Wes Fox U.S. Nat’l Security/Civil Wars SIS 653 014 Dec. 10, 2014

Organization, Violence, and Rebel Success

“It is much easier and much less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for us and our friends to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt the internal peace

and economic stability of a small country.” ­ CIA Director William Casey, 1982. 1

This essay analyzes the organizational differences between the Contra rebels in

Nicaragua and the National Resistance of Mozambique rebels (RENAMO) in Mozambique to

answer the question: what factors explain rebel success? While both groups ultimately agreed to

de­militarization, RENAMO survives as the second­most popular political party in Mozambique

while the Contras had no such success. As is well­documented, both organizations were

extremely violent reactionary groups opposing newly­installed leftist governments during the

1980s. Both were the beneficiaries of massive outside funding, and neither had a clear political

ideology. I argue two differences are critical in explaining their divergent outcomes: their

organizational structures and their use of violence. In doing so I apply Patrick Johnston’s theory

analyzing how centrally­organized rebel groups are more successful than more loosely­organized

ones. I find his theory useful, but the groups he chose for his case are so different from each 2

other that it is difficult to isolate dependent variables in explaining the results. My two

hypotheses contain the two most important dependent variables I found:

H1: Centrally­organized rebel groups are more successful in achieving their political

1 Washington Post, May 8, 1983. 2 Patrick Johnston, “The Geography of Insurgent Organizations and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone,” Security Studies 17 (2008): 107­137.

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and economic goals than non­centrally­organized groups.

H2: Rebel groups can achieve enough central organization for success through the use of

extreme violence against civilians, independent of other factors.

First, I briefly define the terms I use in my argument. Next, I present the existing

literature on reasons for rebel success. I then explain the structure of the two organizations and

their respective conflicts. Next, I analyze why centralized and violent groups are more

successful, and compare the Contras and RENAMO in order to isolate the primary differences

between the two groups which account for the varying results. Finally, I present policy

suggestions based on my findings.

I use Nicholas Sambanis’ definition of civil war, the pertinent aspects of which include

1000 battle deaths in a year with no more than 90% suffered by one side in a conflict fought in a

territory with more than 500,000 people. My working definitions will be as follows. “Rebel 3

groups” are defined as armed organizations participating in a civil war whose goal is to secede

from or overthrow the current government. I define a centrally­organized rebel group as a

hierarchical organization that does not suffer from splinter groups and displays evidence of

centrally­controlled decision­making that is generally followed by the organization’s subunits. A

non­centrally­organized group is effectively the opposite of a centralized one, with more local

autonomy granted or taken by subunits and their commanders, and a higher prevalence of

splinter groups due to the main group’s lack of cohesion. “Success” is more difficult to

3 Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (Dec. 2004): 814­858.

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determine, and I will therefore use three definitions. The first can be called “full success.” This

indicates that the rebel group in question succeeded in overthrowing the central government or

achieved their political objectives (i.e. secession). “Partial success” is when a rebel group forced

a favorable peacekeeping settlement with the government or with remaining rebel groups.

Finally, “no success” is relatively straightforward, and simply is if a rebel group failed to meet its

objectives and was either politically co­opted or military crushed by the government. Longevity

will not count towards any valuation of success. Shining Path’s decades­long insurgency in Peru

has failed to net them any lasting concessions from the central government or achieve any of

their objectives. Longevity is often a successful tactic, but not an ultimate goal in and of itself.

Using these terms, RENAMO achieved partial success while the Contras achieved no success.

Much of the scholarship on civil wars have focused on how civil wars start, instead of

why some groups in civil wars are successful and others are not. Theories of grievances, state

weakness, environmental problems, and repression certainly have effects when analyzing why

civil wars can begin, but often fall short in determining which groups are likely to succeed in the

conflict. Determining which rebel groups are likely to achieve their objectives is critical in

determining who countries should support, fight, intervene for, or merely observe. Once conflict

begins, knowing the major players and their likelihood of success is absolutely necessary for

knowing how to effectively end the conflict.

