Operation a

Operation Barbarossa 1

Operation BarbarossaOperation Barbarossa (German Unternehmen Barbarossa for Frederick I) was the code name for Nazi Germanysinvasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that began on 22 June 1941[1] [2] Over 45 million troops of theAxis powers invaded the USSR along a 2900 km (1800 mi) front[3] In addition to the large number of troops it alsoinvolved 600000 motor vehicles and 750000 horses[4] Planning for Operation Barbarossa started on 18 December1940 the secret preparations and the military operation itself lasted almost a year from spring to winter 1941 TheRed Army repelled the Wehrmachts strongest blow and Adolf Hitler had not achieved the expected victory but theSoviet Unions situation remained dire Tactically the Germans had won some resounding victories and occupiedsome of the most important economic areas of the country mainly in Ukraine[5] Despite these successes theGermans were pushed back from Moscow and could never mount an offensive simultaneously along the entirestrategic Soviet-German front again[6]

Operation Barbarossas failure led to Hitlers demands for further operations inside the USSR all of which eventuallyfailed such as continuing the Siege of Leningrad[7] [8] Operation Nordlicht and Battle of Stalingrad among otherbattles on the occupied Soviet territory[9] [10] [11] [12] [13]

Operation Barbarossa was the largest military operation in human history in both manpower and casualties[14] Itsfailure was a turning point in the Third Reichs fortunes Most important Operation Barbarossa opened up theEastern Front to which more forces were committed than in any other theatre of war in world history OperationBarbarossa and the areas that fell under it became the site of some of the largest battles deadliest atrocities highestcasualties and most horrific conditions for Soviets and Germans alike mdash all of which influenced the course of bothWorld War II and 20th century history

German intentions

Nazi theory regarding the Soviet UnionAs early as 1925 Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf (My Struggle) that he would invade the Soviet Union assertingthat the German people needed Lebensraum (living space ie land and raw materials) and that these should besought in the east Nazi racial ideology cast the Soviet Union as populated by Untermenschen ethnic Slavs ruled bytheir Jewish Bolshevik masters[15] [16] Mein Kampf said Germanys destiny was to turn to the East as it did sixhundred years ago and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a State[17]

Thereafter Hitler spoke of an inescapable battle against pan-Slav ideals in which victory would lead topermanent mastery of the world though he said they would walk part of the road with the Russians if that willhelp us[18] Accordingly it was Nazi stated policy to kill deport or enslave the Russian and other Slavicpopulations and repopulate the land with Germanic peoples (see New Order)


1939-1940 Nazi-Soviet relations

Soviet and German invasions annexations and spheres of influencein Central and eastern Europe 1939-1940

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been signed shortlybefore the German and Soviet invasion of Poland in1939 It was ostensibly a non-aggression pact but secretprotocols outlined an agreement between the ThirdReich and the Soviet Union on the division of theborder states between them[19] The pact surprised theworld[20] because of the parties mutual hostility andtheir competing ideologies As a result of the pact NaziGermany and the Soviet Union had reasonably strongdiplomatic relations and an important economicrelationship The countries entered a trade pact in 1940in which the Soviets received German military andindustrial equipment in exchange for raw materialssuch as oil to help Germany circumvent a Britishblockade[21]

But despite the parties ongoing relations both sideswere strongly suspicious of each others intentionsAfter Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan andItaly it began negotiations about a potential Sovietentry into the pact[22] [23] After two days ofnegotiations in Berlin from November 12ndash14 Germanypresented a proposed written agreement for Soviet entry into the Axis The Soviet Union offered a writtencounterproposal agreement on 25 November 1940 to which Germany did not respond[24] [25] As both sides begancolliding with each other in Eastern Europe conflict appeared more likely though they signed a border andcommercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941


Germany plans the invasion

Situation in Europe by MayJune 1941 at the end of theBalkans Campaign and immediately before Operation

Barbarossa

Stalins reputation contributed both to the Nazisjustification of their assault and their faith in success In thelate 1930s Stalin had killed or incarcerated millions ofcitizens during the Great Purge including many competentand experienced military officers leaving the Red Armyweakened and leaderless The Nazis often emphasized theSoviet regimes brutality when targeting the Slavs withpropaganda German propaganda claimed the Red Armywas preparing to attack them and their own invasion wasthus presented as pre-emptive

In summer 1940 when German raw materials crises and apotential collision with the Soviet Union over territory inthe Balkans arose an eventual invasion of the Soviet Unionlooked increasingly like Hitlers only solution[26] While noconcrete plans were made yet Hitler told one of hisgenerals in June that the victories in western Europe finallyfreed his hands for his important real task the showdownwith Bolshevism[27] though German generals told Hitlerthat occupying Western Russia would create more of a drain than a relief for Germanys economic situation[28]

The Fuumlhrer anticipated additional benefits

bull When the Soviet Union was defeated the labour shortage in the German industry could be relieved bydemobilization of many soldiers

bull Ukraine would be a reliable source of agriculturebull Having the Soviet Union as a source of slave labour would vastly improve Germanys geostrategic positionbull Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies especially the United Kingdombull The German economy needed more oil and controlling the Baku Oilfields would achieve this as Albert Speer the

German Minister for Armaments and War Production later said in his interrogation the need for oil certainlywas a prime motive in the decision to invade[29]


Weisung Nr 21 Fall Barbarossa

On 5 December Hitler received military plans for the invasion andapproved them all with the start scheduled for May 1941[30] On 18December 1940 Hitler signed War Directive No 21 to the GermanHigh Command for an operation now codenamed OperationBarbarossa stating The German Wehrmacht must be prepared tocrush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign[30] [31] The operation wasnamed after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy RomanEmpire a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century The invasionwas set for 15 May 1941[31] In the Soviet Union speaking to hisgenerals in December Stalin mentioned Hitlers references to an attackon the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf and said they must always beready to repulse a German attack and that Hitler thought the RedArmy would need four years to ready itself Hence we must be readymuch earlier and we will try to delay the war for another twoyears[32]

In autumn 1940 high-ranking German officials drafted a memorandumon the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union They said UkraineBelorussia and the Baltic States would end up as only a furthereconomic burden for Germany[33] Another German official argued that the Soviets in their current bureaucratic formwere harmless the occupation would not produce a gain for Germany and why should it not stew next to us in itsdamp Bolshevism[33]

Hitler ignored German economic naysayers and told Hermann Goumlring that everyone on all sides was always raisingeconomic misgivings against a threatening war with Russia From now onwards he wasnt going to listen to any moreof that kind of talk and from now on he was going to stop up his ears in order to get his peace of mind[34] This waspassed on to General Georg Thomas who had been preparing reports on the negative economic consequences of aninvasion of the Soviet Union mdash that it would be a net economic drain unless it was captured intact[34]

Rudolf Hess and others at Heinrich HimmlersBuilding and Planning in the East March 1941

Exhibition

Beginning in March 1941 Goumlrings Green Folder laid out details of theSoviet Unions proposed economic disposal after the invasion Theentire urban population of the invaded land was to be starved to deaththus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and allowing theurban populations replacement by a German upper class During theNuremberg Trials in 1946 Sir Hartley Shawcross said in March 1941as well as administrative divisions previously created the followingdivisions in the Russian East were planned

bull Ural (central and south Ural and nearest territories created fromplanned east Russian European territorial reorganization)

bull West Sibirien (future west Siberia and Novosibirsk held lands)bull Nordland (Soviet Arctic areas West Nordland (Russian European north coasts) and Ost Nordland (northwest

Siberian north coasts))

In summer 1941 German Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg suggested that conquered Soviet territory should beadministered in the following Reichskommissariates

bull Ostland (The Baltic countries and Belarus)bull Ukraine (Ukraine and adjacent territories)bull Kaukasus (Southern Russia and the Caucasus area)bull Moskowien (Moscow metropolitan area and the rest of European Russia)


bull Turkestan (Central Asian republics and territories)Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the geopolitical Lebensraumidea (Drang nach Osten) for the benefit of future Aryan generations

ldquoWe have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing downrdquomdashAdolf Hitler

Operation Barbarossa was to combine a northern assault towards Leningrad a symbolic capturing of Moscow andan economic strategy of seizing oil fields in the south beyond Ukraine Hitler and his generals disagreed on which ofthese aspects should take priority and where Germany should focus its energies deciding on priorities required acompromise Hitler thought himself a political and military genius While planning Barbarossa in 1940-1941 inmany discussions with his generals Hitler repeated his order Leningrad first the Donetsk Basin second Moscowthird[1] [35] Hitler was impatient to get on with his long-desired invasion of the east He was convinced Britainwould sue for peace once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union the real area of Germanys interests GeneralFranz Halder noted in his diaries that by destroying the Soviet Union Germany would destroy Britains hope ofvictoryHitler had grown overconfident from his rapid success in Western Europe and the Red Armys ineptitude in theWinter War against Finland in 1939ndash1940 He expected victory within a few months and therefore did not preparefor a war lasting into the winter This meant his troops lacked adequate warm clothing and preparations for a longercampaign when they began their attack The assumption that the Soviet Union would quickly capitulate would proveto be his undoing[36]

German preparations

ldquoWhen Barbarossa commences the world will hold its breath and make no commentrdquomdashAdolf Hitler

The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the campaign in the Balkans hadfinished By the third week in February 1941 680000 German troops were stationed on the Romanian-Sovietborder[21] In preparation for the attack Hitler moved 35 million German soldiers and about 1 million Axis soldiersto the Soviet border launched many aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory and stockpiled materiel in theEast The Soviets were still taken by surprise mostly due to Stalins belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to attackonly two years after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact The Soviet leader also believed the Nazis would be likelyto finish their war with Britain before opening a new front He refused to believe repeated warnings from hisintelligence services on the Nazi buildup fearing the reports to be British misinformation designed to spark a warbetween Germany and the USSR[37] According to documentary series Battlefield Hitler wired Stalin to say that thetroop massing along the Reichs eastern borders was to keep them away from attacks by the WestSpy Dr Richard Sorge gave Stalin the exact German launch date Swedish cryptanalysts led by Arne Beurling alsoknew the date beforehand but Sorge and other informers (eg from Berlin Police dept) had previously givendifferent invasion dates which passed peacefully before the actual invasion In addition British intelligencegathering information through ULTRA warned the Soviet Union of impending invasion several months prior to 22June 1941[38]

The Germans set up deception operations from April 1941 to add substance to their claims that Britain was the real target Operations Haifisch and Harpune These simulated preparations in Norway the Channel coast and Britain


There were supporting activities such as ship concentrations reconnaissance flights and training exercises Somedetails of these bogus invasion plans were deliberately leakedHitler and his generals also researched Napoleons failed invasion of Russia At Hitlers insistence the German HighCommand (OKW) began to develop a strategy to avoid repeating these mistakesThe strategy Hitler and his generals agreed on involved three separate army groups assigned to capture specificregions and cities of the Soviet Union The main German thrusts were conducted along historical invasion routesArmy Group North was to march through the Baltics into northern Russia and either take or destroy the city ofLeningrad (now Saint Petersburg) Army Group Center would advance to Smolensk and then Moscow marchingthrough what is now Belarus and the west-central regions of Russia proper Army Group South was to strike theheavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine taking Kiev before continuing eastward over the steppes ofthe southern USSR to the Volga and the oil-rich CaucasusHitler the OKW and the various high commands disagreed about what the main objectives should be In preparingfor Barbarossa most of the OKW argued for a straight thrust to Moscow but Hitler kept asserting his intention toseize the resource-rich Ukraine and Baltics before concentrating on the Soviet capital An initial delay whichpostponed the start of Barbarossa from mid-May to the end of June 1941 may have been insignificant especiallysince the Russian muddy season came late that year However more time was lost at various critical moments asHitler and the OKW suspended operations in order to argue about strategic objectivesThe Germans also decided to bring rear forces (mostly Waffen-SS units and Einsatzgruppen) into the conqueredterritories to counter the partisan activity they knew would erupt in areas they controlled

Soviet preparationsDespite the impressions of Hitler and others in the German high command the Soviet Union was by no means weakRapid industrialization in the 1930s had led to industrial output second only to that of the United States and equal toGermany Production of military equipment grew steadily and in the pre-war years the economy becameprogressively more oriented toward military production In the early 1930s a very modern operational doctrine forthe Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulationsOn 5 May 1941 Stalin gave a speech to graduates of military academies in Moscow declaring War with Germanyis inevitable If comrade Molotov can manage to postpone the war for two or three months that will be our goodfortune but you yourselves must go off and take measures to raise the combat readiness of our forces[39] Manyhighlight this as recognition by Stalin of the impending attack

