Operational integrity and primary process management€¦ · Investigations normally conclude...

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Operational integrity and primary process management From theory into a turnaround operation

Transcript of Operational integrity and primary process management€¦ · Investigations normally conclude...

Page 1: Operational integrity and primary process management€¦ · Investigations normally conclude insufficient: Leadership Compliance and procedures Risk evaluation Competence. Actions

Operational integrity and primary process management

From theory into a turnaround operation

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Why am I here to speak?

Winter 2009 / 2010 I and my

team were in trouble !

Through close cooperation and

support from our client we

turned trouble into success!

Supported by “Risk

Management Pro” we identified

our real weaknesses.

This is not a “golden bullet” –

only some experience from an

endless journey when

improving process safety.

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West Navigator –

harsh environment deep water operation

Ormen Lange

Ormen Lange –

harsh environment

subsea field

development

Water depth 1000m

Worlds largest gas

producing wells

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Setting the scene – What happened:

The West Navigator had long been a „pearl

in the crown‟ in Shell‟s ranking

Several High Potential incidents through

2009 / 2010 lead to serious concern

Despite a considerable effort to improve,

our initiatives did not lead to „real

changes‟

The technical utilization of the unit and

the number of High Potential incidents

required a strategy change

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Guide roller (8,5 kg.) dropped 35m

Riser chute bucket run from drill floor to riser setback

Several HIPO’s in a short period of time

DDM hose had collided with the platform

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HIPOS – The standard route of actions:

Management shut down operations. STOP.

Management and teams under pressure

One day a ”Star” to the next day ”a Looser” is painful.

Investigations are kicked off.

Management seek ”root course” and what to do?

Investigations normally conclude insufficient:

Leadership

Compliance and procedures

Risk evaluation

Competence.

Actions are recommended and implemented.

Situation normalized – back in business

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Setting the scene

We agreed with Norske Shell to attack this differently

“Risk Management Pro” assisted us in the process setting up

the program.

The program involved meta analysis of the High Potential

incident supported by Tripod Beta and a Tripod Delta survey.

Rules of Engagement project was established

Prime objective: to achieve structural changes in the way we

operated, how we interacted with the operator.

Strengthen our core processes

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To make a change –

I as the leader need to:

1. Acknowledge there is a problem and that the problem is

mine. Don‟t go into denial. There is nowhere to hide!

2. Have tools that identify the problem and our core process

weaknesses. There is no “silver bullet”!

“Where are our strengths?”

“Where are our weaknesses?”

3. Have the will, ability and capacity, to force the required

improvements through!

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Why Tripod:

Recognized and in use within Shell with good results

International tool to identify Basic Risk Factors with a potential

to fail.

Has the ability to identify gaps and weaknesses in our core

processes.

Is recognized and acknowledged within the academic society.

Give us an opportunity to find our strengths and weakness

“prior” to an incident / accident.

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Rig, tools and equipment Competent People

Efficient Management System

Quality Operations!! The TRIPOD tools is evaluating our defenses in all

three areas.

Client

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The Tripod Model:

Delta Beta

After Before

Design (DE) Hardware (HW) Maintenance Management (MM) Housekeeping (HK)

BRF : Basic Risk Factors Enhanced Conditions (EC)

Procedures (PR) Training (TR) Communication (CO) Incompatible Goals (IG) Organization (OR)

Emergency Preparedness (DF)

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DE HW MM HK EC PR TR CO IG OR DF

Seadrill - West Navigator Disciplines

Marine Drilling Technical Onshore

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The Tripod Delta profile – Starting point Spring 2010

Main focus: Design, Hardware, Maintenance Management & Onshore Organisation!

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Communication structure had to be changed:

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Clear roles and responsibilities (The “Crane”- model):

Together, with clear roles and expectations

Seadrill Shell

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Occupational Safety vs Process Safety

Incident reporting.

Personnel Safety. Process Safety.