As stated previously, Patrick Johnston’s 2008 theory on the organizational structure of

rebel groups is one of the few to analyze why some rebel groups win and others lose. Johnston

posits that unitary rebel groups, that is, groups with a clearly delineated command structure

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allowing a central leader to control “the production and deployment of violence” are “both more 4

formidable on the battlefield and more reliable at the negotiating table.” As evidence, he cites 5

four case studies from conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, two successful, unitary groups

(LURD and the Kamajor militias) contrasted against two less­successful multi­divisional

organizations (RUF and NPFL). He argues that groups in which the leader is better able to

direct, punish, and restrain are far more successful than those where the leader needs to delegate

authority more broadly. His theory is plausible, but requires some additions. My paper agrees

with his conclusions, but also posits that rebel groups can create a more centralized command

and discipline structure through violence, and that such a structure can overcome other

disadvantages.

Another theory about rebel organizations is that their behavior is completely predicated

on the existing social networks they are based on: “preexisting networks determined how armed

organizations were built and how material resources were used.” This applies to the Contras, 6

who were based on the same communal village organization system fighters came from, but

RENAMO’s case example shows the major flaw in this argument. It is made irrelevant if groups

destroy the social ties of their members through extreme violence, making ties to the

organizational structure of the rebel group the only significant ones.

Some theories that explain the outset of civil war can be extended to explain the success

rate of rebel groups. Theories of state weakness that attribute growing support of the rebels to

indiscriminate and ineffective counter­insurgency efforts by the government could plausibly 7

4 Johnston, “The Geography of Insurgent Organizations,” 113. 5 Johnston, “The Geography of Insurgent Organizations,” 137. 6 Paul Staniland, “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia,” International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 142. 7 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1

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explain why some groups, such as RENAMO, remained effective. Essentially, rebel groups

continue to operate because the government cannot stop them. Furthermore, many governments

lack the ability to conduct effective counter­insurgency which does not negatively impact

civilians, meaning civilian populations come to see the government forces as little different from

the rebels in terms of violence. This was certainly the case in Mozambique, less so in Nicaragua.

While it is important in explaining civil war onset, this paper finds little support for

various theories on grievances regarding conflict duration and predictor of victory. Gurr and 8

others have proposed that people rebel when they have significant grievances and believe the

government is against, or at least apathetic about resolving them. Thus, “relative deprivation,” is

responsible for civil violence, meaning that people rebel when their political, economic, and

social attributes are significantly less than those they expect. Other theories, such as horizontal

inequalities, posit that when economic and political disparities coincide with cultural or ethnic

differences, civil war is more likely. While potentially effective in explaining the outbreak of 9

war, the grievance arguments fail to account for war duration or the likelihood of victory for

particular organizations. Elements of the Contras certainly rebelled due to perceived or actual

grievances and repression from the Sandinista government, but for RENAMO’s politically 10

re­educated leadership and the majority of their soldiers who were forcibly abducted, grievances

did not appear to play a significant role.

The final theory pertinent to this paper is the “power to hurt” theory, which argues that

(2003): 75­90. 8 See especially: Ted Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” World Politics 20, no. 2 (Jan. 1968): 245­278. 9 Frances Stewart, “Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict: a review of CRISE findings,” Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity 1 (January 2010): 1­39. 10 For more on repression and state weakness causing civil war, see: Joseph K. Young, “Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War,” Political Research Quarterly 66 (2012): 516­532.

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rebel groups who are able to inflict maximum damage and raise the costs of fighting are often

successful. Thomas and others argue that extreme violence from rebel groups can effectively 11

force governments to come to the bargaining table, meaning that rebels who engage in

particularly “bad behavior” are often those who are rewarded the most. RENAMO is a textbook

example of this: extreme and widespread violence eventually forced its opponent, the

Mozambique Liberation Front government (FRELIMO) to come to terms with the rebels in the

early 90s. Violence, crucially, can also be used as a screening process to test the mettle of new

recruits, willing or otherwise, and can destroy the recruits’ old value and norms in order to 12

make them more easily adopt those of the rebel group. This appears to be the case in 13

RENAMO, which was characterized by a strict military hierarchy (despite unwilling fighters

from heterogeneous backgrounds) and extreme violence. Violence, then, can explain why

groups which rely heavily on child and abducted soldiers can still form a loyal fighting force

responsive to central authority, a structure I argue is crucial for success.

