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TOWARDS A THEORY OF FORCE DESIGN:

The Foundation of Capability-based Defense Planning

Salvador Ghelfi Raza1, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Force Design is a complex issue involving decisions with implications in policy formulation, modernization of military hardware, organizational restructuring and changes in associated decision-making processes. This presupposes effective decision processes that recognize long-term goals, as well as procedures that can guide its execution. Its core theme is the creation of a professional defense sector appropriately sized, based on an efficient use of resources, with precise guidelines subjected to democratic control.

Behind these decisions, a set of foundations seen axiomatic and absolute only because they remain unexamined, often appearing to respond to events as they unfold. When specific problems arise, they become the natural focus of attention. In such situation, these decisions are typically viewed as more urgent than such abstract activity as force design.

Building “more of the same” is always easier than doing a comprehensive review and, perhaps, developing an entirely new approach. Moreover, it is imprudent hinging on technology as a basis for future capabilities without considerations on strategy. Unless force design is addressed explicitly, allowing to better understand the various tradeoffs taken into account and to examine their interaction in a systematic way, defense decisions are likely to be inappropriate, in the sense that they result in a set of capabilities that are incapable of meeting defense objectives.

This paper is an attempt to structure a theory of force design, fastening the foundations of capability-based defense planning into a set of coherent concepts and a framework that make those concepts practical in their proper terms and significance. For this purpose an analytical construct that abstracts military capabilities into its component elements is proposed, explicating concepts and its relationships; and a framework integrating those concepts into a hierarchy is offered articulating processes that allows devising ways of developing and choosing defense alternatives even when limitations of knowledge and information exclude the possibility of assessing the expected outcomes.

The final goal of these system of concepts and framework is to be a useful tool in thinking 1) the general relationship between capabilities requirements and defense demands – properly addressing the challenge of defense planning in an era of uncertainty of threats and information technology and 2) the specification of capabilities to be added that might lead to different choices under three concurring perspectives - adaptation, modernization and adaptation.

1 Dr. Salvador Ghelfi. Raza is professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Studies (CHDS) in the National Defense University. He received a Ph.D in Strategic Studies from the University of Rio de Janeiro, and has a M.A from the University of London. He is a member of the Group for Strategic Studies (Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos) of the University of Brazil (UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro). His current research and teaching interests include force design, defense analysis, games and simulation, and crisis management. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied do not reflect views of any agency, organization or government. (razas@ndu.edu).

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INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Cold War, information technology trends, and other contemporary factors are associated causes for the emergence of new uncertainties and threats to the State’s security goals. However diffuse and asymmetric in their impact, these causes have imposed defense reforms in order to face a broad and more complex nexus of old and new tasks, associated with efforts to eliminate redundancy and inefficiency in the defense resource allocation process. Such accounts often fail to predict correctly that defense reforms effort in is determining required military capabilities, connecting present fiscal possibilities with future demands of the use or threat of force towards politically oriented objectives.

The term defense reform sounds like an aggressive approach to get military superiority and organizational strength. In fact, it is usually just the opposite – an attempt to break out of a deteriorating situation, more likely to reflect a recognition that one has fallen behind than an attempt to exploit new possibilities.

The most telling basis for judging the complexity of defense reforms is the degree of uncertainty of political objectives, evolving technological possibilities and resource allocation priorities, considering that defense can both inhibit and stimulate economic growth2. A few examples might give the sense of the manifestation of these reform trends and goals in the Western Hemisphere3:

♦ Argentina recently changed in its military conscript/professional personnel ratio and is endeavoring to integrate planning, programming, and budgeting procedures in its defense planning and resource management system, struggling to maintain its operational military capability4.

♦ Bolivia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic are endeavoring to produce Defense White Books within the context of new roles for their Armed Forces; whereas Chile is in the stage of revising its White Book.

♦ Peru is reforming its defense organizational structure. And the Paraguay is struggling in the political arena to approve its Defense Organization Law that would redefine military roles and mission and reorganize the defense sector, eventually changing the responsibilities of the Ministry of Defense.

2 There is a lack of consensus in the empirical literature on the positive and negative economic effects of defense spending. On one hand, it is assumed that defense spending divert resources from private and public non-defense investments (crowding out); on the other, it is assumed that defense spending increases the utilization of capital (crowding in). The latter position is support by the Benoit Thesis, referring to a positive association found between defense spending and growth for 44 less developed countries over the 1950-65 period.

See Benoit, Emile, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Boston, USA: Heath, 1973. Sandler, T. E Hartley, K. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge, Ma: Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp. 200-220. review the literature and tabulate models alternative to that of Benoit arrising at different conclusion.3 The object of analysis for this paper was limited to the Western Hemisphere – The Americas. However, its conclusions and the proposed theoretical model it offers have higher ambitions in their possible applications.

4 Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de La Nación, Ley 24.948 de 18 de febrero de 1998. Reestructuración de las fuerzas armadas. For Directives of Military Planning, see http//www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/ d000 cbd2 htm. (Oct/02/9). And for operational capabilities, see http://64.69. 09.103/mic/eabstract.cfm? recno=8796 (Jun/ 25/2002).

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♦ Brazil faces complex civil-military relations in the wake of the creation of its Ministry of Defense (1999) and its National Defense Policy (1996), with impacts on its defense command and control structure. Brazil’s National Multi annual Plan PPA, explicitly declares that5:

“The modernization of the Defense National System will be the main objective of the project for reequipping and adjusting the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force, together with the project for managing the armed forces policy. Both projects will contribute to reequip and adjust force structure to a new technological pattern, assuring the country higher protection”.

♦ In the US case, particularly, 11th catalyzed, albeit drastically, post-Cold War demands for reform. As early as February 2001, the Project on Defense Alternatives of the Commonwealth Institute at Cambridge already pointed out four causes of inefficiencies of the US Armed Forces, demanding reforms in the context of the Quadrennial Defense Review:

“One type of inefficiency is manifest in excess infrastructure – a Cold War residue. Today, the US Armed Forces still maintain 20 percent of excess infrastructure. Crude, costly and seemingly intractable, this problem has had little political salience. The support of excess infrastructure drains money away from training, maintenance, and quality-of-life accounts. A second type of inefficiency derives from inter-service rivalry and redundancy. A third type of inefficiency involves having military “tools” and procedures that do not correspond closely to today’s operational challenges. Persistent shortages despite the expenditure of more than $250 billion on procurement during the past five years indicates a failure to configure our armed forces to meet current needs. A final type of inefficiency results from the failure to fully exploit information-age technology and organizational principles, which could reduce structural redundancies in our military and increase its flexibility. By contemporary business standards, our military remains an industrial age organization” 6.

What is extraordinary are not these changes in themselves, since defense has an evolutionary nature, been future oriented; but the scale and scope of current defense reforms, with countries endeavoring simultaneously to:

♦ Define organizational requirements in association with new decision-making, control and oversight mechanisms aiming at a higher degree of political control over defense issues and priorities.

5 Brazil, National Government. Plano Plurianual. http://www.abrasil.gov.br/anexos/links/links.htm . For an oeverview of current status of Brazilian Defense Reforms, see http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/ especial/militar/militar/militar16.html; and http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/especial/militar/militar/ militar11.html. (Oct 2001).6 The Commonwealth Institute. The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18. 5 February 2001. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. pp. 6 Captured at http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo18.html. (8/28/2001).

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♦ Increase the efficiency, efficacy and economy7 of defense resource allocation, with a focus on the processes and criteria used for the formulation, spending and evaluation of the defense budget.

♦ Define affordable military forces, balanced against multiple axes, to hedge against uncertainty in the current and future threat environment.

These overarching themes are linked into mutually determinant chains of cause and causality, making few of the decisions in security requirements and defense planning either simple or noncrontoversial. Previously unnoticed is the necessity of an articulated set of concepts and its associated analytical framework for planning defense alternatives based on military capabilities. That is why the following questions are always present: What criteria oriented the identification of military capabilities? What strategies do those capabilities support and how do those strategies support political objectives? How are budgets related to those capabilities?

All these questions pertaining to the defense reform debate – in its different shapes and perceived priorities – have a common goal and a common assumption. The common goal is to determine credible military capabilities that connect current fiscal possibilities to future alternatives of possible military action, with an acceptable degree of political risk. The common assumption is that peace has yielded insofar as the strength and credibility of military capabilities to deter threatening intentions by others.

While these central arguments of defense planning are rather common-sensical, it is important to keep in perspective that defining requirements for affordable and credible military capabilities is a complex issue demanding a set of valid conceptual propositions articulated by a coherent internal logic.

Conceptual propositions breed from reasoning and a critical examination of past events while setting requirements for future register that will bring empirical evidence which, eventually, will make them invalid. No conceptual proposition that pretends to be scientific may postulate eternal validity. The internal logic of the conceptual system provides the articulating rules of its component propositions, establishing a causal relationship between concepts, which provides the starting point and the interdependency of the parts for the desired or intended final product8. This logic is only valid insofar as it is useful for instructing the collection, organization and interpretation of quantitative and qualitative information; orienting the research of alternative solutions for the assorted problems; flanking its analysis with consistent and explicit criteria; and allowing the precise communication of results.

The validity of a conceptual system and its internal logic assures that the devised problem is the real problem, and not that it can be solved within its domain of existing competencies; and that the solutions proposed consider the relevant aspects of the problem.

7 Efficacy is defined as a measure of task accomplishment: the degree to which the activity/process and resultant output delivered met the desired expectation. Efficiency translates the best combination of resources to maximize efficacy. It is measured as a relationship of outputs to imputs, usually expressed in terms of a ratio. A higher efficiency ratio translates a situation where changes in defense capabilities for a small change in resources are balanced across all resources used to produce those capabilities. Economy reflects the degree to which efficiency is obtained with lesser fiscal spending8 This is the requirement of making the axiology of the method explicit as condition of scientific research. Without an axiological option explicated, the criteria used to define the problem, determine appropriate research and integrate results are methodologically flawed. For a theoretical discussion of axiological options and its relation with developing conceptual systems, see OLIVA, A. Conhecimento e Liberdade. 2 ed. Porto Alegre: Edipurs, 1999. pp. 124.

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Without the support of a valid conceptual system, defense reform propositions are mere opinions, without any ways of ascertaining which opinion is better.

The required mind set for approaching defense reforms must take into account the fact that most conceptual propositions and their articulating logic used for defense planning have their origin in the last 50 years, in the wake of the Cold War, and are already becoming either obsolete or inadequate. This situation is potentially harmful for three intertwined reasons:

♦ It might harbor inefficiency, compromising the effectiveness of military capability.

♦ It might create misleading performance evaluation criteria, masking capability inefficiencies through methodologies deprived of analytical rigor.

♦ It might cause the breakdown of policy, strategy and resource allocation into isolated processes, breeding into stove piping capabilities.

The outcome of this condition entails risks that are not always recognized, with defense planners often trying to “purchase a breakthrough model” through experiences taken from other cases. Unfortunately, these models do not work properly because they do not “import” the conceptual system and the people who understand it.

Given post-Cold War demands of security and defense, and the aftermath of September Eleven, past conceptual system are to be taken with a grain of salt. It seems appropriate and opportune to propose a new conceptual framework for designing defense alternatives. This would focus on the reevaluation of the concepts of security and defense, taking into consideration its evolving nature and diffused contours; the mechanisms for forecasting contingencies, within a framework that integrate distinctive rising and falling patterns; and requirements for efficiency and economy in defense resource management. Such endeavor should more properly be called Force Design.

This paper offers a conceptual framework for force design with the identification and relationship of variables required to understand and plan defense reforms, accommodating three potentially concurring circumstances: adaptation, modernization and transformation. It proposes an innovative approach for understanding defense reform trends and possibilities, systematically articulating concepts and processes to assure armed forces efficacy, efficiency and economy, providing unity of purpose, unity of effort and unity of action for effectively wielding power in support of national will. Its overarching thesis is that force design must serve as a guide to defense planning, contributing to armed forces accountability, professionalism and civilian control. Thus, defense reforms can play an important role in both preparing for the use of force and in maintaining peace. Its underlying assumption is that defense reform demands emerge as the differential between current defense capabilities and the outcome of defense planning offer of future conditions.

The paper is organized in four parts. Part one, “Force Design”, sets the stage. It defines force design as the fabric of military capability and develops a theoretical construct (an idealization of a situation appropriate for a problem) that abstracts capabilities components and identify its relationships, discussing some tensions among these components and its relationships. Part two, “Force Design Framework”, presents three logical blocks, articulated in an approach that examines the concept of security and defense, presents mechanisms for developing scenarios, and examining defense superintendence requirements. Part three uses force design concepts to present some judgments about actual trends in defense reforms, taking a hard look at current defense superintendence potential mismanagement in the

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Western Hemisphere. Part four, explores both the construct of capabilities and the force design framework to present the concepts and interrelationship of Adaptation, Modernization and Transformation. The paper progress from a rather conceptual approach in parts one and two to a pragmatic proposal of a template in part five, to conclude presenting Force Design as a new area of study with its own articulated set of concepts and hypotheses.

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PART 1

FORCE DESIGN

Force design is the fabric of military capabilities and, as such, it provides the foundations for an integrated project of defense. Its purpose is the conceptualization, development and evaluation of alternative military capabilities to attend defense requirements in response to security demands, assuring that the proper set of effective and efficient military is economically identified, developed, organized, fielded and supported.

Force design results – an integrated project of defense - is the source of guiding principles that contributes to communicate goals and plans that are reinforced through rules and norms at all levels of the defense organization. Such a project ties objectives together and gives meaning and purpose to operational procedures, enabling all parts of the organization consistently contribute to the overall effort even though they have to act independently in an environment changing rapidly. Equally important, it include an indication of what capabilities will not be develop, retaining an appropriate focus in building essential capabilities. The basic purpose of an integrate project of defense is to provide guidance to those whose actions can affect the focus and development of the required military capabilities.

Although subordinating all defense operational processes to a common purpose force design allows the necessary latitude for leadership and initiatives serving as an umbrella over the various functional activities developed within the defense establishment, establishing the context within which day-to-day decisions are made and sets the bounds on strategic options. Further, an integrated project of defense guides in making trade-offs among competing requirements for short-term and long-term goals. Finally, it provides consistency among programs providing the instance of reference for resource allocation.

These guiding principles are defined as the pattern of decisions that determine the ultimate set of military capabilities; being the blueprint for force planning, programming and budgeting9, underpinning all defense related functions, to include procurement and acquisition; intelligence gathering; operational training and evaluation; personnel (civil and military); educational requirements; and technology research. Essentially it is because of the ability of these guiding principles to coordinate operational activities with policy requirements assuring consistency over time: that military capabilities development evolve in a directed manner renewing, augmenting and contracting its components to reinforce and expand defense possibilities.

Although force design mills operational requirements into defense alternatives, it is not merely the application of military planning at ministerial level, warning those who enter its domains about the inadequacy of military operational planning10 concepts and methodologies 9 The traditional methodological approach for determining defense requirements was through procedures commonly named either as force planning, strategic planning or military planning. These are methodological approaches inherited from the Cold War period, led by the US initiative under the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This System provided the benchmark for other similar national initiatives, like the Brazilian Navy Systematic for High Level Planning with its associated “Director Plan.”10 Military operational planning refers to current practiced methodologies used to determine the best alternative form of assigning tasks and to direct actions to secure military objectives by the application or the threat of force.

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for the processes and products that fall under its purposes. This requires attention to the organizational structure of a ministry of defense, involving determining the number and qualification of the individuals on the force design team.

Force design provides a set of concepts and its articulating logic required for swiveling political options into military capability requirements and for cranking these requirements into force alternatives, assuring jointness and interoperability. It provides a functional logic for management of the defense system, disciplining the relationships of its component parts.

Once an integrated project of defense has been defined, it informs the development of subparts related to individual services and defense agencies that will converge to produce the required set of military capabilities. The same logic that provide focus on the required decisions at ministerial level can help to divide responsibilities among multiple agents, dedicating portions of effort to each subunit of the defense establishment.

To insure that the alternatives chosen by subunits is adhered to over time demands of an integrated project of demand, force design provide a systemic perspective in support of decisions regarding preemptive additions or contraction in the military inventory based of forecasted demands of military capabilities required for the desired level of efficacy; the exploitation of better integration and synergy among component parts of the military system in order to maximize its efficiency; and exploit economies of scale and scope that compete on the basis of price in order to assure economy within acceptable levels of risk.

MILITARY CAPABILITY

Common sense, capabilities are understood as the quality of being able to use of be used in a specified way.11 However, for specific force design purposes, a military capability is the potential ability of force components to perform a defense task under specific pre-determined conditions, with an expected degree of success.

Military capabilities are designed to fulfill the demands of the use of force for political purposes, having no intrinsic value – their value derives from the assessment of success in its intended use and has, therefore, a political nature. The above statement is crucial for force design, because it casts light on the fundamental question: how much is enough? Providing the understanding that the only acceptable answer for this question results from the political priorities for defense; which allows developing criteria to pair wise anticipated tasks with requirements of quantitative and qualitative dimensioning of force components under resource constraints and acceptable level of risk.

The nature of these capabilities – instrumental in the practice of violence under state authority - define individualizing competencies defense components have to acquire and circumscribes its use within the political realm. Therefore, military capabilities are not absolute values that could be measured in terms of such things as the currently available quantity of military assets, the number of military personnel, and the possession of weapons. Their value results from the assessment of the potential ability of successfully perform defense tasks in the pursuit of politically defined objectives.

11 Ganer B. The Oxford Dictionary of American Usage and Style. New York: Berkley Books, 2000. pp. 57

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Structure of relationships

Military capabilities emerge in the functional relationship of force components and operational tasks. This functional outline of military capabilities determines its relationships with force structure and concept of employment12.

Figure 1 depicts a general overview of elements that converge to produce military capability as currently found in the literature13. Force structure defines the size, type, dimension, and stationing of military assets. The performance of its components depends on how they are organized, equipped, trained, upgraded, maintained and supported.

Figure 1: Structure of relationships

Force components are the functional aggregation of force structure elements in combat and associated support structures accordingly to practiced doctrine.

The concept of Employment is a set of articulated decisions that express the prioritization of missions and operations, relating them with a political logic. Objectives are elements, either material or insubstantial, that must be worked over through operations, in

12 The literature of force planning uses the term strategy as a synonym for concept of employment. This paper will use the latter to develop the capability construct, reserving the former to translate the use of combat for the purpose of war, in association with tactics, the use of force components in the engagements.13 For an in-depth discussion of defense planning, see, for example, DAVIS, P. K. e KLALILZAD, Z. M. A Composite Approach to Air Force Planning. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1996. DEWAR, J. e BUILDER, C. H. Assumption-based Planning. California, EUA: Rand Corporation, 1993. HAFFA, R. Jr. Planning U.S. Forces. USA: NDU, 1988. KAUFFMANN, W.N. Assessing the Base Force: How Much is Enough. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings Institution, 1992.

Support MaintenanceTrainining

Support MaintenanceTrainining

Military Assets Military Assets ObjectivesObjectives Missions

Operations Missions

Operations

Force Components

Force Structure Concept of Employment

Operational Structures

Capabilities Operational Tasks

Policy Guidelines

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order to provide an intended benefit that contributes to a specific mission. Tasks are required actions to achieve objectives, towards which there is some sort of opposition or threat.14

Countries have their defense assets (number and size) stationed or deployed in military bases. However, these assets are not in themselves military capabilities. It is meaningless to say, for example, that Brazil’s aircraft carrier São Paulo is a military capability. It is only an asset. Brazil’s military capability reflects the scale and scope of tasks that force components, where this asset might be integrated, could perform with expected degree of success.

One alternative of military capability for Brazil could include the São Paulo in a force component to contribute to defend Brazil’s sovereignty in the Amazon area (defense objective), aiming to deter international greed for the Amazon forest. The resulting capability is conditioned by the readiness15 degree of its component air wing, the degree of training of its crew, and the ability to sustain continuous operation for an extended period of time.

The Aircraft Carrier São Paulo is based in Rio de Janeiro, taking approximately 4 days to deploy (non-stop) to the Amazon area, requiring the support of other assets with the technical ability for replenishment at sea – tanker ships, in this case, to refuel the escorts of the São Paulo. Similarly, these tanker ships are not also in themselves a military capability. Replenishment at sea is only a technical requirement; the derived military capability is the ability of the Brazilian Navy to support continuous operation of its sea assets.

Brazil’s required military capability to defend its sovereignty in the Amazon Area, exploring the combat possibilities of air wing of São Paulo aircraft carrier in a force capable to escort a convoy transporting Army troops and material to the region, would only be constrained by the availability of tanker ships, if its defense posture (relating the concepts of employment with force structure), would demand short reaction time, whereas keeping the São Paulo stationed in the Naval Base of Rio de Janeiro (imposing non-stop deploy and therefore requiring replenishment at sea).

If Brazil decides to station/deploy the São Paulo to a northern naval base (changing force structure), it would produce a higher operational response tempo for the Amazon Area with fewer demands of replenishment at sea, with the compromise of reducing the responsiveness of that force component (integrating the São Paulo) to anti-submarine operations within a context of maritime warfare to protect the national flow of petrol in the South Atlantic. This would change Brazil’s defense posture, signaling a higher commitment to defend the Amazon Area and, at the same time, would impose the necessity of developing expensive shipyard facilities in the northern region of the Country, in order to provide repair facilities to this extremely complex ship.

The required technical, fiscal and political costs would have to be weighed against the effectiveness of a reduced operational tempo associated with the lower demands of replenishment at sea. In addition, since the Army troops and material that the São Paulo would convoy to the Amazon Area would be held in Rio de Janeiro, the decision of re-deploying this asset to the northern region should take into consideration the technical characteristics and operational requirements of Brazilian Army’s assets, increasing coordination and control demands.

Referring to cost-effectiveness analysis, Brazil could have decided, instead of convoying Army troops and material using a force component integrated by the Aircraft

14 These concepts will be retaken further on in this paper. Here they are stated with the purpose of supporting arguments to explain the nature of military capabilities.15 At this point, it is proposed to understand readiness as the performance required to accomplish a mission with expected degree of success.

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Carrier São Paulo, to use near-the-shore maritime routes under the umbrella of the Brazilian Air Force aircraft (changing the concept of employment). In this case, the same task – to protect the military flow of troops and material – would be accomplished with other force components and associated operations, without significant changes in the defense posture.

The extensive list of possible alternatives derived from Brazil’s case reflects the complexity of force design. The mission potential of military capabilities results from the assessment of task-force functional aggregations to achieve assigned objectives with force structure components. Similarly, Mexico faces force design problems with its two oceans; Argentina with Chile and Falklands/Malvinas; Venezuela with Suriname borders; Colombia with its internal conflict; to mention just a few other cases.

Having outlined the purpose and several trends in force design, it remains to present its operational definition. Force design is a system of decisions aiming that the proper set of effective and efficient military capability is economically identified, developed, organized, fielded, and supported. Whitin this operation definition, design is related to a proposed solution to a perceived problem, presented with necessary and sufficient details to guide a course of action and evaluate its outcomes, and the force as composite of military capabilities explored to attend defense requirements in response to security demands.

FORCE PLANNING

The specific and limited purpose of force planning within force design is to determine the quantitative dimension, organization, and spatial distribution of military assets in association with a specific concept of employment for a determined theatre of operation.

Force planning has different approaches that might include more or fewer components and processes, depending on the aggregation criteria ruled by specifics doctrinal understanding. Force design does not dispute these aggregation criteria or doctrine16; on the contrary, it recognizes these efforts as a valid procedure to rationalize the planning process, having as a reference the guidelines it provides.

An example might help to clarify the distinction between force design and force planning. Force design might determine US capability requirements for protecting America’s interests in Central and South America, assuring combat efficacy against any specific country or regional coalition, and providing sea control and airspace interdiction against drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The purpose of force planning for the Caribbean Basin Theatre of Operation specifically, would determine how many X surveillance aircraft and Y patrolling surface vessels based in Norfolk (VA) are required to deter and prevent illegal air and maritime traffic under strict rules of engagement limiting the use of force. Force planning would also determine the command and control requirements associated with an operational structure for these air and maritime assets to assure the required operational tempo. In addition, force planning would consider the redeployment of old surface patrol vessels from Norfolk to Guantanamo (Cuba) to reduce transit time, allowing fewer ships to perform the same tasks. It would also consider that the redeployment of these old patrol ships near the theatre of operation would contribute to lesser its aging rate until faster and less fuel consuming combat ships could be developed and stationed back in Norfolk. Force planning also considers what changes in the concept of employment these new assets might demand and determine how many new ships would be necessary and how enhanced air surveillance detection aids (radar, for example) could reduce the number of required surveillance aircraft.

