ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 01110

STATE OF OHIO,Plaintiff Appellee, CASE NUMBER:vs.

Michael Turner White, COURT OF APPEALS CASE NUMBER

AUTIIORIZED AGENT OF: C-090380 and c-090379MICHAEL TURNER WHITE"STRAWMAN"

Defendant Appellant,

RAFFIC COURT CASE: :(In The MatterO M/09/TRD/1945A and M/09/TRD/1945B

^ORWOOD MAYOR'S COURT CASEUMBER: 09-TRD-00494

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF Michael Turner White AUTHORIZED AGENT OF

: "MICHAEL TURNER WIIITE "STRAWMAN"

Michael'1'urner White Authorized Representative of: (COUNSEL OF RECORD)MICHAEL TURNER WHITE "STRAWAfAN"3756 READING ROADAPARTMENT #307CINCINNATI, OHIO 45229

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, Michael Turner White, PROPIA PERSONA

OHIO ATTORNEY GENERALRICHARD CORDRAY

;COUNTY PROSECUTORCIIRISTOPHER BROWNNORWOOD MAYOR'S COURT4645 MONTGOMERY ROADNORWOOD, OHIO 45212

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ATTORNEY FOR STATE OF OHIO

I

GLi ' r i } ` ( i 1' Gi ) UR

UUPFi(:11E :;WUfi'( OF ()Fil()

TABEL OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASEOF PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND GREAT GENERAL INTERESTAND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONALQUESTION FOR WANT OF JURISICTION

PAGE

5-6

STATEMENT OF CASE STAEMENT OF FACTS 7-10

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS 10-17

PROPOSITION OF LAW ITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITED PLAIN ERROR B1'REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE APPELLANT'SRESERVE RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE 1-207, 1-308 AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT PURSUANTTO THE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 10.

PROPOSITION OF LAW HTHE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BYTHE TRAFFIC COURT'SREFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FEDERALJURISDICTION AS DEFINED BY ARTICLE I,SECTION 8, CLAUSE17 OF TITE CONSTITUTON.

PROPISITION OF LAW IIITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSINGTO ACKNOW-LEDGE THE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO TRAVEL THEHIGHWAYS FREELY AND WITHOUT RESTRICTION

PROPOSITION OF LAW IVTHE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCIIANGE CUTS AGAINST THEDICTATES OF THE BANKRUPTCY THAT WAS ESTABLISHED IN1933 AN'D IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY, JUDGEMAHONY & THE CREDIT RIVER DECISION.

CONCLUSIONPROOF OF SERVICF.APPENDIXNotice of AppealAppeal scheduling orderEntry Overruling Motion for TranscriptsEntry overruling Reconsideration niotionEntry Dismissing Appeal as UntimelyAffidavit of Indigency

10-12

12-14

14-15

15-18

1819

APPX. PAGEi-6789

2

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLLC PRIVATE ANDGREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND 1NVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL

CONSTITUTIONAL OUESTION FOR WANT OF JURISICTION

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

It is further refevant to this Memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction that any

violation of the appellant's Rights, Freedom, or Property by the U.S. federal government,

or any agent thereof, would be an illegal and unlawful excess, clearly outside the limited

boundaries of federal jurisdiction. The appellant's standings is that the jurisdiction of the

U.S. federal government is defined by Article L, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S.

Constitution, quoted as follows:

"The Congress shall have the power . . . To exercise exclusive legislation inall cases whatsoever, over such district (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILESSQUARE) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance ofCongress, beconre the seat of the Government of the United States, [Districtof Columbia] and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by theconsent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for theErection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needfulBuildings; And - To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper forcarrying into Execution the foregoing Powers..." [eniphasis added]

aszd Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:

"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rulesand Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to theUnited States; and nothing fn this Constitution shall be so construed as toPrejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."

