Applying the HIPPORecommendations to Mali:Toward Strategic, Prioritized,and Sequenced Mandates

MAY 2016

Introduction

In light of the challenges faced by the UN’s Multidimensional IntegratedStabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the expected renewal of itsmandate, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, andSecurity Council Report co-organized a workshop on April 21, 2016, to givemember states and UN actors the opportunity to develop a sharedunderstanding of the situation faced by the UN in Mali. Based on this sharedunderstanding, the objective was to advance toward a common strategicassessment to use as the basis for enhancing political strategies and missiondesign and crafting a strategic, prioritized, and sequenced mandate forMINUSMA. This workshop was the first in a series analyzing how UN policiesand the June 2015 recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel onPeace Operations (HIPPO) can be applied to country-specific contexts. The first session focused on political strategy, aiming to develop (i) a sharedunderstanding of the current context in which MINUSMA is operating, howthe situation in Mali has evolved so far, and how it is likely to evolve in thefuture; (ii) a shared vision of what self-sustaining peace in Mali would looklike in the future; and (iii) a shared understanding of how MINUSMA couldbest assist the people of Mali to move toward that future, based on lessonsfrom responses under its strategy and mandate to date and what new strate-gies could look like. The second session aimed to apply one of the HIPPOrecommendations—the need for prioritized and sequenced mandates—to theMalian context.

Political Strategy

The past year has seen significant progress in Mali, with the signing of a peaceagreement in June 2015 between the government of Mali, the Coordination ofMovements of Azawad (CMA), and the Platform and the ensuing decrease inviolence between the signatory parties. These achievements have allowed theUN to shift from prioritizing cease-fire monitoring to focusing its efforts onthe implementation of the peace agreement. Increased criminal and extremistactivity, however, continues to threaten to destabilize these fragile gains. Participants agreed that MINUSMA must first and foremost continue toassist with the implementation of the peace agreement. However, the politicalstrategy thus far has focused on the restoration of territorial integrity and theextension of the formal structures of the state. Now that the cease-fire hasbeen maintained with some success, MINUSMA must turn its attention toensuring that the population enjoys peace dividends and that the return of

On April 21, 2016, the InternationalPeace Institute (IPI) co-organized aworkshop with the Stimson Centerand Security Council Report toassess the challenges faced by theUN in Mali. This event is part of aseries of workshops bringingtogether member states and UNactors to analyze how UN policiesand the June 2015 recommendationsof the High-Level Independent Panelon Peace Operations (HIPPO) can beapplied to country-specific contexts.

This meeting note was draftedcollaboratively by IPI, the StimsonCenter, and Security Council Report.It reflects the rapporteurs’ interpreta-tion of the discussions and does notnecessarily represent the views of allother participants.

IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for PeaceOperations conducts wide-rangingresearch and policy facilitation onprevention and mediation, peace -keeping, and peacebuilding, aimed atinforming and assisting a broadrange of policymakers and civilsociety on emerging securitychallenges and multilateral responsecapacities.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to themany donors to the programs of theCenter for Peace Operations. Inparticular, IPI is grateful to theStimson Center for funding thisevent.

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state authority provides for the delivery of publicgoods and services throughout the Malianterritory. It must ensure that its security-focusedactivities are tied to this political goal. Participants suggested that, to reflect this shift incontext, the mission’s political strategy shouldaddress the following issues:• Inclusiveness: The majority of the population ofMali that did not take up arms was excludedfrom the peace negotiations in Algiers.MINUSMA should pursue a more inclusiveapproach to implementing the peace agreementby considering the perspectives of youth, women,and civil society actors, addressing the injusticesof war in the north, and building strongerpartnerships with development actors.Moreover, MINUSMA should address thequestion of representation of armed groups,which has become increasingly problematic inthe implementation phase, notably in the peaceagreement’s Monitoring Committee (Comité desuivi de l’accord). The mission should do its bestto ensure that all constituencies feel a sense ofownership of the peace process and feel that theyare represented by the state, including byemphasizing their inclusion in the NationalAccord Conference (Conférence d’ententenationale) provided for by the peace agreement.The establishment of two new regions(Taoudenni and Menaka) and the implementa-tion of a new interim administration law will bekey to ensuring this sense of ownership. TheMalian government’s authority must derive fromlegitimacy in the eyes of the population, notablyfrom concrete peace dividends and a bettermarriage of politics, security, and development,not just from winning a majority of votes.

