Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJFoucault K

1NC................................................................................................................................................ 1

***ALTERNATIVES ............................................................................................................ 4 Alt Slv............................................................................................................................................. 5Criticize.......................................................................................................................................... 6Reject.............................................................................................................................................. 9Resistance.................................................................................................................................... 10

***LINKS ......................................................................................................................... 10 Generic Links............................................................................................................................... 10L- Cap........................................................................................................................................... 13L- Econ.......................................................................................................................................... 14L- GPS........................................................................................................................................... 15L-Heg............................................................................................................................................ 16L-Militarization............................................................................................................................. 16L-Nuclear war............................................................................................................................... 17L- “Space Pearl Harbor” / Eastern Threat....................................................................................18L- Satellites................................................................................................................................... 19L- Security.................................................................................................................................... 20L-Space Heg................................................................................................................................. 22L- Space Tech............................................................................................................................... 25L-Space Weaponization................................................................................................................26L-Surveillance............................................................................................................................... 28L-State.......................................................................................................................................... 29

***IMPACTS .................................................................................................................... 29 Loss of Autonomy......................................................................................................................... 30Enmity Mod.................................................................................................................................. 31Extinction..................................................................................................................................... 34Nuclear annihilation.....................................................................................................................35Violence........................................................................................................................................ 36Securitization............................................................................................................................... 38Genocide....................................................................................................................................... 39

***AT’S ............................................................................................................................ 39 AT: Nat Security Checks..............................................................................................................40A2: No L- Exploration................................................................................................................... 42A2: No L- Science......................................................................................................................... 43Grassroots/Standpoint Trade-off..................................................................................................44A2: Predictions............................................................................................................................. 45A2: Chinese ASAT Test.................................................................................................................46

***FRAMEWROK ............................................................................................................. 46 Discourse Shapes Politics.............................................................................................................47A2: Realism................................................................................................................................... 48

***AFF ............................................................................................................................. 48 Framework................................................................................................................................... 49Alt Fails........................................................................................................................................ 52Perm............................................................................................................................................. 54AT: Root Cause of War.................................................................................................................56

***MISC. ......................................................................................................................... 57

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJDolman Indicts............................................................................................................................. 58

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJ

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJ1NC

Power and knowledge are co-productive—while the affirmative would like you to believe that their advantages are objective depictions of the world, these claims are in fact contingent products of a dynamic network of power relations—their attempt to know the world is itself an exercise of control which must be interrogated.Pickett 5 [Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 10-11]

Axel Honneth, among others, points out that Foucault's conception of power is a reworking of Nietzsche's idea of the will to power.6 Power, in this view, is not a fixed property held by one class or group; it is the outcome of conflict between a number of actors. It is not stable; it is continually in flux and any truces must be considered temporary. Power is ubiquitous in the linguistic, bureaucratic, moral, and other structures in which agents act. For instance, although determined by power, the fundamental rules of morality are often seen as natural rather than contingent products of history: "It is true that it is society that defines, in terms of its own interests, what must be regarded as crime: it is not therefore natural. . . . [But] by assuming the form of a natural sequence, punishment does not appear as the arbitrary effect of human power." By revealing the origins and historical shifts of our basic moral and cultural distinctions, it is possible to show that what seems to be natural and self-evident is in fact contingent and arbitrary. What appears as nature is in fact the workings of power. Furthermore, the will to knowledge is the expression of power. There is a battle for truth; knowledge is the spoils of victory.9 Both Nietzsche and Foucault deny that there is a timeless, a historical truth. Instead, truth is a thing of this world, and as such, it is subject to the contingency, error, mendacity, and struggle that characterize this world. Hence, Nietzsche argues that every philosophy is an expression of the will to power of the philosopher who wrote it.10 Foucault argues that the human sciences operate on the basis of hierarchical relations, such as those between doctor and patient, or teacher and student, and that these sciences in turn have effects of power.11 For these reasons, power must not be considered as an essentially negative force, as something which is "poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous . . . incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself."12 Instead, power is capable of producing knowledge, rules of morality, and the basic distinctions and denotations of a language. For Nietzsche power is creative and concerned with the continual increase in force. For Foucault, modern power is the same: unlike power in the classical age, it is inventive and concerned with the increase in social forces. Nietzsche and Foucault's views of power culminate in the claim that power produces identity. Each agent is the creation and expression of power. Both are anti-naturalists; they deny that there is something "natural" at the bottom of who we are. There is no fixed human nature or subjectivity. Instead, power produces agency: it creates animals capable of, for example, promising and confessing. A central aspect of both philosophers' work is an attack on the philosophy of the subject, that is, on some concept of an ahistorical metaphysical agent that is the "doer" behind our thoughts and deeds. Instead of positing a subject which is the foundation of all knowledge and action, philosophy should undermine its attachment to this "subject without a history."13 We need to see the subject as simply the outcome of the correlation of forces, relations, and practices that constitute him.

The affirmative’s reliance on space technology and surveillance internalizes, naturalizes, and shields the modern day panopticon of satellite imagery wielded by the military-industrial complexMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

In post-Cold-War unipolar times the strategic rationale for the United States to maintain the prohibition against weaponizing space is diminishing (Lambakis, 2003), even if the rest of the world wishes it otherwise. In 2000, a UN General Assembly resolution on the ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ was adopted by a majority of 163–0 with 3 abstentions: the United States, Israel a n d t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s o f Mi c r o n e s i a (United Nations, 2000). Less than two months later, a US Government committee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld 5 issued a report warning that the ‘relative dependence of the US on space makes its space systems potentially attractive targets’; the United States thus faced the danger, it argued, of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor ’ (Rums feld, 2001 : vi i i ) . As spa ce warfare was, according to the report, a ‘virtual certainty’, the United States must ‘ensure continuing superiority’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). This argument was qualified by obligatory gestures towards ‘the peaceful use of outer space’ but the report left little doubt about the direction of American space policy. Any difficult questions about the further militarization (and even weaponization) of space could be easily avoided under the guise of developing ‘dual-use’ (military/civilian) technology and emphasizing the role of military applications in ‘peacekeeping’ operations. Through such rhetoric,

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJNATO’s satellite-guided bombing of a Serbian TV station on 23 April 1999 could have been readily accommodated under the OST injunction to use outer space for ‘peaceful purposes’ (Cervino et al., 2003). Since that time new theatres of operation have been opened up in Afghani s t an and Iraq, for further trials of space-enabled warfare that aimed to provide aerial omniscience for the precision delivery of ‘shock and awe’. What Benjamin Lambeth has called the ‘accomplishment’ of air and space power has since been called into question by the all too apparent limitations of satellite intelligence in the tasks of identifying Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction or in stemming the growing number of Allied dead and wounded from modestly armed urban insurgents (Lambeth, 1999; Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2004: 205). For all its limitations, even this imagery has been shielded from independent scrutiny by the military monopolization of commercial satellite outputs (Livingstone and Robinson, 2003). Yet, far from undermining Allied confi dence in satellite imagery or in a ‘cosmic’ view of war (Kaplan, 2006), it is precisely these abstract photocartographies of violence – detached from their visceral and bloodied ‘accomplishments’ – that have licensed, say, the destruction of Fallujah (Gregory, 2004: 162; Graham, 2005b). There remains, of course, a great deal more that can be said about the politics of these aerial perspectives than can be discussed here (see, for instance, Gregory, 2004; Kaplan, 2006). The geopolitical effects of reconnaissance from space platforms are by no means confined to particular episodes of military conflict. Like the high-altitude spy plane, its Cold War precursor, satellite surveillance also gives strategic and diplomatic powers. Unlike aerial photography, however, satellite imagery is ubiquitous and high-resolution, and offers the potential for real-time surveillance. The emerging field of surveillance studies, strongly informed by critical geographical thought, has opened to scrutiny the politics and spaces of electronic observation (see, for instance, the new journal Surveillance and Society). The writings of Foucault, particularly those on panopticism, are an obvious influence on this new work (Foucault, 1977; Wood, 2003), but they have seldom been applied to the realm of outer space. As Foucault pointed out, the power of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon prison design is enacted through the prisoner–subjects internalizing the disciplinary gaze: the presence of the gaoler was immaterial, as the burden of watching was left to the watched. Similarly, the power of panoptic orbital surveillance lies in its normalizing geopolitical effects.

Biopolitics allows the government to determine who is worthy of life and who can be killed.Dean 2001 (Dean Mitchell Professor of Sociology and Dean of the Division of Society, Culture, Media and Philosophy at Macquarie University, Australia, “Demonic Societies” in “States of Imagination” p. 57-58)

National Socialism is one contingent, historical trajectory of the development of the biopolitical dimension of the social, medical, psychological, andhuman sciences that occurs tinder a particular set of historical circumstances.One should not underestimate the factors operative in German society, thehistorical legacy of war and revolutionary movements, the nature of Germanpolity, or the economic crises of the early twentieth century. Nevertheless,Peukert and Foucault would both agree that the kind of state racism practicedby the Nazis that would lead to the Final Solution was quite different fromtraditional anti-Semitism insofar as it took the form of a "biological politics."as the German historians call it, that drew on the full resources of the human,social, and behavioral sciences. In this regard, Peukert's retrieval of the process by which the human sci-ences move from a concern with "mass well-being" to acting as the instrument of "mass annihilation" remains extremely interesting. In the ease of"social-welfare education," he identifies a number of phases (1993: 243- 45). First there was a formulation of the problem of the control of the youth in the late nineteenth century within a progressivist discourse in which every child had a right to physical, mental, and social fitness. This was followed by a phase of a phase of routinization and a crisis of confidence exemplified by the failureof legal schemes of detention or protection of those who were "unfit" or"ineducable." The third phase, coinciding with the final years of the WeimarRepublic, has disturbing overtones for our own period. Here there were aseries of scandals in young people's homes and a debate about the limits ofeducability coupled with welfare stare retrenchment. This debate introduceda new cost-benefits trade-oft with services allocated on the basis of immediate return, and the criterion of "value" was brought into the calculative frame-work. Value at this stage may or may not be determined on the basis of raceor genetics, but the ineducable were excluded in

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJ1932 from reform schooleducation. After ig those who opposed the racial version of determiningvalue were forced into silence, compulsory sterilization of the genetically Un-healthy was practiced, and concentration camps for the racially inferior established. However, even this program faced a crisis of confidence and the utopian goals came up against their limits and the catalogue of deviance becamegreater and more detailed. The positive racism of youth welfare provision110W met the negative radicalization of a policy of eradication of those who,in the language of the order that represents the crucial step in the Final Solution, are deemed "unworthy of life" (lebensunwertes Leben). The biopoliticalgovernment of life had arrived at the point at which it decided who was worthliving. With the technology of murder up and running, the social and humansciences "are engaged in a parallel process of theoretical and institutionalgeneralization that is aimed at an all-embracing racist restructuring of socialpolicy, of educational policy, and health and welfare policy'' (Peukert 1993:245). The term Gemeinschaftsfremde (community alien) came to embrace failures, ne'er-do-wells, parasites, good-for-nothings, troublemakers, and thosewith criminal tendencies and threatened all these with detention, imprisonment, or death.

Our alternative is to academically reject the logic of geopolitics at the core of the quest for space dominance—this is critical to open space for interrogation of the socially and historically contingent nature of astropolitical epistemology. MacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

Dolman’s astropolitical project is by no means exceptional. The journal Astropolitics, of which he is a founding editor, contains numerous papers expressing similar views. It is easy, I think, for critical geographers to feel so secure in the intellectual and political purchase of Ó Tuathailian critiques (Ó Tuathail, 1996), that we become oblivious to the undead nature of classical geopolitics . It is comforting to think that most geography undergraduates encountering geopolitics, in the UK at least, will in all likelihood do so through the portal of critical perspectives, perhaps through the excellent work of Joanne Sharp or Klaus Dodds (Dodds, 2005; Sharp, 2005). But the legacies of Mackinder and Mahan live on, and radical critique is as urgent as ever . While this is not the place for a thoroughgoing reappraisal of astropolitics in the manner of Gearòid Ó Tuathail, a few salient points from his critique can be brought out. (1) Astrography and astropolitics, like geography and geopolitics, constitute ‘a political domination and cultural imagining of space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). While commentators like Colin Gray have posited an ‘inescapable geography’ (eg, ‘of course, physical geography is politically neutral’), a critical agenda conceives of geography not as a fi xed substratum but as a highly social form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173; Ó Tuathail, 1999: 109). For geography, read ‘astrography’. We must be alert to the ‘declarative’ (‘this is how the Outer Earth is’) and ‘imperative’ (‘this is what we must do’) modes of narration that astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent (Ó Tu a t h a i l , 1 9 9 9 : 1 0 7 ) . Th e models of Mackinder and Mahan that are so often applied to the space environment are not unchanging laws; on the contrary they are themselves highly political attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes in specific historical circumstances. (2) Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of power, a critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always already in question. Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinize the power politics of the expert/ think-tank/tactician as part of a wider project of deepening public debate and strengthening democratic accountability (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 108). (3) Mackinder’s ‘end of geography’ thesis held that the era of terrestrial exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the task of consolidating the world order to fi t British interests (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolman’s vision of space strategy bears striking similarities. Like Ó Tuathail’s critique of Mackinder’s imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably described as ‘triumphalism blind to its own precariousness’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). Dolman, for instance, makes little effort to conceal his tumescent patriotism, observing that ‘the United States is awash with power after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovo campaign, and stands at the forefront of history capable of presiding over the birth of a bold New World Order’. One might argue, however, that Mackinder – as the theorist of imperial decline – may in this respect be an appropriate mentor (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 1 12). It is important, I think, to demystify Astropolitik: there is nothing ‘inevitable’ about US dominance in space, even if the USA were to pursue this imperial logic. (4) Again like Mackinder, Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism. Implicit in this ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space because ‘they’ are not like ‘us’. ‘The most ruthlessly suitable’ candidates for space dominance, we are told – ‘the

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJmost capably endowed’ – are like those who populated America and Australia (Dolman, 2002: 27). (5) A critical astropolitics must challenge the ‘mythic’ properties of Astropolitik and disrupt its reverie for the ‘timeless insights’ of the so-called geopolitical masters. For Ó Tuathail, ‘geopolitics is mythic because it promises uncanny clarity … in a complex world’ and is ‘fetishistically concerned with …. prophecy’ (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 113). Ó Tuathail’s critical project, by contrast, seeks to recover the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of Mackinder and Mahan has become formalized.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJAlt Slv

Don’t tie your ballot to the same old political truths that create conditions for violence, their universalizing approach to the political can only reproduce the trauma’s they seek to scientifically master—that’s edkins.

The universal intellectual practice of the aff merely serves to buttress biopolitics – only becoming a specific intellectual, using your decision to mark the crude points of the 1AC’s discourse – can make debate a space to challenge regimes of truth and powerOwen ’94 (David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy @ University of Southampton Morality and Modernity, 1994, pp 208-210; swp)

The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the specific intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow , for he is too attentive to the present (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of bargaining again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, a ‘ hyper and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and particularity of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency . What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ideal critique and real transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are but rather of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest (PPC p.154) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the

***ALTERNATIVES

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJrecognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics . The specificity of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematization of the present . It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposing the question ‘who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which others can speak for themselves . The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this crucial activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

Criticize .The outright rejection, criticism and resistance to traditional modes of biopolitics solves through exposing the injustices committed in the status quo. This enables a large scale resistance in which the “new intellectual” emerges from the political struggle empowered amidst the knowledgeable masses.Pickett 5 [Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College 2005 On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 40-41]

A prominent aspect of humanism, one which Foucault is particularly concerned with attacking, involves references to a 'normal' individual based upon the scientific discourses of psychiatry or criminology. By legitimating what is done in prisons and asylums, the categories of humanism "dispel the shock of daily occurrences."26 Humanism is also the legitimating force behind liberal democracy. It tells people that although they do not have power, they are still the rulers: "In short, humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes the possibility of power being seized."27 Because of its effects, Foucault argues that it is necessary to undermine the categories and central concepts of humanism. One of the most effective ways of doing this, Foucault claims, is to learn from those who have been the direct targets of power and repression, learn how they were "divided, distributed, selected, and excluded in the name of psychiatry and of the normal individual, that is, in the name of humanism."28 Their memories, histories, and knowledges are concerned with power and struggles, not with the categories of humanism. This insurrection of subjugated knowledges unmasks previously hidden techniques of power. Since Foucault believes that power is only acceptable to the degree that it is hidden, this insurrection of knowledge will lead to direct action against the central institutions of contemporary culture. At the heart of humanism, according to Foucault, is the theory of the subject. Foucault means two things by 'the subject.' The first is the subject of a hierarchical political order. This is the humanist notion of the 'sovereign' individual who is subjected to the laws of society, nature, truth, and God. The subject, even though he exercises no power, is the sovereign. The humanistic theory of the individual rests, Foucault contends, upon a subjected will to power. That is, the very desire for power is to be eradicated from the individual in the name of truth, nature, and society. In order to achieve the "'desubjectification' of the will to power," that is in order to liberate the desire to take power, it is necessary to engage in political struggle.29 During the early 1970s Foucault repeatedly emphasized that one does not struggle against power because it is morally just; instead it is simply a struggle to take power.30 The notion of the individual as subject, as fixed within a series of hierarchies that limit and constrain, is overthrown through this war for power. The

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJsecond aspect of the theory of the subject is the reference to a 'normal' subject. Modern definitions of normalcy are invariably constructed by the human sciences. This fiction of what a normal person is like has important effects, according to Foucault, in courtrooms, prisons, and various other institutions such as universities. The attack on the normal subject is achieved through breaking the various taboos placed upon the individual. Drug experimentation, communes, and disregard for gender lines are all possible examples of this.31 Another source of struggle against humanism, and the mechanisms of power that it supports, is what Foucault envisions as a 'new intellectual.' In contrast to the traditional theorist, who formulated a totalizing theory apart from the masses and led them with it, the new intellectual does not aspire to guide the masses. He does not impart knowledge to them. Indeed, the masses know better than he, which is why the intellectual must learn from those most exposed to power. The theories constructed from the memories and struggles of factory hands and inmates are local, not global. The new intellectual is not the bearer of truth; instead his theory is merely one more tool in the struggle against power.32 Furthermore, Foucault argued that it is dangerous to formulate a universalistic theory. Struggle must not be made in the name of a new Utopia. "I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system."33 There is a strong temptation to describe a certain human nature, argue that this nature is repressed or distorted by society, and thereby give the outlines of a new, just order. Foucault is adamant that this temptation be resisted. The danger is that the description of human nature will itself be unwittingly drawn from the contemporary power system.34 One becomes entrapped in the very system one is trying to oppose: These notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilization, within our type of knowledge, and our form of philosophy . . . and one can't, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should—and shall in principle—overthrow the very fundaments of our society.35 Instead of opposing the ideal to the real, Foucault suggests that the new intellectual oppose the real to the real. Exposing the specific, concrete workings and events of the prison, asylum, and other institutions is enough to justify action. Once certain "intolerables" are revealed, such as the prevalence of suicide in French prisons, a struggle has been created.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJVoting negative turns this debate into a cite of resistance—use your ballot as both a concrete agitation and ideological critique, destabilizing the utopian metanarratives which form the unquestioned foundation of the affirmative—only our localized criticism can present a viable strategy for challenging dominant power relations.Pickett 5 [Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College 2005 On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 42-43]

