OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGNESS AND THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT*

Harvey S t a r r

Department of Government and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies

U n i v e r s i t y of South C a r o l i n a

Paper prepared f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n at the Annual Meeting of the Western P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , S e a t t l e , March 20-23, 1991.

INTRODUCTION

B u i l d i n g on the e a r l i e r work of Most and S t a r r (1989) which uses the

opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s framework as a basis f o r developing the ideas of

f o r e i g n p o l i c y " s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y " and " a l t e r n a t i v e t r i g g e r s " (the l o g i c o f

studying phenomena that i n v o l v e many-to-one mappings and/or one-to-many

mappings), I have begun a p r o j e c t whose aim i s to develop a " l o g i c " and a set

of concepts which w i l l l i n k a v a r i e t y of i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s to a

s i m i l a r v a r i e t y of i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l behaviors. The e v o l u t i o n of the concepts

and theory behind t h i s p r o j e c t is o u t l i n e d in S t a r r (1990, 1991).

Those papers o u t l i n e a set of concepts and a common l o g i c to de a l w i t h

s o c i a l c o n f l i c t and system change at both the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l s ,

drawing on r a t i o n a l choice-expected u t i l i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as w e l l as the

tr a d e o f f s between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l v i a b i l i t y and the resources r e q u i r e d to

insure e i t h e r (or both). One goal of the p r o j e c t is to model i n t e r n a l and

e x t e r n a l forms of mass v i o l e n c e w i t h the same b a s i c s t r u c t u r e . This i n v o l v e s

an examination of the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between r e v o l u t i o n and war u s i n g the

idea of "nice laws" (Most and S t a r r , 1989:chap.5). That i s , a f t e r developing

a common s t r u c t u r e f o r the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of mass v i o l e n c e at e i t h e r the

domestic or i n t e r s t a t e l e v e l s , I would f o l l o w the admonition of Most and S t a r r

to eschew the search f o r general laws and ask under what c o n d i t i o n s would

r e v o l u t i o n s encourage/lead to war (provide opportunity and increase w i l l i n g n e s s ) ;

under what c o n d i t i o n s would wars encourage/lead to r e v o l u t i o n (provide

opportunity and increase w i l l i n g n e s s ) . An overview of the ways in which

r e v o l u t i o n could l e a d to war (rev>war) and the ways in which war c o u l d l e a d to

r e v o l u t i o n (war>rev) i s presented i n S t a r r (1991).

In t h i s paper I wish to focus on the s y n t h e s i z i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s of the

frameworks employed and the models already developed. This w i l l be addressed

2

in a s e c t i o n p r o v i d i n g a b r i e f review of the components of the p r o j e c t as

presented in the e a r l i e r papers. I w i l l then elaborate on the commonalities

between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t that can be drawn from the use of a more

general s o c i a l c o n f l i c t p e r s p e c t i v e . The theme of commonalities w i l l be expanded

through the use of the opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s framework, which w i l l be

o u t l i n e d and a p p l i e d to models of r e v o l u t i o n or c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e and models

of war, e s p e c i a l l y hegemonic or system change war. Focusing on w i l l i n g n e s s , these

commonalities w i l l a l s o be addressed using a general expected u t i l i t y approach.

OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGNESS: A BRIEF DIGRESSION

Fo l l o w i n g the p o s s i b i l i s t p o s i t i o n of the Sprouts, the concept of

opportunity was developed to represent the p o s s i b i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e to any e n t i t y

w i t h i n any environment; that i s , the t o t a l set of environmental c o n s t r a i n t s and

p o s s i b i l i t i e s . As opportunity represented macro-level (environmental and

s t r u c t u r a l ) f a c t o r s , w i l l i n g n e s s represented the choice processes t h a t occur at

the m i c r o - l e v e l ; that i s , the s e l e c t i o n of some b e h a v i o r a l o p t i o n from a range

of a l t e r n a t i v e s . These ideas have been developed from the Sprouts' idea of the

e c o l o g i c a l t r i a d , composed of an e n t i t y , an environment, and the e n t i t y -

environment r e l a t i o n s h i p (see S t a r r and Siverson, 1990; and S t a r r , Forthcoming

f o r d i s c u s s i o n s of the Sproutian framework). As w i t h the e c o l o g i c a l t r i a d ,

opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s r e q u i r e the combination of both structure-environment

and c h o i c e - d e c i s i o n process. Opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s are t h e r e f o r e concerned

w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p s that nest d e c i s i o n makers w i t h i n t h e i r surrounding

environments.

Opportunity has a dual character. One aspect i s p o s s i b i l i s m - - that some

a c t i v i t y must be p h y s i c a l l y , t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y or i n t e l l e c t u a l l y p o s s i b l e ,

a f f e c t i n g the type and amount of i n t e r a c t i o n i n which e n t i t i e s might engage.

Once some o b s t a c l e to p o s s i b i l i t y i s crossed, however, opp o r t u n i t y should be

conceived as a continuous phenomenon, c r e a t i n g a second aspect. That i s ,

i n i t i a l l y some type of c a p a b i l i t y must be created so as to be p a r t of the range

of p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r at l e a s t some members of a s o c i a l system. The second

dimension of oppotunity then i n v o l v e s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of such c a p a b i l i t i e s

across the system.

The concept of w i l l i n g n e s s i s more f a m i l i a r , being c e n t r a l to the study

of d e c i s i o n making and choice. The dynamics of choice are embedded in a d e c i s i o n

maker's images, or d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . W i l l i n g n e s s is r e l a t e d to a

d e c i s i o n maker's c a l c u l a t i o n s of cost and b e n e f i t — advantage and disadvantage.

It is through w i l l i n g n e s s that d e c i s i o n makers recognize o p p o r t u n i t i e s and then

t r a n s l a t e those o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e s that are weighed i n some manner.

Opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s do not create mutually e x c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s .

Anything that a f f e c t s the s t r u c t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the environment(s) w i t h i n

which d e c i s i o n makers must act a l s o a f f e c t s the i n c e n t i v e s t r u c t u r e s f o r those

d e c i s i o n makers. Opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s thus become more than simply

or g a n i z i n g concepts. They take on t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s when we understand

that they describe c o n d i t i o n s that are necessary f o r the occurrence of events.

It is from these two concepts that Most and S t a r r (1989) developed the ideas of

s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y and n i c e laws, and l e d them to i n v e s t i g a t e the s u b s t i t u t i o n of

p o l i c i e s o n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l , the domestic l e v e l , and p o s s i b l e cross l e v e l

r e l a t i o n s h i p s . That d i s c u s s i o n (Most and S t a r r , 1989:chap.5), in t u r n , d i r e c t e d

me towards the concerns o u t l i n e d in the i n t r o d u c t o r y s e c t i o n a b o v e — how

s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y may be used to help solve the puzzle of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between

i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t .

4

A COMMON LOGIC: WHY AND WHAT

A not i n c o n s i d e r a b l e l i t e r a t u r e has been devoted to the complex q u e s t i o n

of the lin k a g e s / c o n n e c t i o n s / c a u s a l s t r u c t u r e between p o l i t i c a l phenomena

occ u r r i n g w i t h i n the borders of n a t i o n - s t a t e s and phenomena o c c u r r i n g beyond

those borders. The paradox r a i s e d i n many studies and reviews concerns the

apparent i n a b i l i t y of sc h o l a r s to demonstrate i n a systematic e m p i r i c a l manner

r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l phenomena that have been suggested

in separate h i s t o r i c a l case s t u d i e s , anecdotal m a t e r i a l , o r the gut f e e l i n g that

we "know" a r e l a t i o n s h i p must e x i s t . The present p r o j e c t seeks to i n v e s t i g a t e

the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l p o l i c y through the use

of models f o c u s i n g on the choices of r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n makers. This p r o j e c t seeks

to develop models a p p l i c a b l e to d e c i s i o n makers who must make choices coping w i t h

the domestic environment while simultaneously coping w i t h the e x t e r n a l

environment, and v i c e v e r s a . 1 These models are, in a d d i t i o n , based on the

assumption that choices in one arena have consequences, intended and unintended,

on the other.

