Opinion of the European Copyright Society in relation to ... · 3 [1.6] The Court did not, however,...
Transcript of Opinion of the European Copyright Society in relation to ... · 3 [1.6] The Court did not, however,...
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Opinionofthe
EuropeanCopyrightSociety
inrelationtothependingreferencebeforetheCJEUin
CaseC-476/17,HuttervPelham
1. Background
[1.1] The reference arises from a long-running lawsuit in Germany which has already been
consideredbytheBundesgerichtshof(GermanFederalCourtofJustice)in2008and2012and
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court, Supreme Court in
mattersofconstitutionallaw)in2016.
[1.2]Theunderlyingclaimwasbroughtbythe iconicGermanelectronicmusicpioneers,Kraftwerk.
Theyasserted copyrightandphonogramproducer rightsagainst theunauthorizeduseofa
rhythmic sound fragment of two seconds in a continuous rhythmic sequence of Sabrina
Setlur’ssong“Nurmir”.Thesoundfragmentstemmedfromthepiece“MetallaufMetall”in
Kraftwerk’s1977album“TransEuropaExpress”.In“Nurmir”,thesoundfragmentisslowed
down(by5%)andrepeated.
[1.3] In its first two decisions in theMetall aufMetall saga,1 theBundesgerichtshof had held that
sound sampling fell outside the scope of permitted free use (Article 24 of the
Urheberrechtsgesetz (German Copyright Act)) and amounted to infringement of the
neighbouring right of the phonogram producer if the unauthorized userwould have been
abletoproducethedesiredsoundfragmenthim-orherself.2Inafurtherdecision,theCourt
hadspecified that this criterion requiredanassessmentofwhethera soundproducerwith
average equipment and talent, at the time of unauthorized use,would have been able to
1 ForamoredetaileddiscussionoftheMetallaufMetalldecisionsinGermany,seeRupprechtPodszun,‘Postmoderne Kreativität im Konflikt mit dem Urheberrechtsgesetz und die Annäherung an “fair use”’,Zeitschrift fürUrheber-undMedienrecht2016,606;MatthiasLeistner, ‘Die“MetallaufMetall“-Entscheidung
2 Bundesgerichtshof, Case I ZR 112/06, 20 November 2008, “Metall auf Metall I”, 15, published in:GewerblicherRechtsschutzundUrheberrecht2009,403;and, inEnglish,at(2009)56JournaloftheCopyrightSocietyoftheUSA1017,1034.
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producearecordingwhich,fromtheperspectiveofthetargetaudience,couldbeconsidered
tobeequivalenttotheoriginalsoundfragment.3
[1.4] In its decision in this case, theBundesverfassungsgericht held that the jurisprudence of the
Bundesgerichtshof, according to which in principle even smallest samples of phonograms
reproduce a protected “part” of a phonogram and thus infringe the related rights of
phonogramproducers,isincompatiblewiththefreedomoftheartsasguaranteedbyArticle
5(3), sentence 1, of the Grundgesetz (German Basic Law). The Bundesverfassungsgericht
found that thereought tobe room forartistic sampling,and thatneither thepossibilityof
acquiringalicence(“Getalicenceordonotsample”)4northefreedomtoimitatethesample
by recording similar sounds provide adequate alternatives for the unauthorised
reproduction,distributionandotheruseofsamplesforartisticpurposes.5
[1.5]TheBundesverfassungsgerichtalso foundthatthecriterionadoptedbytheBundesgerichtshof
fortheapplicationofArticle24oftheUrheberrechtsgesetzencroachedupontheguarantee
offreeartisticexpressionbecauseitcreatedtoomuchlegaluncertainty.TheCourtexpressed
thefearthat
“evenincaseswheretheproductionofanequivalentrecordingisnotpossible,artisticcreatorsmayrefrainfromuse–eventhoughthiswouldbepermissibleaccordingtotheapproachoftheGermanFederalCourtofJustice–becausetheeffortnecessarytoprovideevidencethattherewerenoavailablemeanstoproducethesamesoundsandthe legal risk involved appear too big. The criterion based on the feasibility ofproducinganidenticalsoundthushasadeterrenteffectwhichrequiresaparticularlyefficientcontrolinthelightofconstitutionallaw.”6
Asa result, theCourt indicated that thedeterrenteffect thatarises from legaluncertainty
surroundingapermittedusemustbefactoredintotheassessmentof itscompatibilitywith
basicrights.
3 Bundesgerichtshof, Case I ZR 182/11, 13 December 2012, “Metall auf Metall II”, 16, published in:Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2013, 614; and, in English (2017) International Review ofIntellectualPropertyandCompetitionLaw343.
4 Cp.theUScaseofBridgeportMusic,Inc.v.DimensionFilms,410F.3 d792(6thCir.2005);butseeVMGSalsoul,LLCv.Ciccone,824F.3 d871(9thCir.2016).
5 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016,ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513,MetallaufMetall,paragraphs[95]etseq.
6 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016,ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513,MetallaufMetall,”,para.[100].
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[1.6]TheCourtdidnot,however,decidehowthis fairbalancebetweentheproperty interestsand
the artistic interests at stake in this case should be implementeddoctrinally. Rather it left
two possible options, which are now before the Court of Justice: either the freedom of
artisticsamplingistoberealizedviaareadingofthelimitationsandexceptions,inparticular
thequotationright,inlightofthefreedomofthearts(seeinfra,question4),orthatfreedom
istobesecuredviaapurposivereadingoftheexclusiverightsofphonogramproducers.7
[1.8]TheBundesgerichtshof,initsorderforreference,8
(i)reiteratesitsposition,accordingtowhichthereproductionofeventhesmallestpartsofa
phonogram may amount to a reproduction in the sense of Article 2(c) of Directive
2001/29/ECandArticle9(1)(b)ofDirective2006/115/ECaseventhesesmallestpartsofthe
phonogramwouldrepresentthenecessaryinvestmentoftheproducer;
(ii)statesthattheprovisiononpermittedfreeuses(Article24GermanCopyrightAct),which
isdirectlyapplicableonlytocopyrightcases,couldneverthelessbeappliedbyanalogytothe
phonogramproducer'sright,solongasthenewphonogrammaintainedasufficientdistance
fromtheearlierprotectedphonogram;.
(iii)arguesthatthelimitationsandexceptionsprovidedunderArticle5ofDirective2001/29
are not available to the defendant in these proceedings. The requirements of “quotation”
(Article 5(3)(d)), “incidental inclusion” in anotherwork (Article 5(3)(i)) and/or “caricature,
parodyorpastiche”(Article5(3)(k))arenotmetbythedefendant'suseinthisinstance;
(iv)concludesthatthefundamentalrightsprotectedundertheEuropeanUnion’sCharterof
Fundamental Rights (CFR) (Articles 17(2) and 13) do not justify a different decision in this
case.
[1.9]Nevertheless,beforecomingtoafinaldecision,theBundesgerichtshofdecidedtoreferseveral
questions to the CJEU. It did so, in particular, because the exclusive rights of phonogram
producers, as well as the limitations and exceptions to those rights, are harmonised by
Directives2001/29/ECand2006/115/EC.
7 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016,ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513,paragraphs[110]-[111]–MetallaufMetall.
8 BundesgerichtshofcaseIZR115/66,1June2017,“MetallaufMetallI”,15,publishedin:GewerblicherRechtsschutzundUrheberrecht2017,9895-900.ForadetaileddiscussionoftheorderseeOhly,GewerblicherRechtsschutzundUrheberrecht2017,964-969.