The ultimate goal of these various tactics and techniques, such as genealogy or learning from those most affected by power, is the incitement of local struggles against the modern power system. These actions must be led by those most subject to their constraints. Students must fight a "revolutionary battle" against schools; prison inmates should revolt and thereby be integrated into the larger political struggles.41 Only those directly involved in the battle can determine the methods used. Three institutions are most important to Foucault in this period. The revolt against these institutions must simultaneously involve concrete agitation and ideological critique. First, schools are important primarily because they transmit a conservative ideology masked as knowledge. Second, psychiatry is important precisely because it extends beyond the asylum into schools, prisons, and medicine: in short, "all the psychiatric components of everyday life which form something like a third order of repression and policing."42 Finally, and probably most importantly to Foucault, there is the judicial system since it relies upon the fundamental moral distinction of guilt/innocence. This allows "the most frenzied manifestation of power imaginable" to masquerade as "the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder."43 The judiciary actually blocks direct action through the construction of an allegedly neutral structure that stops real struggle in the here and now and instead arbitrates in the realm of the ideal. Moreover, the judicial system performs a number of functions which prevent revolution, such as controlling the most volatile people who might spearhead a revolt and introducing internal divisions within the masses so that one group will see the other as "dangerous" or "trash." For these reasons it is vital that the judiciary be attacked. Foucault gives examples of the "thousands of possibilities" for "anti-judicial guerilla operations," including escaping from the police and heckling in the courts.44 Ultimately, Foucault calls for "the radical elimination of the judicial apparatus."45 Yet agitation cannot be limited to prisons, schools, and asylums; it must extend into factories and streets. This raises an essential point. Totalizing theory is rejected, but Foucault does support total revolution. If theory is to be local and discontinuous, how is revolutionary action to gain its larger coherence? "The generality of the struggle specifically derives from the system of power itself, from all the forms in which power is exercised and applied."46 The diffuse yet unitary nature of power allows for these various agitations across society to finally achieve coherence, thereby eliminating the need for imagining a new system. Although Foucault criticizes those who still feel this need for a global theory and its Utopia, he himself occasionally gives suggestions about what a better system would look like. Most prominent here is a desire for a lack of hierarchy, including class divisions. For instance, when speaking about the events of May 1968, Foucault said, "It is of the utmost importance that thousands of people exercised a power which did not assume the form of a hierarchical organization."47 A second feature of a better society appears to be a radical pluralism bordering on anarchy. Foucault strongly disagrees with those who invoke "the whole of society" when formulating plans for revolutionary action.48 Such an ideal, he contends, itself arises from a Utopian dream. It also has the detrimental effect of limiting possible avenues of struggle. If prisoners feel that they must take over their prison, they are not to be dissuaded from this because of what is thought to be best for the whole of society. Only those directly involved at each local site of action can determine the methods used and the goals sought. "The whole of society is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed. And then, we can only hope that it will never exist again."49

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJ

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJReject

Resistance to power only functions in the context of widespread, total rejection.Pickett 5 [Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College 2005 On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 24-25]

Foucault also describes the growth of an individualizing political rationality "whose role is to constantly ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and every one."71 This rationality develops into a system that he calls 'pastoral power.' The issue in this system is the relationship between the leader and the led and how it is to be conceptualized. Foucault traces the origins of pastoral power back to Hebraic and early Christian writings, where the leader is the shepherd and the led are the sheep. According to these writings, obedience is a virtue, and the knowledge about each individual sheep by the shepherd is essential. The shepherd, who should be ever-watchful, must know what goes on in the soul of each one. This account is contrasted with the Greek view that focused upon the relation between the city and the citizen. Instead of the leader involving himself with individuals, he is to seek the unity and flourishing of the state as a whole. It is not that the Greek view has been superseded by the Judeo-Christian one; instead the two have grown together: "Our societies proved to be really demonic since they happened to combine those two games—the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game—in what we call the modern states."72 Two elements are pivotal to this combination. First, individuals must be governed by their own truth. We hold a certain conception of ourselves and attempt to live in accordance with it. We think of our identities as something deep and natural and hence relate to ourselves as the bearers of a truth. One principal mechanism through which this is expressed is our sexuality. Again, this is seen as something natural and therefore as something to which we ought to be true. If a man is not sure about the truth of his sex, he may go to a psychiatrist who interprets what he says and explains his truth back to him. The conceptual preconditions of such a relationship are, first, that there is a truth about one's sex, and second, that one may be incapable of understanding that truth but that another, through one's confession, can. Self-awareness, self-discipline, and self-correction are at the heart of this conceptualization. It is simply a later instance of Christian techniques of self-mortification, techniques which introduced this linkage between obedience, knowledge of oneself, and confession.73 The second central element of this modern political rationality is the fostering of individual lives in a way that adds to the strength of the state.74 Healthy, productive, docile citizens are essential to that strength. This is, in one sense, the pinnacle of disciplinary power. The forces of individuals must be maximized in a manner that adds to the outcome of the disciplinary institution itself. The same is true with the state, supported by all of these various disciplinary practices within society, but in turn supporting them. It is a network of power, beginning with the lowly but ubiquitous practices of discipline, the techniques and strategies of bio-power, all producing the sort of individual who can live within the modern state and who in turn maintains that state as it supports those disciplinary and bio-power practices and institutions. Since modern power produces individuals, it is useless to attempt to subvert that power through an appeal to individualism or an assertion of the rights of the individual. Through a historical analysis of the rationality specific to the art of governing modern states, it is clear that those states have been both individualizing and totalitarian from the very beginning.75 Hence Foucault's claim: "Opposing the individual and his interests to it is just as hazardous as opposing it with the community and its requirements."76 The liberal individual, his normative intuitions, and the rights that he bears are the effects of power, and therefore the liberal individual cannot be the basis for an attack on the modern power regime.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJResistance

Resistance and education are effective means of undermining power—they inherently evade total co-option by those who hold powerPickett 5 [Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College 2005 On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 44-45]

A central issue in Foucault's work from this period is the relationship between power and resistance. Is resistance simply that which frustrates power; is it "the antimatter of power"?52 Is it recalcitrance, refusal, and unruliness?53 There is textual evidence for these views. Foucault sees resistance as the odd element within power relations. Resistance is what eludes power, and power is oriented towards resistance as both an adversary and its target.54 Resistance is what threatens power; hence it stands against power as an adversary. Although resistance is also a potential resource for power, the elements or materials that power works upon are never rendered fully docile. Something always eludes the diffusion of power and expresses itself as indocility and resistance. This is due, William Connolly has suggested, to the fact that human beings do not naturally take one form or another; we do not have an essential telos or essence.55 Thus power may form disciplined individuals, who are rational, responsible, productive subjects, yet that is in no way an expression of a human nature. Furthermore, there is always at least some resistance to the imposition of any particular form of subjectivity, and thus resistance is concomitant with the process of subjectification. Power also can produce the very thing which comes to resist it. Foucault describes power as that which organizes multiplicities. This happens on an individual level, such as organizing an aimless flux of impulses, sensations, and desires into a skilled worker. It also happens on a larger level, for instance by integrating that worker into a divided, hierarchical factory space. The creation of such an organized multiplicity serves to increase force, yet power must be further concerned with the docility of the very force it has produced and maximized. Foucault held onto his idea, formulated during the period that I have labeled "revolutionary action," that power is only accepted to the extent that it is hidden. Therefore, unless it is relatively invisible, it will provoke resistance by what it has produced. Indeed, resistance can be made effective, in a sense, by the very power that has opposed it; for instance, by forging a group of skilled workers and bringing them together, disciplinary techniques have created the possibility of large strikes.56 Power, if it is to minimize dangerous resistances, must seek to individualize and divide the forces of the institutions it creates . The unpredictable or spontaneous mixture of individuals or groups must be stopped, and so it is necessary "that they oppose to the intrinsic, adverse force of multiplicity the technique of the continuous, individualizing pyramid."57 Power, by its very nature, must be hierarchical and inegalitarian. In contrast, Foucault repeatedly links resistance with "horizontal conjunctions" and equality.58 For Foucault, inequality is an essential element of power, and therefore resistance, with its absence of hierarchy, is what Foucault calls 'counter power.'59

Generic LinksDeveloping space allows the government to project power beyond earth and to over power peopleWilliams 2010 (AJ, "Beyond the Sovereign Realm: The Geopolitics and Power Relations in and of Outer Space -Geopolitics, 2010" http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/14650041003718358)

Unsurprisingly, given its pre-eminent position within classical geopolitical renderings of outer space, two chapters consider the conceptual notion of Astropolitik yet in very different ways. Havercroft and Duvall acknowledge Dolman’s work, but argue for the development of a more critically informed astropolitics that makes use of Agemben and Foucault. They argue

***LINKS

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJthat this perspective enables us to consider the possibilities and problems inherent in the development of a space-based empire that could project power across the globe from beyond the planet’s surface and render state sovereignty obsolete. Taking a different approach to astropolitics, David Grondin offers a more straightforward reading of Dolman’s concept in his analysis of how US space policies relate to the ‘war on terror’. Natalie Bormann’s chapter also takes a primarily conceptual position interpreting the weaponisation of space using the work of French theorist Paul Virilio. She uses aspects of Virilio’s work, which coalesce around ideas of speed, technologies of vision, and the aesthetics of disappearance, to understand how outer space can be considered to be socially constructed and uses Virilio to focus upon the simultaneity of the creation of space with the military technologies used to defend it. Finally from a more conceptual position, Penny Griffin takes perhaps the most divergent approach, arguing that we need to consider the gendered nature of outer space discourse and understand how this approach again enables us to consider the socially constructed nature of this realm.

By allowing State institutions attempt to control space and define spaces they pave the way for how we know and see spaceFoucault 67 [Michel Foucault ,1967, published by the French journal Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité in October, 1984, “s (1967), Heterotopias” http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html

Now, despite all the techniques for appropriating space, despite the whole network of knowledge that enables us to delimit or to formalize it, contemporary space is perhaps still not entirely desanctified (apparently unlike time, it would seem, which was detached from the sacred in the nineteenth century). To be sure a certain theoretical desanctification of space (the one signaled by Galileo's work) has occurred, but we may still not have reached the point of a practical desanctification of space. And perhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between private space and public space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space of leisure and that of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred. Bachelard's monumental work and the descriptions of phenomenologists have taught us that we do not live in a homogeneous and empty space, but on the contrary in a space thoroughly imbued with quantities and perhaps thoroughly fantasmatic as well. The space of our primary perception, the space of our dreams and that of our passions hold within themselves qualities that seem intrinsic: there is a light, ethereal, transparent space, or again a dark, rough, encumbered space; a space from above, of summits, or on the contrary a space from below of mud; or again a space that can be flowing like sparkling water, or space that is fixed, congealed, like stone or crystal. Yet these analyses, while fundamental for reflection in our time, primarily concern internal space. I should like to speak now of external space.

The United States will continue to increase space exploration to increase their power over weaker nationsWilliams 2010 (AJ, "Beyond the Sovereign Realm: The Geopolitics and Power Relations in and of Outer Space -Geopolitics, 2010" http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/14650041003718358)

In her first substantive chapter, Johnson-Freese offers a historical assess- ment of the development of US space policy from the beginning of the space age until the G. W. Bush administration. She offers both description and analysis of the limits of US space policy, and considers why the US has had problems separating what is technically achievable from what is techni- cally desirable. She points out that the gulf between the two has remained problematic and illustrates the persistent presence of a blurring between fact and fiction that successive US administrations have failed to understand and move beyond.This focus upon the gulf between the limitations of reality and the desires of the US is developed in more detail in Chapter Three, in which the author focuses specifically upon the facts and fictions of space weapons technology. Here she provides a critical indictment of the way US adminis- trations have failed to acknowledge the gap between desired and achievable technologies and provides a detailed and fascinating account of the extent to which US national security and economic prosperity was increasingly based on plans for space technologies that were far beyond the manufacturing capabilities of the US defence industry. She argues that ever more fantastical claims resulted in, and were the result of, the increasing

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJpoliticisation of the US space race and its associated industries, culminating in a gap between fact and fiction that politicians were simply not willing to acknowledge, thus increasing the space arms race beyond the US’s actual means to pro- vide. One example she provides is of the missile defence system which, she argues, is “either the nation’s most important moral imperative or it is an unworkable solution to a problem that does not exist, depending on your perspective” (p. 73). Here we can see Johnson-Freese’s perspective, seeking to critique a space arms race that she believes is out of hand and driven by rhetoric rather than actual materiel.

Space exploration only justifies war fighting plans Williams 2010 (AJ, "Beyond the Sovereign Realm: The Geopolitics and Power Relations in and of Outer Space -Geopolitics, 2010" http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/14650041003718358)

This concern with multilateralism and a need to engage with the wider world is also drawn out in the book’s penultimate chapter which considers the possibilities and problems of outer space–related diplomacy and arms control. Here, the author considers the effects of the US’s opposition to new legal regimes or restrictions on the industrialisation or militarisation of space. She argues that this runs counter to the US’s plans to include outer space squarely within its war-fighting plans. Again Johnson-Freese returns to her key mantra, that of the gap between the facts and the fictions present within the politicisation and militarisation of space, claiming that many of the Bush administration’s reasons for opposing multilateralism in space diplomacy originate in impossible fictions. In this chapter, several key international forums and treaties are analysed, noting the US’s resistance to each in turn. The author does end this chapter with a note of optimism, noting that Barack Obama was the only presidential candidate to support an international space code of conduct.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL- Cap

Space is simply an outlet for capitalist structures to further saturate new markets in the endless drive for growth

MacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

For all its clunky punnage, ‘a-whereness’ nevertheless gives a name to a set of highly contingent forms of subjectivity that are worth anticipating, even if, by Thrift’s own admission, they remain necessarily speculative. Reading this body of work can induce a certain vertigo, confronting potentially precipitous shifts in human sociality. The same sensation is also induced by engagement with Paul Virilio (2005). But, unlike Virilio, Thrift casts off any sense of foreboding (Thrift, 2005b) and instead embraces the construction of ‘new qualities’ (‘conventions, techniques, forms, genres, concepts and even … senses’), which in turn open up new ethicopolitical possibilities (Thrift, 2004a: 583). It is important not to jettison this openness lightly. Even so, I remain circumspect about the social relations that underwrite these emergent qualities, and I am puzzled by Thrift’s disregard of the (geo)political contexts within which these new technologies have come to prominence. A critical geography should, I think, be alert to the ways in which state and corporate power are immanent within these technologies, actively strategizing new possibilities for capital accumulation and military neoliberalism. To the extent that we can sensibly talk about ‘a-whereness’ it is surely a function of a new turn in capitalism, which has arguably expanded beyond the frame (but not the reach) of Marx and Engels when they wrote that: the need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, set t le everywhere, es t abl i sh connections everywhere. (Marx and Engels, 1998: 39) The current struggle for orbital supremacy, as the next section will make clear, is an extension of these relations into space in order to consolidate them back on Earth. Indeed, outer space may become, to use David Harvey’s term, a ‘spatio-temporal fi x’ that can respond to crises of over-accumulation (Harvey, 2003: 43). While this might seem like shorthand for the sort of Marxist critique that Thrift rejects (Amin and Thrift, 2005), it is an analysis that is also shared by the advocates of American Astropolitik, who describe space as the means by which ‘capitalism will never reach wealth saturation’ (Dolman, 2002: 175). The production of (outer) space should, I think, be understood in this wider context.

Space control forcibly appropriates entire sections of orbit as private commodities—that extends imperialist capitalism

Duvall and Havercroft 8 (Raymond Duvall, PhD and Master’s from Northwestern in IR, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Jonathan Havercroft, PhD from University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.”, in Review of International Studies, vol 34, proquest, IWren)

The doctrine of space control has emerged out of the belief that assets in space represent a potential target for enemies of the US. 38 There are two kinds of vulnerable US assets: private-commercial; and military. One concern is that rivals may attack commercial satellites, thereby disrupting the flow of information and inflicting significant harm on global markets. 39 Militarily, the concern is that, through increasing reliance on satellites for Earth-based military operations, the US has created an ‘asymmetrical vulnerability’. An adversary (including a non-state, ‘terrorist’ organisation) could effectively immobilise US forces by disabling the satellites that provide communication, command, and control capabilities. Consequently, the project of space control is designed to protect commercial and military satellites from potential attacks. Its broader purpose, however, is to prevent rivals from having any access to space for activities antithetical to US interests; this is the imperative for ‘denial of the use of space to adversaries’. Thus space control has dual functions – it is both a privatising of the commons of orbital space and a military exclusion – in a form of ‘inclusive exclusion’. 40 Space control represents the extension of US sovereignty into orbital space. Its implementation would reinforce the constitutive effect identified in the previous section on missile defence, namely to reinscribe the ‘hard shell’ border of the US, now extended to include the ‘territory’ of orbital space. US sovereignty is projected out of this world and into orbit. Under Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, ‘Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means’. The US project of space control would entail a clear violation of this article. 41 In addition to expanding the scope of US sovereignty, however, this violation of international law has a second constitutive effect of importance, namely to produce a distinctly capitalist sovereignty. In Volume One of Capital, Marx chided classical political economists for their inability to explain how workers became separated from the means of production. Whereas political economists such as Adam Smith argued that a previous accumulation of capital was necessary for a division of labour, Marx argued that this doctrine was absurd. Division of labour existed in pre-capitalist societies where workers were not alienated from their labour. Instead, Marx argued that the actual historical process of primitive accumulation of capital was carried out through colonial relations of appropriation

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJby force. 42 While not a perfect analogy, because of the lack of material labour, the value of which is to be forcibly appropriated in orbital space, space control is like such primitive accumulation in constituting a global capitalist order through the colonisation of space as previously common property. One of the purposes of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was to preserve a commons where all states, regardless of technical ability or economic or military power, could participate in the potential benefits space has to offer. In the years since this treaty was signed, the primary economic use of space has been for commercial communications satellites. This industry has expanded dramatically in the last two decades. Total revenues for commercial space-related industries in 1980 were $2.1 bn; by 2003 this figure had expanded to $91 bn and it was expected to increase at least as rapidly into the foreseeable future. 43 Space control is about determining who has access to this new economy. Positions in orbit for satellites are a new form of ‘real estate’. By controlling access to orbital space the US would be forcibly appropriating the orbits, in effect turning them into primitively accumulated private property. 44 In this way, the US becomes even more than it is now the sovereign state for global capitalism, the global capitalist state.