Centralized rebel organization and violence are the theories I find plausible in explaining

rebel success, along with state weakness to a certain extent. As with Johnston, I find a

centralized command structure within a rebel organization to be a critical factor in determining

success, and that extreme violence is an effective tool in creating such an organization. As I will

show, RENAMO had no ethnic, political, national, or philosophical ties which bound it together.

Strict hierarchy and systematic brutality were their primary characteristics, neither of which were

11 Jakana Thomas, “Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 00, No. 0 (2014): 1­15. 12 Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, No. 4 (August 2005): 598­624. 13 Roos Haer, Lilli Banholzer, and Verena Ertl, “Create compliance and cohesion: how rebel organizations manage to survive,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, issue 3 (2011): 420.

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regularly displayed by the Contras. Next, I have a brief discussion of each rebel group and

continue with the theories of organization and violence which explains the differing outcomes.

CONTRAS

In the summer of 1979 the Sandinista revolution finally succeeded in overthrowing the

U.S.­backed Somoza regime. In that same year, the U.S. evacuated commanders of the

Nicaraguan National Guard (Guardia, a military force the U.S. had itself created) to Miami so

they could “reorganize to renew their fight against the Sandinistas.” Throughout the first half 14

the 1980s, “U.S. officials forged the main contra coalitions, determined their leadership, supplied

the contra forces, paid the salaries of both commanders and foot soldiers, and planned their

missions.” Contra organizations were seldom independent of U.S. support or organization. 15

Even from the start, the Contras were always a pluralistic, decentralized group. For the sake of

brevity, I divide the Contra groups broadly in two: the northern Contras led by the Nicaraguan

Democratic Force (FDN) based in Honduras, and the southern Contras led by the Democratic

Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) based in Costa Rica.

FDN formed from groups of ex­Guardia just weeks after the Sandinista victory in order

to stop the expected collectivization and to prevent the new government from exerting control

over the mountainous northern regions. Many of the local guerillas from the mountainous rural

areas were former Sandinistas disenchanted by their perception of the unexpected radicalism of

the new regime. FDN, then, was an especially uneasy alliance between former Guardia from 16

the urban areas as the leaders and local, rural guerrillas as the soldiers; the latter group made up

14 Peter Kornbluh, “The Covert War,” in Reagan Versus the Sandinistas, ed. by Thomas W. Walker (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 21. 15 Kornbluh, “The Covert War,” 25. 16 Brown, The Real Contra War, 66.

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as much as 96% of effective FDN strength as of 1982. Problematically, most of the guardsmen 17

were from southern and urban backgrounds, a cultural combination whose incursion the northern

highland peasant guerrillas had been resisting for centuries. In addition to the FDN, the 18

indigenous Moskito Indians along the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, themselves subject to some

early abuses by the Sandinista government, formed two further Contra groups: MISURA, 19

which was allied with the FDN, and MISURASTA, allied with ARDE.

The second large group was the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) formed by

the enigmatic Edén Pastora (“Commander Zero”) and based out of Costa Rica. He formed

ARDE in late 1982 out of a variety of smaller groups, including MISURASTA. Although he 20

publicly maintained his independence from the U.S. and FDN, Pastora accepted advice and

money from the CIA, enough to support up to 1000 fighters. By 1984, however, Washington 21

had realized that two separate Contra organizations was an unworkable model and pressured

Pastora to unify with FDN. Refusing to do so unless he was named supreme commander,

Pastora was severely injured in an unsolved bombing at his headquarters and afterward opted to 22

retire; his troops either deserted or joined the FDN. 23

By 1986 the only territory Contra organizations fully controlled were the original

CIA­built bases in Honduras and Costa Rica, and the numbers of their fighters had fallen by

almost half. In August of 1989 the remaining Contra groups in Honduras agreed to 24

17 Brown, The Real Contra War, 89. 18 Brown, The Real Contra War, 89. 19 Martin Diskin, “The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles,” in Reagan Versus the Sandinistas, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987): 81­82. 20 Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, 68. 21 Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, 69. 22 Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, 114. 23 Kornbluh, “The Covert War,” 26. 24 Kornbluh, “The Covert War,” 35.