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[1.10]TheEuropeanCopyrightSociety,9which isnot fundedbyandhasnoconnectionwitheither
party, comprises a group of scholars expert in European copyright law and offers here its
viewastotheappropriateanswertothosequestions.
2. InterpretationofRightsandExceptionsinthelightoftheCharter
Question6
InwhatwayarethefundamentalrightssetoutintheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropean
Uniontobetaken intoaccountwhenascertainingthescopeofprotectionof theexclusiverightof
the phonogram producer to reproduce (Article2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC) and to distribute
(Article9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115/EC) its phonogram and the scope of the exceptions or
limitations to those rights (Article5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29/EC and Article10(2), first
sentence,ofDirective2006/115/EC)?
Answer
[2.1] EU secondary legislationmust always be interpreted in amanner that ensures compatibility
with the fundamental rights protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EuropeanUnion (CFR). Under Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the EuropeanUnion (TEU), the
CharterhasequivalentstatustothefoundingEUTreaties.Fundamentalrightsaretherefore
always relevantwhen theCourt,or aMemberState court, seeks toestablisheither (i) the
scopeofaphonogramproducer’sreproductionanddistributionrightsor(ii)thescopeofthe
exceptionsorlimitationstothoserights.
[2.2]TheCourthasalreadyrecognisedthat theCharter rightsare relevant to the interpretationof
the scope of the exclusive rights provided for authors (Case C-160/15, GS Media BV
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, [44]-[46])andtothe interpretation,andapplication,ofexceptionsand
limitations to those rights (C-201/13, Deckmyn ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, [25]-[32])10.
Fundamentalrightsmustalsoberelevanttoequivalentassessmentsinthecaseofprotected
9www.europeancopyrightsociety.org
10 SeeformoredetailsontheinterpretationofexceptionsandlimitationstocopyrightinaccordancewiththeCharter,inparticularfreedomofexpression,thepreviousOpinionoftheEuropeanCopyrightSociety,LimitationsandExceptionsasKeyElementsoftheLegalFrameworkforCopyrightintheEuropeanUnion–OpinionoftheEuropeanCopyrightSocietyontheJudgmentoftheCJEUinCaseC-201/13Deckmyn(2015)_46InternationalReviewofIntellectualPropertyandCompetitionLaw93;andwww.europeancopyrightsociety.org
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rightsrelatedtocopyright, includingtherightsofphonogramproducers.Ininterpretingthe
legislativeacquisoncopyrightandrelatedrights,theCourthasrepeatedlynotedtheneedto
ensurea“fairbalance”betweencompetingrights(see,forexample,C-275/06,Promusicae,
ECLI:EU:C:2008:54;C-201/13,DeckmynECLI:EU:C:2014:2132[27]).
[2.3]Onfactssuchas thoseunderconsiderationhere,11 themostobviously relevantCharter rights
are, in support of the phonogram producer,12 the right of property (including the right of
intellectual property) (CFR, Art 17) and, in support of the user of the phonogram, the
freedomofthearts(CFR,Art13).Therightoffreedomofexpressionandinformation(CFR,
Art11)supportsthe interestsofboththeuserof thephonogramandtheaudienceforthe
newmusicalworkcontainingasamplefromthephonogram.13Thescopeoftheserightsisto
be interpreted inaccordancewithequivalentrights in theEuropeanConventiononHuman
RightsandinaccordancewithconstitutionaltraditionscommontoMemberStates.14
[2.4]Inthenationalproceedings,theBundesverfassungsgerichtdecidedthatafairbalancebetween
competing rightswouldnotbeachieved through theapplicationofa ruleunderwhich the
unlicenseduseofaverysmallsampleofaphonogramwillinfringetheexclusiverightsinthat
phonogram.Inparticular,itheldthatsucharulewouldviolatethefreedomofartisticactivity
underArticle5oftheGrundgesetz(GermanBasicLaw).Anassessmentofthe“fairbalance”
betweencompetingCharterrightsinacasesuchasthisleadsustoconcludethatthesame
outcomeoughtalsotobereachedinEuropeanUnionlaw.
11 QuestionsrelatingtothenatureoftherelationshipbetweenthecopyrightacquisandthefundamentalrightsprotectedundertheCharterhavealsobeenreferredtotheCourtbytheBundesgerichtshofinC-469/17FunkeMedienNRWGmbH(referenceof4August2017)andC-516/17SpiegelOnline(referenceof25August2017).
12 Forthesakeofclarity,itshouldbenotedthattheEuropeanUnion’slegalsystemalsorecognisesdistinctlytherightsofthecomposerinthemusicalwork,andtherightsofperformerswhoseworksareembodiedintherecordings,andnationallaws,whileinternationallawsrequireMemberstatestorecognisethemoralrightsofcomposers(asauthors)andperformers.Here,theCourtissolelyconcernedwiththerightsgrantedtophonogramproducers.
13 Boththeright-holderinthephonogramandthepersonusingthesampleofthephonogrammightconceivablyalsobeentitledtorelyontherighttoconductabusinessunderArt16,CFR.However,suchreliancewouldbeunlikelytoshiftthebalancebetweencompetinginterestsdescribedbelow.
14 CFR,Art52(3),(4).
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[2.5]Creativeexpression,encompassing the right toaccesscreativeexpression, isprotectedunder
bothArticles11and13of theCharter.15 Onfactssuchasthoseat issuehere, thoserights
weighheavily in thebalance.Thesamplingofextracts fromphonograms in thecreationof
newmusicalworksisacontemporaryculturalformofacknowledgedsignificance16.Valuable
creative activity would be deterred if (i) short samples could only be used with the
permissionoftheright-holderinthephonogramand/or(ii)sampleshadtoberecreatedab
initio by the user. In such circumstances, harm to the public interest in access to culture
wouldoccur.
[2.6]Bycontrast,thephonogramproducer’sclaimbasedontherightofproperty(includingtheright
of intellectual property) underArticle 17 of the Charter is less compelling in this instance.
The rightofpropertymustalwaysbeexercised inaccordancewith its social function.17On
facts such as those at issuehere, the essenceof the right of property is not affected. The
right-holderwillsufferminimal,ifany,economicharmasaresultoftheuseofaverysmall
15 Todate,limitedguidanceisavailableontheinterpretationofthefreedomoftheartsundertheCFR.SeeSPeersetal,TheEUCharterofFundamentalRights:aCommentary(HartPublishing,2014)380.Onitsscopeininternational,regionalhumanrightsinstrumentsandinnationalconstitutions,seeChristopheGeiger,FreedomofArtisticCreativityandCopyrightLaw:ACompatibleCombination?,CentreforInternationalIntellectualPropertyStudiesResearchPaperNo.2017-08;8/3U.C.IrvineL.Rev.(forthcoming2018),availableathttps://ssrn.com/abstract=3053980
16 Onthehistoryofmusicalsampling(aswellasitscopyrightimplications),seetheinterestingearlyarticlebyRobertM.Szymanski,‘AudioPastiche:DigitalSampling,IntermediateCopying,FairUse’,(1996)3(2)UCLAEnt.L.Rev.273;InesDuhanic,‘CopythisSound!TheCulturalImportanceofSamplingforHipHopMusicinCopyrightLaw-ACopyrightLawAnalysisoftheSamplingDecisionoftheGermanFederalConstitutionalCourt’,11GRURINT.1007,1008(2016)(asthisauthorrightlyputsit,“nosampling,noHipHop.Andthatwouldbeunacceptableforademocraticsocietygovernedbytheruleoflawandtheresultingfreedomforartiststoexpressthemselvesartistically”);OlufunmilayoB.Arewa,‘FromJ.C.BachtoHipHop:MusicalBorrowing,CopyrightandCulturalContext,’(2006)84N.CarolinaL.Rev.547(2006);DavidSanjek,‘“Don’tHavetoDJNoMore”Samplingandthe“AutonomousCreator”’,(1992)10CardozoArts&Ent.L.J.607(1992);ChristopheGeiger,FreedomofArtisticCreativityandCopyrightLaw:ACompatibleCombination?,supran.14.Fordetailedstudies,seeJOkpaluba,Digitisation,CultureandCopyright:DigitalSampling,ACaseStudy(PhD,King’sCollege,UniversityofLondon,2000);KembrewMcLeod&PeterDiCola,CreativeLicense:TheLawandCultureofDigitalSampling(2011)(ethnographicstudy).Foradiscussionofdifferentformsofsampling,seeD.M.Morrison,‘BridgeportRedux:DigitalSamplingandAudienceRecoding,’(2008)19FordhamIntellectualProperty,MediaandEntertainmentLawJournal75.