Development of the armed forces of the Soviet Unionfrom 1939 to 1941[40]

1 January 1939 22 June 1941 increase

Divisionscalculated

1315 3165 1407

Personnel 2485000 5774000 1324

Guns and mortars 55800 117600 1107

Tanks 21100 25700 218

Aircraft 7700 18700 1428

According to Taylor and Proektor (1974) the Soviet armed forces in the western districts were outnumbered with 26 million Soviet soldiers vs 45 million for the Axis The overall size of the Soviet armed forces in early July 1941 though amounted to a little more than 5 million men 26 million in the west 18 million in the far east with


the rest being deployed or training elsewhere[41] These figures however can be misleading The figure for Sovietstrength in the western districts of the Soviet Union counts only the First Strategic Echelon which was stationed onand behind the Soviet western frontier to a depth of 400 kilometers it also underestimates the size of the FirstStrategic Echelon which was actually 29 million strong The figure does not include the smaller Second StrategicEchelon which as of 22 June 1941 was in process of moving toward the frontier according to the Soviet strategicplan it was scheduled to be in position reinforcing the First Strategic Echelon by early July The total Axis strengthis also exaggerated 33 million German troops were earmarked for participation in Barbarossa but that figureincludes reserves which did not take part in the initial assault A further 600000 troops provided by Germanys alliesalso participated but mostly after the initial assaultTotal Axis forces available for Barbarossa were therefore in the order of 39 million On 22 June the GermanWehrmacht achieved a local superiority in its initial assault (98 German divisions) including 29 armoured andmotorized divisions some 90 of its mobile forces attacking on a front of 1200 km (750 mi) between the Baltic Seaand the Carpathian Mountains against NKVD border troops and the divisions of the Soviet First OperationalEchelon (the part of the First Strategic Echelon stationed immediately behind the frontier in the three western SpecialMilitary Districts) because it had completed its deployment and was ready to attack about two weeks before the RedArmy was scheduled to have finished its own deployment with the Second Strategic Echelon in place At the time41 of stationary Soviet bases were located in the near-boundary districts many of them in the 200 km (120 mi)strip around the border according to Red Army directive fuel equipment railroad cars etc were similarlyconcentrated there[42]

Moreover on mobilization as the war went on the Red Army gained steadily in strength While the strength of bothsides varied in general the 1941 campaign was fought with a slight Axis numerical superiority in manpower at thefront According to Mikhail Meltyukhov (2000477) by the start of war the Red Army numbered altogether5774211 troops 4605321 in ground forces 475656 in air forces 353752 in the navy 167582 as border guardsand 171900 in internal troops of the NKVDIn some key weapons systems however the Soviet numerical advantage was considerable In tanks for example theRed Army had a large quantitative superiority It possessed 23106 tanks[43] of which about 12782 were in the fiveWestern Military Districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front) However maintenance andreadiness standards were very poor ammunition and radios were in short supply and many units lacked the trucksneeded for resupply beyond their basic fuel and ammunition loadsAlso from 1938 the Soviets had partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry support but after theirexperiences in the Winter War and their observation of the German campaign against France had begun to emulatethe Germans and organize most of their armored assets into large armour divisions and corps This reorganizationwas only partially implemented at the dawn of Barbarossa[44] as not enough tanks were available to bring themechanized corps up to organic strengthThe German Wehrmacht had about 5200 tanks overall of which 3350 were committed to the invasion This yieldsa balance of immediately-available tanks of about 41 in the Red Armys favor The best Soviet tank the T-34 wasthe most modern in the world and the KV series the best armored The most advanced Soviet tank models howeverthe T-34 and KV-1 were not available in large numbers early in the war and only accounted for 72 of the totalSoviet tank force But while these 1861 modern tanks were technically superior to the 1404 German mediumPanzer III and IV tanks the Soviets in 1941 still lacked the communications training and experience to employ suchweapons effectivelyThe Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly superior training and readiness of German forces The Soviet officer corps and high command had been decimated by Stalins Great Purge (1936ndash1938) Of 90 generals arrested only six survived the purges as did only 36 of 180 divisional commanders and just seven out of 57 army corps commanders In total some 30000 Red Army personnel were executed[45]

while more were deported to Siberia and replaced with officers deemed more politically reliable Three of the five


pre-war marshals and about two thirds of the corps and division commanders were shot This often left younger lessexperienced officers in their places for example in 1941 75 of Red Army officers had held their posts for lessthan one year The average Soviet corps commander was 12 years younger than the average German divisioncommander These officers tended to be very reluctant to take the initiative and often lacked the training necessaryfor their jobsThe number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets favor However Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete andSoviet artillery lacked modern fire control techniques[46] Most Soviet units were on a peacetime footing explainingwhy aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows rather than dispersed making easy targetsfor the Luftwaffe in the first days of the conflict Prior to the invasion the VVS was forbidden to shoot down Luftwaffereconnaissance aircraft despite hundreds of prewar incursions into Soviet airspaceThe Soviet war effort in the first phase of the Eastern front war was severely hampered by a shortage of modernaircraft The Soviet fighter force was equipped with large numbers of obsolete aircraft such as the I-15 biplane andthe I-16 In 1941 the MiG-3 LaGG-3 and Yak-1 were just starting to roll off the production lines but were farinferior in all-round performance to the Messerschmitt Bf 109 or later the Fw 190 when it entered operations inSeptember 1941 Few aircraft had radios and those that were available were unencrypted and did not work reliablyThe poor performance of VVS (Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Soviet Air Force) during the Winter War with Finland hadincreased the Luftwaffes confidence that the Soviets could be mastered The standard of flight training had beenaccelerated in preparation for a German attack that was expected to come in 1942 or later But Soviet pilot trainingwas extremely poor Order No 0362 of the Peoples Commissar of Defense dated 22 December 1940 ordered flighttraining to be accelerated and shortened Incredibly while the Soviets had 201 MiG-3s and 37 MiG-1s combat readyon 22 June 1941 only four pilots had been trained to handle these machines[47]

The Red Army was dispersed and unprepared and units were often separated and without transportation toconcentrate prior to combat Although the Red Army had numerous well-designed artillery pieces some of the gunshad no ammunition Artillery units often lacked transportation to move their guns Tank units were rarelywell-equipped and also lacked training and logistical support Maintenance standards were very poor Units weresent into combat with no arrangements for refueling ammunition resupply or personnel replacement Often after asingle engagement units were destroyed or rendered ineffective The army was in the midst of reorganizing thearmor units into large tank corps adding to the disorganizationAs a result although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German army the reality in thefield was far different incompetent officers as well as partial lack of equipment insufficient motorized logisticalsupport and poor training placed the Red Army at a severe disadvantageIn August 1940 British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets only a week after Hitlerinformally approved the plans for Barbarossa[38] Stalins distrust of the British led to his ignoring the warningsbelieving it to be a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war[38] [48] In the spring of 1941 Stalins ownintelligence services and American intelligence made regular and repeated warnings of an impending Germanattack[49] However Stalin chose to ignore these warnings Although acknowledging the possibility of an attack ingeneral and making significant preparations he decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler[50] He also had anill-founded confidence in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which had been signed just two years before Last he alsosuspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR[51]

[52] Consequently the Soviet border troops were not put on full alert and were sometimes even forbidden to fire backwithout permission when attacked mdash though a partial alert was implemented on 10 April mdash they were simply notready when the German attack came[48]

Enormous Soviet forces were massed behind the western border in case the Germans did attack However these forces were very vulnerable due to changes in the tactical doctrine of the Red Army In 1938 it had adopted on the instigation of General Pavlov a standard linear defence tactic on a line with other nations Infantry divisions reinforced by an organic tank component would be dug in to form heavily fortified zones Then came the shock of


the Fall of France The French Army considered the strongest in the world was defeated in a mere six weeks Sovietanalysis of events based on incomplete information concluded that the collapse of the French was caused by areliance on linear defence and a lack of armored reservesThe Soviets decided not to repeat these mistakes Instead of digging in for linear defence the infantry divisionswould henceforth be concentrated in large formations[53] Most tanks would also be concentrated into 29 mechanizedcorps each with over 1031 tanks[54] Should the Germans attack their armoured spearheads would be cut off andwiped out by the mechanized corps These would then cooperate with the infantry armies to drive back the Germaninfantry vulnerable in its approach march The Soviet left wing in Ukraine was to be enormously reinforced to beable to execute a strategic envelopment after destroying German Army Group South it would swing north throughPoland in the back of Army Groups Centre and North With the complete annihilation of the encircled German Armythus made inevitable a Red Army offensive into the rest of Europe would follow[55] [56]

The Soviet offensive plans theory

German Soldiers with Soviet Civilians

Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR Adolf Hitler putforward a thesis that the Red Army made extensive preparations for anoffensive war in Europe thus justifying the German invasion as apre-emptive strike[57] After the war this view was brought forward bysome Wehrmacht leaders like Wilhelm Keitel[58]

This thesis[59] was reiterated in the 1980s[57] based on the analysis ofcircumstantial evidence[60] Thus it has been found that a proposal wasdrawn up by Zhukov and signed by Vasilevsky and Vatutin suggestingsecret mobilization and deploying Red Army troops on the Westernborder under the cover of training The proposed operations objective was to cut Germany off from its allies andespecially Romania with its oilfields that Germany needed to conduct the war[61]

According to Viktor Suvorov Stalin planned to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the ldquoIcebreakerrdquo) against the WestStalins idea was to fuel Hitlers aggressive plans against Europe and only after the capitalists had exhaustedthemselves fighting each other would the USSR make their strike For this reason Stalin provided significantmaterial and political support to Adolf Hitler while at the same time preparing the Red Army to ldquoliberaterdquo the wholeof Europe from Nazi occupation Suvorov argued that German Barbarossa actually was a pre-emptive strike thatcapitalized on the Soviet troop concentrations immediately on the 1941 borders Some others who support the ideathat Stalin prepared to attack like Mikhail Meltyukhov reject this part of Suvorovs theory arguing that both sidesprepared for attack on their own not in response to the other sides preparationsAlthough this thesis has drawn the attention of the general public in some countries[57] and has been supported bysome historians it has not been accepted by the majority of western historians[57] [62]

Order of battle


Strength of the opposing forces on theSoviet Western border 22 June 1941

Germany and Allies Soviet Union Ratio

Divisions 166 190 1 11

Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1

Guns and mortars 42601 59787 1 14

Tanks (incl assaultguns)

4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26

Source Mikhail Meltyukhov ldquoStalins Missed Chancerdquo table 47[64]

Composition of the Axis forcesHalder as the Chief of General Staff OKH concentrated the following Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe forces for theoperationArmy Group North (Heeresgruppe Nord) (Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) staged in East Prussia with (26 divisions)bull 16th Army (16 Armee) (Ernst Busch)bull 4th Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 4) (Hoepner)bull 18th Army (18 Armee) (Georg von Kuumlchler)bull Air Fleet 1 (Luftflotte eins) (Alfred Keller)Army Group Centre (Heeresgruppe Mitte) (Fedor von Bock) staged in Eastern Poland with (49 divisions)bull 4th Army (4 Armee) (Guumlnther von Kluge)bull 2nd Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 2) (Guderian)bull 3rd Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 3) (Hermann Hoth)bull 9th Army (9 Armee) (Adolf Strauszlig)bull Air Fleet 2 (Luftflotte zwei) (Albert Kesselring)Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Suumld) (Gerd von Rundstedt) was staged in Southern Poland and Romania with(41 divisions)bull 17th Army (17 Armee) (Carl-Heinrich von Stuumllpnagel)

bull Slovak Expeditionary Force (Čatloš)bull Royal Hungarian Army Fast Moving Army Corps(Mikloacutes) - Initially part of a larger Karpat Group (Karpat

Gruppe)bull 1st Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 1) (von Kleist)bull 11th Army (Eugen Ritter von Schobert)

bull Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia CSIR) (Messe)bull 6th Army (6 Armee) (Walther von Reichenau)

bull Romanian 3rd Army (Dumitrescu)bull Romanian 4th Army (Constantinescu)

bull Air Fleet 4 (Luftflotte vier) (Alexander Loumlhr)Staged from Norway a smaller group of forces consisted ofbull Army High Command Norway (Armee-Oberkommando Norwegen) (Nikolaus von Falkenhorst) with two Corpsbull Air Fleet 5 (Luftflotte fuumlnf) (Stumpff)


