(ORDER LIST: 572 U. S.)

MONDAY, MAY 5, 2014

CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITION

13-788 KOBE PROPERTIES SARL, ET AL. V. CHECKPOINT SYSTEMS, INC.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The

judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for further

consideration in light of Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &

Fitness, Inc., 572 U. S. ___ (2014) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare

Health Management System, Inc., 572 U. S. ___ (2014).

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

13M112 SIMON, IVORY L. V. TERRELL, WARDEN

13M113 DIXON, WILLIAM R. V. MORGAN, WARDEN

The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs

of certiorari out of time are denied.

13-852 FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOC. V. SUNDQUIST, LORAINE

The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this

case expressing the views of the United States.

13-7211 JENNINGS, ROBERT M. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ

The motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel

is granted. Randolph L. Schaffer, Jr., Esquire, of Houston,

Texas, is appointed to serve as counsel for the petitioner

in this case.

13-8844 TAAL, BABOUCAR B. V. ST. MARY'S BANK

13-8887 SHLIKAS, EDWARD G. V. SLM CORP., ET AL.

13-8928 ZHANG, SHUMIN V. CHENG, PAUL P., ET AL.

1

13-8955 JOHNSON, WILLIAM R. V. REGIONS BANK, ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis are denied. Petitioners are allowed until May 27, 2014,

within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and

to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of

this Court.

CERTIORARI GRANTED

13-975 T-MOBILE SOUTH V. ROSWELL, GA

The motion of Competitive Carriers Association for leave to

file a brief as amicus curiae is granted. The petition for a

writ of certiorari is granted.

13-1010 M&G POLYMERS USA, ET AL. V. TACKETT, HOBERT F., ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to

Question 1 presented by the petition.

CERTIORARI DENIED

13-641 PERSON, JOSHUA V. UNITED STATES

13-680 GARCIA-REYES, HOMERO V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.

13-708 MINEMYER, JOHN T. V. R-BOC REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL.

13-712 JACKSON, CLIFTON E., ET AL. V. SEDGWICK CLAIMS MGMT., ET AL.

13-762 BURDEN, MICHELE D. V. SHINSEKI, SEC. OF VA

13-768 AL WARAFI, MUKHTAR V. OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF U.S.

13-827 DRAKE, JOHN M., ET AL. V. JEREJIAN, JUDGE, ETC., ET AL.

13-893 RITCHIE, JONATHAN V. UNITED STATES

13-901 LA CTY. FLOOD CONTROL, ET AL. V. NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL.

13-907 TORRALVA, ARMANDO V. PELOQUIN, HEATH, ET AL.

13-911 FUNDAMENTAL SERVICES, ET AL. V. SPIVERY-JONES, FRANCINA

13-916 ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY V. JACOBSEN, ROBERT

13-992 VODA, JAN K. V. MEDTRONIC, INC., ET AL.

2

13-996 ADELL, KEVIN V. JOHN RICHARDS HOME, ET AL.

13-1020 RICHARDS, DEBORAH J. V. RICHARDS, JUANITA, ET AL.

13-1031 LUCA, SERGIO, ET UX. V. BANK OF AMERICA

13-1043 KELLER, FRED, ET AL. V. FREMONT, NE, ET AL.

13-1046 JASO, OMAR V. COCA-COLA COMPANY, ET AL.

13-1063 RODRIGUEZ, PAULA V. BANK OF NY MELLON, ET AL.

13-1099 EAGLE COVE CAMP & CONF., ET AL. V. WOODBORO, WI, ET AL.

13-1113 BROWN, DANIEL V. VERMONT

13-1131 HAYES, JAMES J. V. HARMONY GOLD MINING CO.

13-1145 LeBLANC, KIM E. V. BELLOW, KRISTIE

13-1168 NORTH PACIFIC ERECTORS V. AK DEPT. OF ADMIN.

13-1182 NUGENT, SUSAN V. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

13-1196 ELLER, GERALD H. V. TRANS UNION, LLC

13-1219 ALVAREZ-AYALA, JOSE L. V. UNITED STATES

13-6870 LAWS, RANDELL V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ

13-7467 ROLLE, VAUGHN V. UNITED STATES

13-8018 HERNANDEZ-MANDUJANO, JOSE L. V. UNITED STATES

13-8042 JIRAK, GENE V. UNITED STATES

13-8221 NGUYEN, NHUONG V. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA

13-8592 GAO, GENBAO V. HI DEPT. OF THE ATT'Y GEN.

13-8835 JOHNSON, ROOSEVELT V. FLORIDA

13-8849 SAUNDERS, CRAIG V. PHILADELPHIA DA OFFICE, ET AL.