L- Econ Economic goals through space promote the United States as a Hegemon Williams 2010 (AJ, "Beyond the Sovereign Realm: The Geopolitics and Power Relations in and of Outer Space -Geopolitics, 2010" http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/14650041003718358)

Dickens and Ormrod’s second chapter is also concerned with advancing a conceptual position, but here the focus is upon the addition of an “outer spatial fix for capitalism” based on the work of David Harvey. Developing their dialectical approach to humans’ relationship with outer space, this chapter theorises the economic value of outer space. It uses Harvey’s work on the circuits of capital to illustrate how space has become increasingly commodified in recent years and how this relates to the establishment of an outer space hegemon. This chapter enables the authors to posit a concep- tual framework that states that “the humanisation of outer space is a product of economic and social crisis” and “that such humanisation is a means of reasserting hegemonic authority” (p. 77). The remainder of the book sets out to prove these contentions.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL- GPS

GPS systems mark a pervasive intrusion into every aspect of social life—the individual relinquishes to the panoptic authority the ability to track and punish pets, pedophiles, and entire populations at the whim of the militaryMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

If the geopolitics of surveillance is particularly evident at the level of the state, it applies also to the organization of the daily activities of its citizens (Molz, 2006). GPS technology is perhaps the most evident incursion of space-enabled military surveillance systems into everyday lif e , becoming an indispensable means of monitoring the location of people and things. For instance, the manufacturer Pro Tech, riding the wave of public concern about paedophilia in Britain, has developed systems currently being trialled by the UK Home Offi ce to track the movements of registered sex offenders (see also Monmonier, 2002: 134). Somewhat predictably, given the apparent crisis in the spatialities of childhood (Jones et al., 2003), children are to be the next subjects of satellite surveillance . In December 2005, the company mTrack launched i-Kids, a mobile phone/GPS unit that allows parents to track their offspring by PC or on a WAP enabled mobile phone. Those with pets rather than children might consider the $460 RoamEO GPS system that attaches to your dog’s collar, should walkies ever get out of hand. It will surprise no one that the same technology gets used for less savoury purposes: a Los Angeles stalker was jailed for 16 months for attaching a GPS device to his ex-girlfriend’s car (Teather, 2004). What is more startling, perhaps, is that one does not need to be a GPSuser to be subject to the surveillant possibilities of this technology. Anyone who leaves their mobile phone unattended for five minutes can be tracked, not just by the security services, but by any individual who has momentary access to enable the phone as a tracking device. For the purposes of a newspaper story, the Guardian journalist Ben Goldacre ‘stalked’ his girlfriend by registering her phone on one of many websites for the commercial tracking of employees and stock (Goldacre, 2006). The exercise revealed how easily everyday technologies like the mobile phone can be reconfigured for very different purposes . Even this modest labour in tracking a mobile phone will become a thing of the past. Phones will be more specifically configured as a tracking device: Nokia is due to release a GPS phone in 2007, while the Finnish company Benefon has already launched its Twig Discovery, a phone that has a ‘finder’ capability that locates and tracks other contacts in your address book. Should the user come within range of another contact, the phone will send a message asking whether you are willing to reveal your location to this contact. If both parties are agreeable, the phones will guide their users to each other. In this way, the gadgetry of space-enabled espionage is being woven into interpersonal as well as interstate and citizen–state relations. If the movements of a car can be tracked by a jealous boyfriend, they can also be tracked by the state for the purposes of taxation : this is surely the future of road tolls in the UK. A British insurance company is already using satellite technology to cut the premiums for young drivers if they stay off the roads between 11pm and 6am, when most accidents occur. Information about the time, duration and route of every single journey made by the driver is recorded and sent back to the company (Bachelor, 2006). The success of geotechnologies will lie in these ordinary reconfi gurations of life such as tracking parcels, locating stolen cars, transport guidance or assisting the navigation of the visually impaired. Some might argue, however, that their impact will be more subtle still. For instance, Nigel Thrift locates the power of new forms of positioning in precognitive sociality and ‘prereflexive practice’, that is to say in ‘various kinds of culturally inculcated corporeal automatisms’ (Thrift, 2004b: 175). In other words, these sociotechnical changes may become so incorporated into our unconscious that we simply cease to think about our position. Getting lost may become diffi cult (Thrift, 2004b: 188). Perhaps we are not at that stage yet. But one can easily envisage GPS technologies enhancing existing inequalities in the very near future, such as the device that will warn the cautious urban walker that they are entering a ‘bad neighbourhood’. In keeping with the logic of the panopticon, this is less ‘Big Brother’ than an army of little brothers: the social life of the new space age is already beginning to look quite different. And it is to this incipient militarization of everyday life that the emerging literature on ‘military geographies’ (Woodward, 2004; 2005) must surely turn its attention.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL-Heg

The US drive for space power allows for the expansion of technological controlMacDonald ‘7 [Fraser MacDonald, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia, Anti-Astropolitik — outer space and the orbit of geography, http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf; WBTR]

Although Galileo has been presented as an infrastructural and commercial asset designed ‘specifically for civilian purposes’, another largely unspoken rationale is undoubtedly EU defence (Wilson, 2002: 5). Galileo will surely underpin a future common European defence policy, even if such a development can be currently subsumed under the guise of ‘dual-use’. The European Advisory Group on Aerospace notes that ‘the well being of the [European space] industry depends on twin pillars, namely civil and defence. These are both complimentary and mutually dependent’ (quoted in Cervino et al, 2003: 233). The notion of ‘dual use’ is convenient for governments because it mitigates against declining public defence research budgets. But there are, I think, grounds for concern about it in this case. Investment in what seems to be civilian infrastructure can easily become at the same time, an extension of the militarization and, potentially, the weaponization of space, particularly in an era when warfare is increasingly being 25 couched in ‘humanitarian’ terms. A team of Italian atmospheric scientists have rightly expressed misgivings that the commercial competition in space technology is becoming a de facto arms race that further undermines confidence in UN OST space governance (Cervino et al, 2003). I should emphasise that I am not advancing some technologically determinist argument to the effect that if something is military in origin it is somehow ‘tainted’ or forever in the service of militarism. Walter Benjamin reminds us that the meaning of technology has no umbilical link to its origins: he noted that the Eiffel Tower ‘found’ its purpose as a military radio transmitter long after it had been built simply as a monument to industrial confidence in iron (Benjamin, 1999: 568). But we should be concerned when the needs of basic civilian infrastructure come to be regarded as coterminous with those of military strategy, particularly in circumstances when technologies of the state are so readily adaptable to monitoring the lives of its citizenry. Another consequence of this conflation is that dual-use systems underpinning normal life have become a ready target of military efforts, being exempt from the usual civilian protections of international law (Graham, 2005c). To use Stephen Graham’s phrase, US air and space power is increasingly aimed at ‘switching cities off’ (Graham, 2005c). This may very easily develop from targeting electricity networks (Belgrade, Baghdad, Beirut) to the destruction of satellite provision on which so much of our civilian infrastructure depends. As Tim Luke observed, many more human beings live highly cyberorganized lives, totally dependent upon the Denature of machinic ensembles with their elaborate extra-terrestrial ecologies of megatechnical economics. This is true for the Rwandans in the refugee camps of Zaire [sic] as it is for the Manhattanites in the luxury coops of New York City (Luke quoted in Graham 2005c: 171) I am reluctant to reiterate Paul Virilio’s preoccupation with the crash and the accident as defining features of modernity (Virilio, 2000; Leslie, 2000). But one cannot avoid the fact that systems that have become vital for sustaining our current mode of existence are now obvious and accessible targets. Concerns have even been raised that constellations of satellites are vulnerable to hackers with 26 destructive intent (Kent, 2006). The point of all this gloomy talk is to qualify rather than to overturn the emphases of Nigel Thrift’s recent work. Moreover I hope to contextualise some of the tendencies Thrift describes within the systems of geo-power from which they have materialized. In the final section I want to show something of the strategic struggle for space; a struggle that is by no means distant from the discipline of geography.

L-MilitarizationMilitarization of space signifies imperialism over non-hegemonic statesWilliams 2010 (AJ, "Beyond the Sovereign Realm: The Geopolitics and Power Relations in and of Outer Space -Geopolitics, 2010" http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/14650041003718358)

This aim begins in Chapter Three which focuses upon analysing the significance of the increased militarisation of outer space with specific rela- tion to issues of imperialism and the closure of space to all non-hegemonic states. In a similar fashion to the other books reviewed here, this begins with a historical description of the space race, focusing specifically on the role and place of the military-industrial complex. Bringing together elements from contemporary geopolitical and security studies literature , they refer to Virilio and Lotringer’s (2007) work on pure war, to the spectacle of ‘shock and awe’ (see Retort, 2005; Ullman & Wade, 1996), and the Strategic Defense Initiative to argue that as war is acknowledged as a “permanent feature of the social order” so it is necessary to consider how outer space, and the military actions that the technologies positioned in orbit can

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJenable, fit within this. In this well-conceived and executed chapter, the authors deliver a nuanced examination of how the practical geopolitics of the post–Cold War world are increasingly being played out with the aid of space-based technologies. They maintain their focus upon the human aspect of this reality asking what the effects of this hegemonic structuring of outer space and its uses will mean for future human society.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL-Nuclear war

The threat of nuclear annihilation is a tool the state uses to justify emergency powers and control over the right to lifeBussolini 2008- Associate Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies, College of Staten Island (Jeffrey “Nuclear State of Exception: Reading and Extension of Foucault's Concepts of Biopower and Biopolitics in Agamben and the Nuclear Age” Abstracts: Foucault Circle 2008)

Near the beginning of Stato de eccezione, Giorgio Agamben includes a very telling quotation from Rossiter: “Nell’era atomica in cui il mondo sta ora entrando, è probabile che l’uso dei poteri di emergenza costituzionale divenga la regola e non l’eccezione. (In the atomic era into which the world is now entering, it is likely that the use of constitutional emergency powers will become the rule rather than the exception).” Studying the atomic age along these lines, as well as those of the earlier considerations on biopolitics in Agamben’s Homo Sacer and Michel Foucault’s lecture courses at the College de France from 1976-1979 (including the crucial concepts of permanent war and the importance of conquest and colonization in contemporary state structures), bears out Rossiter’s quotation—the advent of nuclear technology has indeed coincided with an augmentation of biopolitics and continued hostility both between and within states . By any reckoning nuclear weapons are major artifacts of geopolitics and biopolitics. They are inherently geopolitical tools that emerged from a history of intense inter-state conflict, and their scope and effects make any use a geopolitical event (despite repeated attempts to fashion smaller ‘battlefield’ or ‘tactical’ nukes and come up with scenarios for their employment). The nuclear age is characterized by distrust and hostility between states as well as suspicion of a state’s own citizens and populations (as foreign agents, active threats, or as insufficiently disciplined to handle the secrets and necessary actions of security). Lending credence to the notion that the atomic age is closely linked to a state of exception as nationalist norm, all countries that have developed nuclear arms have substantial secret institutions devoted to developing them and devising plans for their possible use. Nuclear secrets are among the most closely guarded of national security matters. In the United States, all information about nuclear arms is ‘born classified’ and automatically subject to strict controls, the only such category in U.S. classification. The 1947 Smyth Report on the Manhattan Project and U.S. nuclear science says that the secrets of the weapons “must remain secret now and for all time.” Clearly these are regarded as central pillars of geopolitics. The very real threat of Armageddon from these weapons easily gives way to thinking of expediency and triage which instrumentalizes certain populations The fate of those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the continuing collection of data about them by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, has been described in Robert Jay Lifton’s Death in Life. Thousands of soldiers and scientists from different nations have been exposed in tests and research. Indigenous people from the American southwest to the Pacific Islands, Kazakhstan, and Algeria have been forcefully relocated to make room for atomic tests, exposed to radiation, or both. Groups such as prisoners and mental patients have been subjected to radiation experiments against their will or knowledge, supposedly for the purpose of building up crucial knowledge about nuclear effects, as documented in Eileen Welsome’s Plutonium Files and Department of Energy reports on Human Radiation Experiments. These weapons, then, are intimately tied to power over life and death and the management of subject populations. As such, it seems that the exigency related to nuclear thinking justifies (or is the expression of) significant sovereign power over bare life. In the histories mentioned here, survival and protection of the population at large was seen to validate causing death or illness among smaller subsets of that population . One can note that, given their scale, nuclear weapons force consideration of population-level dynamics, as whole populations are placed at risk. In this respect, these arms follow on and accentuate the massive strategic bombing of World War II in which enemy populations were targeted as vital biopolitical resources.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL- “Space Pearl Harbor” / Eastern Threat

The notion of a “Space Pearl Harbor” or looming arms race is founded in the drive to extend contemporary power relations to Outer Space—interrogating this rhetoric is key

MacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

There is also, I think, scope for a wider agenda on the translation of particular Earthly historical geographies into space, just as there was a translation of early occidental geographies onto imperial spaces. When Donald Rumsfeld talks of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’, there is plainly a particular set of historicogeographical imaginaries at work that give precedence, in this case, to American experience. Rumsfeld has not been slow to invoke Pearl Harbor, most famously in the aftermath of 11 September 2001; notably, in all these examples – Hawaii in 1941; New York in 2001; and the contemporary space race – there lurks the suggestion of a threat from the East. 9 All of this is a reminder that the colonization of space, rather than being a decisive and transcendent break from the past, is merely an extension of long-standing regimes of power. As Peter Redfield succinctly observed, to move into space is ‘a form of return’: it represents ‘a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we are leaving behind’ (Redfield, 2002: 814). This line of argument supports the idea that space is part and parcel of the Earth’s geography (Co s g r o v e , 2 0 0 4 : 2 2 2 ) . We can conceive of the human geography of space as being, in the words of Doreen Massey, ‘the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and practices’ (Massey, 2005: 8). She goes on to say that ‘these things are utterly everyday and grounded, at the same time as they may, when linked together, go around the world’. To this we might add that they go around and beyond the world. The ‘space’ of space is both terrestrial and extraterrestrial: it is the relation of the Earth to its firmament. Li s a Pa r k s and Ur sul a Biemann have described our relationship with orbits as being ‘about uplinking and downlinking, [the] translation [of] signals, making exchanges with others and positioning the self ’ (Parks and Biemann, 2003). It is precisely this relational conception of space that might helpfully animate a revised geographical understanding of the Outer Earth.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL- Satellites

Satellite based technology allows unknown monitoring of individuals, leading to government surveillance of its citizens. MacDonald ‘7 [Fraser MacDonald, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia, Anti-Astropolitik — outer space and the orbit of geography, http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf; WBTR]

The geopolitical effects of reconnaissance from space platforms are by no means confined to particular episodes of military conflict. Like high-altitude spy planes, 17 its Cold War precursor, satellite surveillance also gives strategic and diplomatic powers. Unlike aerial photography, however, satellite imagery is ubiquitous, high-resolution and offers the potential for real-time surveillance. The emerging field of surveillance studies, strongly informed by critical geographical thought, has opened to scrutiny the politics and spaces of electronic observation (see, for instance, the new journal Surveillance and Society). The writings of Foucault, particularly those on panopticism, are an obvious influence on this new work (Foucault, 1977; Wood, 2003), but they have seldom been applied to the realm of outer space. As Foucault pointed out, the power of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon prison design is enacted through the prisoner–subjects internalising the disciplinary gaze: the presence of the gaoler was immaterial, as the burden of watching was left to the watched. Similarly, the power of panoptic orbital surveillance lies in its normalising geopolitical effects. If the geopolitics of surveillance is particularly evident at the level of the state, it applies also to the organization of the daily activities of its citizens (Molz, 2006). GPS technology is perhaps the most evident incursion of space-enabled military–surveillance systems into everyday life, becoming an indispensable means of monitoring the location of people and things. For instance, the manufacturer Pro Tech, riding the wave of public concern about paedophilia in Britain, has developed systems currently being trialed by the UK Home Office to track the movements of registered sex offenders (see also Monmonier, 2002: 134). Somewhat predictably, given the apparent crisis in the spatialities of childhood (Jones et al, 2003), children are to be the next subjects of satellite surveillance. In December 2005, the company mTrack launched i-Kids, a mobile phone/GPS unit that allows parents track their offspring by PC or on a WAP-enabled mobile phone. Those with pets rather than children might consider the $460 RoamEO GPS system that attaches to your dog’s collar, should walkies ever get out of hand. It will surprise no-one that the same technology gets used for less savoury purposes: a Los Angeles stalker was jailed for 16 months for attaching a GPS device to his ex-girlfriend’s car (Teather, 2004). What is more startling, perhaps, is that one does not need to be a GPS-user to be subject to the surveillant 18 possibilities of this technology. Anyone who leaves their mobile phone unattended for five minutes can be tracked, not just by the security services, but by any individual who has momentary access to enable the phone as a tracking device. For the purposes of a newspaper story, the Guardian journalist Ben Goldacre ‘stalked’ his girlfriend by registering her phone on one of many websites for the commercial tracking of employees and stock (Goldacre, 2006). The exercise revealed how easily everyday technologies like the mobile phone can be reconfigured for very different purposes. Even this modest labour in tracking a mobile phone will become a thing of the past. Phones will be more specifically configured as a tracking device: Nokia is due to release a GPS phone in 2007, while the Finnish company Benefon has already launched its Twig Discovery, a phone that has a ‘finder’ capability that locates and tracks other contacts in your address book. Should the user come within range of another contact, the phone will send a message asking whether you are willing to reveal your location to this contact. If both parties are agreeable, the phones will guide their users to each other. In this way, the gadgetry of space-enabled espionage is being woven into interpersonal as well as interstate and citizen–state relations. If the movements of a car can be tracked by a jealous boyfriend, they can also be tracked by the state for the purposes of taxation: this is surely the future of road tolls in the UK. A British insurance company is already using satellite technology to cut the premiums for young drivers if they stay off the roads between 11pm and 6am, when most accidents occur. Information about the time, duration and route of every single journey made by the driver is recorded and sent back to the company (Bachelor, 2006). The success of geo-technologies will lie in these ordinary reconfigurations of life such as tracking parcels, locating stolen cars, transport guidance or assisting the navigation of the visually-impaired. Some might argue, however, that their impact will be more subtle still. For instance, Nigel Thrift locates the power of new forms of positioning in precognitive sociality and ‘prereflexive practice’, that is to say in ‘various kinds of culturally inculcated corporeal automatisms’ (Thrift, 2004b: 175). In other words, these sociotechnical 19 changes may become so

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJincorporated into our unconscious such that we simply cease to think about our position. Getting lost may become difficult (Thrift, 2004b: 188). Perhaps we are not at that stage yet. But one can easily envisage GPS technologies enhancing existing inequalities in the very near future, such as the device that will warn the cautious urban walker that they are entering a ‘bad neighbourhood’. In keeping with the logic of the panopticon, this is less ‘Big Brother’ than an army of little brothers: the social life of the new space age is already beginning to look quite different. And it is to this incipient militarization of everyday life that the emerging literature on ‘military geographies’ (Woodward, 2004; 2005) must surely turn its attention.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL- Security

The affirmative depicts a world riddled with dangerous flaws in need of correction at all costs. The image of catastrophe is not a neutral depiction of the way things are, but a rallying cry to a violent project of eliminating otherness.Campbell 98, [David, Professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, 1998 Writing Security, p. 47-48]

To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that abound in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistences of identity. Danger (death, in its ultimate form) might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of Christendom's evangelism of fear. Indeed, in a world in which state identity is secured through dis courses of danger, some low tactics are employed to serve these high ideals. These tactics are not inherent to the logic of identity, which only requires the definition of difference. But securing an ordered self and an ordered world—particularly when the field upon which this process operates is as extensive as a state—involves defining elements that stand in the way of order as forms of "otherness."50 Such obstruc tions to order "become dirt, matter out of place, irrationality, abnormal ity, waste, sickness, perversity, incapacity, disorder, madness, unfreedom. They become material in need of rationalization, normalization, moralization, correction, punishment, discipline, disposal, realization, etc."51 In this way, the state project of security replicates the church project of salvation. The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church justifies its role by guaranteeing salvation to its followers who, it says, would otherwise be destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and the church require considerable effort to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in the process to the temptation to treat difference as otherness. In contrast to the statist discourse of international relations, this understanding proffers an entirely different orientation to the question of foreign policy. In addition to the historical discussion above, which suggested that it was possible to argue that the state was not prior to the interstate system, this interpretation means that instead of regarding foreign policy as the external view and rationalist orien tation of a preestablished state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with others, we can consider foreign policy as an integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the state. The state, and the identity of "man" located in the state, can therefore be regarded as the effects of discourses of danger that more often than not employ strategies of otherness. Foreign policy thus needs to be understood as giving rise to a boundary rather than acting as a bridge. (47-48)

The threats are social constructions and only ensure that the advantages become self-fulfilling prophecies.Lipschutz 95 [Director of Adlai Stevenson Propgram on Global SEecurity 1995Ronnie, On Security, p.10]

Security is, to put Waever’s argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is “out there.”20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJcannot be regarded simply as having some sort of “objective” reality independent of these constructions .21 That security is a socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, “create” each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figment s of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs.22