The definiition of the "United States" being used here, then, is limited to its territories:

1) The District of Coluinbia 6) Northern Mariana Islands2) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 7) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands3) U.S. Virgin Islands 8) Military bases within the several states4 Guam 9) Federal agencies within the several states

3

5) Amcrican Samoa)

It does not include the several states themselves, as is confirmed by the following cites:

"We have in our political system a Government of the United States and agovernment of each of the several States. Each one of these governments isdistinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe itallegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The sameperson may bc at the same time a citizen of the United States and a Citizen ofa State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will bedifferent froin those he has mider the other." Slaughter House Cases UnitedStates vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS A FOREIGI^TCORPORATION WITH RESPECT TO A STATE." [einphasis added]Voluine 20: Corpus Juris Sec. §1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441S.Ct.1973, 41 L.Ed.287.

This is further confirmed by the following quote from the Internal Revenue Service:

Federal jurisdiction "includes the District of Colunibia, the Commonwealthof Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Ainerican Samoa." - InternalRevenue Code Section 312(e).

In legal terminology, the word "includes" means "is limited to."

When referring to this "District" United States, the Internal Revenue Code uses the term"WITHIN" the United States. When referring to the several States, the Internal RevenueCode uses the terni "WITHOUT" the United States.

Dozens, perhaps hnndreds, of court cases prove that federal jurisdiction is limited to the

few federal territory areas above indicated. For example, in two Supreme Court cases, it

was decided:

"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into theterritorial liniits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,and other places that are within the exclusive jtu•isdiction of the nationalgovernment," Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215.

"We think a proper examination of this subject will show that the UnitedStates never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in

4

and to the territory, of which Alabaana or any of the new States were

formed..."

"fBiecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exerciseniunicipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eniinent domain, within the liniits of aState or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted..."

Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all theterritory within her limits, subject to the common law," Pollard v. HaQan, 44U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.

Likewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at §7 specifies that the "territorial

jurisdiction" of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to

any of the several States.

Therefore, in addition to the fact that no unrevealed federal contract can obligate nie to

perforni in any manner withoutiny fully infornied and uncoerced consent, likewise, no

federal statutes or regulations apply to me or have any jurisdictiou over me. I hereby

affirm that I do not reside or work in any federal territory of the "District" United States,

and that therefore no U.S. federal government statutes or regulations have any authority

over me.

POWERS AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OFUNITED STATES AND STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

All United States and State government officials are hereby put on notice that I expect

them to have recorded valid Oaths of Office in accordance witti the U.S. Constitution,

Article VI:

"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the inembers ofthe several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both ofthe United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath oraffirmation to support this Constitution..."

5

I understand that by thcir Oaths of Office all U.S. and State government officials arecontractually bound by the U.S. Constitution as formulated by its framers, and not as"interpreted," subverted, or corrupted by the U.S. Supreme Court or other courts.

According to the Ninth Ainendment to the U.S. Constitution:

"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construedto deny or disparage others retained by the people."

and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitntion, norprohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the

people."

Thus, appellant's understanding from these Amendnients is that the powers of all

U.S. and State government officials are limited to those specifically granted by the U.S.

Constitution. And,

further understand that any laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, rules, and procedures

contrary to the U.S. Constitution, as written by its framers, are null and void, as expressed

in the Sixteenth Anierican Jurisprudence Second Edition, Sectiou 177:

"The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing theappearance of law constitutes the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution isthe supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be inagreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it tobe valid; one must prevail. This is succinctly stated as follows:

'The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the formand name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective forany purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactnient,and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. Anunconstitutional law in leval contemplation , is as inoperative as if it hadnever been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settlejust as it would be had the statute not been enacted.'

'Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that itimposes no duties , confers no right , creates no office, bestows no power orauthority on anyone , affords no protection and iustifies no acts performedunder it...'

'A void act caimot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutionallaw cannot operate to supersede any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a

6

statute runs countcr to the fundamental law of the land, it is supersededthereby.'