Numerous smaller units from all over Nazi-occupied Europe like the Legion of French Volunteers AgainstBolshevism (Leacutegion des Volontaires Franccedilais contre le Bolcheacutevisme) supported the German war effort

Composition of the Soviet ForcesAt the beginning of the German Reichrsquos invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 the Red Army areas ofresponsibility in the European USSR were divided into four active Fronts More Fronts would be formed within theoverall responsibility of the three Strategic Directions commands which corresponded approximately to a GermanArmy (Wehrmacht Heer) Army Group (Heeresgruppen) in terms of geographic area of operationsOn Zhukovs orders immediately following the invasion the Northern Front was formed from the Leningrad MilitaryDistrict the North-Western Front from the Baltic Special Military District the Western Front was formed from theWestern Special Military District and the Soviet Southwestern Front was formed from the Kiev Special MilitaryDistrict The Southern Front was created on the 25 June 1941 from the Odessa Military DistrictThe first Directions were established on 10 July 1941 with Voroshilov commanding the North-Western StrategicDirection Timoshenko commanding the Western Strategic Direction and Budyonny commanding theSouth-Western Strategic Direction[65]

The forces of the North-Western Direction were[66]

bull The Northern Front (Colonel General Markian Popov) bordered Finland and included the 14th Army 7th Army23rd Army and smaller units subordinate to the Front commander

bull The North-Western Front (Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov) defended the Baltic region and consisted of the8th Army 11th Army and the 27th Army and other front troops (34 divisions)

bull The Northern and Baltic FleetsThe forces of the Western Direction werebull The Western Front (General Dmitry Grigoryevitch Pavlov) had the 3rd Army 4th Army 10th Army and the

Army Headquarters of the 13th Army which coordinated independent Front formations (45 divisions)The forces of the South-Western Direction werebull The South-Western Front (Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos) was formed from the 5th Army 6th Army 12th

Army and the 26th Army as well as a group of units under Strategic Direction command (45 divisions)bull The Southern Front (General Ivan Tyulenev) was created on 25 June 1941 with 9th Independent Army 18th

Army 2nd and 18th Mechanized Corps (26 divisions)bull The Black Sea FleetBeside the Armies in the Fronts there were a further six armies in the Western region of the USSR 16th Army 19thArmy 20th Army 21st Army 22nd Army and the 24th Army that formed together with independent units theStavka Reserve Group of Armies later renamed the Reserve Front nominally under Stalins direct command


The invasion

Phase 1 The Frontier Battles (22 June 1941 - 3 July 1941)

German advances during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa

At 0315 on Sunday 22 June 1941 theAxis bombed major cities inSoviet-occupied Poland It is hard topinpoint the opposing sides strength inthis initial phase as most Germanfigures include reserves allocated tothe East but not yet committed as wellas several other comparability issuesbetween the German and USSRsfigures Roughly three millionWehrmacht troops went into action on22 June and they faced slightly fewerSoviet troops in the border MilitaryDistricts The contribution of theGerman allies would generally notmake itself felt until later The surprisewas complete though the Stavkaalarmed by reports that Wehrmachtunits were approaching the border had at 0030 ordered that the border troops be warned that war was imminentonly a small number of units were alerted in time

Aside from the roughly 32 million German ground troops engaged in or earmarked for the Eastern Campaign about500000 Romanian Hungarian Slovakian Croatian and Italian troops accompanied the German forces while theArmy of Finland made a major contribution in the north The 250th Spanish Blue Infantry Division was aformation of volunteered Spanish Falangists and Nazi sympathisersLuftwaffe reconnaissance units worked frantically to plot troop concentration supply dumps and airfields and markthem for destruction The Luftwaffes task was to neutralize the Soviet Air Force This was not achieved in the firstdays of operations despite the Soviets having concentrated aircraft in huge groups on the permanent airfields ratherthan dispersing them on field landing strips making them ideal targets The Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed1489 aircraft on the first day of operations[67] Hermann Goumlring mdash Chief of the Luftwaffe mdash distrusted the reportsand ordered the figure checked Picking through the wreckages of Soviet airfields the Luftwaffes figures provedconservative as over 2000 destroyed Soviet aircraft were found[67] The Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft on the first day ofcombat The Germans claimed to have destroyed only 3100 Soviet aircraft in the first three days In fact Sovietlosses were far higher some 3922 Soviet machines had been lost (according to Russian Historian ViktorKulikov)[68] The Luftwaffe had achieved air superiority over all three sectors of the front and would maintain ituntil the close of the year[69] The Luftwaffe could now devote large numbers of its Geschwader (see LuftwaffeOrganization) to support the ground forces


Army Group North

Crossing of the Daugava (Dvina) river by the20th Panzer Division

Opposite Army Group North were two Soviet armies The WehrmachtOKH thrust the 4th Panzer Group with a strength of 600 tanks at thejunction of the two Soviet armies in that sector The 4th Panzer Groupsobjective was to cross the Neman and Daugava Rivers which were thetwo largest obstacles in the advance to Leningrad On the first day thetanks crossed the River Neman and penetrated 50 mi (80 km) NearRaseiniai the armoured units were counter attacked by 300 tanks ofthe 3rd and 12th Soviet Mechanized Corps It took four days for theGermans to encircle and destroy the Soviet armour who lacked fuelammunition and coordination By the end of the first week the SovietMechanized Corps had lost 90 of its strength[70] The Panzer Groupsthen crossed the Daugava near Daugavpils The Germans were nowwithin striking distance of Leningrad However due to their deteriorated supply situation Hitler ordered the PanzerGroups to hold their position while the infantry formations caught up The orders to hold would last over a weekgiving time for the Soviets to build up a defence around Leningrad and along the bank of the Luga River Furthercomplicating the Soviet position on 22 June the anti-Soviet June Uprising in Lithuania began and on the next dayan independent Lithuania was proclaimed[71] An estimated 30000 Lithuanian rebels engaged Soviet forces joinedby ethnic Lithuanians from the Red Army As the Germans reached further north armed resistance against theSoviets broke out in Estonia as well The Battle of Estonia ended on 7 August when the 18th Army reached theGulf of Finland coast[72]

Army Group Centre

Captured Soviet equipment

Opposite Army Group Centre were four Soviet armies the 3rd 4th10th and 11th Armies The Soviet Armies occupied a salient that juttedinto German occupied Polish territory with the Soviet salients center atBiałystok Beyond Białystok was Minsk both the capital ofByelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and a key railway junction AGCentres two Panzer Groups goal was to meet at Minsk denying theRed Army an escape route from the salient The 3rd Panzer Groupbroke through the junction of two Soviet Fronts in the north of thesalient and crossed the River Neman while the 2nd Panzer Groupcrossed the Western Bug river in the South While the Panzer Groupsattacked the Wehrmacht Army Group Centre infantry Armies struck at the salient eventually encircling Soviettroops at Białystok

Moscow at first failed to grasp the dimensions of the catastrophe that had befallen the USSR Marshall Timoshenkoordered all Soviet forces to launch a general counter-offensive but with supply and ammunition dumps destroyedand a complete collapse of communication the uncoordinated attacks failed Zhukov signed the infamous Directiveof Peoples Commissariat of Defence No 3 (he later claimed under pressure from Stalin) which ordered the RedArmy to start an offensive He commanded the troops ldquoto encircle and destroy the enemy grouping near Suwałki andto seize the Suwałki region by the evening of 26 June and ldquoto encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading inVladimir-Volynia and Brody directionrdquo and even ldquoto seize the Lublin region by the evening of 246rdquo[73] Thismaneuver failed and disorganized Red Army units which were soon destroyed by the Wehrmacht forcesOn 27 June 2 and 3 Panzer Groups met up at Minsk advancing 200 mi (320 km) into Soviet territory and a third ofthe way to Moscow In the vast pocket between Minsk and the Polish border the remnants of 32 Soviet Rifle eight


tank and motorized cavalry and artillery divisions were encircled

Army Group South

In the south opposite Army Group South were three Soviet armies the 5th 6th and 26th Soviet commandersreacted quicker and Germans faced determined resistance from the start The German infantry Armies struck at thejunctions of these armies while the 1st Panzer Group drove its armored spearhead of 600 tanks right through theSoviet 6th Army aiming to take Brody On 26 June five Soviet mechanized corps with over 1000 tanks mounted amassive counter-attack on the 1st Panzer Group The battle was among the fiercest of the invasion lasting over fourdays in the end the Germans prevailed though the Soviets inflicted heavy losses on the 1st Panzer GroupWith the Soviet counter-offensives failure the last substantial Soviet tank forces in Western Ukraine had beencommitted and the Red Army assumed a defensive posture focusing on a strategic withdrawal under severepressure By the end of the first week all three German Army Groups had achieved major campaign objectivesHowever in the vast pocket around Minsk and Białystok the Soviets were still fighting reducing the pocket wascausing high German casualties and many Red Army troops were escaping The usual estimated casualties of theRed Army amount to 600000 killed missing captured or wounded The Soviet air arm the VVS lost 1561 aircraftover Kiev[74] The battle was a huge tactical (Hitler thought strategic) victory but it had drawn the German forcesaway from an early offensive against Moscow and had delayed further German progress by 11 weeks General KurtVon Tippleskirch noted The Russians had indeed lost a battle but they won the campaign[74]

Phase 2 Battle for Smolensk (3 July 1941 - 5 August 1941)

German advances during Operation Barbarossa 22 June 1941 to 9 September 1941

On 3 July Hitler finally gave thego-ahead for the Panzers to resumetheir drive east after the infantrydivisions had caught up However arainstorm typical of Russian summersslowed their progress and Russiandefenses stiffened The delays gave theSoviets time to organize a massivecounterattack against Army GroupCenter Army Group Centers ultimateobjective was Smolensk whichcommanded the road to MoscowFacing the Germans was an old Sovietdefensive line held by six armies On 6July the Soviets attacked the 3rdPanzer Army with 700 tanks TheGermans defeated this counterattackwith overwhelming air superiority The2nd Panzer Army crossed the River Dnieper and closed on Smolensk from the south while the 3rd Panzer Armyafter defeating the Soviet counter attack closed on Smolensk from the north Trapped between their pincers werethree Soviet armies On 18 July the Panzer Groups came to within 10 miles of closing the gap but the trap would notsnap shut until 26 July When the Panzer Groups finally closed the gap 180000 Red Army troops were captured[75]

but liquidating the pocket took another 10 days in which time 100000 Soviet troops escaped to stand between theGermans and Moscow

Four weeks into the campaign the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength The German troops had used their initial supplies without attaining the expected strategic freedom of movement Operations were


now slowed down to allow for resupply the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation Hitler hadlost faith in encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers Hitler now believed he coulddefeat the Soviets by economic damage depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war That meantseizing the industrial center of Kharkov the Donets Basin and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the south and aspeedy capture of Leningrad a major center of military production in the north He also wanted to link up with theFinns to the northFedor von Bock and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa vehemently argued in favorof continuing the all-out drive toward Moscow Besides the psychological importance of capturing the enemyscapital the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms production and the center of the Sovietcommunications and transportation system More importantly intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the RedArmy was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timoshenko for an all-out defense of the capital But Hitler wasadamant and issued a direct order to Guderian bypassing his commanding officer von Bock to send Army GroupCentres tanks to the north and south temporarily halting the drive to Moscow