13-8859 RINDAHL, RANDY V. McCLOUD, S.C.O., ET AL.

13-8860 STEELE, COLELL B. V. HUNT, SUPT., COLUMBUS

13-8865 CLARK, SEAN A. V. HUMAN RESOURCE ADMIN., ET AL.

13-8867 MERRIEL, TERENCE L. V. CREWS, SEC., FL DOC, ET AL.

13-8870 MATHIS, WILLIE N. V. FLORIDA

13-8872 BARASHKOFF, IVAN V. SEATTLE, WA, ET AL.

3

13-8876 NEAL, RONALD L. V. MARYLAND

13-8877 MIZHIRUMBAY-GUAMAN, JUAN V. NEW YORK

13-8878 MISENHEIMER, BRIAN K. V. HOBBS, DIR., AR DOC

13-8880 THOMPSON, JASON JAVON V. CALIFORNIA

13-8881 LUSICK, DAVID V. PHILADELPHIA, PA, ET AL.

13-8883 RICHARDSON, ERIN V. McDONALD, WARDEN

13-8884 CANTU, VICTOR V. TEXAS

13-8886 SCOTT, DERRICK V. ZERINGUE, BENJAMIN, ET AL.

13-8891 BELL, JESSIE V. LOUISIANA

13-8906 ALVARADO, JAMES V. ILLINOIS

13-8912 ZAVALA, SALVADOR V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ

13-8913 JOSEPH, VONDRA V. TEXAS

13-8918 RUFFIN, MARY V. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT, ET AL.

13-8919 SANTOS, DAVID V. TANNER, WARDEN

13-8921 ALEXANDER, DION D. V. TEXAS

13-8922 BROWN, THOMAS T. V. FLORIDA

13-8924 SMITH, MARVIN B., ET UX. V. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.

13-8929 GERBER, ROBERT G. V. CAMP HOPE, ET AL.

13-8934 ROBINSON, KENNETH V. NORMAN, WARDEN

13-8943 GLOSSIP, RICHARD V. TRAMMELL, WARDEN

13-8946 MAI, HUNG THANH V. CALIFORNIA

13-9019 DESPER, JAMIE P. V. COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS

13-9071 GODETT, DEREK H. V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.

13-9072 GUILLEN, ALBERTO V. MONTANA

13-9084 MARABLE, ORRIN V. ALABAMA

13-9141 BAUMHOFER, WILLIAM S. V. COLVIN, ACTING COMM'R, SOCIAL

13-9148 ELLIS, ROBERT L. V. CALIFORNIA

13-9159 CHACON-TELLO, MARCO V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.

4

13-9179 McCABE, GARY D. V. WASHINGTON

13-9197 SHIELDS, CURTIS V. ILLINOIS

13-9198 HERSHIPS, HOWARD V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.

13-9208 KIDD, LEONARD V. WILLIAMS, WARDEN

13-9251 ROSS, DETRIC V. ILLINOIS

13-9283 GRAHAM, MELVIN V. BRADSHAW, BARBARA

13-9288 STEBBINS, DAVID A. V. UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

13-9290 HEARNS, CLARENCE L. V. CALIFORNIA

13-9296 KRECIC, ANITA V. BROWN, CLARENCE, ET AL.

13-9300 MOORE, ARTIS V. MASTO, ATT'Y GEN. OF NV, ET AL.

13-9301 RUBIO, JORGE A. V. GENEVA VAUGHN, ET AL.

13-9315 COOK, KIM M. V. ALASKA

13-9358 JACOBS, JOHN V. ESTEFAN, EMILIO, ET AL.

13-9417 GONZALEZ, GABRIEL V. VARANO, DAVID, ET AL.

13-9429 LOVEJOY, LAURENCE V. ILLINOIS

13-9437 HENDRY, ROSEMARY B. V. DONAHOE, POSTMASTER GEN.

13-9467 OGEONE, GALINA V. UNITED STATES

13-9468 HOOPER, BRIAN K. V. MINNESOTA

13-9472 NAVAREZ, VIRGIL P. V. SCRIBNER, WARDEN

13-9473 HUNTER, SHANNAKAY M. V. UNITED STATES

13-9475 LANDSDOWN, RONNIE V. UNITED STATES

13-9479 AVILA, HECTOR G. V. SPENCER, COMM'R, MA DOC, ET AL.

13-9482 CENTENO, BRIAN R. V. UNITED STATES

13-9484 McDUFFIE, TODD V. UNITED STATES

13-9485 PHILLIPS, MARK E. V. UNITED STATES

13-9490 TAYLOR, MARCUS R. V. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

13-9495 STRATTON, ROBERT V. COLEMAN, SUPT., FAYETTE, ET AL.