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demobilization ahead of the February 1990 elections, which resulted in a surprising victory for 25

the National Opposition Union (UNO), a U.S.­backed coalition of left­wing, right­wing, and

centrist opposition parties against the Sandinistas. However, the fragmented nature of UNO 26

made it difficult to govern and the new UNO President of Nicaragua Violeta Chamorro

disbanded the Contras and allowed the Sandinista agrarian redistribution policies to continue. 27

UNO was crushed in the 1996 elections, coming in tenth. The Sandinista National Liberation 28

Front currently enjoys a nearly 61% majority in the National Assembly as well as the Presidency,

which is now held by the same man who was also the leader of Nicaragua during the Contra

wars, Daniel Ortega. The Contras did not topple the Sandinista government, and the fighting

stopped when they agreed to unconditional demobilization.

RENAMO

Following approximately fifteen years of guerilla warfare against Portugal, the

FRELIMO transitional government gained control of the country on September 7 1974 through

the Lusaka Accords. As retribution for Mozambique supporting Zimbabwe nationalists, the 29

Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office created RENAMO in 1977 in order to destabilize the new

Marxist FRELIMO regime. Afonso Dhlakama became its leader in 1980 following the death 30

of the organization’s first leader, André Matsangaissa, in combat. Dhlakama remains the leader

of the RENAMO political party today. RENAMO received massive foreign backing, at least for

25 Johm M. Goshko, Ann Devroy, “U.S. Endorses Contra Plan as Prod to Democracy in Nicaragua,” The Washington Post, August 8 1989. 26 Mark A. Uhlig, “Turnover in Nicaragua; Nicaraguan Opposition Routs Sandinistas; U.S. Pledges Aid, Tied to Orderly Turnover,” The New York Times, February 27th 1990. 27 Thomas W. Walker, ed. Nicaragua Without Illusions (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1997), 49. 28 David Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999): 185. 29 Martin Rupiya, “Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique,” Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives issue 3 (1998): 12. 30 Alex Vines, “Renamo’s Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique,” International Peacekeeping 20, issue 3 (2013): 375.

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a time. Coinciding with Dhlakama’s takeover, South Africa’s Directorate Special Tasks (DST)

took over management of the organization, airlifting 45­60 tons of supplies to RENAMO every

month between 1980 and 1984. In addition to the millions of dollars in equipment provided by 31

South Africa, RENAMO crucially received advanced radio communication systems, enabling

Dhlakama and its leaders to consistently communicate with their field commanders even after

foreign aid started to dry up in the mid­80s. 32

As with the Contras, RENAMO was notoriously brutal, although drastically more so.

The Mozambique Civil War killed between 600,000 and 1 million people through both direct

violence and secondary effects, as opposed to the 43,000 killed during the Contra war. That 33

number is nearly ten percent of Mozambique’s 1984 population, and the war is likely the reason

the country experienced flat or negative population growth throughout the 1980s. Even 34

assuming that conservatively RENAMO was only responsible for half the deaths (an assumption

most scholars would reject), the organization was still far and away more violent than the

Contras; in addition to massacres, RENAMO frequently engaged in mutilation, cutting off noses,

lips, ears, and sexual organs. As with Contras, they targeted weak civilian targets in order to 35

cause the most destabilization: schools, clinics, and transportation hubs. Most notably, unlike 36

the Contras the vast majority of RENAMO fighters had been forcibly recruited. 37

31 Vines, “Renamo’s Rise and Decline.” 32 Vines, “Renamo’s Rise and Decline.” 33 For Mozambique see: Africa Watch, “Conspicuous Destruction: War Famine & The Reform Process in Mozambique” (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1992): 2; H. Andersson, “Mozambique: A War Against the People” (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992): 64. For Nicaragua see: For Nicaragua see: Correlates of War, “Intra­State War Data v.4.0,” http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (accessed Dec. 5, 2014). 34 “Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects:” The 2010 Revision. 35 Vines, “Renamo’s Rise and Decline,” 377. 36 Vines, “Renamo’s Rise and Decline,” 389. 37 Chris Dolan and Jessica Schafer, “The Reintegration of Ex­combatants in Mozambique: Manica and Zambezia