'No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound toenforce it."' [emphasis added]

and as expressed once again in the U.S. Constitution, Article VI:

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made inpursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under theauthority of the United States, shall be the supreine law of the land; and thejudges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution orlaws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

All U.S. and State government officials are therefore hereby put on notice that any

violations of their contractual obligations to act in accordance with their U.S. Constitution,

may result in prosecution to the full extent of the law, as well as the application of all

available legal remedies to recover damages suffered by any parties damaged by any

actions of U.S. and State government officials in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On March 20, 2009 a police officer badge number 130 for the Norwood Police

Department, Unft 23 and Post 3128, issued a speedhig ticket on form B28 102726-2 for a

matter of jurisdiction under case number 09TRD00494. This states a violation of the Ohio

Revised Code 333.03B, which is a speeding contract. The speed was 43 MPH in a 25 MPH

zone. The summons to appear at the Norwood Mayor's Court was scheduled for March 20,

2009 and a trial was scheduled for April 13, 2009. Upon the appellant stating this to be an

Adniiralty Marititne Court summons the Norwood Mayor's Court judge refused to hear

the case. That judge transferred this matter to the Hamilton Comity Courthouse 100 Main

7

Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 for April 29, 2009. The Mnnicipal Court is Magistrate Jay

G. Littner and Judge Brad Greenberg hearing the matter of 112-09-TRD-1945 (A) and (B).

Greenberg Court denied the appellant's restricted appearance notice as well as any

and all case law sanctioned to the states by the United States Supreme Court. This Supreine

Court sanction the appellant's liberty interest to travel the lughways without restriction as

a Sovereign American Citizen. And, vehemently announced that the appellant does not

need to possess a driver's license, nor license plates to travel the highways. The Suprenie

Court further enshrined this right as guaranteed; and, if this right is mutilated that

retaliation can be compensated as a violation of the United Sates Constitution and the

Separation of Powers Doctrine. The Greenberg Court decreed the appellant to be in

violation of the Ohio revised Code and sanction a fine of $197.00, which is Federal Reserve

notes that have been sanctioned as counterfeit in State of Minnesota Coirnty of Scott, First

National bank of Montgomery, Planitff vs Jerome Daly defendant. The Justice Martin V.

Mahone,y ruled the Federal Reserve notes are comiterfeit.

Furthermore, the Greenberg strictly ignored the bankruptcy of 1993 and executive

order declared so by President Roosevelt by Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 611.1 and

Executive Order 6260. This information can be retrieved from the following resources:

Bankruptcy of U.S in 1933 & State of EmerQency, War Powers &TradinIZ with the Enemy Act of 1917

Bankruptcy of 1933

The United States went "bankrupt" in 1933. [President Roosevelt Executive Order 6073,

6102, 6111, 6260;

8

Senate Report 93-549, pgs. 187 & 594, 19731

In 1950, declared "bankruptcy and reorganization".Secretary of Treasury appointer receiver in the bankruptcy [Reorganization Plan, No. 26,5 U.S.C.A. 903; Public Law 94-564; Legislative History, Pg. 59671

The Secretary of the Treasury is the "Governor" of the International Monetary Fund, Inc.of theU.N. [Public Law 94-564, supra, pg. 5942; U.S. Government Manua11990/91, pgs. 480-81;26 U.S.C.A. 7701(a)(11); Treasury Delegation Order No 150-10]

On Oct. 28th 1977, the United States as a°Corporator" and "State" declared insolvancy.Statebaiil<s and most other banks were put under control of the "Governor" of the "Fund"(I.M.F.). 26IRC 165 (g)(1); U.C.C. 1-201(23), C.R.S. 39-22-103.5, Westfall vs. Braley, 10 Oliio 188,75 Am. Dec. 509, Adams vs. Richardson, 337 S.W. 2d. 911 Ward vs. Snzith, 7 Wall 447

