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On the Status of EqualityAuthor(s): Amartya SenSource: Political Theory, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 394-400Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191919 .
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ON THE STATUS OF EQUALITY
AMARTYAEN
HarvardUniversity
1. INTRODUCTION
The belief thatthere s a close connectionbetweenequalityand ustice is
quite common. Since justice is a quintessentiallyethical idea, thatlinkage
clearly must have some ethical status.But what is the basis of this status9
On this subject, presumptionsdiverge-explicitly or by implication-even
amongthosewhofirmlyassociateequalitywith ustice.Some see thelinkageto be mainly political;others take it to be more than that-perhaps even
logically necessary.Thisdistinction s notunimportantince politicalperspi-cuitywouldhave to becontingentonthe ideasandcommitmentsof thepeople
involved, whereaslogical necessity must be independentof that. I want todiscuss the difference between the two approaches-the political and the
logical-and toexaminebrefly therespectivedomainsof analytical elations
andpolitical contingencies n connectingequalitywithjustice.The immediateoccasionfor thisexanunations an interestingandimpor-
tantpaperbyJohnKane, nwhichhedisputes heviewthat here sanylogicalconnectionbetweenjustice andequality.'Kane is not alone to have ques-tionedthepresumed ogical link,and this makesit all themoreimportanto
addressKane'scogent reasoning. argue hatKane s partlynght,buthedoes
notgive theanalyticalrelations hedueacknowledgement hateven his ownline of reasoningwouldrequire.
However,before I proceedfurther, must commenton an ambiguity-
perhaps even an error-in Kane's interpretationof my own position in
InequalityReexamined,on this subject.2This is important o do notjust to
set the recordstraight,butalso becausethe substantivepositionI shallargue
AUTHOR'SNOTE:For helpfuldiscussionon the issues in thisarticle, I am gratefulto Sudhir
Anand,JohnRawls,and ThomasScanlon.Thanks re also due to the MacArthurFoundationfor
researchsupport.
POLITICALHEORY,ol.24No.3,August 996394-400? 1996SagePublicatons,nc.
394
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Sen/ ON THE STATUSOF EQUALITY 395
for is a developmentof whatI hadproposed n thatmonograph. n thissense,
the next section hasbotha correctiveanda constructivepurpose.Inthe latersections,I proceedto distinguishbetweentherespectivedomainsof analyti-cal relations and political contingencies,and also to comment on Kane's
substantivearguments.
2. POLITICAL LAUSIBILITYNDBASALEQUALITY
Kanenotes that thepresumption
f somenecessary
connection between
the ideas of justice andequalityis endemic as Sen andI bothbelieve.
Buthe also contends-suggesting strongly hatthere s adivergencebetween
our views here-that sucha presumptions in fact mistaken. 3 hadnot, in
fact, claimed that one mustpresume that there is a necessary connection
between usticeandequality.Rather, hadnotedthat everynormative heoryof social arrangementhathas at all stood the test of time seems to demand
equalityof something-something thatis regardedas particularlymportantin thattheory p. 12). I did tryto clarifywhatexactly I was claiming:
We may be persuadedthat the basic disputationsare likely to be about equalityof
what? ,butit mightstill be asked whether hereneedbe a demandforequality n some
importantspace or other. Even if it turnsout thatevery substantivetheoryof social
arrangementsn vogue is, in fact, egalitaran in some space-a spaceseen as central n
thattheory-there is still the needto explainanddefendthatgeneralcharactenzationn
each case. The issue to addressis not so muchwhether there mustbefor strctly
formal reason(such as thedisciplineof the anguageof morals ),equalconsideration
for all, at some level, in all ethical theories of social arrangement. I am more
concernedwith the question whetherethical theories must have this basic featureof
equalityto have substantiveplausibility n theworldInwhich we live.4
In theformalstructure hadtried odevelop,equalityof sometype-whatwas called basalequality -is sought neach suchsubstantive thicaltheoryby arguing or(orbysimply assuming) hepnmacyof somespace-incomes,utilities, libertariannghts, and so forth, in the respectiveactual ideas of