Phase 3 Kiev and Leningrad (5 August 1941 - 2 October 1941)By mid-July below the Pinsk Marshes the Germans had come within a few kilometers of Kiev The 1st Panzer Armythen went south while the German 17th Army struck east and in between the Germans trapped three Soviet armiesnear Uman As the Germans eliminated the pocket the tanks turned north and crossed the Dnieper Meanwhile the2nd Panzer Army diverted from Army Group Centre had crossed the River Desna with 2nd Army on its right flankThe two Panzer armies now trapped four Soviet armies and parts of two othersFor its final attack on Leningrad the 4th Panzer Army was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Centre On 8August the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses the German 16th Army attacked to the northeast the 18thArmy and the Estonian guerilla Forest Brothers cleared the country and advanced to Lake Peipus[76] By the end ofAugust 4th Panzer Army had penetrated to within 30 mi (48 km) of Leningrad The Finns had pushed southeast onboth sides of Lake Ladoga reaching the old Finnish-Soviet frontierAt this stage Hitler ordered the final destruction of Leningrad with no prisoners taken and on 9 September ArmyGroup North began the final push which within ten days brought it within 7 mi (11 km) of the city However theadvance over the last 10 km (62 mi) proved very slow and casualties mounted At this stage Hitler lost patience andordered that Leningrad should not be stormed but starved into submission Deprived of its Panzer forces ArmyGroup Center had remained static and was subjected to numerous Soviet counter-attacks in particular the YelnyaOffensive in which the Germans suffered their first major tactical defeat since their invasion began These attacksdrew Hitlers attention back to Army Group Center and its drive on Moscow The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4thPanzer Armies to break off their siege of Leningrad and support Army Group Center on its attack on MoscowBefore the attack on Moscow could begin operations in Kiev needed to be finished Half of Army Group Centre hadswung to the south in the back of the Kiev position while Army Group South moved to the north from its Dnieprbridgehead The encirclement of Soviet Forces in Kiev was achieved on 16 September A savage battle ensued inwhich the Soviets were hammered with tanks artillery and aerial bombardment In the end after ten days of viciousfighting the Germans claimed over 600000 Soviet soldiers captured Actual losses were 452720 men 3867artillery guns and mortars from 43 Divisions of the 5th 37th 26th and 21st Soviet Armies[77]


Phase 4 Operation Typhoon (2 October 1941 - 5 December 1941)

The eastern front at the time of the Battle of Moscow Initial Wehrmacht advance -to 9 July 1941 Subsequent advances - to 1 September 1941 Encirclementand battle of Kiev - to 9 September 1941 Final Wehrmacht advance - to 5

December 1941

After Kiev the Red Army no longeroutnumbered the Germans and therewere no more directly available trainedreserves To defend Moscow Stalincould field 800000 men in 83divisions but no more than 25divisions were fully effectiveOperation Typhoon the drive toMoscow began on 2 October In frontof Army Group Centre was a series ofelaborate defense lines the firstcentered on Vyazma and the second onMozhaysk

The first blow took the Sovietscompletely by surprise as 2nd PanzerArmy returning from the south tookOryol which was 75 mi (121 km) southof the Soviet first main defence lineThree days later the Panzers pushed onBryansk while 2nd Army attacked from the west The Soviet 3rd and 13th armies were now encircled To the norththe 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked Vyazma trapping the 19th 20th 24th and 32nd Soviet Armies Moscowsfirst line of defence had been shattered The pocket yielded 673000 Soviet prisoners bringing the tally since thestart of the invasion to three million Soviet soldiers captured The Soviets had only 90000 men and 150 tanks left forthe defense of Moscow

On 13 October 3rd Panzer Army penetrated to within 90 mi (140 km) of the capital Martial law was declared inMoscow Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon the weather had deteriorated Temperatures fell whilethere was a continued rainfall turning the unpaved road network into mud and steadily slowing the German advanceon Moscow to as little as 2 mi (32 km) a day The supply situation rapidly deteriorated On 31 October the GermanArmy High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were re-organized The pause gave theSoviets who were in a far better supply situation time to consolidate their positions and organize formations ofnewly activated reservists In little over a month the Soviets organized eleven new armies which included 30divisions of Siberian troops These had been freed from the Soviet far east as Soviet intelligence had assured Stalinthere was no longer a threat from the Japanese With the Siberian forces came over 1000 tanks and 1000 aircraftThe Germans were nearing exhaustion they also began to recall Napoleons invasion of Russia General GuumlntherBlumentritt noted in his diary

They remembered what happened to Napoleons Army Most of them began to re-read Caulaincourtsgrim account of 1812 That had a weighty influence at this critical time in 1941 I can still see VonKluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office and standing before the mapwith Caulaincourts book in his hand[78]

On 15 November with the ground hardening due to the cold weather the Germans once again began the attack on Moscow Although the troops themselves were now able to advance again there had been no delay allowed to improve the supply situation Facing the Germans were the 5th 16th 30th 43rd 49th and 50th Soviet armies The Germans intended to let 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow from the northeast 2nd Panzer Army would attack Tula and then close in on Moscow from the south As the Soviets reacted


to the flanks 4th Army would attack the center In two weeks of desperate fighting lacking sufficient fuel andammunition the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow However in the south 2nd Panzer Army was beingblocked On 22 November Soviet Siberian units augmented with the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies attacked the 2ndPanzer Army and inflicted a shocking defeat on the Germans However 4th Panzer Army pushed the Soviet 16thArmy back and succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal and began the encirclementOn 2 December part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within 15 mi (24 km) of Moscow and could see thespires of the Kremlin[79] but by then the first blizzards of the winter began The Wehrmacht was not equipped forwinter warfare Frostbite and disease caused more casualties than combat and dead and wounded had alreadyreached 155000 in three weeks Some divisions were now at 50 strength The bitter cold also caused severeproblems for their guns and equipment and weather conditions grounded the Luftwaffe Newly built-up Soviet unitsnear Moscow now numbered over 500000 men and on 5 December they launched a massive counterattack whichpushed the Germans back over 200 mi (320 km) The invasion of the USSR eventually cost the German Army over250000 dead and 500000 wounded the majority of whom became casualties after 1 October and an unknownnumber of Axis casualties such as Hungarians Romanians and Waffen SS troops as well as co-belligerent Finns

Later events

German Soldiers with destroyed Soviet tank atKaunas

Shirer argues that the fatal decision of the operation was thepostponement from the original date of 15 May because Hitler wantedto intervene against an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia and Greekadvances against Italys occupation of Albania However this was justone of the reasons for the postponement mdash the other was the latespring of 1941 in Russia compounded by particularly rainy weather inJune 1941 that made a number of roads in western parts of the SovietUnion impassable to heavy vehicles During the campaign Hitlerordered the main thrust toward Moscow to be diverted southward tohelp the southern army group capture Ukraine This move delayed theassault on the Soviet capital though it also helped secure Army Group Centers southern flank By the time theyturned to Moscow the Red Armys fierce resistance the mud following the autumn rains and eventually snowbrought their advance to a halt

In addition resistance by the Soviets who proclaimed a Great Patriotic War in defence of the motherland wasmuch fiercer than the German command had expected The border fortress of Brest Belarus illustrates that tenacityattacked on the very first day of the German invasion the fortress was expected to fall within hours but held out forweeks (Soviet propaganda later asserted it held out for six weeks)[80] German logistics also became a majorproblem as supply lines grew very long and vulnerable to Soviet partisan attacks in the rear The Soviets carried outa scorched earth policy on some of the land they were forced to abandon in order to deny the Germans food fueland buildingsDespite the setbacks the German advance continued often destroying or surrounding whole armies of Soviet troopsand forcing them to surrender The battle for Kiev was especially brutal On 19 September Army Group South seizedcontrol of Kiev and took 665000 Soviets prisoner Kiev was later awarded the title Hero City for its heroic defenceArmy Group North which was to conquer the Baltic countries and eventually Leningrad reached the southernoutskirts of Leningrad by August 1941 There fierce Soviet resistance stopped it Since capturing the city seemedtoo costly German command decided to starve the city to death by blockade starting the Siege of Leningrad Thecity held out despite several attempts by the Germans to break through its defenses unrelenting air and artilleryattacks and severe shortages of food and fuel until the Germans were driven back again from the citys approachesin early 1944 Leningrad was the first Soviet city to receive the title of Hero City


In addition to the main attacks of Barbarossa German forces occupied Finnish Petsamo in order to secure importantnickel mines They also launched the beginning of a series of attacks against Murmansk on 28 June 1941 Thatassault was known as Operation Silberfuchs

Reasons for initial Soviet defeats

A column of Red Army POWs captured nearMinsk is marched west

A group of Soviet POWs taken to undefinedPrison Camp

The Red Army and air force were so badly defeated in 1941 chieflybecause they were ill-prepared for the Axis surprise attack By 1941the Germans were the most experienced and best-trained troops in theworld for the rapid blitzkrieg-style warfare that encompassed theEastern Front during the second half of 1941 The Axis had a doctrineof mobility and annihilation excellent communications and theconfidence of repeated low-cost victories The Soviet armed forces bycontrast lacked leadership training and readiness The officer corps ofthe Red Army had been decimated by Stalins Great Purge of1936-1938 and their replacements appointed by Stalin for politicalreasons often lacked military competence which was shown by thedifficulty that the Soviet Union had in defeating Finland in theRusso-Finnish War of 1939-1940 Much of Soviet planning assumedthat no war would take place before 1942 thus the Axis attack camewhen new organizations and promising but untested weapons werejust beginning to trickle into operational units Much of the SovietArmy in Europe was concentrated along the new western border of theSoviet Union in former Polish territory that lacked significantdefenses allowing many Soviet military units to be overrun anddestroyed in the first weeks of war Initially many Soviet units werealso hampered by Semyon Timoshenkos and Georgy Zhukovs prewarorders (demanded by Joseph Stalin) not to engage or to respond toprovocations (followed by a similarly damaging first reaction from Moscow an order to stand and fight thencounterattack this left those units vulnerable to encirclement) by a lack of experienced officers and by bureaucraticinertia

Soviet tactical errors in the first few weeks of the offensive proved catastrophic Initially the Red Army was fooledby overestimation of its own capabilities Instead of intercepting German armour Soviet mechanised corps wereambushed and destroyed after Luftwaffe dive bombers inflicted heavy losses Soviet tanks poorly maintained andmanned by inexperienced crews suffered an appalling rate of breakdowns Lack of spare parts and trucks ensured alogistical collapse The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions proved disastrous Without tanks or sufficientmotorization Soviet troops could not wage mobile warfare against the AxisStalins orders not to retreat or surrender led to static linear positions that German tanks easily breached againquickly cutting supply lines and surrounding whole Soviet armies Only later did Stalin allow his troops to retreatwherever possible and regroup to mount a defense in depth or to counterattack More than 24 million Soviet troopshad been captured by December 1941 by which time German and Soviet forces were fighting almost in the suburbsof Moscow Most of these prisoners were to die from exposure starvation disease or willful mistreatment by theGerman regimeDespite the Axis failure to achieve Barbarossas initial goals the huge Soviet losses caused a shift in Sovietpropaganda Before the onset of hostilities against Germany the Soviet government had said its army was verystrong But by autumn 1941 the Soviet line was that the Red Army had been weak that there had not been enough


time to prepare for war and that the German attack had come as a surprise

OutcomeThe climax of Operation Barbarossa came when Army Group Center already short on supplies because of theOctober mud was ordered to advance on Moscow forward units of the 2nd Panzer Divisions 38 Panzer PioneerAbteilung (38PzPiAbtl)[81] (armored engineers) came within sight of the spires of the Kremlin when they reachedthe rail line just south of the town of Lobnya 16 km (99 mi) from Moscow on 1 December 1941 Soviet troopswell supplied and reinforced by fresh divisions from Siberia defended Moscow in the Battle of Moscow and drovethe Germans back as the winter advanced The bulk of the counter-offensive was directed at Army Group Centerwhich was closest to MoscowWith no shelter few supplies inadequate winter clothing chronic food shortages and nowhere to go German troopshad no choice but to wait out the winter in the frozen wasteland The Germans avoided being routed by Sovietcounterattacks but suffered heavy casualties from battle and exposureAt the time the seizure of Moscow was considered the key to victory for Germany Nowadays historians debatewhether the loss of the Soviet capital would have caused collapse but Operation Barbarossa failed to achieve thatgoal In December 1941 Germany joined Japan in declaring war against the United StatesThe outcome of Operation Barbarossa hurt the Soviets at least as badly as the Germans however Although theGermans had failed to take Moscow outright they held huge areas of the western Soviet Union including the entireregions of what are now Belarus Ukraine and the Baltic states plus parts of Russia proper west of MoscowGerman forces had advanced 1050 mi (1690 km) and maintained a linearly-measured front of 1900 mi (3100km)[82] The Germans held up to 500000 sq mi (1300000 km2) of territory with over 75 million people at the end of1941 and went on to seize another 250000 sq mi (650000 km2) before being forced to retreat after defeats atStalingrad and Kursk However the occupied areas were not always properly controlled by the Germans andunderground activity rapidly escalated Wehrmacht occupation was brutal from the start due to directives issued byHitler himself at the operations start according to which Slavic peoples were considered a race of UntermenschenThis attitude alienated the population while in some areas (such as Ukraine) it seems that some local people hadbeen ready to consider the Germans as liberators helping them to get rid of Stalin Anti-German partisan operationsintensified when Red Army units that had dissolved into the countrys large uninhabited areas re-emerged asunderground forces and under the German repressive policies The Germans held on stubbornly in the face of Sovietcounterattacks resulting in huge casualties on both sides in many battlesThe war on the Eastern Front went on for four years The death toll may never be established with any degree ofcertainty The most recent western estimate of Soviet military deaths is 7 million that lost their lives either in combator in Axis captivity Soviet civilian deaths remain under contention though roughly 20 million is a frequently citedfigure German military deaths are also to a large extent unclear The most recent German estimate (RuumldigerOvermans) concluded that about 43 million Germans and a further 900000 Axis forces lost their lives either incombat or in Soviet captivity Operation Barbarossa is listed among the most lethal battles in world historyThe Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva Convention (1929) However a month after the German invasion in1941 an offer was made for a reciprocal adherence to the Hague convention This note was left unanswered byThird Reich officials[83]