17For further discussion of a limited nature of the right to property in general and intellectual property inparticular,seeAlexanderPeukert, ‘TheFundamentalRightto(Intellectual)PropertyandtheDiscretionoftheLegislature’, inC.Geiger (ed.),ResearchHandbookonHumanRights and Intellectual Property (2015) 132; J.GriffithsandL.McDonagh,‘FundamentalRightsandEuropeanIPLaw:thecaseofArt.17(2)oftheEUCharter,’inCGeiger(ed.),ConstructingEuropeanIntellectualProperty:AchievementsandNewPerspectives,(2913)75;ChristopheGeiger, ‘TheSocialFunctionof IntellectualPropertyRights,orhowEthicscanInfluencetheShapeandUseofIPLaw,’inGDinwoodie(ed.),IntellectualPropertyLaw:MethodsandPerspectives(2013)153.
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extract from a protected phonogram as a sample in a subsequent musical work.
Consequently, the Court should conclude that a fair balance between competing
fundamentalrightswillonlybesecuredifsuchsamplingofverysmallextractsispermitted.
[2.7]Onthisbasis,theCourtcanensurecompatibilitywiththeCharterby(i)interpretingthescope
oftherightsofaphonogramproducerasexcludingtheirapplicationincasesofsamplingof
short extracts and/or (ii) interpreting the quotation exception under Article5(3)(d) of
Directive 2001/29/EC as covering such sampling activity. The former approach avoids a
situationinwhichtheuserofaphonogramwouldberequiredtoprovethattheuseofavery
smallextractiscoveredbyanexceptionorlimitation.Inasituationinwhichtheapplication
of theCharter favours creative freedom, suchan incidenceof theburdenofproofmaybe
inappropriate.Asindicatedabove,theBundesverfassungsgerichthighlightedtheriskoflegal
uncertainty having a chilling effect on artistic creativity in this case.A solutionbasedon a
restrictive interpretation of the exclusive right of phonogram producersmight have some
advantages from this perspective. It relieves sound samplers of the legal uncertainty that
may arise from the obligation to convince a judge of the applicability of an exception or
limitation.
3. TheMeaningof‘Part’and‘Copy’
Questions1and2
Question1: Isthereaninfringementofthephonogramproducer’sexclusiverightunderArticle2(c)
ofDirective2001/29/ECtoreproduceitsphonogramifveryshortaudiosnatchesaretakenfromits
phonogramandtransferredtoanotherphonogram?
[3.1] In the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof, the subject matter of the exclusive rights of the
phonogram producer is not the phonogram itself but the economic, organizational and
technical effort to produce the first fixation, in other words, the investment into this
product.18Althoughthisapproachcorrectlyidentifiesthepurposeoftherightsofphonogram
producers,itisnotinlinewiththeclearwordingofArticle2(c)ofDirective2001/29/EC)and
Article9(1)(b)ofDirective2006/115/EC.Theseprovisionssetout thatMemberStatesshall
18 Bundesgerichtshof, Request for a preliminary ruling, Pelham GmbH and others, Case C-476/17,paragraph[18].
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providefortheexclusivereproductionanddistributionright“forphonogramproducers,[in
respect] of their phonograms”. Correspondingly, recital 10, second sentence, of Directive
2001/29/EC provides that the investment required “to produce products such as
phonograms”isconsiderable.Thus,andincontrasttothesuigeneris(sic!)rightfordatabase
producers, the related rightofphonogramproducersdoesnotattach to the investment in
thephonogram,buttotheendproductassuch.19TheBundesgerichtshof thereforeasks, in
essence,whatconstitutesaprotected“part…of[a]phonogram”accordingtoArticle2(c)of
Directive 2001/29/EC. This question resembles the issue posed in the Infopaq case with
regardtoprotectedpartsof“works”underArt.2(a)ofDirective2001/29/EC.20
[3.2] In providing a definition of a “part of a phonogram” in the sense of Art. 2(c) of Directive
2001/29/EC, theCourt should takenoteof theprovisionsof international law.Neither the
Rome Convention,21 nor theWIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty,22 refer to “partial”
reproductionofphonograms.RatherliketheBerneConventiononauthorsrights,23thetwo
Conventions leavethedeterminationof thethresholdof liability toMemberStates.Having
said that, it is clear from the proceedings of the WIPO 1996 Treaty (where there was a
proposalto introducearighttocontrol ‘modifications’) thatmanyMemberStatesconsider
19 Article3(b)oftheRomeConventiondefinesaphonogramasanexclusivelyauralfixationofsoundsofaperformanceorofothersounds;whichArticle2(b)oftheWIPOPerformersandPhonogramsTreatydefinesaphonogramaseitherafixationofsoundsofaperformance,orofothersoundsorofarepresentationofsounds.
20 Case C-5/08 Infopaq International, ECLI:EU:C:2009:465, [2009] ECR I-6569, paragraphs [30] et seq.;Leistner,GRUR2016,772(775).
21 RomeConventionfortheProtectionofPerformers,ProducersofPhonogramsandBroadcastingOrganisations,Art10(„Producersofphonogramsshallenjoytherighttoauthorizeorprohibitthedirectorindirectreproductionoftheirphonograms.“)(athttp://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=289757)DuringtheDiplomaticConference,aBelgianproposalexplicitlytoextendthewordingofthereproductionrighttocoverpartialreproductionwasrejected.