"Mr. Speaker, we are now in Chapter 11. Members of Congress are official Trusteespresidingover the greatest reorganization of any bankrupt entity in world history, the United Statesgovernment..." -- (Mr. Trafficant from Ohio, Congressional Record, pg. II1303, March17th,1993)

"...the United States obligations in the International Monetary Fund..." -- Public Law94-564,94th Congress, Sec. 10(a)

State of National Emergeney

"Since March 9th, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared nationalemergency..."(Senate Resolution 9, 93d. Congress, lst. Session, Foreward, 1973)

"When Congress declares an emergency, there is no Constitution...° (Congressman Beclc,Congressional Record, Farm Bill, 1933)

"A majority of people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergencyrule. For40 years, freedoms and governniental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have invaryingdegrees been abridgeci by laws brought into fore.e by states of national emergeney..." --SenateReport 93-549 (Introduction) 1973

"The President may: Seize property, organize commodities, assign military forces abroad,

institute

9

Martial Law, seize and control and transportation and conimunication, regulate operationof privateenterprise, restrict travel, and in a plethora of particular ways, control the lives of allAmericancitizens". -- Senate Report 93-549; Senate Resolution 9, 93d Congress, l st. Session (I11)1973See: Chapter 1, Title 1, Section 48, Statute 1, March 9, 1933; Proclamation 2038; Title 12U.S.C 95(b)

Currently, permanent state of national emergency. -- 22 U.S.C.A. 286d. 1977

See: Executive Order 12919 signed by President ClintonTrading with the Enemy Act of 1917 & 1933 (People Declared the Enemy)

Oct. 6, 1917, under the Trading with the F,neniy Act, Section 2, subdivision (c), Chapter

106-Eneiny defined "other than citizens of the United States..."

March 9, 1933, Chapter 106, Section 5, subdivision (b) of the Trading with the Enemy

Act ofOct.6 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411) amended as follows "...any person within the United States.."Sce H.R. 1491 Public No.l

As a direct result of this bankruptcy, the Greenberg Court is action is de facto and

in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, all of which, suspend administering

jurisdiction to the United States of America and its Sovereign Ainerican Citizens as

Michael Turner White, authorized agent of: MICHAEL TURNER WHITE -

"STRAWMAN".

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

PROPOSITION OF LAW ITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSING TOACKNOWLEDGE THE APPELLANT'S RESERVE RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THEUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1-207, 1-308 AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACTPURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 10.

Every system of civilized law must have two characteristics: Remedy and Recourse.

Reniedy is a way to get out froin under that law. The Recourse is if you have been damaged

under the law, you can recover your loss. The Coinmon Law, the Law of Merchants, and

10

even the Uniform Coinniercial Code all have reinedy and recourse. The remedy and

recourse are found in the UCC. They are found right in the first volume, at 1-207 and 1-

103. The making of a valid Reservation of Rights preserves whatever rights the person then

possesses, and prevents the loss of such rights by application of concepts of waiver or

estoppel. (UCC 1-207.7)

In the case sub judice, the appellant his constitutional rights by signing the traffic

citation with UCC-1-207. This same i-ight was fiu-ther demanded when the appellant

appeared in traffic court made a reservation of rights under the UCC 1-207 which goes on

to say, "When a waivable right or claim is involved, the failure to make a reservation

thereof, causes a loss of the right, and bars its assertion at a later date. (UCC 1-207.9).

further, any expression indicating an intention to reserve rights, is sufficient, such as

"without prejudice". (UCC 1-207.4). thus and therefore, the signing of the traffic citation

and the proffering of this right in the traffic court and in the `connection with the

appellant's autograph, this clearly states a reserve and the right not to be compelled to

perform under any contract or commercial agreexncnt that the appellant did not enter

Icnowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. And fnrthermore, the appellant does not accept

the liability of the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.'