16 For an example, see Kent G. A Framework for Defense Planning. California: RAND Corporation, 1989.

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During these processes, Force Design would shape new rules of engagement and instruct Force Planning about the changing defense roles and missions in the Caribbean Basin, which would determine new tasks and evolving readiness and doctrine requirements, conditioning the specification, development and deployment of these new assets. Force design is, therefore, the instance of reference for force planning. It provides planning guidance while incorporating operational alternatives as a condition of possibility for its designing purposes. Although with complementary purpose, they do not fuse into one all encompassing process. Force Design is the master of force planning; recognizing that its servant would makes its designing requirement feasible. When these roles are inverted, or force design simply does not exist, force planning starts imposing limits to political alternatives. Politics will do what the military says it can do and it can do what it thinks should be done: the military becomes the master of policy.

FORCE DESIGN ENVIRONMENT

The complex interrelationship between the problems force design faces must be viewed and understood against the background of the political structure of the society in which they occur, although this may not always give us a clear understanding of every detail. Current mechanism to enforce defense reform range from reorganization acts, assuming the structuring principle that legal boundaries can create conditions for effective defense reform, to political guidelines provided by defense policy or “white papers”. The question, therefore, of what kind and what amount of information is need head into the devilish question of functional relevance. Applying these considerations, the most import feature in analyzing the force design environment is to ascertain the place at the hierarchy of defense decision-making from which its actions are guided.

Force design processes are related to defense ministry functions, being deeply permeated with settled and routinized situations and decisions in situations that have not yet been subjected to regulation.

Karl Mannheim, quoting the Austrian sociologist and statesman Albert Schäffle, pointed out that: “at any moment of social-political life two aspects are discernible – first, a series of social events which have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly; and, second, those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which in individual cases, decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique situations”17. This distinction developed to qualify the difference between the routine affairs of state and politics, also apply to qualify ministerial functions in the realm of administration and the realm of politics. Notwithstanding the boundary between these two classes is rather difficulty, a set of enduring characteristics is present in the ministerial functions18:

♦ To be the prime instrument for assuring civilian control over defense alternatives.

♦ To represent the nation’s defense requirements and advise on the implications of proposed alternatives.

♦ To balance military expertise and administrative-fiscal viewpoints on formulating defense alternatives

17 Mannheim, K. Ideology & Utopy: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. London, UK: Hancourt, 1936. pp.112. 18 Some of these functions are reflected in Huntington’s perspective of the “Departamental Structure of Civil-Military Relations. Huntington, S. P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press: 2000. pp.428-455.

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Force design contribute to this ministerial functions because it demands the explanation of the assumptions that support the formulation of military capability requirements, and determine making explicit the articulating links between military capability requirements and defense objective demands, integrating and assessing those assumptions, requirements and objectives with a political logic.

This is not without problems. For example, the analysis of the definition of capability presented by the Joint Pub 1-02 can explain a chain of unexpected consequences of force design concepts in the environment and vice-versa. This publication defines military capability as: “The ability to execute a specified course of action (a capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention)19”. This view transforms military capability in a self-sufficient ability to perform operations. When military instrumentality becomes dissociated from political goals, it allows military control of policy alternatives, jeopardizing the prerogatives of popularly elected governments to decide upon defense alternatives.

Richard H. Kohn suggests evidence for this trend in the US:

“The U.S. Military is now more alienate from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history, and more vocal about it. The warning signs are very clear, most noticeable in the frequency with which officers have expressed disgust for the President over the last year… Divorced now from broad parts of American society, the military, increasing Washington-wise, was determined never again to be committed to combat without the resources, public support, and freedom on the battlefield to win… The military had accepted “downsizing” and reorganization, but not changes that invaded too dramatically the traditional function of each of the individual armed services, or that changed too radically the social composition of the forces, or cut too deeply into combat readiness, or otherwise undermined the quality and ability of the military to fullfill its functions”.20

One of the undisputed givens is that armed forces are still a major player in national politics both in the US and in the region, with influence through expenditures, investments, and savings in the economy and social environment to which they belong. Thus, designing defense capabilities is an influencing factor in the national and international arena.

Zackkrison’s21 study of the roles and missions of the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, brings a unique perspective to force design environment:

♦ Argentina has the most distance between the arguments, with civilians generally debating the need for armed forces and the military successfully lobbying the government for money to maintain international multilateral operations.

♦ Brazil has the largest armed forces, adequately funded, but has no real sense of missions and not enough public support to push a specific agenda.

♦ Chile has perhaps the best funded military in the region, and the best defined set of roles and missions, but faces just enough public hostility that the future after General Augusto Pinochet’s departure is a big question.

19 USA, Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 9 April 2002). pp.62.20 Kohn, R.H. Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. In The National Interests. Spring 1994, pp.3-17.21 Zackrison, J.L. Drawdown to Instability: Defense Budgets and Mission Glide.

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♦ Colombia has the most urgency in defining an adequate role for its armed forces because of the threat to national survival at the hand of the Marxist insurgents and drug traffickers.

♦ Peru faces the popular perception of having lost a recent border skirmish against a much smaller military, an increasing threat of insurgency, and pressure from the armed forces for more funding and better military equipment.

These facts should be understood in the constantly changing configuration of experience in which they actually lived. Notwithstanding, they give an example of the ever- flowing stream of trends that shape force design environment.

The measure of the relevance of this trends have need of an analytical model that can assure that the result to be achieved with force design do not become detached from the environment it belongs. It is needed to model the components and relationships of military capabilities understanding that the constituting characteristics of the whole will emerge through the relationships of the individual characteristics of its component parts.

The goal is to understand not just the function of individual military assets, doctrine, tasks, objectives, but to learn how all of these components interact within capabilities possibilities hoping then to use this information to generate more accurate defense planning methodologies that will help to unravel the complexities of defense reforms and the underlying mechanisms that provoke inefficiency.

MODELING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

In order to design capabilities, first it is required to understand that capabilities are a measure of the resulting ability of force component arrangements to perform a range of tasks. The performances of these arrangements being depend on the performance of its component parts and the stability of its relationships. Secondly, it its required to comprehend that abstraction is the first step toward a model because it allows pointing out and organizing aspects of the reality as the object of analysis. As Bunge22 presents, “ abstraction is indispensable not only to apply causal ideas, but also to permit either empirical or theoretical investigation.”

Both provisions were included in the formulation of the construct of capabilities depicted in figure 2. This construct identifies military capability components, stating its precise meaning with the description of its basic qualities, delineating the outer edge of its component against the context they pertain. That means giving significance to the abstracted object of analysis, defining its variety23 as pertaining to a system24.

22 Bunge, M. La Causalidade: El Principio de Causalidade en la Ciencia Moderna. trad. Aernan Rodrigues. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamericana, 1959. pp 189.

23 Variety is a concept developed by Ross Ashby within the Theory of Cybernetics. It is used to explain the distinguishable conjuncts, regardless of the order in which they appear, necessary and sufficient to describe the essential characteristics of the systems at the required level of abstraction. ASHBY, W Ross. Introduction to Cybernetics. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1970. Chap. 7.24Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who introduced the General Theory of Systems in 1925/6, provides the concept of system: a conjunct of interacting elements. The defense components are a system because they possess a mutual dependency and complementary relationship: the performance of the whole depends on the performance of its component parts. Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: fundamentos, desarrollo, aplicaciones. Trad. Juan Almela. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1968, pag. 38.

There are authors, such Bertalanffy himself, who recognizes that the founder of Theory of System would be W. Kohler, with his work Die Phsischen Gestalten in Ruhe and in Staionaaren Zustand. Erlangen, 1924. Notwithstanding, the literature credits Bertalanffy for developing the Theory of System because Kohler’s work

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The capability construct is an ideal25 model with two purposes. The first purpose is to abstract the complexity of the empirical reality in necessary and sufficiently analytical variables; and explaining how these variables interact, contract and maintain relationships that enable a required capability to be obtained. The second purpose is to explain the sensibility of military capability to changes in the security and defense environment, providing assessment criteria of its efficiency, efficacy and economy in adapting, modernizing and transforming the defense sector in response to changes in the security environment. The sensitivity analysis of military capability to changes in the security and defense environment requires making explicit possible forms of its relationships and logical consequences. That means supporting hypothesis formulation and explaining its elements of refutation.

The capability construct, as an ideal model – in the sense o logical -, is not a hypothesis and, therefore, can be neither true nor false but valid or not valid depending on its utility for understanding reality26. That means that it has its own conditions of possibility; it contains its own principle of constitution, encapsulating a conjunct of defined predicative, arbitrarily created accordingly to the necessity of the investigation, that can be used – or not – as an instance of reference to compare empirical data drawn from the reality .

The construct models capabilities as an open system. It assumes a flow of materials, information, etc. from and to the surrounding environment, implying that its variety assumes different values in time, as well as the relationship between its component are dynamically reconfigure, whereas keeping the system in a uniform state27. This explains the characteristic

is restricted to applying the concept of system to biological phenomena, restricting its amplitude. For applications of the Theory, see Bertoglio, J. Introduction a la Teoria General de los Sistemas. México: Limusa, 1982. This theory provides an investigative methodology that could be synthetically described as: take the reality as it is presented, examine its component systems and enunciate valid regularities presented.” This methodology was named empirical-inductive. For a critique of the theory and investigation methodology, see Ashby, W.R. General Systems Theory as a New Discipline. EUA, General System, 3, 1958, pp. 1-6. Ashby proposes an opposite approach, named deductive: instead of studying the system in a progressive form, from inferior to superior levels of abstraction, he recommends taking the conjunct of all conceivable systems and reduce them to a unique system of acceptable dimension. Luhmann, N. Power. Toronto: John Willey & Sons, 1979, proposes interpreting a macro system – society as the most complex macro system - using the deductive methodology. He aims to eliminate the main restriction of Bertalanffy’s approach that in macro system the distinction between the surrounding environment and the objected system under analysis becomes blurred. Luhmann’s theory wasn’t completely accepted because it cannot be applicable to others fields that have more restricted objects of analysis. 25 Ideal models, according to Weber, are theoretical models resulting from a selective process that blocks some elements from the reality and explains its content unequivocally. Ideal models do not exist as part of the reality; they are only a proposition of a hypothetical relationship of elements abstract from that reality. Weber, M. Ensaios Sobre a Teoria da Ciência. Paris: Plon, 1965. pp.76. Ideal models are not a description of the reality, because they retain only some of its aspects, representing relevant aspects of the totality that are regularly presented in the object of investigation. They are not also an average term of the reality because ideal models do not emerge from quantitative notion. Popper converges to Weber’s understanding of ideal models and explains its utility in preventing contradictions and impreciseness when theorizing upon selected aspects of reality. Lévis-Strauss has a different interpretation of ideal model. According to him, an ideal model is a simulacra, a relational conjunct that simplifies reality in order to explains the totality of the phenomenon. See Bruyne, P. Herman, J. and Schoutheete, M. Dinâmica da Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: Os Polos da Prática Metodológica. 5 ed. trad. Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48. 26 Bruyne, P. Herman, J. and Schoutheete, M. Dinâmica da Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: Os Polos da Prática Metodológica. 5 ed. trad. Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48, 182.

27 The concepts of “closed and open system” are part of Bertalanffy’s General Theory of Systems. A system is defined as closed when it can be considered in an equilibrium state independent of the surrounding environment. Chemistry, for example, deals with physical-chemical reactions in isolated recipients; and thermodynamics affirms that its laws are only applicable to closed systems. Opens systems have in their animus the governing

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of military capabilities to retain its efficacy while its components are reconfigured. It will also explain the limits and possibilities of adaptation, modernization and transformation trends.

Pragmatically, the construct will help in problem definition in force design: what will (and will not) be considered as inputs and outputs. This entails defining the scope of the expected alternatives, what procedures will be followed in generating and evaluating alternatives, and in selecting the alternatives to recommend to political decision.

Readiness

Rules ofEngagement

Enabling Elements

Military Hardware

Personel

Operational Protocols

Military Assets

Combat

Support

Operational Structures

C4

Tasks

Objectives

Interoperability

Force Components Regulating Factors Concepts ofEmployment

DoctrineDerivativeElements

Operations

ISR

Figure 2: Capabilities construct

Military capabilities alternatives are a particular manifestation of a (intended) stable relationship of three conjuncts28 of elements: the conjunct of force components, the conjunct of regulating factors, and the conjunct of concepts of employment, all interacting with each other in unique ways.

The concept of employment, force components and regulating factors are mutually determined elements of capabilities. The first assures the proper relationship of tactical

factor towards higher states of order and organization. This paper uses the same characterization for capabilities, having adaptation, modernization and transformation as trends to higher states of order and organization. The biologist Driesch uses this description to characterize a system of living organisms. A uniform state is achieved when an open system is in equilibrium. Closed systems equilibrium is dependent of the initial conditions. The final concentration of a chemical product depends on the initial concentration of its components. However, in open systems, uniform state is achieved based on the systems own parameters, and therefore is independent of its initial conditions. Drischel, H. Formale Theorien der Organization. Halle: Nova Acta Leopoldina, 1968, pp. 136, in Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: Fundamentos, Desarrollo, Aplicaciones. Trad. Juan Almela. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1968. pp. 40.28 M.D. Mesarovic explains the concept of conjunct as the individualizing properties that provide to some type of cluster of elements within the environment its quality as system components. Each conjunct is, in itself, a system, defined by particular analytical criteria used to isolate them from the rest. Mesarovic, M.D. Foundations for a General System Theory. New York, USA: John Willey & Sons, 1964. pp. 1-24.

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possibilities, strategic alternatives and political goals. The second determines the proper quantitative and qualitative dimensioning of military assets and organizations, being enabled by interoperability, jointness, command, control, communications and computing (C4) possibilities. The regulating factors link both force components and concepts of employment, assuring the external coherence of military capabilities with the political will and internal coherence between its component parts. By examining these complex interactions, it is possible to shed more light on how they alter defense reforms possibilities.

THE CONJUNCT OF FORCE

The conjunct of force emerges in the articulation of A) military assets possibilities, B) operational structures, and C) its enabling elements, which will make tactics and strategy possible.

A) Military Assets

Military assets are the means effectively used to accomplish assigned tasks and the means necessary to provide efficiency and sustain the tactical effort for a certain period. For analytical purposes, each military asset has three component elements: 1) military hardware; 2) personnel; and 3) protocol of operations29.

1) Military hardware

Military hardware is the machinery and equipment of war, such as tanks, aircraft, ships, rifles, etc. The identifying criterion for including an element in the conjunct of military asset is its sufficiency for a specific purpose. Such is the case with a war ship, with its sensors, weapon systems, engines, damage control systems, communication and command centers integrated into a single platform with the purpose of providing task efficiency.

A Boeing 747 initially conceived for civilian airlines might become a military asset as a troop transport; a merchant freighter may become a tank carrier or an ordinary SUV may be converted into an armed scooter. On the other hand, if it is considered aircraft, warships or tanks originally conceived as war-machines, the question would be what are the distinguished features that typify a corvette, a frigate and a cruiser other than their size and weaponry? A corvette with sophisticated and powerful weaponry might overcome a frigate in an artillery duel, but the overweigh of this weaponry could restrain its speed and performance, allowing the frigate maneuver fast to overcome its weakness. Similar propositions could be posed to the entire war arsenal with its composing typology of fighters, bombers, aircraft carriers, tanks, guns, etc. Clearly, not only their aptitude to fly, navigate or off-road traffic empowers these material components as military assets. What defines these material means as military assets is their ability to provide tactical efficacy. However, because resources are always constrained, efficacy should be associated with efficiency. An efficient combat asset, for example, will perform tasks with less fuel, which is transformed into a wider deployment range or longer periods on station without replenishment.

In other words, the criteria to define a military mean is whether it is able to provide an identifiable contribution to the required task, being a lever of influence in the outcome. Military assets are defined using four combining criteria:

29 For a typology of military assets, see Brzoska, M. et. al. Typology of Military Assets. Bonn, Ge: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Paper 16. April 2000.

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• Mobility and staying power: the ability of military means to deploy and maintain continuous operations. Mobility and staying power can be enhanced by new transportation and communications technologies.

• Offensive and defensive firepower: offensive firepower regards the ability to damage (neutralize or destroy) adversaries’ fighting ability by attacking targets such as missile launch sites, airfields, naval vessels, command and control nodes, munitions stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure. Offensive firepower includes but is not limited to physical attack and/or destruction, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and special operations, and could also include computer network attack. Defensive firepower seeks to affect the adversary’s ability to achieve or to promote specific damage against our assets. It includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously employing frequent movement, using deception and concealment or camouflage.

• Sustainability: the ability to perform tactical actions until successful accomplishment or revision of the tasks.

• Tactical Flexibility and Versatility: the ability to adjust assets configuration to confront changes in the environment, laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths.

2) Military personnel

Military personnel are considered in force design in its qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The qualitative dimension of military personnel translates both its total combat efficiency and the individual ability to assess complex situations making and implementing decisions within the domain of their professional expertise, with reasonable expectation of success. The quantitative dimension of military personnel deals with the required mix of active, reserve, professional and conscripts to effectively operate, deploy, and maintain material means required to attend a set of concepts of employments.

The common trend in personnel reforms, supported by most scholars as a by-product of the end of the Cold War, has been downsizing the military and a complement of civilians. This is a monumental decision that has to be carefully throughout in its impacts. David McCormick30 summarizes its complexity:

“Judging the appropriateness of an army’s downsizing objectives is more complicated than it might appear. The logic behind each of the four primary objectives – protecting quality, shaping the force, sustaining personnel readiness, and demonstrating care and compassion – is persuasive. An officer corps of exceptional quality is obviously crucial to a dynamic and effective military organization, even more so given the uncertain challenges of the post-Cold War era. Maintaining promotion opportunities and enhancing professional development opportunities as a means of retaining to performers seems reasonable, too, especially since downsizing organizations often lose their most valued performers. Similarly, there is an obvious and compelling need for shaping the officers corps by precisely identifying the individuals with the specific skill and expertise needed in a downsized organization and for distributing officer cuts across the entire officer corps…Sustaining personnel

30 McCormick, David. The Downsized Warrior: America’s Army in Transition. New York: New York University Press, 1998. pp 75-76.

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readiness is also a reasonable objective. Personnel readiness in the aggregate is a telling indicator of the alignment between cuts in force structure and cuts in personnel, two activities that should ideally go hand in hand. Thus, personnel readiness allows the army to gauge how effectively it is managing this aspect of downsizing. In addition, at the unit level, reasonably high levels of personnel readiness are necessary for effective unit training and operations. And, personnel readiness obviously has significant implications for the army’s wartime capabilities. Finally, a caring compassionate approach to downsizing is justified on moral as well as practical grounds. From a moral perspective, it has traditionally to those who loyally serve. And, as noted earlier, fair and compassionate treatment of downsizing victims affects the attitudes and performance of those who remain and influences an organization’s ability to recruit new members.”

In the US case, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld believes that the military's personnel management system might be a Cold War relic that encourages too many service members to stay for 20 years, too few to stay thereafter, and most members to scurry between assignments at a pace harmful to unit cohesion and to families. 31

3) Operational protocols

Operational protocols are the instructions of how to operate efficiently those material means, exploring their technical characteristics to maximize task effectiveness. An operational protocol for five similar surface ships to deploy in calm sea aiming sonar detection of low speed submarines would recommend a pattern of simultaneous turning to have a detection probability of 80%. Another protocol of operation for the same class of ships operating in rough sea would recommend another pattern for a 60% detection probability32.

More efficient protocols of operations can be developed by applying computational routines to a generic “model”, modifying its parameters to make military assets to satisfy performance requirements appropriated to a wide variety of conditions, or to make them to perform existing tasks better, or to implement tasks never before performed.

However, one of the most difficult and expensive activities of modern armed forces is exactly making efficient protocols of operations. It demands sophisticated centers of operational analysis and complex processing. For this reason, not all countries can afford such centers. The problem, therefore, is that they might employ newly acquired military assets with obsolete operational protocols, virtually neutralizing their efficiency. However, since they do not have such centers, they do not realize their necessity, or simply deny this problem. The error, therefore, is circular, with increasing costs of acquiring and maintaining technologically sophisticated assets with diminishing returns in terms of effectiveness.

When defining the military assets conjunct, the relevant variable is the tooth-to-tail ratio of fighting assets to its supporting components. Fighting assets are designed to maximize combat ability relatively to foreseen opponents. Supporting components are designed to assure the maintenance of the cutting edge of fighting assets. The fighting tooth needs refueling and ammunition supplies to maintain combat ability. Without supplying

31 Tom Philpott. Military Update: Longer Careers, Fewer Moves: Two Of Rumsfeld's Tougher Goals . http://www.militarylifestyle.com/home/1,1210,S:1100:1:1187,00.html. (June 19, 2002).32 For methodological processes of developing operational protocols, see NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. Naval Operations Analysis. (2. ed.). Annapolis, EUA: NWC Press, 1989.

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vessels, tank aircraft, depots and bases, the fighting ability would be severed to the point of impairing task possibilities. In US, for example, the fighting tooth has required deployment of only 4% of active-duty personnel33.

The conjunct of military assets, therefore, includes both its cutting edge and its supporting device categories. Training and motivation of military personnel, the internal military organization, communications systems, logistical and other systems all may enhance or prejudice military capability because they possible impact on the possible tooth-to-tail ratio.

B) Operational Structures

The conjunct of operational structures creates the ability of military assets to perform operations in support of required tasks. They are designed, therefore, to attend command and control requirements, articulating military assets in order to get task efficacy through the efficient performance of the parts. Its role is to make the conjunct of military assets present in a military capability become more than the sum of the parts. For analytical purposes, operational structures have two distintive components: 1) Combat structures, and 2) Support Strutures.

1) Combat structures

Combat structures allow parts of the conjunct of military assets to be detached and deployed to specific tasks, allowing expansion of the number of possible tasks that the conjunct might perform. Therefore, the synchronization of detachment and reincorporation of those parts maximizes the potential ability of military assets to accomplish the envisaged concept of employment.34

2) Support structures

Support Structures are designed to fulfill two simultaneous demands. The first refers to the maintenance of military effort in time. In this case, the purpose of support structures is to provide the adequate logistical flow to maintain both military means in their optimum technical performance, and personnel adequate supplied in order to assure the continuous validity of operational protocols, providing for the expected performance of military assets. The second demand imposed on support structures is to prepare the conjunct of military assets to attend operational requirements. In the first demand, support structures are articulated with combat structures, timely linking, for example, depot resources with theatre demands. In the second demand, support structures group military assets by types and classes, seeking a gain in scale in maintenance, repair and training.

Decisions regarding military assets and the organizational design are highly dependent on the degree of require jointness, as well as on decisions regarding how force components are deployed, interconnected and specialized.

33 The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18 5 February 2001. http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo 18.html. . pp. 5. (8/28/2001)34 See Department of the Army, United States of America. 1986 US Army Field Manual 100-5, blueprint for the AirLand Battle. Washington DC: Brassey’s (US), Inc, 1991. To identify the impact of combat structure in force structure and warfare see Deichman, P.F. der. Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwffe Operations in Support of The Army: 1939-1945. New York, USA: IVY Books, 1996. Diechman’s book is also relevant to see the functional role of doctrine in the relationship of combat structure and the conjunct of military assets.

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C) Enabling Elements

The range of possibilities provided by military assets in response to tasks depends on the 1) interoperability of their component parts, and 2) the possibilities created by command, control, communication, and computing. Together, they contribute to achieve and jointness synergy.

1) Interoperability

Interoperability defines the degree of compatibility between force components that permits them to work together to produce expected tactical results. It explores technical features incorporated in military assets to perform operations.

Interoperability is a technology function. It depends on a systemically integrated conjunct of knowledge and instructions that fulfill or create specific demands of force designing, and guide the production possibilities of defense products and processes though proper techniques35.

Technology differs from techniques in continuously reconstructing and transforming itself, having as reference all previous knowledge, whereas techniques are specific knowledge circumscribed in time and space oriented to use or produce required products and processes. Technology supports the presumption of certainty that force components will produce expected results to tasks demands, and determines the transforming rules of knowledge into force components possibilities36.

