in political discourse during electionperiod when political leaders seek the support of the Church. On 29 October 2004, at thebeginning of electoral campaign, Prime Minister Adrian Nastase made public the decisionof his government to offer 95,000 hectares of forest to the Church from state patrimony.Archbishop Pimen of Suceava, the beneficiary of this decree and who was previously one ofthe staunchest critics of the regime, suddenly changed his attitude and stated that Nastasebecame ‘one of the major patrons and guardians’ of the Church; his name would always beremembered by the Church in its prayers similar to that of previous patrons from thenation’s past’ (Ziua, 30 October 2004). Moreover, on 7 November 2004, after Nastaseattended a religious ceremony held by Bishop Calinic of Arges, the bishop publicly claimedto the congregation that Nastase’s ‘humble’ personality reminded him of previous leaders,concluding his remarks that ‘you are similar to the great leaders in the history of ourcountry’ (Ziua, 8 November 2004). Through his comments, Bishop Calinic not only madereference to a sacralised past, but also connected the glorious history of the country withthose candidates for whom the faithful should vote. This type of discourse is closelyconnected with the Orthodox perception of the political leader as embodying the gloriouspast. The basis for this perception lies within the concept of ‘symphonia’, which claims thatpolitical actions are the will of God (Stan and Turcescu, 2007).

Comparable sacralisations of politics can be seen in neighbouring Serbia and Bulgaria.In Serbia, the creation of the state has been perceived closely connected to that of theSerbian Orthodox Church. Serbs converted to Christianity around 870 and reachedpolitical and religious dominance of the Balkans during the Nemanja dynasty. StevenNemanja (1169!1196) achieved political cohesion by uniting the Serbian tribes, while histhird son, Sava, obtained religious independence from Byzantium by establishing theSerbian Orthodox Church. Serbia had its golden age in the first half of the thirteencentury, becoming the most important political and military force in the Balkans.The decline of Serbian political supremacy occurred with the battle at the ‘Field ofthe Blackbirds’ (Kosovo Polje) in 1389, during which Prince Lazar was killed and led to thecreation of the myth of ‘Prince Lazar’s Supper’. According to this myth, before the battleof Kosovo, Lazar occupied the position of Jesus at the Last Supper and took communionwith his soldiers, preferring to die and reach a heavenly world rather than survive in amaterial one (Sells, 1996, p. 39). Through this gesture, Lazar united the spiritual andmaterial worlds, sacrificing himself for his faith and, in consuming the sacraments, heappropriated the divine presence of Christ from the Eucharist. According to Orthodoxy’sinterpretation, the prince believed that only imitating Christ’s sacrifice would save his soul,and his example should be followed by modern political leaders.

Bulgarians converted to Christianity under the rule of Tsar Boris in 864 and adoptedthe Cyrillic alphabet by brother monks Cyril and Methodius. The ninth century isconsidered the golden age of the country during which Prince Simeon took the title ofking, declaring the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a Patriarchate. In the eleventh century,Bulgaria fell under Byzantine rule and the Church lost its patriarchal title, but twocenturies later it regained its autonomy. However, independence was short as at the end ofthe fourteenth century Bulgarians came under Ottoman rule. After the Second World War,political myths were organised around the idea of the civilising mission of Bulgarians

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among the Slavs, suggesting that common religion and similar languages should fostercloser relations between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Communist Bulgaria became thecradle of antique Slavonic literacy and had a linguistic mission to other Slav countries(Savova-Mahon Borden, 2001, p. 147). These myths acquired a martyrium form inducingthe idea of a long-suffering nation under Ottoman rule. From this perspective, Bulgarianshave more rights in the region because they survived the religious and political occupationof the Muslim Porte. In the 1980s, some members of the clergy, with the support of thestate, advocated a campaign forcing Bulgarian Turks to adopt Christian names andconvert to Orthodoxy. The central presence of political myths in post-communist Bulgariahas been asserted in the canonisation of Cyril and Methodius as national saints, despitesimilar claims from Macedonia and Greece. They were titled in the Church calendar as‘equal to apostles and teachers of the Slavs and Bulgarians’. The day of theircommemoration, 11 May, was declared the national day of the ‘Bulgarian Enlightenmentand Culture’.