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The starkest difference between the Contras and RENAMO though, is that the latter was

clearly a successful rebel organization. After a failed ceasefire in 1984, RENAMO and

FRELIMO leadership signed a “General Peace Agreement” in 1992 in Rome after two years of

protracted talks and massive pressure both internationally and from within the country. The 38

Catholic church in particular, through personal relationships between its bishops and RENAMO

leadership, was crucial to bringing the group to the table. Indeed, despite the RENAMO 39

delegation’s strategy of trying to “extract the maximum material, rather than political, benefits

from the peace process,” they scored significant political victories as well. Half of the new 40

Mozambique army was comprised of former RENAMO fighters, and the RENAMO political

party won 112 of the 250 seats in the National Legislature in 1994. Though their popularity has

declined, they still hold 51 seats, a remarkable achievement for a former rebel organization with

no discernible political ideology.

Ultimately, there are numerous similarities between the Contras and RENAMO. Both

were groups formed with massive assistance from foreign actors, both were primarily (the

Contras) or initially (RENAMO) not based in their country of conflict, neither had a clear

political ideology, both were brutal to enemies and civilians (although RENAMO significantly

more so) and both fought against newly­empowered leftist governments in the 1980s. Why,

then, were the Contras defeated and RENAMO successful? I argue that two key differences

between the groups tells us why some rebel organizations are more successful than others. First,

Provinces’, Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford, 1997; Lisa Hultman, ‘The Power to Hurt in Civil War: The Strategic Aim of Renamo Violence,” Journal of Southern African Studies 35, no.4, 2009, 828. 38 Saul, “Un/Civil War,” 137. 39 Alex Vines, No Democracy without Money: The Road to Peace in Mozambique (1982­1992) (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations), 6. 40 Vines, No Democracy without Money, 31­32.

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RENAMO had a unified command structure controlled by a single leader. The Contras were

never more than a loose confederation at best of different organizations made up of different

people with different aims. The massive foreign aid provided could not overcome their disparate

and disorganized organization, regardless of how effective individual fighting units may have

been. Second, RENAMO was far more brutal than the Contras. While the Contras practiced

violence against civilian populations, the 43,000 killed during the Contra War pales in

comparison to the 600,000­1,000,000 fatalities in Mozambique. RENAMO routinely massacred

and mutilated civilians to an extent the Contras never did. Organization and violence are the two

differences between the groups which explain the success of one and the failure of the other.

Analysis

The command structure of rebel organizations is not just an aesthetic feature; it is crucial

to determining success. The reasons for why centrally­organized group are successful are

straightforward. As argued by Johnston, groups with a more unified, hierarchical structure are

able to prevent rampant opportunism by subordinates, cut down on information asymmetries

within different parts of the organization, and coordinate more effective military strikes. Less 41

centrally­organized groups are less able to achieve these goals, and risk rogue elements purusing

their own objectives, as well as the heightened chance of defection. I find much support for 42

this theory and argue that violence can increase centralizations. Again, my hypotheses are as

follows:

H1: Centrally­organized rebel groups are more successful in achieving their political

and economic goals than non­centrally­organized groups.

41 Johnston, 113­116. 42 Johnston, 116.

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H2: Rebel groups can achieve enough central organization for success through the use of

extreme violence against civilians.