The Recourse appears in the Uniform Conunercial Code at 1-103.6, which says: The

Code is complimentary to the Common Law, which remains in force, except where

displaced by the code. A statute should be construed in harmony with the Common Law,

unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the Common Law. The Code recognizes

the Common Law. If it did not recognize the Common Law, the government would have

11

had to admit that the United States is bankrupt, and is completely owned by its creditors.

'Therefore, the explicit reservation at 1-207 and insist that the statutes be construed in

harmony with the Conunon Law. In furtherance to the traffic citation, the appellant

requisitions this court to produce the injured person who has filed a verified complaint. To

further cement this deniand the last sentence of 1-103.6, which states: The Code cannot be

read to preclude a Common Law action. Further, the appellant understand that the traffic

court has made a legal determination that the sections 1-207 and 1-103 of the Uniform

Commercial Code, which is the system oi'law you are operating under, are not valid law

before this court?' if, the answer to this is affirmative the appellant places this court on

notice that an appeal will ensue regarding this legal determination.

PROPOSITION OF LAW IITI3E JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BY THE TRAFFICCOURT'S REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FEDERAL JURISDICTION AS DEFINEDBY ARTICLE I, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 17 OF THE CONSTITUTON.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution, is quoted as follows:

"The Congress shall have the power ... To exercise exclusive legislation inall cases whatsoever, over such district (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILESSQUARE) as inay, by cession of particular states and the acceptance ofCongress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, [Districtof Colunibia] and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by theconsent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for theErection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needfulBuildings; And - To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper forcarrying into Execution the foregoing Powers..." [eniphasis added]

arad Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:

"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rulesand Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the

12

United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so cotistrued as toPrejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."

The (lefinition of the "United States" being used here, then, is limited to its territories:

1) The District of Columbia2) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico3) U.S. Virgin Islands

4)Guain5) American Samoa

6) Northern Mariana Islands7) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands8) Military bases within the several states9) Federal agencies witlwi the several states

It does not include the several states themselves, as is confirmed by the following cites:

"We have in our political system a Government of the United States and agovernment of each of the several States. Each one of these governments isdistinct froin the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe itallegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The sameperson may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a Citizen ofa State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will bedifferent from those he has under the other." Slaughter House Cases UnitedStates vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN'I' IS A FOREIGNCORPORATION W1TI3 RESPECT TO A STATE." [emphasis added]Volume 20: Corpus Juris Sec. §1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441S.Ct.1973, 41 L.Ed.287.

This mater has further been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows;

"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into theterritorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the nationalgovernment," Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215.

"We think a proper exaniination of this subject will show that the UnitedStates never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil inand to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new States wereformed..."

"[B]ecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercisemunicipal jurisdictiou, sovereignty, or eniinent domain, within the liniits of aState or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted..."

"Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all theterritor•y within her limits, subject to the common law," Pollard v. Hagan, 44U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.

13

Lilcewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at §7 specifies that the "territorial

jurisdiction" of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to

any of the several States. Therefore, in addition to the fact that no unrevealed federal

contract can obligate the appellant to perform in any manner without hini being fully

informed and uncocrced consent, likewise, ito federal statutes or regulations apply to the

appellant or have any,jurisdiction over the appellant. And, the appellant hereby affirm that

he does not reside or work in any federal territory of the "District" United States, and that

therefore no U.S. federal government statutes or regulations have any authority over the

appellant..

PROPISITION OF LAW IiITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSING TO ACKNOW-LEDGE THE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO TRAVEL THE HIGHWAYS FREELY ANDWITHOUT RESTRICTION

LAW AND ARGUMENTThe right to travel is vehemently announced as a secured liberty interest guaranteed

under the first and fifth amendment. The U.S. supreme Court addressd this matter in

Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 encompasses all legal cases for the right to travel.

Therefore, the appellant has a right to travel freely and incumbent, which is the right to

life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Further, the Snpreme Court announced the

Constitution is th supreme law of the land. See, Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137, (19430 and

can the state convert the right to travel to a priviledge? The answer is negative. No state

can convert a secured right to a priviledge. And, no state can convert ant secured liberty

into a priviledge and issue a license and a fee. Il; any state does such it is unconstitutional,

because no state can pass a law that takes away this secured right.