As has been presented in S t a r r (1991), the r e l a t i o n s h i p s set out by the

common l o g i c r e f l e c t a common concern of governmental d e c i s i o n makers w i t h the

" v i a b i l i t y " of the government (Boulding's [1962] term), from e i t h e r i n t e r n a l or

exte r n a l t h r e a t , and how the government responds to that t h r e a t on the b a s i s of

a general governmental " c a p a c i t y " or resources. The modeling of t h i s l i n k a g e

i s based on four components of a common l o g i c (see Most and S t a r r , 1989: chap. 5):

— Ci, a s t a t e ' s ( s t a t e i) defense c a p a c i t y

— Ri, the e x t e r n a l r i s k s the s t a t e faces in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system

— Si, the s t r e n g t h of the government in the face of domestic o p p o s i t i o n

— Ti, the t h r e a t the government faces from domestic sources

Each of these components a f f e c t s the perceptions that d e c i s i o n makers have

of a s t a t e ' s v i a b i l i t y , or s e c u r i t y , and i t s c a p a c i t y (resources) to defend

i t s e l f a g a i n s t i n t e r n a l o p p o s i t i o n or e x t e r n a l t h r e a t . V i a b i l i t y i s gauged on

two l e v e l s : e x t e r n a l r i s k (R) which may have economic as w e l l as m i l i t a r y or

s t r a t e g i c components, and the i n t e r n a l t h r e a t to the v i a b i l i t y of the government

(T), which may have m i l i t a r y , economic, or peaceful p o l i t i c a l dimensions. In

order to respond to the demands placed on the government, or the p o l i t i c a l system

of the s t a t e , the government r e q u i r e s resources. The o v e r a l l c a p a c i t y of the

government to deal w i t h such demands i s r e f l e c t e d i n C and S — the

m i l i t a r y / c o r e c i v e , economic, and p o l i t i c a l resources i t can b r i n g t o bear a g a i n s t

e x t e r n a l challenge o r i n t e r n a l o p p o s i t i o n .

We thus have a set of four concepts which are s u f f i c i e n t l y a b s t r a c t t h a t

they enable the i n v e s t i g a t o r to recognize and avoid the worst e f f e c t s of the

s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y problem, and yet are a l s o " r i c h " in the sense that they overarch

and embrace a number of concrete e m p i r i c a l f a c t o r s which one can observe and

measure. As w i t h the opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s framework, the p o i n t to

recognize i s that i t i s p o s s i b l e to organize things under a common l o g i c , and

begin to i n t e g r a t e what we know.

The c e n t r a l axioms of the f i v e formulations (or models) that were developed

by Most and S t a r r (1989:chap.5) are presented in Figure 1. Governmental goals

are simply d e f i n e d — to promote v i a b i l i t y by maintaining (or i n c r e a s i n g ) O R and

S>T; and/or to assure that the degree to which OR and S>T does not s l i p below

the l e v e l a t t a i n e d at a previous p e r i o d in time. 2

[Figure 1]

6

THE COMMONALITIES OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

Despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n e s t a b l i s h i n g systematic e m p i r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s

between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t in the l i t e r a t u r e , I f e e l t h a t a continued

concern w i t h t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s j u s t i f i e d because o f a b e l i e f t h a t i t i s

p o s s i b l e to uncover the b a s i c contours of a c o n f l i c t p r o c e s s — whether or not

that c o n f l i c t is between n a t i o n - s t a t e s or other types of actors at the sub-state

l e v e l . This view crosses d i s c i p l i n a r y boundaries in a d e s i r e to understand and

map the phenomenon of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t .

Thus, as w i t h James Rule (1988:3) I am concerned w i t h "the problem of

order" i n that s o c i a l c o n f l i c t i s a mechanism by which order i s e s t a b l i s h e d ,

challenged and r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . This can be seen in both the l i t e r a t u r e

presenting t h e o r i e s of r e v o l u t i o n and the l i t e r a t u r e which has developed around

the concept of "general," "hegemonic," or "system change" war. On t h i s broad

b a s i s I wish to use the r e l a t i o n s h i p between domestic and f o r e i g n c o n f l i c t as

a way to study s o c i a l change as w e l l as the more general l i n k a g e s between

i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s ; s o c i a l c o n f l i c t and s o c i a l change can, i n t u r n ,

be used to c o n c e p t u a l i z e the i n t e r n a l - e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p .

The study of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t is indeed capable of s e r v i n g t h i s purpose.

A widely used working d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t can be o f f e r e d . C i t i n g Coser,

Oberschall (1978: 291) presents s o c i a l c o n f l i c t as "a s t r u g g l e over v a l u e s or

claims to s t a t u s , power and scarce resources, i n which the aims of the c o n f l i c t

groups are not only to gain the d e s i r e d value but a l s o to n e u t r a l i z e , i n j u r e or

e l i m i n a t e r i v a l s . " Such a d e f i n i t i o n i s c l e a r l y and e a s i l y a p p l i c a b l e to both

domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t .

On the domestic l e v e l , I w i l l begin w i t h the concept of " c o l l e c t i v e

v i o l e n c e " as a b a s i s f o r moving on to r e v o l u t i o n . Rule (1988: 11) d e f i n e s

c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e as the " d e l i b e r a t e d e s t r u c t i o n of persons or p r o p e r t y by

people a c t i n g together." This is s i m i l a r to the p o s i t i o n taken by E c k s t e i n

(1980: 137) where " c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e i n v o l v e s d e s t r u c t i v e a t t a c k s

by groups w i t h i n a p o l i t i c a l community against i t s regime, a u t h o r i t i e s , or

p o l i c i e s . " R e v o l u t i o n s , E c k s t e i n argues "are the extreme cases of c o l l e c t i v e

p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e , " e x h i b i t i n g the l a r g e s t magnitude ( i n terms of "scope" and

" i n t e n s i t y " ) , and the broadest goals (changing the regime or s o c i e t y ) . "

External c o n f l i c t w i l l be conceptualized i n terms of the e s c a l a t i o n of the

c o n f l i c t process to war. 3 I do not intend on rehearsing the c o m p l e x i t i e s of

c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g war (see i n s t e a d , Most and S t a r r , 1989:chap.4), w i t h the

attendant debates over o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s , degree of l e t h a l i t y ,

etc. The b a s i c n o t i o n of war, as noted i n Most and S t a r r , w i l l i n c l u d e the

f o l l o w i n g components: at l e a s t two p a r t i e s (with at l e a s t one being a s t a t e ) ,

which h o l d c o n f l i c t i n g goals and are aware of those goal i n c o m p a t i b i l i e s , and

are w i l l i n g to use overt, organized m i l i t a r y force to o b t a i n those goals in a

s e r i e s o f connected and temporally concentrated m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s .