Unlike RENAMO, the Contras were a relatively homogeneous organization with highly

heterogenous objectives. By the time the FDN, easily by then the largest and strongest Contra

organization, disbanded in 1990­91, fully 97% of them were peasants from the rural highland

regions, mostly in the northeast; less than 1% were former Guardia (although the latter made up

a disproportionate part of the leadership). In terms of how individual combat units worked, the 43

structure can be seen as

a series of small pyramids, each planted in a comarca [village] community, with Comando combat formations at their tops. Rather like locally raised British regiments in the days of the British Empire, most units came from and relied on a particular local populace...a unit was most active militarily in or near the communities from which its Comandos came. 44

Contra units were militarily composed of local volunteers (who could and did leave

service freely) primarily concerned with defending their local villages against the incursions of

the central government, resistance in which they had been participating for centuries. Despite

the United States’ massive financial, political, and military effort to turn resistance into a

national attempt to topple the Sandinista government, the aims of highland peasants who made

up the vast majority of the Contras’ fighting strength were much more those of separatists.

Divergent goals likely explain why the United States took such an active role in the leadership

and direction of the Contra organizations, and why no Contra offensive ever succeeded in

capturing territory or forcing concessions. The vast majority of fighters were simply

better­armed (courtesy of the US) descendents of highland peasants who had long fought for

43 Brown, Real Contra War, 116­117. 44 Brown, Real Contra War, 92.

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independence and isolation. Without significant US involvement, they had little incentive to

attack Sandinista­held territory, and certainly no incentive to hold it. Time and again, the US

would organize Contra attacks and the Contras would sometimes be successful (often only with

US air or naval support). Inadvertently however, they would be driven back to their Honduran or

El Salvadoran bases by Sandinista counter­attacks, leaving behind American weapons, supplies,

and sometimes maps. 45

No amount of intervention could change the fact that the Contras were overwhelming

defensive and parochial highland peasants with little interest in expanding outside their

communities which supported them. Crucially, authority “flowed from the bottom up, not from

the top down.” Contra fighters were representatives of the communities they defended, not of 46

any sort of high command. Thus, the social ties which were so crucial in making them an

effective resistance force also made their interests so local that they never posed a serious threat

to capture or hold any Sandinista territory. The Sandinistas, never suffering any major loss in

territory, could slowly push the Contras into smaller and smaller pockets of resistance. Due to

their organizational structure, the Contras were effective in defending their communities for a

time, but little else.

RENAMO, on the other hand, enjoyed no built­in advantages in existing social structure,

shared ethnicities, or a tradition of resistance. A purely military organization, RENAMO

overcame these deficiencies, as well as steadily diminishing resources as the 80s continued, with

a highly­disciplined organizational structure and extreme violence against civilians. Although

the Contras engaged in human rights abuses, the scale and ferocity of RENAMO massacres and

45 Robinson, Norsworthy, David and Goliath, 98­99. 46 Brown, The Real Contra War, 108.

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abuses was considerably greater. I argue the violence served two purposes: to inflict as much

damage as possible on the FRELIMO government in order to bring them to the table, and to

de­couple recruits from prior ethnic, religious, and local social ties.

Despite the non­existent political message or ideology, RENAMO was an organization 47

with a strict, linear, military chain of command. The only decisions low­level groups made were

over immediate tactics in a combat situation; central command had control over both the actions

of the individual fighting units and available information. The commander­in­chief, who was 48

Dhlakama for the majority of the fighting, made all strategic decisions which were then

logistically planned by his chief­of­staff, whose plan was subject to veto by the commander.

Regional commanders would be responsible for specific decisions in terms of fighting units and

weapons for the planned action. As stated before, one of the most important things RENAMO 49

received were radio equipment. The importance of this was evident as RENAMO spread its

combat operations to nine of the ten provinces in Mozambique: every day, each regional

commander would radio a report to the chief of general staff, who would then draft a report for

Dhlakama. High command also kept itself well­informed about the discipline in the various 50

units stationed around the country and was quick to punish poor behavior. 51

This last point is the key to how RENAMO used extreme violence to craft a

well­disciplined fighting force. New fighters were often posted far from their families,

47 According to the first RENAMO leader Andre Matsangaissa: “We are not interested in policy making.” Alex Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (York, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, 1996), 76. 48 Hultman, “The Power to Hurt,” 828. 49 Hultman, “The Power to Hurt,” 827­28. 50 Hultman, “The Power to Hurt,” 828. 51 Hultman, “The Power to Hurt,” 828.