Causes of the failure of Operation BarbarossaThe gravity of the beleaguered German armys situation towards the end of 1941 was due to the Red Armysincreasing strength and factors that in the short run severely restricted the German forces effectiveness Chief amongthese were their overstretched deployment a serious transport crisis and the eroded strength of most divisions Theinfantry deficit that appeared by 1 September 1941 was never made good For the rest of the war in the Soviet Unionthe Wehrmacht would be short of infantry and support servicesParallels have been drawn with Napoleons invasion of Russia

Underestimated Soviet potentialGerman war planners grossly underestimated the mobilization potential of the Red Army its primary mobilizationsize (ie the total of already trained units that could be put on a war footing quickly) was about twice the expectednumber By early August new armies had replaced destroyed ones This alone implied Operation Barbarossasfailure for the Germans now had to limit their operations for a month to bring up new supplies leaving only sixweeks to complete the battle before the start of the mud season On the other hand the Red Army proved it couldreplace huge losses quickly and was not destroyed as a coherent force When the divisions of conscripts trainedbefore the war were destroyed new ones replaced them On average about half a million men were drafted eachmonth for the duration of the war The Soviets also proved very skilled in raising and training many new armies fromthe different ethnic populations of the far flung republics It was this Soviet ability to mobilize vast (if often poorlytrained and equipped) forces rapidly and continually that allowed the Soviet Union to survive the critical first sixmonths of the war and it was a grave underestimation of this capacity that rendered German planning unrealisticAlso data collected by Soviet intelligence excluded the possibility of a war with Japan which allowed the Soviets totransfer forces from the Far East (troops fully trained to fight a winter war) to the European theaterThe German High Command grossly underestimated the control the central Soviet government exercised TheGerman High Command wrongly thought the Soviet government was ineffective The Germans based their hopes ofquick victory on the belief the Soviet communist system was like a rotten structure which would collapse from ahard kick[84] In fact the Soviet system proved resilient and surprisingly adaptable In the face of early crushingdefeats the Soviets managed to dismantle entire industries threatened by the German advance These criticalfactories along with their skilled workers were transported by rail to secure locations beyond the Germans reachDespite the loss of raw materials and the chaos of an invasion the Soviets managed to build new armamentsfactories in sufficient numbers to allow mass production of needed war machinery The Soviet government wasnever in danger of collapse and remained at all times in tight control of the Soviet war effortThe Germans treated Soviet prisoners brutally and showed cruelty to overrun Soviet populations This treatmentinstilled a deep hatred in the hearts and minds of the Soviet citizens Hatred of the Germans enabled the Sovietgovernment to extract a level of sacrifice from the Soviet population unheard of in Western nationsThe Germans underestimated the Soviet people as well The German High Command viewed Soviet soldiers asincompetent and considered the average citizen as an inferior human being German soldiers were stunned by theferocity with which the Red Army fought German planners were amazed at the level of suffering the Soviet citizenscould endure and still work and fightThe Germans also underestimated Soviet technical and productive capacity


Faults of logistical planningAt the start of the war in the dry summer the Germans took the Soviets by surprise and destroyed a large part of theSoviet Red Army in the first weeks When good weather gave way to the harsh autumn and winter and the RedArmy recovered the German offensive began to falter The German army could not be sufficiently supplied forprolonged combat indeed there was not enough fuel for the whole army to reach its objectivesThis was well understood by the German supply units even before the operation but their warnings weredisregarded[85] The entire German plan assumed that within five weeks they would have attained full strategicfreedom due to a complete collapse of the Red Army Only then could they have diverted necessary logistic supportto fuelling the few mobile units needed to occupy the defeated stateGerman infantry and tanks stormed 300 mi (480 km) ahead in the first week but their supply lines struggled to keepup Soviet railroads could at first not be used due to a difference in railway gauges until a sufficient supply of trainswas seized Lack of supplies significantly slowed down the blitzkriegThe German logistical planning also seriously overestimated the condition of the Soviet transportation network Theroad and railway network of former Eastern Poland was well known but beyond that information was limited Roadsthat looked impressive on maps turned out to be just mere dust roads or were only in the planning stages[85]

WeatherA paper published by the US Armys Combat Studies Institute in 1981 concluded that Hitlers plans miscarriedbefore the onset of severe winter weather He was so confident of quick victory that he did not prepare for even thechance of winter warfare in the Soviet Union Nonetheless his eastern army suffered more than 734000 casualties(about 23 of its average strength of 3200000 troops) in the first five months of the invasion and on 27 November1941 General Eduard Wagner Quartermaster General of the German Army reported We are at the end of ourresources in both personnel and material We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter[86]

The German forces were unready to deal with harsh weather and the poor road network of the USSR In autumnterrain slowed the Wehrmachts progress Few roads were paved The ground in the USSR was very loose sand insummer sticky muck in autumn and heavy snow in winter German tanks had narrow treads with little traction andpoor flotation in mud In contrast the new generation of Soviet tanks such as the T-34 and KV had wider tracks andwere far more mobile in these conditions The 600000 large western European horses the Germans used for supplyand artillery movement did not cope well with this weather The smaller horses the Red Army used were much betteradapted to the climate and could even scrape the icy ground with their hooves to dig up the weeds beneathGerman troops were mostly unprepared for the harsh weather changes in the autumn and winter of 1941 Equipmenthad been prepared for such winter conditions but the severely overstrained transport network could not move it tothe front Consequently the troops lacked adequate cold-weather gear and some soldiers had to pack newspapersinto their jackets to stay warm while temperatures dropped to below -30 degC (-22 degF) While at least some coldweather uniforms were available they rarely reached the Eastern Front because Hitler ordered that supply lines givemore priority to shipments of ammunition and fuel To operate furnaces and heaters the Germans also burnedprecious fuel that was in short supply Soviet soldiers in contrast often had warm quilted uniforms felt-lined bootsand fur hatsGerman weapons malfunctioned in the cold Lubricating oils were unsuitable for these temperatures leading toengine malfunction and misfiring weapons To load shells into a tankrsquos main gun frozen grease had to be chipped offwith a knife Soviet units faced less severe problems due to their experience with cold weather Aircraft hadinsulating blankets to keep their engines warm while parked Lighter-weight oil was used German tanks andarmored vehicles could not move due to a lack of antifreeze causing fuel to solidifyDue to the fact that few Russian roads were paved when the rains and snow came in late October and earlyNovember most of the main roads turned to mud and with a combination of longer supply lines the German


advanced stalled within sight of the spires of Moscow The Soviet December 1941 counteroffensive led primarily bySiberian troops trained for harsh winter combat recently arriving from the east along with the numerous T-34 tanksheld in reserve advanced up to 100 mi (160 km) in some sectors showing that mobile warfare was still possible inthe Russian winterWhen the severe winter began Hitler feared a repetition of Napoleons disastrous retreat from Moscow He orderedthe German forces to hold their ground defiantly in the face of Soviet counterattacks This became known as thestand or die order While some historians have argued that this order prevented the Germans from being routedothers contend that this order restricted Germanys ability to conduct mobile defensive warfare and led to heavycasualties from battle and cold

Aftermath

Soviet World War II poster depicting retreating Nazisamong them Hitler and Goumlring It reads Death to the

German Occupiers

With the failure in the Battle of Moscow all German plans of aquick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be revised The Sovietcounter offensives in the Winter of 1941 caused heavy casualtieson both sides but ultimately lifted the German threat to MoscowNevertheless despite this setback the Soviet Union sufferedheavily from the loss of big parts of its army allowing theGermans to mount another large scale offensive in the summer of1942 called Case Blue now directed to the oil fields of BakuThis offensive again failed in the same way as Barbarossa theGermans conquering vast amounts of no-mans-land but ultimatelyfailing to achieve their final goals with the defeat at StalingradWith the now running Soviet war economy and its much greatermanpower reserves the Soviet Union was able to simplyoutproduce and outnumber the Germans who were not preparedfor a long war of attrition This way the last German all outoffensive in 1943 in the Battle of Kursk failed After three years ofconstant warfare the Germans were exhausted and so the Sovietswere finally able to defeat the Germans decisively in OperationBagration in summer 1944 This led to a chain of fast Sovietvictories which now pushed the Germans back to Berlin in just oneyear leading to the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945

See alsobull Eastern Front (World War II)bull Winter Warbull Timeline of the Eastern Front of World War IIbull Black Sea Campaigns (1941-44)bull Siege of Leningrad - the siege began in 1941 and was ended in 1944bull Continuation War ndash the war at Finnish frontbull Operation Silberfuchs and Blaufuchs ndash the attack on the Soviet Arctic and GermanndashFinnish general operational

plansbull Molotov Line ndash An incomplete Soviet defence line at the start of Operation Barbarossabull Operation Northern Light ndash Summer of 1942 was another major attack against besieged Leningradbull Captured Tanks and Armoured cars for German use in Russian Front


bull Captured German equipment in Soviet use on the Eastern frontbull Pobediteli ndash Russian project celebrating the 60th anniversary of World War IIbull The Battle of Russia ndash film from the Why We Fight propaganda film seriesRussian folk song about June 22 the day Germany invaded http en wikipedia org wiki The_22_June_song

Referencesbull Bellamy Christopher (2007) Absolute War Soviet Russia in World War Two New York Knopf Publishers

ISBN 978-0-3754-1086-4bull Bergstrom Christer (2007) Barbarossa - The Air Battle July-December 1941 London ChervronIan Allen

ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2bull Bethell Nicholas TimendashLife (2000) Uacutetok na SSSR druhaacute světovaacute vaacutelka (Attack on the USSR World War 2)

Prague Svojtka amp Co ISBN 80-7237-279-3bull Clark Alan (1965) Barbarossa The RussianndashGerman Conflict 1941ndash45 New York Willam Morrow amp Co

1985 (Paperback ISBN 0-688-04268-6)bull Erickson John (2003) The Road to Stalingrad London Cassell Military ISBN 0-304-36541-6bull Erickson John and Dilks David eds (1994) Barbarossa The Axis and the Allies Edinburgh Edinburgh

University Press 1994 (hardcover ISBN 0-7486-0504-5) 1998 (paperback ISBN 0-7486-1111-8)bull Foumlrster Juumlrgen Mawdsley Evan (2004) Hitler and Stalin in Perspective Secret Speeches on the Eve of

Barbarossa War in History Vol 11 Issue 1 pp 61ndash103bull Farrell Brian P (1993) Yes Prime Minister Barbarossa Whipcord and the Basis of British Grand Strategy

Autumn 1941 The Journal of Military History Vol 57 No 4 pp 599ndash625bull Glantz David M Col (rtd) (1991) Soviet Military Operational Art In Pursuit of Deep Battle London Frank

Cass ISBN 0-7146-4077-8bull Glantz David M (2001) Barbarossa Hitlers invasion of Russia 1941 Gloucestershire Tempus ISBN

0-7524-1979-Xbull Glantz David M (1998) Stumbling Colossus The Red Army on the Eve of World War Kansas University Press

of Kansas ISBN 0-7006-0879-6bull Glantz David M (2005) Colossus Reborn the Red Army at War 1941ndash1943 Kansas University Press of

Kansas ISBN 0-7006-1353-6bull Gorodetsky Gabriel (2001) Grand Delusion Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia Connecticut London