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL-Space Heg

The notion of space dominance expands geopolitical control over humansMacDonald ‘7 [Fraser MacDonald, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia, Anti-Astropolitik — outer space and the orbit of geography, http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf; WBTR]

Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no longer remote from our everyday lives; it is already profoundly implicated in the ordinary workings of economy and society. Secondly, the import of space to civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earth’s orbit. One cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in terms of establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for terrestrial geopolitics. It is in this context that I want to briefly introduce the emerging field of astropolitics, defined as ‘the study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military policy and strategy’ (Dolman, 2002: 15). It is, in both theory and practice, a geopolitics of outer space. Everett Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar to critical geographers, like the modestly titled Small Wars and Insurgencies. As what follows is uniformly critical of Dolman’s work, I should say that his Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman, 2002) is unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of research and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration and space policy, and presents a lucid and accessible introduction to thinking strategically about space. (In the previous section I drew heavily on Dolman’s description of the astropolitical environment). My critique is not founded on scientific or technical grounds but on Dolman’s construction of a formal geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military conquest of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among neoconservative colleagues in Washington think-tanks, critical engagements (e.g. Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground. Dolman’s work is interesting for our purposes here precisely because he draw’s on geography’s back catalogue of strategic thinkers, most prominently Halford Mackinder, whose ideas gained particular prominence in America in the wake of 28 the Russian Sputnik (Hooson, 2004: 377). But Dolman is not just re-fashioning classical geopolitics in the new garb of ‘astropolitics’; he goes further and proposes an ‘Astropolitik’ – ‘a simple but effective blueprint for space control’ (p. 9) – modeled on Karl Hausofer’s Geopolitik as much as Realpolitik. Showing some discomfort with the impeccably fascist pedigree of this theory, Dolman cautions against the ‘misuse’ of Astropolitik and argues that the term ‘is chosen as a constant reminder of that past, and as a grim warning for the future’ (Dolman, 2002: 3). At the same time, however, his book is basically a manual for achieving space dominance. Projecting Mackinder’s famous thesis on the geographical pivot of history (Mackinder, 1904) onto outer space, Dolman argues that ‘who controls the Lower Earth Orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra [Earth]. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind’. Dolman sees the quest for space as already having followed classically Mackinderian principles (Dolman, 2002: 87). And like Mackinder before him, Dolman is writing in the service of his Empire. ‘Astropolitik like Realpolitik’ he writes, ‘is hardnosed and pragmatic, it is not pretty or uplifting or a joyous sermon for the masses. But neither is it evil. Its benevolence or malevolence become apparent only as it is applied, and by whom’ (Dolman, 2002: 4). Further inspiration is drawn from Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose classic volume The Influence of Seapower Upon History, has been widely cited by space strategists (Mahan, 1890; Gray, 1996; see also Russell, 2006). Mahan’s discussion of the strategic value of coasts, harbours, well–worn sea paths and chokepoints has its parallel in outer space (see France, 2000). The implication of Mahan’s work, Dolman concludes, is that ‘the United States must be ready and prepared, in Mahanian scrutiny, to commit to the defense and maintenance of these assets, or relinquish them to a state willing and able to do so’ (Dolman, 2002: 37).

Astropolitik Philosophy gives space a geography resulting in the control of human movements. MacDonald ‘7 [Fraser MacDonald, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia, Anti-Astropolitik — outer space and the orbit of geography, http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf; WBTR]

Stephen Graham, following Eyal Weizmann, has argued that geopolitics is a flat discourse (Graham, 2004: 12; Weizmann, 2002). It attends to the cartographic horizontality of terrain rather than a verticality that cuts through the urban landscape from the advantage of orbital supremacy. Just as, for Graham, a critical geopolitics must urgently consider this new axis in order to challenge the practices and assumptions of urbicide, so too – I would argue – it must lift its gaze to the politics of the overhead. Our interest in the vertical plane must extend beyond terrestrial perspectives; we must come to terms with the everyday realities of space exploration and domination as urgent subjects of critical geographical enquiry. A prerequisite for this

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJagenda is to overcome our sense of the absurdity and oddity of space, an ambivalence that has not served human geography well. The most obvious entry point is to think systematically about some of the more concrete expressions of outer space in the making of Earthly geographies. For instance, many of the high profile critical commentaries on the recent war in Iraq, even those written from geographical perspectives, have been slow to address the orbital aspects of military supremacy (see for instance, Harvey, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Retort, 2005). Suffice to say that, in war as in peace, space matters on the ground, if indeed the terrestrial and the celestial can be sensibly individuated in this way. There is also, I think, scope for a wider agenda on the translation of particular Earthly historical geographies into space, just as there was a translation of early occidental geographies onto imperial spaces. When Donald Rumsfeld talks of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’, there is plainly a particular set of historico–geographical imaginaries at work that give precedence, in this case, to American experience. Rumsfeld has not been slow to invoke Pearl Harbour, most famously in the aftermath of September 11; notably, in all these examples – Hawaii in 1941; New York in 2001; and the contemporary space race – there lurks the suggestion of a threat from the East9. All of this is a reminder that the colonisation of space, rather than being a decisive and transcendent break from the past, is merely an 34 extension of longstanding regimes of power. As Peter Redfield succinctly observed, to move into space is ‘a form of return’: it represents ‘a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we are leaving behind’ (Redfield, 2002: 814). All of this supports the idea that space is part and parcel of the Earth’s geography (Cosgrove, 2004: 222). We can conceive of the human geography of space as being, in the words of Doreen Massey, ‘the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and practices’ (Massey, 2005: 8). She goes on to say that ‘these things are utterly everyday and grounded, at the same time as they may, when linked together, go around the world’. To this we might add that they go around and beyond the world. The ‘space’ of space is both terrestrial and extra-terrestrial: it is the relation of the Earth to its firmament. Lisa Parks and Ursula Biemann have described our relationship with orbits as being ‘about uplinking and downlinking, [the] translation [of] signals, making exchanges with others and positioning the self’ (Parks and Biemann, 2o03). It is precisely this relational conception of space that might helpfully animate a revised geographical understanding of the Outer Earth. As has already been made clear, this sort of project is by no means new. Just as astropolitics situates itself within a Mackinderian geographical tradition, so a critical geography of outer space can draw on geography’s early modern cosmographical origins, as well as on more recent emancipatory perspectives that might interrogate the workings of race, class, gender and imperialism. Space is already being produced in and through Earthly regimes of power in ways that undoubtedly threaten justice and democracy. A critical geography of space, then, is not some far-fetched or indulgent distraction from the ‘real world’; rather, as critical geographers we need to think about the contest for outer space as being constitutive of numerous familiar operations, not only in respect of international relations and the conduct of war, but also to the basic infrastructural maintenance of the state and to the lives of its citizenry. Geography is already well placed to think about these things; there are many well worn lines of geographical critique that have their parallel in space. For instance, there are pressing ‘environmental’ questions about the pollution of Earth’s orbit with space ‘junk’, a development which is seriously compromising the sustainable use of Lower Earth Orbit. This high-speed midden, already of interest to archaeologists (see Gorman, 2005), is coming up for its fiftieth anniversary in 2007, after the launch of the Russian satellite Sputnik on the 4th October 1957. Since then, the sheer variety and number of discarded objects is remarkable. From lens caps to frozen astronaut faeces, the number of orbiting articles greater than 10cm in diameter currently being tracked is over 9000 (Brearley, 2005: 9). The ability to think critically about nature conservation and heritage policy – another aspect of the geographer’s remit – may also have an extra-terrestrial transference, as wilderness and ‘first contact’ paradigms look set to be mobilized in space (Cockell and Horneck, 2004; Rogers, 2004; Spennemann, 2004). One might further speculate that the economic geography of outer space would be a rich, if as yet undeveloped, avenue of enquiry. And a cultural and historical geography of space offers numerous flights of fancy, from questions of astronautical embodiment to the politics of planetary representation. All of this is to say that a geography of outer space should be a broad undertaking, aside from the obvious project of a critical geo/astropolitics. Lastly, a critical geography must not be overly pessimistic, nor must it relinquish an engagement with space technology on the grounds that this has, to date, been driven largely by military agendas. The means of our critique may require us to adopt such technologies, or, at least to ask what opportunities they present for radical praxis. One thinks here of various forms of playful and subversive activism, experiment and art-event that have deliberately toyed with space hardware (Triscott and la Frenais, 2005; Spacearts, 2006). GPS receivers can help us think reflexively about position (Parks 2001); remote sensing can be used to explore political conditions in the world (Parks and Biemann, 2o03); amateur radio-telescopy can help us re-conceptualize space by attuning us to the sonorous qualities of its scientific ‘data’ (Radioqualia, 2003); even rocket science can still carry utopian freight (Chalcraft, 2006). Through such means, can space be given a truly human geography.

Space satellites are the basis for the State to exercise powerNeil’ 6 (Ross M., “Space Technologies for Global Environmental Governance: Transitions”, 2006, Chapter 2, page 29)

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJhttp://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rssN6ft1WkAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA27&dq=Space+Technologies+for+Global+Environmental+Governance:+Transitions&ots=wFDTMCwWI0&sig=5saqoE-I4xfJ5QMfCXSx0_zw0Ig#v=onepage&q=Space%20Technologies%20for%20Global%20Environmental%20Governance%3A%20Transitions&f=false

Satellite based earth remote sensing and surveillance technologies are now becoming integrated tools for technologically advanced societies, adding to the utility of related telecommunications and navigation technologies. Combined, space technologies are increasingly affecting political, economic and military decision making, symbolizing a new sensory organ that we have created and transforming outer space into a new political, economic and military centre of gravity. Michel Foucault has argued that surveillance technologies have been the basis for the state’s administrative power throughout the modern era, suggesting the strong role that access to space technology will continue to play in international relations and economic development. As the knowledge content largely provides the strategic value in high technology collection capacities, a situation that could be describing as contributing to a tragedy of space and information commons. But at the beginning of the 21st century, the geography of out space represents an environment in transition. While the development of out space represents the unprecedented technological advancement of human society over the past half-century and technologies such as remote sensing satellites on and observation satellites hold great promise for improving human livelihoods, growing dependencies on these technologies and the information they provide for a range of applications are continuing to pose serious questions about control, access and appropriateness of use. At the same time, an imperative for countries to participate in the wider economic and security benefits that situational awareness from space can provide, coupled with the high risk, investment and long term timescales involved in developing space systems, has ensured that less powerful states have engaged widely in an imperialistic development enterprise often misrepresented at international cooperation in space. The hegemonic imbalance in almost all aspects of space development advantages the U.S. in various ways but also creates for it certain responsibilities and challenges especially in sharing access to the space commons.

Satellites are an extension of the military through bio-powerDickens and Ormrod 7 - *Visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex AND**Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton (Peter and James, Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe pg 116)

Foucault’s concept of ‘capillary power has also been useful, though this theory too needs to recognize the forms of power being exerted via surveillance. The bottom line is that outer space is being used by military-cum-civil authorities and by companies (including media conglomerates) as a means of consolidating and extending their social and political power. On the other hand, we have used the notion of hegemony to suggest that the use of these technologies in outer space does not necessarily result in long-lasting solutions to overaccumulation and social-cum-political crises on Earth. They generate possibilities for new resist-acnes (including resistances to communication) and preliminary attempts at popular control. Satellite technology is capable of being subverted, captured and used by subordinated interests. At the same time, of course, they can be used for humanitarian purposes – tracking refugee populations, for example – and there is always the potential for educational and health programmes to provide genuine assistance to those in poverty, provided their agenda is not dictated by the ideo-logical interests of Western neo-liberal capitalism. Dominant forms of politics and culture exercised via control of outer space are not stable and are constantly up for renegotiation and reworking.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL- Space Tech

Space tech is merely another front for the military-industrial complex—civilian technologies are used to exploit loopholes in international regulations to monitor and control entire tech-dependent populationsMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

Although Galileo has been presented as an infrastructural and commercial asset designed ‘specifically for civilian purposes’, another largely unspoken rationale is undoubtedly EU defence (Wilson, 2002: 5). Galileo will surely underpin a future common European defence policy, even if such a development can be currently subsumed under the guise of ‘dual use ’. The European Advisory Group on Aerospace notes that ‘the well being of the [European space] industry depends on twin pillars, namely civil and defence. These are both complementary and mutually dependent’ (quoted in Cervino et al., 2003: 233). The notion of ‘dual use’ is convenient for governments because it mitigates against declining public defence research budgets. But there are, I think, grounds for concern about it in this case. Investment in what seems to be civilian infrastructure can easily become, at the same time, an extension of the militarization and, potentially, the weaponization of space, particularly in an era when warfare is increasingly being couched in ‘humanitarian’ terms. A team of Italian atmospheric scientists have rightly expressed misgivings that the commercial competition in space technology is becoming a de facto arms race that further undermines confidence in UN OST space governance (Cervino et al., 2003). I should emphasize that I am not advancing some technologically determinist argument to the effect that if something is military in origin it is somehow ‘tainted’ or forever in the service of militarism. Walter Benjamin reminds us that the meaning of technology has no umbilical link to its origins: he noted that the Eiffel Tower ‘found’ its purpose as a military radio transmitter long after it had been built simply as a monument to industrial confidence in iron (Benjamin, 1999: 568). But we should be concerned when the needs of basic civilian infrastructure come to be regarded as coterminous with those of military strategy, particularly in circumstances when technologies of the state are so readily adaptable to monitoring the lives of its citizenry . Another consequence of this conflation is that dual-use systems underpinning normal life have become a ready target of military efforts, being exempt from the usual civilian protections of international law (Graham, 2005c). To use Stephen Graham’s phrase, US air and space power is increasingly aimed at ‘switching cities off’ (Graham, 2005c). This may very easily develop from targeting electricity networks (Belgrade, Baghdad, Beirut) to the destruction of satellite provision on which so much of our civilian infrastructure depends . As Tim Luke observed: many more human beings live highly cyberorganized lives, totally dependent upon the Denature of machinic ensembles with their elaborate extra-terrestrial ecologies of megatechnical economics. This is true for the Rwandans in the refugee camps of Zaire [sic] as it is for the Manhattanites in the luxury coops of New York City. (Luke, quoted in Graham, 2005c: 171) I am reluctant to reiterate Paul Virilio’s preoccupation with the crash and the accident as defining features of modernity (Virilio, 2000; Leslie, 2000), but one cannot avoid the fact that systems that have become vital for sustaining our current mode of existence are now obvious and accessible targets . Concerns have even been raised that constellations of satellites are vulnerable to hackers with destructive intent (Kent, 2006). The point of all this gloomy talk is to qualify rather than to overturn the emphases of Nigel Thrift’s recent work. Moreover, I hope to contextualize some of the tendencies Thrift describes within the systems of geopower from which they have materialized. In the final section I want to show something of the strategic struggle for space; a struggle that is by no means distant from the discipline of geography.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL-Space Weaponization

Space weapons are the iron fist of the panopticon—they are utilized to transcend international sovereignty, police the globe, and reduce the entire world population to bare lifeDuvall and Havercroft 8 (Raymond Duvall, PhD and Master’s from Northwestern in IR, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Jonathan Havercroft, PhD from University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.”, in Review of International Studies, vol 34, proquest, IWren)

Force application entails using weapons either based in space or deployed through space to attack targets on Earth or within Earth’s atmosphere. Such weapons systems (other than missiles) are many years off, but substantial research is being conducted, and military strategists are already discussing how they might be used. 45 The major advantage of space-based weapons is that they can be deployed to attack extremely quickly. Additionally, it is very difficult to defend against them. They become the violent parallel to the surveillance panopticon . In order to investigate the constitutive effects of force application from outer space, we need to look at two aspects of these weapons: technical (what they can do); and tactical (how they would be used). 46 Technically, the two types of force application weapons systems currently envisioned, laser-energy and kinetic-energy, have different features. Laser weapons would take only seconds to deploy, and they could reach any target on or near Earth instantaneously and very precisely. They are not very destructive, however, and as such would not be very useful against large-scale and/or heavily shielded targets. Kinetic-energy weapons, in contrast, have the potential to deliver very destructive force, even well below the Earth’s surface (in deep bunker-busting). They would take a few hours to deploy, however. 47 While they could also be designed to attack any point on earth, they are only useful against fixed targets, because of deployment lag-time. In addition to laser and kinetic-energy systems, conventional weapons, such as bombs and missiles, might also be placed in space. They would occupy a middle ground. It would take approximately ten minutes to launch them and they could attack any targets that have relatively fixed locations. 48 The tactical advantages are obvious. Their tremendous range would enable space-based weapons to reach targets that other weapons cannot, and because they are based in orbital space there are no concerns about violating the airspace of other states in transit, as there is with airplanes or non-ballistic missiles. They could also be used on very short notice, in contrast to the days to weeks typically required to deploy Earth-based weapons, such as airplanes, ships, or troops. Their major drawback is cost, both for development and for placing in orbit. 49 As such, they would likely have limited use, 50 particularly if other weapons and tactics can accomplish the same mission for lower cost. Why, for instance, would the military use a kinetic-energy weapon orbiting in space against a target when a similar result could be produced by a cruise missile or a bomb? Thus, to repeat, the prime advantage of these weapons is their ability to be used very quickly against targets that are out of the reach of other weapons. In what kind of military operations, then, would space-based weapons for force application be useful? Military analysts have speculated on just such questions: Alternatively, a space weapon might be the weapon of choice for an otherwise lower-value target if the space weapon were the only choice available in time, particularly for a time critical political effect. For example, a locomotive might not be worth a space-delivered smart munition. However, it might be well worth the use of a space-delivered smart munition to target a locomotive pulling a train full of people forced from their homes for transport to the border or to a concentration camp at the beginning of an ethnic cleansing campaign – particularly if aircraft and helicopters cannot reach the train because air defenses have not been suppressed, basing and overflight rights have not been granted, or coalition consensus on the action has not been reached. 51 This scenario is fascinating for the political logic at work within it – force application from space is required to attack an otherwise inaccessible target. All three reasons stated for inaccessibility involve potential gaps in US capacity to project its power globally. Either the defences of the target country have not been suppressed, or other states have not consented to let US forces fly through their airspace, or other coalition members – presumably in NATO or the UN – have not consented to the action. What places targets ‘out of reach’ in this scenario, then, is the sovereignty of other states as exercised through their abilities to defend their territory, control their airspace, and/or participate (jointly) in authorised decision of the (global) exception to international law. As Schmitt has argued with respect to domestic law, the sovereign is constituted through the capacity to decide the exception to the application of law in a moment of crisis. 52 The e ff ect of space weapons for force application is to erase that sovereignty – states are constituted as subjects lacking authorisation of decision, and lacking a boundary e ff ectively demarcating inside from outside. While other weapons systems can be used to intervene in a ff airs within a state’s borders, their constitutive logic (with the possible exception of nuclear and some forms of biological weapons) is not, per se, corrosive of sovereignty, because in principle, even if not in every instance, they can be defended against. Precision space-based strikes happen so rapidly, however, that a defensive response is not possible. As such they strip states of the defensive ‘hard shell’ that, classical realists argued, is constitutive of sovereignty. All three justifications thus buttress the exclusive capacity of the US to ‘decide the exception’ globally, while diminishing, by circumvention, the sovereignty of other states. The hypothetical use of space weapons in this scenario is an imperial project. 53 Furthermore, these weapons would be most useful against small targets, such as groups and individuals. While the justification for the use of space-based weapons in the quoted scenario was to prevent genocide, the hypothetical attack constitutes their possessor as global police, punishing without trial those specific actors it deems responsible for genocide. Even if the specific act provoking