14

Can a state require the appellant to have a license? The answer is negativc. No state

can require the appellant to possess a license. See, Shuttlesworth v Birminghani Alabama,

373 U.S. 262, (1962). If a state does convert the appellant's right into a priviledge and

issues a license for it, the appellant can ignore the license and a fee and engage in the right

with impunity.

In regards to evillfuhzess: as an evil intent or notion to avoid a known duty or task

under law with a inoral certainty, is the definition of the Supreme court in U.S. v Bishop at

412 U.S. 346. Here, the appellant has relied upon the Constitution and United States

Supreme Court decision to enforce his right to travel freely. This is not the appellant's

interpretation; rather, the interpretation of Byres v U.S., 273 U.S. 28 says it is to he

interpreted in favor of the appellant. See, 16 Am.Jurp.2i°, section 97 states:

"then a constitution should receive literal interpretation in favor of the Citizen, is especiallytrue, with respect to those provision whieh were designed to safeguard the liberty andsecurity of the Citizen in regard to person and property". Bary v U.s., 273 128. And, "anyconstitutional provision intended to confer a benefit should be liberally construed in favorof the clearly intended and expressedly designated beneficiary". The appellant is tbebeneficiary of the United States Constitution.

Thus and therefore, pursuant to Boyd v U.S., 116 U.S. 616, ( 1886), this court is to

protect against any constitutional infringement. And, pursuant to Norton v Shelby County,

118 U.S. 425, (1886) an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no

duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is legal contemplation as inoperative

as though it had never been passed.

PROPOSITION OF LAW IVTHE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCHANGE CUTS AGAINST THE DICTATES OFTHE BANKRUPTCY TI3AT WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1933 AND IS IN DIRECTOPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY, JiJDGE MAHONY & THE CREDIT RIVERDECISION.

15

LAW AND ARGUMENT

THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States Congressional Record, March 17, 1993 Vol. 33, page H-I303

enshrines the bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES is a 38 part docuinent. It is an

established fact that the United States Federal Government has been dissolved by the

Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, Public Law 89-719; declared by

President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent. H.J.R. 192, 73rd Congress m session

June 5,1933 - Joint Resolution To Suspend The Gold Standard and Abrogate The Gold

Clause dissolved the Sovereign Authority of the United States and the official capacities of

all United States Governmental Offices, Officers, and Departments and is furtlier evidence

that the United States Federal Government exists today in name only. This created a

federal contractual relationship pursuant to this presidential executive order and U.S.

Const. Article I Sect. X , Cl.t with the states and the Office of the Person. The traffic

citation is a security, exchange and violates the presidential executive order, U.S. Const.

Article X, Cl.1.Sectimi. 10.

Clause l: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters ofMarque and Reprisal; coin Money; eniit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold andsilver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, orLaw impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

Clause 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties onImports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspectionLaws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports orExports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shallbe subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

Clause 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay an,y Duty of Tonnage, keepTroops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with

16

another State, or with a forcign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or insach iinniincnt Danger as will uot adniit of delay

The security of exchange is the underwriting of insurance for the corporate

UNITED STATES mauitenance is the criniinai penalty of $130.00 (one hundred and thirty

dollars) are federal reserve notes, which is explained by the Jeronie Daly, Judge Mahon,y &

The Credit Rivet• Decision. In the decision a Minnesota Trial Court's decision holding the

Federal Reserve Act unconstitutional and VOID; holding the National Banking Act

unconstitutional and VOID; declaring a mortgage acquired by the First National Bank of

Montgomery, Minnesota in the regular course of its business, along with the foreclosure

and the sheriff's sale, to be VOID. Meaning, the Federal Reserve uotes are counterfeit and

uncoustitutional. See, First National Bank of Montgomery vs. Jerome Daly, State of