• Trust: MINUSMA should continue to use itsgood offices to help build trust between theparties to the conflict to ensure progress on theimplementation of the peace agreement. Towardthis end, MINUSMA should help expedite theappointment of the independent observersprovided for by the peace agreement to provideregular and impartial reports on its implementa-tion.

• Spoilers and asymmetric threats: It ischallenging to distinguish between proactiveprotection of civilians and counterterrorism

objectives in Mali. MINUSMA should receiveclear guidance on what its role in relation to thesetwo objectives should be. This role could includeidentifying regions vulnerable to radicalizationand engaging in prevention work, developingmechanisms to support defectors from extremistgroups, developing corrections programs toensure that individuals in prison do notradicalize, and strengthening the counter -terrorism capacity of the Malian government andthe G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,Mauritania, and Niger). A more granularunderstanding of armed groups and their links toextremist groups and organized crime is alsoneeded.

• Political-military balance: The balance betweenpolitical and security reforms in Mali has reacheda potentially destabilizing stalemate. Securityconcerns have impeded the return of stateadministrative control to much of the north, yetuntil crucial political and institutionalcomponents of the peace agreement areimplemented, armed groups are hesitant toproceed with cantonment and disarmament. Themission should try to ensure that its securityefforts, including disarmament, demobilization,and reintegration (DDR) and the reconstitutionof defense and security forces, are linked to thebroader political strategy. Despite the defenseand security sub-committee’s progress on thefollow-up to the agreement, there is at times adisconnect between the political direction andthe needs of the people. The mission’s credibilityalso risks being called into question if it is unableto protect itself and, therefore, to protectcivilians.

• Partnerships: The success of the peaceagreement depends on many factors, not all ofwhich fall within MINUSMA’s purview,including economic development, organizedcrime, border security, and development ofcounterterrorism capacity within the Maliandefense and security forces. The mission shouldidentify the comparative advantages of national,regional, and international partners inaddressing these factors and support thosepartners in whatever way is appropriate.

• Capabilities: The HIPPO drew attention to thegap between some missions’ mandates and the

resources to implement them. Such a gap isparticularly evident in Mali, where the mission isa target of violence and operates in a challengingand changing environment. There is a need toenhance contingents’ self-protection capacities,including through training and equipment fortroop- and police-contributing countries, inorder to minimize the “bunkerization” of themission, which is counterproductive to theimplementation of its mandate

• Completion strategy: The Malian government’scall for an exit strategy for 2018, the year of thenext presidential elections in Mali, can serve asan opportunity for MINUSMA to work inconjunction with the Malian government and itspeople to develop a shared understanding of thepriorities and a vision for self-sustaining peace inMali, with clear benchmarks for achieving thatvision, including what each partner should bedoing (the government, MINUSMA, regionaland international partners, etc.).

Prioritization andSequencing

Considering that all priorities listed inMINUSMA’s mandate are highly important,participants agreed that attempting to rank themaccording to importance would prove futile.Moreover, adding to MINUSMA’s mandatewithout increasing its resources and capabilitieswould only widen the gap between the expectedand the possible. It was noted that the mission’smandate should be considered as a starting pointrather than an end in itself. Participants discussed the importance of prioriti-zation and sequencing to ensure that mandates arerealistic and achievable. Both the Security Counciland the UN Secretariat have to be pragmatic aboutwhat is and is not feasible at any given time. TheUN’s default setting for liberal peace must be offsetby a realistic analysis of the context, political will,and financial means available. This will require theSecurity Council to make bold and difficultdecisions about what to exclude from mandates. Participants agreed that prioritization andsequencing should not be viewed as a contest todetermine which agendas the internationalcommunity considers most important. Instead,mandate sequencing should be approached

pragmatically, with consideration for theconditions that need to be in place for key missionobjectives to succeed at different stages of theconflict recovery process. Prioritization alsorequires understanding how different parts of themission work together to support evolving priori-ties under a coherent mission-wide strategy. Another element raised by participants was theneed to tweak the mandate and its priorities overtime, highlighting how the mandating processneeds to be more flexible to ensure that it respondsto needs on the ground. Participants alsohighlighted the importance of the Security Councilexercising its political leverage throughout thelifespan of peace operations, not only when theirmandates come up for renewal. MINUSMA’s deployment has been severelyhampered by a lack of critical operational capabili-ties and human intelligence networks. More than80 percent of MINUSMA’s military capacity isdirected toward force protection, mainly of itsfacilities, leaving a very limited capability tosupport the mission’s other objectives. In the faceof these limitations, what can the mission feasiblyachieve? Participants suggested possible achieve-ments in the following areas:• Link the peace agreement’s security andpolitical dimensions: The security and politicaldimensions of the conflict are fundamentallylinked. At this stage, unless immediate institu-tional reforms take place, the defense andsecurity aspects of the peace agreement cannot beimplemented.