22 WIPOPerformersandPhonogramsTreaty,Art11(„Producersofphonogramsshallenjoytheexclusiverightofauthorizingthedirectorindirectreproductionoftheirphonograms,inanymannerorform„)(athttp://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295578)
23 SamRicketson&JaneCGinsburg,TheBerneConventionandBeyond,(Oxford:OUP,2006),[11.26],644(„Bernedoesnotdictatethestandardforfindinginfringement.Itdoesnotinstructmemberstatesastowhetherthereisathresholdofsubstantialitythatthedefendant’scopyingmustcrossbeforeitcanbeheldliable“)
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aninfringementoftherightsinaphonogramtooccuronlywherethereisareproductionofa
‘substantialpart’thereof.24
[3.3]Nevertheless,theGenevaPhonogramsConvention(GPC),towhichmostEUMemberStatesare
bound,offerssomeguidance.25AccordingtoArticle2oftheGPC,eachContractingStateshall
protectproducersofphonogramswhoarenationalsofotherContractingStatesagainstthe
making of duplicates without the consent of the producer and against the importation of
such duplicates, provided that any such making or importation is for the purpose of
distribution to thepublic,andagainst thedistributionof suchduplicates to thepublic.The
crucialnotionof“duplicate”isdefinedinArticle1(c)oftheGPCasfollows:
“For the purposes of this Convention, ‘duplicate’ means an article which contains
sounds takendirectly or indirectly froma phonogramandwhich embodies all or a
substantialpartofthesoundsfixedinthatphonogram”.26
WhereasitistruethatArt.7(1)GPCproclaimsthattheGPCshallinnowaybeinterpretedas
limitingorprejudicingtheprotectionotherwisesecuredtoproducersofphonogramsunder
anydomesticlaw,theCourtofJusticeshould,forthefollowingreasons,interpret“part…of
aphonogram”inlightofArticle1(c)oftheGPC.
[3.4] Firstly, the GPC attaches, like EU copyright law, to the phonogram and thus the fixation of
sounds (and not the investment). Secondly, using Art. 1(c) GPC as a point of reference
guarantees that EU copyright law is interpreted in conformity with relevant international
24 RecordsoftheDiplomaticConferenceonCertainCopyrightandNeighbouringRights,Geneva1996(Geneva:WIPO,1999),Vol2,665,[228],[230],[232],[235](discussionofproposedArticles8and15,9Dec1996).
25 ConventionfortheProtectionofProducersofPhonogramsAgainstUnauthorizedDuplicationofTheirPhonograms(1971),http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=288582#P61_6005.
26 Bundesgerichtshof, Request for a preliminary ruling, Pelham GmbH and others, Case C-476/17,paragraph [16]. See further 'ReportPresentedby theGeneralRapporteur,'paragraph [40], inRecordsof theInternational Conference of States on the Protection of Phonograms, Geneva, October 18 to 29, 1971(WIPO/UNESCO,1975)35,38(substantialityexpressesaqualitative,notjustaquantitative,assessment;inthisrespect 'quite a small part may be substantial'); Commentary on the Draft Convention (adopted by theCommitteeofGovernmentalExperts),Phon.2/4,[55],ibid,159,167(givingasexampleofapartcomprisingawhole track); Summary Minutes (Main Commission), paragraphs [668]-[688.1] in ibid, 74, at 101-103(discussingthedrafttext,andadoptingtheterm'substantial'toensurethereproductionofatrackfromanLPwas covered) and [918.3], [923]-[937] at 126-7 (deciding not to re-open discussion of the requirement ofsubstantiality);WIPOGuidetotheRomeConventionandPhonogramsConvention(Geneva:WIPO,1981)97-98(accessible online at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/617/wipo_pub_617.pdf) (’nationallawsandcourtshavethefinaldecisionwhenasufficientpartistakentomakethisdamageareality.’)
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law.27Thirdly,theapplicationoftheGPCthresholdof“substantiality”wouldallowtheCourt
of Justice to subject the related right of phonogram producers, like any other intellectual
property right, including in particular copyright, to a minimum requirement of protection
that reflects the purpose of the respective right.28 Derogations from the principle of free
movementandlimitationsontheexerciseoffundamentalrights(suchasthefreedomofthe
arts) through intellectual property rights are permitted only to the extent that they are
justified for the purpose of safeguarding the specific subject-matter of the intellectual
propertyconcerned.Arightholderisnotguaranteedtheopportunitytodemandthehighest
possible remuneration.29 To this end, the Court could extrapolate from its jurisprudence
regardingArticle7(1)oftheDatabaseDirective.30Whereasthepointofattachmentofthesui
generisrightindatabasesandtherelatedrightsofphonogramproducersdiffer(investmentv
phonogram), the purpose of both rights is the same: databases like phonograms require
substantial investment, and the possibility of recouping that “especially high and risky”
investment can be effectively guaranteed only through adequate legal protection of the
right-holders concerned.31 According to Article 7(1) of the Database Directive, 96/9/EC,
“MemberStatesshallprovideforarightforthemakerofadatabasewhichshowsthatthere
hasbeenqualitativelyand/orquantitativelyasubstantialinvestmentineithertheobtaining,
verification or presentation of the contents.” As the Court held in The British Horseracing
Board Ltd and Others, this threshold implies “significant human, technical or financial
investment”.32
[3.5] In contrast to the suggestionof theBundesgerichtshof in its request for a preliminary ruling,
every sample of a phonogram does not automatically represent a quantitatively or
27 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016,ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513,paragraph[111]–MetallaufMetall.
28 v. Ungern-Sternberg, GRUR 2014, 209 (216); Hoeren, MMR 2009, 253 (257); contraBundesgerichtshof,Requestforapreliminaryruling,PelhamGmbHandothers,CaseC-476/17,paragraph[19].
29 CJEU Joined casesC-403/08andC-429/08,FootballAssociationPremier LeagueandKarenMurphy,ECLI:EU:C:2011:631,paragraphs[106],[108].
30 Ohly,GRUR2017,964(966).
31 Directive96/9/EC,Recital40;Directive2001/29/EC,recitals4s.1,10s.2;Directive2006/115,recital5.
32 CaseC-203/02,TheBritishHorseracingBoard LtdandOthers vWilliamHillOrganization Ltd [2004]ECRI-10415,paragraph[71].
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qualitatively substantial investment in the aforementioned sense.33 In the light of the
available digital technologies for the recording and mixing of audio tracks, it is factually
incorrecttoassumethatevery independentlyrecordedaudiotrack, letaloneatwosecond
sound sample of such an audio track, requires significant human, technical or financial
investment. Whether that is so depends upon the circumstances of the case, taking into
accountboththeplaintiff’sandthedefendant’sphonogram:
[3.6] Furthermore, Article 7(1) of the Database Directive demonstrates that the requirement of a
“substantial investment” not only informs the decision whether a part of a phonogram
qualifies for protection in the first place, but also the scope of the rights in a protected
phonogram.Anextractionand/orre-utilizationofthecontentsofaprotecteddatabasewill
infringeonly if thisuseconcerns“thewholeor…asubstantialpart,evaluatedqualitatively
and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database” (Database Directive, 96/9/EC, Art
7.1). As the Court of Justice has explained, a user extracts and/or re-utilises such a
quantitativelyorqualitativelysignificantpartofthecontentsofadatabase“iftheinvestment
intheextractedorre-utilisedpartis,proportionately,…substantial”.34Iftherulesthathave
evolvedinthefieldofdatabaseprotectionaretakenasareferencepointfordealingwiththe
corresponding question of protecting investment in a phonogram, it may be said that a
protected phonogram is reproduced in part only if the copying free-rides on a substantial
investment. It is thusmistaken automatically to equate a short samplewith the complete
phonogram.35Again,everythingdependsuponthecircumstancesofthecase.
[3.7] The approach advocated by the Bundesgerichtshof also ignores the concrete effects of the
sampleontheprotectedinterestsofthephonogramproducerinthecaseathandandthus
fails to take intoaccount thepurposeof the related right inquestion.Thispurpose isonly
affected if a reproduction and/or distribution of a part of a phonogram prevents the
phonogram producer from recouping a substantial investment.36 In this regard, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht,initsdecisioninthiscaseof31May2016,requiredafindingthat
33 ContraBundesgerichtshof,Requestforapreliminaryruling,PelhamGmbHandothers,CaseC-476/17,paragraph[18].
34 CaseC-203/02,TheBritishHorseracingBoard LtdandOthers vWilliamHillOrganization Ltd [2004]ECRI-10415,paragraphs[69]-[71].