The models on which I w i l l focus here are those d e a l i n g w i t h hegemonic or

system change wars-- that is not simply wars between or among major powers, but

those between the c e n t r a l or dominant s t a t e s in the system, and c h a l l e n g e r s to

t h e i r s t a t u s as system l e a d e r s . These are wars which s e t t l e the nature and

d i r e c t i o n of the s t r u c t u r e of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system (e.g. see G i l p i n , 1981:

Modelski and Morgan, 1985; Levy, 1983, 1985; and overviews of p r o j e c t s by Doran,

Organski and Kugler, Modelski and Thompson, in M i d l a r s k y , 1989).

8

While treatments of some form of the revolution-war r e l a t i o n s h i p may be

found in the r e v o l u t i o n l i t e r a t u r e , they do not s p e c i f i c a l l y look at r e v o l u t i o n

and hegemonic war, they are not f u l l y developed, and/or are not f o l l o w e d to a

conclusion which w i l l help solve the puzzle of the i n t e r n a l - e x t e r n a l nexus. Most

importantly they do not act to u n i t e the two forms of c o n f l i c t i n t o a general

framework f o r the study of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t . T i l l y (1985b), however, i s one

scholar has most c l e a r l y moved i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , n o t i n g h i s d e s i r e to look

across l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t (1985b:517-18), and to show that "over much of h i s t o r y

i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic c o n f l i c t have been not merely s i m i l a r but o v e r l a p p i n g ,

even i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e phenomena" (1985b:522).

Note that the d e s i r e to cross l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t in t h i s way is a b a s i c

feature of the Most and S t a r r analyses of the d i f f u s i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

c o n f l i c t ; (e.g. Most and S t a r r 1980), and t h e i r l a t e r ideas concerning

s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y . The need t o t r e a t s o c i a l c o n f l i c t i n the i n t e g r a t e d f a s h i o n

noted above is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the conclusions of Most and S t a r r (1989:99):

I f i n t e r n a t i o n a l behaviors can be a l t e r n a t i v e means that d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s u t i l i z e i n p u r s u i t o f t h e i r (perhaps heterogeneous) n a t i o n a l goals and under at l e a s t c e r t a i n conditions s t a t e s may s u b s t i t u t e one means f o r another, then a l l of the behaviors that tend to be stud i e d in fragmented f a s h i o n need to be conceived and s t u d i e d from the o u t s e t - - not as separate and d i s t i n c t phenomena, the understanding of which w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be i n t e g r a t e d — but r a t h e r as commensurable behaviors of component parts of a b s t r a c t conceptual puzzles.

Commonalities in Components and Processes

The components of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t have been addressed by many s c h o l a r s

(e.g. see Boulding, 1962; M.Deutsch, 1973). Oberschall (1978:291) can be used

to summarize an extensive l i t e r a t u r e when he notes that , " C o n f l i c t r e s u l t s from

purposeful i n t e r a c t i o n among two or more p a r t i e s i n a competitive s e t t i n g . " Yet

T i l l y (1985b: 517) i n d i c a t e s that t h i s most b a s i c concept of c o n f l i c t — the

r e c o g n i t i o n of two or more p a r t i e s i n conscious competition of some s o r t — may

not be taken f o r granted i n some of the l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g w i t h c o n f l i c t w i t h i n

s t a t e s . In t h e i r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of war, Most and S t a r r (1989:chap.4) argue

that the r e c o g n i t i o n of at l e a s t two p a r t i e s is c r u c i a l , in that war as a

c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n must be recognized as the interdependent outcome of the

behavior of two or more a c t o r s . As Simon (1991:chap.1) notes, s o c i a l c o n f l i c t

should make one t h i n k more about the nature of the i n t e r a c t i o n s between a c t o r s

than the nature (that i s , the s i z e or l e v e l of o r g a n i z a t i o n ) of the a c t o r s

themselves.

In a d d i t i o n to war being a r e s u l t of the interdependent outcomes of choice

by at l e a s t two a c t o r s , Most and S t a r r (1989) develop an argument demonstrating

that war cannot occur without both actors possessing both o p p o r t u n i t y and

w i l l i n g n e s s . As a consequence, a major argument presented in Most and S t a r r

(1989:chs.3 and 4) is that such interdependent-outcome phenomena cannot,

l o g i c a l l y , b e explained b y l i n e a r , a d d i t i v e , c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l l y analyzed

combinations of s i n g l e - a c t o r a t t r i b u t e s . As they summarize (1989:98), "While

scholars have focused on i d e n t i f y i n g which f a c t o r s are the determinants of

i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , e q u a l l y important... questions concern how those f a c t o r s

are l o g i c a l l y and c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d to one another and to c o n f l i c t i t s e l f . "

The p o i n t of g r e a t e s t relevance to t h i s p r o j e c t is that r e v o l u t i o n s are

c o n f l i c t phenomena that f u l l y match these observations about war. They are

" r e s u l t a n t s " of interdependent c h o i c e s — at l e a s t two p a r t i e s are needed who

are both w i l l i n g and able to pursue organized v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t in a dominant-

dependent r e l a t i o n s h i p . The f o l l o w i n g comment on the war l i t e r a t u r e i s e q u a l l y

a p p l i c a b l e to much of the r e v o l u t i o n l i t e r a t u r e (Most and S t a r r , 1989:97):

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While many a n a l y s t s have focused on l i n e a r and a d d i t i v e combinations o f f a c t o r s i n t e r n a l t o s t a t e s — " n a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s " — a s p o s s i b l e s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r war [ r e v o l u t i o n ] , the general e x i s t e n c e of such r e l a t i o n s h i p s appears to be l o g i c a l l y precluded by a n a l y s t s ' c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of wars [ r e v o l u t i o n s ] which e n v i s i o n s such phenomena as both interdependent outcomes or r e s u l t a n t s of the a c t i o n s of at l e a s t two s t a t e s [or p a r t i e s — government and o p p o s i t i o n ] and a l s o as occurrences that are fundamentally t i e d to important micro- o r d e c i s i o n - l e v e l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

If these b a s i c components of c o n f l i c t are s i m i l a r , so are the processes

by which c o n f l i c t develops. Both forms of c o n f l i c t are concerned w i t h

" m o b i l i z a t i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n , and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n " ( O b e r s c h a l l , 1978:305) to

support an a c t o r ' s e f f o r t s against some opponent. The c o n f l i c t can e s c a l a t e to

v i o l e n c e , to higher (or broader) l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e or deescalate to stalemate

or r e s o l u t i o n ; (see Rummel, 1979, f o r a lengthy d i s c u s s i o n of the " c o n f l i c t

h e l i x " ) . E s c a l a t i o n may i n v o l v e the expansion of the c o n f l i c t to new areas, or

the a d d i t i o n of new parties/combatants. That i s , d i f f u s i o n processes are

inherent i n s o c i a l c o n f l i c t , a t e i t h e r l e v e l , (see Most, e t . a l . , 1989).

The i n t e r a c t i o n opportunity model developed by Most and S t a r r (see Most

and S t a r r , 1980) can be used to deal w i t h the growth of v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t s at

both l e v e l s . The Most and S t a r r studies a c t u a l l y centered on the d i f f u s i o n of

organized, v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t (not "war" per se). The model that was developed

proposed that p o s i t i v e s p a t i a l d i f f u s i o n would be enhanced by the presence of

v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t ( e i t h e r c i v i l war, large s c a l e c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , o r

i n t e r s t a t e war) i n neighboring s t a t e s .