• Support stabilization in the north: State institu-tions are still absent in almost half of the country.The absence of basic services heightens the risk ofradicalization and recruitment by extremistgroups in areas, like Mopti, where the securitysituation has rapidly deteriorated in the last year.Where possible, and with full respect for thehumanitarian space, MINUSMA should facilitatethe deployment of humanitarian and develop-ment partners to the north of Mali. MINUSMAshould also reexamine its approach topeacebuilding and stabilization projects in thenorth, which have so far been undertaken in apiecemeal way, and integrate them into acoherent stabilization plan.

• Prioritize DDR as part of a long-term strategy:

Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to Mali 3

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There is an urgent dilemma regarding thesequencing of DDR activities. The current DDRapproach has been ad hoc; ideally DDR should beimplemented as part of a longer-term and well-planned strategy for security sector reform (SSR).DDR should not be treated as a technical exerciseand needs to be supported by a political strategy.Immediate gains need to be made on DDR toassure parties to the conflict that their concernsare being prioritized and alleviated. As thecurrent cantonment process continues to moveforward, critical questions remain. Whichcombatants will be integrated into the Maliandefense and security forces, and which will bedisarmed and reintegrated into civilian society?Who will take charge of the vetting process forthose who are integrated into the armed forces?Is there an opportunity for some combatants toform part of a specialized counterterrorism unitwithin the defense and security forces? Willdefectors from extremist groups be included inthe DDR process? These questions must beanswered, and quickly, before DDR and SSRreforms can move forward.

• Clarify the protection of civilians mandate:MINUSMA’s current mandate links protectionof civilians to the goal of stabilizing the north.However, this region holds only 10 percent of thecountry’s population, and MINUSMA has foundit extremely challenging to protect itself andcivilians from violent extremist actors there. Themission’s protection efforts in northern Malihave mostly consisted of using good offices and

political dialogue. Moreover, these efforts havebeen greatly limited by the “bunkerization” ofmission personnel and the absence both of stateinstitutions and of civilian actors in general(particularly development and humanitarianpartners) from large parts of northern Mali.Greater clarity is needed with regard to themission’s responsibility to protect civilians andhow this links to its political strategy. In theimmediate security context, the mission mayneed to place greater emphasis on discreetpartnerships with civil society actors that havegreater capacity to engage with communities thatfeel marginalized by the political process in orderto make its protection efforts more successful.

• Come to a joint understanding of what thereturn of state authority means: Some partici-pants raised reservations to strongly linkingMINUSMA’s mandate to the return of stateauthority to the north. In the past, a similarmandate for the mission put it in a difficultsituation with respect to the political process.Now that there is an agreement in place, someparticipants emphasized the need to come to ajoint understanding of what the return of stateauthority means. It was noted that state authorityshould focus on the delivery of basic servicesrather than just on the return of security anddefense actors. In addition, questions remainover the degree of decentralization of stateinstitutions.

Agenda

Thursday, April 21, 2016

9:00–9:15 Opening Remarks Arthur Boutellis, Director, Center for Peace Operations, IPI

Keynote Speaker El Ghassim Wane, Assistant Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping Operations

9:15–11:00 Session 1: Political StrategyExperts will present a brief conflict analysis, outlining the major threats to peace and securityin Mali. Participants will then define a political strategy for the mission that responds to thethreats outlined in the conflict analysis. By defining a political strategy, participants will aim tooutline what support the mission can provide with its current capacities.

Discussion questions: What is the political strategy underlying the current MINUSMAmandate? Is that political strategy still viable, or does it need to be revised? What are theprimary obstacles to successful implementation of the peace agreement? How is MINUSMAworking with other partners in the international mediation? What mission capabilities andapproaches have proven effective at influencing the conflict? How can the UN best collaboratewith regional organizations in evaluating the political and strategic context in which themission is deployed? How can the Security Council remain engaged in supporting MINUSMA’spolitical strategy?