35 ContraBundesgerichtshof,Requestforapreliminaryruling,PelhamGmbHandothers,CaseC-476/17,paragraph[18].
36 Supranote31(recitals).
12
the use of the sample significantly prejudices the economic interests of the phonogram
producerbythreateningtoreducethenumberofsales/licensesoftheoriginal.37This,inturn,
isonlythecaseifthesamplesubstitutesfortheoriginalphonogram.38
[3.8] Because such a substitutive effect will be rare in the case of a short sample, a purposive
interpretationoftheconceptof“part”ofa“phonogram”willensurealsothatafairbalance
isstruckbetweenthefundamentalrighttointellectualproperty(CFR,Art.17(2)CFR)andthe
fundamentalrighttoartisticfreedom(CFR,Art.13firstsentence).
[3.9] Sampling ought to encroach upon the exclusive rights of a phonogram producer only if it
significantly prejudices the economic interests of the right holder, i.e. if it prejudices the
prospectofrecoupingasubstantialinvestmentintheproductionofthephonogram,through
substitutionoftheoriginal.39
Question2
Is a phonogramwhich contains very short audio snatches transferred from another phonogram a
copyoftheotherphonogramwithinthemeaningofArticle9(1)(b)ofDirective2006/115/EC?
[3.10]Seeanswertoq1.
4. TheScopeoftheQuotationException
Question4
37 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016,ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513,paragraphs[101]etseq.–MetallaufMetall
38 Ohly,GRUR2017,964(966).
39 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016,ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513, paragraph [110] – Metall auf Metall; HanseatischesOberlandesgericht,Case3W38/91,GRURInt.1992,p.390(391);HanseatischesOberlandesgericht,Case3U237/90,NJW-RR1992,p.746 (748);Gelke,Mashups imUrheberrecht,2013,pp.128et seq.;Häuser, Soundund Sampling, 2002, pp. 109 et seq.; Leistner, Juristenzeitung 2014, 846 (849); Salagean, Sampling imdeutschen,schweizerischenundUS-amerikanischenUrheberrecht,2008,pp.231etseq.
13
Can itbesaid thataworkorothersubjectmatter isbeingused forquotationpurposeswithin the
meaningofArticle5(3)(d)ofDirective2001/29/ECif it isnotevidentthatanotherperson’sworkor
anotherperson’ssubjectmatterisbeingused?
Answer:
[4.1]UnderArt5(3)(d),MemberStatesmayprovideforanexceptiontotheauthor’sexclusiveright
ofreproductionofhisworkinrespectof
(i) quotationsforpurposessuchascriticismorreview,providedthat
(ii) they relate to a work or other subject-matter which has already been lawfully made
availabletothepublic;
(iii) theiruse is inaccordancewith fairpractice, and to theextent requiredby the specific
purpose.
(iv) the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be
impossible.
[4.2] The terms of the provision reflect those of Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention. However,
while theprovision is presented as optional forMember States, it is important toobserve
thatunderArticle10(1)ofthatConvention,anexceptionforuseinquotationismandatory
formembersoftheBerneUnion.40Indeed,inthetravauxtotheStockholmRevisionofBerne
(whenArticle10(1)was introduced), theprovision iscommonlydescribedas thequotation
right.41
40 Onitsface,theArticlecreatesanobligationonMembersoftheUniontopermitquotationincaseswheretheconditionsaremet.Itstatesthat‘itshallbepermissible…‘[italicsadded].Theuseoftheword‘shall’inthiscontextisimperative.Article10(1)usesquitedifferentlanguagefromthatusedinotherprovisionsconcerningexceptions.Forexample,Article10(2),states,inrelationtoexceptionsforeducation,that‘itshallbeamatterforlegislationinthecountriesoftheUnion...topermit...’SimilarlanguageisfoundinArticle10bisinrelationtoreportingcurrenteventsandArticle9(2),whichallowsexceptionstothereproductionright‘incertainspecialcases’.ThelanguageofArticle10(1)isdistinct,andclearlyreadsasmandatoryratherthanpermissive.SeeSamRicketson&JaneCGinsburg,TheBerneConventionandBeyond,(Oxford:OUP,2006),788-9,[13.42];PaulGoldsteinandBerntHugenholtz,InternationalCopyright:Principles,Law,Practice(Oxford:OUP,2010)379,[11.4.1];GraemeB.DinwoodieandRochelleC.Dreyfuss,ANeo-FederalistVisionofTRIPS(OUP,2012),185(‘amandatoryquotationright’);RaquelXalabarder,StudyonCopyrightLimitationsandExceptionsforEducationalActivitiesinNorthAmerica,Europe,Caucasus,CentralAsiaandIsrael(WIPO,2009).
41 WIPO,RecordsoftheIntellectualPropertyConferenceofStockholm,June11toJuly14,1967,VolI,(WIPO,1971)116(BIRPIStudyGroup),117(DocumentS/1,‘ProposalsforRevisingtheSubstantiveCopyrightProvisions,Arts1-20(PreparedbytheGovernmentofSwedenwiththeAssistanceofBIRPI)’).
14
[4.3] As already observed, one key aim of Article 10(1) and Article 5(3)(d) is to ensure that the
copyrightsystemactsasanengineof,ratherthananimpedimentto,freedomofexpression.
It is therefore important for the exception to be interpreted and applied in the light of
Articles11and13oftheCharter42.Freedomofexpressionrequiresthatauthorsarefreeto
use pre-existing materials where such use is proportionate to the aim pursued and in
accordancewithfairpractice.
[4.4] As a result, the restrictive approach to the interpretation of exceptions and limitations first
adoptedinC-5/08InfopaqInternationalA/SvDankeDagbladesForeningECLI:EU:C:2009:465
[56]-[58] cannot prevail in circumstances in which the use of a work is protected by a
fundamentalrightundertheCharter,suchasArticles11or13.
[4.4]TheonlyoccasiononwhichtheCJEUhasexaminedtheoperationofArticle5(3)(d)todatewas
in its first Judgment in Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:798.43 In that Judgment, the Court treated Article 5(3)(d) as requiring a
balancingoftherightsofownerandusers:
[132]AsregardsthecontextsurroundingArticle5(3)(d)ofDirective2001/29,itisimportant
tonotethat,asstatedinrecital31inthepreambletothatdirective,a‘fairbalance’mustbe
safeguarded between, on the one hand, the rights and interests of authors, and, on the
other,therightsofusersofprotectedsubject-matter
..
[134] Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 is intended to strike a fair balance between the
righttofreedomofexpressionofusersofaworkorotherprotectedsubject-matterandthe
reproductionrightconferredonauthors.
[4.5]NeithertheDirectivenortheBerneConventionofferadefinitionof“quotation”.Accordingly,
thewordshouldbegiven itsordinarymeaning, taking intoaccount thecontext inwhich itoccurs.
One importantaspectof that context is that the right toquote isnot limited toparticular cultural
genres.Article5(3)(d)appliestoallworksandsubjectmatterofrelatedrights,justasArticle10(1)of
42 SeeEuropeanCopyrightSociety,LimitationsandExceptionsasKeyElementsoftheLegalFrameworkforCopyrightintheEuropeanUnion–OpinionoftheEuropeanCopyrightSocietyontheJudgmentoftheCJEUinCaseC-201/13Deckmyn,supra.