The recent evolution of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was affected by a majorschism in May 1992 when part of the Church split from the communist-appointedhierarchy. This separation was used by political leaders to ensure that the Churchsupported government policy. The widening role of the Church in the national mythologyof Bulgaria was visible in the appearance on the political scene of the former tsar SimeonBoris Sakskoburggotsky, who, as a child, was deposed in 1946 by the communists. Despiteonly 15% of the population supporting the restitution of the monarchy, he took advantageof the political capital offered by the Church. At the 2001 Easter celebrations, he publiclyrecited the Orthodox Creed and subsequently attended religious ceremonies at the time ofthe electoral campaign advocating his political ambitions. The National Movement forSimeon II, then only two months old, subsequently won the election and formed thegovernment (Broun, 2002, pp. 389!90). Although religion was not the major factor inwinning the elections, the combination of religion and politics, and the employment ofpolitical myths, fostered his political campaign. As the former tsar of Bulgaria he occupiesan important place on the national mythical level and, returning to his country, he wasperceived as a providential person who held authority both over religious and politicaloffices.

The nation as a divine manifestation

The second element of political myths in the Balkans is the perception of the nation ashaving divine qualities. Of all countries in the region, the most active political myths thatbring the concept of ‘symphonia’ from the Byzantine world to contemporary politics havetaken place in Serbia. As Branimir Anzulovic (1999, p. 22) argues: ‘The differencebetween Byzantium and Serbia . . . is that the Byzantine regarded the emperor and hiscourt as heavenly, whereas the Serbs conferred heavenly status on the nation as a whole.The earthly Serbia is holy Serbia.’ Serbia acquired mythical dimensions as Orthodoxyprovided the means of salvation. Serbian political myths have developed an antemuraleform, claiming that the Serbians have not only been defenders of Christianity, but arealso a chosen people with a sacred mission (Velinkoja, 1998; Mylonas, 2003). Theexistence of the Serbian nation in history was a direct act of creation by God who chosethem from other people in the same way that previously he had chosen the Jews as hiselected people.

According to Serbian Orthodoxy, the myth of ‘Prince Lazar’s Supper’ also had aliturgical dimension. In the Church’s view, the liturgy is the most important moment in its

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ceremonials and, at a symbolic level, is the place where the material and heavenly worldsmeet and combine in a common celebration of God. The celebrating faithful and hierarchyare surrounded in their liturgy by saints and angels. Political myths in Serbian identity tookthis symbolism and adapted it at a national level. The Serbian nation acquired a sanctifieddimension. God was seen to be present in a continuous national liturgy among Serbsindicating to the faithful how political leaders should rule their people.

The myth of Lazar was employed by Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in supporting thepolitical rights of Serbians over the Albanian majority in Kosovo (Ramet, 1996). In 1989 atthe celebration of 600 years after the Kosovo battle, the Church and regime attractedalmost one million people to assert the rights of Serbians in dominantly-Albanian Kosovo.The meeting was a display of religious and political symbolism in which Milosevic’sphotographs were displayed together with religious banners and icons. Political mythspromoted not only a remembrance of a glorious past, but also an actualisation of the waysin which Orthodoxy could be politically used by the authorities. In this way, Milosevicbecame the modern embodiment of past historical leaders, as a unique political actor whocould save the nation.

Comparable mythical perceptions remained visible not only during his regime, but alsoduring that of President Kostunica. On 3 December 2000, a few weeks beforeparliamentary elections, Kostunica travelled to Mount Athos in Greece. Referring togrowing relations between Serbians and Greeks, he made remarks that recall church-staterelations in the Byzantine world, stating that ‘the two peoples will remain united until theDoomsday’ (Athens News Agency, 4 December 2000). By visiting one of the most veneratedreligious sites of Orthodoxy and referring to the Church’s theological doctrine, Kostunicaasserted the importance of religion for the evolution of their nations and, indirectly, forelections in Serbia.

Tito’s regime had earlier generated another myth ! that of a Croatian genocide againstthe Serbs or the Jasenovac myth, after the place where around the Serbs were killed duringthe Second World War (Byford, 2004; Perica 2005, p. 137). This myth was foundedimmediately after the war, when two exiled Serbian bishops, Nikolaj Velimirovic and IrinejDjordjevic, claimed that the Ustase regime in Croatia killed large sections of the Serbianpopulation in concentration camps similar to those set up by the Nazis. The myth began tobe more vividly asserted in Serbian society from September 1984 when 20,000 Orthodoxfaithful attended the consecration of a memorial dedicated to Jasenovac, at which, in hissermon, Patriarch Germanus of Serbia drew a parallel between Jasenovac and Jerusalem(Perica, 2005, pp. 152!3).