2) Command, Control, Communications and Computing (C4)

Command and Control, Communications and Computing assure the processes transaction of operational and support structures in a logical fashion, being an

35 Literature offers a variety of definitions of techniques within an unresolved discussion about the difference with technology. Longo defines technology as the organized assemblage of all scientific, empiric and intuitive knowledge used in the production and commercialization of goods and services; and techniques as the purely empirical and intuitive knowledge. Longo, W.L. O Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico do Brasil e suas Perspectivas Frente aos Desafios do Mundo Moderno. Belém: UNAMA, 2000. pp. 11,12. For Morais, technology is derived from the evolution of techniques. For him, techniques refers to Paleolithic, Neolithic, medieval or even modern humankind creative behavior used to provide human necessities though the transformation of the environment; and technology refers to more recent practice of objective human creativity. Morais, R. J.F. Ciência e Tecnologia. 2.ed. São Paulo: Cortez & Morais, 1978. pp.102. Munford has the same understanding of Morais regarding techniques: “through technical improvements we create a new environment and highly organized new behavioral standards that have attended human necessity of living in a orderly and predicable world”. Munford, L. Arte e Ciência. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1986. pp.14. Jacques Ellul has an inverted perspective of the concepts when he says that technology regards naïve activities oriented toward perfection; and techniques as the contemporaneous mentality oriented to efficiency as a supreme goal. Ellul, J. A Técnica e o Desafio do Século. trad. Roland Corbisier. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1968. pp. 445. Buzan sees in the technology the most important factor in determining the nature of military alternatives and means of force, isolated from political influence. Buzan, B. Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations. London, UK:MacMillan Press, 1987. pp.7. Häbermas, on the other hand, thinks that technical reasoning does not abandon its political content. Habermas, J. Técnica e ciência como Ideologia. (trad. Arthur Morão). Lisboa, Portugal: Edições 70, 1968. pp. 46. 36 For a historical perspective of the composition and influence of technology upon force design, see: Macksey, K. Technology in War: the Impact of Science on Weapons Development and Modern Battle. London, UK: Armour Press, 1986. Creveld, M. van. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C to the Present. New York, USA: Free Press, 1991. Dupuy, T.N. The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Fairfax, USA: Hero Books, 1984. Jones, A. The Art of War in the Western World. New York, USA:Oxford University Press, 1987. O’Connel, R.L. Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggressions. London, UK: Oxford U.P., 1989. MacNeill, W. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society Since A.D. 1000. Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.

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integral part of force structure manifested in military capabilities. They can lead to fewer changeovers in force components and tasks to produce required military capabilities, reducing cycle time without changing military effectiveness or increasing military effectiveness using lesser-sophisticated conjunct of military assets. As the size of force components increases, it can exploit more and more tasks, but it also becomes increasingly complex to select the C4 system that makes it possible to provide effectiveness at a low total cost/risk ratio and at the same time assure interoperability37.

Properly identified, C4 requirements lead demand growth of military capabilities with preemptive actions to exploit current deployment of military assets considering its different degrees of readiness tailored to expanding or contracting tasks demands within a specific concept of employment.

THE CONJUNCT OF CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT

The conjunct of concepts of employment define a set of articulated decisions that express the prioritization of objectives and its translation into tasks requirements having operations as its linking factors, whereas relating all of them with a political logic.

In the US case, for example, the Navy has put emphasis on network-centric operations, the Air Force moves towards becoming an expeditionary force, the Marines’s continuing experiments with concepts such as Desert Warrior and Urban Warrior, and the Army’s recently announced effort to develop medium-sized brigades with increaded responsiveness38.

A) Objectives

Objectives are functionally sufficient descriptors of foreseeable demands of the use of force for political purposes. Each one encapsulates a comprehensive content that justifies its individuality and permanence, supporting the assumption that during the processes force design guides those demands of force will not change.

There are five implicit premises in this formulation. First, that the objectives, once selected, are necessary and sufficient to achieve the predetermined purpose. Second, that the processes are logically articulated. Third, that if those objectives were achieved, the envisaged initial purpose would be accomplished. Forth, that its formulation and execution are bounded by some degree of sufficient rationality. Fifth, that during the processes, the objectives and the rules of transformation will not change.

These premises support the proper linkages between national interests and defense capabilities towards higher states of effectiveness, efficiency, provided four conditions:

• Intelligibility: the denotative content of objectives are clearly defined and understood.

• Feasibility: objectives are achievable within the realm of practical possibilities and logical reasoning.

• Assessment possibility: the results are measurable either quantitatively or qualitatively.

37 For a in-depth discussion of Command and Control, see Weisman, R.M.L. A Conceptual Model for Military Command and Control. Ontario, Canada: University of Ontario,UMI Dissertations Services. 1992. 38 Davis, P. Tranforming Military Force. California: Rand Corporation, 2002. pp. 231. http://www.rand.org/ contact/personal/pdavis/MR1306.1.sec6.pdf . (Mar/20/2002).

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• Compatibility: the effects are part of a chain of causality addressing defense requirements

Intelligibility is the requirement for the proper developing of plausible hypothesis related to a set of accepted values and principles; and for clearly communicated results. Assessment Possibility is the requirement for determining the consistency of the proposed objectives and its sensibility to changes in the threat environment.

Attending intelligibility and assessment possibility requirements are relevant to prevent three common risks in defining defense objectives. The first risk is making static a dynamic process. The second, is that objectives, as Lodi39 put, convey solutions in terms of re-scaling existing capabilities, increasing or downsizing, thus restricting the emergence of new capabilities based on different internal logic for rearranging force components. Finally, objectives tend to focus on the short term.

Compatibility is the enable of strategic possibilities. It assures that the resulting effect of operations – manifested in tactical use of military assets in the engagements – might be articulated toward the political goals though a cascade of linked results.

B) Tasks

Tasks are a set of intended actions or desired effects of the application of force towards specific defense objectives. They are the building blocks of the concept of employment, defining the intention for using force components in a chain of linked tactical actions, expecting that the aggregated outcome of this chain will contribute to achieve a cascade of intermediate objectives having at its top the defense objective.

The political logic that links objectives and tasks can be understood with the comprehension of its relation with 1) Defense Missions and 2) Defense Roles.

1) Defense missions

Defense missions are the assemblage of tasks within the scope of an intended purpose. Each mission is related to a specific outcome, in the form a hypothetical combination of assumptions and chains of future developments that serve as a reference for the diagnosis of current and required tasks. Defense missions are, therefore, a proposition of reality aiming to anticipate possible, probable and plausible contingencies where the uses of military capabilities are considered.

Determining and prioritizing missions are a prime political decision found in a set of compromises seeking to reconcile, and where possible, to balance conflicting questions of value. Once defined, they orient the bulk of national effort towards the political use of military capabilities in defense related tasks. At least three important characteristics are common to the use of the term mission:

a) Time horizon: it defines a time horizon for the anticipated impact of the tasks required to carry out its mandate.

b) Focus: it required concentration of effort on a narrow range of pursuits reducing the resources available for other activities.

c) Chain of causality: in requires a series of decisions supportive to one another following a consistent pattern.

39 Lodi conclusions are taken for business strategic planning methodologies. However, his analyis and conclusions can be transposed to force design because both fields explore similar articulating logic and general concepts. See Lodi, J.B. Admininstração por Objetivos: Uma Crítica. São Paulo: Pioneira, 1972. pp.25.

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2) Defense roles

Defense roles are generic descriptors of the nature of the effect, cause or consequence of applied military capabilities in defense tasks. Defense roles are usually categorized as nation building, diplomatic, combat, constabulary, and police; reflecting the different political rules and legal framework that bounds defense tasks.

Nation building roles shape defense tasks towards the social and economic development of the state under democratic governance, civil law and economic rules of market regulation. International law and treaties bind diplomatic and combat roles in peace, crisis and war, asseverating Clausewitz’s conclusion that war is the continuation of policy with the introduction of means of force. The importance of diplomatic roles lies in the fact that nations judge potential adversaries in terms of its military responsiveness, reliability, consistency, and, most of all, unity: unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of action40. Constabulary and policy roles are oriented to the maintenance of order and enforcement of regulations, under national or coalition legal mandate.

The priorities of defense roles reflect the mandate of politics in defense issues. The importance of clearly defined defense roles is the assignment of functions for defense, making it accountable for its results. Military capabilities acquire fighting, diplomatic, police, or constabulary roles depending on doctrine, the way they are organized, deployed, trained, sustained, commanded and controlled. The required status of each of these requirements are assessed taking into considerations topological characteristics of possible areas of operation, national and alliances fiscal and production possibilities to sustain existing capabilities or incorporate others during the course of operations. This, in turn, will require a sustained degree of readiness41 articulated with expected tempo of the military operations.

The relationship of objectives, roles and missions, having tasks as its linking elements, define a matrix of cross impacts.

Objectives

A B C D

Missions

1 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks A

Roles2 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks b

3 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks c

4 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks d

Figure 3: Cross-Impact matrix of objectives, tasks, missions, and roles

40 Foster, GD. The Postmodern Military: The Irony of "Strengthening" Defense. Harvard International Review; Cambridge, Summer 2001. pp. 24-29.41 The concept of readiness will be retaken further on. Here, it is proposed to understand it as the degree of preparedness for a specific purpose.

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Strategy links tactical intended results with the purpose of defense through a political logic; and use tasks, missions and roles to both instruct its formulation and assess its results.

Canada offers an example of the relationship of mission, objectives, and tasks42:

Defense Mission: Defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and securityDefense Objective: To conduct surveillance and control of Canada’s territory, aerospace and maritime areas of jurisdiction. This Defense Objective will be met byDefense Tasks:1. Protecting Canadian sovereignty through surveillance and control of Canada’s

territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction; and2. Mounting an immediate, effective and appropriate response for the resolution of

terrorist incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect, national interests.

Tasks determine the chain of operations and actions [tactical] expected to be accomplished to achieve an objective. Defense mission instructs strategy formulation establishing the validity of linked task results for defense objectives and security goals. Defense Roles provide parameters to assess the degree of efficacy of these valid results to the envisage success defense and security policy determine. That means that strategy completes itself in the tactical possibilities and in the political determinants; having no significance isolated from any one. Finally, it should be kept in mind that objectives, roles and missions are enormously sensitive issues, for they means fiscal resources.

C) Derivative elements

Derivative elements mediate the process of desegregating tasks attending both the criteria formulated based on 1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and 2) the practiced categories of operations. Together, they offer the criteria for developing guidelines for making decisions about the employment of the force components, reflecting how decision-makers define the hierarchy of tasks and describe through missions their understanding of the country’s requirements of security and defense.

1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

ISR ensures that threats will be detected well in advance. Asymmetric threats, for example, such as information and terrorist attacks, are more difficult to predict than large-scale conventional attacks, and therefore have significantly less strategic warning associated with them. The response to asymmetric attack, however, is unlikely to trigger the requirement for national mobilization of conventional forces. As a conclusion, readiness requirements that anticipates a longer period of increasing tension marked by hostile activities, warning indicators and instances of crises prior to the outbreak of a conflict, may be undertaken with the expectation of warning time prior to the emergence of a threat necessitating mobilization.

2) Operations

42 Canada. Defense Planning Guidance 2001 – Chapter 2 – Strategic Directions. http://www.vcds.ca/dgsp/dgp/ dgp2001/chap2e.asp. (Jun/01/2002).

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Operations are doctrinarly defined actions taken in the pursuit of defense tasks, such as convoying, combat air patrol, interdiction, reconnaissance, and replenishment at sea. These actions inevitably involve a degree of coordination; nonetheless, they need not necessarily result in either desired or desiralbe results.

The assemblage of practiced operations are doctrinally defined and categorized, varying from country to country and time to time accordingly to the practiced conceptual system used to determine those categories and the criteria used to allocate operations within each category. Currently, the general trend is to define two broad categories for operations: one reflecting the bulk of the required warfare effort against a specific type of assets (submarine warfare, mine warfare, etc.); the other reflecting required supporting actions to provide efficiency of the operation in the first category (replenishment, surveillance, intelligence, patrol, etc.).

Across the spectrum of operations, small-scale contingencies are the dominant trend in the current defense environment, expanding its limits toward war-like operations and diplomatic actions. The US uses nine categories for smaller-scale contingencies, which are defined as the range of military operations: 1) beyond peacetime engagement but short of major theater warfare; 2) opposed interventions; 3) coercive campaigns; 4) humanitarian intervention; 5) peace accord implementation; 6) follow-on peace operations; 7) interposicional peacekeeping operations; 8) foreign humanitarian assistance; 9) domestic disaster relief and consequent management; 10) no-fly zone enforcement; 11) maritime intercept operations; 12) counterdrug operations and operations in support of other agencies; 13) noncombatant evacuation operations: 14) shows of force; 15) and strikes. These categories and the criteria to allocate contingencies in each one of them have been a focus of debate, making it a major issue in the post-Cold War era to offer a public rationale for capabilities needed to handle the full range of contingencies without putting undue strains on budget and political possibilities.

Combined as derivative elements of the capability construct, ISR and operations attend four basic purposes:

1) To collect authoritative information about the security and defense context;

2) To provide criteria to identify required tasks to be performed (application domain decomposition);

3) To orient representational abstractions for those tasks; and

4) To define interactions and relations among objectives and tasks to ensure that a) constraints and boundary conditions imposed by context are accommodate, b) identify data to be collected and appropriately addressed, and c) control the flow of information that allow the derivation of tasks be stopped or restarted, assuring that the scope and scale of tasks are represented with discernible details.

THE CONJUNCT OF REGULATING FACTORS

Regulating factors are the arsenal of normative instructions linking the requirements of the concepts of employment with the possibilities of force components. This arsenal comprises A) Doctrine, B) Readiness Guidelines, and C) Rules of Engagement (ROE).

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A) Doctrine

Doctrine is the acerb of experiences and practices that guides the selection of operational protocols, instructing the individual and collective use of military assets towards higher levels of efficacy and efficiency, and exploring operational and support structures to perform military operations43.

Doctrine is associated with tactical success, while operational protocols are associated with the technical performance of military assets. Military commanders are expected to have the moral courage to discard a doctrinal recommendation based on its professional experience and even intuition, when they perceive that current doctrine will not produce the expected tactical success in the novel situation he/she confronts. Operational protocols provide guidance, but it is the ability to interpret its adequacy and translate it into tactical success that makes a general a master of war.

B) Readiness

Readiness is defined as the level of preparedness for personnel and materiel to respond to considered tasks. The time assigned to a force component to reach the readiness level is the time required to be fully manned and equipped at organizational strength, including training and logistics stocks necessary for the operations or actions assigned.

Readiness requirements are specified at three levels: 1) tactical, 2) structural and 3) mobilizational.44

1) Tactical Readiness

Tactical readiness determines the level of training and maintenance necessary for timely deployment of military assets. It explores operational and support structure possibilities to accomplish a predetermined range of tasks with expected degree of success and acceptable level of risk.

Higher degree of tactical readiness, either to prepare to immediate deployment or simple to communicate political intentions, demands military assets be kept in higher state of alert with its systems energized and manned, causing personnel fatigue and increased rate of material damage. In turn, personnel fatigue and higher maintenance demands burdens the support structures, stressing the logistics possibilities to the point that the degree of expected tactical success can not anymore be maintained.

2) Structural Readiness

Structural Readiness determines military organizational architecture and logistic requirements to avail, when demanded, large scale and higher periods of tactical readiness, either increasing the range of possible tasks or diminishing risk probability. However, structural readiness has its costs. Higher degree of structural readiness immobilizes capital and resources for future actions, inherently creating inefficiency. Maintaining large repair facility mostly inactive and enormous logistics structure are expensive; similarly, structural readiness demands a top heavy military personnel structure based upon the assumption that it is more difficult and time

43 For a discussion on military doctrine, see Drew, D.M and Snow. D.M. Making Strategy: An introduction to National Processes and Problems. Maxwell, Alabama: Air University Pres, 1988. pp.163-174.44 See Betts, Richard. Military Readness: Concepts, Choises, Consequences. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings, 1995.

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consuming to prepare officers than soldiers. In addition, structural readiness bets on time for bolstering military capabilities.

3) Mobilizational Readiness

Mobilizational readiness determines priorities for the conversion of the peace time social, technologic, industrial and economic national possibilities into military assets and support requirements to avail and maintain tactical efforts through the organizational and logistic possibilities created by the structural readiness. Mobilizational readiness also has its costs, mainly in terms of preparing and maintaining an inventory of conversion possibilities.

The proper balance of tactical, structural and mobilizational readiness requirements reflect concept of employment possibilities and the assumption of time available for deploying military capabilities and the efforts to sustain that effort. Location decision also impacts in readiness alternatives. This balance, therefore, changes as the concept of employment changes. US readiness spending per person in uniform, for example, averaged 22 percent more (in inflation-adjusted terms) during the Clinton years than on the eve of the 1990-1991 Gulf War45.

C) Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement are directives delineating the circumstances and limitation under which the use of force would be initiated, continued and ceased. These rules have a political nature with two mutually complementary dimensions. The first one, judicial, refers to the limitations imposed by domestic and international law, in peace and war, to the use of force. The second one, functional, refers to the limitations imposed by the defense roles.

The choices regarding the degree of readiness required depends of the size, location, and specification of force components possibilities, the spectrum of anticipated tasks made possible by practiced doctrine and authorized by the ROE, complemented by an understanding of the interaction among these decisions. All issues related to force designed are centered in these elements. The optimal size of a given military is only possible to be assessed affixed to its political determinants and costs possibilities, the construct of capabilities make explicit the tradeoff among the required elements to produce this optimum.

The functional merit of the construct is in reducing all military capabilities to the same components abstracted into an ideal model; recognizing that the difference among actual resulting capabilities is directed by the scope of its components and the relationship they establish. The assumption here is that if the total parts constituent of a construct and its relationships are known, the nature of the whole is derivable from the nature of the parts. The result determines a common nature for all possible emergences of capabilities belonging to the same system of knowledge.

The number and qualitative dimension of personnel, the number of levels of organizations, the characteristics of the technology employed, and the articulation of tasks into mission within the concepts of employment are all import determinants of this an ever

45 The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18 5 Feburary 2001. http:://www.comw. org/pda/0102bmemo18.html. Downloaded in8/28/2001. pp. 5

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changing optimum. They are a function of the political determinants for defense, making military capabilities a living with changing composite of relationships, whose linkages are enacted by two inner factors: Jointness and C4I-SR (Command, Control, Communication, Inteligence, Surveillance, and Reconaissance). These factors provide the “animus” of a military, allowing the mechanisms at work within the capabilities to attempt to improve continually its relationship to produce the optimum levels of force and procedures over time to enforce required tasks.

Jointness

The most succinct definition of jointness is that offered by Gen Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as a team46”. Jointness is a major factor that contributes to capability potential. It is the idea of unity of effort and acting accordingly. In the end, how integrated force components are poses the essential question to jointness, to encompass organizational expediency requirements and statutory jurisdiction alike.

The current emphasis on jointness is on the establishment of rules and conventions that allow efficient control of military operations through established mechanisms. Incremental demands for jointness have created demand for flexible military capabilities in their composition, generating raids for new appropriations (operations and maintenance). Force design sees this demand as a reactive-corrective measure to improperly devised capabilities. From the perspective of force design, jointness determine the degree of integration of force structure requirements and tasks possibilities since its conception. Relatively homogeneous service operational doctrine does not provide an indication as to the degree of jointness if dissociated from jointly designed capabilities.

Interoperability stems from good functioning and close coordination of all force components in the effort of providing adequate operational efficiency. Decisions regarding technology in interoperability are incorporated in specific pieces of assets equipment, the degree of automation and the connection between different equipment. Whereas jointness depends on assuring cohesive operations for extended periods with a focus in how best to support task accomplishment.

Jointness, as a requirement of force design, derives from the stability of those patterns of relationship required to produce a capability, which implies in the ability of its components to store its own program of integration, devised for operations that could last the range of combining tasks, without reprogramming.

C4I-SR

Command and control, communications and computers, are enabling elements of the force components, which are linked through doctrine to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, constituting the enacting mechanisms C4I-SR, designed to provide support for the employment of a capability according to its specific operational requirements. C4ISR is seen as an adaptative control system seeking to influence selected aspects of an operating environment, supported by a variety of information systems47. Its functionally progresses across the full range of possible tasks, directing and monitoring operations at the joint and combined level and supporting effective end-to-end management. This includes space and 46 Joint Forces Quarterly. Summer 1993, pp 5. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0301.pdf. (Jun/18/2002).47 Alberts, D. et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publication Series, 2001. pp. 136.

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terrestrial communications, improved interoperability and joint capabilities, and automated information integration to ensure that commanders are provided with the information they will require.

Jointness and C4I-SR are influent factors in facilitating the composite of relationships required to produce a military capability. This two elements exist in a continuum of interdependecies across the spectrum of possible capabilities, configuring a process support system of factors, which orient, develop and constrain the dynamic organization of military assets, operational organizations, objectives and tasks in order to provide different kinds of capabilities. Such system can be thought of as a code of rationalization operating to articulate interrelated processes limiting the variance of a military capability.

Those codes are formulated as a set of accepted rules and values that mediate the relationship between military assets, operational structures, objectives and tasks, adapting itself and influencing that relationship in response to changes in the technological horizon and in the intellectual superstructure that define security and defense requirements. And, therefore, need to be reevaluated periodically.

Jointness and C4I-SR enforce complementarities and inhibit proprieties that produce antagonisms between different structuring criteria used to articulate military assets, operational organizations, objectives and tasks. They provide the principle of organization for the defense construct.

Force components and the concept of employment possess different structuring criteria. The former, integrative, relies on technical performance of individual assets and their degree of interoperability to cluster elements, ranging in size from single units to major aggregation, with their upper limit circumscribed to the armed forces total numbers. The latter, derivative, has its origin in the collective goal of defense objectives, desegregating in a hierarchy of subordinated objectives, accordingly to practiced organizational structure and criteria for allocating responsibilities.

Force components are structured underlying an ability to perform a task required to achieve a politically oriented objective in observance of prescribed rules of engagement. Because resources are always limited, force structure and force components seek to maximize efficiency, although with different parameters. Force structure maximizes efficiency through economy of scale, whereas force components aim for economy of scope. The former tends to concentrate military assets to optimize the industrial production and repair potential of depots and shipyards; the latter tends to maximize tasks with fewer assets.

Determining and assigning defense tasks takes into account force components potential within the scope of practiced doctrine, the practiced degree of readiness and the limits imposed by the Rules of Engagement. Readiness, doctrine and ROE regulate the way military assets are organized, deployed and used to carry out assigned tasks. Doctrine is rooted in military experience, whereas determining readiness requirements is primarily a political decision that reflects task priorities. The resulting effect of the interaction of doctrine possibilities and politically defined readiness requirements determines the proper quantitative dimension of military assets and its relation with operational and support organizations, assuring the internal coherence of military capabilities: the degree of integration, synergy and completeness of force components’ state and relationship throughout time.

However, assuring internal coherence of military capabilities is not sufficient. It is also necessary to assure external coherence, measured as the degree of consistency between force structure possibilities and alternative uses of the military assets.

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The external coherence of military capabilities is enforced through rules of engagement, in the form of prescriptive instructions establishing the limits of use of force for the achievement of military objectives. Its ultimate goal is to assure the proper relationship between the use of force and political will in order to produce mission efficacy, considering both the resulting benefits and its opportunity costs.

To achieve external coherence demand changing the pattern of decisions over time to react to status quo-enforcing mechanisms used to assure internal coherence. This causes a conflict between force components search for stability and political search for task-flexibility. The balance among this competing trends is always contingent, providing the characteristic forms and nature of military capabilities.

FORMS AND NATURE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Military capabilities assume an active form when forces are effectively mobilized, deployed, and engaged to achieve a purpose defined by their tasks. In this form, the assessment of their potential success is conditioned by technical and incommensurable factors as endurance, maintenance, leadership, and weather. All these factors can affect the expected outcome of the engagements changing the pre-condition where military capabilities were designed. The art of the generals is reflected in their ability to assess these changes and adjust capabilities to reassure their expectations.

Military capabilities assume a latent form when its perceived value (translated as expected degree of tactical, strategic and political success) is considered only in the possible outcome of engagements thought in the minds of the conflicting actors, creating deterrent or compelence effects. Deterrence effects are generated in two ways. By means of denial, when aimed to prevent conflicts, inducing the perception that the eventual use of force would be opposed by a substantially powerful defense. And that this defense could generate unacceptable damages to the attacking party, whereas subjecting it to a counterattack with plausible expectations of disassembling its combat capability, imposing the peace that its opponent considered desirable. Or by retaliation, when intended to prevent the start of the opponent action by making evident that the attacked party would even retain retaliation capability, and that this residual capability would still ensure an unacceptable level of destruction to the attacking party. Compelence induce the reversion of an already initiated action towards the initial situation, or towards other situation still acceptable. Deterrence and compelence, from a conceptual point of view, are like opposite sides of a coin, linked by an internal logic sustaining the credibility/plausibility of potential military capabilities as suitable for political purposes.