Basing the l o g i c on e a r l i e r work by Midlarsky and Boulding, Most and S t a r r

argued that the presence of organized v i o l e n c e in a bordering country is h i g h l y

s a l i e n t to i t s neighbors. This s a l i e n c e derives from a newly heightened

u n c e r t a i n t y in the neighboring s t a t e s as to the changing p o l i c i e s of a new

government, p o s s i b l e i d e o l o g i c a l change and i t s i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h e i t h e r a newly

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strengthened or weakened government and s t a t e . This s a l i e n c e a l s o d e r i v e s from

a newly heightened u n c e r t a i n t y in the neighboring s t a t e s as to t h e i r own

v i a b i l i t y or that of t h e i r neighbors. The neighbor must d i s c e r n whether i t has

a newly strengthened or weakened country on i t s borders. In t h i s way the study

o f war d i f f u s i o n , o r the d i f f u s i o n o f v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t , i s h i g h l y r e l e v a n t t o

both the rev>war and war>rev r e l a t i o n s h i p s (see S t a r r , 1991 f o r a f u l l

d i s c u s s i o n ) .

Thus, a s discussed i n S t a r r (1991), i n t e r n a l o r e x t e r n a l v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t

may i n v i t e e s c a l a t i o n / d i f f u s i o n through e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n , whether requested

or not. 4 I n t e r n a l c o a l i t i o n s may grow around the government and i t s primary

o p p o s i t i o n i n the same way that a l l i a n c e s form i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena.

Reinforcement e f f e c t s (Most and S t a r r , 1980) can also operate at e i t h e r l e v e l -

- c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e b e g e t t i n g more c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e w i t h i n the same s t a t e ,

war experiences l e a d i n g the s t a t e i n t o f u r t h e r war experiences; (see Sorokin's

[1957] view on change and v i o l e n c e ) .

Commonalities i n Sources o f C o n f l i c t

Returning t o a b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n f l i c t — that s o c i a l c o n f l i c t d e r i v e s

from i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s between s o c i a l u n i t s of some k i n d — i t i s c l e a r that

there i s a common core of sources to i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t . Governments

face i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s w i t h other governments and w i t h i n t e r n a l o p p o s i t i o n over

"who gets what when and how": "Like war, r e v o l u t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e

a r i s e from ongoing contests f o r resources, i n f l u e n c e , and hegemony p r e v i o u s l y

managed w i t h i n e x i s t i n g d i p l o m a t i c channels" (Aya, 1979:68). I n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t

centers on questions of who has a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n s o c i e t y ; many e x t e r n a l issues

are s i m i l a r l y about a u t h o r i t y , or the t e r r i t o r i a l domain over which governments

can e x e r c i s e sovereignty.

In e i t h e r case, as developed in S t a r r (1991), governments r e q u i r e

resources in order to e x e r c i s e a u t h o r i t y and/or p r o t e c t a u t h o r i t y , and to do so

l e g i t i m a t e l y by s a t i s f y i n g the demands of s o c i e t y . The i n t e r n a l e x t r a c t i o n of

resources may provoke o p p o s i t i o n in a v a r i e t y of ways— i n c r e a s i n g governmental

demands without r e q u i s i t e increases i n b e n e f i t s or governmental performance,

damaging l e g i t i m a c y and the bonds of i n t e g r a t i o n , and i n c r e a s i n g domestic

grievance. 5 E x t e r n a l e x t r a c t i o n leads t o " i n t e r s e c t i o n s " w i t h other s t a t e s

seeking resources (to use Choucri and North's term).

These observations begin to i n d i c a t e the c e n t r a l r o l e played by l a t e r a l

pressure processes f o r both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t . Choucri and North

(1989:295) do warn that "the search f o r resources is only one m a n i f e s t a t i o n of

l a t e r a l pressure," and thus, c o n f l i c t . Nevertheless, they a l s o note (1989:292)

t h a t , " C a p a b i l i t i e s can be increased in two major ways: by drawing upon

a v a i l a b l e technology f o r the development of s p e c i a l i z e d c a p a b i l i t i e s . . . ; and by

bargaining and applying leverages in order to persuade others to a s s i s t or

cooperate w i t h them." As governments apply leverage to i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l

groups they create s i t u a t i o n s o f p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t , i n c l u d i n g p o t e n t i a l v i o l e n t

c o n f l i c t .

Choucri and North i n v e s t i g a t e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the l a t e r a l

pressure process and i n t e r s t a t e war in t h e i r study of the pre-World War I p e r i o d

(1975). David Snyder (1978:505-506) o u t l i n e s an i n t e r n a l form of l a t e r a l

pressure when he observes that as groups m o b i l i z e , they attempt "to apply t h e i r

resources toward a c q u i r i n g c o l l e c t i v e goods... Since such demands l a y c l a i m to

scarce and competitive resources they are o f t e n met by organized r e s i s t a n c e from

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other m o b i l i z e d groups and (most often) from governments v i a t h e i r agents of

o f f i c i a l f o r c e . "

H ighly r e l e v a n t t o the current p r o j e c t i s understanding t h a t l a t e r a l

pressure is c e n t r a l to the whole array of models concerned w i t h hegemonic/system

change wars which are based on the d i f f e r e n t i a l growth of power. L a t e r a l

pressure-type processes are important to changes in "power" as the r e l a t e to the

search f o r resources (and u l t i m a t e l y the m o b i l i z a t i o n and e x t r a c t i o n of those

resources). S i m i l a r l y , as i n t e r n a l groups become d i s s a t i s f i e d they a l s o search

f o r resources, as T i l l y and other exponents of r e s o u r c e - m o b i l i z a t i o n t h e o r i e s

argue. These searches l e a d to c o n f l i c t u a l i n t e r s e c t i o n s , i n v o l v i n g o p p o s i t i o n

groups i n a process of d i f f e r e n t i a l growth of power i n regard to each other (and

thus the process of c o a l i t i o n development and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n ) and to the

government. One might argue that t h i s i s a c e n t r a l theme of Mancur Olson's

(1982) treatment of the r i s e and d e c l i n e of s t a t e s — that we must s t a r t w i t h the

basic premise that s o c i e t i e s w i l l always be comprised of d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups

with d i f f e r e n t resources, i n t e r e s t s and power. These groups w i l l then a l s o grow,

stagnate or d e c l i n e at d i f f e r e n t r a t e s .

The d i f f e r e n t i a l growth of power i s , i n t u r n , important to systemic

change. whether the system is s o c i e t a l or i n t e r n a t i o n a l . Sorokin (1957:534-535)

presents a p i c t u r e of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t which derives from change— change

disorganizes systems, thereby d i s t u r b i n g order and l e a d i n g to v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t .

H a l l i d a y (1990:211) makes the important point that students of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

r e l a t i o n s most o f t e n assume that r e v o l u t i o n s i n d i c a t e breakdown r a t h e r than

t r a n s i t i o n . This is u s e f u l , because system change wars at the i n t e r n a t i o n a l

l e v e l are u s u a l l y not seen as breakdowns, but as mechanisms of t r a n s i t i o n ! (e.g.

see Rosecrance, 1963). 6 Although most s t u d i e s of war do not take r e v o l u t i o n i n t o

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account, they s h o u l d — as r e v o l u t i o n s , l i k e war, are mechanisms by which the

i n e r t i a of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system to major change can be r a p i d l y overcome

(e.g. see Adelman, 1985:197, 208-209).

G i l p i n (1981) c l e a r l y develops the concept of change, and s p e c i f i e s how

i t a f f e c t s the c o n f l i c t process. Changes brought about by d i f f e r e n t i a t e d growth

in power have impacts upon the c o s t - b e n e f i t c a l c u l a t i o n s of both government and

challenger, whether i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l (1981:95): "The c r i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e

of the d i f f e r e n t i a l growth of power among states i s that i t a l t e r s the cost of

changing the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system and therefore the i n c e n t i v e s f o r changing the

i n t e r n a t i o n a l system." Change in power is also c e n t r a l to the Organski and

Kugler (1981) power t r a n s i t i o n model. Changes in resources a f f e c t both the

p h y s i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i e s (opportunity) and the w i l l i n g n e s s to use

them-- to challenge the government, or to be deterred by the po.wer of the

government (see Kugler and Organski, 1989:186).