43 [2011]ECRI-12533,[2012]ECDR(6)89(ECJ,ThirdChamber).
15
Berne applies to all works.44 The significance of this is that the right to quote is not limited to
quotationoftextorintext.Print-basedparadigmsofquotationshouldnotbethesoleconsideration
wheninterpretingtheconceptofquotation.
[4.6]Discussionof re-useofmusic,art,architectureand filmas“quotation” isverycommon.45For
thiscase,itisimportanttoobservethattheterm“quotation”isalsowidelyusedtoreferto
the re-use of recordings of music.46 Digital sound sampling has often been described as
“quotation”.47
[4.7] In theparadigmaticcaseof textualquotation inanother text, theconvention is todistinguish
thequotedmaterialfromthequotingmaterial.Thisisdoneusingquotationmarks,insetting,
and other devices. However, given that the right to quote applies to all material
encompassed by authors’ rights and related rights, it is inappropriate to import such
conventions into the definition of “quotation.” Otherwise, the meaning of quotation in
Article5(3)(d)wouldnotcomportwithitsuseasadescriptionofpracticesoftextualre-usein
other cultural sectors, such as art, film, music and recorded music. Instead, the use of
conventional devices such as “quotation marks” to delineate quoted text is more readily
incorporated through the condition that permitted quotation must accord with “fair
44 OpeningdiscussioninMainCommitteeIattheintergovernmentalConferenceonJune16,1967,Cavin,theSwissrepresentative,saidhisdelegationapprovedtheprincipleofextendingtherightofquotationto‘allthecategoriesofprotectedworks’:Minutes,para.[761],inWIPO,RecordsoftheIntellectualPropertyConferenceofStockholm,June11toJuly14,1967,VolI,(WIPO,1971)860.Later,GeorgeStraschnovobjectedtoaproposaltolimittheexceptionto‘short’quotationsonthebasisthatthiswouldraiseparticularproblemsinrelationtothequotationofartisticworks,wheremoralrightswouldbeimplicatedifonlypartwasused:Minutes,para.[769],Records,861.
45 See,forexample,therecentspecialissue,(2014)33(2)ContemporaryMusicReviewonMusicBorrowingandQuotation.
46 OneexampleisVladimirUssachevsky’sre-useofarecordingofa1951performanceofWagner’sParsifalinhisavant-gardesoundcollage,entitledWirelessFantasy(1960)(AvailableviaYouTube:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEShy2QIj4U(accessed23Sept2017)),whichcombinedtheperformancewiththesoundsofMorse-codesignalsbeingtappedout.SeeRichardBeaudoin,‘CounterpointandQuotationinUssachevsky’sWirelessFantasy,’(2007)12(2)OrganisedSound143-151,esp.147-149.
47 MarkKatz,Capturingsound:howtechnologyhaschangedmusic(Berkeley:UniversityCaliforniaPress,2010),140-1(referringtosamplingas“performativequotation”,thatis,“quotationthatrecreatesallthedetailsoftimbreandtimingthatevokeandidentifyauniquesoundevent“);KevinHolm-Hudson,‘QuotationandContext:SamplingandJohnOswald'sPlunderphonics,’(1997)7LeonardoMusicJournal17-25,17(describingdigitalsamplingas“timbralquotation”andexplainingthat“thesamplefunctionsasaquotethatisrecontextualizedbutthatneverthelessbearstheweightofitsoriginalcontext”);SergeLacasse,‘IntertextualityandHypertextualityinRecordedPopularMusic’inMichaelTalbot(ed),TheMusicalWork:RealityorInvention?(LiverpoolUniversityPress,2000),Ch2(describingsamplingasatypeof“autosonicquotation.”)
16
practice”and/orthatthesource,includingtheauthor’sname,mustbeindicated,unlessthis
turnsouttobeimpossible.
[4.8]Asaresult,theanswertoQuestion4isthataworkmaybeusedforquotationpurposeswithin
themeaningofArticle5(3)(d)ofDirective2001/29/ECeven if it isnotevidentthatanother
person’sworkoranotherperson’ssubjectmatterisbeingused.Tosatisfytherequirementto
indicateanauthor’sname,itissufficienttoincluderelevantinformation–totheextentthat
this possible48 – in the description of the derivativework inwhich the pre-existing source
materialhasbeenincorporated.
5. HarmonizationandFreedomofMemberStatesinImplementingtheDirective
Question5
DotheprovisionsofEU lawonthereproductionrightandthedistributionrightof thephonogram
producer(Article2(c)ofDirective2001/29/ECandArticle9(1)(b)ofDirective2006/115/EC)andthe
exceptions or limitations to those rights (Article5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29/EC and
Article10(2),firstsentence,ofDirective2006/115/EC)allowanylatitudeintermsofimplementation
innationallaw?
Answer
[5.1]Wedonotthinkitnecessaryintheseproceedingstoanswerthesequestionsintheabstractor
categorically,astheanswerstothepreviousquestionsshouldbesufficienttodeterminethe
proceedings.However,weoffersometentativeguidance.
WithrespecttotherightsinArts2and4
[5.2]Inaccordancewithprecedent,itisclearthattheconceptsof“reproduction”and“distribution”
areautonomousconceptsofEuropeanlaw.TheCourthasconsistentlyheldthattheneedfor
uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality demand that the terms of a
provisionofEUlawwhichmakesnoexpressreferencetothelawoftheMemberStatesfor48 Astocollagesamplingwhichincludesawidevarietyofsound“snippets”,seeD.M.Morrison,“BridgeportRedux:DigitalSamplingandAudienceRecoding”,(2008)19FordhamIntellectualProperty,MediaandEntertainmentLawJournal75.Arguably,collagesamplingusingaveryhighnumberofpre-existingsoundsisanexampleofaderivativeworkwheretheindicationofthenameoftheauthorsofallsourcematerial“turnsouttobeimpossible”inthesenseofArticle5(3)(d).
17
thepurposeofdetermining itsmeaningandscopemustnormallybegivenanautonomous
anduniforminterpretationthroughouttheEuropeanUnion,havingregardtothecontextof
the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question. See, for example,
C-467/08,Padawan,EU:C:2010:620,[32].
[5.3] The effect is that Member States are not permitted to deviate from the terms of those
provisions:CaseC-466/12,Svensson, ECLI:EU:C:2014:76, [33]-[41] (onDirecive2001/29/EC,
Art3).
[5.4] However, as already noted, it is also clear that the interpretation and application of these
provisionsmusttakeaccountoftheCharter.Responsibilityforprovidingguidanceastosuch
interpretation liesultimatelywith theCJEU,butapplying theprovisions isamatter for the
courtsoftheMemberStates.
[5.5]TheresponsibilityforsoensuringinterpretationandapplicationinlinewiththeCharterliesnot
justwiththeCJEUbutalsowiththeCourtsofMemberStates.InCaseC-275/06,Promusicae
[2008],ECLI:EU:C:2008:54,at [70], theCJEUstatedthat"when implementingthemeasures
transposing… directives, theauthorities and courts of theMember Statesmust not only
interprettheirnationallawinamannerconsistentwiththosedirectivesbutalsomakesure
that they do not rely on an interpretation of them which would be in conflict with those
fundamental rights or with the other general principles of Community law, such as the
principleofproportionality".
Articles5(2),(3)(exceptionsandlimitations)
[5.6] In most instances, Member States have the choice whether to implement the optional
exceptions, but the list of suchexceptions is exhaustive:Member Statesmaynotmaintain
anyotherexceptionsorlimitations.SeeDirective2001/29/EC,Recital32.