Active and latent capabilities either alternate or coexist in the full spectrum of violence, which ranges from a simple armed observation to major conflicts involving all available resources, operating simultaneously in the tactical, strategic and political domains, according to the intended use of force in the engagements for the purpose of war, and in the use of combats for political purposes.

The relationship of military capabilities to the spectrum of violence, explicating its simultaneous impact in the tactical, strategic and political domains, prevents the common error of seeing capabilities breaking down into isolated segments according to quantitative dimensions of military assets employed (either in its latent or active form). The error lies in segregating tactics from strategy, and introducing a technical (or technological) dimension into the tactical, strategic, policy relationship.

The nature of military capabilities reflects the nature of the relationship between tactics, strategy, and politics, with its categorization subordinated to the taxonomy used for tasks.

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This connection entails tactical, strategic and political capabilities to reflect the relationship of tasks in the tactical, strategic and political realms; tactical military capabilities provide the ability of military assets to perform tactical tasks that strategic military capabilities will explore for political purposes.

Two patterns – convergent and divergent - emerge as tactical and strategic possibilities from the relationship of force components (FC) and tasks (T).

The divergent pattern emerges because of the ability of the same force component to provide different military capabilities, exploring their integrated assets technical features and organizational architectures in response to different tasks, although with different expectations of tactical success.

A Colombian force-component, for example, integrated by infantry, artillery, engineer, logistics, command, and air wing components, may assume both:

a) The capability to hold in force, for 20 hours, a superior Venezuelan military capability on its eastern border. Ground combat and close air support operation would be sustained until forces stationed near Bogota could be mobilized and deployed to the border (20 hours requirement). The task of defending the eastern border contributes to the defense objective of detering Venezuelan aggressive actions and, should deterrence fail, to provide mobilization time to gather forces for counter-attack.

b) The capability to prevent FARC’s guerrilla action on the eastern border (same region). To suppress guerrilla action to acceptable levels would demand intelligence gathering and random patrolling associated with police-type operations. There is no specific time limit imposed by logistic re-supply and the attrition might be expected to be low because the FARC are not powerful in that region.

A trained mind could provide a reasonable success assessment of the Colombian military capability in both situations. This mind would be computing a nexus of interrelated variables (readiness, organization, doctrine, ROE tactics, elements of weather and terrain, expected attrition levels, training, logistics, leadership, etc.) that underpin those force components to perform both tasks. This mind could summon these capabilities simply expressing theirs asset components; but only because it has already integrated all those variables into a declaratory value.

T

T

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Divergent Pattern Convergent Pattern

Figure 5: Divergent and Convergent Patterns

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A conceptual error takes place when this declaratory value of military capabilities is expressed as the nominal dimension of force structure elements only, reducing capability to its assets components. The error is to take effects per one causal factor only. Military capabilities are not intrinsic characteristics of military assets; they are reconvened in the dual relation of assets with their enabling factors and of those with objectives integrated into tasks.

The convergent pattern emerges as possibility of the same task to be accomplished with different force-components, with specific expectations of tactical success.

In the above example, the task to defend the eastern border of Colombia could be accomplished either by that mentioned conjunct of assets, or by another one, also derived from the Colombian force structure, as a centered in a light tank brigade supported by helicopters.

These two patterns reaffirm the understanding that aircraft carriers, destroyers, tanks and aircraft are only military assets; and squadrons, battalions, etc., are only organizing structures for these assets. A capability emerges in the relationship of these assets to a specific task, when an aircraft carrier with its escorts or an aircraft wing with its tankers, or a battalion with its combat service support, are considered to perform specific operations aiming a desired political effect. Denying this logic would both assign an intrinsic political value to military assets, refuting the subordination of the war to policy, and providing leeway for military autonomy in deciding what assets to have and defining its intended political purposes.

There is, therefore, no military capability independent simultaneously of political, strategic and tactical considerations. Military capabilities breed each time military assets are assembled and oriented with a political purpose to act in force. When it is said that a country has the capability to control its borders or deny the use of the sea, or deter an adversary, or gather intelligence, or patrol its economic zone, it is assumed that it has ability to assembly a conjunct of military assets with a specific political purpose translated intos defense objectives. Once this animating purpose is removed, military capability ceases to exist, given place to assets’ technical possibilities only.

EVALUATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES EFFECTIVENESS

Military capabilities are made of a political tissue and can only be measured through political criteria. When a capability is dissociated from its political intention, the use of force become dissociated from its political purpose. The unwillingness to accept this paramount aspect has led to a common error in evaluating military capabilities effectiveness - to take criteria that suggest itself; that is, a tendency to measure what a capability can do rather than what it should do. Once this pitfall is realized, and preconceived or early ideas about the solution are given up, three ways of assessing capability effectiveness can be formulated.

The first way is goal attainment - the extent to which the instrumental role of military capabilities in military actions, does, in fact, contribute to the state's political aims. The second is the extent to which military capabilities contribute to the effective management of political perceptions. The latter is especially important because military capabilities are ingrained in the creation and projection of the national image, supporting the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of defense policies in support of national interests.

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On another level, the perceptual dimension of strategic effectiveness reflects the fact that the military not only possesses capabilities and performs functions but also projects a certain image of itself. Reorienting the use of military capabilities, and thus transforming their image, contributes to the promotion and protection of a conception of security. Thus, military spending must be balanced between providing for defense objectives and contributing to national development, considering that when resources are diverted from other critical national needs to support mammoth and unrealistic military needs, security is diminished rather than strengthened.

The third assessment criterion is sustainment, defined as the ability to maintain operational effectiveness, measured in days of operations at anticipated usage rates at the expected operational tempo. Force components will normally maintain sufficient supplies of combat commodities such as ammunition, fuel and rations for a limited number of days of operations at the tactical level. Support organizations will expand the number of days with supplies in theatre, and mobilizational process will provide the stocks required to sustain operations beyond this point. Sustainment is, therefore, the effect and consequence of readiness possibilities and operational demands within a determined framework used as a reference for assessment.

These three ways of assessing capabilities effectiveness demand mechanisms for its execution phased with the design and implementation cycles of defense alternatives. The recommended choice would be a permanent assessment system, with standardized mechanisms that feedback its results into the defense system. Other alternative, instead of not assessing at all, would be to phase this assessment with presidential elections, within the defense reviews process. Although this type of interval assessment (or any other criteria used to determine intervals) might be at least a precautionary action, defense reviews are expensive and cause some instability in the defense sector that wave out into the industry of defense, foreign policy and even into the government itself.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE CONSTRUCT OF CAPABILITIES

No matter how the construct of capabilities strive to maintain standards of scientific inquiry, determining its components and establishing its relationships cannot be turned into an exact science. Expert judgment will always be relevant in deciding what interrelations between components to choose as relevant, and in analyzing and interpreting the results. The demands of this construct, particularly in an environment highlighted by political uncertainties, are magnified by the highly specialized nature of military capabilities, at the same time that its condition of possibility are advanced by technological developments.

The objective of the construct is primarily to recommend – or at least to suggest – rather than predict. Thus, it is like to engineering, for the purpose of using its results to make defense alternatives effective, efficient and economic. Such an approach typically stressess the selection of a scheme – a framework – for carrying out possible alternatives, in which the difficulty lies precisely in deciding what ought to be done, not simply in how to do it.

Learning to use such construct provides expertise to assess structural relationships among force components and tasks, systematically addressing them to enhance the likelihood that the appropriate decisions will be made.

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PART 2

FORCE DESIGN FRAMEWORK

Section two presented a conceptual model for military capabilities. However, it is necessary to translate the complex relationships of the processes involved in force design, providing a conceptual framework that organizes the variables involved. Such a framework is offered in the hope that it will bring some assistance for force design and, ultimately, for defense reforms, contributing to the formulation and implementation of an effective military.

The force design framework is a conjunct of knowledge presented in the form of propositions and assumptions logically ordered, assumed as valid for investigating problems-type with expectations of obtaining a stable anticipated solution-type. The logical ordering of its components is provided by the axiology used, which emphasizes the existence of a common set of concepts derived from the construct of capabilities.

A framework is conceptually different from a methodology. The former is an abstraction of the intended desired effect of processes within the complex of relationship to which they belong. It is, therefore, eminently relational and explicative. Whereas the latter is a hierarchy of processes required for achieving some desired effects specified by the framework it refers. Methodologies are, therefore, eminently prescriptive, oriented to the selection of techniques that can perform the required procedures it determines48.

There is a conceptual hierarchy among frameworks, methodologies and techniques, progressing downwards with decreasing degrees of abstraction and increasing degrees of specificity. A framework is associated with designing, meaning the development of guidelines with logically necessary details for its comprehension as an articulated set of decisions oriented to a clearly defined purpose, and with logically sufficient details to verify whether the outcomes it promotes fulfill the objectives which that purpose instructs. Methodologies49

are associated with planning, meaning a hierarchy of articulated procedural instructions. Techniques are specific ways of performing an action implying precise deliverables at the end.

Figure 6 depicts the force design framework and its components logic blocs – Cogitare, Prospicere, Renovatio50 whose purpose is to specify the scope and scale of military capability, translating them into force alternative requirements in association with the condition for its intended use.

48 For a detailed discussion of the distinction between construct, framework, methodologies and techniques, see Lakatos and Marconi (1995, 17, 81).49 For other understandings of methodology, see Jolivet, R. Curso de Filosofia. 13. Ed. Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 1979. pp.71. Bunge, M. La Ciência, su Método y su Filosofia. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veinte, 1974. pp. 55. And Cervo, A. L. e Bervian, P. A. Metodologia Científica. 2.ed. São Paulo: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 50 Latin terms are used to avoid existing – and segmented – understanding of current practices and terminologies.

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A. Determine the problem

B. Select design methodology and associated

techniques

C.Determine the requirements to validate anticipate

results

D. Security and Defense environments evaluation

with the determination of objectives

E. Diagnosis of current capabilities

F. Scenarios formulation

G. Determine the concept of employment

H. Explicit and prioritize tasks

I. Determine capabilities profile

J. Active decomposition of capabilities

K. Programming

L. Budgeting

M. Composite of defense reform requirements

N. Elaborate normative documentation

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Figure 6: The force design construct

The architecture of decisions component of this framework define a set of operational processes through which military capabilities requirements are conceived, developed, and produced to assure timing and effective relationships between force components and tasks, and, ultimately, those reasons that justify the existence of armed forces.

These operational processes, it is relevant to notice, are instrumental to the purpose that each logical block determines. Therefore, they can be arranged/combined accordingly to the organizational structure and practiced methodologies/techniques that each country adopts. The goal of the force design construct is to provide a reference for selecting those methodologies and techniques, arranging/combining processes within a common and articulated purpose. Different arrangements can be articulated and processes can be mixed and matched to build defense alternatives.

Operational processes are servants of the purposes that each block determines; however, this is not always observed. If the academic curricula of war colleges in the Hemisphere is taken as an analytical reference, assuming that the practice of force design will follow the conceptual teaching developed in these schools, it will be observed that this logic is usually inverted, making processes the master of purposes; determining whatever they produce as valid outcomes of a designing goal.

Despite the intention of these institutions to teach at graduate level, this logical inversion makes its endeavor doctrinaire, teaching what to think instead of how to think. Until academic curriculum reflects the logic of force design, force-planning techniques will

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prevail as tools to enforce services doctrine and parochialism, serving only as instrument to corroborate results already determined by traditions and customs. There is no joint education unless force design philosophy becomes instrumental in designing the curricula of military schools.

COGITARE (Reflect about)

The Cogitare block defines an articulated system of decisions aiming to interpret and transform intended political purposes into defense objectives that could be pragmatically achieved though rational actions and available means. To achieve its purpose, this logical block determine what are the valid rules of transformation of information, products and processes required to achieve defense objectives; and orients the formulation of evaluating criteria for the relationship between those objectives, the transformation processes and its outcomes.

The literature51 summons this purpose into two generic procedures: political-strategic evaluation and defense policy formulation, oriented to define the intended use of force, to establish a set of sustained political objectives that comes out from the intercourse of security and defense interests and commitments, and a set of self-relied design guidelines to instruct the development and evaluation of military capabilities.

The problem, one should recognize, lies within these procedures through which political objectives are defined and the legitimacy that the designing guidelines absorb in the process of its formulation and implementation to represent defense demands. In recognition of the importance of conceptual, as well as for reuse of the conclusions obtained from these operational processes, the Cogitare Block offers the Security and Defense Matrix as a basis for judgment about the appropriateness of data for all conditions not specifically tested.

The Security and Defense Matrix

Security and defense52 are commonly used terms permeated with discordance. They are incorporated into scholarship and statecraft, but there is not an agreed consensus on its meaning, resulting from distinctive usages taken arbitrarily from historical contexts, analytical criteria or functional purposes.

For force design purposes, a state of security is a perceived or intended state of equilibrium between a desired way of life and forecasted threats to statecraft, organizations and means that accounts for the feasibility or maintenance of that equilibrium53. Defense alternatives are the possible assemblage of human, material, organizational and information resources developed, sustained and used by the States aiming a desired state of security.

51 See, for example, Lewis, K. Khalilzad, Z. M. and Roll, R.C. New-concept Development: A Planning Approach for The 21st Century Air Force. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1997. Fox, R.J. The Defense Management Challenge. Boston, EUA:Harvard Business School Press, 1988.

52 The epistemological question of what defense and security are is an ontological problem, being out of the force design realm. The answer for this question would provide an explanation for its nature. For force design functional purpose, the relevant is the concept of defense as practiced by each country (each one being a particular manifestation of a general phenomena), how it evolves, and how this evolution influences the conceptualization and development of military capabilities. Other disciplines deal with these ontological questions, establishing a theoretical and practical relationship between force design and other areas of study. 53 Another common understanding of security translates the police role of providing material and individual safety; commonly referred as public security. This is a restrictive and limited understanding of security.

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Each perceived and intended state of security is a transitory situation in which there is a collective agreed upon expectations. The expression of national intended state of security breeds in the political realm and pertains monopolistically to empowered government. It is a matter of politics that some states of security are preferred (prioritized) to others; and it is a matter of policy whether certain defense alternatives are to be banned entirely in view of the intended security state. Alan K. Simpson explains the nature of politics which domains force design: In politics there are no right answers, only a continuing series of compromises between groups resulting in a changing, cloudy and ambiguous series of public decisions, where appetite and ambition compete openly with knowledge and wisdom. That's politics54.

The definition of defense alternatives in association with possible security states reflects a mutually complementary relationship: each endeavored defense alternative changes security goals as it is accomplished; whereas each state of security exists in the present and extends into the future subjected to feasibility of capabilities and acceptability of risks55

derived from the selected defense alternative.

Force design demands defense alternatives be in accordance with the political goals and priorities of each State reflected in its intended stated of security. The nature of security goals and the effects of the instrumentality of defense alternatives find a common denominator in politics, providing coherence for the assessment of their relationship.

The range of security states and associated defense alternatives establish two spectrums of possibilities defined by their logical extremes.

Security states spectrum

This spectrum of possibilities is defined between the Broad Security and Narrow

security states

Defense alternatives spectrum

This spectrum of possibilities is defined between the Broad Defense and Narrow

Defense

Broad Security describes a state of equilibrium were individuals perceive themselves with freedom to access information, products and processes they consider proper to foster their development, express their political preferences and decide about the social and economical organization required to produce it, feeling satisfied with the results.

Broad Defense encompasses all available human, material, organizational and information resources everything that States can use to protect itself from external attacks and domestic insurrection, including but not limited by the Armed Forces instrumentality.

Narrow Security describes a state of equilibrium not menaced by eminent possibility of having to wage an external war or confront an internal convolution for its maintenance.

Narrow Defense defines restrictively the instrumental capability of the Armed Forces to conduct wars only in the pursuance of the intended state of security.

54 Alan K. Simpson, the former U.S. senator from Wyoming who holds the Lombard Chair at the John F. Kennedy, School of Government at Harvard University http://globetrotter. Berkeley.edu/conversations/ Simpson/simpson4.html (24/11/01).55 For a discussion about the “state of security”, see Lippman W. U.S.Foreign Policy. Boston, EUA: John Hopkins Press. 1943, pp. 51. Wolfes us.es Lippmans concepts to review the Defense Policy of the USA. Wolfers, A. “American Defense Policy”. Baltimore, EUA: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. pp. 3. For the application of the term in the context of policy formulation, see Proença, D. and Diniz, E. Política de Defesa no Brasil: uma análise crítica. Brasília: UNB, 1998. pp. 55.

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The range of security and defense significances between its logical extremes defines four quadrants depicted in the figure 7.

Quadrant (1) and (4) brings together the logical extremes of security and defense, contrasting the exclusiveness and inclusiveness criteria in their relationship. Exclusiveness shortens security state to one qualifying criteria only: the absence of war; whereas inclusiveness widens security states towards an imprecisely defined and all encompassing common good. In quadrant (1), Broad Defense alternatives are inclusive of everything that contributes to obtain security, whereas security is everything that brings defense to be unnecessary. In quadrant (4), Narrow Security state is exclusive of any other parametric variable than war; whereas Narrow Defense alternative is defined exclusively in terms of the required armed forces to provide the understanding of security it is associated with. In the quadrants (1) and (4), the distinction between military function and responsibilities become blurred with national governance. In quadrant (1), defense merges in security; and in quadrant (4), security merges into defense.

In quadrant (2), the instrumental role of the military comes dingily close with national governance, entailing the military control of politics. Quadrant (3) produces the opposite effect, distancing to meanness the military role in politics. In the left side of the diagram, were Broad Security is the common denominator, force design leans toward the support role of military capabilities, whereas in the right side the combat role is the prominent variable to consider in force design. In the upper side of the diagram, were Broad Defense is the common denominator; the tendency is to balance functions of the armed forces among multiple axes; whereas in the lower side, combat becomes the leading trend in defining armed forces roles and missions.

Inside these four quadrants, a spectrum of transitory states is defined. Each one of these states gaining its individuality and permanence though an assemblage of defense objectives that translates into pragmatic intentions (missions) a political will. Defense missions, therefore integrate objectives that represents the position of each specific country its position in the Security and Defense Matrix.

When the relationship between defense alternative and the intended security state is reduced near to quadrant (1) one, military capabilities become an instrument of national development towards the envisaged common good, forcing the bulk of military capabilities to lend towards, for example, disaster relief, where a combat role is not required. When those objectives translate the relationships near quadrant (4), military capabilities become war oriented.

(1)

Broad Security

Broad Defense

(2)

Narrow Security

Broad Defense

(3)

Broad Security

Narrow Defense

(4)

Narrow Security

Narrow Defense

Figure 7: Security and Defense Matrix

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The variance of this relationship between defense alternative and security states within these four quadrants – like a metal ball attracted by four magnets - is pushed and pulled by the combining effects of political military relations and interagency dynamics. The former refers to the political identity and prerogatives of the military as a political actor within the defense policy formulation process. The latter refers to the organizational cultures and interests that shape the same process.

Civil-military relations and interagency cooperation are specific field of study, each one with its own analytical framework and working hypotheses intermingle with force design regarding its ability to explain and predict defense objectives outcomes and trends. Civil-military relation and interagency cooperation will explain and anticipate possible tendencies of defense policies in a web of competitive priorities alternatives, attitudes and preferences. In this context, the task of force design is to structure and manage itself so as to mesh with, reinforce, and enhance defense capabilities, being capable to help think about what the priorities are, because if resources are diverted to low-priority objectives, some capabilities that are really important simply will not get done.

The political environment continually forces countries to reevaluate their understanding of security and the concept of defense, adjusting their priorities in force design accordingly. Understanding the national preferences, and their implications for decision patterns (and biases) in the formulation of defense objectives is a prerequisite to realizing the full potential of the security and defense matrix. As an example, two notional charts are presented with the estimated position of hemispheric countries in this diagram in the early 70’ and 200256.

56 To develop these notional charts, the following aspects were considered: a) the type of government; b) military forces deployed abroad; c) internal conflict involving military forces or policy; d) active and latent borders disputes; e) the inclusion/exclusion of police forces within the structure of the armed forces; f) civilian or military ministry of defense; and g) the attribution of constabulary tasks to the armed forces or policy (federal policy/gendarmerie/coat guard). All variables were equally weighted from – 5 to + 5 for defense and security (-5 Narrow, +5 Broad). Aggregated results were plotted using the standard deviation (the center of the matrix = 0,0 defense - 0,0 security). The analytical value of the results is circumscribed to its notional purpose only, limited by the analytical limits of a single valuator and the arbitrary aggregation criteria used.

(2)Narrow Security

Broad Defense

3)Broad SecurityNarrow Defense

(4)Narrow SecurityNarrow Defense

(1)Broad SecurityBroad Defense

(2)Narrow Security

Broad Defense

3)Broad SecurityNarrow Defense

(4)Narrow SecurityNarrow Defense

(1)Broad SecurityBroad Defense

1970

Haiti

Honduras Nicaragua

Pananma Uruguay Dom. Rep.

Guatemala USA Canada Peru Ecuador Uruguay

Mexico Paraguay

Colombia Costa Rica

Brazil Venezuela

Chile Argentina

Bolivia

Colombia Costa Rica Panama

Dom.Rep. Nicaragya

Honduras Peru Ecuador Uruguay

Guatemala

Haiti Argentina Venezuela

Paraguay

Canada

Mexico

USA Chile Brazil

2002

Figure 8: Notional chart for selected countries

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Contrasting these two charts, it would be possible to correlate the position of those depicted countries in the early 70’ with the influence of the Soviet threat, border disputes and internal conflicts. These were primary forces shaping the concept of security and defense toward the right side of the Security and Defense Matrix, were Narrow Security is dominant.

In the early 2002, Colombia is isolated in the upper left corner of the chart, struggling to solve its internal conflict using not only the military but also all possible resources available, as reflect in the Plan Colombia. Costa Rica and Panama, formally without armed forces, tend explicit and emphatically to a concept of wider defense. Paraguay still has a strong perception of the influence of its Armed Force in providing security goals, although moving fast to a wider concept of defense. Brazil’s maintain a declaratory posture of do not directly involve the military in functions and roles other than its professional combat orientation, being kept in the lower part of the matrix of security and defense, where narrow defense is dominant.

One can dispute the particular position of a specific country in the charts. However, two aspects are undisputed. First, the understanding of security and the concept of defense evolved, pressed by the perception of the treaty environment. Venezuela is a remarkable example, with its 1999 Constitution imposing the armed forces a role in the development of the country. Second, there is a marked clustering of countries widening its concept of defense to include other roles and function to the armed forces, adjusting the design of its military capability alike.

The latter aspect provides an indication of possible convergence of a group of countries towards Broad Defense alternatives and Security State’s alike. Whether this imply or not a more peaceful world is arguable, Broad Security shifts the emphasis of force design from war oriented roles of the armed forces to support functions and activities like disaster relief and law enforcement (a constabulary role). Furthermore, it provides an indication that the geographical/regional approach becomes an inadequate criterion for foreign policy formulation, when the use of force might be considered as an alternative, such as in regional security or defense alliances.

In a globalized world, developing foreign policy based upon countries geographic positioning is not anymore a valid criterion. It is not only contrary to evidences of others and more important clustering criteria; it lacks efficacy and harasses national indigenous perception of their willingness to auto-determination.

Whereas the latter aspect - clustering tendency of countries - might impose changes in foreign policy formulation, the former aspect is paramount for force design. It implies that each country will transform its own concept of defense reflecting how it perceives the nexus of threats molding his desired security state. Threats, therefore, are the parametric variable in force design. They are anticipated relationship of possible events required for that an undesirable result or consequence happens. Force design identify and assess threats in order to find out whether they have influence or modify military capabilities ability to attend defense objectives.

The adequacy of the policy formulation process can only be judged accordingly to its functional sufficiency in providing guidelines for force design. Its formulation is driven by the legacy of past practices, the inertial factors derived by the nature of object it orients the conception, and from the ambient where defense takes is purpose. There are, therefore, no principles for designing defense objectives; its craft cannot be reduced to enforceable rules. This is warning for those practitioners who search for objective-making principles and a precaution for those who try to conceptualize its component processes relationships.

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It must be borne in mind that the task of policy formulation is the bulk of a creation and prioritization of stable and viable defense objectives able to capture the position and trend of each country regarding its understanding of security and concept of defense. Whatever compromises this process might entail; engineering defense objectives cannot fail to fully consider its practical achievement taking into consideration civil military relations and the interagency bargaining process. That implies that force design can neither escape things political when it seeks to affect policy nor when it seeks to be supported by policy.