13-9497 ADETILOYE, ADEKUNLE O. V. UNITED STATES

5

13-9501 BABSA-AY, MIKE B. V. SHINSEKI, SEC. OF VA

13-9502 MARQUEZ, ROCKY L. V. UNITED STATES

13-9511 DICKSON, MOSHOOD V. UNITED STATES

13-9514 FLORES-GONZALES, JOSE L. V. UNITED STATES

13-9517 GODBY, WANDA M. V. UNITED STATES

13-9518 HERRERA-RAMOS, JAIME V. UNITED STATES

13-9519 HERNANDEZ-ABRAHAM, MIGUEL A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9520 IGLESIAS, LOURDES V. WAL-MART STORES EAST

13-9521 HODGE, IVAN V. GELB, SUPT., SOUZA-BARANOWSKI

13-9522 RONE, WILLIAM A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9523 CARRERA-CASTRO, FAUSTINO V. UNITED STATES

13-9524 DAY, GREGORY A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9525 SCOTT, MICHAEL K. V. UNITED STATES

13-9530 RASCO, ALFREDO F. V. UNITED STATES

13-9531 HERNANDEZ FLORES, VICTOR R. V. UNITED STATES

13-9533 SANCHEZ-CRUZ, GABRIEL V. UNITED STATES

13-9534 CHEEK, ERIC M. V. UNITED STATES

13-9535 PINEDA-MARTINEZ, CESAR W. V. UNITED STATES

13-9538 PEREZ-REQUENA, ROLANDO I. V. UNITED STATES

13-9540 CROWE, CLAYTON P. V. UNITED STATES

13-9541 DENNIS, KEVIN E. V. UNITED STATES

13-9542 CALDERON-VALDEZ, LESTER A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9544 JACQUES, MARC V. UNITED STATES

13-9545 BACKUS, BRUCE A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9547 BUNN, CURTIS T. V. UNITED STATES

13-9548 AYYUBI, HALIM A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9550 PALMA-PALMA, JUAN C. V. UNITED STATES

13-9557 GALDAMEZ-ESCOBAR, MANUEL A. V. UNITED STATES

6

13-9558 HOOKER, MICHAEL V. UNITED STATES

13-9563 THOMAS, JONATHAN M. V. UNITED STATES

13-9564 SENSI, EDGARDO V. UNITED STATES

13-9565 AUGUSTINE, DENNIS V. UNITED STATES

13-9567 GRAHAM, DAMON V. UNITED STATES

13-9569 MORALES, LUIS E. V. UNITED STATES

13-9570 VERDUGO, MARTIN Y. V. UNITED STATES

13-9571 FILPO, VICTOR V. UNITED STATES

13-9572 SAMANIEGO, JESUS A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9578 GARDNER, SHAWN V. UNITED STATES

13-9581 FOSTER, BRIAN L. V. UNITED STATES

13-9582 HOLMES, CURTIS V. UNITED STATES

13-9588 CORTEZ-DUTRIEVILLE, ANTOINE V. UNITED STATES

13-9595 JIMENEZ, RICARDO V. UNITED STATES

13-9599 NIELSON, WILLIAM R. V. UNITED STATES

13-9606 BROOKS, MARK A. V. UNITED STATES

13-9608 BALLARD, DAVID V. UNITED STATES

13-9616 COLE, KENNETH V. UNITED STATES

13-9623 NEALY, GLEN V. UNITED STATES

13-9625 HARPER, BILLY J. V. UNITED STATES

13-9626 ATKINS, CHRISTOPHER J. V. UNITED STATES

13-9629 REVERIO, JESSE C. V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

13-1115 MARTIN, JAMES L. V. PA BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice

Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this

petition.

7

13-1170 WILLIS, DAVID V. MARCHANT, JASMINE, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice

Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this

petition.

13-1184 COHEN, SAMUEL V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice

Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this

petition.

13-9067 CONCEPCION, ALBERTO V. U. S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER

13-9574 GIBSON, BERNARD V. UNITED STATES

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis are denied, and the petitions for writs of certiorari

are dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioners have

repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed

not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from

petitioners unless the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) are

paid and the petitions are submitted in compliance with Rule

33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506

U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

HABEAS CORPUS DENIED

13-9698 IN RE WILLIE R. BUSH

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly

abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept

any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner

unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the

petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin

8

v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)

(per curiam).