Yale University Press ISBN 0-300-08459-5bull Hoffmann Joachim (2001) Stalins War of Extermination Capshaw Alabama Theses amp Dissertations Press

ISBN 0-9679856-8-4bull Kershaw Robert J (2000) War Without Garlands Operation Barbarossa 194142 Shepperton Ian Allan ISBN

0-7110-2734-Xbull Kirchubel Robert (2003) Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1) Army Group South Oxford Osprey ISBN

1-84176-697-6bull Kirchubel Robert (2005) Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2) Army Group North Oxford Osprey ISBN

1-84176-857-Xbull Krivosheyev G (1993) Grif sekretnosti snyat Poteri vooruzhonnyh sil SSSR v voynah boevyh deystviyah i

voyennyh konfliktah Voenizdat Moscowbull Krivosheev GF ed (1997) Soviet casualties and combat losses in the twentieth century London Greenhill

Books ISBN 1-85367-280-7 Available online [87] in Russianbull Koch HW (1983) Hitlers Programme and the Genesis of Operation Barbarossa The Historical Journal

Vol 26 No 4 pp 891ndash920bull Latimer Jon (2001) Deception in War London John Murray ISBN 0-7195-5605-8


bull Lubbeck William Hurt David B (2006) At Leningrads Gates The Story of a Soldier with Army Group NorthPhiladelphia Pennsylvania Casemate ISBN 1-932033-55-6

bull Macksey Kenneth (1999) Why the Germans Lose at War The Myth of German Military Superiority LondonGreenhill Books ISBN 1-85367-383-8

bull Maser Werner (1994) Der Wortbruch Hitler Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg (

The breach of promise Hitler Stalin and World War II) Munich Olzog 1994 (hardcover ISBN 3-7892-8260-X)Munich Heyne 2001 (paperback ISBN 3-453-11764-6)

bull Megargee Geoffrey P (2006) War of Annihilation Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front 1941 LanhamMassachusetts Rowman amp Littelefield (Hardcover ISBN 0-7425-4481-8 paperback ISBN 0-7425-4482-6)

bull Murphy David E (2005) What Stalin Knew The Enigma of Barbarossa New Haven Connecticut LondonYale University Press 2005 (hardcover ISBN 0-300-10780-3) 2006 (paperback ISBN 0-300-11981-X)bull Reviewed by Robert Conquest at The American Historical Review Vol 111 No 2 (2006) p 591

bull Nekrich Aleksandr Moiseevich (1968) 22 June 1941 Soviet Historians and the German Invasion ColumbiaUniversity of South Carolina Press ISBN 0-87249-134-X

bull Pleshakov Constantine (2005) Stalins Folly The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the EasternFront Boston Houghton Mifflin ISBN 0-618-36701-2

bull Raus Erhard (2003) Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941ndash1945 compiled andtranslated by Steven H Newton Cambridge Massachusetts Da Capo Press 2003 (hardcover ISBN0-306-81247-9) 2005 (paperback ISBN 0-306-81409-9)

bull Rayfield Donald (2004) Stalin and his Hangmen London Penguin Books ISBN 0-141-00375-8bull Reviewed by David R Snyder in The Journal of Military History Vol 69 No 1 (2005) pp 265ndash266

bull Roberts Cynthia (1995) Planning for War The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941 Taylor and FrancisPublishers Europe-Asia Studies Vol 47 No 8 pp 1293ndash1326

bull Rees Laurence (1999) War of the Century When Hitler Fought Stalin New York New Press ISBN1-56584-599-4

bull Shirer William L (1960) The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich New York Simon and Schuster (1964 PanBooks Ltd reprint ISBN 0-330-70001-4)

bull Stolfi RHS (2003) German Panzers on the Offensive Russian Front North Africa 1941ndash1942 AtglenPennsylvania Schiffer Publishing ISBN 0-7643-1770-9

bull Suvorov Viktor (2007) The Chief Culprit Stalins Grand Design to Start World War II Dulles VirginiaPotomac Books ISBN 1-59797-114-6

bull Taylor AJP and Mayer SL eds (1974) A History of World War Two London Octopus Books ISBN0-70640-399-1

bull van Creveld Martin (1977) Supplying War Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press ISBN 0-421-29793-1

bull Waller John (1996) The Unseen War in Europe Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War LondonTauris amp Co ISBN 978-186064092-6

bull Weeks Albert L (2002) Stalins Other War Soviet Grand Strategy 1939ndash1941 Lanham Maryland Rowman ampLittlefield 2002 (hardcover ISBN 0-7425-2191-5) 2003 (paperback ISBN 0-7425-2192-3)

bull Wegner Bernd ed (1997) From Peace to War Germany Soviet Russia and the World 1939ndash1941 ProvidenceRhode Island Berghahn Books ISBN 1-57181-882-0bull Reviewed by Peter Konecny Canadian Journal of History Vol 34 Issue 2 (August 1999) pp 288ndash290

bull Wieczynski Joseph L Fox JP (1996) Operation Barbarossa The German Attack on The Soviet Union 22June 1941 The Slavonic and East European Review Vol 74 No 2 pp 344ndash346

bull Ziemke Earl F (1987) Moscow to Stalingrad Decision in the East Washington DC United States Army Centerof Military History 1988 New York Military Heritage Press ISBN 0-88029-294-6


bull Ziemke Earl F (1966) Stalingrad to Berlin The German Defeat in the East Washington DC United StatesArmy Center of Military History Honolulu Hawaii University Press of the Pacific 2003 (paperback ISBN1-4102-0414-6)

bull Мельтюхов МИ (2000) Упущенный шанс Сталина Советский Союз и борьба за Европу 1939ndash1941(Документы факты суждения) Моscow Вече Available online [88] in Russian

bull Суворов В (2003) Последняя республика Почему Советский Союз проиграл Вторую Мировую войнуМоscow AST ISBN 5170078765 Available online [89] in Russian

bull Pictures taken by German soldiers during this operation http worldwar2photos infobull lt Kolobanov and KV-2 Notable engagements of KV series against outnumbering enemy forces http wio ru

tank ww2tank htm

External linksbull Operation Barbarossa [90] Original reports and pictures from The Timesbull Relationship between the campaigns in the Balkans and the invasion of Russia [91] and associated timeline [92] in

The German Campaigns in the Balkans a publication of the United States Army Center of Military Historybull Multimedia map [93]mdashCovers the invasion of Russia including Operation Barbarossabull Operation Barbarossa [94]mdashDetailed analysis of the operation by author Bevin Alexanderbull Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence The Soviet History of World War II [95] 28 October

1959bull Huge very detailed online map on 22 June 1941 Dislocation of Soviet and German airforce and ground units in

one hour before invasion [96]

References[1] Higgins Trumbull (1966) Hitler and Russia The Macmillan Company pp 11ndash59 98ndash151[2] Bryan I Fugate Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front 1941 Novato Presidio Press 1984[3] World War II Chronicle 2007 Legacy Publications International Ltd 46[4] Yad vashem - Chronology of the Holocaust (http www1 yadvashem org about_holocaust chronology 1939-1941 1941

chronology_1941_9 html)[5] AJP Taylor amp Colonel D M Proektor p 106[6] AJP Taylor amp Colonel D M Proektor 1974 p 107[7] Simonov Konstantin (1979) Records of talks with Georgi Zhukov 1965ndash1966 (http www hrono ru dokum 197_dok 1979zhukov2

html) Hrono [8] Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad 1941ndash44 (Studies in Russian and Eastern European History) edited by John Barber and Andrei

Dzeniskevich New York Palgrave Macmillan 2005 (hardcover ISBN 1-4039-0142-2)[9] The siege of Leningrad By Alan Wykes Ballantines Illustrated History of WWII 3rd edition 1972 Pages 9-61 and Scorched Earth (pages

205 - 240) By Paul Carell Schiffer Military History 1994 ISBN 0-88740-598-3 and Finland in the Second World War Between Germanyand Russia Palgrave 2002 (pp 90 - 141)

[10] Military-Topographic Directorate maps No 194 196 Officers Atlas General Staff USSR 1947 Атлас Офицера Генеральный штабвооруженных сил ССР М Военно-топографическоее управление- 1947 Листы 194 196

[11] Russias War A History of the Soviet Effort 1941-1945 ISBN 0-14-027169-4 by Richard Overy Page 91[12] The World War II Desk Reference Eisenhower Center Director Douglas Brinkley Editor Mickael E Haskey Grand Central Press

Stonesong Press HarperCollins 2004 ISBN0-06-052651-3 Page 210[13] Siege of Leningrad Encyclopedia Britannica (http www britannica com bps topic 335949

Siege-of-Leningradtab=active~checkeditems~checkedgt bps topic 335949 Siege-of-Leningradamp title=Siege of Leningrad -- BritannicaOnline Encyclopedia)

[14] Peter Antill Peter Dennis Stalingrad 1942 Osprey Publishing 2007ISBN 1846030285 9781846030284 p 7[15] BenderskyJoseph W A History of Nazi Germany 1919-1945 Rowman amp Littlefield 2000 ISBN 083041567X page 177[16] Muumlller Rolf-Dieter Gerd R Ueberschaumlr Hitlers War in the East 1941-1945 A Critical Assessment Berghahn Books 2002 ISBN

157181293 page 244[17] Shirer 1990 p 716[18] Rauschning Hermann Hitler Speaks A Series of Political Conversations With Adolf Hitler on His Real Aims Kessinger Publishing

2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7


[19] Text of the NazindashSoviet Non-Aggression Pact (http www fordham edu halsall mod 1939pact html) executed 23 August 1939[20] Roberts Geoffrey (2006) Stalins Wars From World War to Cold War 1939ndash1953 Yale University Press pp 30 ISBN 0300112041[21] Shirer William L The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich A History of Nazi Germany Simon and Schuster 1990 ISBN 0671728687 page

668-9[22] Roberts Geoffrey (2006) Stalins Wars From World War to Cold War 1939ndash1953 Yale University Press pp 57 ISBN 0300112041[23] Brackman Roman The Secret File of Joseph Stalin A Hidden Life London and Portland Frank Cass Publishers 2001 ISBN 0714650501

page 341-3[24] Roberts Geoffrey (2006) Stalins Wars From World War to Cold War 1939ndash1953 Yale University Press pp 59 ISBN 0300112041[25] Nekrich Aleksandr Moiseevich Ulam Adam Bruno Freeze Gregory L (1997) Pariahs Partners Predators German-Soviet Relations

1922-1941 Columbia University Press pp 202ndash205 ISBN 0231106769[26] Ericson Edward E (1999) Feeding the German Eagle Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany 1933ndash1941 Greenwood Publishing Group

pp 127 ISBN 0275963373[27] Ericson Edward E (1999) Feeding the German Eagle Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany 1933ndash1941 Greenwood Publishing Group

pp 129ndash130 ISBN 0275963373[28] Ericson Edward E (1999) Feeding the German Eagle Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany 1933ndash1941 Greenwood Publishing Group

pp 138 ISBN 0275963373[29] Yergin Daniel (1991) The Prize The Epic Quest for Oil Money amp Power New York Simon amp Schuster ISBN 0-671-79932-0 p 334[30] Overy R J (2004) The Dictators Hitlers Germany and Stalins Russia W W Norton amp Company ISBN 0393020304[31] Brackman Roman (2001) The Secret File of Joseph Stalin A Hidden Life Frank Cass Publishers ISBN 0714650501[32] Berthon Simon Potts Joanna (2007) Warlords An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler

Churchill Roosevelt and Stalin Da Capo Press ISBN 0306815389[33] Gorodetsky Gabriel (2001) Grand Delusion Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia Yale University Press pp 69ndash70

ISBN 030008459[34] Ericson Edward E (1999) Feeding the German Eagle Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany 1933ndash1941 Greenwood Publishing Group

pp 162 ISBN 0275963373[35] Bryan I Fugate Operation Barbarossa Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front 1941 Novato Presidio Press 1984[36] Albert Speer identifies these points in the The World At War series in the episode Barbarossa[37] Whaley Barton_ Codeword BARBAROSSA Cambridge London 1973 ISBN 0-262-73038-3 pp1-10[38] Waller 1996 p 192[39] N Lyashchenko O vystuplenii I V Stalina v Kremle 5 maya 1941 Volkogonov Papers reel no8 p1[40] Meltyukhov 2000446 (http militera lib ru research meltyukhov 11 html) Table composed by the author according to История