Close relations between the golden age of the Nemanjic dynasty, the Kosovo myth andthe Saint Sava cult, which dominate Serbian mythology, form the main political myths.These myths were clearly evident in 1988 when, in seeking greater unity of the Serbiannation, the Church exhumed Prince Lazar’s remains and toured them around the countrypromoting the idea of a heavenly Serbia (Radic, 1998, p. 167). After the fall ofcommunism, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church canonised nine new saints,including eight victims of the Ustase regime, and in 2003 the founder of the Jasenovacmyth, Bishop Velimirovic, was also canonised (Perica, 2005, p. 156).

The Bulgarian nation has also been seen as having divine qualities. According tonational mythology, the Bulgarian nation appeared in history at the same time as theinstitutionalisation of religion and language and directly connected with the religiousmission of Cyril and Methodius (Savova-Mahon Borden, 2001, p. 144). According toofficial textbooks, the adoption of Orthodoxy led to the rise of the nation, for ‘Beingconverted to Christianity, our nation was no longer barbarian’ (Hranova, 2005, p. 316).

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From this perspective, the relationship between Orthodoxy and the Bulgarian peopleelevated the nation to a new position, similar to that of other modern nation-states inEurope.

Romanians promote a comparable perception. They perceive themselves as ‘true’defenders of Christianity being chosen by God to fight for the right religion. RomanianOrthodoxy was seen as a means of uniting the people to the nation and the duty ofreligious leaders was to ensure that various ethnicities would ultimately embrace theprevailing religion of the state. Political myths acquired an extreme form in the interwarperiod when right-wing political parties promoted the concept of superiority of Orthodoxnations; only by being Orthodox could individuals be good citizens of their country(Leustean, 2007b).

Another nation with divine qualities that influences the very core of mythical identity isGreece. The special relationship between Greek citizenship and Orthodoxy dates back tothe establishment of the Greek state in 1830 and has remained a contentious issue since. Ifduring the Ottoman Empire the Patriarch of Constantinople had jurisdiction over allOrthodox faithful, soon after he came to power, King Othon of Greece ruptured relationsand proclaimed an autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church. The church was transformedinto a state institution and the government took control of religion. Greek political mythswere seen in the dispute between Hellenism and Byzantium, between those who supportedthe idea that the nation dates back to Ancient Greece or the Byzantine Empire. In thisdispute, the Church looked back into history and comfortably appropriated themes frompagan antique Greece as long as they fitted with state interests. The relation between Greekcitizenship and religion was also highlighted in the stipulations of the Treaty of Lausannein 1923. Following the defeat of Greece in the war against Turkey, the Greek-speakingpopulation from Asia Minor was transferred to the Greek mainland (Stavrou, 1988). Thusthe state had new citizens, and language and religion were the main factors that mouldedtheir national identity.

The relationship between Orthodoxy and citizenship has remained a major issue inGreek national identity until today. In April 2000 the government removed reference toreligion on identity cards. Mass demonstrations were organised by the Church, whichclaimed that this was a direct attack against the nation. The notion that a Greek is onlyGreek if he or she is Orthodox represents a direct expression of political myths. As CostaCarras (2004, p. 321) points out: ‘Orthodoxy remains a stronger element of identity forHellenes today than does religion for most other Europeans. . . . [M]odern Greece is seen assuccessor to the subjugated Orthodox, with frequent use of the language of resurrectionapplied to the nation.’

The construction of a divine realm on earth

The third structural element of political myths and the ultimate aim of the concept of‘symphonia’ is the idea of constructing a divine realm of earth. This perception has beenparticularly visible in Greece, whose mythical imaginary is closely connected withterritorial disputes. By assimilating religion as part of their national identity, Greeksbecame not only continuators of the great Byzantine Empire, but also had a specialmission in the Balkans. After the fall of Constantinople, Greek Orthodoxy carried out themyth of re-conquering the former capital. This vision forged the return not only to theglory of previous times, but also recapturing the place where the emperor, the thirteenthapostle, ruled the polis. In this way, Greek perception of political myths has both a concrete

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historical mission ! the conquering of the holy city ! and an unseen symbolism ! the returnto the spiritual order of Byzantium.

However, the re-emergence of the Byzantine world has been advocated not only byGreek mythology, but also by Bulgarians and Romanians. In the nineteenth century, KingFerdinand of Coburg adopted the title of ‘tsar’, recalling the glorious past of the BulgarianEmpire. By adopting this title, he claimed to be a descendent of Byzantine emperors and inthe Balkan Wars (1912!1913) he supported the idea that if his side won he should becrowned in the Church of Saint Sophia in Constantinople (Kolarz, 1946, p. 222).