While there i s a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e of r a t i o n a l choice models

in the a n a l y s i s of r e v o l u t i o n and s o c i a l c o n f l i c t in S t a r r (1990), as an

i n t r o d u c t i o n to the next s e c t i o n , we need only note here that many students of

r e v o l u t i o n and war base t h e i r analyses on the c o s t - b e n e f i t c a l c u l a t i o n s that

challengers make before t a k i n g on a government, c a l c u l a t i o n s that i n c l u d e the

p r o b a b i l i t y of winning. For example, a key to Lichbach's models of c o l l e c t i v e

v i o l e n c e (e.g. 1990), is the c a l c u l a t i o n by oppositions, in t h e i r d e c i s i o n to

challenge governments, on how events or f a c t o r s a f f e c t the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t such

a challenge w i l l indeed succeed. As M u l l e r (1980:97) observes. "More simply and

t r i t e l y put, people r e b e l when they b e l i e v e i t i s r i g h t to r e b e l and that

r e b e l l i o n w i l l pay o f f . "

15

S i m i l a r types of c a l c u l a t i o n s have been found in a v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s .

For example, in a study of the processes by which wars end ( r a t h e r than s t u d y i n g

when groups w i l l i n i t i a t e or enter c o n f l i c t ) , Wittman (1976:759) notes, " I t i s

assumed t h a t , unless both sides b e l i e v e that they can be made b e t t e r o f f by a

settlement, the war w i l l continue." Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990:166)

provide us w i t h a s u c c i n c t summary statement of r a t i o n a l choice c a l c u l a t i o n s f o r

s o c i a l c o n f l i c t :

Assume that d e c i s i o n makers are r a t i o n a l i n the sense t h a t they do what they b e l i e v e i s i n t h e i r best i n t e r e s t . Assume, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t they c a l c u l a t e the expected u t i l i t y associated w i t h c h a l l e n g i n g and not c h a l l e n g i n g a p u t a t i v e adversary... the more they b e l i e v e they stand to gain, the more l i k e l y they are to use force i n p u r s u i t of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s .

Waterman (1981) reviews Gamson's work on the u t i l i t y and i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of

s o c i a l v i o l e n c e . He notes (1981:572) t h a t , "the o v e r a l l c o n c l u s i o n must be t h a t

Gamson i s r i g h t : v i o l e n c e i s u s u a l l y i n t e l l i g e n t l y used, and i t pays."

CHANGE, CHALLENGE AND CALCULATIONS OF UTILITY

Two important works p r o v i d i n g overviews of the t h i n k i n g on r e v o l u t i o n and

c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e are e x p l i c i t l y o r i e n t e d toward r a t i o n a l i t y - b a s e d

explanations, (see a l s o Lichbach's [1989] s e c t i o n on the " R a t i o n a l A c t o r

S c i e n t i f i c Research Program"). Michael Taylor (1988:1) i n d i c a t e s t h a t h i s book

intends "to show that there i s a u s e f u l r o l e f o r ideas and t h e o r i e s of r a t i o n a l

choice i n the study of r e v o l u t i o n and r e b e l l i o n . " James Rule (1988:18) notes

that, "A f u l l understanding of c i v i l v i o l e n c e s u r e l y must de a l w i t h the

i n t e r e s t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s , and w i t h p a r t i c i p a n t s ' judgments as to how such

i n t e r e s t s are engaged i n s t r i f e - t o r n s i t u a t i o n s . " This observation i s r e f l e c t e d

i n the work of many s c h o l a r s , e.g. Eckstein's (1980) d i s c u s s i o n of the

16

"inherency theory" of c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e which depends on s t r a t e g y

and the c o s t - b e n e f i t c a l c u l a t i o n s behind t a c t i c a l choices, or Aya's (1979)

" p o l i t i c a l model" of r e v o l u t i o n , which i s centered on the s t r a t e g i c c o e r c i v e

i n t e r a c t i o n s between c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s .

It is important to note that Rule, a f t e r h i s survey of the t h e o r i e s of

c i v i l v i o l e n c e , concludes that the work of Charles T i l l y i s c e n t r a l to the

understanding of c i v i l v i o l e n c e . T i l l y represents one major t h e o r e t i c a l

perspective on r e v o l u t i o n - - a resource m o b i l i z a t i o n approach as opposed to the

p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y based d e p r i v a t i o n / d i s c o n t e n t approach; (see Davies, 1969; Gurr,

1970 for examples of the l a t t e r ) . More relevant f o r the present d i s c u s s i o n ,

T i l l y ' s work provides important analogues to u t i l i t y - b a s e d t h e o r i e s which have

become c e n t r a l to our t h i n k i n g about system change war.

Robert G i l p i n ' s (1981) theory of hegemonic challenge is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of

a number of theories/models of general, hegemonic, or system change war. His

"framework f o r understanding i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l change" c l e a r l y

demonstrates the r a t i o n a l i t y / u t i l i t y b a s i s of h i s theory (1981:10-11):

1. An i n t e r n a t i o n a l system is s t a b l e ( i . e . , in a s t a t e of e q u i l i b r i u m ) i f n o s t a t e b e l i e v e s i t i s p r o f i t a b l e t o attempt t o change the system.

2. A s t a t e w i l l attempt to change the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i f the expected b e n e f i t s exceed the expected costs ( i . e . , there is an expected net g a i n ) .

3. A s t a t e w i l l seek to change the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system through t e r r i t o r i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and economic expansion u n t i l the marginal costs of f u r t h e r change are equal to or greater than the marginal b e n e f i t s .

4. Once an e q u i l i b r i u m between the costs and b e n e f i t s of f u r t h e r change and expansion is reached, the tendency is f o r the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to r i s e f a s t e r that the economic c a p a c i t y to support the status quo.

17

5. If the d i s e q u i l i b r i u m in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system is not resolved, then the system w i l l be changed, and a new e q u i l i b r i u m r e f l e c t i n g the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of power w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d .

Although there are a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n c e s ( a l l v i g o r o u s l y debated!),

G i l p i n ' s u t i l i t y - b a s e d approach is not d i s s i m i l a r to other approaches based on

d i f f e r e n t i a l rates of power growth, and the s a t i s f a c t i o n or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of

the hegemonic c h a l l e n g e r s a r i s i n g from these d i f f e r e n t growth r a t e s . For

example, d e s c r i b i n g t h e i r work on the power t r a n s i t i o n theory, Kugler and

Organski (1989:172) note that the "power t r a n s i t i o n conceived i n t e r n a t i o n a l

competition as d r i v e n by the p o t e n t i a l net gains that could be accrued from

c o n f l i c t or cooperation. The o b j e c t i v e of nations was not... to maximize power;

rather the o b j e c t i v e was to maximize net gains." They al s o c i t e (1989:182-183)

t h e i r e a r l i e r work demonstrating that challengers would i n i t i a t e h o s t i l i t i e s

only a f t e r surpassing the power of the dominant system actor (and not b e f o r e ) .