второй мировой войны Т 4 С 18 50 лет Вооруженных Сил СССР М 1968 С 201 Советская военная энциклопедия T I M 1976С 56 Боевой и численный состав Вооруженных Сил СССР в период Великой Отечественной войны (1941ndash1945 гг) Статистическийсборник 1 (22 июня 1941 г) М 1994 С 10ndash12 РГАСПИ Ф 71 Оп 25 Д 4134 Л 1ndash8 Д 5139 Л 1 РГВА Ф 29 Оп 46 Д 272Л 20ndash21 учтены пограничные и внутренние войска Пограничные войска СССР в годы Второй мировой войны 1939ndash1945 М 1995С 390ndash400 РГВА Ф 38261 Оп 1 Д 255 Л 175ndash177 340ndash349 Ф 38650 Оп 1 Д 617 Л 258ndash260 Ф 38262 Оп 1 Д 41 Л 83ndash84РГАЭ Ф 1562 Оп 329 Д 277 Л 1ndash46 62 139 Д 282 Л 3ndash44

[41] AJP Taylor amp D M Proektorp98[42] Meltyukhov 2000414[43] NPZolotov and SI Isayev Boyegotovy byli Voenno-Istorichesskiy Zhurnal Ndeg 11 1993 p 77[44] The Russian Front by James F Dunnigan Arms amp Armour Press 1978 p 82 88 ISBN 0-85368-152-X[45] Rayfield 2004 p 315[46] Dunnigan Russian Front pp 93-94[47] Bergstroumlm p11-12[48] Glantz amp House 1995 p 42[49] Waller 1996 pp 196-8[50] Waller 1996 p 202[51] Roberts 1995 p 1293[52] Wold at War series Volume 5 Supported by Dr Grigori Tokaty (1909-2003) defected to Britain 1947[53] Roberts 1995 p 1297-1298[54] Glantz 1991 p 96[55] Roberts 1995 p 1212-14[56] Roberts 1995 p 1309-1310[57] Teddy J Uldricks The Icebreaker Controversy Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler Slavic Review Vol 58 No 3 (Autumn 1999) pp

626-643[58] Andreacute Mineau Operation Barbarossa ideology and ethics against human dignity Rodopi 2004 ISBN 9789042016330[59] Viktor Suvorov Thomas B Beattie Icebreaker who started the Second World War Hamish Hamilton 1990 ISBN 0241126223

9780241126226[60] Chris Bellami Absolute war Soviet Russia in the Second World War Vinage 2007 ISBN 9870375724718 p103


[61] Stalin The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russias Secret Archives Anchor (1997) ISBN0-385-47954-9 pages 454-459 In view of the fact that Germany at present keeps its army fully mobilized with its rear services deployed ithas the capacity of deploying ahead of us and striking a sudden blow To prevent this I consider it important not to leave the operationalinitiative to the German command in any circumstances but to anticipate the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it is inthe process of deploying and before it has time to organize its front and the coordination of its various arms

[62] R C Raack Reviewed work(s)Was the USSR Planning to Attack Germany in 1941 by Joseph Bradley Source Central European HistoryVol 32 No 4 (1999) pp 491-493)

[63] Bergstroumlm 2007 p 130Uses figures from German archives Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Frieburg Luftfahrtmuseum Hannover-LaatzenWASt Deutsche Dienststelle Berlin

[64] Meltyukhov 2000 (electronic version) (http militera lib ru research meltyukhov index html) Note that due to the fact that Russianarchives have been and to an extent still are inaccessible exact figures have been difficult to ascertainThe official Soviet sources invariably over-estimated German strength and downplayed Soviet strength as emphasized by David Glantz(1998292) Some of the earlier Soviet figures claimed that there had been only 1540 Soviet aircraft to face Germanys 4950 that there weremerely 1800 Red Army tanks and assault guns facing 2800 German units etcIn 1991 Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov published an article on this question (Мельтюхов МИ 22 июня 1941 г цифрысвидетельствуют История СССР 1991 3) with other figures that slightly differed from those of the table here though had similarratios Glantz (1998293) was of the opinion that those figures ldquoappear[ed] to be most accurate regarding Soviet forces and those of GermanysalliesPrime though other figures also occur in modern publications

[65] Keith E Bonn (ed) Slaughterhouse Handbook of the Eastern Front Aberjona Press Bedford PA 2005 p299[66] John Erickson The Road to Stalingrad Cassel Military Paperbacks 2003 edition p172[67] Bergstroumlm 2007 p 20[68] Bergstrom 2007 p 23[69] Glantz amp House 1995 p 49[70] Glantz amp House 1995 p 51[71] (Lithuanian) Gediminas Zemlickas Pasaulyjemdashkaip savo namuose Mokslo Lietuva 11 February 1998 No 3 (161) (http ic lms lt

ml 161 zemlickas htm)[72] Bergstrom 2007 p 36[73] as cited by Suvorov http militera lib ru research suvorov7 12 html[74] Bergstrom 2007 p 70[75] According to http www soldat ru doc casualties book chapter5_13_08 html based on German sources (see site reference page)[76] Tartu in the 1941 Summer War (http www bdcol ee fileadmin docs bdreview bdr-2003-9-13 pdf) By Major Riho Rotildengelep and

Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen (2003) Baltic Defence Review 9[77] Glantz amp House 1995 p 77[78] A Clark 1995 p 165[79] Shirer William (1964) The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Pan pp 1032[80] A Day By Day Diary of WWII (http www bartcop com 41081218 htm) Retrieved 13 June 2006 See also Charles Messenger The

Chronological Atlas of World War Two (New York Macmillan Publishing 1989) p 63[81] Strausszlig Franz Joseph Die Geschichte der 2(Weiener)Panzer Division pg 337 DOumlRFLER im NEBEL VERLAG Eggolsheim DE[82] Glantz David The Soviet-German War 1941ndash45 Myths and Realities A Survey Essay 11 October 2001 page 7[83] Beevor Stalingrad Penguin 2001 ISBN 0141001313 p60[84] German Attack of USSR ISBN 80 - 7237 - 279 - 3[85] van Creveld Martin Supplying War Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Cambridge 1977 ISBN 0-421-29793-1[86] CSI (http www cgsc edu carl resources csi Chew CHEW asp) Retrieved 2 April 2010[87] http www rus-sky org history library w[88] http militera lib ru research meltyukhov index html[89] http militera lib ru research suvorov3 index html[90] http www timesonline co uk tol system topicRoot Operation_Barbarossa[91] http www history army mil books wwii balkan 20_260_5 htm[92] http www history army mil books wwii balkan append htm[93] http english pobediteli ru[94] http www militaryhistoryonline com wwii articles barbarossa aspx[95] http www foia cia gov CPE CAESAR caesar-25 pdf[96] http www krunch ru page june22

Article Sources and Contributors 28

Article Sources and ContributorsOperation Barbarossa Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphpoldid=386692911 Contributors ( Ajvol 0x6adb015 119 12832172xxx 14thArmored 1exec1 200191188xxx 3Loumlwi Achilies99 Achp ru AdamProcter Adamdaley Adashiel Aff123a Agent of the Reds Ahoerstemeier Ahpook Ajaxkroon Alansohn Aleksandr Grigoryev Alephh AlertwhileAlexSwanson AlexWelens Ali Basheer Aligwcorguk Altenmann Amrafifi264 Ams80 Anas Salloum AndrewHowse Andrewpmk ApJilly Aranherunar Areasort123 AristeiakorpsAshLin Atift2 Atomicsender Atomicspamer Atomsgive Ave Caesar AxelBoldt B Franken Bacquesne Badgerpatrol Balcer Banksmotor55 Barbatus Bcameron54 Bd84 Beenhj Benji77Beringar BigBobcool Bigbob311 BiggKwell Bigwhiteyeti Bill37212 Billthefish Binksternet Biophys Bjf Bjh21 Bkell Bleh999 Blueboy96 Bmhkim Bob maverick Bob1200 BobblewikBobby D Bryant Bobo192 Bogdan BokicaK Booksworm Boothferry Boothy443 Born2x Boslifania Brendanconway Breversa Brian Crawford Brianyee0 Bruske Bryan Derksen BschorrBsimmons666 Buckshot06 Byelf2007 Bziobnic Calaschysm Callidior Cant sleep clown will eat me Cancun771 Captain panda Carillonatreides Carryoverthere Carter Cenya95 ChaimShel Chairman S CharlesMartel Chase me ladies Im the Cavalry Chaser Chessy999 Chiefteam Chris Roy Chrislk02 ClaesWallin Clarityfiend Clicheacute Online Cloudbelow4 Cod1337Colchicum Comatose51 Commander Keane CommonsDelinker Constanz Conversion script CosineKitty Courcelles Craiglen Crotalus horridus Crucible315 Ctbolt Cunikm DBabaDDima DIREKTOR DMorpheus DONeil DabMachine Daborhe DaddyWarlock Danny Dapi89 Dar-Ape Darwinek David Kernow DavidMonniaux Dbrodbeck Dbrower DecltypeDeltabeignet Den fjaumlttrade ankan Dendirrek Der Eberswalder DerHexer Derek Ross Dgies Diderot DimaDorfman Dino Dmerrill Dna-webmaster Dodo19 Doggyman100 DojarcaDomino theory DopefishJustin Dorotheou Dosinovsky Dreadstar Drogo Underburrow Dutchman1234 ES Vic ESkog Ecko1o1 Ed Fitzgerald Edivorce Edward Egern Ehasbun El CEldumpo Elrith Emptyroute666 Epbr123 Eric Shalov Ericoides Esn Esperant Eurocopter EvanHarper Everyking Excirial Existenjoy Explained Cause Fallschirmjaumlger FartherredFavonian Finlay McWalter Firstorm Flamerfrogpig Fleminra Folks at 137 Frank A FrankA Fullmetalshinigami GCarty Gabr-el Gaius Cornelius Gatoclass Gbinal Gdr Gene NygaardGene s General Grievous GeneralPatton Geoff B Getmoreatp Gilliam Givegains Glane23 Gliese876 Gogo Dodo Golfrold Goodralph Gprince007 Gpvos Graham87 Grant76GregLoutsenko GregorB Greudin Ground Zero Gtstricky Gwernol Gzkn H Jonat HROThomas Hadal Hagedis Hairy Dude Halibutt Hallmark HanBoN Hans Zarkov HanzoHattoriHarveyHenkelmann Harveyj Hawkeye7 HebrewHammerTime Hephaestos Hirudo Historian932 Hongooi Househeard Hoygan Humus sapiens Hurricane111 Husond HeacutebusI-do-do-you IJK Principle ITSENJOYABLE Illythr Interchange88 Irbergui Irpen Iska Isnow J Di JALockhart JLogan Jaan JackMcJiggins Jagripino JanSuchy Jason M JaysscholarJcrook1987 Jdlh Jeff8765 Jeffrey Henning JeltLuthor Jiang Jim Sweeney Jj137 Jmcc150 Jmlk17 Jn25b JoanneB Johan Magnus JohnCD Johnatx Johnjohnsy Jojit fb Jokeguide JosephSolis in Australia Josh Parris Joy Jusdafax JustPhil KNewman Kanags Kappus Kate Phaye Katieh5584 Katous1978 Kbdank71 Kedi the tramp Keimzelle Kelvinc Kenneth VergilKeraunos Kernel Saunters KingPenguin Kingpin13 Kinneyboy90 Kirill Lokshin KlaudiuMihaila KnightLago KnowledgeOfSelf Ko Soi IX KoRnRoCks Koalorka Kober KoltKonder11111 Kotare Kpalion Krellis Kristof vt Ksenon Kubigula Kungfuadam Kungming2 Kurt Leyman Kusma Kvn8907 La Fegravere-Champenoise Lacantia Laddiebuck Lairor LandrooLao Wai Lapisphil Lapsed Pacifist Lastdingo LeaveSleaves Lefty Legionas Lendorien Licon Lightmouse Ligulem Lilac Soul Lindberg Linksnational Lipbrush Listerz LizisbearycuteLothar von Richthofen LtSpecht LtNOWIS Lucius1976 Lupo Lysy MK2 MPerel MTWEmperor MWAK MaGioZal Madcat87 Magus732 Mais oui Malik Shabazz MaltaGC ManuelAnastaacutecio Marco Krohn MarineMajor Mark1800 Markewew Marqueed MartinDK Martynas Patasius Materialscientist MathFacts Matilda Sharks Matthead Mav Max rspct MaxthatkillzMcjoshio Meegs Melyn Mercenary2k Metalhead94 MiG Miacek Michael mills Michas pi Michigan07 Mike Rosoft Mikenassau Mintguy Mintleaf Miroslaw MisterBee1966Mitchrockey Mkpumphrey MoRsE Molly-in-md Monedula Moneyocean666 Monteitho MoogleEXE Morgan Hauser MorganJoel Mortcv Mortense Mosedschurte Moshe ConstantineHassan Al-Silverburg Mozzerati Mpiff MrFish Mrg3105 Mswake Muad Mugsywwiii Muhends Muijz Muniosa Murphy11 Musickna Mwanner Mzajac N328KF NVO NakonNecessary Evil Necktrips Neko-chan Ngorongoro Nick-D Nick123 Night Gyr Nightbolt Nightmare X Nimbusania Nishkid64 Nixer Noclador Noorkhanuk85 Nordgh NrehakNuclearWarfare Oberiko Oblivious Ohconfucius OldakQuill OllieFury Operationpastorius OrbitOne Otolemur crassicaudatus Ourswisher Paluki Parsecboy Pastel kitten Patrick PaulSiebert PaulVIF Perfect Proposal Peter Isotalo PeterGh Petri Krohn Philip Baird Shearer Philip Trueman Pibwl Piccolo Modificatore Laborioso Picture Master Pilotmodel77 PinkblutyPiotrus Piratedan Pistachio69 Plasma Twa 2 Poiman12 PokeTIJeremy Pompeymb Poor Yorick Prattjon Propaganda328 Propound Pudeo Pwnycnyc Qworty R RnB R-41 RCS RG2RJASE1 RabbitHead RandomCritic Rattlesnake Raul654 Rcbutcher Real123 Recesende Recognizance RedZebra Redroach Rhadoo32 Rhamiel Rich Farmbrough Richard CaneRichwales Rindis Ripberger Rjwilmsi Robth Rodina38 Roentgenium111 Rory096 Routlej1 Rsm99833 Ruhrjung Russavia Russian Power Russian front1944 Ruy Lopez SColomboSadads Sakkura SakuYukihimesan Sam Hocevar Sango123 SaveTheWhales Savidan Sceptre Schapirama SchfiftyThree SciFi25 Scoop100 Scott Paeth ScrewyD Sdguitarman SealmanSecretAgentMan00 Semper-Fi 2006 Sfan00 IMG Shahab Shanes Sherbet lemon Shimgray Sietse Snel Silver hr Silverhorse SimonP Sir Vicious Sixtyfiveseven Slinkyhead148 SluzzelinSmoth 007 Snapperman2 Snowolf SonicAD Soyweiser SparhawkWiki Species8471 SpeedyGonsales Spellcast Spespatriae Spinningspark Spot87 Staberinde StephenMacmanusStevebritgimp Steveshelokhonov StoneProphet Stonewhite Strelic Subsume SuperDeng Surv1v4l1st Svetovid Svmich SwordSmurf Szopen T-1000 TJRC Tabletop Tanaats TangotangoTapir2001 Taraborn Tavkhelidzem Tavrian Taw Teamdot Tedman1973 TehNomad Tellyaddict TestPilot The Oracle of Podunk The Spanish Inquisitor The Thing That Should Not BeThe jenan The monkeyhate The wub The1marauder Thebigt788 Theocide Theonlyedge Thething88 Thisglad Thomas419ca ThreeBlindMice Thue Tim1357 Timli Tkasmai Tm1729Tobyc75 Tom the Goober Tommy2010 Tony0Maxwell Tony1 Toresbe Tovojolo Trbochrgr Trieste Trivialist Trotboy Trumpet marietta 45750 Tswold Tswoldmsncom TuomasTwinxor TwoOneTwo Tymek Tyrenius Ufwuct Ulric1313 Uncle Dick UninvitedCompany Urgedover1234 Valentinian Valip Valpo Vanka5 Venganza135 Vic Victorperton VidorVividcover Vladko VolatileChemical Volker89 Vossiewulf Voxpolaris16 Vuo WBardwin WWC Wantsoftenkree Weedro Weiwensg Welham66 Wendell Wgfcrafty WhaleyTimWhatthree16 Whichtrial Whiskey White Shadows WikiDao Wikieditoroftoday Wikiliki William Allen Simpson William Mauco Winters457 Witt E Pseudonym Wombert WoohookittyWork permit Writer 34 Writer22 Wuzzy Wwoods XX55XX Xelous Xiahou Xyl 54 Yath Zagreber Zigger Zocky 1428 anonymous edits