When policy formulation does not play its functional role in identifying adequate defense objectives, the results are defective capabilities inarticulate with strategies and inadequate organizational structures that do not provide required jointness.

One hypothesized chain of events could explain how a defective defense policy concurs for the lack of internal and external coherence and sufficiency: defense purposes are not clearly defined, provoking vague and even conflicting objectives; without clearly defined objectives, the responsibilities of States’ agency become blurred. Interagency conflicts tend to stovepipe processes accordingly to their operational procedures and institutional goals. The resulting products of these stovepipe processes become inarticulate and even conflicting.

When a defense policy is defective, wasteful use of national resources tends to occur. The US experienced this situation in the 1960’s with duplication of projects within the Armed Forces when five over imposing and simultaneous U.S projects for nuclear capabilities were simultaneously developed.

The democratic institutions may suffer alike from defective defense policy because of the guidance vagueness provides excessive autonomy for the Armed Forces to define its own missions. Brazil’s Defense policy of 1989, for example, although recognized as an important contribution, was very much criticized for its vagueness. Beside, in the worst case, the State’s own existence may be threaten because a defense policy fails to provide the adequate capabilities or conveys the wrong message, changing the fragile equilibrium of peace.

PROSPICERE (Look ahead)

The prospicere block purpose is to provide referent scenarios for both evaluate the validity of policy guidelines and current capabilities, and anticipate future capabilities requirement. Its primary function is to serve as the mechanisms by witch objectives are transformed into detailed capacity requirements. This is an epistemological necessity of a framework oriented to develop hypotheses about the future. The variety of component elements of these hypotheses depends on two factors: dimensions of complexity and time. Dimensions of complexity regard the numbers of chains of events considered to represent objected hypothesis of future. The wider and complex the objected hypothesis, the bigger the probability of chains of events present differentiated logic. Longer the time ahead considered bigger the bifurcation of chain of events. The combined effect of these two factors can generate such a number of chains of events that can end up conflictive.

The Prospicere block provides the Diagram of Futures as “authoritative” information about the domains that future defense capabilities are to address. It provides plausible representation of contexts and references to sources that define tasks possibilities, ensuring that these sources do not employ contradictory assumptions or factors.

The Diagram of Futures

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Force design deals with uncertainties. March and Simon57 propose three categories of uncertainty: 1) unacceptability of alternatives, when the distribution of probability between alternatives is not know; 2) incompatibility of alternatives, when the distribution of probability between alternatives is know, but one cannot decide about the most favorable one; and 3) unpredictability of alternatives; when the distribution of probability that relates choices and outcomes is unknown. Davies and Klalilzad58 categorize uncertainty as programmed, when one is able to recognize its possibility but not its time-occurrence; and catastrophic, when one cannot anticipate either its nature or its time-occurrence. Force design categorizes uncertainties accordingly to ends, means and the relationship between ends and means.

• Uncertainty of ends

The uncertainty of ends reflects the fact that defense objectives may emerge, disappear of transform at the same time force is threaten or used, conditionally changing the desired end state for what these threats and uses were intended for.

• Uncertainty of means

The uncertainty of means reflects the spectrum of possible forms that acts of force may assume pending on the relationship of the components of the force and the permanency of these relationships over time.

Each form derives from the (re) configurations of constituent elements of the force, exploring the integrative and derivative patterns of military capabilities, qualitatively changing its expected tactical efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, those possible configurations reflect: a) the evolving production structures and technological horizons of States; b) and the interdependency of factors that define and prioritize allocation of national resources between defense and other States interests.

Ships, aircraft, combat organization, and other military assets, only receive their purpose as means of force when incorporated into political determinants. These determinants possibilities lend to the force its nature as States’ will and explain why it is never an end in itself. Uncertainty of means, in force design, is, therefore, an attribute of tactics, having in its possibilities the building blocks of strategies aiming anticipated ends.

• Uncertainty of the relationship between means and ends

The uncertainty of the relationship between means and ends regards the use of engagement outcomes for political purposes. Each relationship intending an anticipated concept of employment that reflects the nature of forecasted conflicts in which it will develop itself.

The convertibility of means into ends, whereas means and ends are changing, entails an spectrum of conflict possibilities ranging from simple unarmed observations to situations where an adversary has to be completely de-armed and submitted to the will of its adversary.

The evolving nature and relationship of mean and ends explains the limits of a spectrum of conflict with predetermined category, and challenge the concept of escalation as a single

57 March, J.C. and Simon, H. A. Teoria das Organizações. 2.ed. trad. Hugo Wahrlich. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1970.58 Davies, P. K. and Klalilzad, Z. M. A Composite Approach to Air Force Planning. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1996. pp.6.

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line progressing from present to future. Military capabilities emerge, and keep its existence in this end-means uncertainties.

Force design deals with ends, means, and its relationships simultaneously, taking its cross-impacts in conjunct with considerations about required changes in functions, responsibilities, and institutional organization of defense. The practical implication of this challenge is the building of armed forces with unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of action for effectively wielding power in support of national will. When different clusters of assets, for example, can provide the same degree of tactical success for the same task, there is an indication of redundancy in force structure components. This redundancy might be either intended, when associated with multiple and simultaneous similar tasks; or undesirable, being a warning for improper force design.

These three types of uncertainty reflect the clausewitzian construct. Uncertainty of ends is about politics, uncertainty of means about tactics and uncertainty of the relationship between means and ends about strategy. In the same way, one cannot distinguish tactics, strategy and politics except for analytical purposes; these three types of uncertainty cannot be separated. It is under this understanding that the concept of event has to be acknowledged.

Events

Schwartz59 gives meaning to events as “the building blocs of forecasting”. Events help reducing the complexity of decision-making under uncertainty, isolating discrete elements and establishing its links in a trend that emerges in the present, progressing into the future. On the other hand, Bunge60, analyzing those links, concludes that events are an abstraction of reality, an arbitrary simplification of reality.

Force design recognizes both the utility and limits of events. From an ontological perspective, events are a defective selection of expected attributes of the future. Each event derives from many others in an infinite progression, from which one extract only those that are currently judge as important. Therefore, any suggestion that forecasting should take into consideration all events do not correspond to the logical possibilities of current human capability of identifying and linking events. There will always be interconnections rich in important that would not be properly recognized or considered. Notwithstanding, from a methodological perspective, events are a necessity. They support the formulation of hypothesis about the future, for what they are a research and analysis imposition. The methodological rigor of force design demands recognizing this necessity and its limits, in the same way others fields of science does. The validity of any conclusion based on events is limited by the expectation of its no vulnerability. Under this understanding, events can be categorized in four terms61.

• Dependent Events

Dependent events are those events that appear, disappear, or change when researchers add, remove, or modify other events. They are, therefore, the factor or propriety that is effect, result, or consequence to what was manipulated.

59 Schwartz, P. The Art of The Long View. London, UK: Cunerry, 1991. pp. 32.60 Bunge, op. cit. 1959. pp. 187. 61 This categorization uses criteria presented in Lakatos, Eva and Marconi, M. A. Cientific Methodology. 2 ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 1991. pp.172.

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• Parametric Events

Parametric events are those events required for a determined result or consequence to happen. They are selected and manipulated in order to find out whether they have influence or modify dependent events.

• Relational Events

Relational events establish a test factor for the limits of inference and expectation. Relational events are assumptions that incorporate into force design the ability to make explicit its own limits. They demand when hypothesizing through abstracted elements of reality, to make results relative with its measuring criteria. That is, to make clearly discursive what surges from intuition and analysis; allowing assessing equally valid arguments whereas averring their validity as function of its utility.

The role of relational events can be expressed in a simple formulation: if the assumption turns out to be vulnerable, the relation between parametric and dependent events is corrupted, and inferences derived from this relation are no longer valid. In this role, relational events fulfill the fundamental demand of force design: that the accurateness of measurement refers to the sensibility of measuring method and take into consideration conditions of permanence of the object under measure for the stability of derived conclusions.

• Control Events

Control events are those intentionally neutralized to prevent that its occurrence translate a logical obstruction for designing capabilities. An extreme situation of control event would be the possibility of disappearance of men. Less extreme examples are more difficult to establish, although more important, as the continuation of the system of states and the role of force as a political instrument.

The mechanics of forecasting

Forecasting mechanics can be made explicit using the relationship between events. Its goal is to describe with some degree of confidence, the most likely future strategic environment, in the form of design scenarios:

Control events are established in order to neutralized uncertainties that would preclude force designing; a set of relevant parametric events are stated and hypothetical chains of future developments are established converging to dependent events. Finally, relational events are established to provide evidence of a possible vulnerability of these hypothetical chains, depending on the change of the state of parametric variables or the occurrence of others events not neutralized. If forecasting is established above authorized conditions of relational events, they mean nothing and are an error.

Parametric events establish three types of link: projection, prospective and prosficcion. The importance in recognizing these types is to preventthe transitivity between phenomena of distinctive nature.

Projection and the projective horizon

Projection is explained by the Theory of Causality, formulated by Bunge62, as a causal relation that can be empirically verified. Temporal series, for example, are projections. Chains of projection link present facts to future events through a tendency depending on two

62 Bunge, op. cit. 1959.

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factors: how much can be retreated to capture the necessary information to construct temporal series, with the identification of its periodicity; and the selection of the appropriated technique to construct and interpret these series.

According to Wright63, projection validity can only be claimed upon parts of future, and not upon the future as a totality. The time-limit of these parts define the projective horizon.

The projective horizon delimits a temporal context where practices from the past ascertain regularities that impose a degree of inertia to changes. Therefore, although the projective future is not absolutely undetermined; it is also not unique in its determination, in the sense that the course of the present would be derivative of a set of rigid and inexorable causal laws. The projective future has, indeed, some degree of freedom, but this degree is restricted, being subjected to the possibilities authorized by regulatory elements of the construct of capabilities, which will determine the limits of adaptation in defense reforms.

Force design assumes that in this part of the future that projection is utile there is a dynamic equilibrium – said homeostatic equilibrium – between the demands of defense and the defense system. The time length of the projective horizon – and therefore the continuity of the homeostatic equilibrium – is determined by the expectation that some aspects of the past will continue in the future. The assumption of continuity, as stated by Makridakis64, which depends on the availability of sufficient information about the past. In The Medium Age, for example, the projective horizon established a temporal context extremely long, derived from the relative inertia of warfare practices derived from a relative stability of costumes, techniques and production capacities (feudal structure). Present projective horizons are much shorter, with a diversified variation caused by the acceleration of technical developments enhancing tactical possibilities65.

The risk in force design is the auto-compensation of elements, artificially enlarging the projective horizon; structure and budgets proceedings, production capabilities and military bureaucracy, for example. Within this horizon, warfare practices are determined by a grammar that produces no comparative advantage between forces under the same state-of-the-art.

The accepted degree of dispersion of projections translates the level of risks politics is willing to accept. This acceptable level of risk establishes the limits of the projective horizon and it is for determining its occurrence that projective assumptions are constructed. This understanding contradicts that of Chuyev and Mikhaylov66, who suggest as prediction interval the medium time between weapons systems cycles of development and acquisition. It is conceivable that the development of a complex and time length weapon system could be artificially precluding changes, imposing inertia to tasks and missions for which that weapons system is inadequate or inefficient.

Projection has its problems. First, as expressed by Henry Kissinger, because it projects the familiar into future. Second, because it induces an incremental changes in defense capabilities, inhibiting creativity and precluding peripheral vision that should be used for rethinking the rate and form of these changes. The conclusion is that projections make 63 Wight, M. International Theory: The Three Traditions. London, UK: Leicester U.P., 1994. pp.11.64 Makridakis, S.G. Forecasting: Planning and Strategy for The 21st Century. London, UK: Free Press, 1990. pp.9.65 For warfare practices in the Medium Age and its relation with feudal structure, see Howard, M. War in European History. London, UK: Penguin, 1983. 66 Chuyev, Y. and Mikhaylov, Y. Soviet Military Thought.nr.16: Forecasting in Military Affairs. trad. DGIS Multilingual Section Translation Bureau – Secretary of State Department – Canada. Moscou, URSS.: Washington, D.C., EUA: U.S Government Printing Office, 1980. pp.4.

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analysts see only what they illuminate; but, due to its nature, they cannot illuminate their own discontinuities.

Prospective and the prospective horizon

The conceptual foundation of prospective is the Theory of Propensity as explained by Popper67. He presents the concept of propensity as the probabilistic outcome derived from a condition of possibility posed by a conjunct of probabilities that are neither fully empirically supported nor totally tested.

The prospective does not fill empty spaces in the chain of events; it creates probable alternatives, each one presented as a relationship that confirms the following with regressive degrees of certainty. The judgment of new occurrences is a function of previous judgments. Prospective is concerned more with the structure of the conditional relation between present facts and future events than with the accuracy of the premises. Therefore, prospective does not restrain itself to what effectively may happen in the future, but is concerned with possible events that could happen under probable conditions. The prospective, in fact, present a story where some data are occult, but assume that this story is sufficiently coherent to infer conclusions.

The prospective differs from the projection in the morphology of the chain of events. Projective alternatives disperse from a common origin in the present within a cone of possibilities authorized by the links of causality. Prospective alternatives derive along the path, creating a tree-like structure; each new branch being judged accordingly to the qualification of its pertinence to envisaged ends.

The prospective horizon delimits a temporal context where the regularities observed in the past condition the future together with a set of significant parametric variables that could alter the chain of events. The limit of this horizon is given by the possibility of prospective assumptions become vulnerable. Vulnerable prospective assumptions condition defense alternatives by turning obsolete doctrine, readiness requirements and strategic concepts. It signals a qualitative change in the forms and means of war: it heralds an on going revolution in military affairs, which determines the possibilities and limits of modernization in defense reforms.

Prosficcion and the prosficcional horizon

The concept of prosficcion emerges within force design as a methodological requirement. The Theory of Probabilistic Induction, in Reichenback68 terms, explains Prosficcional links between parametric events. It allows explaining the induction of probability of truth where the links are sufficiently strong and the sequence of events sufficiently short.

Prosficcion uses a plan of concepts accepted in the present to think in different categories of concepts and its logical arranges in the future. Prosficcional links varies without preconceived plans, measuring standards, or statistical tolerances. It accepts temporal bifurcation to propose and explore logical relationship and create new possibilities. Its limits

67 Popper, K.R. A Lógica da Pesquisa Científica. trad. Leonidas Hegenberg. São Paulo: Cultrix, 1972.68 Reichenbach, H. Experience and prediction. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Kaplan says that the probabistic induction is based on the notion that exists an expectative of truth in chains of events if the links of thinking sequences were sufficiently strong and the links sufficiently short. Kaplan, M. Decision Theory. Massachusetts, EUA: Cambrige U.P., 1996. pp. 235, a indução probabilística fundamenta-se na noção de que existe uma expectativa de verdade se as ligações entre elos das seqüências de raciocínio forem suficientemente fortes e as cadeias suficientemente curtas.

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are the plausibility of alternatives – the possibility of its existence -, which is a marked subjective limit. Prosficcion produces thought experiments aiming to explore logical extremes of possible futures. It is not an attempt of predicting the future; it is a research of possible innovations through questioning ends, means, and its relationships using an illustrated mind. The different between prosficcion and mere guest – wherever illustrated the last could be – is a contrast that gives sense to acquiring knowledge. Mach69 calls this knowledge Phantasie-Vorstellung – derived from pure reason, but not its substitute – that is manifested when is necessary to make apparently conflicting alternatives to be concurrent in their utility.

Prosficcional parametric events are intuitively conceived. The choice of its expression of synthesis is informed by functional considerations of representatives of the conceived object and by the informed judgement of its feasibility. There is no denial of the intuition phenomena as part of creative action. Although its probation is a controversial issue in the realm of philosophy, its epistemological functionality is accepted as an attribute of method in science. It is utile for advancing knowledge though the critic of false or non-existing problems70 .

Moles71 provide the limit of a temporal context defined by prosficcion: the distance of coherence, the limit of propagation of causal truth. The important is not what is over these limits, but what it circumscribes. The distance of coherence determines the limits of transformation alternatives in defense reforms. Over this limit, the mind cannot intuitively believe in the proposed chain of events and see growing changes of contradiction in parts of the cognitive process. Within these limits, prosficcion see links between events that otherwise would not be evident though projection or prospective lens. Terraine72, for example, concludes that I Word War trench phenomena were not evident though a projection from past trends neither from prospective formulation but though intuitively conceived links between the new industrial production possibilities and evolving forms of war. In the same line, Clark (1993,83) quotes la Guerre au vingtième siècle as evidence for the trenches73.

The ordainment of dependent events is done within three reference axes: time, acts of force and topology, creating the foundation for looking ahead guided by a coherent and articulated set of concepts ensuring that scenarios which will be extracted do not employ contradictory assumptions or factors.

69 Apud. Bunge, M. Intuition and Science. New York, EUA: Prentice Hall, 1962. pp.77.70 Bruyne, P. et al. Dinamica da pesquisa em ciências sociais: os polos da prática metodológica. 5 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. 1991. pp. 57. 71 Moles, A. As Ciências do Impreciso. trad. Glória Lins. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1995. pp.125.72 Terraine, J. The Smoke and the Fire: Miths & Anti-Miths of War: 1861-1945. London, UK: Leo Cooper, 1992. Cap. XIX.73 For further examples, see Dyson, F. Mundos Imaginados. São Paulo: Scharcz, 1998; and Malone, J. O futuro ontem e hoje. trad. Ricardo Silveira, Rio de Janeiro: Ediouro, 1997. Prosficcion can be siphon out in Clark, I.F. Voices prophesying war: future wars, 1763-3749. New York: Prentice Hall, 1993. pp.224-262.

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Time

The first ax is the time line. It superimposes the three project horizons – projective, prospective and prosficcional. All chains of events, and therefore the three horizons, start from the same point in the present, but have different length depending on the particular form that the relation between events is established. These horizons represent distinct expectations that their related chains of events have as qualities that hold the past; coexisting on this first ax until projective assumptions make projective chains vulnerable, or prospective assumptions make propensity chains vulnerable, or prosficcional assumptions have determined the limit of coherence of forecasting.

Projective assumptions establishes criteria for evaluating the acceptance of dispersion of temporal series; prospective assumptions establishes a reference for judging the acceptance of preserving propensity based relationship between prospective events; and prosficcional assumptions are used for judging limits of validity of induction of truth in inductive links. Together, these assumptions are used to establish the conditions of possibility of force design alternatives, regulating, respectively, adaptation, modernization and transformation possibilities.

Reality entwines together these three horizons. The diagram of future isolated them for analytical purposes only. Making these three horizons explicit allows resolving the apparent paradox of force design, expressed by the simultaneous necessity of military capability requirements to be sufficiently stable for planning purposes and sufficiently dynamic to take into account a continuous process of change in the environment force design environment.

The coexistence of these three horizons refutes the traditional assumption of a unique and continuous horizon, with a hierarchy of segmented elements: short, medium and long time intervals. These intervals say nothing but a pseudo-scientific category imposed upon uncertainty. In other terms, an error – that improperly transfers to a not verifiable category the impreciseness of the process of defining forecasting limits.

It was explained that procurement is not a proper criterion for establishing forecasting horizons in force design. Clearly, assuming an “a priory” force design horizon is not only an epistemological but also a methodological mistake, entailing inevitably a highly imperfect process. The fragility, for example, of a directive stating 12 years as force planning horizon is evident with the question: why not 13, or 15 or 20?

Time

Acts of ForceTopology

Figure 9: Space of Capabilities

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The specification of the time length for force design, and therefore the limits of forecasting, is an integral part of the process of designing defense alternatives, limited by relational events (assumptions) which offer criteria for assessing the vulnerability of the proposed scenarios.

Force design horizons are defined by the possibility of considered assumptions being vulnerable. They demand making explicit data that otherwise would be implicit. They impose transparency in expected capabilities, and provide control and oversight of budgeting and management through required performance indicators clearly articulated with political goals. Finally, they contribute to national development, since onerous political and financial costs of defense reforms can be rationally explicated as necessary, and not automatically derived from budgeting cycle or electoral periods.

Topology

The second ax distinguishes particular topologic contexts contained in the dependent events that provide specificity to forecasted conflicts. Topologic is used in a wider sense; it implies not only the traditional partition of land-sea-air segments, but also space, informational and cybernetic segments alike.

Acts of force

The third ax distingue the nature of forecasted conflicts. Dunningan and Macedonia74

offer a perspective though which those acts of force could be considered. Creveld75, as well as Dunningan and Nofi76, Belamy77, Simpkin78, Grove79 and Brown80 also offer their perspectives. All provide situations where the natures of future acts of force are anticipated. The problem, therefore, is not the existence, or not, of distinctive natures of these acts, but how to translate them into patterns. That is exactly part of force design.

These three axes create a space named space of capabilities81. Each segment of this space is recognized by its functionality to force design purposes, and thus defined as a valid scenario subjected to the linking codes of its events (projective, prospective and prosficcional). The structure of the rules of these codes is explained by its functional interdependency with the formulated scenario (what technique was used, for example, for deciphering the code of tendencies).

74 Dunningan, J. F. and Macedonia. R.M. Getting it Right: American Military Reforms after the Vietnan to the Gulf War and Beyond. New York, USA: Willian Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993.75 Creveld, M. van. The Transformation of War. New York, USA: The Free Press, 1991.76 Dunningan, J. F. e Nofi, A.A. Shooting Blanks: War that Doesn't Work. New York, USA: Willian Morrow and Company, 1991.77 Bellamy, C. The future of Land Warfare. New York, USA: ST Martin's Press, 1987.78 Simpkin, R.E. Race to the Swift; Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. New York, USA: Brassey's, 1985.79 Grove, E. The Future of Se Power. Annapolis, EUA: Naval Institute Press, 1990.80 Brown, N. The Future of Air Power. New York, USA: Holmer & Meier, 1986.81 The use of this term “space of capabilities” mimics the term space of phase used in the Theory of Complexity denoting a multidimensional set of variables that represents the characteristics of a point in a complex system. But it also recognizes its similarity with space of combat used by the USA as a doctrine. See USA. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. EUA, 1995. It also has similarities with the term scenario-space created by Davies, P. and Finch, L. Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War: Giving Meaning to Flexibily, Adaptiveness, and Robustness of Capability. California, EUA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 1993. As well as the same term used by Bennet, B et al. Theater, Analysis and Modeling in an Era of Uncertainty. California, EUA: Rand Corporation, 1994.

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Particular rules of auto-development determine the peculiar structure of each formulated scenario, this rules being external to the causal nexus of events. That means that the techniques for developing scenarios should not interfere in the development of the chains of events.

Each particular area in the diagram of future – each space of capabilities – animates a scenario, providing the required reference for force design to create a full-spectrum of capabilities that could dominate future battlefields; in whatever nature they might emerge.

Scenarios

Scenarios are hypothetical interpretation of combining missions at a specific time and space with previously determined purpose. As an intellectual representation, the scenarios can be seen as a draw in a canvas made by a light bean. The distance of the canvas from the lamp (time effect) will illuminate more or less details (dimensions of complexity). Forecasting explains the internal structure of the bean – the chains of events; it allows anticipating shadow patterns and colors, but it says nothing about the projected draw.

Because of the diversity of decisions that must be made over time based on scenarios, an organizing framework that groups them into categories is useful.

♦ War scenarios encompass missions that demand the violent use of force either offensively or defensively. In spite of many efforts, there is no acceptable war categorization and no legitimacy in adherence to past practice and usage in warfare. Political objectives vary as well as commitments to use force as an alternative to compel the enemy to do our will. Politics ordains the exercise of force in the clash of weapons and wills, endeavoring adversaries to bound for the peace it intended, when it decided to use force in order to achieve its objective; whereas tactical results inform policy alternatives.

♦ Crisis scenarios anticipate a situation where both means and the intention of violent use of force are limited, this limitation being contingent and temporally determined in accordance with values, customs and practices implicitly recognized and accepted by the parts in conflict. Mission in crisis scenarios are oriented either to actions of presence, performed in a routinely way, with concealed and indirect intentions or though mission carrying deliberate exercise of limited force. Luttwak calls the latter suasion, with the approximate meaning of coercion. In both forms, crisis missions’ aims to evoked specific reaction by means of deliberately planned and executed actions or signals82.

♦ Environment shaping scenarios aims to prevent either crises or war though the manipulation of the perception of benefits and priorities of using force for political stability, economic development and social welfare. The emphasis in environment shaping missions is on molding patterns of thinking or behavior, where it is assumed that the desired resulting effect will come though the system of values of the target state.