justice. The endorsementof the importanceof equalityin thatcentralspace(i.e., basalequality)thenyields the need to acceptinequality n otherspaces,since thesedifferentequalitiescouldnotbesimultaneouslyguaranteed.The
extensive diversities of humanbeings-a majortheme of my book-makesthe congruenceof equalitiesin thedifferentspaces extremelyunlikely.)For
example, those who seek equalityof incomes cannotalso demandequalityof libertarianrghts of ownership,transactions,and bequeathal-and vice
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396 POLITICALTHEORY August1996
versa. Equalityn what s seenasthe 'base' s invoked orareasoneddefence
of theresulting nequalities n thefar-flung periphenes.'5
I had notclaimedthat twould belogicallyimpossibletoconstructamoral
theory that would not demandequality in any space whatsoever,nor in
particularattachany importance o equalityin some space that is seen as
central o thatmoraltheory.But in confiningmy attention o theclass of
theoriesthat do value equalityin some space,I did emphasizethe politicalforceof having equalconcernfor all at some level -a level that s seen as
quite centralin thattheory(e.g., incomes for Income-egalitanans, iberties
for libertarians, nd so on).6Political diversities of ourbeliefs permitsome
variation n the choice of space in whichequalityis to be basally valued,buttheydo noteasily accommodate ejecting he need for equality n every
possible space. I did try to readsome significancein the fact that everynormative heoryof social arrangementhat has at all stood the test of time
seems to demand equality of something-something that is regardedas
particularlymportantn thattheory, butthereadingwas primarilypolitical
(withoutanyclaimbeingmadethatthingscould nothave beenotherwise,or
that merelogic wouldmake this testof time analytically nescapable).To seize the structureof this
argument,t is useful to note thatI was not
only acknowledgingthe practical orce of the demandsof equalityin some
chosen space that is seen as central,but also-the other side of the same
coin-the corresponding eed toaccept(and, n termsof consistency,contin-
gently require) nequality n otherspacesthatareseen as less central.There
is no necessity in all this of disputingKane's claim that justicerequiresdifferentthingsin differentcircumstances,and no a pnon judgmentsas to
equalityor inequalityof treatmentarejustifiable (p. 389). Indeed,even as
far as basalequality s concerned, heargumentmustsurelygo wellbeyond
the a priori,andwell beyondthe acceptanceof the need to seek equalityinsomespace.Substantivearguments aveto bepresentedas towhyaparticular
space rather hananothershouldbe seen as central n thatethicalcontext.7
3. ARISTOTELIANROPORTIONALITY
While the need to have substantiveargumentsgoing beyondtheform of
equalityis not a bone of contentionbetweenus, Kanedoes, in fact, offera
differently ormalizedview ofjustice, related o theAristoteliandoctrne of
proportionality.He contrasts his formalprnciple withthe ruleof equality
in some space, in outliningwhathe believes the basic conceptionof justice
to be:
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Sen / ON THESTATUSOF EQUALITY 397
The pnnclple uponwhich such rghts, penalties,or dutiesaretraditionally alculated s
the Anstotelianpnnciple of proportionality:he more one has of a certainpropertyX,
the more one deserves of whatever reatmentY is relevant o it. (p. 378)
I had, in fact,brieflydiscussedthisprnciple, in termsof particularuses, in
InequalityReexamined pp. 90-2), treating t as a type of equalityof treat-
ment. Since Kane sees equality and proportionalityas two contradictoryformalprinciples, it is worthdiscussing in what sense they are or are not
reallycontrary.In fact, a kind of formalequality,with well-defined analyticalrequire-
ments,is
implied by anyrule
ofthe
typeofthe
proportlonality rinciple: nthis case, thatdifferentpersons(no matterwho) that share thesame value of
the centralpropertyX must be seen as deservingthe same value of Y.The
basic pointhere is that the Y that is due to use Kane'sterminology)to a
personis supervenlenton his or herX, and not on who the personis (or on
anyother charactersticof thisperson).Thegeneralnatureof treatingpeople
equally in this sense was extensively discussed in InequalityReexamined,andItapplies inter alia to the proportionality rnciple as well.