Image Sources Licenses and ContributorsImageNazi-Soviet 1941png Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileNazi-Soviet_1941png License GNU Free Documentation License Contributors Original uploader wasMosedschurte at enwikipediaFileEurope before Operation Barbarossa 1941 (in German)png Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileEurope_before_Operation_Barbarossa_1941_(in_German)png License GNU Free Documentation License Contributors MaGioZalImageFall Barbarossa 1jpg Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileFall_Barbarossa_1jpg License Public Domain Contributors Adolf HitlerImageBundesarchiv Bild 183-B01718 Ausstellung Planung und Aufbau im Ostenjpg Sourcehttpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileBundesarchiv_Bild_183-B01718_Ausstellung_Planung_und_Aufbau_im_Ostenjpg License unknown Contributors Fallschirmjaumlger FelixStember Goumldeke Mtsmallwood ProfessorX 3 anonymous editsFileBundesarchiv Bild 101I-020-1262-26 Russland-Suumld Soldaten mit Zivilbevoumllkerungjpg Sourcehttpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileBundesarchiv_Bild_101I-020-1262-26_Russland-Suumld_Soldaten_mit_Zivilbevoumllkerungjpg License Public Domain Contributors HarschneckFileOperationBarbarossaPNG Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileOperationBarbarossaPNG License Public Domain Contributors The History Department of theUnited States Military AcademyImageDvina crossingsvg Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileDvina_crossingsvg License Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 30 Contributors Llaird McKinnleyFileOperation Barbarossa - German lootjpg Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileOperation_Barbarossa_-_German_lootjpg License Public Domain ContributorsuserJarekt userJarektImageEastern Front 1941-06 to 1941-09png Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileEastern_Front_1941-06_to_1941-09png License GNU Free Documentation License Contributors Fz22 Joonasl Juiced lemon TCY 1 anonymous editsImageEastern Front 1941-06 to 1941-12png Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileEastern_Front_1941-06_to_1941-12png License GNU Free Documentation License Contributors Original uploader was Gdr at enwikipedia Later version(s) were uploaded by Zocky Marskell Felix116 Forteblast Mahahahaneapneap at enwikipediaFileKowno Panzerschlacht 1941 01 (RaBoe)jpg Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileKowno_Panzerschlacht_1941_01_(RaBoe)jpg License Creative CommonsAttribution-Sharealike 30 Contributors Der Grossvater von Ra BoeFileBundesarchiv Bild 146-1982-077-11 Russland Minsk gefangene sowjetische Soldatenjpg Sourcehttpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileBundesarchiv_Bild_146-1982-077-11_Russland_Minsk_gefangene_sowjetische_Soldatenjpg License Public Domain Contributors ChristianGanzer Dezidor EugeneZelenko Manxruler 1 anonymous editsFileRussian POW (1941)jpg Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileRussian_POW_(1941)jpg License Public Domain Contributors Berillium Derbeth Jarekt ManxrulerPelex Zac allanImageNa-zapadjpg Source httpenwikipediaorgwindexphptitle=FileNa-zapadjpg License unknown Contributors Miacek

License 29

LicenseCreative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 30 Unportedhttp creativecommons org licenses by-sa 3 0

Operation Barbarossa

German intentions

Nazi theory regarding the Soviet Union



German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle

Composition of the Axis forces

Composition of the Soviet Forces

The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South


Phase 3 Kiev and Leningrad (5 August 1941 - 2 October 1941)


Later events


Outcome

Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa

Underestimated Soviet potential

Faults of logistical planning

Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License



Soviet and German invasions annexations and spheres of influencein Central and eastern Europe 1939-1940

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been signed shortlybefore the German and Soviet invasion of Poland in1939 It was ostensibly a non-aggression pact but secretprotocols outlined an agreement between the ThirdReich and the Soviet Union on the division of theborder states between them[19] The pact surprised theworld[20] because of the parties mutual hostility andtheir competing ideologies As a result of the pact NaziGermany and the Soviet Union had reasonably strongdiplomatic relations and an important economicrelationship The countries entered a trade pact in 1940in which the Soviets received German military andindustrial equipment in exchange for raw materialssuch as oil to help Germany circumvent a Britishblockade[21]

But despite the parties ongoing relations both sideswere strongly suspicious of each others intentionsAfter Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan andItaly it began negotiations about a potential Sovietentry into the pact[22] [23] After two days ofnegotiations in Berlin from November 12ndash14 Germanypresented a proposed written agreement for Soviet entry into the Axis The Soviet Union offered a writtencounterproposal agreement on 25 November 1940 to which Germany did not respond[24] [25] As both sides begancolliding with each other in Eastern Europe conflict appeared more likely though they signed a border andcommercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941




Barbarossa













Exhibition











German preparations









Divisionscalculated

1315 3165 1407

Personnel 2485000 5774000 1324


Tanks 21100 25700 218

Aircraft 7700 18700 1428


















Order of battle





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



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December 1941








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References[1] Higgins Trumbull (1966) Hitler and Russia The Macmillan Company pp 11ndash59 98ndash151[2] Bryan I Fugate Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front 1941 Novato Presidio Press 1984[3] World War II Chronicle 2007 Legacy Publications International Ltd Page 146[4] Yad vashem - Chronology of the Holocaust (http www1 yadvashem org about_holocaust chronology 1939-1941 1941







Stonesong Press HarperCollins 2004 ISBN0-06-052651-3 10[13] Siege of Leningrad Encyclopedia Britannica (http www britannica com bps topic 335949




2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























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German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License




Barbarossa













Exhibition











German preparations









Divisionscalculated

1315 3165 1407

Personnel 2485000 5774000 1324


Tanks 21100 25700 218

Aircraft 7700 18700 1428


















Order of battle





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26



















The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























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German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License







Exhibition











German preparations









Divisionscalculated

1315 3165 1407

Personnel 2485000 5774000 1324


Tanks 21100 25700 218

Aircraft 7700 18700 1428


















Order of battle





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26



















The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License





German preparations









Divisionscalculated

1315 3165 1407

Personnel 2485000 5774000 1324


Tanks 21100 25700 218

Aircraft 7700 18700 1428


















Order of battle





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26



















The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License






Divisionscalculated

1315 3165 1407

Personnel 2485000 5774000 1324


Tanks 21100 25700 218

Aircraft 7700 18700 1428


















Order of battle





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26



















The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License

















Order of battle





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26



















The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License








Order of battle





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26



















The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm











[11] Russias War A History of the Soviet Effort 1941-1945 ISBN 0-14-027169-4 by Richard Overy 1[12] The World War II Desk Reference Eisenhower Center Director Douglas Brinkley Editor Mickael E Haskey Grand Central Press





2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























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German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License





Personnel 4306800 3289851 13 1



4171 15687 1 38

Aircraft 4389[63] 11 537[] 1 26



















The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License












The invasion






Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License


Army Group North



Army Group Centre






Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License



Army Group South













December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm





References[1] Higgins Trumbull (1966) Hitler and Russia The Macmillan Company pp 11ndash59 98ndash151[2] Bryan I Fugate Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front 1941 Novato Presidio Press 1984[3] World War II Chronicle 2007 Legacy Publications International Ltd 6[4] Yad vashem - Chronology of the Holocaust (http www1 yadvashem org about_holocaust chronology 1939-1941 1941











2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License







December 1941








Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License



Later events























Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License




















Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License







Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm












Stonesong Press HarperCollins 2004 ISBN0-06-052651-3 0[13] Siege of Leningrad Encyclopedia Britannica (http www britannica com bps topic 335949




2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License



Aftermath


German Occupiers






















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License



















































tank ww2tank htm
















2006ISBN 142860034 pages 136-7




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License




























License 29



German intentions




German preparations

Soviet preparations


Order of battle



The invasion


Army Group North

Army Group Centre

Army Group South




Later events


Outcome




Weather

Aftermath

See also

References

External links

License

Operation a

Documents

Transcript of Operation a