T i l l y ' s view of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e — w i t h emphases both on resource

m o b i l i z a t i o n and the purposive c a l c u l u s o f p a r t i c i p a n t s ( T i l l y , 1985a)-- i s

analogous to the u t i l i t y approaches of both Bueno de Mesquita and G i l p i n , and

incorporates both opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s . In a piece l o o k i n g at the

r e l a t i o n s h i p between modernization and r e v o l u t i o n , (1986:47), T i l l y asks a set

o f questions concerning the s t r u c t u r e o f p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which c l o s e l y

m i r r or those used by Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues (1985) in a p p l y i n g h i s

expected u t i l i t y models to domestic p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s : what groups contend f o r

power? what claims do they make on the government? what c a p a c i t y do they have

to mobi l i z e s o c i e t a l resources? 7

T i l l y (e.g. 1986:51-52) sees a p o l i t y as a "set of contenders" i n a manner

analogous to G i l p i n ' s view of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. G i l p i n ' s view (1981:9)

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of the dynamics of challenge are e a s i l y t r a n s l a t a b l e to the domestic s e t t i n g :

"As a consequence, those actors who b e n e f i t most from a change i n the s o c i a l

system and who gain the power to e f f e c t such change w i l l seek to a l t e r the

system i n ways that favor t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . " T i l l y ' s "Model of P o l i t i c a l

C o n f l i c t " is q u i t e s i m i l a r . The "government is an o r g a n i z a t i o n which c o n t r o l s

the p r i n c i p a l concentrated means of c o e r c i o n w i t h i n the p o p u l a t i o n , " i n a manner

analogous to the systemic hegemon. A "contender f o r power is a group w i t h i n the

population which at l e a s t once during some standard p e r i o d a p p l i e s resources to

influence the government." Such a "contender" is G i l p i n ' s " c h a l l e n g e r . "

T i l l y (1986:52) continues: " . . . c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e [hegemonic war] i s

l a r g e l y a by-product of s i t u a t i o n s in which one contender openly l a y s such

claims [ f o r resources] and other contenders (or, e s p e c i a l l y , the government)

r e s i s t those claims; such s i t u a t i o n s occur w i t h p a r t i c u l a r frequency when groups

are a c q u i r i n g or l o s i n g membership [ d i f f e r e n t i a l growth i n power]. . . ; a

contender accumulating such resources outside the c o n t r o l of the government is

l i k e l y to f i n d i t s e l f i n acute c o n f l i c t with the agents of the government."

This a l s o c l o s e l y resembles the Kugler and Organski (1989:174) v e r s i o n of the

hegemonic c h a l l e n g e r :

Challengers are those powerful and d i s s a t i s f i e d great n a t i o n s who have grown in power a f t e r the i m p o s i t i o n of the e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l order. Their e l i t e s face circumstances where the main b e n e f i t s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order have already been a l l o c a t e d . The c o n d i t i o n s f o r c o n f l i c t are present. Peace i s threatened when c h a l l e n g e r s seek to e s t a b l i s h a new place f o r themselves in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, a place to which they b e l i e v e t h e i r i n c r e a s i n g power e n t i t l e s them.

T i l l y ' s contenders are l i k e w i s e i n v o l v e d i n a process o f d i f f e r e n t i a l

power growth, i n c l u d i n g group membership and the a c q u i s i t i o n of other resources.

Because he focuses on resource m o b i l i z a t i o n — f o r both the o p p o s i t i o n group and

the government— T i l l y i s concerned with opportunity i n the form of a c q u i r i n g

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c a p a b i l i t i e s . W i l l i n g n e s s flows from the desire o f o p p o s i t i o n groups, l i k e

G i l p i n ' s c h a l l e n g e r s , to pursue t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r than those of the

hegemon/government.

But w i l l i n g n e s s encompasses more than simply i n t e r e s t s — i t must i n c l u d e

the s u b j e c t i v e expected u t i l i t y o f a t t a i n i n g those i n t e r e s t s through the

balancing of costs and b e n e f i t s . In a statement that n e a t l y t i e s together

opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s , G i l p i n (1981:51) observes: "There have been many

cases throughout h i s t o r y in which s t a t e s have foregone apparent o p p o r t u n i t i e s

to increase t h e i r power because they judged the costs to be too h i g h . " In the

same way, Lichbach's (1987) r a t i o n a l a c t o r model of d i s s e n t emphasizes that

o p p o s i t i o n groups take i n t o account the " r e l a t i v e p r i c e s " and " r e l a t i v e

e f f i c a c y " of d i f f e r e n t t a c t i c s ; (see a l s o Schwartz, 1971:120).

I n sum, T i l l y ' s approach t o c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e s t r o n g l y p a r a l l e l s

G i l p i n ' s view of hegemon-challenger r e l a t i o n s at the l e v e l of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l

system. This can be seen i n Rule's (1988:179) summary of T i l l y ' s r a t i o n a l choice

approach t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n : 1 ) c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n costs something; 2 ) a l l

contenders count c o s t s ; 3) c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n brings b e n e f i t s in the form of

c o l l e c t i v e goods; A) contenders continuously weigh expected c o s t s a g a i n s t

expected b e n e f i t s ; 5) both costs and b e n e f i t s are u n c e r t a i n because (a)

contenders have imperfect i n f o r m a t i o n about the current s t a t e of the p o l i t y and

(b) a l l p a r t i e s engage i n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n .

ORGANIZING MODELS OF VIOLENCE WITH OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGNESS

The opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s framework has the a b i l i t y to order broad

l i t e r a t u r e s , as demonstrated in Most and S t a r r (1989:chap.2) in regard to war.

Much of the above m a t e r i a l has concerned o p p o r t u n i t y — the a v a i l a b i l i t y and

20

a c q u i s i t i o n of resources that permit c e r t a i n forms of behavior. But, as I have

argued in d i s c u s s i o n s on g e o p o l i t i c s (e.g. S t a r r and S i v e r s o n , 1990), the

various p o s s i b i l i t i e s presented by the environment must be p e r c e i v e d and plugged

in t o d e c i s i o n makers' c a l c u l a t i o n s of choice (as i n the u t i l i t y d i s c u s s i o n s

above). Both opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s must be taken i n t o account. G i l p i n ,

(1981: 85; 101; 51) i n d i c a t e s the same requirement f o r o p p o r t u n i t y and

w i l l i n g n e s s a s j o i n t l y necessary f a c t o r s :

The s t r u c t u r e of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i t s e l f g r e a t l y a f f e c t s the c a p a c i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s of a group or s t a t e to t r y to change the system... The great changes in the h i s t o r y of the world have been engineered by those p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y leaders and e l i t e s who. have grasped the s i g n i f i c a n c e of new p o s s i b i l i t i e s and reordered t h e i r s o c i e t i e s to take advantage of such o p p o r t u n i t i e s . . . Although a group or s t a t e may d e s i r e to change the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system in order to advance i t s i n t e r e s t s , the e f f o r t to do so n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s c o s t s ; the group or s t a t e not only must have s u f f i c i e n t resources to meet these costs but a l s o must be w i l l i n g to pay such c o s t s .