♦ Disaster relief scenarios depict after-effect missions in the case of natural disaster, or missions related to the prevention and reaction for search and rescue of material and lives. The use of military capabilities to fulfill task requirements of disaster relief

82 For a discussion about crisis and crisis management, see Raza, S. Crises e Manobra de Crises Internacionais Político Estratégicas. in Aeroespace Power Journal, Spring 2002.

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scenarios emphasizes the peacetime use of the command and control and the logistics components of force structure, exploring its permanent organization and usually adequate degree of readiness.

♦ Law enforcement scenarios define missions related with public security, borders control (immigration and custom), and counter-narcotics. Defense law enforcement missions support, substitute or complement police activities.

As implied by these different categories, an effective conceptual system is not necessarily one that promises the maximum perfection in developing scenarios, but rather one that fits the needs of force design, striving for consistency of the representational entities being sought through the relationships of events. Translating events into an appropriate collection of scenarios requires a solid epistemological foundation to ensure they are supportive of force design goals and functions.

The Diagram of Futures identifies the component elements of these representational entities within the domain of its assumptions needed to ensure that capabilities specification in the next logical block – Renovatio – fully satisfy the requirements of the use of force for political purposes, allocating specific tasks in each category with the definition of its relative importance and occurrence.

One of the most critical functions in force design is to define the scenarios that will be used to size the force and offer a public rationale for this decision. In the US case, for example, for the past eight years, the primary criterion for sizing conventional forces has been two nearly simultaneous Major Teather Warfare (MTW) and Forward Presence (for naval forces). Critics argue that these scenarios are problematic for three reasons. “First, despite important differences between then, both scenarios are cases of aggression involving large armored invasions on land, but not every plausible MTW would take this form. Second, different MTW scenarios might involve different endstate objectives. Whereas one case might involve restoring the international border between victim and aggressor and imposing a sanctions regime, another might involve removing the aggressor from power, ushering in a new regime, and helping to restore post-conflict stability. Third, the two canonical MTW cases do not represent the full range of challenges that the U.S. military could face in the futre – even the near future- such as more capable regional foes employing antiaccess strategies to thwart U.S. power projection”83. These critics suggest the need for new planning scenarios for the U.S. The diagram of futures offers the conceptual foundations for its development with associated methodologies, like for example “Capabilities Based Planning” with a proposed framework developed by Paul K. Davis, David Gompert and Richard Kugler84.

It is worth recovering here the definition of defense missions: the assemblage of tasks within the scope of an intended purpose in the form a hypothetical combination of

83 Flournoy, M. A. (Project Director). Report on the national Defense University – Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group. Washington, D.C. Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2000. pp. 11. For other criticisms of the two-MTW, see Krepinewich, A. D. in The Botton-up Review: An assessment. Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 1994. O’Hanlon, M. Rethinking two War Strategies. Joint Forces Quarterly, nr 24. Spring 2000, pp. 11-17. For a defense of the of the two-MTW, see, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Press, May, 1997, pp. 12-13. 84 Davis, P. et al. Adaptativeness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework. California: Rand Corporation, 1996. http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/Ip155/. (Jun/12/2002).

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assumptions and chains of future developments that serve as a reference for the diagnosis of current and required tasks. Defense missions are, therefore, a proposition of reality aiming to anticipate possible, probable and plausible contingencies where the uses of military capabilities are considered. Scenarios are the foundation of missions; and should not fusion dependent events. On the contrary, they must prevent a cause and causality relationship between ordains of different nature. This is a relevant conceptual aspect of the diagram of futures, since there is not a theory that supports the fusion of chains of events of different nature. As Allport85 explains in 1956, chains of events of different nature, although always related, are distinct and must not be interchanged or substituted. Stevenson and Inayatyllah86

said the same thing 43 years late when they affirm the epistemological necessity of explicating premises in studies about the future, making explicit distinct chains of significance hidden in the scenarios.

This is exactly what the diagram of futures prevents. Moreover, when the diagram of futures recognizes dissimilarities in chains of events, it avoids taking the expectation of time length of the longest chain of events as the expectation of time validity of the resulting scenario. Coherently, it takes the expectation of vulnerability of the shorter horizon, derived from the vulnerability of its related relational events (assumptions), as the assessment criteria for the expectation of validity of the resulting scenario.

The diagram of futures circumscribes a field of possibilities that is neither undefined (although it may be unknown in parts) nor unlimited (relational events provide those limits). The scope and dimension of this field derive from the possibility of blocking the variety of events, whereas possessing the articulating logic for dependent events that wasn’t blocked. This limit constrain and determine what are valid and non-valid decision in force design allowing the acquisition of the real stage of the force though the confrontation of defense political objectives with the possibilities offered by the technology, conditioned by resource allocation priorities and assessed degree of acceptable risks.

It is the collective pattern of decisions based on parcels of the diagram of future that determine concepts of employment, ascribing strengths and weakness of current and future military capabilities. These strengths and weakness are the direct result of the pattern of decisions pursued, typically viewed as structural in nature because of the difficulty of reversing them and the fact that a substantial investment is required to alter or extend them. This latter aspect has led defense reforms to rely primarily on fiscal resources for reviewing structural decisions. This diagram of future deny this logic, explaining the necessity of interrelated decisions regarding the capability that is incorporated within each of the projective, prospective and prosficcional arena are taken, considering how their cumulative impact can contribute to defense objectives.

RENOVATIO (Reengineer)

The Renovatio block of the Framework is the designer way of identifying capabilities profile, presenting its most noteworthy characteristics; decompose this profile in capabilities requirements and translate them into programs demands and budget requirements. In a broad sense, the purpose of this block is to facilitate the allocation, coordination and utilization of fiscal, material, human, organizational and information resources. It assures implementation dependency of theses resources, making certain a fundamental traceability link between designing requirements and implementation, integrated in a composite of defense reform requirements.

85 Allport, F.H. Theories of perception and the concept of structure. Londres: John Wiley & Sons. 1955. pp.622.86 Stevenson, T.and Inayatullah, S. "Future-oriented Writing and Research". Futures. V.30, Feb. 1998. pp. 2.

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Active decomposition of capabilities

Active decomposition is carried out for breaking capabilities into subparts that relate to functional possibilities among its multiple components. The construct of capabilities is vital for this process, explicating what the components of capabilities are and what are their possible relationships through the tactical, strategic and political realms, while assuring its relationship with tasks demands and its integration into mission requirements. This is not without difficulties.

Decomposing capabilities is a complex function with no widely accepted principles for determining minimum levels of fidelity. The fundamental aspect of decomposing capabilities is not to produce independent elements that must interface with each other. Instead, capabilities are decomposed into dependent producing units which all interface directly to each other and to the context they pertain. Such process is called active decomposition, because, to a larger extent, defining capabilities requirements for a parcel of the diagram of futures will interact with other requirements for other parcels.

The pervasiveness of this requirement is not always appreciated, abstracting capabilities requirements away from the supposed domains of its application. To be effective, military capabilities requirements must support, through a specific and consistent pattern of decisions, the tasks being sought by force components. For example, decisions to increase tactical readiness would be very different if the desired capability were instrumental for a concept of employment dedicated to a scenario that emphasizes long-term mobilization. Similarly, research and development decisions as the selection of technologies to be pursued, whether to be high professional/weapons system intensive rather than a conscript/labor intensive personnel structured military.

Central to active decomposing of military capabilities are both a model that abstracts capabilities components and relationships and the supporting techniques articulated into a methodology. The former was offered in the capability construct and the diagram of futures. The real problem lays in the latter, rooting multifaceted drawbacks, inefficiencies and inadequacies.

There is an array of methodologies associated techniques; most of them raised in realm of operational analysis/system analysis87, such as finite element simulation, difference equations or execution rules, evolving into sophisticated procedures exploring information technology (IT). However, currently, there is no validated set of techniques capable of acquiring knowledge of the real-time state of the cross-impact of actively decomposing capabilities, recognizing the coming together of its individual outcome. Currently, the best results are provided through gaming/simulations supported by system analysis (with its inclusive subordinated techniques and analytical tools), exploring IT in processes active modeling to gather data, search for patterns and display results.

Peter Perla, in a seminar work about the “Future Directions for War Gaming”, express that:

“To deal with constant change in the geopolitical and military environment, policymakers, strategists, analysts and operators are all looking for means to overcome the clouds of uncertainty that obscure the future. As defense budgets decrease, it becomes more critical than ever to identify new technological, operational, and political directions that will become most profitable to pursue. As truly integrated joint

87 Quade, E. S. and Boucher, W.I. System Analysis and Policy Planning. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co, 1968.

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operations become the norm rather than the exception to the rule, the Armed Forces must find the tools to help them fit together seamlessly – doctrinally, technically, and operationally… But wargaming is not a panacea. It is only one tool – albeit a powerful one – among many that we can employ to explore the changing world. When used appropriately it can contribute to an understanding of where we are and where we should go. In particular, it can help build truly joint forces from the capabilities of various service components. Misused or overused, wargaming can dangerously lead us to self-fulfilling prophecies and delusions of self-proclaimed messiahs.”88

How the characteristics of capabilities subparts are defined determines the accuracy and precision of programming and resource allocation. The greater the separation between subparts, the easier is for configure specific needs of assigned objectives. However, carried to its extreme, it can lead to the separation of parts that should be dedicated to a common objective, hampering the relationship among parts and compromissing the outcome.

It cannot be overemphasized that it is the pattern of decisions actually selected with the diagram of futures, and the degree to which that patterns supports objectives representative of the countries’ position in the matrix of security and defense, that constitutes the base for devising the required military capabilities.

Programming

Programming is the process by which force design assures a conscious appraisal and formulation of activities to carry out capabilities requirements (decomposed into its functional subparts) and that required resources are allocated effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of defense tasks. As a practical matter, programming serves to needs of management control, dedicated to be a translator between expected capability outcomes and associated budgets.

Programming processes are found in many activities other than force design. Engineer explores its logic for meaningfully scheduling production activities. In force design, programming is fundamental for linking capability requirements to budget possibilities, providing the homomorphism from a set of intentions to a similar system of fiscal and production possibilities. Programming is, therefore, an agent of transformation of one set (force components) into another (budget) that preserves in the second the interrelations between the members of the first set. Projects then implement initiatives for the modification, enhancement, or development of to meet programs’ requirements and interfaces. Some projects may develop the technical infrastructure and some may develop fiscal management functionalities.

Programming is forked into two complementary actions. The first refers to program engineering: the definition of a set of programs, each one comprising entities and processes that must be present to accomplish specific capabilities requirements identified through the process of decomposition. The second, control management, refers to phasing the prioritization of programs over time, assuring that their outcome attends strategic demands of military capabilities.

A. Program Engineering

Given the importance of programming, it usually takes a sequentially approach, based on a series of discrete programs and its component projects by which decisions can be

88 Perla, P.. Future Directions for Wargaming. Washington, D.C: Joint Forces Quarterly: Summer 1984, pp. 77-83.

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analysed, evaluated, and implemented as needed and affordably possible. Such an approach, named program engineering, makes efficient the use of resources and reduces the likelihood that important details will be overlooked.

Program engineering decisions are made about the level of aggregation of entities and processes requirements appropriate to assure specific capabilities requirements, determining whether its outcome be represented as a single entity, as a composite of subsystem entities, or a composite of composites of ever smaller entities (to whatever level of aggregation is needed for the purpose of force design). These decisions are taken in attendance of three principles:

• The aggregation criteria influence how the problem is attacked and how a solution is shaped.

• Every program may be expressed at different levels of precision.

• No single program is sufficient to refer to all military capabilities.

These principles suggest that program engineering is essentially a craft that has not yet matured into methodologies. As programs grew in size and complexity, following the diversity of demands of capacities for the post-Cold War with new threats and emerging technologies, attitude towards programming changed. Instead of meticulously codes for programming and rigid categories, force design increasingly distend projects component of programs in an array of capability-packages. Just as dwellings are built with standardized fittings, programs integrated by capability-package projects are built out of modular, interchangeable elements. This is not only good engineering practice; it is the only way to make something the size of a defense system work at all.

Programs content may assume several forms related to the type of budget practiced. For example: a program-budget will have programs as descriptors of goals (measurable results activities and actions - constants); a performance-budget89 will have programs communicating performance information. The US Coast Guard, for example, set as its Performance Goals for National Security: Reduce drug flow by denying maritime smuggling routes, Reduce undocumented migrants from entering via maritime routes, Eliminate illegal EEZ encroachment, Achieve and sustain complete military readiness, Provide core military competencies.

Program engineering is called upon to deal with a conversion process that change or combine resources to obtain a desired output typically addressing the following issues:

1. The definition of the capability to be produced and its desired output level determined by the required degree of readiness, practiced doctrine and enforced rules of engagement.

2. The production facilities and technology required to produce military assets, the mix of their protocols of operations and the tasks that will not be required of the military assets.

3. The interrelationship between these military assets and other military assets as well as maintenance levels, and operation and deployment policies to be adopted.

4. A provision for the subsequent expansion or contraction of the program considering other programs that might be schedule.

89 US Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard. Budget Estimates – Fiscal year 2002. pp.5

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5. The overhead defense functions, processes and procedures to be followed and its control systems.

Standard procedures are seldom applicable in such process because defense program engineering results in unique customized products. While it is important to understand the differences between defense programs and civilian programs (usually characterized by continuous flow processes like for example oil refineries), it is also necessary to recognize that both are subjected to the same constraints imposed by technology.

Once the program is clearly defined, it must be evaluated along financial dimensions, considering its cost-benefit as well as events that would cause a change in the common set of assumptions taken for this analysis across all programs. This evaluation should also consider the impacts of potential failure to develop the capability assumed in the financial analysis of each option.

The major objective of program engineering is to define appropriate measures of individual capabilities, as well the set of capabilities as a whole. Such measures must take into account the considerable uncertainty as to the functionally of resulting capabilities to defense objectives.

B. Control Management

Programming is supported by control management initiatives expressed as a series of linked actions dedicated to govern the choice of programs, its production schedule and performance evaluation which would place each decision in the context of a sequence of such decisions as they define and implement the selected alternative of force design.

For this reason, control management does not consist simply of a line drawn to indicate different dates in which a capability will be needed. It requires a policy statement defining what kinds of capabilities are to be provided in conjunction with specific projective, prospective and prosficcional scenarios describing their likely evolution over time.

Control management is fundamental in determining the scope of representation of the linkage between program component requirements and budget possibilities over time. For this purpose, it develops a milestone that supports reasonable judgment about the affordability of required capabilities minimizing costs duplication and overlap. In addition this milestone provide a meaningful perspective of future force components, providing a comprehensive relationship between designing assumptions (implicited in forecasting) and intended capabilities allowing critical analysis about overestimation of requirements and underestimation of costs.

This milestone schedule programs components in order to provide coherence and articulation among parts functionally conceived. It gives significance to programs components outputs within defense, forcing designers to evaluate priorities and measure risks, taking into account the degree to which various constituencies within the defense system support its implementations. Its most important role is to provide a set of specific capabilities required over time to attend defense objectives, rather than define a simply time frame for developing military assets for existing concept of employment in existing scenarios. A planning process of this milestone is creatively defined and should consider three significant aspects:

1) How individual programs are related directly to military capabilities priorities in each project horizon (projective, prospective, and prosficcional) with an explicit definition of the assumptions that will change that relationship.

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2) The phasing of programs and projects over time presents a broad variety of options. These options should be evaluated in terms of the overall performance of the defense system and not only on the performance of a specific major program.

3) The selection of an option should fit into the overall pattern of decisions contained in the integrated project for defense, addressing the full set of military capabilities need to support defense objectives.

In developing this milestone, force design is confronted with the need to make changes that render existing force components, concept of employment or regulating factors obsolete. These changes are enforced through a variety of ways. The most obvious is reducing investments, which will delay replacing old equipment, or allowing the performance of force components to deteriorate by reducing maintenance. Other, less obvious, is persistently replacing assets based on the same technology.

A compelling justification for the usefulness of force design is that programming decisions cannot be made on a decentralized basis. They should be integrated through a guidance provide by an integrated project of defense with appropriated criteria to measure the interaction of various resource constraints and the overall efficiency with such resources should be consumed.

This necessarily implies the definition of defense objectives within the context of the security and defense matrix; some assumptions to develop the diagram of future and select the scenario to be employed as proactive tools for achieving long-term goals; and the expect production of force components over time according to expect tasks requirements, assuring that the proper set of military capabilities are made available within fiscal constraints and political determinants.

The development of these requirements demands making explicit those designing elements, assumptions and driving forces, providing the necessary transparency to the designing process through with politics enforces its control over military decisions. Using the three horizons make easier to identify the types of decisions required for each program and highlights the needs of proper resource allocation.

Resource Allocation

Resource allocation is deciding how to allocate human resources, production and fiscal resources among various competing programming outcome possibilities.

Human resource allocation is about the assignment of qualified personnel that oversee the complexities of force design providing the crucial linkages between production possibilities and fiscal resources within which schedules are developed and modified as the programs proceed and develop. The acquisition and deployment of valuable human resources should be well integrated with control management requirements in order to strength the defense establishment ability to identify and negotiate acquisition opportunities, fighting unwelcome fusion of projects an divesting lines that are inappropriate for the envisioned goals. The ultimate function of skilled human resources in force design is deliberating critical decisions that involve complex technological and capability requirement tradeoffs, cutting though the complexities of scheduling activities while standing aloof of the details, moving quickly in repositioning production resources either to orchestrate a takeover or a divestment.

Production resource allocation is just as important as human resources allocation, exercising interaction among industrial possibilities and operational functions. It consist of

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creating a pattern of decisions that affects the manufacturing of military assets, and should be reflective of policy with careful attention to the potential interaction and driving forces within the national and international defense industrial base. If properly allocated, production resources can play a unique role in defining, supporting and enhancing the success of a defense project, operating in concert with all its functions.

Budgeting is the process of deciding about fiscal resources allocation that maximizes the efficacy of programs, the efficiency of programs engineering and economy in management control to assure that the outcome of these processes – the required military capability – attend the objectives they should serve.

One test of budgeting appropriateness which aspires more than specialized technical competence in a restrict domain of accountability is its ability to comprehend the political environment in which it is developed. Petrei90 presents two central approaches explaining how public budgets are prepared:

“One school of thought believes that the state intervenes to increase overall satisfaction and operates on the basis of an aggregate utility function (that is, the sum of the individuals utility functions of members of the society). The other school of thought believes that the budget is the product of political forces guided by voluntary exchange among individuals and that, to perfect a budget, one must understand that political process”.

After discussing those schools of though, Petrei concludes:

“… several methods can be used to decide what measures to take. Decision-makers, or people involved in preparing and evaluating alternatives. Some analysts have tried to quantify various objectives, but these efforts have never gone beyond a theoretical exercise that is probably too complicated for everyday use. In most cases, compromise is the solution: those who opt for a particular alternative know that in order to achieve their objective they must sacrifice one or several other goals of economic policy. Decisions generally take the form of a political option in which actors engage in trade-offs to achieve their objective…thus the budget must be put into perspective, and the need to use it in harmony with other instruments must be recognized.”

Whichever measure is used of the appropriateness of the budget, once defined it becomes a surrogate for all of the resources required to meet programming requirements at desired readiness levels.

Distinctly from decomposing capabilities, program engineering and production planning, budgeting has an array of best practices that provide guidance for its development, presentation and communication. The inability to sustain this claim gravely compromises force design outcome. In the US, although accounting categories existed for preparing and presenting budget requests to Congress, there is not uniformity among the services and other Government Institutions. The US. Coast Guard (subordinated to the Department of Transportation), for example practices performance-budget, whereas the Services (subordinated to the Department of Defense), practice program-budget.

When a ceiling budget drives the design of capabilities, fiscal resources allocation tends to be equated between Services, leaving them alone to identify defense requirements. When it occurs, the Government abdicates its prerogatives of specifying how, when and for how long its instrument of force should be used. The outcome is the risk of each Service to procure

90 Petrei, H. Budget and Control. Washington, D.C: Inter-American Development Bank/The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. pp.3, 15.

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material accordingly to its own perspective, promoting the absence of interoperability with statements of requirements detached from empirical assessment of concrete or potentials threats.

Since there is no specified political purpose for the instrumentality of the use of force the military offers, the coherence between military capability and defense objectives are at stake; and because the budget was evenly distributed, balancing the force becomes the implied policy (equity often serve as the rationale for justifying bad policies), with the services pledge of assuring interoperability though more resources, retrofitting the process virtually guaranteeing perpetual shortfalls in the funding of “requirements” and inducing what is described as the “disciplinary gap”.

Lewis Kevin91 and Builder92 describe this gap. The Armed Forces required financial resources over and above what would be necessary whereas planning current alternatives with less. The difference among requested and provided resources becomes a debt the Government has with the Military. When the debt is paid, the military tends to expand abnormally or improperly its infrastructure; resulting inadequacies are evidenced when the State faces a crisis: current military capabilities drive political possibilities, forcing strategic options that could be neither desired nor appropriate.

The budget orients strategic preferences, constraining and compressing programs alternatives by fiscal realities, whereas programs express hard choices and accepted major risks derived from adopting a parcel of the space of capabilities and associated concepts of employment in response to defense objectives.

Programming is a composite of processes, being an utterance of political intention towards required capabilities and possibilities. It constitutes an intervention in the background of force design, growing out of resource allocation possibilities that regulate the kinds of programs that will be accepted, specifying, in advance, how and where breakdowns in capabilities will be accepted, creating or banning military assets, organizational structures, doctrines, etc., that will show up in everyday practice.

In programming, force design is doing more than asking what can be built. It is engaged in a reflection about what defense capabilities are and what they can be, creating the tools to actions that will bring then forth. In order to define the resources force design might use, it looks backwards to the trends that has formed current capabilities and looks forward to as-yet-undeveloped adaptation, modernization and transformation of military capabilities, maintaining or/and bringing forth different kinds of commitments, opening up a space of communicative actions, within the context of a network of interests, concealment and resistance.

Translating defense requirements into budget demands requires time and management perseverance to ensure literally hundreds of decisions mutually supportive. It is the collective pattern of these decisions that determines the integrated project for defense. Because of the diversity of these decisions that must be made over time, an organizing structure is for its superintendence.

91 Lewis, K. "The Disciplinary Gap and other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning". in New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethink How Much is Enough. ed. Paul Davies. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1994. pp.21.92 Builder, C. H. Military Planning Today: Calculus or Charade? California, EUA: RAND: 1993. pp.93.

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Defense Superintendence

Decomposing capabilities, programming and resource allocation follow a logic pattern regulated by its own results; each one stimulated and derived from the other. As programming is developed to satisfy capabilities requirements, inconsistencies among requirements and lack of balance among requirements (some very lax and others stringent in similar area) become apparent. Although budgeting should follow programming, it may begin before its completion because of different federal budgeting and appropriations cycles. Budgeting may reveal problems with programs requirements, especially if there has not been a rigorous validation of requirements before initiation of development, or if program-engineering practices have not been employed adequately. Programming may review inconsistencies where the budget developer is left to his own initiative about what the capabilities the programs should generate.

This shows just how these three processes are not truly neutral, that their substantive content affects the independence of the purposes they serve. In conjunct, they belong to an elaborate complex of related activities that crystallizes around a common goal of superintending the allocation of defense resources. Its major management objective is to remove bottlenecks to expand or contract over time capabilities possibilities without major new investments. It depends, therefore, on the time horizons that are appropriate for the capability programming naturally linked to the duration of the projective, prospective and prosficcional segments as defined temporally by the vulnerability of projective, prospective and prosficcional assumptions.

The superintendence of defense networks processes on a vast scale, managing knowledge information in order to influence the powers that control it. Its great need is to make work together all operational processes, expanding and contracting their relationships as the needs develops. Because of its role, the superintendence of defense resources allocation is what makes the concept of system to emerge from the interrelation of operational procedures.

Systems, as explained, are a conjunct of elements in interactions where the performance of the parts conditions the performance of the whole. Defectives operational procedures and defective linkages between operational procedures are the prime causes of disjunctive decisions, contributing for stovepipe capabilities, shortfall, or redundancy in fiscal resources allocation. In sum, the goal of superintending the allocation of defense resources is to make processes functions effective, reflected in tree aspects: the speed of problem solving; the accuracy of problem solving and the adequacy of the solution proposed to the problem depicted. The defense superintendence exists as a system only if each agency or department of the ministry of defense is engaged and adopts a common set of goals and convergent planning procedures governed by common concepts and frameworks across all the defense establishement.