ChairYoussef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, IPI, and former member of the HIPPO

SpeakersWilliam J. Durch, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson CenterSamuel Gahigi, Mali Integrated Operational Team (IOT) Leader, UN Department ofPeacekeeping OperationsDianguina dit Yaya Doucouré, Chargé d’affaires, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malito the UN

11:00–11:15 Coffee Break

11:15–1:00 Session 2: Prioritization and SequencingParticipants will identify the mission’s highest priority objectives in order to advance thepolitical strategy defined in the previous session. Participants will also discuss the sequence inwhich priority objectives should be undertaken. By sequencing the objectives, participants willaim to ensure that the mission is not burdened by too many tasks at the same time.Participants will also aim to sequence objectives so that the mission is not asked to carry outcertain tasks prematurely, before the conditions for their success are in place.

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Discussion questions: On the basis of the UN strategic review, which objectives in MINUSMA’scurrent mandate should be prioritized? What obstacles have prevented the mission fromtranslating mandated tasks into action, and what conditions need to be in place for those tasksto be carried out? How could the mandate better allow the mission to adapt to changingconditions on the ground? What prioritized and achievable benchmarks could be set for themission, and how could these help prepare an exit strategy—as requested by the Maliangovernment? Could these be translated into a compact with the host government?

ChairIan Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report, and former member of the HIPPO

SpeakersAditi Gorur, Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, Stimson CenterRenata Dwan, Chief of Policy and Best Practices Section, UN Department of PeacekeepingOperations/Department of Field SupportEmmanuel Suquet, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of France to the UNBrigadier General AKM Akhtaruzzaman, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic ofBangladesh to the UN

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Ms. Olga AbilovaInternational Peace Institute

Brig. Gen. AKM AkhtaruzzamanPermanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the UN

Mr. Arthur BoutellisInternational Peace Institute

Col. Helmut BreitfussPermanent Mission of Austria to the UN

Mr. Victor CasanovaSecurity Council Report

Ms. Carmen CastiellaPermanent Mission of Spain to the UN

Col. Lutgardis ClaesPermanent Mission of Belgium to the UN

Dr. James CockayneUnited Nations University

Ms. Radha DayUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Mr. James Della-GiacomaCenter on International Cooperation

Col. Barthelemy DioufPermanent Mission of the Republic of Senegal to the UN

Mr. Dianguina dit Yaya DoucouréPermanent Mission of Mali to the UN

Dr. William J. DurchStimson Center

Dr. Renata DwanUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Mr. Samuel GahigiUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Ms. Claudia GarciaPermanent Mission of Uruguay to the UN

Mr. Martin GirardPermanent Mission of Canada to the UN

Ms. Celine GiulianiOffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

Ms. Aditi GorurStimson Center

Mr. Thierry KaiserUN Multidimensional Integrated StabilizationMission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Mr. Paul KeatingExecutive Office of the UN Secretary-General

Dr. Youssef MahmoudInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Charlélie MariePermanent Mission of France to the UN

Mr. Marco MarquezUN Department of Political Affairs

Mr. Ian MartinSecurity Council Report

Ms. Delphine MechoulanInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Naomi MiyashitaUN Department of Policy and Best PracticesService

Mr. Kevin MurrayPermanent Mission of Australia to the UN

Dr. Alexandra NovosseloffCenter on International Cooperation

Mr. Christopher O'DonnellUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Participants

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Mr. Jang-ho ParkPermanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN

Ms. Sheila ParkPermanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN

Ms. Rosfazidah RaziPermanent Mission of Malaysia to the UN

Mr. Florian ReindelPermanent Mission of Germany to the UN

Mr. Andrea RomussiPermanent Mission of Italy to the UN

Mr. Jean-François RuelUN Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs

Mr. Halvor SaetrePermanent Mission of Norway to the UN

Mr. Daniel Safran-HonExecutive Office of the UN Secretary-General

Ms. Hedda SamsonPermanent Mission of the Kingdom of theNetherlands to the UN

Ms. Sofia SebastianUnited States Institute of Peace

Mr. Jake ShermanUnited States Mission to the UN

Mr. Adam SmithUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Col. Andreas StoebePermanent Mission of Germany to the UN

Mr. Emmanuel SuquetPermanent Mission of France to the UN

Ms. Ayaka SuzukiUN Department of PeacekeepingOperations/Department of Field Support

Mr. Ruben TreurnietPermanent Mission of the Kingdom of theNetherlands to the UN

Ms. Madeline VellturoStimson Center

Mr. El Ghassim WaneUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

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