MANDAMUS DENIED

13-9504 IN RE TIRAN R. CASTEEL

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

13-1018 IN RE JESSIE D. McDONALD

The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is

denied.

REHEARINGS DENIED

13-812 JAFFE, ROBERT J. V. PREGERSON, JUDGE, ET AL.

13-855 S. M. V. FL DEPT. OF REVENUE

13-875 LAITY, ROBERT C. V. NEW YORK

13-6459 JOHNSON, PEARL L. V. EDWARDS, LONNIE, ET AL.

13-7567 BITON, CRYSTAL V. LIPPERT, MICHAEL, ET AL.

13-7599 McWILLIAMS, GREGORY D. V. SCHUMACHER, JAMES T., ET AL.

13-7668 YBARRA, AMBER V. HOOTS, LeROY

13-7763 VENZIE, RANDALL K. V. YATAURO, ADM'R, ADULT DIAGNOSTIC

13-7841 TAYLOR, CHANEL E. V. OMEECHEVARRIA, ELISA M.

13-7857 BELL, JACOB M. V. BATSON, DEPUTY WARDEN, ET AL.

13-7872 PETTWAY, JOHN V. CREWS, SEC., FL DOC, ET AL.

13-7888 IN RE CRYSTAL BITON

13-7889 IN RE CRYSTAL BITON

13-7900 BITON, CRYSTAL V. ABRUTYN, MORGAN M., ET AL.

13-7952 KORTE, EUGENE V. MIDLAND FUNDING, ET AL.

13-8227 CHEN, PRI-YA N. V. COLONIUS, ROSAMOND C.

13-8298 SHERRILL, BARBARA E. V. USDC D AZ

13-8355 TOKLEY, DANA T. V. SANTIAGO, ADM'R, NJ, ET AL.

13-8421 BOWEN, CRAIG S. V. GRAMIAK, WARDEN

9

13-8439 DRIESSEN, ROCHELLE V. CITIBANK, N.A.

13-8604 IN RE ULYSSES T. WARE

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

D-2745 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF LESLIEANN HAACKE

LeslieAnn Haacke, of Phoenix, Arizona, having been suspended

from the practice of law in this Court by order of November 12,

2013; and a rule having been issued requiring her to show cause

why she should not be disbarred; and the time to file a response

having expired;

It is ordered that LeslieAnn Haacke is disbarred from the

practice of law in this Court.

D-2747 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF MICHELLE HAMILTON DAVY

Michelle Hamilton Davy, of Forestville, Maryland, having

been suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order

of December 2, 2013; and a rule having been issued requiring her

to show cause why she should not be disbarred; and the time to

file a response having expired;

It is ordered that Michelle Hamilton Davy is disbarred from

the practice of law in this Court.

D-2748 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF GEORGE M. NACHWALTER

George M. Nachwalter, of Miami, Florida, having been

suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of

December 2, 2013; and a rule having been issued and served upon

him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

and the time to file a response having expired;

It is ordered that George M. Nachwalter is disbarred from

the practice of law in this Court.

10

D-2751 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF HUGH D. JAEGER

Hugh D. Jaeger, of Wayzata, Minnesota, having been suspended

from the practice of law in this Court by order of December 9,

2013; and a rule having been issued and served upon him

requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred; and

the time to file a response having expired;

It is ordered that Hugh D. Jaeger is disbarred from the

practice of law in this Court.

D-2752 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF MATTHEW B. MURRAY

Matthew B. Murray, of Charlottesville, Virginia, having been

suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of

December 9, 2013; and a rule having been issued and served upon

him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

and the time to file a response having expired;

It is ordered that Matthew B. Murray is disbarred from the

practice of law in this Court.

D-2753 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF MARTIN J. SIEGEL

Martin J. Siegel, of Pennsville, New Jersey, having been

suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of

December 9, 2013; and a rule having been issued requiring him

to show cause why he should not be disbarred; and the time to

file a response having expired;

It is ordered that Martin J. Siegel is disbarred from the

practice of law in this Court.

D-2754 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF FRANK R. SAIA

Frank R. Saia, of Longmeadow, Massachusetts, having been

suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of

December 9, 2013; and a rule having been issued and served upon

11

him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

and the time to file a response having expired;

It is ordered that Frank R. Saia is disbarred from the

practice of law in this Court.

D-2755 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF RAYMOND VAUGHN PATTON

Raymond Vaughn Patton, of San Ramon, California, having been

suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of

December 9, 2013; and a rule having been issued requiring him to

show cause why he should not be disbarred; and the time to file

a response having expired;

It is ordered that Raymond Vaughn Patton is disbarred from

the practice of law in this Court.