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Significance

Fre

quency

Piper Alpha

Alexander Kielland Macondo

Montara

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When investigating the ”red – use the opportunity to identify the ”blue”

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Occupational Safety vs Process Safety

Incident reporting.

Personnel Safety. Process Safety.

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Significance

Frequency

Piper Alpha

Alexander KiellandMacondo

Montara

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.Process Safety Personnel Safety

Death

LTA‟s

MTC‟s

FAC‟s

Blow outs, loss of unit, multiple death, significant environmental impact

Significant cost and time impact, death, loss of well, gas leaks, well control incidents etc.

Near misses

Incidents, HIPOS, NPT, equipment failure, leaks, maintenance defects, tests failing, operational mistakes etc.

Defects KPI‟s

KPI‟s, Controls & Leadership

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Occupational Safety vs Process Safety

Incident reporting.

Personnel Safety. Process Safety.

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Significance

Frequency

Piper Alpha

Alexander KiellandMacondo

Montara

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.Process Safety Personnel Safety

Death

LTA‟s

MTC‟s

FAC‟s

Loss of units, multiple death, environmental consequences

Significant cost and time impact, death, delays, gas leaks, well control incidents etc.

Near misses

Incidents, HIPOS, NPT, equipment failure, maintenance defects, tests failing, operational mistakes etc.

Defects

A main challenge is to avoid ”factory blindness” and “complacency” when things are going ok!

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Occupational Safety vs Process Safety

Incident reporting.

Personnel Safety. Process Safety.

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Significance

Frequency

Piper Alpha

Alexander KiellandMacondo

Montara

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.Process Safety Personnel Safety

”Process safety” is hard work, cost $$$ and depends

on upper management. Core process improvements gives long term effect and is

a sound investment

”Occupational safety” is often mixed with “process safety” and becomes an easy way out for leaders pushing the problem to

crews and first line managers offshore

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Some other issues and observations:

Lack of clear distinction and responsibilities

Our High Potential incidents were just symptoms of

underlying issues

We had allowed the operator to take over decisions and

priorities on our behalf

The organization was stressed and had become reactive

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Some immediate actions taken:

Some crew rotation to get a fresh start

Prioritize and align on actions and tasks (Design, Hardware,

Maintenance Management and Organization)

Agree and communicate our plan - follow up

Align with senior management and key stake holders on the

way forward

Allocate recourses and funding ($$$ - budgets / people)

Increase the number of key resources to deliver

Then “just DO IT!”

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Perception or reality? (14 months later, Summer 2011)

Improvements also in areas outside our main focus..

All BRF DE HW MM HK EC PR TR CO IG OR DF

WNA total

Management

Supervisors

Operational Personell

Marine

Drilling

Technical

Onshore

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Summary (1):

„Tripod results was unpleasant but was used to make

real change to our core processes

Process safety‟ is a move from being reactive to

become proactive

Management needs to acknowledge and understand

the problem and have the ability to do something

about it.

Tripod can be a proactive approach to identify our

basic risk factors.

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Summary (2):

Without the „buy-in‟ from the operator, it’s hard for

the contractor alone

Post Macondo learning's – well control and process

safety in balance with occupational safety (KPI‟s)

We saw improvements in other areas outside what

managements focused on

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Feedback some year later:

“We have now finished 2 successful Lower Completions and

3 successful Upper Completions way ahead of budget (28

days ahead of plan). You have managed to deliver the

scope in a safe manner without any LTI’s and Spills to

Environment.” (27 July 2011)

“Last week the West Navigator became the first rig in the

world to demonstrate compliance with Shells

new requirements on equipment traceability for the well

control envelope!” (2 August 2011)

“Rig of the year award! (November 2012)

And more important, “We may have saved two lives in this

period”

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Recommended to study:

“Process Safety” vs “ Occupational Safety”:

1 2

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Thank you for your attention.

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