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJspace-based attack is not a violation of international law, the political society with the capacity to intervene – and with it the capacity to decide when to intervene – constitutes itself as sovereign police of the international system. 54 Space-based weapons for force application, then, are most useful at targeting individuals and groups at short notice in order to achieve the policing objective of ‘order’ and control under a rule of law, even as that sovereign policing decision is made outside of the very law in whose name it is made . We have already seen glimpses of this type of warfare in recent years. Consider, for example, that the Iraq War began with a so called ‘decapitation strike’ aimed at assassinating Saddam Hussein in the hope of ending the war before it began. Similar tactics have been used by the Israeli Defence Forces to kill specific leaders of the Palestinians. Also, the US has used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles equipped with missiles to target members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Placing weapons in space aimed at terrestrial targets would markedly accelerate the ability to carry out these types of ‘targeted killings’ (assassinations). Thus, application of force from orbital space would have at least three crucially important constitutive effects. First, it would constitute the US, as possessor of these weapons, as the centre of a globally extensive, late-modern empire, 55 a sovereign of the globe. But this sovereign would exercise its power in a new way. Rather than needing to have occupying forces in place to control the Earth’s lands and seas, it could rely heavily on space weapons to exercise social-political control. While these weapons are not particularly useful in fighting large-scale wars, or in the conquest of territory, there would no longer be a need to hold territory. All the global sovereign would have to do is to kill, or perhaps even threaten to kill, potential adversaries around the world in order to ‘police’ social and political activities throughout its global empire. 56 Second, these weapons, just as space-based missile defence, would e ff ectively strip other states of their territorial sovereignty. While de jure sovereignty may remain intact, de facto sovereignty would be effectively erased, in a manner reminiscent of classical empire. For decades, realist international relations scholars have promoted the idea that states secure their sovereignty through self-help. 57 If states lack the capacity to defend themselves from adversaries, they are particularly vulnerable to attack and conquest. While liberal and constructivist scholars have questioned how closely sovereignty is linked to military capability, realists have responded that throughout history states with disproportionate military power have repeatedly violated the sovereignty of weaker states. 58 While space-based weapons in and of themselves would not enable conquest of another state, they could be used very effectively to achieve precise political objectives on the territories nominally under the sovereign authority of other states. Imagine what impact these weapons would have on US foreign policy with respect to two of its currently most pressing objectives. Consider, for one, how useful such weapons might be with respect to preventing a rival state, such as Iran or North Korea, from acquiring nuclear weapons. While there has been speculation that the US or Israel may launch air strikes against potential nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities in these countries, the logistics – getting access to airspace from neighbouring countries, and the possibility of retaliation against military forces in the area – make such operations difficult. Using weapons in space would avoid these logistical difficulties, thereby making the missions easier (and presumably more likely). Threatening spaced-based attack on either manufacturing sites of weapons or on the political leadership of an adversary might be sufficient in many cases to alter the behaviour of targeted governments. In short, if the US were to deploy such weapons in space, they would likely be used to similar effect as the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century. A second contemporary policy objective is to fight specific non-state actors. The 9/11 Commission Report discussed in great detail the logistical obstacles that prevented the Clinton administration from capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden, 59 principally the difficulty in either launching cruise missiles into Afghanistan through another state’s airspace or deploying US Special Forces in an area remote from US military bases. Had the US possessed space-based weapons at the time, they probably would have been the weapons of choice. When combined with intelligence about the location of a potential target, they could be used to kill that target on very short notice without logistical hurdles. The sovereignty of states would no longer be an obstacle to killing enemies. All that would stand in the way would be international norms against assassination and the potential political backlash of imperial subjects. While much has been made by constructivists in recent years of the capacity of norms and taboos to restrain state behaviour in a world of sovereign states, it does not necessarily follow that in a world of only one e ff ectively global sovereign such taboos and norms would continue to function or even exist. The example of using space weapons to target non-state actors such as Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda points to a third constitutive effect of space weapons capable of force application. Because these weapons could target anyone, anywhere, at anytime, everyone on Earth is e ff ectively reduced to ‘bare life.’ 60 As Agamben demonstrates, sovereign power determines who is outside the laws and protections of the state in a relationship of ‘inclusive exclusion.’ While human rights regimes and the rule of law may exist under a late-modern global empire policed by space weapons, 61 the global sovereign will have the ability to decide the exception to this rule of law, and this state of exception in many cases may be exercised by the use of space weapons that constituted the sovereign in the first place.

Space weapons erase contemporary forms of sovereignty, positing all nations as empty shells subject to US domination and all populations as bare life to be managed and assassinated at imperial willDuvall and Havercroft 8 (Raymond Duvall, PhD and Master’s from Northwestern in IR, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Jonathan Havercroft, PhD from University of Minnesota, Professor in

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJPolitical Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.”, in Review of International Studies, vol 34, proquest, IWren)

Each of the three forms of space weapons has important constitutive effects on modern sovereignty, which, in turn, are productive of political subjectivities. Exclusive missile defence constitutes a ‘hard shell’ of sovereignty for one state, while compromising the sovereign political subject status of other states. Space control reinforces that exclusive constitution of sovereignty and its potentiality for fostering unilateral decision. It also constitutes the ‘space-controlling’ state, the US, as sovereign for a particular global social order, a global capitalism. Space weapons capable of direct force application obliterate the meaning of territorial boundaries for defence and for distinguishing an inside from an outside with respect to the scope of policing and law enforcement – that is an authorised locus for deciding the exception. States, other than the exceptional ‘American’ state, are reduced to empty shells of de jure sovereignty, sustained , if at all, by convenient fiction – for example, as useful administrative apparatuses for the governing of locals. And their ‘citizens’ are produced as ‘bare life’ subject to the willingness of the global sovereign to let them live. Together and in conjunction, these three sets of effects constitute what we believe can appropriately be identified as an empire of the future, the political subjects of which are a global sovereign, an exceptional ‘nation’ linked to that sovereign, a global social order normalised in terms of capitalist social relations, and ‘bare life’ for individuals and groups globally to participate in that social order. If our argument is even half correct, the claim with which this article began – that modes of political killing have important effects – would be an understatement!

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL-Surveillance

Satellites are the new Panopticon – they exercise biopolitical control over the populationDickens and Ormrod 7 - *Visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex AND **Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton (Peter and James, Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe pg 116, dml)

Foucault’s account is useful when we turn to one of the main ways in which the socialization of outer space is being deployed today. There is a direct parallel between Bentham’s panopticon and this new orbital or ‘planetary’ panopticon (Whitaker 2000). Both involve a watchstation up on high that observes deviant populations, and in neither case do the monitored have any knowledge of whether or not they are being watched. About 200 of the Earth’s 2,500 satellites can be seen exercising ‘biopower’ and ‘capillary’ authority via satellite. Satellites capable of monitoring and transmitting pieces of information around the globe are a step towards making a global panopticon. If Foucault is right, the outcome is a cowed and self-policing population. A system of geosynchronous satellites is arguably the modern-day equivalent of a punishing God or supreme power in the sky feared by societies throughout human history. As we shortly discuss, however, this picture needs some modification. Surveillance is becoming especially important in contemporary society. Not only does it involve the observation of populations, but increasingly it is implicated in the transmission of information about people around the globe. The planetary panopticon monitors and transmits highly personal information. Data on consumers’ purchases, for example, is used not only for stock-control purposes but also to make profiles of individuals as consumers. This data can be used to target consumers, to bring to their attention new products via advertising or promotion over the internet. But personalized surveillance goes even further than this. Closed-circuit television monitors the activities of individuals. Telephone conversations can also be quite easily monitored, even though the sheer amount of information generated by all these technologies is difficult to cope with. Car number plates can be photographed and matched to centralized records to track individuals or to charge them for the use of certain streets.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJL-State

The ability to control what people creates the conditions for biopowerEdkins 2k-lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth,Jenny, “Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid”, 2000, p. 37-38)

Agamben argues that since Aristotle "politics" has been founded on a separation between zoe (bare life) and bios (a politically qualified life). He describes "bare life" as common to all living beings, but bios as a form of living proper to an individual or a group, a particular way of life. Originally, zoe or bare life was excluded from the polis and confined to the home. Foucault analyzes the transition at the threshold of the modern era when bare life was included in the mechanisms and calculations of state power. At this point politics needs a new name. to distinguish it from what went before: biopolitics. Whereas for Aristotle, man is a living animal with a capacity for political existence, in modernity man has become "an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question." Modernitv is the point at which the species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society's political strategies. There has been a transition from a territorial state to a state of population-rather than governing territory, the state governs people. For Agamben the concentration camp is the exemplary space of modern biopolitics. The famine relief camp is another site, albeit less appalling, where biopolitics is installed. In the relief camp the authorities' concern for death rates and the bureaucracy of organization obscures any awareness of the refugees' own social and political aims.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJLoss of Autonomy

Space Technology causes loss in human autonomy and allows humans to be controlled like cattle. MacDonald ‘7 [Fraser MacDonald, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia, Anti-Astropolitik — outer space and the orbit of geography, http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf; WBTR]

Mention must also be made of ‘geo-fencing’ technologies. This is not merely a matter of tracking dogs, children or friends, but an even more active expression of geographic power. Take, for example, the case of networked cows6. Zack Butler, an academic computer scientist at the Rochester Institute of Technology, has pioneered a form of satellite herding technology which would allow a farmer move livestock by means of ‘virtual fences’ controlled by a laptop computer: ‘basically we downloaded the fences to the cows’ Butler told the New Scientist (New Scientist, 2004). Each cow wears a collar with a GPS ‘cowbell’ that activates a particular electric or sound stimulation which discourages the animal from proceeding in a given direction whenever it arrives at the virtual fence. It is of passing interest to learn that Butler also compares this new era of satellite-guided farming to ‘playing a computer game’. This may be a relatively minor example, but it gives some indication of the potentially wide array of applications that await geo-fencing technologies. Many of these space-enabled developments have, unaccountably, been neglected by the mainstream of geography. For instance, Barney Warf makes the comment that ‘to date, satellites remain a black hole in the geographical literature on communications’ (Warf, 2006: 2). And yet, these technologies underwrite an array of potentially new subjectivities, modes of thinking and ways of being whose amorphous shape has recently been given outline by Thrift in a series of 20 original and perceptive essays (Thrift, 2004; 2004b; 2005). He draws our attention to assemblages of software, hardware, new forms of address and locatability, new kinds of background calculation and processing, that constitute more active and recursive everyday environments. The background ‘hum’ of computation that makes Western life possible, he argues, has been for the most part inaudible to social researchers. Of particular interest to Thrift is the tendency towards ‘making different parts of the world locatable and transposable within a global architecture of address’ (Thrift, 2004: 588), which is, of course, the ultimate achievement of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), of which GPS is the current market leader. On the back of the absolute space of GPS – and its ancillary cartographic achievements (Pickles, 2004) – have emerged other (relational) spatial imaginaries and new perceptual capacities, whereby the ability to determine one’s location and that of other people and things is increasingly a matter of human pre-cognition (Thrift, 2005: 472). Dissolving any neat distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘technology’, this new faculty of techno-intelligence can support quite different modes of sensory experience. Thrift offers the term ‘a-whereness’ to describe these new spatial modalities that are formed when what used to be called ‘technology’ has moved ‘so decisively into the interstices of the active percipience of everyday life’ (Thrift, 2005: 472; see also Massey and Thrift, 2003: 291).

***IMPACTS

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJEnmity Mod

Bio-political control justifies the creation of enmity towards other actors. Thorup ‘6 [Mikkel Thorup, , lecturer and at the Institute of Philosophy and History of Ideas at the univ of Aarhus in Denmark In Defense of Enmity – Critiques of Liberal Globalism, Ph.D. Dissertation]

Another register in which the lines are blurred or rather non-existent is in the biopolitical enmity as theorized by Michel Foucault (2003; Kelly 2004) and Giorgio Agamben (1998). Here, we most clearly see the blurring of lines. In the biopolitical enmity, the enemy is named in biological and psychological terms and the enemy is found within the social body. The line between an inside, the friends, and an outside, the enemies, is no longer meaningful. The enemy lives among us and the biopolitical state takes it upon itself to single out those, who threaten the health of the community. This concept of enmity is also highly discriminatory. It establishes a hierarchy of worthy life and starts to talk about 'life unworthy of being lived' and its annihilation (Agamben 1998: 136), most dramatically and tragically executed in the Nazi concentration and euthanasia program but for both Foucault and Agamben a constitutive element in modernity. The goal of a biopolitical war is not to reach a modus vivendi with the enemy but to eliminate him. This is a total war: ... the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. (Foucault 2003: 256, my italics) What the biopolitical enmity makes clear is the normalization of the exceptional, as the biopolitical state declares war on parts of its own population, not only in form of extermination but also quarantining of the sick, surveillance, exclusions, imprisonments, institutionalization of the abnormal etc. The heroic battles are replaced by micro-technologies that maximize the mortality of some groups and minimize it for others. Instead of individual killings, we get what Ernst Fraenkel with a very precise expression called 'civil death' (1969: 95) or what Foucualt called 'statistical death'. The sovereign does not manifest himself in splendid displays of power, public executions, but in the actions of the secret police, disappearances and extermination camps (Foucault 2003: chap. 11). The biopolitical state emerges, where racism and statism meets. It is no longer: 'We have to defend ourselves against society', but 'We have to defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other, the subrace, the counterrace that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence' ... we see the appearance of a State racism: a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification (Foucault 2003: 61-2)

That from of enmity leads to instability that slides into absolute violence. Derrida 1997 [Jacques Derrida, Visiting Professore at NYU The Politics of Friendship, p. 83-89]

— We have lost the friend, as it is said in this century. — No, we have lost the enemy, another voice says, in this same waning century. Both voices speak of the political, and that is what we wish to recall. They speak, in sum, of a political crime of which it is no longer known — this is a question of borders — if it is to be defined in the order of the political (for instance, when there is assassination, torture, or terrorism in a given political state for political reasons) or if it is a crime against the political itself, when in one way or another it puts to death that without which a political crime could no longer be defined or distinguished from other sorts of crimes, when appeal to political reason or to some critique of political reason would no longer be possible. Following this hypothesis, losing the enemy would not necessarily be progress, reconciliation, or the opening of an era of peace and human fraternity. It would be worse: an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented — therefore monstrous — forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable. The figure of the enemy would then be helpful — precisely as a figure — because of the features which allow it to be identified as such, still identical to what has always been determined under this name. An identifiable enemy — that is, one who is reliable to the point of treachery, and thereby familiar. One's fellow man, in sum, who could almost be loved as oneself he is acknowledged and recognized against the backdrop of a common history. This adversary would remain a neighbour, even if he were an evil neighbour against whom war would have to be waged. Among all the possible political readings of Nietzsche's phrase, we are on the verge of giving precedence to one, specifically where — at least apparently — it would lead back to a tradition, a tradition already in modernity. One which the twentieth century would certainly have replayed; and would replay again under new conditions, between two world wars and from one mutation to another of its postwar periods. But it would lead back to a tradition of modernity which, in a naturally differentiated and complicated fashion, goes back at least to Hegel. This tradition takes on systematic form in the work of Carl Schmitt, and we believe it is necessary to dwell temporarily on it here. At length, but temp¬orarily. Certainly on account of the intrinsic interest of Schmitt's theses —their originality, where they seem, however, as ragingly conservative in their political content as they are reactive and traditionalist in their philosophical logic. But also on account of their heritage. Their paradox and equivocality are well known. Is it fortuitous that the same filiation unites several right-wing and left-wing (Marxist, post-Marxist, and neo-Marxist) families?4

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJFirst reminder: for Schmitt, it is indeed nothing more and nothing less than the political as such which would no longer exist without the figure of the enemy and without the determined possibility of an actual war. Losing the enemy would simply be the loss of the political itself — and this would be our century's horizon after two world wars. And today, how many examples could be given of this disorientation of the political field, where the principal enemy now appears unidentifiable! The invention of the enemy is where the urgency and the anguish are; this invention is what would have to be brought off, in sum, to repoliticize, to put an end to depoliticization. Where the principal enemy, the 'structuring' enemy, seems nowhere to be found, where it ceases to be identifiable and thus reliable — that is, where the same phobia projects a mobile multiplicity of potential, interchangeable, metonymic enemies, in secret alliance with one another: conjuration. Here is the Schmittian axiom in its most elementary form: the political itself, the being-political of the political, arises in its possibility with the figure of the enemy. It would be unfair, as is often done, to reduce Schmitt's thought to this axiom, but it would nevertheless be indispensable to his thought, and also to his decisionism, his theory of the exception and sovereignty. The disappearance of the enemy would be the death knell of the political as such. It would mark the beginning of depoliticization (Entpolitisierung), the beginning of the end of the political Facing this end, at the eschatological edge of this imminent death, at the moment when the political has begun to expire, the Christian sage or the fool might say, with a sighed alas: 'there is no enemy! (es gibt keinen Feind!)' But then, to whom would he address himself (Tnemies . .!"Feinde .!'), to which enemies? Perhaps to his political enemies with whom he would still share that love of war outside the horizon of which, according to Schmitt, there is no state. But perhaps he would also be addressing the enemies of the political, the ultimate enemies, the worst of them all, enemies worse than enemies. At any rate, the Schmittian axiom is also posited in a `Nietzschean' posterity. The fact that it is attuned to a fundamentally Christian politics is certainly not insignificant even if in many respects this is considered secondary. In The Concept of the Political,5 Schmitt (whose massively attested Nazism remains as complex and overdetermined as his relation to Heideg¬ ger, Benjamin, Leo Strauss,6 etc.) claims to have pinpointed the determining predicate, the specific difference of the political. He writes, for example: The specific political distinction (die spezfisch politische Unterscheidung), to which political actions and notions can be reduced, is the distinction (Unterscheidung) between friend and enemy.'' If the distinction or the differential mark (Unterscheidung), if the determi¬nation of the political, if the 'political difference' itself (die politische Unterscheidung) thus amounts to a discrimination (Unterscheidung) between friend and enemy, such a dissociation cannot be reduced to a mere difference. It is a determined opposition, opposition itself This determina¬tion specifically assumes opposition. Should that opposition erase itself, and war likewise, the regime called 'politics' loses its borders or its specificity. Schmitt draws a great number of consequences from this axiom and these definitions, notably with regard to a certain depoliticization. There would be an essential risk for modem humanity tout court, which, qua humanity, ignores the figure of the enemy. There is no enemy of humanity. A crime against humanity is not a political crime. Alas, for humanity qua humanity, there is not yet, or already no longer, any enemy! Anyone who takes an interest in humanity qua humanity has ceased, according to Schmitt, to talk about politics, and should realize it. Is the person levelling this warning at us too much the sage or too much the fool? Schmitt claims that he has awakened a tradition that was beginning to lull. Whether we can substantiate them or not, some of his remarks must claim our attention here. We should underscore two of them. They deal on the one hand with the opposition public/private, and on the other with a certain concept of ethics. Let us begin with the first. The second will be taken up much later. Although he does not propose equivalence or symmetry for the friend, one of the opposing terms of the discrimination (Unterscheidung), Schmitt considers that the enemy has always been esteemed a 'public' enemy. The concept of a private enemy would be meaningless. Indeed, it is the very sphere of the public that emerges with the figure of the enemy: One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend and enemy opposition, that this opposition still remains actual today, and that it subsists in a state of real virtuality (als reale Moglichkeit) for every people having a political existence. Hence the enemy is not the competitor or the adversary in the general sense of the term. Neither is he the personal, private rival whom one hates or feels antipathy for. The enemy can only be an ensemble of grouped individuals, confronting an ensemble of the same nature, engaged in at least a virtual struggle, that is, one that is effectively possible (Feind 1st nur eine wenigstens eventuell, d.h. der realen Moglichkeit nach kampfende Gesamtheit von Menschen die einer ebensolchen Gesamtheit gegeruthersteht).' We have cited the letter of the last sentence of the original (slightly abused in the French translation) because the most obscure zone of the difficulty is enclosed therein. This last sentence points up in fact — but furtively, almost elliptically, as if it were self-evident — the innermost spring of this logic: the passage from possibility to eventuality (which is here specified as minimal eventuality) and from eventuality to effectivity-actuality (which in the sentence is named real possibility, 'reale Moglichkeit'). This passage takes place, it rushes into place, precisely where the abyss of a distinction happens to be filled up. The passage consists in fact in a denial of the abyss. As always, the tank is replenished in the present, with presence [le plein se fait au present]: in the name of a present, by allegation of presence — here, in the form of a present participle (kampfende). Schmitt emphasizes this present participle, as if to point to the sensitive spot of the operation, with an attentiveness which the translation, unfortunately, has passed over. As soon as war is possible, it is taking place, Schmitt seems to say; presently, in a society of combat, in a community presently at war, since it can present itself to itself; as such, only in reference to this possible war. Whether the war takes place, whether war is decided upon or declared, is a mere empirical alternative in the face of an essential necessity: war is taking place; it has already begun before it begins, as soon as it is characterized as eventual (that is, announced as a non-excluded event in a sort of contingent future). And it is eventual as soon as it is possible. Schmitt does not wish to dissociate the quasi-transcendental modality of the possible and the historico-factual modality of the eventual. He names now the eventuality (wenigstens eventuell), now the possibility (Moglichkeit), without thematizing the crite¬rion of distinction. No account of this distinction is taken in the French translation.' As soon as war is possible-eventual, the enemy is present; he is there, his possibility is presently, effectively, supposed and structuring. His being-there is effective, he institutes the community as a human community of combat, as a combating collectivity (kampfende Gesamtheit von Menschen). The concept of the enemy is thereby deduced or constructed a priori, both analytically and synthetically — in synthetic a priori fashion, if you like, as a political concept or, better yet, as the very concept of the political. From then on,