D-2756 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF DANIEL THOMAS McCARTHY

Daniel Thomas McCarthy, of Phoenix, Arizona, having been

suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of

December 9, 2013; and a rule having been issued and served upon

him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

and the time to file a response having expired;

It is ordered that Daniel Thomas McCarthy is disbarred from

the practice of law in this Court.

D-2757 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF NEIL A. MALVONE

Neil A. Malvone, of Milltown, New Jersey, having been

suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of

December 9, 2013; and a rule having been issued and served upon

him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

and the time to file a response having expired;

It is ordered that Neil A. Malvone is disbarred from the

practice of law in this Court.

12

1 Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ROBERT R. TOLAN v. JEFFREY WAYNE COTTON ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–551. Decided May 5, 2014

PER CURIAM. During the early morning hours of New Year’s Eve,

2008, police sergeant Jeffrey Cotton fired three bullets at Robert Tolan; one of those bullets hit its target and punc-tured Tolan’s right lung. At the time of the shooting,Tolan was unarmed on his parents’ front porch about 15 to20 feet away from Cotton. Tolan sued, alleging that Cot-ton had exercised excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judg-ment to Cotton, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that regardless of whether Cotton used excessive force, hewas entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate any clearly established right. 713 F. 3d 299 (2013).In articulating the factual context of the case, the FifthCircuit failed to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferencesare to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986). For that reason, we vacate its decision and remand the case for further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion.

I

A

The following facts, which we view in the light mostfavorable to Tolan, are taken from the record evidence and the opinions below. At around 2:00 on the morning of December 31, 2008, John Edwards, a police officer, was onpatrol in Bellaire, Texas, when he noticed a black Nissan

2 TOLAN v. COTTON

Per Curiam

sport utility vehicle turning quickly onto a residential street. The officer watched the vehicle park on the side ofthe street in front of a house. Two men exited: Tolan and his cousin, Anthony Cooper.

Edwards attempted to enter the license plate number ofthe vehicle into a computer in his squad car. But he keyedan incorrect character; instead of entering plate number 696BGK, he entered 695BGK. That incorrect number matched a stolen vehicle of the same color and make. This match caused the squad car’s computer to send an auto-matic message to other police units, informing them thatEdwards had found a stolen vehicle.

Edwards exited his cruiser, drew his service pistol and ordered Tolan and Cooper to the ground. He accused Tolan and Cooper of having stolen the car. Cooper re-sponded, “That’s not true.” Record 1295. And Tolan ex-plained, “That’s my car.” Ibid. Tolan then complied with the officer’s demand to lie face-down on the home’s front porch.

As it turned out, Tolan and Cooper were at the home where Tolan lived with his parents. Hearing the commo-tion, Tolan’s parents exited the front door in their paja-mas. In an attempt to keep the misunderstanding fromescalating into something more, Tolan’s father instructed Cooper to lie down, and instructed Tolan and Cooper tosay nothing. Tolan and Cooper then remained facedown.

Edwards told Tolan’s parents that he believed Tolan and Cooper had stolen the vehicle. In response, Tolan’s father identified Tolan as his son, and Tolan’s mother explained that the vehicle belonged to the family and that no crime had been committed. Tolan’s father explained, with his hands in the air, “[T]his is my nephew. This is my son. We live here. This is my house.” Id., at 2059. Tolan’s mother similarly offered, “[S]ir this is a big mistake. This car is not stolen. . . . That’s our car.” Id., at 2075.

While Tolan and Cooper continued to lie on the ground

3 Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)

Per Curiam

in silence, Edwards radioed for assistance. Shortly there-after, Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton arrived on the scene anddrew his pistol. Edwards told Cotton that Cooper andTolan had exited a stolen vehicle. Tolan’s mother reiter- ated that she and her husband owned both the car Tolan had been driving and the home where these events were unfolding. Cotton then ordered her to stand against thefamily’s garage door. In response to Cotton’s order, To-lan’s mother asked, “[A]re you kidding me? We’ve lived her[e] 15 years. We’ve never had anything like this hap-pen before.” Id., at 2077; see also id., at 1465.

The parties disagree as to what happened next. Tolan’s mother and Cooper testified during Cotton’s criminal trial1 that Cotton grabbed her arm and slammed her against thegarage door with such force that she fell to the ground. Id., at 2035, 2078–2080. Tolan similarly testified thatCotton pushed his mother against the garage door. Id., at 2479. In addition, Tolan offered testimony from his mother and photographic evidence to demonstrate that Cotton used enough force to leave bruises on her arms and backthat lasted for days. Id., at 2078–2079, 2089–2091. Bycontrast, Cotton testified in his deposition that when he was escorting the mother to the garage, she flipped her arm up and told him to get his hands off her. Id., at 1043. He also testified that he did not know whether he left bruises but believed that he had not. Id., at 1044.