[5.7]However,asalreadynoted,atleastArticle5(3)(d)oftheDirectiveismandatoryasamatterof
international law on authors’ rights (Berne Convention, Art 10(1)). The interpretation and
applicationofEUprovisionsmustbeincompliancewithsuchinternationalobligations(SGAE
/Rafaelhotels,ECLI:EU:C:2006:764, [2006]ECR I-11519paragraphs[35], [40], [41]andCase
C-403/08 and Case C-429/08, Football Association Premier League and Karen Murphy,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:631,[2011]ECRI-9083,paragraph[189]).
18
[5.8] In the case of optional exceptions, the freedom that is left to Member States varies from
provisiontoprovision..Someexceptionsseemtoenvisagesomefreedom;othersdonot.
[5.9] In some cases, Member States do have limited freedom as to the implementation of an
exception.TheclearestexampleisArt5(3)(o),whichallowsforexceptionsincasesof‘minor
importance’ provided they only concern ‘analogue uses.’ Another is Art 5(3)(e). In Case C-
145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, the Court (at
[101]) noted that the provisions of Directive 2001/29/EC do not expressly address the
circumstancesinwhichtheinterestsofpublicsecuritycanbeinvokedwithaviewtotheuse
ofaprotectedworkand,therefore,that‘theMemberStateswhichdecidetoenactsuchan
exceptionenjoyabroaddiscretioninthatrespect…’Itaddedthat‘suchadiscretionis,first,
in accordance with the idea that each Member State is best placed to determine, in
accordance with its national needs, the requirements of public security, in the light of
historical,legal,economicorsocialconsiderationsspecifictoit’[102].
[5.10] InCaseC-462/09,StichtingdeThuiskopie , theCourtconsideringArt5(2)(b), stated (at [23])
that:
Withregardtotheanswertothequestionofthe identificationofthepersonwhomustbe
regarded as responsible for paying the fair compensation, the provisions of Directive
2001/29 do not expressly address the issue ofwho is to pay that compensation,meaning
thattheMemberStatesenjoybroaddiscretionwhendeterminingwhomustdischargethat
obligation.
[5.10] Inothercases,nosuchfreedomexists:CaseC-510/10,DR,TV2DanmarkA/Sv.NCB-Nordisk
Copyright Bureau, EU:C:2012:244, paragraph [36]. In C-201/13, Deckmyn ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132,
paragraph[16],theCJEUstated
‘An interpretation according towhichMember States that have introduced that exception
are free to determine the limits in an unharmonised manner, which may vary from one
MemberStatetoanother,wouldbeincompatiblewiththeobjectiveofthatdirective.’
[5.11]Evenwheresome“latitude”exists,principlesofEuropean lawshould informtheexerciseof
discretion:Opinion 3/15, (MarrakeshOpinion),ECLI:EU:C:2017:114, paragraphs [122]-[127]
(ECJ,GrandChamber). These include theneed to safeguard thehierarchyofnormsand to
19
ensure compliance with fundamental rights (C-275/06, Promusicae, ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, at
paragraph[70]),aswellascompliancewithinternationalobligations.
Question3
CantheMemberStatesenactaprovisionwhich—inthemannerofParagraph24(1)of theGesetz
über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (German Law on Copyright and Related Rights)—
inherently limitsthescopeofprotectionofthephonogramproducer’sexclusiverighttoreproduce
(Article2(c)ofDirective2001/29/EC)and todistribute (Article9(1)(b)ofDirective2006/115/EC) its
phonogram in suchaway thatan independentworkcreated in freeuseof itsphonogrammaybe
exploitedwithoutthephonogramproducer’sconsent?
[6.1]Aswewillexplain,wetreatthisquestionlastbecauseweconsideritunnecessarytodetermine
thequestionintheseproceedings.
[6.2]Webeginby reminding theCourt that it isbeingasked to consider the interpretationof two
Directives.AccordingtoArticle288oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,a
Directiveisbinding“astotheresulttobeachieved”leavingtoMemberStates“thechoiceof
formandmethods.”Itthusseekstorespectnationaltraditionsandapproachestostructure,
categorisation,formandinterpretation.Whatisimportantistheresult.
[6.2]Question3concernsaparticularityofGermanandAustriancopyrightlawinitsrelationtothe
EU copyright acquis, namely the provision on “free use” in Article 24 of the
UrheberrechtsgesetzandArticle5(2)oftheAustrianUrheberrechtsgesetz(AustrianCopyright
Act).49 Dutch copyright law sets forth a similar rule in Article 13 of theAuteurswet (Dutch
Copyright Act), namely that adaptations constituting a new, original work fall outside the
scope of the right of adaptation.50 According to Article 24(1) of the German
Urheberrechtsgesetz, an independentwork created in the free useof thework of another
personmaybepublishedorexploitedwithouttheconsentoftheauthoroftheworkused.
Paragraph two setsout that the ruleon “freeuse” shall not apply to theuseof amusical
49 AstotheapplicationofthisAustrianfreeuseruleinthelightoffundamentalrightsandfreedoms,see,forinstance,ObersterGerichtshof(AustrianSupremeCourt),13July2010,case4Ob66/10z,“Lieblingshauptfrau”.
50 ForamoredetaileddiscussionoftheDutchprovision,seeMartinR.F.Senftleben,’Quotations,ParodyandFairUse,’in:P.BerntHugenholtz,AntoonA.QuaedvliegandDirkJ.G.Visser(eds.),ACenturyofDutchCopyrightLaw–Auteurswet1912-2012,(Amstelveen:deLex,2012),359.
20
workinwhichamelodyisrecognisablytakenfromtheworkandusedasthebasisforanew
work.AsfollowsfromthewordingandthecontextofArticle24oftheGermanCopyrightAct,
which forms part of a subchapter on the exploitation rights of an author, the provision
regulatesthe“freeuse”ofworks,notthefreeuseofphonogramsandothersubjectmatter
ofrelatedrights.TheBundesgerichtshofisoftheopinion,however,thatArticle24(1)German
CopyrightActcanbeappliedbyanalogytotherelatedrightofphonogramproducers.51Itis
thereforeworthemphasisingfromtheoutsetthattheansweroftheCourtofJusticetothis
question will have implications for copyright and related rights other than the rights of
phonogramproducersunderGermanlaw.
[6.3] In assessingquestion3, it is furthermore important tonote thatArticle 24(1)of theGerman
Copyright Act is applied by German courts in two separate categories of cases, and that
question 3 only concerns one of those, namely the situation where a copyright work has
beenmadeuseofmerelyasaninspirationforanotherexpression,whichissodifferentinits
outer appearance from the original that the expression of the original work has faded
(“äußerer Abstand, verblassen”).52 It is this classical doctrine of “free use” that the
Bundesgerichtshof refersto inparagraphs22to27of itsreferraldecision.53 Inapplyingthe
doctrineinthiscase,theBundesgerichtshofisoftheopinionthatthemusicalpiece“Nurmir”
hasindividualfeaturesofitsownwhichdepartfromthetwosecondsamplecopiedfromthe
1977 Kraftwerk phonogram to such an extent that “Nur mir” is to be considered an
“independentcreation”underArticle24(1)oftheUrheberrechtsgesetz,asappliedbyanalogy
tophonograms.54
[6.4]Theobviousproblemwiththisreasoningisthatitcompares,ontheonehand,thedefendant’s
completepieceofmusicwith,ontheotherhand,thetwosecondexcerptfromtheplaintiffs’
phonogram. International,EUandGermancopyright lawsdonotoperate,however,onthe
basis of a holistic concept of a “piece ofmusic”. Instead, they strictly distinguish between
51 Bundesgerichtshof, Request for a preliminary ruling, Pelham GmbH and others, Case C-476/17,paragraph[24].
52 Theothercategoryconcernsuseforthepurposeofcaricature,parodyorpastiche,andthuscasesofArt. 5(3)(k) Directive 2001/29; see Bundesgerichtshof, Request for a preliminary ruling, Pelham GmbH andothers,CaseC-476/17,paragraphs[38]-[39],andinfra.