The efficiency with which resources are utilized provides a measure of the success of defense superintendence, demanding a performance review system to provide evidence that the proposed investments will be properly used. This system has a larger share in providing transparency in defense issues, assuring that the required data is provided to attend control and oversight requirements, while assuring that the processes involved in identifying, developing, organizing, fielding and supporting military capabilities are properly accomplished effectively, efficiently and economically.

This installment is even more prominent in making as explicit as possible the costs and consequences of defense decisions; insisting upon the use of the best practices for

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systematically validate capability requirements, ensuring that deficiencies uncovered are corrected with appropriate modifications, and compelling a rationale for defense expenditures fully integrated and balanced with defense programs.

The predictability of defense superintendence results refers to intrinsic uncertainties (such as the amount of resources required and programs lifetime) and extrinsic uncertainties that might, for example, drive a program to be discontinued if key assumptions become vulnerable. To reduce uncertainties, based on the expected values of the different variables defining program engineering, control management, and resource allocation, defense superintendence demands a stock of knowledge to deal with the generation of alternatives that might control selected aspects of the diagram of future, the development of criteria through which those alternatives would be able to be compared, the assessment of these alternatives, and the correction of the process and its outcome based on the result of this assessment. Defense superintendence manage information, through which it maximizes the efficiency with which it plans, collects, organizes, controls, disseminates, uses and disposes of its information, and through which it ensures that the potential value of intelligence is identified and exploited to the fullest extent.

Foundered on the incremental development, iterative refinement, and ongoing evolution of process description, defense superintendence assures that the nature of the finished integrated project of defense – the object of force design – emerges from a process of developing shared interpretation of capabilities requirements among the parties involved in decomposing capabilities, programming and budgeting, who must wrestle with hard choices about how to allocate limited resources to provide defense and advance national social and economic interests.

Defense superintendence constantly offers enduring patterns that can guide force design processes as they progress through the defense organizational structures. The magnitude of the importance of organizational structures for force design was encapsulated in 1982 by General David Jones’s testimony to U.S. Congress, when he said:

“We do not have, currently, an adequate organizational structure. It is not sufficient to have resources, dollars and weapons systems; we should also have an organization that allows us to develop the proper strategy, the necessary planning and an effective fighting capability”93.

The requirements for defense superintendence change constantly, organizational structure change only with great deliberation and much effort. Yet, it is essential to ensure that defense organizational structure allows the best decisions be formulated, reflecting national requirements for defense rather than separate, often differing, perspectives of military services, or preferences of bureaucratic servants in the ministry of defense, or been influenced by industrial forces external to the ministry of defense.

Defense superintendence is supported by oversight process expressed as imposition that regulates budgeting procedures to enforce practices of accountability and codes of conduct over fiscal expenditures to assure the proper allocation and use and of public funds. Its function is to regulate the proper linkages between programming milestone expected outcomes, commitments, and procedures. In this role, defense oversight crafts provision and assist the assessment of results with the final goal of assuring fiscal economy within legal boundaries.

To design defense alternatives, allocate and manage fiscal and human resources that will traduce those alternatives in force components, defense ministries are bounded for the

93 (verify text– in Locher, 1999,13)

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necessity of translating defense superintendence requirements into methodical processes – to make practical theoretical determinants.

Defense superintendence sets in motion the actions required to deliberately regulate and direct changes in military capabilities, but they do not thereby make all desirable things possible. The value of this set of actions is that it helps to understand the purposes and meaning of reform actions, helping to set in place the proper amount of effort to overcome the problems involved in designing and marshaling military capabilities.

The resulting effects of defective defense superintendence are brokered layers of normative orientation (policy guidance, planning guidance, fiscal guidance, etc.) offering little guidance to determining objectives and formulating scenarios, and with little relevance to decomposing military capabilities, programming and budgeting. Because of vagueness and incomplete information, services make choices that they believe best attend corporate vision and best satisfy service needs, resulting in stove piped capabilities. Enthoven and Smith explain the American Defense Services stove piping processes in the context of the Cold War: “In 1961, the airlift, the sealift, the bases, the prepositioned equipment, the planned deployments and the readiness was the responsibility of a different group of people in the Defense Department. The elements were seen as separate and unrelated entities”94.

However inarticulate and conflicting, defense superintendence justifies the existence of bureaucracies that creates its own assessment criteria though organizational and procedural mechanisms. This inertia preclude the defense sector react to new demands posed by the evolving political environment and its internal elements adjust defense objectives to installed assets and organizations. Finally, self-sufficient capabilities become inarticulate with political purposes and assumptions are created to sustain that inadequate relationship, in an effort to validate the status quo of the current strategy and force structure. This status quo, once justified, provide the rational for the policy.

These serious questions increase the difficulty of force design, directly influence the alternatives of adapting, modernizing and transforming the defense sector, creating bothersome discontinuities where coherence and harmonic transients for defense change are required. The key function of the Renovatio block in force design is deciding about the requirements and priorities of adaptation, modernization and transformation.

94 Apud, Haffa, R. Jr. The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1983. Colorado, U.S.A: Westview Press, Inc. 1984. pp. 147.

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PART 3

ADAPTATION, MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION

In the exploding uncertainties of the information technology era, defense superintendence compels goal attainment and processes integration preventing them to scatter, travelling at an accelerated rate farther from its purpose of integration, evaluation and assimilation of required changes in defense capabilities. These responsibilities are harmonized into three simultaneous patterns that explain armed forces adaptation, modernization and transformation as alternatives constituents of defense reforms, in an interplay between current possibilities and future uncertainties in constant redefinition.

Although adaptation, modernization, and transformation cannot be isolated from one another, except in most extremes conditions, it is important to recognize its analytical requirements because they differ for different parts of a defense policy that evolves simultaneously through the projective, prospective and prosficcional horizons.

Adaptation

Adaptation seeks to maximize the efficacy of military capabilities through changes in the relationship of existing defense components and using existing military assets more efficiently.

Adaptation possibilities are a function of the enacting factors, implying that these factors determine the variance of possible military capabilities. Within these limits, adaptation explores interoperability, jointness and C4 (enabling elements) to establish alternative links to integrate military assets and operational structures, as well as it derives alternative tasks to fulfill defense objectives exploring the range of possibilities provided by the derivative (ISR and operations) elements. The combining possibilities of these integrative and derivative structuring criteria are regulated by the scope of doctrine, readiness requirements, and rules of engagement (regulating factors).

Adaptation possibilities are limited to the projective horizon. Within these limits, emphasis is on better results from force planning, efficiency in defense resource allocation and management, and better control and oversight practices associated with structural reorganization to respond to new by making quick and effective changes in how they are organized and operate. However, improvements sought through adaptation only might be proven grossly insuffficient, degenerating into a costly series of actions that fail to secure cumulative improvements, attacking causes rooted in modernization requirements.

In essence, adaptation believes that by confining force components to its existing forms and shapes provide the required military capabilities to respond effectively to the need of particular tasks. A defense system that defines itself in this way often finds it very difficult to venture outside the dominant orientation of current concepts of employment, since they incorporate implicitly, if not explicitly, judgments as to the importance of operational functions in achieving defense goals; establishing strong mind-sets as real constraints for change.

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Modernization

Modernization replaces aging weapon systems and changes the dimensional characteristics of force structure components, creating other rearranging possibilities of military capabilities that would not exist. The final size (dimensional requirements) and scope (possibilities created though the reform of defense components without a dimensional modification) of force structure components define the range of tactical possibilities in response to defense objectives. However, the validity of possible military capabilities is only retained valid as a function of its utility in relating the outcome of tactical actions with the political purpose that initially oriented its assignment.

Modernization changes the variance of military capabilities exploring demonstrated technologies within the prospective horizon. The act of modernization often is seen as propelled by procurement of sophisticated - state of the art - technologies. Yet, its effectiveness can be enhanced through relatively less expensive technologies that increase interoperability and jointness so that assets from all services become better able to work together, or through measures to increase operational readiness.

Modernization only, however, may fail to see opportunities for larger gains by means of possibilities geared to new ways of thinking. Further, particularly in a fast changing technological environment, modernization can be dangerously myopic insofar as the actions taken to achieve gains may acquire a momentum that is difficult to reverse.

In essence, modernization seeks patterns of diversification closely interrelated with the predominant system of concepts and planning framework, reflecting a preference to concentrate on a relatively narrow set of changes rather than spread broadly over many.

Over time, the ability of the armed forces to compete on the basis of technological superiority only may become eroded, tending to make military capabilities less effective when confronted with the need to make changes that render existing ways of thinking technology obsolete.

Patterns of exploring technology has the tendency to make designers to react in predicable ways. Capabilities born of usual circumstances become the norm creating imitative designs with reducing returns in performance bonuses for changes in force components able to cut through the competitive defense environment. Despite the appeal of more of the same, when the frontier is gone, one must develop ways of thinking that nurtures new technologies, organizations and processes that prevents dampening the innovativeness of capabilities that might be brought by transformation.

Transformation

Transformation changes patterns of thinking force design, creating new assessing parameters of efficiency and efficacy. Transformation seeks to create a differential of capability against competing forces, making obsolete all previous capabilities, regardless of its efforts of adaptation and modernization. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told students Jan. 31 at the National Defense University: Transformation is “about new ways of thinking … and new ways of fighting."95

Transformation elects uncertainty over predictability and unsettled relationship among force components and defense tasks in place of a proven efficient structure. The investment in leadership is likely to be higher, and some time may elapse before a net benefit is obtained.

95 Garamone, Jim. Flexibility, Adaptability at Heart of Military Transformation. American Forces Press Service Washington - Feb 1, 2002. http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-02b.html

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However, when these benefits are sensible accrued, they make obsolete existing force components and even intuition in creating tasks possibilities. A striking feature of these results is a differential of military capability that enhances the defense ability to develop new alternatives or improve the uniqueness or quality of existing possibilities.

The qualitative and quantitative dimensions of transformed military capabilities demand rethinking not only specific technologies incorporated in products and processes, but also doctrine and organizational culture with its implication in tactical, strategic and political possibilities alike. In the prosficcional horizon, new forms of defense organizations and weapons systems will be less prone to be characterized as “purely” military with their own shortcomings, and so on, with no end in sight.

Transformation, therefore, is more than exploring aspects of demonstrated technologies derived from a revolution in military affairs (RMA). It goes beyond the rhetoric of changes and gradual advancements in incorporating new assets or revising tasks. Transformation excites imagination, encouraging “outside the box” thinking needed to respond to unexpected challenges with a menu of choices to do anything different. It causes the rupture of the anemia stemming from the lack of innovative vitality in defense thinking and derogates the lethargy of conceptual systems and analytical frameworks who have not actively explored ways to improve their own ability to produce transformed military capabilities.

The role and importance of transformation is a third factor influencing force design alternatives, through which defense confronts changing opportunities. In essence, transformation is an attitude toward assuming a competitive pattern of decisions to keep up with uncertainties. This need tends to take precedence over established competitive advantages creating other dimensions of effectiveness.

Transformation actions, however, should not ignore the possible risks and costs of attempting to create a variety of options and to retain as much flexibility as possible, disregarding relatively simple adaptation and modernization rules for coping with complexity and uncertainty.

Adaptation, modernization and transformation processes develop simultaneously over time; each one regulated by different factors and affecting specific components and relationships of force design components. Neither the diagnosis of situations nor the choices of action for dealing with them are rigidly prescribed and determined by only one of those three processes. The complexity of military reforms is in the simultaneity in time and space of those three processes, combining tendencies, propensities, and daunting prosficcional challenges.

Adaptation, modernization and transformation serve to shape policy maker’s effort to engage in rational processing to the complexity and uncertainty that are the characteristic of defense reforming. Determining which programs should be held constant for a given period become a difficult problem because it involves tradeoffs between immediate needs in adherence to past practices and focus the effort in those areas where competitive advantages are promised in the future. The evolving demand of old and new tasks posed by the threat environment is not easily followed by military capabilities.

Defense reforms are, currently, greatly addressed to correct the lag between new defense objectives and existing military capabilities. The choice of adaptation, modernization and transformation demand tradeoffs that a designer has to make. By its nature, transformation is destructive, whether in the form of personnel skills, programs, budgeting systems or force components. It may require unique, tailored organizational structure that cut

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across traditional defense segments, disrupting responsibilities and cannibalizing military assets. Modernization is readily adaptable to existing tasks, fitting with existing segmentation of force components and concepts of employment. Adaptation is relatively well know and predictable facilitating cost reduction through streamlined procedures that affords maximum use of existing facilities, processes and procedures.

It is a matter of policy that the selected force design alternative reflects an attempt to stay ahead of demanded defense in adding capabilities; or it may prefer to lag behind, trading-off present adaptation possibilities to future transformed technology. Such choices reflect important aspect of force design: when capabilities are to be added or reduced, in conjunction with the sizing of such changes, and how they are expected to affect defense overall effectiveness.

Although coexisting in the present, adaptation, modernization and transformation progress into the future with different motions and patterns, each one, simultaneously, affecting and being affected by changes in the others, in a futurist process of experimentation that creates its destiny at the same time it develops its own valuation criteria.

The greater the capability provided in the projective horizon, the greater the likelihood of multiple tasks and the ability to faster deployment requirements without the prejudice of overtime and the disruption resulting from the need to reschedule force components; however, unused capability is expensive. One reason a country might be willing to incur this cost is that such surplus would make it possible to respond to unexpected demand surges, like those of crisis that suddenly appears. The greater the capability provided in the prospective horizon, the greater the expectation to match, as nearly as possible, anticipated demands. This decision would also build time to develop programs expected to be fully utilized, for example, in 7 years, if the lead time to develop force components were five years, them control management might delay building the new capability for about 2 years. The greater the capability provided in the prosficcional horizon, the greater the likelihood of making potential adversaries find themselves stocked with a large inventory of obsolete military assets. The risk of technological obsolesce increases if capabilities are built before they are needed. This same conclusion is applied by Hayes R. and Wheelwright96 for the industrial arena:

“In many industries, major technological advances occur with shocking suddenness. Although this is particularly true of industries that depend heavily on electronics or computer technology, no industry is immune to such disruption. The technology of plate glass production, for example, was completely overturned in the lat 1950s when the float glass process was introduced by Pilkinton Glass, Ltd., a relatively small English firm. And the newspaper industry, whose technology had been relatively stable for more than 200 years (since Gutenberg, according to some industry observers), experienced a series of profound technological changes between 1960 and 1980 that made much of its traditional production equipment and skills obsolete”.

The decision to adapt, modernize or transform, accepting or rejecting some alternatives, signals, in a fundamental way, the kind of defense is preferred, being both an input to defense reform guidelines and an output to confront the continually changing demands of the security and defense environment. Although one alternative may be priced higher than other, or may not offer the highest efficiency, or the latest technology, they may work if delivered on time, and the defense systems stands ready to change its degree of readiness instantly to ensure that any failure are corrected immediately. It is up to the defense superintendence decide when a

96 Hayes R.H. and Wheelwright, S.C. Restoring our Competitive Edge: Competing Through Manufacturing. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984. pp. 68.

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capability reaches its final stages of usefulness within a project horizon. It can be a period of renewal, during which the force components continue to adapt to lesser demanding tasks or of evolution through modernization or to a more radical transformation. Or it can be a period of degeneration into a downward spiral that ends it the extinction of useful capabilities for military purposes, signaling the admission by defense superintendence that it has failed to develop a viable long-term set of capabilities and that it is unwilling to make the investments necessary to turn it into one.

The importance of considering three simultaneous time horizons in force design is asseverated when confronted with the risks of a linear forecasting (one single forecasting horizon divided into short, medium and long term). If linear forecast is wrong, then defense not only may have enough or a shortage of some capabilities, but also may incur the cost of unused resources or the risks of not having adequate capability. Alternatively, if linear forecast is proved right in the short term, it precludes changes based on the assumption that it will know exactly what force components will be demanded and in what quantities.

However, linear forecasting cannot provide neither the same speed of response than the concurring possibilities in simultaneous adaptation, modernization and transformation, nor prevent incurring the risk of obsolete inventory and the cost of unused capital resources. Using three simultaneous horizons in force design provide the tradeoffs between the speed of response and the investment required, helping decide whether to hold inventories in the projective horizon or provide additional capabilities in the prospective horizon, or to gain a transformed differential of capabilities in the prosficcional horizon. Consequently, slower response time for capabilities with less committed investments does not imply immediately in defense weakness. It may only signal a decision to the least risk of inefficiency in the present to the full necessary provision of additional capability when demands are expected to grow.

Adaptation, modernization and transformation can be formidable competitive programmatic alternatives, and a key to doing that is the development of a coherent control management within defense superintendence. It is important to recognize that defense superintendence is a mean to an end: the proper management required in order to carry out policy decisions. The proper mix of adaptation, modernization and transformation initiatives should be jointed conceived and directly linked to defense objectives.

Repeated adaptation, modernization, and transformation have a cumulative effect on defense system complexity, and the rapid evolution of technology quickly renders existing technologies obsolete. Eventually, the existing force components become too fragile to modify and too important to discard. For this reason, force design must consider adapting, modernizing and transforming these legacy force components to remain viable. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each possibility is paramount to select the proper solution and the overall success of a reformation effort reflected in at least four two alternatives. An alternative that competes of the basis of task-force flexibility emphasizes its ability to handle nonstandard contingencies. Smaller defense systems often make this their primary basis for force design. Other alternatives compete through their ability to juggle force components to meet demands for simultaneous tasks.

It is difficult (if not impossible), and potentially dangerous, to try to offer superior performance along all dimensions of the diagram of future simultaneously.

Short-term task-force flexibility simply readdressing new tasks to existing assets has two immediate consequences. First, the expected efficiency is limited because those assets were usually engineered with other operational parameters. Second, as a corollary, their maintenance requirements tend to increase, burdening the defense budget. However, with

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decreasing defense budget (because a Broad Defense concept would prioritize other governmental areas), the required increase in appropriations to support those new maintenance demands would not be provided, increasing the rate of damaged material. This rate would burden other assets still operational to fulfill the existing operational demands for using the armed forces in the newly created tasks, increasing the aging rate of material, thus reinforcing a vicious circle. This is one the reasons of currently obsolescence and limited operational readiness of military assets in most countries: a task obsolescence that induces exponential aging rate.

Developing countries without a defense industrial base that could provide indigenously develop material tailored to its needs face the alternative of acquiring assets made available by opportunity. However, rationally, if these materials were made available, they are usually either at the end of their life cycle, with higher and costly demands of maintenance, or task obsolete. On the other hand, a properly allocate production function makes economy of scale to arise. Programs derive from many different elements of total costs and over time most of the relatively fixed costs of defense are difficult to change quickly (salary, maintenance, etc), increasing the volume of production will not cause costs to increase proportionally.

The cross impacts of these conditions create a chain of pair-wised force component-tasks relationship crossing over the tactical domains, that find their assessment criteria in the demands posed by defense objectives. Because of tactical uncertainties, the more force components are dedicated to perform multiple tasks (divergent pattern), the more sophisticated and expensive their technological requirements become in order to maintain the same level of efficiency across the range of possible strategies to fulfill evolving defense objectives.

On the other hand, the alternative of task-dedicated capability (convergent pattern) may increase fighting efficiency; however, as capability gains efficiency it loss flexibility to adapt to others tasks that may derive from changing political priorities or an evolving threat environment. Task-dedicated capabilities increase the problems of interoperability when military components belonging to different tasks-dedicated capability category have to be clustered in response to more complex and demanding tasks. Interoperability requirements are based on the assumption that a complex task can be disaggregated into smaller components. In order to respond to multiple tasks, more dedicated capabilities are required, increasing redundancies and consequently reducing resource allocation efficiency.

Technology alone – and more specifically, information technology - however, is not sufficient to cover all environment-determined elements of efficiency. It is also necessary to consider the human factor, which explicates some of the pragmatic difficulties in determining, under a rational costs and risks reasoning, required defense capabilities aiming a desired state of security. Furthermore, it is also fundamental consider the form and extent of required jointness effort.

Beniger97 explains that obsolescence emerge in defense when new technologies create unbalance operational possibilities and information processing. He calls this unbalance as Crisis of Control. Chandler98 provides empirical data for that hypothesis, when he explains the combined role of railroads and telegraph, in the context of the Prussian War. These new technologies provided new possibilities for the mobilization, deployment and sustainability of huge amounts of personnel and material, expanding the limits for size the as a function of the

97 Beniger, J. The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge U.P. 1986. pp.87.98 Chandler, A.D. The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambrige, USA: Cambridge U.P. 1977.

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production possibilities of the State and the socio-demographic structure of the population. Prussia Defense Reform of 1862 addressed this changes though universal conscription (Landwehr) centrally controlled by The Prussian War Ministry, and the development of a military organizational structure that could control the new tempo of operations.

If Chandler data is abstracted and transposed to the contemporary ambient, the crisis of control emerges with new technologies influencing the defense and security environment supported by a variety of information systems that transforms operational possibilities. This experience makes it clear that National Defense Systems are being transformed; that Hemispheric Countries are emerged into designing defense alternatives to attend those new functional capabilities and new forms of organizations required.

Although the phenomenon is recognizable, its conceptual and practical treatment is defective, allowing self-explanatory criteria be deliberated created to explain others questions that requires those criteria for its justification. The result is a non-end circle of empirical generalizations that do not solve any problem, but are considered a solution anyhow because it carries the justification for its own existence.

The problem of justifying technology requirements is essentially the same as that of deciding upon requirements for adaptation, modernization and transformation within force design. After formulating the problem and establishing assessment criteria, it is feasible to examine alternatives for accomplishing objectives, establishing the anticipated impacts of technology in each element component of the capability construct, and how each one will affect the over-all performance of the system. With this information, it is possible then to be able to determine the cost of technology and its associated benefits, determining, given a budget level, the scope and scale of reform that technology drives in a specified time-length.

Specifying the scope of defense reforms through the requisites of adaptation, modernization and transformation requires a statement of missions, objectives and its evolving possibilities as decided in coherence within the cogitare and prospicere blocks. Such a statement – the defense project - is necessary not only to prevent direct competition among defense components but alto to focus the effort on programs that are likely to enhance military capabilities. A given defense project might achieve advantages using one of a variety of approaches to produce innovation and unique features or customize force components for selected tasks.

To be effective, such an approach must be sustainable using the proper allocation of defense resources taking into account forecasted changes in the environment to fit selected segments of the diagram of futures. To be efficient, such a project must support, through a specific and consistent pattern of decisions (defense superintendence), the capabilities being sought, making all subparts of the defense system maximize its performance either related to single functions or related to subfunction to the overall goal of force designing. That strives for consistency between objectives and the capabilities being sough within the projective, prospective and prosficcional horizons.

Force design provides an articulated pattern of decisions with the primary function of planning and managing the defense system, putting together the set of force components that will enable carrying out the tasks required to attend defense objectives. Being able to move from the level of specific decisions about procurement and acquisition to defense objectives within the security and defense matrix, and back again, is central to developing and implementing effective military capabilities. The notion is that force design can be a competitive tool for the assemblage and alignment of decisions, providing a cohesive guide to help defense reforms to attain a desired competitive advantage within the projective,

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prospective and prosficcional horizons. Clear priorities must be attached to each horizon, and these priorities will determine how defense positions itself relative to other state’s priorities. Specifying and clarifying these priorities in the first step in force design – the purpose of the Cogitare block - since the assessment of whether an integrated project of defense is appropriated is whether it displays a consistent set of decisions through the pattern of preferences it makes over time.

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PART 4

A TEMPLATE FOR FORCE DESIGN

Force design framework compiles a complex inventory of articulated processes aiming an integrated project of defense. Clearly, no matter how well crafted and managed these process are, there is no guarantee that its result are precisely right, but it can never be afforded to got it very wrong.

The difficulty of mapping the relationship of force components shows the need for a template that better links them together with a functional purpose. Such a template attempts to develop a mechanism that allows decisionmaking to be more closely reflected in defense alternatives.

The likelihood of defense effectiveness, efficiency, and economy is greatly increased when the elements presented in the template offered below are contemplated in the final project presented for political scrutiny. Its usefulness is in developing military capabilities across different time periods, respecting the projective, prospective and prosficcional circumstances and, therefore, allowing any resulting defense alternative to adapt to changing political preferences.

This template is not prescriptive; it is only a reference, drowned from several force design experiences currently developed, with emphasis on that practiced in Canada and developed by the U.S. Coast Guard. Some countries in the Hemisphere are still struggling to produce a “defense white paper” or equivalents “defense policy” or “national security policy”, with the main goal of gathering political consensus upon the necessity of an integrated project of defense. This template provides a perspective of what comes next.