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJit is important that the concept be purified of all other dimensions — especially of everything opposed to the political or the public, beginning with the private: anything that stems from the individual or even the psychological, from the subjective in general . In fact, this conceptual prudence and rigour are bound to imply, as is always the case, some sort of phenomenological procedure. Following what resembles at least an eidetic reduction, all facts and all regions that do not announce themselves as political must be put in parentheses. All other regional disciplines, all other knowledge — economic, aesthetic, moral, military, even religious knowl¬edge — must be suspended, although the theological-political tradition has to remain in operation for essential reasons — this is well known, but we shall return to it later — in this apparently secular thought of the political.'° This prudence, at once phenomenological and semantic, is often difficult to respect, but the stakes involved, for Schmitt, are decisive. This prudence sometimes receives authorization, at least in The Concept of the Political, from a distinction first marked in two languages, Latin and Greek (hostis/inimicus, polimios/ekhthros), as though the distinction of the political could not be properly formulated in more than two idioms; as if other languages, even the German language, could not have as clear an access to the distinction. But whether Schmitt allows himself this linguistic reference or whether it is used as a convenient pedagogic tool is difficult to say. He may well do both at the same time, as though the whole history of the political — that is, the rigorous determination of the enemy — sealed here or there, in a linguistic felicity, a universal necessity forever irreducible to it. In fact, following the publication of his book in 1932, Schmitt more than once returned to re-examine this linguistic limitation, in a context we shall specify in a moment. Would the question still be, as it always is, that of the 'right name', as Nietzsche would say? The question of the right name of friendship or of its supposed antithesis, enmity? We, speakers of Latin that we are, would have to understand, in adjusting our language on this point, that the antithesis of friendship in the political sphere is not, according to Schmitt, enmity but hostility. First consequence: the political enemy would not inevitably be inimical, he would not necessarily hold me in enmity, nor I him. Moreover, sentiments would play no role; there would be neither passion nor affect in general. Here we have a totally pure experience of the friend-enemy in its political essence, purified of any affect — at least of all personal affect, supposing that there could ever be any other kind. If the enemy is the stranger, the war I would wage on him should remain essentially without hatred, without intrinsic xenophobia. And politics would begin with this purification. With the calculation of this conceptual purification. I can also wage war on my friend, a war in the proper sense of the term, a proper, clear and merciless war. But a war without hatred. Hence a first possibility of semantic slippage and inversion: the friend (amicus) can be an enemy (hostis); I can be hostile towards my friend, I can be hostile towards him publicly, and conversely I can, in privacy, love my enemy. From this, everything would follow, in orderly, regular fashion, from the distinction between private and public. Another way of saying that at every point when this border is threatened, fragile, porous, contestable (we thus designate so many possibilities that 'our time' is accentuating and accelerating in countless ways), the Schmittian discourse collapses. It is against the threat of this ruin that his discourse takes form. It defends itself, walls itself up, reconstructs itself unendingly against what is to come; it struggles against the future with a prophetic and pathetic energy. But it is also from within this threat, from within the dread that it seems to provoke in this traditionalist and Catholic thinker of European law, that he is able to see coming, better than so many others, the force of the future in this threatening figure. This reactive and unscrupulous dread is often presented in the rigour of the concept, a vigilant, meticulous, implacable rigour inherited from the tradition — from a tradition, moreover, that this entire discourse intends to serve and repeat, in order to put it up against the novelty of what is coming and to see, so it would seem, that it carries the day. With the energy of a last-ditch effort. If one is not to lose the enemy, one must know who he is, and what, in the past, the word `enemy' always designated — more precisely, what it must have designated. No, what it should have designated: The enemy is solely the public enemy (nur der offentliche Feind), because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense; poiernios, not ekhthrds. As German and other languages do not distinguish between the private and political enemy, many misconceptions and falsifications are possible. The often quoted 'Love your enen-nes' (Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27) reads diligite hostes vestros, agapdte tous ekhthrous tundn and not diligite inimicus vestros. No mention is made of the political enemy. Never in the thousand-year struggle between Christians and Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend Europe out of love toward the Saracens or Turks. The enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally, and in the private sphere only does it make sense to love one's enemy, that is, one's adversary." (We could say a great deal today, among so very many other analogous indications that abound in Schmitt's text, on the choice of this example: Islam would remain an enemy even though we Europeans must love the Muslims as our neighbours. At a determining moment in the history of Europe, it was imperative not `to deliver Europe over to Islam' in the name of a universal Christianity. You are obliged, you will always have been obliged, to defend Europe against its other without confusing the genres, without confusing faith and politics, enmity and hostility, friendship and alliance or confusion. However, a coherent reading of this example should go further: today more than ever such a reading should take into account the fact that all the concepts of this theory of right and of politics are European, as Schmitt himself often admits. Defending Europe against Islam, here considered as a non-European invader of Europe, is then more than a war among other wars, more than a political war. Indeed, strictly speaking, this would be not a war but a combat with the political at stake, a struggle for politics. And this holds even if it is not necessarily a struggle for democracy, which is a formidable problem in any reading of Schmitt. From then on the front of this opposition is difficult to place. It is no longer a thoroughly political front. In question would be a defensive operation destined to defend the political, beyond particular states or

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJnations, beyond any geographical, ethnic or political continent. On the political side of this unusual front, the stakes would be saving the political as such, ensuring its survival in the face of another who would no longer even be a political enemy but an enemy of the political — more precisely, a being radically alien to the political as such , supposing at least that, in its purported purity, it is not Europeanized and shares nothing of the tradition of the juridical and the political called European.)

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJExtinction

Biopower allows for the destruction of all life Foucault 78- Professor of the history of systems of thought, at the college de france (Michel, “The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1”, 1978, p. 143.)

If one can apply the term bio-history to the pressures through which the movements of life and the processes of history interfere with one another, one would have to speak of bio-power to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life. It is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them. Outside the Western world, famine exists. on a greater scale than ever; and the biological risks confronting the species are perhaps greater, and certainly more serious, than before the birth of microbiologv. But what might be called a societv's "threshold of modernity" has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a divine animal with the additional capacity for a political existence: modem man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.

Rejection of biopolitical thought is vital to stop extinctionBernayer 90- Philosophy professor at Boston College =) (James, “MICHAEL FOUCAULT'S FORCE OF FLIGHT: TOWARD AN ETHICS OF THOUGHT”, pp. 141-2 1990) 

This capacity of power to conceal itself cannot cloak the tragedy of the implications contained in Foucault's examination of its functioning. While liberals have fought to extend rights and Marxists have denounced the injustice of capitalism, a political technology, acting in the interests of a better administration of life, has produced a politics that places man's "existence as a living being in question."' The very period that proclaimed pride in having overthrown the tyranny of monarchy, that engaged in an endless clamor for reform, that is confident in the virtues of its humanistic faith this period's politics created a landscape dominated by history's bloodiest wars. What comparison is possible between a sovereigns authority to take a life and a power that, in the interest of protecting a societys quality of life, can plan, as well as develop the means for its implementation, a policy of mutually assured destruction. Such a policy is neither aberration of the fundamental principles of modern politics nor an abandonment of our age's humanism in favor of a more primitive right to kill; it is but the other side of a power that is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. The bio-political project of administering and optimizing life closes its circle with the production of the Bomb. "The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of a power to guarantee an individual's continued existence."" The solace that Might have been expected from being able to gaze at scaffolds empty of the victims of a tyrant's vengeance has been stolen from us by the noose that has tightened around each of our own necks. That noose is loosened by breaking with the type of thinking that has led to its fashioning, and by a mode of politic action that dissents from those practices of normalization that have made us all potential victims. A prerequisite for this break is the recognition that human being and thought inhabit the domain of knowledge-power relations (savoir-pouvoir), a realization that is in opposition to traditional humanism. In the light of SP and VS, man that invention of recent date continued to gain sharper focus. By means of that web of techniques of discipline and methods of knowing that exists in modern society, by those minute steps of training through which the body was made into a fit instrument, and by those stages of examining the mind's growth, the "man of modern humanism was born.' The same humanism that has invested such energy in developing a science of man has foisted upon us the illusion that power is essentially (repressive) in doing so, it has led us into the dead end of regarding the pursuit and exercise of power as blinding the faculty of thought." Humanism maintains its position as Foucault's major opponent because it blocks the effort to think differently about the relations between knowledge and power. His weapon against this humanism continues to be a form of thinking that exposes human being to those dissonant series of events that subvert our normal philosophical and historical understanding.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJNuclear annihilation

Biopower leads to nuclear annihilation, the power to organizing life it allows for the power over ultimate death Coviello 2k- Assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College(Peter, "Apocalypse from Now On," Queer Frontiers, 2000, page 41 )

Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life ... [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations ." In his brief comments onwhat he calls "the atomic situation," however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern vower must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race;' agencies of modem power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone." Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize anv expression of force. no matter how invasive or, indeed. potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modem power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent retum to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an avoca- lyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJViolence

Biopoolitics is the root cause of violence. When we allow the state to calculate lives we have no value in living Dillon 99- professor of political theory at lancaster (Michael, “Political theory, Another Justice”, 1999, p. 165)

Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure: 03 6 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility . As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.

Biopower is the root cause of violence, racism, and warFoucault 76- Professor of the history of systems of thought, at the college de france (Michel, “Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France”,1976)

What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die" - function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are elim- inated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I- as species rather than individual-can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJfunctions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. I think that we are now in a position to understand a number of things. We can understand, first of all, the link that was quickly-I almost said immediately-established between nineteenth-century biological theory and the discourse of power. Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense-or in other words, not so much Darwin's theory itself as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as: the hierarchy of species that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the struggle for existence among species, the selection that eliminates the less fit) naturally became within a few years during the nineteenth century not simply a way of transcribing a political discourse into biological terms, and not simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing, but a real way of thinking about the relations between colonization, the necessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness, the history of societies with their different classes, and so on. Whenever, in other words, there was a confrontation, a killing or the risk of death, the nineteenth century was quite literally obliged to think about them in the form of evolutionism. And we can also understand why racism should have developed in modern societies that function in the biopower mode; we can understand why racism broke out at a number of .privileged moments, and why they were precisely the moments when the right to take life was imperative. Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide. If you are functioning i n the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill people, to kill populations, and to kill civilizations? By using the themes of evolutionism, by appealing to a racism. War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme of racism? From this point onward, war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race, of destroying that [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race . In one sense, this is of course no more than a biological extrapolation from the theme of the political enemy. But there is more to it than that. In the nineteenth century-and this is completely new-war will be seen not only as a way of improving one's own race by eliminating the enemy race (in accordance with the themes of natural selection and the struggle for existence), but also as a way of regenerating one's own race. As more and more of our number die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJSecuritization

The inability to grapple with the world’s inherent disorder and chaos, specifically in the field of international relations, leads to an endless violent struggle with uncertainty that has resulted in a model of the political that makes annihilation both possible and necessary. Campbell and Dillon 1993 [David Campbell , professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, and Michael Dillon professor of politics at Lancaster University, The Political Subject of Violence, p. 163-165]

This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst excesses of violence exhibited by the formation of (political) identity. The orthodox rendering of such violence as pre-modern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism. For if these ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out. The only alternative is for nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a hypostatised conception of man/nature as determinative of the social/political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if it is overturned. It might have once been the case that the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful—indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point. But , having reached what Foucault has called society’s ‘threshold of modernity’, ‘we’ now face a prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold because the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence: modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question. How the prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically and politically, is not. The double bind of this prospect is that modernity’s alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of (inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reason’s success; not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters of the political (Ia politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violent practices of politics (la politique). The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust. For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis’ genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the ‘civilising process’. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal other, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the Holocaust ‘was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house’.’°The paradoxical nature of modernity is suggested by the emergence of a Holocaust from within its bosom. And there can be no better indication in contradistinction to those ‘modernists’ who

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJwould like to brand so-called ‘postmodernists’ with the responsibility for all and future Holocausts — that a reliance on established traditions of reason for ethical succour and the progressive amelioration of the global human condition may be seriously misplaced. The comfort we have derived from the etiological myth of modern politics has occluded the way in which the ‘civilising process’ of which that myth speaks has disengaged ethics from politics. As Bauman concludes: We need to take stock of the evidence that the civilizing process is, among other things, a process of divesting the use and deployment of violence from moral calculus, and of emancipating the desiderata of rationality from interference of ethical norms and moral inhibitions.”

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJGenocide

Biopower Justifies Genocide, Mass Destruction, And warFoucault 78- Professor of the history of systems of thought, at the college de france (Michel, “The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1”, 1978, p. 259.)

Since the classical age, the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them to submit or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century. and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life. that endeavors to administer, optimize and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars arc no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone . entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many people to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction , the decision that initiates them and the one that termites them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee and individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJAT: Nat Security Checks

Global Tracking is justified by the government under the guise of national security. MacDonald ‘5 [Fraser MacDonald, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia, Anti-Astropolitik — outer space and the orbit of geography, http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf; WBTR]

For all its clunky punnage, ‘a-whereness’ nevertheless gives a name to a set of highly contingent forms of subjectivity that are worth anticipating, even if, by Thrift’s own admission, they remain necessarily speculative. Reading this body of work can induce a certain vertigo, confronting potentially precipitous shifts in human sociality. The same sensation is also induced by engagement with Paul Virilo (Virilio, 2005). But unlike Virilio, Thrift casts off any sense of foreboding (Thrift, 2005b) and instead embraces the construction of ‘new qualities’ (‘conventions, techniques, forms, genres, concepts and even … senses’), which in turn open up new ethico–political possibilities (Thrift, 2004: 583). It is important not to jettison this openness lightly. Even so, I remain circumspect about the power relations that underwrite these emergent qualities. And I am 21 puzzled by Thrift’s disregard of the (geo)political contexts within which these new technologies have come to prominence. A critical geography should, I think, be alert to the ways in which state and corporate power are immanent within these technologies, actively strategising new possibilities for capital accumulation and military neo-liberalism. To the extent that we can sensibly talk about ‘a-whereness’ it is surely a function of a new turn in capitalism, which has arguably expanded beyond the frame (but not the reach) of Marx and Engels when they wrote that the need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere (Marx and Engels, 1998: 39). The current struggle for orbital supremacy, as the next section will make clear, is an extension of these relations into space in order to consolidate them back on Earth. Indeed, outer space may become, to use David Harvey’s term, a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ that can respond to crises of over-accumulation (Harvey, 2003: 43). While this might seem like shorthand for the sort of Marxist critique that Thrift rejects (Amin and Thrift, 2005), it is an analysis that is also shared by the advocates of American Astropolitik, who describe space as the means by which ‘capitalism will never reach wealth saturation’ (Dolman, 2002: 175). The production of (outer) space should, I think, be understood in this wider context. To illustrate this discussion, it is worth returning to the example of GNSS (GPS and its new European competitor, Galileo), given the centrality of positioning technologies to the tendencies that Thrift describes. Let us not neglect the significance of these changes (which, to his great credit, Thrift is among the earliest in the social sciences to recognise). We are potentially talking about an end to the ordinary meaning of the question where am I? In a development comparable to the nineteenth-century standardisation of clock time for the measurement of labour, GNSS technology has conquered space; it is becoming part of the computational background to everyday life – ‘an epistemic wallpaper’ – a form which, like clock time, structures social life but is relatively invisible 22 because of its utter familiarity (Thrift, 2004). GNSS represents a standardisation of space in terms of a Euclidean topology or system of co-ordinates – ‘the most absolute of absolute spaces’ (Thrift, 2004: 600) – which, while not new in its conception, has only been fully realised with the advent of satellites and atomic clocks. From now on, every corner of the globe can be given an address to an accuracy of four metres, allowing, as we have already seen, for an unprecedented ability to track people and things. But such technology did not just ‘emerge’. Rather, the example of the American GPS shows how military systems for missile guidance were gradually refined for civilian use as the commercial possibilities for innumerable user-applications have become more evident. The current global standard for position, velocity and timing information, GPS was forged in the Cold War, originating in the science of monitoring the Russian Sputnik. An early version quickly found its principal use determining the exact locations of American submarines in order to accurately deploy the Polaris nuclear missile (Beidleman, 2005: 121). The potential civilian utility of the technology was not widely publicised until 1983 when a Korean passenger aircraft (KAL 007) bound for Seoul, accidentally strayed over Soviet airspace and was shot down by jet interceptors. Outraged by the episode, President Ronald Reagan announced that when the full GPS constellation was operational the data could be used for civil aviation. However, as GPS was a military support system tailored for missile guidance, the US was unwilling to make an accurate signal widely and freely available; to do so, it was thought, could assist an enemy in

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Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJtargeting the US. The civilian GPS signal was therefore deliberately degraded to 100 metres or so, until President Clinton eventually authorized access to the 10–20 metre signal in 2000. Since then, GPS has become so hard-wired into social and economic life on Earth , that its commercial and military rationales are more evenly weighted. The value of the market at stake is considerable. In 2002, commercial services based on free access to GPS had estimated revenues of $12 billion; the global market for services and receivers was expected to reach €40 billion by 2005 (Beidleman, 2002: 134). Further, GPS has become crucial to so many of the routine infrastructural operations of nation states, a dependence entirely based on a continuing trust in the American provision. Should issues of (American) national security be at stake, however, the US has made no guarantee of GPS signal quality. It is in this context that the European Union has pursued its own GNSS, Galileo, whose first satellite (GIOVE-A) started transmission in January 2006 (figure 2). The pan-European support for Galileo revealed a widespread concern among member states that having such basic infrastructure ultimately subject to 24 the control of a foreign power was a breach of European sovereignty. Indeed French President Chirac went so far as to warn that failing to support Galileo ‘would inevitably lead to [Europe] becoming … vassals of the United States’ (quoted in Beidleman, 2005: 129). The initial American response to Galileo was outright diplomatic opposition coupled with a certain doubt that the E uropean Space Agency could manage the political and technical coordination necessary to complete the project. The likelihood that Galileo will be successful has, however, brought about a major challenge to American orbital supremacy. An agreement to standardize signal protocol means that Galileo will not disrupt GPS signals, but the European system makes it much more difficult for the US to deny positioning data to users with potentially hostile intent. The fact that other non-European states, including China, Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, have also invested in the project has been disconcerting for the US. Even more worrying is the anticipated portion of market share that Galileo may acquire before a planned accuracy upgrade to GPS can be completed. The enhanced precision of Galileo looks set to generate new applications as well as attract new users; a market penetration of 13% in 2010 is expected to rise to 52% in 2020 (Beidleman, 2005: 135).