The parties also dispute the manner in which Tolanresponded. Tolan testified in his deposition and duringthe criminal trial that upon seeing his mother being pushed, id., at 1249, he rose to his knees, id., at 1928. Edwards and Cotton testified that Tolan rose to his feet. ——————

1 The events described here led to Cotton’s criminal indictment in Harris County, Texas, for aggravated assault by a public servant. 713 F. 3d 299, 303 (CA5 2013). He was acquitted. Ibid. The testimony of Tolan’s mother during Cotton’s trial is a part of the record in this civilaction. Record 2066–2087.

4 TOLAN v. COTTON

Per Curiam

Id., at 1051–1052, 1121. Both parties agree that Tolan then exclaimed, from

roughly 15 to 20 feet away, 713 F. 3d, at 303, “[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.” Record 1928. The partiesalso agree that Cotton then drew his pistol and fired three shots at Tolan. Tolan and his mother testified that these shots came with no verbal warning. Id., at 2019, 2080. One of the bullets entered Tolan’s chest, collapsing his right lung and piercing his liver. While Tolan survived, he suffered a life-altering injury that disrupted his buddingprofessional baseball career and causes him to experience pain on a daily basis.

B In May 2009, Cooper, Tolan, and Tolan’s parents filed

this suit in the Southern District of Texas, alleging claims under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Tolan claimed, among other things, that Cotton had used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 After discovery, Cotton moved for summary judgment, arguing that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred the suit.That doctrine immunizes government officials from dam-ages suits unless their conduct has violated a clearlyestablished right.

The District Court granted summary judgment to Cot-ton. 854 F. Supp. 2d 444 (SD Tex. 2012). It reasoned that Cotton’s use of force was not unreasonable and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 477–478. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on a different basis. 713 F. 3d 299. It declined to decide whether Cotton’s actions ——————

2 The complaint also alleged that the officers’ actions violated theEqual Protection Clause to the extent they were motivated by Tolan’s and Cooper’s race. 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 465 (SD Tex. 2012). In addi-tion, the complaint alleged that Cotton used excessive force against Tolan’s mother. Id., at 468. Those claims, which were dismissed, id., at 465, 470, are not before this Court.

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violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it held that even if Cotton’s conduct did violate the Fourth Amend-ment, Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity becausehe did not violate a clearly established right. Id., at 306.

In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit began by noting that at the time Cotton shot Tolan, “it was . . . clearly established that an officer had the right to use deadly force if that officer harbored an objective and rea-sonable belief that a suspect presented an ‘immediate threat to [his] safety.’ ” Id., at 306 (quoting Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F. 3d 156, 167 (CA5 2009)). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Tolan failed to overcome the qualified-immunity bar because “an objectively-reasonable officer in Sergeant Cotton’s position could have . . . be-lieved” that Tolan “presented an ‘immediate threat to the safety of the officers.’ ” 713 F. 3d, at 307.3 In support ofthis conclusion, the court relied on the following facts: thefront porch had been “dimly-lit”; Tolan’s mother had “re-fus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm”; and Tolan’swords had amounted to a “verba[l] threa[t].” Ibid. Most critically, the court also relied on the purported fact thatTolan was “moving to intervene in” Cotton’s handling of his mother, id., at 305, and that Cotton therefore could reasonably have feared for his life, id., at 307. Accord-ingly, the court held, Cotton did not violate clearly estab-lished law in shooting Tolan.

The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 538 Fed. Appx. 374 (2013). Three judges voted to grant rehearing.Judge Dennis filed a dissent, contending that the panel opinion “fail[ed] to address evidence that, when viewed in ——————

3 Tolan argues that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the reason-ableness of Sergeant Cotton’s beliefs under the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis rather than the first. See Pet. for Cert. 12, 20. Because we rule in Tolan’s favor on the narrow ground that the Fifth Circuit erred in its application of the summary judgment stand-ard, we express no view as to Tolan’s additional argument.

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the light most favorable to the plaintiff, creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether an objective officer inCotton’s position could have reasonably and objectivelybelieved that [Tolan] posed an immediate, significantthreat of substantial injury to him.” Id., at 377.

II A

In resolving questions of qualified immunity at sum-mary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks whether the facts, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show theofficer’s conduct violated a [federal] right[.]” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). When a plaintiff allegesexcessive force during an investigation or arrest, the federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394 (1989). The inquiry into whether this right was violated requires a balancing of “ ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the gov-ernmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’ ” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8 (1985); see Graham, supra, at 396.