The final document should provide a framework for translating government direction into a capable and efficient set of programs and associated budget that deliver affordable and capable forces, and superintendence guidance to align the defense planning cycle to its intended milestones. The political nature of this project determines that its results are limited by its logically necessity99. Logical necessity derives from the perception of functional sufficiency. There is not how to validate the functional sufficiency of a defense project, since the question of “which components are sufficient?” is in the same category of “Is it true”? Therefore, it is necessary to assess the utility of this template as a function of the perception of its comprehensiveness for its purpose. This template is hardly a technique for defense planning, for such a creation would be impossible.

This template develops a straightforward logic. It demands a systematic investigation of the problem and the relevant criteria for deciding among alternatives that promise to offer a

99 Logical necessity does not confound itself with intuitive validity. The former admits the verifications of the necessary outcomes from what it determines, whereas the latter appears from habits and traditions, taking as reference regularities from the past, and do not have the ability to distinguish among valid and not valid outcomes. For further details, see Mitchell, D. An Introduction to Logic. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1962. pp. 155. Although intuition is admitted as a cognitive process in hypothesis formulation, it does not assure possible outcomes. For this specific distinction, see Goodman, N. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. 4 ed. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 1983. pp. 59-83 and pp. 196-8. This is a relevant distinction for the implementation of the template presented in this paper. Although intuition is admitted as a cognitive process admitted in hypothesis formulation, it is not taken as assuredness of possible outcomes.

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stable solution. Identifies alternatives accordingly that attend the requisites posed in the three simultaneous horizons – projective, prospective, and prosficcional - and examines its feasibility. Compare these alternatives in terms of its cost and effectiveness, weighting the results against acceptable levels of uncertainty, for which assumptions are established to determine its possible vulnerability. And measure the extent to which the selected alternative attains the initial purpose, translating its results in terms of costs and risks100.

The template offers a description of deliverables, in terms of its properties and measures that affects force design, and points out tradeoffs, benefits, risks and limitations that may arise in various situations of use. Descriptions are not meant to be comprehensive - each description provides enough knowledge to know what questions to ask in gathering more information. What it seeks is to lay out the elements of the force design framework in a logical and transparent way, in which defense planning can display options and inherent tradeoffs between the construct of capabilities components, debating the merits of competing choices.

I – COGITARE

This ultimate goal of this section is to provide a general description and background of the project, what was anticipated when originally conceived and quality measures required.

1) Purpose of the project and the reasons for its development, with an assessment of the international and regional environment. Describe commitments with considerations about trends that might influence future developments and influence the security and defense environment, including technological, economic, political and social aspects. This assessment must be in consonance with the Defense Policy, expanding and detailing aspects relevant to force design.

2) Fiscal context. Describe conditioning factors and critical aspects that might affect the integrity of the defense programs, including economic adjustments and additional funding required for activities where the costs exceed an agreed level. Portray the estimated total budget for future years.

3) Military inventory, organizational structure, defense superintendence procedures, explicating its relation with military capability. This should provide a clear audit trail on how military capabilities achieve objectives; how readiness requirements are maintained over time in face of different concept of employment; and how demands for operational tempo attend the most likely tasks.

4) Defense mission, objectives, and tasks. Defines the nature and scope of the Ministry of Defense responsibilities, the results it expects to achieve, and the monitoring and reporting requirements through which it will answer for the authority vested in it. Anticipate changes in mission, objectives and tasks in reaction to changes in the position of the country in the security and defense matrix.

5) Consolidated defense challenges, with the justification of the the reasons for a new project, explaining why evolutionary adjustments in current project (through adaptation, modernization, or transformation) cannot attend those challenges: detail vulnerable assumptions (parametric events of former project).

II – PROSPICERE

100 For similar efforts, see, for example, McGin, J. et al. A Framework for Strategy Development. California, USA: Rand, 2002.

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The final goal of this section is to provide a general description and brief background of designing scenarios, recognizing that scenario is right for every situation, and each scenario has associated costs (monetary and otherwise).

1) Strategic vision and selected scenarios for the projective, prospective and prosficcional horizons with the statement of its assumptions and considered time horizon. These scenarios span the spectrum of conflict and describe operations representative of those anticipated.

2) Nature of operations, envisioned commitments or far-flung operations that would required the use of force with the description of associated topological environments. Requirements for readiness, sustainability, and deployability will be derived from the scenarios in conjunction with military objectives and tasks.

3) Description of anticipated ways the scenarios might evolve and expected changes in the nature of operations.

III – RENOVATIO

This section provides information and critical assets that should be incorporate, systems that must be updated continuously to reflect evolving superintendence practices.

1) Concepts of employment and associated operational tempo within each project horizon. Linking guidance and attainable goals that should be completed within the project horizons.

2) Changing guidelines. Sets objectives that direct defense adaptation, modernization and transformation within the project horizons, and assign responsibilities These changing guidelines will direct decision-making across the whole range of defense endeavors, orienting the harmonic evolution of defense reform along the three horizons, and instructing the derivation of capabilities and programming with corporate priorities and superintendence requirements.

3) Required capabilities and associated major programs with associated performance indicators. Major programs must reflect the attainability of defense objectives and contain assigned leader management service and accountabilities responsibilities. Program description must include component projects and its relationship, and associated fiscal costs (current and future).

4) Force structure. It includes the specification of all assets (combat, combat support and combat service support units, all naval combatant ships, and airforce fighter, maritime patrol, maritime and tactical helicopter, and transport squadrons, police and cost guard, etc), tied to readiness requirements and weighted against the formation of units or/and re-deployment of military assets. Military assets earmarked for disposal. Personnel annual adjustments and distribution priorities to balance current and future operational effectiveness, and distinctive required competencies. Numbers of personnel, by occupation and rank, required to meet operational requirements; recruiting, education, training, and career management in order to sustain and renew the skills and knowledge base. This includes the established colleges, schools, and operational training units.

5) Procurement Priorities. Procurement Priorities provide guidelines linked to readiness levels and expected operational tempo. It is not expected that any capability will be lost or become unavailable in any quantity for prolonged periods due to the application of these priorities. Procurement Priorities are designed to facilitate services resource leveling, and the effective apportionment of scarce resources. The

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underlying principle should be of cost-effectiveness and utility (the ability to serve multiple functions and critical tasks in practice).

6) Balance. Refers to the overall resources deemed necessary, indicating the relative relevance of projects and its relationships with demands of adaptation, modernization, or transformation. Results of sensitivity analysis with elements for judging priorities and relative importance. Programs are placed on a schedule, and the schedule is compared to the fiscal possibilities, sequencing fiscal years.

7) Macro planned resource allocations and Milestone. Indicate significant defense spending (in capital equipment, construction, procurement, miscellaneous requirements, contributions to pensions and other personnel benefit plans, etc.) associated with a milestone providing guidelines to generate, support, and maintain the forces required to meet assigned tasks.

8) Resource allocation priorities and accountability structure. This are elements against which reports and accounts for the resources received and results achieved will be provided (internally as well as externally to control and oversight agencies and Congress). Provide instructions and restrictions for transferring capital funds and establishes priorities for the funding approval and details on the budget adjustments.

9) Superintendence requirements. This are fundamental elements to develop, implement and maintain force design process and technical architectures required to provide the framework necessary for advancing programming and budgeting, including the manner it is to be progressively employed as an enabler in support of operational functions. Collectively these architectures, together with the associated standards, are essential for the effective acquisition, integration and management of processes within a framework of reformation to meet defense requirements for the present and into the future

10) Performance indicators and Risk Assessment. Performance indicators are the reference through which defense superintendence will monitor performance against assigned tasks. Assessment criteria with precise measure and control mechanisms will permit the establishment of trends and provide senior management the opportunity to provide steerage. Measures and indicators should include: Sustainability of operational Forces; Leadership, Professionalism & Values; Resource Management; and Contribution to national growth and social development. Risk Assessment indicate consequences whether portions of programs are not adequately resourced attributable to project delays, unexpended funds, account imbalances due to historical trends, overestimation, as well as a variety of external factors affecting revenue and timely expenditure. Recommendations for changes to readiness levels and the resulting effect on sustainment.

The code for gluing together all these elements is a coherent conceptual system and its articulating logic. An adequate design in the final product reflects an adequate code in the process of creating it. However difficult may be the attempt, rationality and prudence demand that the effort be made.

Pre prevailing viewpoint in the above discussion is that the cornerstone of force design is a critical assessment of an appropriate measure of requirements for adapting, modernizing and transforming the defense system. On this view, force design is essentially concerned with a decision process with a twofold purpose: to provide necessary information for a well-informed decision, and to present this information in a concise and intelligible form.

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PART 5

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK

Looking across countries’ defense alternatives within the framework helps to identify strategic decisions and trends. To indicate this trend, this section explores force design concptual system (construct of capabilities and framework) to differentiate Argentina, Chile, and Brazil military reforms; and attempts to consolidate the problems confronting Western Countries’ defense superintendence.

Argentina, currently, focus on adaptation, endeavoring to maximize efficiency with the implementation of a planning, programming and budgeting system within actual resources constrains. Its emphasis on peace operations and its changes in operational structures explore the enacting factors to generate required capabilities, in response to new tasks posed by redefined defense objectives, without significant changes in military assets. This analysis provides the conclusion that Argentina is willing to accept higher risks to its defense objectives, assuming the maintenance of the projective horizon for an extended period. Its defense policy is clearly oriented to support this goal, being dedicated to create confidence-building measures with Chile and Brazil.

Chile and Brazil, currently, defense reforms processes focuses on capabilities that could provide continuous territorial presence and borders control, assuring a degree of success in deterring and protecting their countries. Both assume a large prospective horizon where events could activate threats currently dormant. Chile’s concerns are, primarily, events that might change its relation with Peru and Argentina or impact in its objectives regarding the control of its National Air Space and Oceanic Territory (Mar Chileno – Chilean Sea)101. While Brazil’s concerns are, primarily, with a coalition that would threat either the Amazon area or the its maritime flow of petrol and goods.

Brazil military reforms lend towards adaptation, as an effect of its position in the inferior part of the matrix of security and defense, echoing an understanding (more traditional than rational) initiated in its Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War College)102.

For Brazil, the current security environment do not impose major changes in its defense objectives, producing scenarios that emphasizes the continuously validity of past practices. Brazil’s Ministry of Defense faces a challenge in information management. It still do not have a clearly defined force design framework (reminding that force design finds its purpose and instrumental functionality at defense ministry level), but rather services force planning methodologies, with results integrated (with some difficulty and not explicitly defined criteria), resulting in a tendency to stovepipe capabilities as an effect of Service initiatives in providing its own force structure requirements. Jointness and interoperability, although recognized as a requirement, does not found support in a coherent doctrine, and readiness requirements present a conflict between operational and structural demands because of the absence of an integrated concept of employment: the Brazilian Army founds its designing reference in a concept of employment that privileges the Amazon area, whereas the Brazilian Navy holds traditional missions in the South Atlantic.

101 Chile. Libro de La Defensa Nacional de Chile. pp.89,114,119.102

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The declaratory policy orienting the defense reform process in Chile, although impulsed by jointness requirements and interoperability at force component levels and concept of employment, is inertialized by service doctrines that still holds its Navy, Army and Air Force looking for independent actions. Going beyond Chile example, hemispheric military systems are built around the services, which are the depository of traditions and expertise in matters ranging from doctrine formulation and technical specifications. Not surprisingly, modernization becomes accomplished within the separated services.

Transformation, in most countries and particularly in the US, has become an umbrella rubric used for many reform-related activities. The jury is still out on determining what exactly it means and a good deal of groundwork has to be laid before it could be agreed that a quintessentially transformation action is gaining momentum. The US has had a lengthy action on adaptation to new tasks, revising its doctrine and organizational structure. It has also attacked problems from a modernization perspective, with the exploitation of state-of-the-art technology; but truly innovative thinking about defense alternatives has yet to be demonstrated. Albeit some efforts toward adaptative joint command and control associated with rapid decisive operations based on joint strike force concepts against critical mobile targets has been developed, the US defense system has not yet pointed out related changes in program categories, measures of effectiveness to its department’s routinezed planning, programming, and budgeting system that could make those efforts more than rhetorical efforts.

Transformation is still a work in progress in the US, with priorities clearly allocated to identify how the Department of Defense might improve leadership and department oversight in services and joint organizations. The results might transcend current force configurations and increase reliance of information dominance, featuring smaller, leaner and intelligent weapons systems.

The American expression of defense planning is widely known by its acronym PPBS, for Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System the Planning. This system is initiated with a Defense Planning Guidance published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which translate the National Military Strategy prepared by the Joint Staff in reference to the National Security Strategy led by the National Security Council through an interagency process. Proposed programs by the services and defense agencies, to attend those planning guidance in observance to fiscal guidance allotted separately the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are evaluated and adjusted to ensure compliance with the strategic directions and other policy documents creating the Future Years Defense Program. The services and defense agencies repackage the first two years of the Future Years Defense Programs into appropriations format used by the Congress in legislating the annual defense budget.

These processes, in the US case,. The PPBS has served American needs since 1961, being installed by former Defense Secretary Robert S. MacNamara and his Defense Comptroller, Charles J. Hitch. Its functional logic has the merit of providing credible, managerial system during the relative stable period of the Cold War. However, its foundational concepts and articulating logic has become complex and bureaucratic, resulting in lack of clear rationality for the increasingly undisciplined relationships of its components parts103.

103 For a detailed discussion of how the U.S. Department of Defense develops military capabilities, see Kent, A.G. and Thaler, D.E. A New Concept for Streamlining Up-Front Planning. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, MR-271, 1993. Thaler, D.E. Strategies to Tasks: A Framework for Linking Means to Ends. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, MR-300-AF, 1993. kauffmann, W.N. Assessing the Base Force: How Much is Enough. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings Institution, 1992.

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Henry Mintzberg concludes that PPBS "proved to be an impediment to effective strategic thinking and action, whether one favored hawkish military strategies or dovish political ones"104. Although the PPBS has become complex and cumbersome, with countless critics claiming for its revision, including Secretary of Defense Donald S. Rusfeld, as he stated in January 2002 at the National Defense University:

“The way the Department of Defense runs, the budgeting system, the planning system is, broken. It is not serving the department or the country well. And yet it is inexorable. It just rolls along, like the freight train coming from San Francisco with the wrong things for New York. And there are plenty of people who look at it and don't know it's wrong. I sat in meeting after meeting, and people said, "Well, that's the way we do it. This is how it works. This is what it is." And, "Don't you understand that the only way to affect that is to reach back 2-1/2 years ago and load it properly?" And of course my answer is, "Don't you understand we didn't have -- we don't have 2-1/2 years to wait to change? We need to get at it" 105.

Being able to move from the level of methodologies and techniques is central to developing and implementing effective military capabilities. Albeit, it is surprising to discover hemispheric countries endeavoring to emulate the PPBS model in theirs defense superintendence process. The model, for the US, albeit critics, has its validity and utility, existing good reasons to believe that it can be made to work effectively; however, copying the model, with only a cursory description of its general purpose and objectives is doomed to fail, unless officials and senior defense civil servants recognize the centrality of force design in superintending defense, and its intricacy with the organizational structure that supports its development and evaluation.

It is difficult to overemphasize the uniqueness of each country force design and associated problems. There is relatively little systematic research on the nature and consequences of these problems, forcing, therefore, analysis to rely largely upon impressionistic data in order to discuss their importance. With this qualification in mind, it is possible to consider the following list of problems and issues found – although in different degrees and shapes – in 14 hemispheric countries analyzed106:

♦ Reluctance in re-evaluate management practices and resistance to force design, fearing a transfer of power within the Ministry of Defense from the services to the Minister and his force designing staff, failing to effectively reshape the military to meet future demands, whereas supporting the existence of a culture that accepts redundancy as synonym of security rather than inefficiency.

♦ Official documentation on defense superintendence and force design divergent from actual management, planning, programming and budgeting actions and routines,

104 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York: The Free Press, 1994. pp. 120.

105 Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on "21st Century Transformation" of U.S. Armed Forces”. (transcript of remarks and question and answer period). National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., Thursday, January 31, 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html. (Jun 2002).106 The countries were Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Dominican Republica, United States, Canada and Mexico. The data for this list was collected over one a half year in the Center of Hemispheric Defense Studies, with fellow students. The rules of no-attribution preclude mentioning specific sources. However, the registers are consistent with most of the ostensive literature, providing valid examples, and a useful reference for further research. The data is also consistent with the U.S. experience of the past decades, suggesting that most countries are manifesting similar problems and that they could profit from the U.S. lessons learned.

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with a tendency of budgeting followed by capabilities requirements followed by defense policies, essentially reversing the logic of force design.

♦ Major decisions on force structure not adequately identified with force design results and defense acquisition systems focusing on a wide range of relative near term, unconnected issues, rather than specific outcomes related with decisions on adaptation, modernization, and transformation linked requirements.

♦ Absence or inadequate criteria and organized procedure for integrating and assessing programs, translating its result into a budget that reflects capability requirements, with a tradition of secrecy preventing defense programs being criticized in open forums.

♦ Defense budget profile reflects appropriation cycles, institutional determinants and spending patterns, rather then defense capability requirements to attend national objectives, resulting in a sterile endeavor for bureaucratic efficiency focusing on accounting procedures.

♦ Existence of relatively inter-service secretive bargaining manners to adjust the budget before submission, with frantically attempt to establish a “pre-approved” package in order to not compromise services’ resource pre-allocated, with consensus found in advocating more funds rather that program reductions.

♦ Vague or incomplete criteria for distributing funding levels to the services, and imperfect criteria for effective resource allocation, allowing services make procurement choices that they believe best satisfy their needs, resulting in military capabilities either inappropriate for the defense environment, inconsistent with the national interpretation of security demands, or incompatible with foreign policy demands.

♦ Defense budgets unrelated to concepts of employment, with the latter dissociated from requirements of defense infrastructure, logistical support, and maintenance, producing major limitations for force components to produce useful outputs as capabilities.

♦ Capabilities evaluation seemed less an effort to determine current abilities to perform envisaged task, than a means to justify current and anticipated force structure. In this context, readiness is not evaluated because of the absence of guidance on what tasks force components were supposed to be integrating to produce a valuable capability, concurring to breaking down rational linkages between current force structure and future capability requirements.

♦ Defense superintendence operates semi-autonomously from national security decision-making, failing to shape defense priorities thoughtful debates on issues that affect national defense capabilities.

♦ Defense budgets derived from a predetermined, arbitrary ceiling rather than integrated programs requirements, creating resistance to revisiting prior decisions, and making only marginal adjustments from an existing base, resulting in the absence of flexibility for military preparation.

♦ Programs priority are decided by compromise rather than based on explicit criteria of capability requirements and analytical tools, resulting in a not fully integrated

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and balanced conjunct of defense programs, with vested interests of defense industry and services parochialism.

♦ Lack of procedural discipline among officials and defense civil servants in the daily activities of defense superintendence, the absence of overall organizing logic for force design and relative indifference of senior national leaders with security and defense risks associated with this situation, other than those immediately and explicitly related to fiscal resources.

♦ Force design purpose and functional instrumentality atrophied with delayed decisions on the position of the country in the security and defense matrix, vague defense objectives that do not serve as gauge against capabilities could be derived, and tendency to lack of specificity and delay in program developments.

♦ Failure to adjust military and defense civil servants education to overall demands of force design and defense superintendence, perpetuating many earlier defense customs force design is intended to eliminate, creating a vicious circle that deprives countries of needed efficiency, efficacy and economy in designing force alternatives and superintending its development, management and assessment.

There are unknown conditions under which Western Hemispheric Countries make their defense reforms decisions. Although at different levels, the complexity of decision-making is intensifying the demands for adopting force design practices and concepts in the formulation of defense alternatives.

Generalizations from these findings must be made cautiously, however, if allowed to persist, these conditions would degrade armed forces’ ability to defend their countries. Thus, as indicators, they serve to convey the growing requirements for care in the process of designing defense alternatives, acting as a reminder of certain points already made: major changes occurred in the security and defense environment have intensified the sophistication required for concepts dealing with forecasting; the optimal allocation of resources depend on how the problem is defined; decomposing capabilities, programming and budgeting become intertwined demanding timely decision; and the need for ingenuity in hedging decision on adaptation, modernization and transformation has grown over.

These aspects stress complementarities in designing capabilities and the need of determining how variations in the specifications of a particular defense alternative affect the requirements of that alternative for resources. The scope of the discussion indicates the necessity of a guide for allocating efforts to provide the kind of information needed to be made available for decision-makers.

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FORCE DESIGN AS AREA OF STUDY

Throughout this paper, it was argued that force design must take a proactive role in defining military capabilities that are to be pursued with defense reforms. It must communicate clearly to the decision makers the constraints it operates under, the abilities it can exploit within the three simultaneous horizons (projective, prospective and prosficcional), and the options available to it (adaptation, modernization, and transformation). And it seek collaborative relationships with other state functions. While seemingly complicated, force design can be a useful decisionmaking tool for developing an articulated system of concepts exploiting rationality to produce coherent defense alternatives that could be judged with a political logic.

The focus of force design is defense reform, eliciting that defense reform is not an end in itself, but rather an action needed for reasons of both opportunity and necessity. The complex possibilities of arranging force components in a stable capability solution offered to a perceived problem are the challenges force design faces as an area of study. The objects of its study are the components and processes involved in the design of military capabilities, the assumptions that supports conclusions and its sensibility to changes in these assumptions.

As result, a system of concepts and procedures that makes useful those concepts in its own terms are distilled, and made available to support organizational reforms, to foster methodological changes, and for the reconsideration of current and future capability requirements. Theoretical concepts and practical actions are mutually complementary in the goal of producing a system of articulated decisions aiming the conception and justification of defense alternatives.

Force design is an area of study and field of practical action delved into a complex of practices and academic disciplines that interface with defense issues. Military history, Defense Economics; International Relations; Management and Organization; Political Science; Military Sociology; Operational Analysis – to mention just a few – are part of this complex.

Force Design functionally adapts concepts derived from these areas, whereas creating its own concepts, integrating all of them in a theoretical construct with its own hypothesis and methodologies. The resulting theoretical construct configures an inter-related nexus of propositions aiming to:

a) Research the field of force design and instruct the search for solutions for the perceived problems. A precise object of investigation helps the identification of what is relevant to observe and instructs the gathering of information. The conceptual components of the theoretical construct offer elements for developing plausible hypothesis related to a set of accepted values and principles.

b) Assess those solutions found. The assessment processes aim to identify the coherency and the degree of relevance of the proposed solution to the perceive problem, forked into two complementary approaches: a theoretical approach that research the logical consistency of the proposed solution; and an empirical

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approach, when it exams the consistency of the theoretical model with the observed reality.

c) Contribute to clearly communicate results. The efficacy of communication of force design results derives from a clearly defined set of terms.

What is important is the basic point that deciding about defense issues cannot preclude a solid theoretical base. Notwithstanding this evidence, it is usual to have defense reforms initiatives drowned by intuition into the diversity and complexities of force design.

Force design results – an articulated project of defense - is a political issue. It express the declaratory posture of the States regarding its perception of a desired state of security, in which its citizen’s values, way of life and expectations are not threatened and, if it were, the State’s willingness to apply force to assure its protection. It this role, Force Design is servant of foreign policy, carrying out messages that may range from a vague statement towards peace to a firm commitment to war. Moreover, Force Design may contribute to internal politics, placating demands though a declaration of intentions.

The two overarching roles of force design – to guide the conception of defense capabilities and its intended use, and to be a political instrument of the State - are always linked. The former relates to the necessity of classify and systematized before foreseen and deciding about defense alternatives; the latter refers to the disputed and uncertain cross impacts of interests and perspectives aiming an accord where alternatives get its purpose and toward what its results are oriented for. In the one hierarchy and order is expected; in the other, self-esteem to exercise independent decision is jealously preserved from all authority.

These two tendencies are far from conflicting; they are mutually supportive. Systematic ordeal independence of decision, forcing politics to explicit a stable goal force design needs to fulfill its tasks; and force design prepares a field where policy affords to exercise its guidance. Once a project of defense is selected and empowered as policy, it is considered as the source of almost all guidance to conceive defense functions, roles and missions, instruct its organizations, and explain the limits of validity of roles, missions and organizations as a function of changes in defense functions resulting from differences in the security ambient.

Because the results of force design – an integrated project of defense – is so portentous, this is an endeavor that must be guided wisely. The construct of capabilities, the diagram of futures and defense superintendence offer a set of concepts and a framework that illuminates the possibilities of reform the defense system in order to produce better military capabilities, and should be judge by this standard.

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