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJA2: No L- Exploration

Space may not have air but it certainly has ideology—the affirmative’s expansion into space is simply a continuation of terrestrial imperial politicsMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

My basic claim, then, is that a geographical concern with outer space is an old project, not a new one. A closely related argument is that a geography of outer space is a logical extension of earlier geographies of imperial exploration (for instance, Smith and Godlewska, 1994; Driver, 2001). Space exploration has used exactly the same discourses, the same rationales, and even the same institutional frameworks (such as the International Geophysical Year, 1957–58) as terrestrial exploration. Like its terrestrial counterpart, the move into space has its origins in older imperial enterprises. Marina Benjamin, for instance, argues that for the United States outer space was ‘always a metaphorical extension of the American West’ (Benjamin, 2003: 46). Looking at the imbricated narratives of colonialism and the Arianne space programme in French Guiana, the anthropologist Peter Redfi eld makes the case that ‘outer space reflects a practical shadow of empire’ (Redfi eld, 2002: 795; see also Redfi eld, 2000). The historian of science Richard Sorrenson, writing about the ship as geography’s scientifi c instrument in the age of high empire, draws on the work of David DeVorkin to argue that the V-2 missile was its natural successor (Sorrenson, 1996: 228; see also DeVorkin, 1992). A version of the V-2 – the two-stage ‘Bumper WAC Corporal’ – became the fi rst earthly object to penetrate outer space, reaching an altitude of 244 miles on 24 February 1949 (Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 1961). Moreover, out of this postwar allied V-2 programme came the means by which Britain attempted to reassert its geopolitical might in the context of its own ailing empire. In 1954, when America sold Britain its fi rst nuclear missile – a refi ned version of the WAC Corporal – its possession was seen as a shortcut back to the international stage at a time when Britain’s colonial power was waning fast (Clark, 1994; MacDonald, 2006a). Even if the political geography literature has scarcely engaged with outer space, the advent of rocketry was basically Cold War (imperial) geopolitics under another name. Space exploration then, from its earliest origins to the present day, has been about familiar terrestrial and ideological struggles here on Earth.

More ev—the study and expansion into space are contingent on terrestrially-based social bodies of dominationMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

The historic relationship between knowing a space and exerting political and strategic dominion over it is entirely familiar to geographers. Just as the geographical knowledge of Empire enabled its military subjugation, colonization, and ultimately its ecological despoliation, this same pattern is being repeated in the twenty-first-century ‘frontier’. 4 It is also worth remembering that the geographies of imperialism are made not given. In what follows, I want to examine how the geographies of outer space are being produced in and through contemporary social life on Earth. Such an account inevitably throws up some concerns about the politics and socialities of the new space age. Against this background, I set my argument on a trajectory which is intermittently guided by two key writers on technology with very different sensibilities. It is my intention to hold a line between the dark anticipations of Paul Virilio and the resplendent optimism of Nigel Thrift. This discursive flight may well veer off course; such are the contingencies of navigating space.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJA2: No L- Science

You make the problem worse—the military empirically funds and utilizes scientific surveillance to identify enemiesMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

In this discussion so far, I have been drawing attention to geography’s recent failure to engage outer space as a sphere of inquiry and it is important to clarify that this indictment applies more to human than to physical geography. There are, of course, many biophysical currents of geography that directly draw on satellite technologies for remote sensing. The ability to view the Earth from space, particularly through the Landsat programme, was a singular step forward in understanding all manner of Earth surface processes and biogeographical patterns (see Mack, 1990). The fact that this new tranche of data came largely from military platforms (often under the guise of ‘dual use’) was rarely considered an obstacle to science. But, as the range of geographical applications of satellite imagery have increased to include such diverse activities as urban planning and ice cap measurements, so too has a certain reflexivity about the provenance of the images. It is not enough, some are realizing, to say ‘I just observe and explain desertification and I have nothing to do with the military’; rather, scientists need to acknowledge the overall context that gives them access to this data in the first place (Cervino et al., 2003: 236). One thinks here of the case of Peru, whose US grant funding for agricultural use of Landsat data increased dramatically in the 1980s when the same images were found to be useful in locating insurgent activities of Maoist ‘Shining Path’ guerrillas (Schwartz, 1996). More recently, NASA’s civilian SeaWide Field Studies (Sea-WiFS) programme was used to identify Taliban forces during the war in Afghanistan (Caracciolo, 2004). The practice of geography, in these cases as with so many others, is bound up with military logics (Smith, 1992) ; the development of Geog r aphi c a l Informa t ion Sys tems (GIS) being a much-cited recent example (Pickles, 1995; 2004; Cloud, 2001; 2002; see Beck, 2003, for a case study of GIS in the service of the ‘war on terror’).

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJGrassroots/Standpoint Trade-off

The god’s-eye view of orbital surveillance directly trades off with localized and standpoint epistemologiesMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

In all these geographical precedents , the enabling character and production of space itself tends to be assumed. This much is also true for some of the literature from Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and Science, Technology and Society (STS) concerned with missile or space technology. Both of these fields have done much to expose the contingency of technological outcomes and to denaturalize the ‘inevitability’ of technical progress (Mackenzie, 1990; Ma c k , 1990; Mort, 2002). However, the key monographs on missile and satellite programmes by Donald Mackenzie, Pamela Mack and Maggie Mort, while taking a broadly SSK or STS approach, do not for the most part apply this perspective specifically to outer space. Only Peter Redfield, writing in Social Studies of Science, conceives space as a problematic which calls into question some of the cherished tenets of contemporary social theory (Redfield, 2002). Where, for instance, does the study of outer space leave political discourses of ‘groundedness’ (Massey, 2005) or ‘grass-roots’? Or, for that matter, the repeated mantra (especially prominent in sociologies of science and histories of geography) that ‘all knowledge is local’ (see Geertz, 1983: 4)? ‘All knowledges, practices and objects may indeed be local, but a re they equal l y loc a l ? ’ asks Redfield (2002: 792). This point also has a bearing on the feminist argument, very familiar to geographers, about the situatedness of knowledge and vision. There is a vast literature in geography which critiques the notion of an Olympian view, arguing instead for a politics and an epistemology of location, positioning and (once again) groundedness. Informed b y Donna Haraway’s work, it makes the case that partiality rather than universality is the basis from which we should make rational knowledge claims (Haraway, 1991). How will this argument fare in an era when there is no point on the Earth’s surface, nor in the Earth’s atmosphere (nor even, increasingly, below the Earth’s surface) that is not subject to the gaze of satellite surveillance? This is not to question the political necessity of Haraway’s disclosure of position – nor to suggest that a view from space is anything other than situated – but to draw attention to the changing circumstances in which this tactic might be deployed, remembering too that a satellite is a great deal more Olympian than Mount Olympus. It seems that, literally and figuratively, it is this ‘god-trick’ so explicitly forbidden by Haraway that is now the primary goal of astrostrategy (Haraway, 1991: 195).

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJA2: Predictions

Yes we can—we recognize that this isn’t an exact science, but social structures of domination have substantial reproductive capacities that can be examined to draw probabilistic conclusions regarding the futureDuvall and Havercroft 8 (Raymond Duvall, PhD and Master’s from Northwestern in IR, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Jonathan Havercroft, PhD from University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.”, in Review of International Studies, vol 34, proquest, IWren)

In examining constitutive e ff ects scholars ask how structured social relations , such as systems of signification (Foucaultian discourses), and the processes of their (re-)production constitute what a referent object is as a social kind. To engage in constitutive analysis, then, is to investigate the social determination of the ontology of a being or form. 21 Our concern, however, is with not-yet-realised social beings and social forms of the future. How does one analyse the social constitution of that which does not yet exist? The answer, we maintain, lies in examination of the structural logics of social production. Structured social relations entail (often very powerful) reproductive logics, the constitutive implications of which can be discerned even prior to their e ff ectuation. Those constitutive implications are structural potentialities and tendencies – likelihoods – not determinant products, of course. But to the extent that operative reproductive logics of generative structures are strong, future constitutive e ff ects can be identified with some degree of confidence . This is precisely the character of Marx’s analysis of capital, as well as Wendt’s argument about teleology and the inevitability of a world state and Herz’s argument about the loss of the state’s ‘hard shell’. 22

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJA2: Chinese ASAT Test

This argument proves the criticism—China is exploiting asymmetric resistance at the periphery of the empire of the future, not seeking space dominance—the aff’s discourse only solidifies domination by framing it as such

Duvall and Havercroft 8 (Raymond Duvall, PhD and Master’s from Northwestern in IR, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Jonathan Havercroft, PhD from University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.”, in Review of International Studies, vol 34, proquest, IWren)

Given these grim prospects for a deterritorialised global rule, 69 what are the possibilities for resistance? Historically, every advance in the weaponry of imperial powers has been met with an advance in counter-hegemonic strategy. Most recently, insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq have been able to counter the technological superiority of US forces with very simple yet effective Improvised Explosive Devices. In these instances, those subjugated by the technologies and scientific knowledge linked to emerging weapons systems have reappropriated these weapons systems to resist their imperial overlords. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that space weaponry could be countered through a variety of asymmetrical tactics such as: disabling space weapons while in orbit through kinetic energy, or even nuclear anti-satellite attacks; destroying the facilities where space weapons are produced or launched, or the research and development centres (such as universities) that are integral to the production of these systems; organising strikes for the workers involved in harvesting the necessary raw materials; and refusing to pay taxes to the political apparatuses that control these systems. While it is difficult to imagine what precise forms resistance to space weapons might take, it is not unreasonable to conclude that even in a context of space-based empire, some form of political and military resistance will be possible, and will occur. Indeed, China’s recent launch of an Anti-Satellite system is an example of a state actor at the boundaries of imperial order engaging in such a reappropriation of a weapons technology. One of the reasons Chinese military strategists have given for developing Anti-Satellite technology is that this technology exposes an asymmetrical vulnerability in the US military structure. The US military is already dependent on satellite systems to co-ordinate its communications and weapons targeting systems. By developing a technology that can disable US communications and targeting satellites, the Chinese military would hope to disrupt the operational abilities of conventional US forces should an actual shooting war between the two powers take place. 70 The development gives us some idea of how state and non-state actors at the margins of an empire of the future might resist space power by reappropriating its technologies. Sovereignty as strategy Yet, even as China’s ASAT test points to one possible way of resisting the empire of the future it also points to one way in which this empire is currently being constituted. Within US strategic planning circles China’s ASAT test has been used as an impetus to increase funding to American space weapons research and development initiatives. This reaction by the US defence policy establishment is indicative of the strategic logic at work in the empire of the future. This strategic logic accelerates processes of deterritorialisation by pursuing the development of technologies that make the control of territory irrelevant; yet the logic simultaneously pursues the reterritorialisation of the US and orbital space as areas that should be o ff -limits to non- American actors. We are explicitly drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation here. 71 In their writings deterritorialisation refers to ‘the movement by which ‘‘one’’ leaves the territory’. Reterritorialisation is the process that accompanies deterritorialisation, whereby the sovereign state apparatus recombines the deterritorialised elements to constitute a new assemblage. This is precisely the logic of the singular control by the US of weapons in Earth’s orbital space.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJDiscourse Shapes Politics

Popular discourse on outer space is informs and comprises contemporary geostrategy—critical geopolitics is key to examining thisSage 8 (Daniel Sage, PhD in Space, Place and Politics, Research Associate at Loughborough University, “Framing Space: A Popular Geopolitics of American Manifest Destiny in Outer Space”, in Geopolitics, Vol 13 Issue 1, TandF Online, IWren)

In working towards this conceptual objective, this paper draws upon the ‘critical geopolitics problematic’ epitomised by the work of Gearoid O Tuathail, enabling an approach to the American sublime as a “problematic of writing the global”, 6 that is implicated in the way global space is produced, disseminated and contested. 7 The critical geopolitics literature provides a breadth of methodological cases that problematise cultural articulations of the geography of global space, as well as those of foreign policy practitioners or formal geopolitical texts. 8 Joanne Sharp's work on ‘popular geopolitics’ has been particularly important in regard to the former. Sharp 9 draws attention to the way popular geographical imaginations, articulated through popular culture, are mobilised by political actors to inscribe and simplify often complex relations between nations, cultures, identities, places and ideologies. Outer space is not exempt from these tactics and strategies.

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Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJA2: Realism

There’s no realism in the world of the aff—the potential for power in empire of the future transcends contemporary state-centric narratives of international relationsDuvall and Havercroft 8 (Raymond Duvall, PhD and Master’s from Northwestern in IR, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Jonathan Havercroft, PhD from University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.”, in Review of International Studies, vol 34, proquest, IWren)

The strategy of the empire of the future undermines the binary logic of a states-system predicated either on territorially bounded sovereign states or a globally diffused, decentralised and deterritorialised biopolitical Empire as proposed by Hardt and Negri. Our analysis reveals a third possibility: in the empire of the future space power combines a set of otherwise heterogeneous processes. Space based missile defence strips all states – except the possessor of the system – of their hard shells by eroding nuclear deterrence capabilities, while providing the possessor of missile defence with a territory more secure from nuclear attack. Space control denies all states with the exception of the controlling power unfettered access to space. Furthermore it annexes orbital space as a territory of the space power. Finally, force application from orbital space makes any point on earth a potential target for the military force of empire of the future. This makes the traditional imperial imperative to project force through controlling territory no longer necessary. Empire of the future combines strategies of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation to simultaneously undermine some features of state sovereignty and reinforce others . Therefore the current assumption that many IR theorists make that international society must be based on either a collection of sovereign territorial states or deterritorialised biopolitical apparatuses ignores the possibility that these two processes can be co-constitutive. In the empire of the future the locus of authority is centralised but this authority governs a deterritorialised political entity. While this new constellation of political power will present new possibilities for resistance, we should not underestimate how this empire’s new modes of killing will constitute structures of domination potentially more terrifying than anything humanity has yet encountered.

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Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJFramework

Our public deliberation about political solutions to neoliberalism is key to reclaim politics from the right.Giroux 8 (Henry A. Giroux 2008 Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630802343432)

Opposing neoliberalism, in part, suggests exposing the myths and conditions that sustain the shape of late modern politics as an economic, social, and pedagogical project. This means addressing neoliberalism as both a mode of rationality and as a unique intersection of governmentality and sovereignty that shapes every aspect of life. Engaging neoliberalism as a mode of governmentality that produces consent for its practices in a variety of sites requires that educators and others develop modes of pedagogical and political interventions that situate human beings as critically engaged social agents capable of addressing the meaning, character, fate, and crisis of democracy. Against a biopolitics of neoliberalism and its anti-democratic tendencies, educators, artists, intellectuals, and others might consider selectively reclaiming John Dewey’s (1916/1966) notion of democracy as an ethical ideal and engaged practice informed by an active public open to debate, dialogue, and deliberation.17 Dewey rejected any attempt to equate democracy and freedom with a market society, and he denounced ritualistic definitions of democracy that he felt reduced it to the periodic rituals of elections, conceding meaningful actions to formal political institutions. According to Dewey (1927), democracy was a ‘way of life’ that demanded work, a special kind of investment, desire, and willingness to fight those antidemocratic forces that produced what he called the ‘eclipse of the public’. Dewey believed that democracy demanded particular competencies, modes of understanding, and skills that enabled individuals both to defend certain institutions as vital public spheres and to equate public freedom with the capacity for debate and deliberation and a notion of politics that rejects any commitment to absolutes. If democracy was to survive, Dewey argued that it had to be nourished by pedagogical practices that enabled young people and others to give it the kind of active and constant attention that makes it an ongoing, neverending process of replenishment and struggle. Hannah Arendt builds upon Dewey’s concerns about what it means not only to rethink the meaning of democracy in dark times, but also to put into place those pedagogical conditions that enable people to speak from a position of critical agency and to challenge modes of authority that speak directly to them. While Arendt did not provide a theory of pedagogy, she argued passionately about connecting any viable notion of democracy with an educated public. For her, neither democracy nor the institutions that nourished it could flourish in the absence of individuals who could think critically, exercise judgment, engage in spirited debate, and create those public spaces that constitute ‘the very essence of political life’ (Arendt, 1977, p. 241). Arendt recognized that any viable democratic politics must offer an informed and collective challenge to modes of totalitarian violence legitimated through appeals to safety, fear, and the threat of terrorism. She writes: Terror becomes total when it becomes independent of all opposition; it rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way. If lawfulness is the essence of non-tyrannical government and lawlessness is the essence of tyranny, then terror is the essence of totalitarian domination. (Arendt, 1976, p. 162) If, as both Arendt and Dewey argued, human beings become superfluous in societies that eliminate the conditions for debate and critical engagement, it is all the more important to once again rethink the relationship between democracy and politics in an age that relegates ethics along with the social state to the dustbin of history. Arendt believed that persuasion, reflective judgment, and debate were essential to politics, while Dewey viewed it as a fragile enterprise that could only be kept alive as an ongoing struggle to preserve a democratic ethos.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJThe reach and extent of biopower can be controlled at the state, does not lead to radical impacts if kept in checkDickinson 4 (Edward Ross Dickinison,Cambridge Journals, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’” http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FCCC%2FCCC37_01%2FS0008938900002776a.pdf&code=76697c5627d61132ead73b8e039e5e6c)

In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the volkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass "eugenic" abortion and murder of the "defective." Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

Engaging policy is critical—failure to spark debates in the middle ground reduce the quality of our arguments by producing insular dogmaMcClean 2001 (David McClean, New School University, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm)