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threatened with harm to their families, or in some cases forced to kill them. Desertion was 52

punished by death. Similar to other rebel groups RENAMO used extreme violence to eliminate 53

or change less­enthusiastic members by severing the social and community ties they once had.

Crucially, this violence was coordinated by RENAMO high command: provinces which had

poor communication with Dhlakama tended to be badly­organized but also less violent. 54

Finally, the best example of the efficient command structure of the organization came at the end

of the war. When Dhlakama signed the final peace agreement on October 4, 1992, RENAMO

had just captured the major eastern suburb of the capital Maputo. The soldiers were confident

they could capture the capital and secure a military victory but remarkably, when Dhlakama

ordered a ceasefire against the wishes of his soldiers, they obeyed.

How was RENAMO’s violence related to its success? First, using Lisa Hultman’s

“Power to Hurt” theory, RENAMO simply made the social and political price for continuing the

war too high for the FRELIMO government . By gruesomely and systematically proving the

government was failing in its social obligation to protect its citizens, RENAMO forced them to

the table. Second, the extreme violence its leaders ordered the soldiers to carry out resulted in a

disciplined, responsive fighting force able to stay in the field long enough to extract concessions.

Hultman sums up the “Power to Hurt” theory succinctly:

By destroying the government's ability to maintain control, and by proving that the state is unable to provide security, a rebel group can force the government to back down and offer them concessions. Violence against civilians creates fear and chaos, and ultimately denotes the failure of the state to uphold its power... This is particularly damaging if the government's core constituency is targeted by the violence. Although seemingly indiscriminate, the violence may thus be strategic when it targets those that should have

52 Hultman, “The Power to Hurt,” 828. 53 Hultman, “The Power to Hurt,” 829. 54 Hultman, “The Power to Hurt,” 829.

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been protected by the state. 55

This theory is echoed by Jakana Thomas who finds that rebel groups are more often called to the

negotiating table and receive more concessions when they carry out more terror attacks. This 56

fits well with the comparison of RENAMO to the Contras. The former is credited with being

particularly ferocious in their attacks and, although ferocity is unquantifiable, they were certainly

responsible for many times the number of deaths of the Contras. As shown previously, the total

number of people killed in the Contra Wars by both sides would account for a mere fraction of

RENAMO’s victims even with the most conservative estimate. Consequently, RENAMO

received far more concessions during negotiations than the Contras, who essentially were

disarmed unconditionally.

The second reason for their violence I argue is to make fighters more responsive to

RENAMO leadership by de­coupling recruits or abductees from former social ties. One way

organizations such as RENAMO can effectively manage a large number of forced recruits is to

significantly raise the costs disobedience or desertion; this can be achieved by making recruits go

through initiation rituals, or simply by imposing harsh discipline. Rebels can use extreme 57

violence against civilians to enforce discipline within their ranks and deter potential defection. 58

Extreme violence, then, can serve not only as a signalling device to the government to indicate

commitment to resistance, but also as a signalling device to new recruits to indicate the 59

55 Hultman, ‘The Power to Hurt. 823­24. 56 Jakana Thomas, “Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science. 00, No. 0, (2014): 1­15. 57 Haer, Banholzer, Ertl, “Create Compliance.” 58 Weinstein, “Resources and the Information Problem, 622. 59 For more on signalling mechanisms to governments, see: Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343­361.

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necessity of changing their own values to match those of the organization. That RENAMO was

a highly­centralized and successful rebel organization that participated in regular and widespread

brutality against civilians indicates that we need to rethink the theory that decentralized and

uncontrolled groups are often more likely to commit atrocities. 60

Could, however, the violence practiced by RENAMO merely be incidental, and not used

to test and maintain group cohesion? Possibly, though unlikely. First, RENAMO soldiers, as

mentioned previously, had no common social, religious, ethnic, or ideological ties that could

have naturally bound the group together. The majority of its fighters had been abducted. Brutal

discipline is often not enough to sever social ties in order to prevent desertion, but regular and

widespread atrocities against civilians are. Accordingly, there is evidence that organizations

with a high number of forced recruits are more likely to engage in brutality in order to test and

maintain loyalty. Furthermore, violence against civilians was the cornerstone South African 61

and Rhodesian strategy in creating and initially managing RENAMO in order to destabilize

Mozambique, a strategy Dhlakama and RENAMO leadership presumably would not have 62

independently continued had it not kept the group an effective fighting force. Far from

incidental, violence was essential in maintaining the centralized organization that kept

RENAMO in the field long enough to force FRELIMO to the table.