The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysisasks whether the right in question was “clearly estab-lished” at the time of the violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U. S. 730, 739 (2002). Governmental actors are “shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did notviolate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Ibid. “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law” at the time of an incident provided “fair warning”to the defendants “that their alleged [conduct] was uncon-stitutional.” Id., at 741.

Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to

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engage these two prongs. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 236 (2009). But under either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seek-ing summary judgment. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 195, n. 2 (2004) (per curiam); Saucier, supra, at 201; Hope, supra, at 733, n. 1. This is not a rule specific toqualified immunity; it is simply an application of the moregeneral rule that a “judge’s function” at summary judg-ment is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U. S., at 249. Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any materialfact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). In making that determi-nation, a court must view the evidence “in the light mostfavorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, supra, at 255.

Our qualified-immunity cases illustrate the importanceof drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant, evenwhen, as here, a court decides only the clearly-establishedprong of the standard. In cases alleging unreasonable searches or seizures, we have instructed that courts should define the “clearly established” right at issue onthe basis of the “specific context of the case.” Saucier, supra, at 201; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640–641 (1987). Accordingly, courts must take care not to define a case’s “context” in a manner that importsgenuinely disputed factual propositions. See Brosseau, supra, at 195, 198 (inquiring as to whether conduct violatedclearly established law “ ‘in light of the specific context of the case’ ” and construing “facts . . . in a light mostfavorable to” the nonmovant).

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B In holding that Cotton’s actions did not violate clearly

established law, the Fifth Circuit failed to view the evi-dence at summary judgment in the light most favorable to Tolan with respect to the central facts of this case. Byfailing to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual conclusions, the court improperly “weigh[ed] the evidence” and resolved disputed issues in favor of the moving party, Anderson, 477 U. S., at 249.

First, the court relied on its view that at the time of the shooting, the Tolans’ front porch was “dimly-lit.” 713 F. 3d, at 307. The court appears to have drawn this as-sessment from Cotton’s statements in a deposition that when he fired at Tolan, the porch was “ ‘fairly dark,’ ” andlit by a gas lamp that was “ ‘decorative.’ ” Id., at 302. In his own deposition, however, Tolan’s father was asked whether the gas lamp was in fact “more decorative than illuminating.” Record 1552. He said that it was not. Ibid. Moreover, Tolan stated in his deposition that two flood-lights shone on the driveway during the incident, id., at 2496, and Cotton acknowledged that there were two motion-activated lights in front of the house. Id., at 1034. And Tolan confirmed that at the time of the shooting, hewas “not in darkness.” Id., at 2498–2499.

Second, the Fifth Circuit stated that Tolan’s mother “refus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm,” thereby “com-pound[ing]” Cotton’s belief that Tolan “presented an im-mediate threat to the safety of the officers.” 713 F. 3d, at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). But here, too, the court did not credit directly contradictory evidence. Al- though the parties agree that Tolan’s mother repeatedlyinformed officers that Tolan was her son, that she lived in the home in front of which he had parked, and that the vehicle he had been driving belonged to her and her hus-band, there is a dispute as to how calmly she provided this information. Cotton stated during his deposition that

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Tolan’s mother was “very agitated” when she spoke to theofficers. Record 1032–1033. By contrast, Tolan’s mother testified at Cotton’s criminal trial that she was neither “aggravated” nor “agitated.” Id., at 2075, 2077.

Third, the Court concluded that Tolan was “shouting,” 713 F. 3d, at 306, 308, and “verbally threatening” the officer, id., at 307, in the moments before the shooting.The court noted, and the parties agree, that while Cotton was grabbing the arm of his mother, Tolan told Cotton,“[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.” Record 1928. But Tolan testified that he “was not screaming.” Id., at 2544. And a jury could reasonably infer that his words, in con-text, did not amount to a statement of intent to inflict harm. Cf. United States v. White, 258 F. 3d 374, 383 (CA5 2001) (“A threat imports ‘[a] communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm’ ” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1480 (6th ed. 1990))); Morris v. Noe, 672 F. 3d 1185, 1196 (CA10 2012) (inferring that the words “Whywas you talking to Mama that way” did not constitute an“overt threa[t]”). Tolan’s mother testified in Cotton’s criminal trial that he slammed her against a garage doorwith enough force to cause bruising that lasted for days. Record 2078–2079. A jury could well have concluded that a reasonable officer would have heard Tolan’s words not as a threat, but as a son’s plea not to continue any assault ofhis mother.