Minnesota, County of Scott, Township of Credit River and Justice Martin v Mahoney,

Credit River township, Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968. Wherefore, the

appellant invokes the United States Constitution Article 7 Section 101ega1 tender that only

gold and silver can originate to pay a debt. Considering the State of Ohio does not provide

gold and silver to the appellant the traffic criminal offence must be absolved. Most

iinportantly, the failure to present the charging instrument is constitutional grounds for a

disniissal with prejudice in this matter, as well as, releasing the order of the court to the

appellant.

PROPOSITION OF LAW VITHE SEPERATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THESOVEREIGN CITIZEN WAS SENTENCED IN AN ADMIRALTY COURT OF AFOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS IN WANT OF JURISIDCTION.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

17

The State of Ohio is in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, which says

the United States cannot pass legislation mi to the United States of America. Is this true"?

Yes, this is true. The United States Supreme Court opined the following:

"...the Constitutioti divides authority[legislative jurisdiction] between federal and stategoveniments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion ofsovereign power." Coleinan v Thompson, 501 U.s. 722, 759 (1991)(BLACKMAN, j.,DISSEMTINGO. "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branehes ofthe federal government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any onebranch, a healthy balance of power between the States and federal Government will reducethe risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v, 1505 U.S. 144, ] 82] Ashcroft,501 U.S. at 458. See the federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)" [New York v unitedSates, 505 U.S. 144, (1992)].The federal government has no legislative power outside of itsterritory. And, this very same law is spoken of by Judge Story, in his treatise on theConflicts of law.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for want of jurisdiction, the herein Propositions of Law ought to be

within the spirit of the ancient veils of justice that are crevices of sacred wrinldes that guide

the ageless wisdom of Conimon Law. Most iniportantly, injustice is a threat to justice

everywhere in the universe and the cancer that is spread by injustice ought to be extricated

froni this memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction.

graph of:ael Turner White Au orized Representative of:

-HITE "STRAWMAN"CHAEL TURNFR W3756 READING ROADAPARTMENT #307CINCINNATI, OHIO 45229

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEThe Sovei-eign Citizen, Michael Turner White, an American Citizen, certify that on

this 5th day of Octobcr , 2009, a true and exact copy of the aforesaid Appellant's notice ofappeal is submitted to clerk of court of the Ohio supreme Court, at 30 East broad Street,State Office Tower, Columbns, Ohio 43226-0419 with a return receipt pursuant to the OhioCriminal Rule 55. And, a receipt is requested by the sovereign appellant as filed and timedstamped, per Ohio Criininal Rule 55. And, a copy is sent to Norwood County Prosecutor,Christopher brown, Norwood Mayor's Court, 4645 Montgomery Road, Norwood, Ohio45212. This Certificate of Service is sanctioned pursuant to Houston v Lack, 487 U.S. 266,108 S.Ct. 2379, (1988) and sanctioned to 28 U.S.C. 1746. And, is prepared outside of theUNITED STATES, INCORPORATED.

AVRights RescrveC d-207 and UC

ograph of:

Authorized Representative of:MICHAEL TURNER WHITE-"STRAWMAN

hael Turner Vylti'fe, Ainerican Sovereign

19

APPENDIX

JUDGES: COURT OF APPEAI.,s

LEE H. HILDEBRANDT JR. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT MARK E. COMBS

COURT AnMINISTRATORMARK PHILIP PAINTER WILLTAM HOWARD TAFTLAW CENTER

J. HOWARD SUNDERMANN JR. 230 EAST NINTH STREET MOLLY LEONARDSYLVIA SIEVE HENDON CINCINNATI, OHio 45202-2138 ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

PENELOPE R. CUNNINGHAM 513,946.3500 FAx 513.946.3412 CHRISTOPHER P. DIETZPATRICK DINKELACKER

www.hamilton-co.org/appealscourt CUtLror STAFF

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL NOS. Co9o379Co9o38o

TRIAL NOS.Mo9TRDr9aSiA.Mo9TRDi9451B

ACCELERATED CALENDAR SCHEDULING ORDER AND CONSOLIDATING APPEALS

Having reviewed the notice of appeal and docket statement filed herein, and pursuant to Local Rule12(2), it is the Order of this Court that this cause be placed on the Court's accelerated calendar.