Second,it so happens hat f Y andX arestrictlyproportionalasthename
of the rulesuggestsandsome versionsof the Arstotelianclaimendorse), hennotonlydoeseveryonewith the same X getanequalY,butalsoeveryone-nomatterwhatX he or she has-gets an equal amount of Y per unit of X. In
fact, however,despite the name, it is common to considermonotonlc func-
tions f(X) otherthanproportlonalitynapplying he so-calledproportlonality
princlple.This involves an additionalproblemof rescaling to characterze
the sense in which the due values of Y for respective values of X are
supposedto be determinedby theprincipleof proportionality. he ideaof
equal reatment would relateto the dueness unctionconnected withthat
scaling. I shall not pause here to elaborateon this (the relationcan be dealt
with, mathematically,n similarways to the problemof interpersonal om-
parability).8The crucial issue is the equal treatmentof people in identical
circumstances (taking, in this case, the relevant circumstance to be thevalue of X).
Thefact thattheproportlonality ule falls well withinthegeneralcategoryof egalitarian ules need notcome as agreatsurprise, ince theformalaspectsof equalitycanbe veryversatile.Thisis nottodenythat here s aninteresting
substantivequestionas to theform in whichequalitymay be mostplausiblysought.Indeed, nInequalityReexamined 91-3), theproportlonality iew of
havingone's Y in line withone's X ( equal reatment nrelatingY toX) was
contrasted, n this respect,with the rule of workingfor the same Y for all
( equaltreatment n giving everyone equalY). A substantiveexamination
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398 POLITICALTHEORY August1996
of equalityof what has to address his questionalong with the choice of
space. Butwhat is
at Issue is not whether or not to have any general re-quirementof equalityof treatment,butthe formthatequaltreatment hould
take. Any principle of the kind that Kane himself discusses thus incor-
poratesarequirement f equality, nd theonlyremaining ssue is themore
general one(towhichInequalityReexaminedwasaddressed),namely,equal-
ity'ofwhat?
4. REACHANDLIMITSOFNECESSITY
So whatdo we conclude? As a substantiveproposition,the requirementof equalityof any particular ind(of incomes,of utilities,of freedoms,etc.)
cannot,of course,bea logically necessarypartofjusticeundereverypossible
conception.Even therequirement f demandingequalityof something hat
is regardedas particularly mportant n the respective theory of justicecannotbe fully analytical.If it is indeed the case (as I have triedto claim it
is) that everynormativetheoryof social arrangementhat has at all stood
the test of time does, in fact,satisfy sucha requirement,hatcommonalitycertainlydenves largely romthepoliticalregulantles hathaveemergedover
time in the beliefs andconvictionsof people.Forthisreason,I see noreason odisagreewith Kane's mainclaim(except
withhis implicitsuggestionthatI hadargued orthecontraryview; thisI had
notdone).But there s a furtherssue,to wit, theformalrequirementshatare
imposed by any general rule of justice. Any delineationof principles-ofneeds, of deserts,of entitlements,or whatever-makes the rightoutcomes
supervenienton some specific charactenstics hata personmay possess or
acquireorreceive,andthiscames withit the entailment hatanyonewho hasthe samecharactenstics-no matterwhoheorshe is-must receive the same
consideration.That equalityof treatment s nonspecific,butit does incor-
poratea substantivedemand orequality, n a parametrcform.
This applies to all the classes of justificatoryarguments hatrequire he
use of such rules andregularntes.Kane does not say this, and indeed in his
citationof Anstotelian proportionality ules,he seems to be denyinganyconnectionof such prnciples withequaltreatmentat all. But this is largely
a matterof presentation.Consider,for
example,Kane's
argument:If a
teacherpunishesawhole class forthe misbehaviour f onepupil,or anofficer
shoots an entirevillage for an actof sabotage by one of its members,surelythe onus is on the perpetratorsf the equal treatment o say why they have
madenodistinctionsbetweentheguiltyand theinnocent p.389).Thesame
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Sen / ON THE STATUSOFEQUALITY 399
substantivequerycan be raisedby asking the offendingteacher(or police
officer)whytheprinclple hould notbe thatall misbehavers orall saboteurs)be treatedequally,rather han thatpeople with dissimilarresponsibilitiesbe
given the samepunishment.What Kanecalls theequaltreatment s notthe
only formthatequaltreatment an take.