Did the Contras not engage in such brutality because they had stronger ties to the local

communities they came from? Yes, although this suggests that rebel groups’ actions and

60 As argued by Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (August 2006): 429­447. 61 See again: Weinstein, “Resources and the Information Problem,” and Haer, Banholzer, Ertl, “Create compliance.” 62 J. Hanlon, “Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique” (Oxford, James Currey, 1996), 15; P. Johnson and D. Martin, “Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report” (London, James Currey, 1989).

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behaviors are based on existing social ties in the region. In many cases, however, this 63

argument is simply irrelevant. RENAMO was not influenced by existing social ties, not because

Mozambicans have any less attachment to their communities or ethnicities, but because

RENAMO systematically destroyed the allegiances of their fighters through extreme brutality.

The Contras, having no centralized authority to give orders, predictably did not turn their guns

on their own communities. They were on the whole less organized, less violence, and far less

successful.

My paper has a few policy repercussions. First, I hope to show that popular support for

rebel groups has no effect on their success. We should not see violence that alienates

populations as a sign of weakness. Violent groups are often successful. However, there are 64

two positive policy conclusions we can draw from the examination of these case studies. The

first is that we can think of violent, centralized groups like RENAMO and ISIS as essentially

military organizations operating in a certain territory. Tactics and strategies for defeating

conventional military forces might be applicable for these groups, as opposed to the newer COIN

strategies developed in Afghanistan. Because of their extreme violence, fighters and leaders may

be easier to identify: there is less chance of classic insurgent situations where the entire

population of one village might be tacitly supporting just a few fighters, making them difficult to

root out. Leaders and command structures are much more important to centralized groups, and

thus could present weak spots. Targeting leaders for the Contras or the Taliban would have little

effect on the overall movement, as both were and are based on existing and decentralized social

structures. On the other hand, had the FRELIMO government been able to kill Dhlakama and

63 As argued by Staniland, “Organizing Insurgency.” 64 As argued by Thomas Friedman, “How ISIS drives Muslims from Islam,” NY Times (Dec. 6 2014).

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disrupt RENAMO’s communications, they may have been able to defeat the group militarily.

Second, although violent rebel groups signal their unwavering commitment to resistance

through committing atrocities, the RENAMO example demonstrates that no matter how violent

the group, negotiated settlements can bring a peaceful end to the fighting. Mozambique is a

hopeful example of a lasting peace following a brutal civil war. Leaders of rebel groups, no

matter how violent, can be bought or reasoned with. As in combat the leader is the weak point 65

of the group in negotiations, which means a centrally­organized system can work to the

peacekeepers’ advantage if the leader agrees to a settlement: RENAMO was closer than it had

ever been to capturing Maputo when Dhlakama ordered the lasting ceasefire.

My research suggests that Johnston is correct in arguing that centrally­organized rebel

groups are more successful in civil wars than their decentralized counterparts. Additionally, I

find that extreme violence against civilians is an effective way of building and maintaining this

central organization, as it dramatically shifts the values of recruits away from those of society,

religion, and ethnicity, and towards those of the organization. Extreme violence also has the

benefit of increasing the chances of the government suing for peace and granting significant

concessions. Far from being an incidental occurrence or damaging to popular support, atrocities

against civilians is crucial to the only thing that ultimately matters to a rebel organization:

ensuring a disciplined, centrally­organized group stays in the field long enough to extract

favorable concessions.

65 Dhlakama accepted $300,000 a month in bribes during the negotiations. Saul, “Un/Civil War,” 147.

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