Greater a t t e n t i o n was given to w i l l i n g n e s s in S t a r r (1990). There the r o l e

of w i l l i n g n e s s was brought to bear through the use of Theda Skocpol's

s t r u c t u r a l / r e s o u r c e m o b i l i z a t i o n t h e o r i e s , (e.g 1979). In b r i e f , Skocpol (among

others) has been unconvinced by the d e p r i v a t i o n / d i s c o n t e n t t h e o r i s t s — she

argues that intense d i s c o n t e n t i s much more frequent i n h i s t o r y than the rare

event of r e v o l u t i o n . She thus looks f o r the "rare s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t

permit e x i s t i n g discontents t o coalesce i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n " ( T i l l y ,

1984:105). In my terms, w i l l i n g n e s s in the form of discontent is almost always

present. What is r e q u i r e d is the opportunity in the form of resources or

c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r r e v o l u t i o n which are s u f f i c i e n t f o r overthrowing the

considerable power of the government, or at the i n t e r n a t i o n a l systemic l e v e l ,

the considerable power of the hegemon. R e c a l l that G i l p i n at l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y

21

assumes that because of d i f f e r e n t i a l power growth t h e r e ' w i l l always be a r i s i n g

c h a l l e n g e r — a s t a t e w i l l i n g to change the status quo; s i m i l a r l y , some t h e o r i s t s

of r e v o l u t i o n assume that a s u b s t a n t i a l r e s e r v o i r of anti-government d i s c o n t e n t

always e x i s t s .

Notice that we are now able to synthesize the two b r o a d l y competing

perspectives on c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e — p s y c h o l o g i c a l / d e p r i v a t i o n models and

resource m o b i l i z a t i o n models. As Most and S t a r r (1989: e s p e c i a l l y ch.7) argue,

r a r e l y are t h e o r i e s or models f u l l y competing or contending. I n t h i s case both

perspectives on r e v o l u t i o n are needed in that they represent the two c o n d i t i o n s

which are necessary f o r a c t i o n : opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s . While resource

m o b i l i z a t i o n models embody opportunity, d e p r i v a t i o n / d i s c o n t e n t models represent

w i l l i n g n e s s . Both are r e q u i r e d . The question is one of contingency (a primary

theme of Most and S t a r r , 1989): under what c o n d i t i o n s w i l l the o p p o r t u n i t y

threshold be reached, and what r e l a t i o n does t h i s have to the l e v e l s of

w i l l i n g n e s s that e x i s t ; under what c o n d i t i o n s w i l l a w i l l i n g n e s s t h r e s h o l d be

crossed, and what r e l a t i o n does t h i s have to the l e v e l s of o p p o r t u n i t y that

e x i s t . 8

I t should be c l e a r that the l o g i c whose components were in t r o d u c e d above

provides an approach to system change that covers both the G i l p i n and T i l l y

models. The model developed from the work of Most and S t a r r (1989) i n d i c a t e s

that governmental d e c i s i o n makers in each s t a t e operate in an environment which

is p a r t i a l l y defined a t any p o i n t i n time o n the b a s i s o f t h e i r s t a t e ' s

c a p a c i t i e s and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a c i t i e s across other s t a t e s in the system.

This d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a c i t i e s w i t h i n a system "set" a government's v i a b i l i t y

r a t i o s ; i . e . e x t e r n a l l y , a s t a t e ' s C/R r a t i o i s set at any i n i t i a l time p e r i o d ,

i n t e r n a l l y , a government's S/T r a t i o i s set at any i n i t i a l time p e r i o d .

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We can r e c a s t both G i l p i n and T i l l y w i t h i n the terms of the r e v i s e d Most

and S t a r r f o r m u l a t i o n . For example, l e t us look at the e x t e r n a l r a t i o ,

remembering that p a r a l l e l comments cou l d be made about the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n .

D e c i s i o n makers i n some i n i t i a l l y dominant s t a t e may be s a t i s f i e d (Ci may be >

Ri, f o r example), but those i n some other, i n i t i a l l y weak s t a t e may not be

content. Presuming that d e c i s i o n makers i n the l a t t e r s t a t e seek OR, they would

be expected to undertake to increase C (capacity) or decrease R ( r i s k s ) . If

they succeed in e i t h e r or both, then the other s t a t e ' s C/R c o n d i t i o n would be

a l t e r e d and i t , too would begin to act and react ( i n a c l a s s i c s e c u r i t y dilemma-

c o n f l i c t s p i r a l r e l a t i o n s h s i p ) . I f the i n i t i a l l y weak s t a t e succeeds and/or the

i n i t i a l l y dominant s t a t e f a i l s to r e a c t , a "new" power emerges and the system

i s transformed. I f the i n i t i a l l y weak s t a t e keeps going (now pursuing the goal

of becoming c o n t i n u a l l y b e t t e r o f f ) it could replace the dominant s t a t e as

hegemon (or, the o p p o s i t i o n group could replace the government).

In sum, the processes covered by the common l o g i c i n d i c a t e t h a t the "type

of system" i n terms of p o l a r i t y , "anarchy," e t c . , sets i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s , and

may have an impact on the p r o b a b i l i t y of system transformation (what d e c i s i o n

makers are w i l l i n g to do) and the p o s s i b i l i t y of such changes (what they are

capable of a c t u a l l y doing). However, as demonstrated in Most and S t a r r (1989:

e s p e c i a l l y ch.6), m i c r o - l e v e l d e c i s i o n processes should be seen as having

generative e f f e c t s . If d e c i s i o n makers pursue c e r t a i n goals and they are

s u c c e s s f u l in t h e i r p u r s u i t s , systems should be expected to transform in

i n t e l l i g i b l e ways.

The important p o i n t to note at t h i s stage is that o p p o r t u n i t y and

w i l l i n g n e s s and the common l o g i c are capable of d e a l i n g w i t h the e n t i r e range

of governmental behavior in the face of a challenge to governmental v i a b i l i t y .

23

Not only i s t h i s scheme able to uncover patterns i n the d i v e r s e behaviors of

s t a t e s , but a l s o the non-behaviors of s t a t e s (see e s p e c i a l l y P a r t B of Most and

S t a r r , 1989: Table 5.1). That i s , non-action by governments a l e r t s us to

i n v e s t i g a t e whether or not (1) they have the opportunity ( c a p a b i l i t y ) to respond

to a challenge, or (2) they even perceive a challenge to governmental v i a b i l i t y

(e.g. see Figure 4 in S t a r r , 1991). If they do not, there would be no i n c e n t i v e

( w i l l i n g n e s s ) t o take any a c t i o n i n regard t o v i a b i l i t y .

Note a l s o , that as a consequence of the s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y phenomenon,

system transformations could occur w i t h or without organized, c o l l e c t i v e

v i o l e n c e . 9 Governments might use force against e x t e r n a l c h a l l e n g e r s or i n t e r n a l

o p p o s i t i o n groups, but they could f i n d a v a r i e t y of other ways to decrease r i s k s

(R or T). Thus, the a s s e r t i o n s that c e r t a i n types of systems would be more or

l e s s c o n f l i c t u a l or war prone r e a l l y do not f o l l o w . As demonstrated in Most and

S t a r r (1989:ch.6), system s t r u c t u r e s provide a range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and even

a f f e c t the p r o b a b i l i t i e s that some actors w i l l want to change the power

s t r u c t u r e of the system. But such systems do not seem l i k e l y to be strong

determinants of the means by which governments (or o p p o s i t i o n groups) w i l l a ct.

CONCLUSION

As elaborated in t h i s and two previous papers, I am attempting to develop

t o o l s which w i l l be able us to make sense of the i n t e r n a l - e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t

r e l a t i o n s h i p . These t o o l s derive from the b a s i c opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s

framework. They i n c l u d e concepts which have been derived from t h a t b a s i c

framework (such as s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y and "nice laws"), as w e l l as a s e t of models

or formulations that permit the "nesting" of i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l games of

v i a b i l i t y o r s e c u r i t y (see T s e b e l i s , 1990).