We canstill questionwhether here s any necessityto have thesegeneralclasses ofjustificatoryargumentshat akeus toequalityof treatmentnsome
generic sense (e.g., a personshouldget this because of some characterstic
he or she has).Indeed,one can arguethatthenecessityof equality n classes
of substantivemoral theores was not in itself a necessity.I do not see much
merit in spendingeffort to resist this claim. I have no great difficulty inconceiving of a putativetheoryof justice thatremainscompletely arbitraryin its allocation,withoutany use of a principlethat involves supervenienceon some generalcharactensticsof persons(rather hansimply who is who).I will, of course,resist such a theoryof justice, but not on the groundthat
there is something of a logical mistake here. Its arbltrannesshas to be
comparedwith thereasons-plausible to us-that can be given in favour of
equal treatmentof one kind or another,and this fits into the discipline of
examininga substantive
heoryof
justicein
political philosophy.The really engaging questions about the status of equality concern
(a) the choice of the space and the form in which equalityis to be sought
( equalityof what? ),and(b) addressingconflictsbetween theclaims of any
particular ypeof equalityand otherconsiderations,ncludingothertypesof
equality( whatrelativesignificance to attach? ).The statusof equalityis asubstantiverather hana formal ssue.
NOTES
1. John Kane, Justice,Impartiality, nd Equality: Why the Conceptof Justice Does NotPresumeEquality, Political Theory24, no. 3 (1996, this issue):375-93.
2. AmartyaSen, InequalityReexamlned Oxford:ClarendonPress;New York:RussellSageFoundation;Cambrdge, MA. HarvardUniversityPress, 1992).
3. Kane, Justice, mpartiality,ndEquality, 76. He does notexplicitlyattributehis viewto me (as far as I can see) butproceedsas if I believed in a logically necessaryconnection. He
comes closest to attribution n thefollowing passage:
Sen suspects thatthe reason why so many altogetherdifferentsubstantivetheones ofsocialjusticehave thecommonfeatureof demanding qualityof something s tobe foundin a foundationalprnciple of ethicalreasornng,namely, hepnncipleof equalconcern
for all at some level. The absenceof such concern,he says, makes a theoryarbitrarilydiscnnmnating.pp. 375-6)
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400 POLITICALTHEORY August1996
But the questionto ask here surely is: whatlknd of arbitrarnesswould this be-political or
logical or both?
4. Sen, InequalityReexanuned,16-7. I had, m fact, gone on to argue: A theory may
accept-indeed demand-inequality intermsof manyvariables,but ndefending hose nequali-ties it would be hard o ducktheneed to relatethem,ultimately, oequalconsideration or all in
some adequately ubstantialway (p. 17).5. Sen, InequalityReexanuned,19.
?6.Thatargumentativeorce relatesclosely to the ideathathas been illummatingly xplored
by Thomas Scanlon of the need to have reasons hatothers could not readilyreject. Idem,
Utilitanamnsmnd Contractualism, n Utilitaranism and Beyond, ed. AmartyaSen and
BernardWilliams(Cambridge,UK. Cambrdge Umnversityress, 1982).7. Kanesimplyasserts that the castesystemm India s formally ust, and in this context
cites MichaelWalzer o the effect that ina societywhereshared ocial meaningsareintegratedandhlerarchical,justicewill come to the aidof inequality' (p. 390). Butpoliticalmovements
challenging this view have been, in fact, dominantin contemporaryIndia, and even the
constitutionof the Indian Umon (adopted on the basis of a consensus immediately after
independence)bans variouspracticesof caste-based nequalityand requires affirmativedis-
crimnations m favor of lower castesin civil serviceandeducation provisions hathave been
furtherexpanded n the last decade). The disciplineof politicalplausibility s not without its
substantivebite.
8. On this,see my CollectiveChoice and Social Welfare SanFrancisco:Holden-Day,1970;
republished,Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979),chaps.7 and 7*
ProfessorAmartyaSen is LamontUniversityProfessorandprofessorof economics and
philosophyat HarvardUniversity.