In Romania, after 1989, political myths reinforcing the idea of a divine realm on earthmaterialised with the Orthodox Church’s intention of building a ‘cathedral of nationalsalvation’ in Bucharest. At a time of economic difficulties and Romania joining thesecularised European Union, Romanians are searching for the salvation of their nation.The Church claimed that Romanians could trace their roots from the activity of ApostleAndrew, who allegedly preached on the territory of Dobrodja, in the southeast of thecountry. Although there is no evident archaeological evidence to support this theory, theChurch brought the times of Jesus and his apostles into the present day implying that inthe process of the country’s democratisation, the Church and people had to ‘look back toapostolic times’. In addition, the invitation of Pope John Paul II to Romania ! the first tripof a Catholic primate to a dominantly Orthodox country ! supported the claims of theChurch that Romania was a unique spiritual place in the Orthodox commonwealth.According to the Church’s view, Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Teoctist wereprovidential men who would take the Christian faith towards unification as in the firstcenturies.

One of the newest Orthodox churches in the Balkans is the Macedonian OrthodoxChurch, which ceded from Serbian jurisdiction in 1967. In a manner similar to that of theother Orthodox churches, it affirmed its close connection to the Macedonian nation and itspolitical emergence. The Church constructed its identity on the religious history providedby the intersection of political and religious developments in the region. ByzantineEmperor Justinian I (527!565) was born in the Skopje region, where he built a city calledJustiniana Prima. In order to raise the religious profile of the city, he created anarchbishopric to which he appointed the Metropolitan of Skopje. Moreover, after Cyriland Methodius translated the Bible into Cyrillic, their mission was continued by SaintClement and Saint Nahum, who are considered national saints. They founded a ‘universityfor the Slavs’ and established the first Slavic monastery on the shore of Lake Ohrid. TheOhrid Archdiocese existed until 1767 when it was abolished by the Ottoman Empire andthe Orthodox inhabitants were placed under Serbian jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional split from the Serbian Orthodox Church was directly supported bypolitical myths. Macedonian hierarchs argue that the Ohrid Archbishopric was ‘the motherof the Serbian Orthodox Church’ and its new status would represent the restoration ofprevious historical circumstances. The proclamation of autonomy on 17 July 1967symbolically marked 200 years since the abolition of the Archbishopric of Ohrid andthe official document declaring ecclesiastical independence clearly made reference to theglorious restoration of the former ecclesiastical organisation (Ilievski, 1973, pp. 92!4).Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, ethnic conflict betweenAlbanians and Macedonians led to religious clashes in the country. Under pressure fromthe EU and NATO, the new constitution did not make reference to the role of theMacedonian Orthodox Church in an attempt to alleviate the conflict. Orthodox hierarchssaw this action as a direct attack against their church and accused President BorisTrajkovski, who was a Methodist, of orchestrating a campaign against the dominant

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religion. They created conspiracy theories and claimed that Macedonia had to resist notonly Albanian terrorists, but also religious sects supported by the president (Ivekovic,2002, p. 533). A decrease in the influence of Orthodoxy in society was attributed to aconspiracy at the top level, and the hierarchs made reference to previous collaborationsbetween church and state in the Middle Ages, thus emphasising the construction ofpolitical myths.

Conclusion

Eastern Orthodox Christianity centres its doctrine on the unchanged search for thekingdom of God and sees every political regime as the will of divinity on earth. Orthodoxyis at the core of Balkan national mythologies and has a direct influence on the politicalevolution of the state. The Church claims that its presence in society is fundamental for theevolution of the nation. According to the Orthodoxy, the church is the cradle of the nationand the place in which political and religious rulers should cooperate.

Due to their autocephalous structures and nationalist discourses, Orthodox churchesplay a significant role in shaping the mythical imaginary, which is closely connected to theByzantine concept of ‘symphonia’. Political myths in the Balkans lie at the intersection ofreligion and politics and are key to the development of the mythical imagination. Politicalmyths not only make reference to the former glory of the country, but also strengthen therelationship between the body of the nation and religious and political authorities. Afterthe fall of communism, political myths have been most visible during election campaignswhen political leaders have used the Church discourse for gaining support from theelectorate or when the Church is threatened by religious competition. Thus, the mainelements of political myths are: the sacralisation of politics; the perception of the nation ashaving divine qualities; and the promotion of the construction of a divine realm on earth.This structure remains at the core of political myths, making them the most potent inBalkan national identities.

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