It is Ordered that the complete record of this action be filed on or before o7/24/2001).(See paragraphs one and two of the enclosed.)

The appellants brief shall be filed on or before o8/26/2oon.The appellee's brief shall be filed on or before 09/29/2009.(See paragraph four of the enclosed.)

Counsel who wish to submit the appeal to the Court without oral argument should submit a writtenrequest to the court at least three working days prior to the hearing.

Further, the Court hereby sua sponte consolidates the above causes for the purpose of appeal underthe case number C-o9o379•

NOTE: Enclosed with this Order are several admonitions. These admonitions should be reviewed.

To The Clerk:^ ' .\'. P .. . e. '

Enter upon the Journal of the Court on June i2. 2ooq per order df'the Court.

By:Presidin Judge ^^--

(Copy sent to counsel)

IN THE COURT OF APPF,ALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, APPEAL NO. C-o9o379

Appellee,

vs. ENTRY SUA SPONTE STRIKINGSTATEMENT, PRAECIPE, ANDAGREED STATEMENT FILED ONJULY 15, 2009

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,

Appellant.

This cause came on to be considered upon the appellant's statement,

praecipe, and agreed statement filed on July 15, 2009.

The Court sua sponte strikes the filing as not being in compliance with the

Court's entry of July 7, 2009.

The Court's scheduling order of June 16, 2009 obligates the Clerk of Courts to

prepare and certify the docket and journal entries, thus making appellant's statement

and praecipe moot. The docket and journal entries are to be filed by July 24, 2009.

As stated in this Court's entry of July 7, 2009, the transcript of proceedings

or, in lieu of a transcript, an agreed statement, shall be filed by July 24, 2oo9. The

agreed statement portion of appellant's filing dated July 15, 2009 fails to comport

with Appellate Rule 9(D). Appellate Rule 9(D) requires that the appellant present

his statement to the trial court for its review. The failure of appellant to file the

transcript of proceedings or a properly filed agreed statement by July 24, 2009 may

result in this appeal being dismissed.

To The Clerk:

Enter ug0n ;& Journal of the Court on JUL 1`6 2Q09per order of the Court.

(Copies sent to all counsel)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COTJNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, APPEAL NO.C-o9o379C-o9o380

TRIAL NO. Mo9TRD19451-A & BAppellee,

vs.

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,

Appellant.

ENTRY OF DISMISSAL

This cause came on to be considered upon the appeal from the trial court.

'Phe Court sua sponte dismisses the appeal for failure of the appellant to

comply with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure to wit: the transcript of

proceedings or an agreed statement under Appellate Rule 9(D) was not timely filed

It is further ordered that a certified copy of this judgment shall constitute the

mandate to the trial court puisuant to Rule 27, Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

To The Clerk:

Enter upon tjieJournal of the Court onlUL 2 9 2009 per order of the Court.

By: (Copy sent to counsel)Presiding Judge

IN TI-IE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELILATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, APPEAL NO. C-o9o379C- 0903 80

Appellee,

vs. ENTRY OVERRULING MOTIONFOR RECONSIDERATION

M:ICI-IAL'L TURNER WHITE,

Appellant.

This cause came on to be considered upon the appellant's motion for

reconsideration.

The Court finds that the motion is not well taken and is overruled.

To The Clerk:

Enter uponAe Aournal of the Court onAU6 2 62009 per order of the Court.

By: ^^^ (Copies sent to all counsel)Presiding Judge