Fourth, the Fifth Circuit inferred that at the time of the shooting, Tolan was “moving to intervene in SergeantCotton’s” interaction with his mother. 713 F. 3d, at 305; see also id., at 308 (characterizing Tolan’s behavior as “abruptly attempting to approach Sergeant Cotton,”thereby “inflam[ing] an already tense situation”). The court appears to have credited Edwards’ account that at the time of the shooting, Tolan was on both feet “[i]n a crouch” or a “charging position” looking as if he was going to move forward. Record 1121–1122. Tolan testified at

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trial, however, that he was on his knees when Cotton shot him, id., at 1928, a fact corroborated by his mother, id., at 2081. Tolan also testified in his deposition that he “wasn’t going anywhere,” id., at 2502, and emphasized that he did not “jump up,” id., at 2544.

Considered together, these facts lead to the inescapableconclusion that the court below credited the evidence of the party seeking summary judgment and failed properlyto acknowledge key evidence offered by the party opposing that motion. And while “this Court is not equipped tocorrect every perceived error coming from the lower federalcourts,” Boag v. MacDougall 454 U. S. 364, 366 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring), we intervene here because the opinion below reflects a clear misapprehension of sum-mary judgment standards in light of our precedents. Cf. Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 197–198 (summarily reversingdecision in a Fourth Amendment excessive force case “to correct a clear misapprehension of the qualified immunitystandard”); see also Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabili-tative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam) (summarily reversing an opinion that could not “be reconciled with the principles set out” in this Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence).

The witnesses on both sides come to this case with their own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases.It is in part for that reason that genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our adversarial system. Byweighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that atthe summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.

Applying that principle here, the court should haveacknowledged and credited Tolan’s evidence with regardto the lighting, his mother’s demeanor, whether he shouted words that were an overt threat, and his positioning

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during the shooting. This is not to say, of course, thatthese are the only facts that the Fifth Circuit should con-sider, or that no other facts might contribute to the rea-sonableness of the officer’s actions as a matter of law. Nor do we express a view as to whether Cotton’s actions vio-lated clearly established law. We instead vacate the Fifth Circuit’s judgment so that the court can determine whether,when Tolan’s evidence is properly credited and factualinferences are reasonably drawn in his favor, Cotton’sactions violated clearly established law.

* * * The petition for certiorari and the NAACP Legal De-

fense and Educational Fund’s motion to file an amicus curiae brief are granted. The judgment of the UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is vacated,and the case is remanded for further proceedings con-sistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ROBERT R. TOLAN v. JEFFREY WAYNE COTTON ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–551. Decided May 5, 2014

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, con-curring in the judgment.

The Court takes two actions. It grants the petition for awrit of certiorari, and it summarily vacates the judgmentof the Court of Appeals.

The granting of a petition for plenary review is not adecision from which Members of this Court have custom-arily registered dissents, and I do not do so here. I note, however, that the granting of review in this case sets aprecedent that, if followed in other cases, will very sub-stantially alter the Court’s practice. See, e.g., this Court’s Rule 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely grantedwhen the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”); S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D.Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §5.12(c)(3), p. 352(10th ed. 2013) (“[E]rror correction . . . is outside the mainstream of the Court’s functions and . . . not amongthe ‘compelling reasons’ . . . that govern the grant of certiorari”).

In my experience, a substantial percentage of the civil appeals heard each year by the courts of appeals present the question whether the evidence in the summary judg-ment record is just enough or not quite enough to support a grant of summary judgment. The present case falls into that very large category. There is no confusion in the courts of appeals about the standard to be applied inruling on a summary judgment motion, and the Court of Appeals invoked the correct standard here. See 713 F. 3d

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299, 304 (CA5 2013). Thus, the only issue is whether the relevant evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient to support a judgmentfor that party. In the courts of appeals, cases presentingthis question are utterly routine. There is no questionthat this case is important for the parties, but the same istrue for a great many other cases that fall into the same category.

On the merits of the case, while I do not necessarilyagree in all respects with the Court’s characterization of the evidence, I agree that there are genuine issues of material fact and that this is a case in which summaryjudgment should not have been granted.

I therefore concur in the judgment.

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ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JEFFREY BEARD, SECRETARY, CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION, PETITIONER v.

GILBERT R. AGUILAR

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–677. Decided May 5, 2014

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dis-

senting from the denial of certiorari. I dissent from the Court’s decision to deny certiorari.

See Tolan v. Cotton, ante, p. ___ (ALITO, J., concurring in the judgment).

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13-677