Our new president, possessing no towering intellect, talks of a people who share a continent, but are not a nation. He is right, of course. We are only beginning to learn to put tribal loyalties aside and to let ourselves take seriously other more salutary possibilities, though we delude ourselves into believing that we have made great progress. Perhaps so-called "compassionate conservatism," though a gimmick to win a political contest, will bear a small harvest of unintended and positive consequences, although I remain dubious about this if the task of thinking through what it might actually mean remains the chore of George W. Bush. But if the not-too-Neanderthal-Right is finally willing to meet the not-too-wacky-Left at a place of dialogue somewhere in the "middle," then that is good news, provided the Left does not miss the opportunity to rendevous. Yet, there is a problem here. Both the Cultural Left and the Cultural Right tend to be self-righteous purists. The best chance, then, is for the emergence of Rorty's new Political Left, in conjunction with a new Political Right. The new Political Left would be in the better position of the two to frame the discourse since it probably has the better intellectual hardware (it tends to be more open-minded and less dogmatic) to make a true dialogue work. They, unlike their Cultural Left peers, might find it more useful to be a little less inimical and a little more sympathetic to what the other side might, in good faith, believe is at stake. They might leave behind some of the baggage of the Cultural Left's endless ruminations (Dewey's philosophical cud chewing) about commodity fetishization, or whether the Subject has really died, or where crack babies fit into neo-capitalist hegemonies, and join the political fray by parsing and exposing the more basic idiotic claims and dogmas of witless politicians and dangerous ideologues, while at the same time finding common ground, a larger "We" perspective that includes Ronald Reagan and Angela Davis under the same tent rather than as inhabitants of separate worlds. The operative spirit should be that of fraternal disagreement, rather than self-righteous cold shoulders. Yet I am not at all convinced that anything I have described is about to happen, though this essay is written to help force the issue, if only a little bit. I am convinced that the modern Cultural Left is far from ready to actually run the risks that come with being taken seriously and held accountable for actual policy-relevant prescriptions. Why should it? It is a hell of a lot more fun and a lot more safe pondering the intricacies of high theory, patching together the world a priori (which means without any real consideration of those officers and bureaucrats I mentioned who are actually on the front lines of policy formation and regulation). However the risk in this apriorism is that both the conclusions and the criticisms will miss the mark, regardless of how great the minds that are engaged. Intellectual rigor and complexity do not make silly ideas politically salient, or less pernicious , to paraphrase Rorty. This is not to say that air-headed jingoism and conservative rants about republican virtue aren't equally silly and pernicious. But it seems to me that the new public philosopher of the Political Left will want to pick better yardsticks with which to measure herself. Is it really possible to philosophize by holding Foucault in one hand and the Code of Federal Regulation or the Congressional Record in the other? Given that whatever it has meant to be a philosopher has been under siege at various levels, I see no reason why referring to the way things are actually done in the actual world (I

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJmean really done, not done as we might imagine) as we think through issues of public morality and social issues of justice shouldn't be considered a viable alternative to the way philosophy has proceeded in the past. Instead of replacing epistemology with hermeneutics or God knows what else as the foundation of philosophical practice, we should move social philosophers in the direction of becoming more like social and cultural auditors rather than further in the direction of mere culture critics. We might be able to recast philosophers who take-up questions of social justice in a serious way as the ones in society able to traverse not only disciplines but the distances between the towers of the academy and the bastions of bureaucracies seeking to honestly and sometimes dishonestly assess both their failings and achievements. This we can do with a special advantage over economists, social scientists and policy specialists who are apt to take the narrow view of most issues. We do have examples of such persons. John Dewey and Karl Popper come to mind as but two examples, but in neither case was there enough grasp of the actual workings of social institutions that I believe will be called for in order to properly minister to a nation in need of helpful philosophical insights in policy formation. Or it may just be that the real work will be performed by philosophically grounded and socially engaged practitioners rather than academics. People like George Soros come to mind here.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJAlt Fails

Because power is spread between people so thinly, we must resist democratically in large numbersPickett 5 [Brent Pickett Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College 2005, On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 2-3]

This argument is clearly in tension with some of Foucault's own proposals. Indeed, the notion of a transparent society marked by a Rousseauian general will is a Foucaultian nightmare. Democracy itself is based upon the diffusion of disciplines. Yet a carefully formulated "communitarianism" need not lead to postmodern anguish.3 There are several immediate reasons for this. First, the proposals suggested by Foucault, Connolly, Hooke, and others, such as a new form of rights or an aesthetic approach to ethics, cannot be implemented without a large measure of collective, democratic support. This is because of the nature of 'capillary' power as described by Foucault. In his view, power is so ubiquitous, insidious, and flexible that it is implausible to suggest that individuals acting alone could successfully combat it. Furthermore, this collective support cannot be gained without moral argumentation and appeals to shared values. An exclusive use of genealogical investigations and deconstructions of others' moral views is not sufficient. The conception of democracy and collective action endorsed here does not emphasize a postmodernist agonism or contestation, though such heated debate often proves salutary. Instead, moral debate which seeks consensus and which in turn motivates group action is seen as a better ideal. Still, collective action and democratic institutions can and should embody practices and goals that Foucault himself would support.

The kritik destroys agency—their understanding of foucault’s work as a terminal screen on analysis forecloses the possibility of counterhegemonic resistance.White 92 (Lucie E. White, 1992 B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D. Harvard Law School, Cornell Law Review, “SYMPOSIUM: SEEKING ‘. . . THE FACES OF OTHERNESS . . .’: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS SARAT, FELSTINER, AND CAHN”, Nexis)

Yet with the power of this new lens comes a risk. With such an instrument in our hands, it is easy to forget the lesson that Professor Geertz taught. Any "terminal screen" gives us only a partial view of the world: it enhances some features of reality -- probably those that [*1505]   its inventors most wanted to see -- while erasing or obscuring others. The risk for those who use Foucault's lens is that they will forget this lesson, and begin to think of their own meta-theory as the last word on how power "really" works -- the terminal screen. Foucault's lens reveals such a longed-for landscape of possibility that it has begun to entrap our imagination, deluding us into thinking that with this lens we have finally seized the power to comprehend the world. One consequence inevitably follows when we forget that our latest theories are not absolute. This is the risk that, in our own certainty, we will lose patience with those who do not share our faith. As Professor Delgado points out, such intolerance often reveals itself only after time renders our certainties obsolete, and thereby ridiculous.

Only the aff can solve the most pernicious manifestation of their impact—the alternative is unable to resist neoliberal violence.Giroux 8 (Henry A. Giroux 2008 Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630802343432)

While there is little question that since the new millennium, the United States has moved into lockdown (and lockout) mode both at home and abroad with its burgeoning police state, its infamous title as the world leader in jailing its own citizens, and its history of foreign and domestic ‘torture factories’ (Davis, 2005, p. 50)1 it is a mistake to assume that the Bush administration is

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJsolely responsible for transforming the United States to the degree that it has now become unrecognizable to itself as a democratic nation. Such claims risk reducing the serious social ills now plaguing the United States to the reactionary policies of the Bush regime a move which allows for complacency to set in as Bush’s reign comes to a close on January 20, 2009. The complacency caused by the sense of immanent regime change fails to offer a truly political response to the current crisis because it ignores the extent to which Bush’s policies merely recapitulate Clinton era social and economic policy. What the United States has become in the last decade suggests less of a rupture than an intensification of a number of already existing political, economic, and social forces that have unleashed the repressive anti-democratic tendencies lurking beneath the damaged heritage of democratic ideals.What marks the present state of American ‘democracy’ is the uniquely bipolar nature of the degenerative assault on the body politic, which combines elements of unprecedented greed and fanatical capitalism, called by some the New Gilded Age (McHugh, 2006; Greider, 2006; Davis & Monk, 2007; Krugman, 2007a; Uchitelle, 2007; Dreier, 2007; Trachtenberg, 2007), with a kind of politics more ruthless and savage in its willingness to abandon even vilify those individuals and groups now rendered disposable within ‘new geographies of exclusion and landscapes of wealth’ that mark the new world order (Davis & Monk, 2007, p. ix). Neoliberalism and the return of the Gilded Age. The first Gilded Age, occurring at the end of the nineteenth century, serves as both a historical landmark and a point of departure in American history. As a historical landmark, it marks the rise of the robber barons, the merging of various backlash, nativist, and right-wing populist movements, legally sanctioned segregationism, a celebration of free-market economics, evangelical revivals, law-and-order moralism, limited government, violent labor conflicts, massive inequality, and the rise of a daunting nationalist capitalist class (Josephson, 2001[1934]).2 As an all-embracing rationality, it made visible an economic, political, and cultural model that presented a powerful political challenge for various progressive struggles, which in turn needed to contest the official ideology, values, institutions, social relations that violently ordered American society around the discourses of racism, greed, unencumbered individualism, self-interest, and a rationality that recast all aspects of political, cultural, and social life in terms of the calculating logic of the market. Inherently anti-democratic, steeped in glamour and violence, the Gilded Age eventually gave way to progressive movements committed to the strengthening of the social state and a renewed sense of social citizenship under the New Deal, initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which demonstrated both a conception of democracy extended primarily to its white citizenry that served as a corrective to the immediacy of the Great Depression of the 1930s and a political refusal to reproduce the corruption of turn-of-the century politics ‘with its minimal taxation, absence of regulation and reliance on faith-based charity rather than government social programs’ (Krugman, 2007a). 588 H.A. Giroux Downloaded By: [CDL Journals Account] At: 08:24 2 July 2009 The Gilded Age offers us today a historical snapshot of the worst underpinnings of an unchecked and unregulated capitalism, state-sanctioned racial repression, and modes of subjectivity, ideology, and politics that undermine any vestige of moral and political values that could sustain the public good and nourish a flourishing democracy. With the emergence of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the rise of powerful labor unions, the establishment of the welfare state, and the redistribution of income and jobs, the worse excesses of the Gilded Age seemed to be under control, especially between the 1930s and the 1970s. Unfortunately, in the last few decades, the reformist legacy of the New Deal and its ideological successor, the Great Society, initiated by President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s, has been removed from both the rhetoric of politics and the very meaning of governance. At the dawn of the new millennium, the Gilded Age with its updated neoliberal ‘‘‘dreamworlds’’ of consumption, property, and power’ has returned with a vengeance (Davis & Monk, 2007, p. ix). The new exorbitantly rich along with conservative ideologues such as Rush Limbaugh and Marvin Olasky now publicly preach and celebrate the gospel of wealth associated with that period in nineteenth-century American history when corporations ruled political, economic, and social life and a divinely ordained entrepreneurial spirit brought great riches and prosperity to the rest of the country.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJPerm

Space technology isn’t intrinsically domineering—it can be used in reflexive or liberatory critical studiesMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

Lastly, a critical geography must not be overly pessimistic, nor must it relinquish an engagement with space technology on the grounds that this has, to date, been driven largely by military agendas. The means of our critique may require us to adopt such technologies , or at least to ask what opportunities they present for praxis. One thinks here of various forms of playful and subversive activism, experiment and art-event that have knowingly toyed with space hardware (Triscott and la Frenais, 2005; Spacearts, 2006). GPS receivers can help us think reflexively about position (Parks, 2001); remote sensing can be used to explore political conditions in the world (Parks and Biemann, 2003); amateur radio-telescopy can help us reconceptualize space by attuning us to the sonorous qualities of its scientific ‘data’ (Radioqualia, 2003); even rocket science can still carry utopian freight (Chalcraft, 2006). Through such means, can space be given a truly human geography

Only the permutation can solve their impacts—foucaultian analysis must be combined with conventional understandings of power in order to galvinize real change.White 92 (Lucie E White B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D. Harvard Law School, Cornell Law Review, “SYMPOSIUM: SEEKING ‘. . . THE FACES OF OTHERNESS . . .’: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS SARAT, FELSTINER, AND CAHN”, Nexis)

While the Foucaultian lens reveals the fluidity of power, it does not show how power can become congealed in social institutions in ways that sustain domination. It may be true that everyday interactions create and maintain social institutions, but this insight does not enable us to map those interactions against the institutional matrices they create. Nor does this insight show us how institutions constrain the circulation of power, channeling it to flow toward some social groups and away from others. In short, the Foucaultian lens does not move us toward a theoretics and a reconstructive politics of institutional design. Without richer meta-theories -- stronger lenses -- that focus on institutional as well as interpersonal realities, we will remain bewildered by exactly how our actions reiterate what has been called "structural" or "institutional" subordination. n30 We will remain unable to critique and repattern our actions, so that we enact more democratic institutions as we seek to live more ethical lives. These other lenses need not replace Foucault's; rather, they can provide a second filter on the same landscape, enabling us to study the geology  [*1506]  of the ocean floor as well as the action of the waves. Without these other lenses, the dynamics of systemic injustice -- dynamics that stunt the life-chances of some social groups with more than random frequency -- will remain invisible and therefore go unchallenged. In divorce lawyering, Professors Felstiner and Sarat have studied an area in which systemic patterns of race and class privilege do not always figure in obvious ways. Therefore, in that setting it may be, as they suggest, that their theoretical framework does pick up much of what is interesting to see. However, we cannot tell what different lenses might show us until we try them out. The work of Martha Fineman, n31 for instance, suggests that theories about gender and motherhood, as well as a Foucaultian theory of power, might help us make sense of Felstiner and Sarat's story of the unsupported wife. n32 And in areas of legal practice where hierarchies of race and class routinely figure, such as criminal law or social welfare law, the risk that a Foucaultian lens will unduly limit our vision is great . In those domains of practice, recurring patterns of domination will go uncharted unless lawyer-client interactions are studied through a lens that explicitly theorizes race and class. n33 Getting stuck inside the Foucaultian worldview carries a second risk as well. In addition to stunting our ability to rethink institutions in emancipatory ways, this lens

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJobscures our human capacity -- or, more accurately, our longing -- to realize ourselves in the world by feeling with other people, as well as by winning against them. Foucault's lens defines and thereby reveals human interactions as strategic contests. Our personhood takes form in those moments when the contest shifts power our way. This lens does not pick up those moments when we feel the force of another's emotions or the resolve behind her commitments. If such moments appear at all, they look like surges of the other's power rather than images of the other's face.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJPerm Solves – Only through realizing the flaws and then changing and acting within politics can we hope to solveOjakangas ‘5 ( Mika OjakangasHelsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland, “ Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault”, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/856/874)

To the extent that it is the law that defines all juridico‐factual conditions, the status of the law in the messianic life becomes obvious. Also, the law, when rendered inoperative, becomes a “locus of pure praxis.”108 One should not live according to the maxims of law, but rather use them. In the messianic life the law becomes, in other words, a mere instrument, a neutral object of pragmatic considerations. The law operates more and more as a norm, as a means of planning, as a tactics.109 What is revolutionary in all this? Where is the revolutionary moment of the messianic life in which the self is relativized, the law neutralized and politics becomes pragmatics? It is precisely here, in these operations. The messianic revolution is nothing but the original impetus of secularization – to the extent that secularization is understood both as the process in which the law and politics descend from the isolated sacred sphere to the common sphere of the profane and as the process in which the biblical message is made accessible for its free usage in the sphere of the profane. Doubtless, the sacred and the profane are thereby entered into a zone of irreducible indistinction, but the result of this process is not Nazi‐Germany and Auschwitz, as Agamben would claim (the Third Reich was a reaction against secularization), but, rather, bio‐politics in the Foucauldian sense, that is, the care of all life. It is only because of the process of secularization – the neutralization of the law and the pragmatization of politics, on the one hand, and the free usage of the biblical message, on the other – that the shepherd’s original care of his flock for the sake of the hereafter turns out to be the care of life of individuals for In fact, the neutralization of the law was, also according to Agamben, Paul’s original task when he tried to bypass this cursed – and I would like to add sacred – wall that separates nations: “In what way is it possible to neutralize, from the messianic perspective, the partitions imposed by the law?” the sake of their mundane health and happiness. This is not so, however, only because the Judeo‐Christian tradition of pastoral care is included in the messianic revolution of neutralization and pragmatization, but also because the law and politics are neutralized and pragmatized precisely by means of love and care. For it is, after all, love and care (agape) by means of which the law is inactivated in the first place: “Love [agape] is the fulfilment [pleroma] of the law” (Romans 13:10).

Perm Solves—Self reflection inside politics keyWhite ‘92 (, Lucie E. White 1992 B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D. Harvard Law School, Cornell Law Review, “SYMPOSIUM: SEEKING ‘. . . THE FACES OF OTHERNESS . . .’: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS SARAT, FELSTINER, AND CAHN”, Nexis)

This new meta-theory of power is especially important to progressive law teachers, scholars, and advocates for at least two reasons. First, this lens is bringing forth a new body of situated micro-descriptions of lawyering practice. For the first time, these descriptions give us a substantial base of data that we may use to reflect on our work. This new data enables us to see exactly how and when we deploy power within the routines of our own lawyering. With this new insight into what we do, we can begin to ask why we do it and how we might change. We can begin to envision different habits --  [*1503]  different ways of talking and paying attention -- that may make our deployments of power less disruptive of our clients' efforts to empower themselves. This kind of reflective reconstruction of our day-to-day lawyering routines can make our practice, as progressive lawyers, more consistent with our aspirations of greater social justice. n20 Thus, the descriptive project undertaken by Felstiner and Sarat makes possible a new field of critical reflection on advocacy and pedagogy n21 -- a "theoretics" of practice -- the potential of which we are just beginning to explore.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJAT: Root Cause of War

Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of expertsCashman 2k

Greg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9 Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJ

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJDolman Indicts

Dolman’s a hack—even if he can research well, his conclusions are flawed and his supporters are neoconsMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no longer remote from our everyday lives; it is already profoundly implicated in the ordinary workings of economy and society. Second, the import of space to civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earth’s orbit. One cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in terms of establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for terrestrial geopolitics. It is in this context that I want to briefly introduce the emerging field of astropolitics, defined as ‘the study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military policy and strategy’ (Dolman, 2002: 15). It is, in both theory and practice, a geopolitics of outer space. Everett Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar to critical geographers, like the modestly titled Small Wars and Ins urgencies. As what follows is uniformly critical of Dolman’s work, I should say that his Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman, 2002) is unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of research and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration and space policy, and presents a lucid and accessible introduction to thinking strategically about space. (In the previous section I drew heavily on Dolman’s description of the astropolitical environment.) My critique is not founded on scientific or technical grounds but on Dolman’s construction of a formal geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military conquest of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among neoconservative colleagues in Washington think-tanks, critical engagements (eg, Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground.

Dolman is jingoistic, myopic, and borderline racist—here’s a summary of his justifications for AstropolitikMacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master’s from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography”, in Progress in Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)

To his credit, Dolman does give some attention to the divisive social consequences of this concentrated power. Drawing on earlier currents of environmental determinism and on the terrestrial model of Antarctic exploration, he ponders the characteristics of those who will be first to colonize space. They will be ‘highly educated, rigorously trained and psychologically screened for mental toughness and decision-making skills, and very physically fi t’; ‘the best and brightest of our pilots, technicians and scientists’; ‘rational, given to scientific analysis and explanation, and obsessed with their professions’ (p. 26). In other words, ‘they are a superior subset of the larger group from which they spring’ (p. 27). As if this picture is not vivid enough, Dolman goes on to say that colonizers of space ‘will be the most capably endowed (or at least the most ruthlessly suitable, as the populating of America and Australia … so aptly illustrate[s])’ (p. 27; my emphasis). ‘Duty and sacrifice will be the highest moral ideals’ (p. 27). Society, he continues, must be prepared ‘to make heroes’ of those who undertake the risk of exploration (p. 146). At the same time, ‘the astropolitical society must be prepared to forego expenditures on social programs … to channel funds into the national space program. It must be embued with the national spirit’ (p. 146). Dolman slips from presenting what would be merely a ‘logical’ outworking of Astropolitik to advocating that the United States adopt it as their space strategy. Along the way, he acknowledges the full anti-democratic potential of such concentrated power, detaching the state from its citizenry: the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and the attitudes and reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do little to challenge it. So powerful is the United States that should it accept the harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services appear to be proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be little if any opposition to a fait accompli of total US domination in space. (Dolman, 2002: 156) Although Dolman claims that ‘no attempt will be made to create a convincing argument that the United States has a right to domination in space’, in almost the next sentence he goes on to argue ‘that, in this case, might does make right’, ‘the persuasiveness of the case’ being ‘based on the self-interest of the state and stability of the system’ (2002: 156; my emphasis). Truly, this is Astropolitik: a veneration of the ineluctable logic of power and the permanent rightness of those who wield it. If it sounds chillingly familiar, Dolman hopes to reassure

***MISC.

Michigan Debate Institute BBRFJus with his belief that ‘the US form of liberal democracy … is admirable and socially encompassing’ (p. 156) and it is ‘the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world’ (p. 158). His sunny view that the United States is ‘willing to extend legal and political equality to all’ sits awkwardly with the current suspension of the rule of law in Guantanamo Bay as well as in various other ‘spaces of exception’ (see Gregory, 2004; Agamben, 2005).