If the o p p o r t u n i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s framework is to serve as the conceptual

basis f o r such a p r o j e c t , I needed to i n d i c a t e how it could serve the broad

i n t e g r a t i n g f u n c t i o n s that undergird the p r o j e c t . I had a l s o to i n d i c a t e the

p l a u s i b i l i t y o f a general s o c i a l c o n f l i c t c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , and how i t could

synthesize r e v o l u t i o n and war. This paper, then, was a l i m i t e d e x e r c i s e

demonstrating that the framework and concepts I wish to use p r o v i d e at l e a s t

minimal s y n t h e s i z i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s . The very l a s t l i n e s of S t a r r (1990) convey

the o v e r a l l aims of the p r o j e c t and a l s o h i g h l i g h t the themes and purposes of

t h i s paper:

Hopefully, when t h i s p r o j e c t i s completed we w i l l know more about: — r e v o l u t i o n / c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , w i t h the a b i l i t y t o s y n t h e s i z e "contending" models -general war, with the a b i l i t y to merge models of r e v o l u t i o n and war - s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y (and n i c e laws) - r a t i o n a l approaches to the study of c o n f l i c t -the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s

25

NOTES

* I must repeat the acknowledgments presented in S t a r r (1991): A number of i n d i v i d u a l s have commented on S t a r r (1990) which o u t l i n e d the general concerns and shape of my p r o j e c t on r e v o l u t i o n and war; others have provided comments on t h i s p r o j e c t and suggestions about r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e and f u t u r e research d i r e c t i o n s . In a l p h a b e t i c order I would l i k e to thank them f o r t h e i r thoughts and suggestions: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Mark Lichbach, Roy L i c k l i d e r , Mike McGinnis, Manus M i d l a r s k y , C l i f f Morgan, Karen R a s l e r , Peter Sederberg, and Charles T i l l y . I n a d d i t i o n , Mark Lichbach and I made presentations on "War and R e v o l u t i o n : A D i s c u s s i o n of Research F r o n t i e r s , " a colloquium sponsored by the P o l i t i c a l Science Department at Indiana U n i v e r s i t y , January 10, 1991. I would l i k e to thank those p a r t i c i p a t i n g f o r t h e i r comments, e s p e c i a l l y E l i n o r Ostrom, Michael Squires, and John W i l l i a m s . In a d d i t i o n to general comments, J e f f r e y Hart, Mark Lichbach, Mike McGinnis and Marc Simon were p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l i n d i s c u s s i n g and developing p o t e n t i a l s t r a t e g i e s f o r formal modeling. A l l these colleagues have provided u s e f u l l e s s o n s ; I may have been l e s s apt as a p u p i l . A l l e r r o r s and shortcomings, are, of course, my own.

1. As noted i n S t a r r (1991) the i n i t i a l impetus to t h i s p r o j e c t was a concern f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between "great r e v o l u t i o n s " and the hegemonic or system change wars which are c e n t r a l to the study of long c y c l e s , the power t r a n s i t i o n , or the r i s e and d e c l i n e of great powers. Both the shape of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p and the consequences of each form of c o n f l i c t f o r the other were to be p a r t of the research. However, f o l l o w i n g the arguments of Most and S t a r r I found myself forced to confront broader issues regarding the more general r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e v o l u t i o n and war. T h i s , in t u r n , could be seen as a subset of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e r n a l c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e and various forms of e x t e r n a l v i o l e n c e — the most v i o l e n t form of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e r n a l and ext e r n a l c o n f l i c t . In sum, the u l t i m a t e aim of the p r o j e c t w i l l be to develop a model of the i n t e r n a l - e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t nexus b u i l t upon a common l o g i c , and applied to r e v o l u t i o n (through c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e ) and war as each serves as an agent of change.

2. The f i r s t two of these models are based on u n i f i e d a c t o r assumptions, and are concerned w i t h e x t e r n a l v i a b i l i t y (or the t r a d i t i o n a l meaning of s e c u r i t y as presented by r e a l i s m ) . The t h i r d and f o u r t h models are u n i f i e d a c t o r formulations which deal w i t h i n t e r n a l v i a b i l i t y / s e c u r i t y . The f i f t h model i n t e g r a t e s a l l four to provide a model in which d e c i s i o n makers are p o s i t e d as u n i f i e d but in which they are allowed to pursue any one (or combination) of the o b j e c t i v e s s p e c i f i e d i n the f i r s t four models.

3. I w i l l not, as noted in S t a r r (1990), be concerned w i t h other "dimensions" of e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t , f o r example as i d e n t i f i e d through f a c t o r analyses of event data from the 1950s or e a r l y 1960s (e.g., see Rummel, 1963; Tanter, 1965).

4. Bueno de Mesquita (1983:356), f o r example, notes t h a t , "Indeed, t h i r d p a r t i e s to a c o n f l i c t are o f t e n in a strong p o s i t i o n to a l t e r the expected u t i l i t y estimates o f a d v e r s a r i e s . . . "

26

5. Lee (1990:3) notes that "Revolution thus r e q u i r e s at l e a s t two g r o u p s " — the c h a l l e n g e r and the government/pro-government group. "The r e v o l u t i o n a r y struggle is the process by which these two groups t r y to maximize t h e i r c o n t r o l over the resources, human or m a t e r i a l , i n a s o c i e t y . "

6. Consistent w i t h Rosecrance's view that system change depends on the sources and degree of system disturbance v i s - a - v i s the e x i s t e n c e and e f f i c a c y of systemic r e g u l a t o r s , G i l p i n (1981:13) argues: "In every i n t e r n a t i o n a l system there are c o n t i n u a l occurrences of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes that promise gains or threaten l o s s e s f o r one or another a c t o r . In most cases these p o t e n t i a l gains and l o s s e s are minor, and o n l y incremental adjustments are necessary in order to take account of them... The r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y o f the system i s , i n f a c t , l a r g e l y determined b y i t s c a p a c i t y t o adjust to the demands of actors a f f e c t e d by changing p o l i t i c a l and environmental c o n d i t i o n s . In every system, t h e r e f o r e , a process of d i s e q u i l i b r i u m and adjustment is c o n s t a n t l y t a k i n g p l a c e . " As one example of a number of e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n s , Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990) conclude t h a t war does not c a u s a l l y f o l l o w from any s p e c i f i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of power, but more from the process of change. Most and S t a r r (1989:chap.6) use s i m u l a t i o n to develop an analogous p o i n t .

7. Oberschall (1978:306) s i m i l a r l y summarizes T i l l y ' s concerns: "the number and types of major c o l l e c t i v e actors i n the system, t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s , and the major resources at t h e i r command." Thus, i n summarizing T i l l y , O b e r s c h a l l a l s o discusses those aspects of T i l l y ' s work th a t I f i n d p a r a l l e l to the ideas of Bueno de Mesquita and G i l p i n (see p.306 f o r the G i l p i n analogy a l s o ) .

8. These questions must be asked f o r both the o p p o s i t i o n group and the government. As noted, f o r interdependent outcomes such as war or r e v o l u t i o n , -violence w i l l occur only when both government and c h a l l e n g e r / o p p o s i t i o n have both opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s . In a d d i t i o n , we must keep in mind that as government a c t i o n s a f f e c t an o p p o s i t i o n group's opportunity and w i l l i n g n e s s there w i l l be (intended and unintended) e f f e c t s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e r s ; as o p p o s i t i o n groups take a c t i o n s which a f f e c t the government's o p p o r t u n i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s there w i l l be (intended and unintended) e f f e c t s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e r s . This i s e s p e c i a l l y true o f opportunity a s r e f l e c t e d i n c a p a b i l i t i e s .

9. For a r e l a t i o n s h i p ,

f u l l d i s c u s s i o n o f s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y and the r e v o l u t i o n - w a r see S t a r r (1990).

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