53 Bundesgerichtshof, Request for a preliminary ruling, Pelham GmbH and others, Case C-476/17,paragraphs[22]-[27].
54 Bundesgerichtshof, Request for a preliminary ruling, Pelham GmbH and others, Case C-476/17,paragraph[26].
21
musicalworks(thecomposition),literaryworks(thelyrics),theperformanceofvocalistsand
instrumentalists, the phonogram onwhich all these expressions have been fixed, and the
respective copyrights and related rights therein. The musical composition, the lyrics, and
most of the performances fixed on the phonogramof the defendant do not reproduce or
otherwise use the two second sample at stake in the case. As such, these creative
expressionsdonotencroachupontheexclusiverightsoftheplaintiffs“intheirphonograms”
(cf. Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC) and Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115/EC)
becausetheydonotincorporatepartsoftheoriginalphonogram.
[6.5] What the Bundesgerichtshof therefore asks, in essence, is whether the aforementioned
distinction betweenworks, performances, and fixed sounds remains valid if the combined
fixationofallthoseindependentsubjectmatter includesafragmentofanotherphonogram
that, in the overall impression of the piece ofmusic and its artistic features, plays such a
subordinate role that thecreativeexpressionof thederivativeworkclearly supersedes the
creative expression of the incorporated fragment and, as a result, can be deemed
independentand“free”.Onitsmerits,this“freeuse”privilegerequiresthederivativework
tohavenewfeaturesofitsownthatmaketheindividualfeaturesoftheincorporatedsource
materialfadeaway.55Iftheclaimantswereentitledtoinjunctivereliefandfurtherremedies
asregardsthereproductionanddistributionofthesong“Nurmir”,theywouldbeentitled,
on the mere basis of their rights in their phonogram, to authorize or prohibit the use of
musicalcompositions, lyrics,performancesand (partsof)phonogramsthatmakenouseof
theirprotected subjectmatterwhatsoever. It is this kindofoverreach thatArticle24(1)of
theGermanCopyrightActasappliedbytheBundesgerichtshof ismeanttoprevent.Sucha
“freeuse”ofaphonogramisausethatdoesnotreproduceordistributeprotectedpartsofa
phonogrambecause it displays somany individual, expressive features of its own that the
takingfrompre-existingsourcematerialisnolongerdiscernible.
[6.6] In our view, this reading of German copyright law is in line with Article 2(c) of Directive
2001/29/ECandArticle9(1)(b)ofDirective2006/115/ECbecausethescopeofprotectionof
the phonogram producer’s exclusive rights is inherently limited to uses of this particular
phonogram,i.e.the(partial)reproductionofthisfixationandtheuseofthosereproductions.
55 Foramoredetaileddiscussionofthisfreeuseprivilegeagainstthebackgroundofinternationalobligations,seePaulEdwardGeller,’AGermanApproachtoFairUse:TestCasesforTRIPsCriteriaforCopyrightLimitations?,’,(2010)57JournaloftheCopyrightSocietyoftheU.S.A.901.
22
Thisinherentlimitationoftheexclusiverightsfollowsbothfromthewordingandpurposeof
Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC and Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115/EC, which
attachtophonogramsandaimatprotecting the investmentnecessary for theirproduction
(see infra, questions 1 and 2). These rights do not entitle the phonogram producer to
authorizeorprohibitthecreationandexploitationofindependentworks,performances,and
fixationsofsounds.Thisistrueirrespectiveofthefactthattheseobjectsarecombinedwith
a partial reproduction of a protected phonogram. Rightly understood, the German rule of
“free”use,therefore, isameansof identifyingformsofusewhichfalloutsidethescopeof
theaforementionedexclusiverightsfromtheoutset.
[6.7]Whether such a partial reproduction of a protected phonogram and the distribution of this
reproductionaspartofanothersonginfringetherightsofthephonogramproduceristhusa
questionwhichonlyarisesifthetakinghasbeensubstantialenoughtoremainadiscernible,
individual feature of the derivative work. In cases where the expressive features of the
derivative work are sufficiently strong to make the features of an incorporated sound
fragment fade away, however, the unauthorized taking does not reach a level of intensity
thatjustifiestheinvocationoftheexclusiveright.Onlyifthederivativeworkdoesnothave
sufficiently strong features of its own, the taking is substantial and the assessment of
infringementdependsuponwhetherthesampleconstitutesaseparatelyprotectedpartofa
phonogram(questions1and2)and,ifyes,whetherthereproductionanddistributionofthis
sample is subject to a limitation or exception under Article 5 of Directive 2001/29/EC and
Article10ofDirective2006/115/EC(question4).Wehavealreadyconsideredthosematters.
23
DraftingCommittee:
• Prof.LionelBently,Professor,UniversityofCambridge,UnitedKingdom• Prof. Christophe Geiger, Director, Centre d’Etudes Internationales de la Propriété
Intellectuelle(CEIPI),UniversityofStrasbourg,France• Prof.JonathanGriffiths,Professorof IntellectualPropertyLaw,SchoolofLaw,QueenMary
UniversityofLondon,UnitedKingdom• Prof. AxelMetzger, Professor of Civil and Intellectual Property Law, Humboldt-Universität
Berlin• Prof.AlexanderPeukert,Goethe-UniversitätFrankfurtamMain,Germany• Prof. Martin Senftleben, Professor of Intellectual Property, VU University Amsterdam,
Netherlands
Signatories:
• Prof.P.BerntHugenholtz,Director,InstituteforInformationLaw,UniversityofAmsterdam,Netherlands
• Prof. Estelle Derclaye, Professor of Intellectual Property Law, University of Nottingham,UnitedKingdom
• Prof. Thomas Dreier, Director, Institute for Information and Economic Law, KarlsruheInstituteofTechnology(KIT),Germany
• Prof.SéverineDusollier,Professor,SchoolofLaw,SciencesPo,Paris(France),andCentredeRechercheInformation,DroitetSociété(CRIDS),UniversityofNamur(Belgium)
• Prof. Reto Hilty, Director, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich,Germany
• Prof.Marie-ChristineJanssens,ProfessorofIntellectualPropertyLaw,UniversityofLeuven,Belgium
• Prof.MartinKretschmer,ProfessorofIntellectualPropertyLaw,UniversityofGlasgow;andDirector,CREATe,UnitedKingdom
• Prof.MarcoRicolfi,ChairofIntellectualProperty,TurinLawSchool,Italy• Prof. Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Professor of Law, Department of Private Law, University of
Oslo,Norway• Prof.AlainStrowel,Professor,UCLouvainandUniversitéSaint-Louis,Belgium• Prof.TatianaSynodinou,Professor,UniversityofCyprus• Prof. Raquel Xalabarder, Chair on Intellectual Property, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya,
Barcelona,Spain